The Right Reverend Father in God

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET D.D.

late Lord Bishop of Worcester.

Obijt March 27. 1699. *Ætatis Suæ 63.*

The Right Reverend Father in God

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET D.D.

late Lord Bishop of Worcester.

Obijt March 27. 1699. *Ætatis Suæ 63.*

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR, A

Rational Account of the Grounds

OF

NATURAL and REVEAL'D

RELIGION.

THE EIGHTH EDITION.

To which is now added

Part of another BOOK upon the ſame Subject,

Written *A. D.* MDCXCVII.

Publiſh'd from the AUTHOR'S Own

MANUSCRIPT.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, D. D.

Late Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter.*

LONDON,

Printed by *J. Heptinſtall,* for HENRY and GEORGE MORTLOCK,
at the *Phœnix* in St. *Paul's* Church-yard, MDCCIX.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

To his most Honour'd FRIEND

And PATRON

Sr. ROGER BOURGOINE,

Knight and Baronet.

SIR,

IT was the early felicity of *Moses*, when expos'd in an Ark of *Nilotic papyre*, to be adopted into the favour of so great a Personage as the Daughter of *Pharaoh*: Such another Ark is this Vindication of the Writings of that Divine and Excellent Person expos'd to the World in; and the greatest ambition of the Author of it is, to have it receiv'd into your Patronage and Protection. But altho' the Contexture and Frame of this Treatise be far below the excellency and worth of the subject (as you know the Ark in which *Moses* was put, *was of bulrushes daubed with slime and pitch,*) yet when You please to cast your eye on the matter contain'd in it, you will not think it beneath your Favour, and unworthy your Protection. For if Truth be the greatest present which God could bestow, or Man receive (according to that of *Plutarch*, Ὡς ἔδὲν ἀνθρώπῳ λαβεῖν μεῖζον, ἢ χαρίζεσθαι θεῷ σεμνότερον ἀληθείας) then certainly those Truths deserve our most ready acceptance, which are in themselves of greaetst importance, and have the greatest evidence that they come from God. And altho' I have had the happiness of so near relation to You, as to know how little You need such discourses which tend to settle the Foundations of Religion, which you have rais'd so happy a Superstructure upon; yet withal I consider what particular kindness the Souls of all good Men bear to such designs, whose end is to assert and vindicate the Truth and Excellency of Religion. For those who are enrich'd themselves with the inestimable Treasure of true Goodness and Piety are far from that envious temper to think nothing valuable but what they are the sole possessors of; but such are the most satisfy'd themselves, when they see others not only

Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir.

admire but enjoy what they have the higheſt eſtimation of. Were all who make a ſhew of Religion in the World really ſuch as they pretend to be, Diſcourſes of this nature would be no more ſeaſonable, than the commendations of a great Beauty to one who is already a paſſionate admirer of it; but on the contrary we ſee how common it is for Men firſt to throw Dirt in the face of Religion, and then perſuade themſelves it is its natural Complexion; they repreſent it to themſelves in a ſhape leaſt pleaſing to them, and then bring that as a Plea why they give it no better entertainment.

It may juſtly ſeem ſtrange, that true Religion, which contains nothing in it but what is truly Noble and Generous, moſt rational and pleaſing to the Spirits of all good Men, ſhould yet ſuffer ſo much in its eſteem in the World, thro' thoſe ſtrange and uncouth vizards it is repreſented under. Some accounting the life and practice of it, as it ſpeaks ſubduing our Wills to the Will of God (which is the ſubſtance of all Religion) a thing too low and mean for their Rank and Condition in the World; while others pretend a quarrel againſt the Principles of it, as unſatisfactory to Humane Reaſon. Thus Religion ſuffers with the Author of it between two Thieves; and it is hard to define which is more injurious to it, that which queſtions the Principles, or that which deſpiſeth the Practice of it. And nothing certainly will more incline Men to believe that we live in an Age of Prodigies, than that there ſhould be any ſuch in the Chriſtian World, who ſhould account it a piece of Gentility to deſpiſe Religion, and a piece of Reaſon to be *Atheiſts*. For if there be any ſuch thing in the World as a true height and magnanimity of Spirit, if there be any ſolid Reaſon and depth of Judgment, they are not only conſiſtent with, but only attainable by a true generous Spirit of Religion. But if we look at that which the looſe and profane World is apt to account the greateſt Gallantry, we ſhall find it made up of ſuch pitiful ingredients, which any skilful and rational Mind will be aſham'd to plead for, much leſs to mention them in competition with true Goodneſs and unfeign'd Piety. For how eaſy is it to obſerve ſuch who would be accounted the moſt high and gallant Spirits, to quarry on ſuch mean preys, which only tend to ſatisfy their brutiſh appetites, or fleſh Revenge with the Blood of ſuch who have ſtood in the way of that airy title, *Honour!* Or elſe they are ſo little ap-

prehenſive

prehenſive of the inward worth and excellency of Human Nature, that they ſeem to envy the gallantry of Peacocks, and ſtrive to outvy them in the gayety of their Plumes; ſuch who are, as *Seneca* ſaith, *ad ſimilitudinem parietum extrinſecus culti*, who imitate the Walls of their Houſes in the fairneſs of the outſides, but matter not what rubbiſh there lies within. The utmoſt of their ambition is to attain *enervatam felicitatem qua permadeſcunt animi*, ſuch a felicity as evigorates the Soul by too long ſteeping, it being the nature of all terreſtrial pleaſures, that they do Ἐκτήκειν καὶ ἀνυγραίνειν τὸ φρονεῖν, by degrees *conſume Reaſon*, by *effeminating* and *ſoftening* the *Intellectuals*. Muſt we appeal then to the judgment of *Sardanapalus* concerning the nature of Felicity, or inquire of *Apicius* what Temperance is? or deſire that *Sybarite* to define Magnanimity, who fainted to ſee a Man at hard labour?

Or doth now the conqueſt of Paſſions, forgiving Injuries, doing good, Self-denial, Humility, Patience under croſſes, which are the real expreſſions of Piety, ſpeak nothing more noble and generous than a luxurious, malicious, proud, and impatient Spirit? Is there nothing more becoming and agreeable to the Soul of Man, in exemplary Piety, and a Holy well-ordered Converſation, than the lightneſs and vanity (not to ſay rudeneſs and debaucheries) of thoſe whom the World accounts the greateſt Gallants? Is there nothing more graceful and pleaſing in the ſweetneſs, candor, and ingenuity of a truly Chriſtian temper and diſpoſition, than in the revengeful, implacable Spirit of ſuch whoſe Honour lives and is fed by the Blood of their Enemies? Is it not more truly honourable and glorious to ſerve that GOD who commands the World, than to be a ſlave to thoſe paſſions and luſts which put Men upon continual hard ſervice, and torment them for it when they have done it? Were there nothing elſe to commend Religion to the Minds of Men, beſides that tranquility and calmneſs of Spirit, that ſerene and peaceable temper which follow a good Conſcience where-ever it dwells, it were enough to make Men welcome that Gueſt which brings ſuch good entertainment with it. Whereas the amazements, horrors, and anxieties of Mind, which at one time or other haunt ſuch who proſtitute their Conſciences to a violation of the Laws of GOD, and the Rules of rectify'd Reaſon, may be enough to perſuade any rational Perſon, that Impiety is the greateſt folly, and Irreligion, madneſs.

It cannot be then but matter of great pity to conſider that any Perſons, whoſe Birth and education hath rais'd them above the common People of the World, ſhould be ſo far their own enemies, as to obſerve the Faſhion more than the Rules of Religion, and to ſtudy Complements more than Themſelves, and read Romances more than the ſacred Scriptures, *which alone are able to make them wiſe unto ſalvation.*

But, SIR, I need not mention theſe things to You, unleſs it be to let you ſee the excellency of your choice, in preferring true Vertue and Piety above the Ceremony and Grandeur of the World. Go on, SIR, to value and meaſure true Religion, not by the uncertain meaſures of the World, but by the infallible dictates of GOD himſelf in his ſacred Oracles. Were it not for theſe, what certain foundation could there be for our Faith to ſtand on? and who durſt venture his Soul, as to its future condition, upon any Authority leſs than the infallible veracity of GOD himſelf? What certain directions for practice ſhould we have, what Rule to judge of Opinions by, had not God out of his infinite Goodneſs provided and preſerved this authentic Inſtrument of his Will to the World? What a ſtrange Religion would Chriſtianity ſeem, ſhould we frame the Model of it from any other thing than the Word of GOD? Without all controverſy the diſeſteem of the Scriptures upon any pretence whatſoever, is the decay of Religion, and thro' many windings and turnings leads Men at laſt into the very depth of Atheiſm. Whereas the frequent and ſerious converſing with the Mind of GOD in his Word is incomparably uſeful, not only for keeping up in us a true notion of Religion (which is eaſily miſtaken, when Men look upon the face of it in any other glaſs than that of the Scriptures) but likewiſe for maintaining a powerful ſenſe of Religion in the Soul of Men, and a due valuation of it, whatever its eſteem or entertainment be in the World. For tho' the true genuine Spirit of Chriſtianity (which is known by the purity and peaceableneſs of it) ſhould grow never ſo much out of credit with the World, yet none who heartily believe the Scripture to be the Word of God, and that the Matters reveal'd therein are infallibly true, will ever have the leſs eſtimation of it. It muſt be confeſs'd that the credit of Religion hath much ſuffer'd in the Age we live in thro' the vain pretences of many to it, who have only acted a part in it, for the ſake of ſome private intereſts of their own. And

it

it is the uſual *Logic* of *Atheiſts*, *Crimine ab uno diſce omnes*; if there be any hypocrites, all who make ſhew of Religion are ſuch; on which account *the Hypocriſy of one Age makes way for the Atheiſm of the next.* But how unreaſonable and unjuſt that Imputation is, there needs not much to diſcover, unleſs it be an argument there are no true Men in the World, becauſe there are ſo many Apes which imitate them; or that there are no Jewels, becauſe there are ſo many counterfeits. And bleſſed be God, our Age is not barren of inſtances of real goodneſs and unaffected Piety; there being ſome ſuch generous Spirits as dare love Religion without the dowry of Intereſt, and manifeſt their affection to it in the plain dreſs of the Scriptures, without the paint and ſet-offs, which are added to it by the ſeveral contending parties of the Chriſtian World. Were there more ſuch noble Spirits of Religion in our Age, *Atheiſm* would want one of the greateſt pleas which it now makes againſt the truth of Religion; for nothing enlarges more the Gulf of *Atheiſm*, than that Μέγα χάσμα, *wide paſſage* which lies between the Faith and Lives of Men pretending to be Chriſtians. I muſt needs ſay there is nothing ſeems more ſtrange and unaccountable to me, than that the practice of the unqueſtionable duties of *Chriſtianity* ſhou'd be put out of countenance, or ſlighted by any who own, profeſs, and contend for the Principles of it. Can the profeſſion of that be honourable, whoſe practice is not? *If the Principles be true, why are they not practis'd? If they be not true, why are they profeſs'd?*

You ſee, SIR, to what an unexpected length my deſire to vindicate the Honour as well as Truth of Religion, hath drawn out this preſent Addreſs. But I may ſooner hope for your pardon in it, than if I had ſpent ſo much paper after the uſual manner of Dedications, in repreſenting You to Your ſelf, or the World. SIR, I know You have too much of that I have been commending, to delight in Your own deſerv'd Praiſes, much leſs in Flatteries, which ſo benign a ſubject might eaſily make one's pen run over in. And therein I might not much have digreſs'd from my deſign, ſince I know few more exemplary for that rare mixture of true Piety, and the higheſt Civility together, in whom that ineſtimable Jewel of Religion is plac'd in a moſt ſweet, affable, and obliging temper. But

altho'

altho' none will be more ready on any occaſion with all gratitude to acknowledge the great obligations You have laid upon me; yet I am ſo far ſenſible of the common vanity of *Epiſtles Dedicatory*, that I cannot ſo heartily comply with them in any thing, as in my hearty prayers to the Almighty for your good and welfare, and in ſubſcribing my ſelf,

SIR,

Your moſt humble

and affectionate Servant,

June 5. 1662.

ED. STILLINGFLEET.

THE

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

IT is neither to satisfy the importunity of Friends, nor to prevent false Copies (which and such like excuses I know are expected in usual Prefaces) that I have adventured abroad this following Treatise: but it is out of a just resentment of the affronts and indignities which have been cast on Religion, by such who account it a matter of judgment to disbelieve the Scriptures, and a piece of wit to dispute themselves out of the possibility of being happy in another World: When yet the more acute and subtile their arguments are, the greater their strength is against themselves; it being impossible there should be so much wit and subtilty in the Souls of Men, were they not of a more excellent Nature than they imagin them to be. And how contradictious is it for such Persons to be ambitious of being cry'd up for Wit and Reason, whose design is to degrade the rational Soul so far below her self, as to make her become like the Beasts that perish! If now the weight and consequence of the subject, and the two great seasonableness of it (if the common fame of the large spread of Atheism *among us be true) be not sufficient Apology for the publishing this Book, I am resolv'd rather to undergo thy censure, than be beholding to any other. The intendment therefore of this Preface is only to give a brief account of the scope, design, and method of the following Books, altho' the view of the Contents of the Chapters might sufficiently acquaint thee with it. How for I have been either from transcribing, or a design to excuse out of the hands of their admirers, the several Writings on the behalf of Religion in general, or Christianity in particular (especially* Mornay, Grotius, Amyraldus, *&c.) may easily appear by comparing what is contain'd in their Books and this together. Had I not thought something might be said, if not not more fully and rationally, yet more suitably to the present temper of this Age, than what is already written by them, thou hadst been troubled with this Preface, much less with the whole Book. But as the Tempers and Genius's of Ages and Times alter, so do the arms and weapons which* Atheists *imploy against Religion:*

the moſt popular pretences of the Atheiſts *of our Age, have been the irreconcilableneſs of the account of Times in Scripture, with that of the learned and ancient Heathen Nations; the inconſiſtency of the belief of the Scriptures with the Principles of Reaſon; and the account which may be given of the Origin of things from Principles of Philoſophy without the Scriptures: Theſe three therefore I have particularly ſet my ſelf againſt, and directed againſt each of them a ſeveral Book. In the firſt I have manifeſted that there is no ground of credibility in the account of ancient times given by any Heathen Nations different from the Scriptures, which I have with ſo much care and diligence inquir'd into, that from thence we may hope to hear no more of Men before* Adam *to ſalve the Authority of the Scriptures by, which yet was intended only as a deſign to undermine them; but I have not thought the frivolous pretences of the Author of that* Hypotheſis *worth particular mentioning, ſuppoſing it ſufficient to give a clear account of things without particular citation of Authors, where it was not of great concernment for underſtanding the thing it ſelf. In the ſecond Book I have undertaken to give a rational account of the grounds, why we are to believe thoſe ſeveral Perſons, who in ſeveral Ages were imploy'd to reveal the Mind of* God *to the World; and with greater particularity than hath yet been us'd, I have inſiſted on the Perſons of* Moſes, *and the Prophets, our Saviour and his Apoſtles, and in every of them manifeſted the rational evidences on which they were to be believ'd, not only by the Men of their own Age, but by thoſe of ſucceeding Generations. In the third Book I have inſiſted on the matters themſelves which are either ſuppos'd by, or reveal'd in the Scriptures; and have therein not only manifeſted the certainty of the foundations of all Religion, which lie in the being of* God *and Immortality of the Soul, but the undoubted truth of thoſe particular accounts concerning the Origin of the Univerſe, of Evil, and of Nations, which were moſt liable to the* Atheiſts *exceptions, and have therein conſider'd all the pretences of Philoſophy Ancient or Modern, which have ſeem'd to contradict any of them; to which* (mantiſſæ loco) *I have added the Evidence of Scripture-Hiſtory in the remainders of it in Heathen Mythology, and concluded all with a Diſcourſe of the excellency of the Scriptures. Thus having given a brief view of the Deſign and Method of the whole, I ſubmit it to every free and unprejudic'd judgment. All the favour then I ſhall requeſt of thee is, to read ſeriouſly, and judge impartially; and then I doubt not but thou wilt ſee as much reaſon for Religion as I do.*

THE

THE CONTENTS.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

The Obſcurity and Defect of Ancient Hiſtory:

I, II, III, IV. *The knowledge of* Truth *proved to be the moſt natural perfection of the Rational Soul*; V. *Yet* Error *often miſtaken for* Truth: *the Accounts of it.* VI. *Want of Diligence in its ſearch*; VII, VIII. *The mixture of Truth and Falſhood: Thence comes either rejecting Truth for the Error's ſake, or embracing the Error for the Truth's ſake*; IX. *The firſt inſtanced in Heathen Philoſophers*, XIII. *The ſecond in Vulgar Heathen.* X, XI, XII. *Of* Philoſophical Atheiſm, *and the grounds of it.* XIV. *The Hiſtory of* Antiquity *very obſcure.* XV. *The Queſtion ſtated, where the true Hiſtory of Ancient Times is to be found? In Heathen Hiſtories, or only in Scripture?* XVI. *The want of credibility in Heathen Hiſtories aſſerted, and proved by the general defect for want of timely Records among Heathen Nations; the reaſon of it ſhewed from the firſt Plantations of the World.* XVII. *The manner of them diſcovered. The Original of* Civil Government. XVIII. *Of* Hieroglyphicks. XIX. *The uſe of* Letters *among the* Greeks *no elder than* Cadmus. XX. *His Time inquired into: no elder than* Joſhua: XXI. *The Learning brought into* Greece *by him.* Pag. 1.

CHAP. II.

Of the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory.

I. *The particular defect in the Hiſtory of the moſt learned Heathen Nations.* II. *Firſt the* Phœnicians. *Of* Sanchoniathon, *his Antiquity and Fidelity.* III. *Of* Jerom-baal, Baal-Berith. IV. *The Antiquity of* Tyre. Scaliger *vindicated againſt* Bochartus. V. Abibalus. VI. *The vanity of* Phœnician *Theology.* VII. *The imitation of it by the* Gnoſticks. VIII. *Of the* Ægyptian *Hiſtory.* IX. *The Antiquity and Authority of* Hermes Triſmegiſtus. X. *Of his Inſcriptions on Pillars, tranſcribed by* Manetho. XI. *His Fabulouſneſs thence diſcovered:* Terra Seriadica. XII. *Of* Seth's *Pillars in* Joſephus, *and an account whence they were taken.* p. 16

CHAP. III.

Of the *Chaldean* Hiſtory.

I. *The conteſt of Antiquity among Heathen Nations, and the ways of deciding it.* II. *Of the* Chaldean *Aſtrology, and the foundation of Judicial Aſtrology.* III. *Of the* Zabii, *their Founder, who they were; no other than the old* Chaldees. IV. *Of* Beroſus *and his Hiſtory.* V. *An Account of the fabulous Dynaſties of* Beroſus *and* Manetho. VI. *From the Tranſlation of the Scripture-hiſtory into Greek in the time of* Ptolomee. VII. *Of that Tranſlation and the time of it.* VIII. *Of* Demetrius Phalereus. Scaliger's *Arguments anſwered.* IX. Manetho *writ after the Septuagint, proved againſt* Kircher; *his Arguments anſwered. Of Rabbinical Arabick Authors, and their little credit in matter of Hiſtory.* X. *The time of* Beroſus *inquired into; his writing contemporary with* Philadelphus. p. 25

CHAP. IV.

The defect of the *Grecian* Hiſtory.

I. *That manifeſted by three evident Arguments of it.* (1.) *The fabulouſneſs of the Poetical Age of* Greece. *The Antiquity of Poetry.* II. *Of* Orpheus *and the ancient Poets. Whence the Poetical Fables borrowed.* III. *The advancement of Poetry and Idolatry together in* Greece. IV. *The different cenſures of* Strabo *and* Eratoſthenes *concerning the Poetical Age of* Greece; *and the reaſons of them.* V. (2.) *The eldeſt Hiſtorians of* Greece *are of ſuſpected credit. Of* Damaſtes, Ariſteus, *and others;* VI. *Of moſt of their eldeſt Hiſtorians we have nothing left but their Names, of others only the Subjects they treated of, and ſome Fragments.* VII. *The higheſt Antiquity of the* Greeks *not much older than* Cyrus *or* Cambyſes. VIII. (3.) *Thoſe that are extant either confeſs their ignorance of elder times, or plainly diſcover it. Of the firſt ſort are* Thucydides *and* Plutarch. IX. *Several evidences of the* Grecians *ignorance of the true original of Nations.* X. *Of* Herodotus *and his miſtakes.* XI. *The* Greeks *ignorance in Geography diſcovered, and thence their inſufficiency as to an account of ancient Hiſtory.* p. 35

CHAP. V.

The general uncertainty of Heathen Chronology.

I. *The want of credibility in Heathen Hiſtory further proved from the uncertainty and confuſion in their accounts of ancient times; that diſcovered by the uncertain form of their Years.* II. *An inquiry into the different form of the Ægyptian years; the firſt of thirty Days,* III. *The ſecond of four Months; of both inſtances given in the Ægyptian hiſtory.* IV. *Of the Chaldean accounts, and the firſt Dynaſties mentioned by* Beroſus, *how they may be reduced to probability.* V. *Of the*

the Ægyptian Dynasties of Manetho. *Reasons of accounting them fabulous, because not attested by any credible authority, and rejected by the best Historians.* VI. *The opinion of* Scaliger *and* Vossius, *concerning their being contemporary, propounded,* VII. *and rejected; with reasons against it.* VIII. *Of the ancient division of* Ægypt *into* Nomi *or Provinces, and the number of them, against* Vossius *and* Kircher. p. 45

CHAP. VI.

The uncertain Epocha's of Heathen Chronology.

I. *An account of the defect of Chronology in the eldest times. Of the Solar Year among the* Ægyptians, *the original of the Epacts, the Antiquity of the Intercalation among them. Of the several Canicular Years; the difference between* Scaliger *and* Petavius *considered. The certain Epocha's of the* Ægyptian *History no elder than* Nabonassar. II. *Of the* Grecian *accounts. The fabulousness of the Heroical age of* Greece. III. *Of the ancient* Grecian *Kingdoms. The beginning of the* Olympiads. IV. *The uncertain origin of the Western Nations. Of the* Latin *Dynasties. The different* Palilia *of* Rome. *The uncertain reckoning* Ab Urbe condita. V. *Of Impostures as to ancient Histories. Of* Annius. VI. Inghiramius, *and others.* VII. *Of the characters used by Heathen Priests.* VIII. *No sacred characters among the* Jews. IX. *The partiality and inconsistency of Heathen Histories with each other. From all which the want of credibility in them as to an account of ancient times is clearly demonstrated.* p. 55

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

The certainty of the Writings of *Moses.*

In order to the proving the truth of Scripture-history, several Hypotheses laid down. I. *The first concerns the reasonableness of preserving the ancient History of the World in some certain Records, from the importance of the things,* II. *and the inconveniencies of mere Tradition or constant Revelation.* III. *The second concerns the certainty that the Records under* Moses's *name, were undoubtedly his. The certainty of a matter of fact inquired into in general, and proved as to this particular,* IV. *by universal consent,* V. *and settling a Common-wealth upon his Laws.* VI, VII. *The impossibility of an Imposture as to the Writings of* Moses *demonstrated. The pleas to the contrary largely answered.* p. 66

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Moſes's certain knowledge of what he writ.

I. *The third Hypotheſis concerns the certainty of the matter of* Moſes's *Hiſtory, that gradually proved: Firſt,* Moſes's *knowledge cleared by his education, and experience, and certain information.* II. *His education in the wiſdom of* Ægypt; *what that was.* III. *The old* Ægyptian *learning inquired into;* IV. *the conveniences for it.* V. *Of the* Ægyptian *Prieſts,* Moſes *reckoned among them for his knowledge.* VI. *The Mathematical, Natural, Divine, and Moral learning of* Ægypt. VII. *Their Political wiſdom moſt conſiderable.* VIII. *The advantage of* Moſes *above the Greek Philoſophers, as to wiſdom and reaſon.* Moſes *himſelf an eye-witneſs of moſt of his Hiſtory:* IX. *the certain uninterrupted tradition of the other part among the* Jews *manifeſted by rational evidence.* p. 73

CHAP. III.

Moſes's fidelity and integrity proved.

I. Moſes *conſidered as an Hiſtorian, and as a Lawgiver; his fidelity in both proved; clear evidences that he had no intent to deceive in his Hiſtory, freedom from private intereſt, impartiality in his relations, plainneſs and perſpicuity of ſtile.* II. *As a Law-giver, he came armed with Divine Authority, which being the main thing, is fixed on to be fully proved from his action, and writings.* III. *The power of Miracles the great evidence of Divine Revelation. Two grand Queſtions propounded. In what caſes Miracles may be expected, and how known to be true. No neceſſity of a conſtant power of Miracles in a Church:* IV. *Two caſes alone wherein they may be expected. When any thing comes as a Law from God, and when a Divine Law is to be repealed. The neceſſity of Miracles in thoſe caſes as an evidence of Divine Revelation aſſerted.* V, VI, VII. *Objections anſwered. No uſe of Miracles when the Doctrine is ſettled and owned by Miracles by the firſt Revelation. No need of Miracles in reformation of a Church.* p. 83

CHAP. IV.

The fidelity of the Prophets ſucceeding *Moſes*.

I. *An order of Prophets to ſucceed* Moſes, *by God's own appointment in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The Schools of the Prophets.* III. *The original and inſtitution of them.* IV. *The Cities of the Levites. The occaſion of their firſt inſtitution.* V. *The places of the Schools of the Prophets, and the tendency of the Inſtitution there to a Prophetical Office.* VI. *Of the Muſick uſed in the Schools of the Prophets.* VII. *The Roman Aſſamenta, and the Greek Hymns in their ſolemn worſhip.* VIII. *The two ſorts of Prophets among the* Jews, *Leiger and extraordinary. Ordinary Prophets taken out of the Schools, proved by* Amos *and* Saul. p. 92.

CHAP.

The CONTENTS.

CHAP. V.

The tryal of the Prophetical Doctrine.

I. *Rules of trying Prophets eſtabliſhed in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The puniſhment of pretenders. The ſeveral ſorts of falſe Prophets. The caſe of the Prophet at* Bethel *diſcuſſed.* III. *The tryal of falſe Prophets belonging to the great Sanhedrin.* IV. *The particular rules whereby the Doctrine of Prophets was judg'd. The proper notion of a Prophet, not foretelling future contingencies, but having immediate Divine Revelation.* V. *Several Principles laid down for clearing the Doctrine of the Prophets.* 1. *That immediate dictates of Natural light are not to be the meaſure of Divine Revelation. Several grounds for Divine Revelation from natural Light.* VI. 2. *Whatever is directly repugnant to the dictates of Nature, cannot be of Divine Revelation.* VII. 3. *No Divine Revelation doth contradict a Divine poſitive Law without ſufficient evidence of* God's *intention to repeal that Law.* VIII. 4. *Divine Revelation in the Prophets, was not to be meaſured by the words of the Law, but by the intention and reaſon of it. The prophetical office a kind of Chancery to the Law of* Moſes. p. 102

CHAP. VI.

The Tryal of Prophetical Predictions and Miracles.

I. *The great difficulty of trying the truth of prophetical Predictions, from* Jer. 18. 7, 8, &c. *Some general* Hypotheſes *premiſed for the clearing of it.* II. *The firſt concerns the grounds why Predictions are accounted an evidence of Divine Revelation. Three Conſectaries drawn thence.* III. *The ſecond, the manner of* God's *Revelation of his Will to the Minds of the Prophets. Of the ſeveral degrees of Prophecy.* IV. *The third is, that* God *did not always reveal the internal purpoſes of his Will unto the true Prophets.* V. *The grand Queſtion propounded, How it may be known when Predictions expreſs* God's *decrees, and when only the ſeries of cauſes. For the firſt ſeveral rules laid down.* 1. *When the Prediction is confirm'd by a preſent Miracle.* 2. *When the things foretold exceed the probability of ſecond cauſes.* VI. 3. *When confirm'd by* God's *Oath.* VII. 4. *When the Bleſſings foretold are purely ſpiritual.* VIII. *Three rules for interpreting the Prophecies which reſpect the ſtate of things under the Goſpel.* IX. 5. *When all circumſtances are foretold.* 6. *When many Prophets in the ſeveral Ages agree in the ſame Predictions.* X. *Predictions do not expreſs* God's *unalterable purpoſes, when they only contain comminations of judgments, or are Predictions of temporal Bleſſings.* XI. *The caſe of the* Ninevites, Hezekiah, *and others, opened.* XII, XIII. *Of repentance in* God, *what it implies.* XIV. *The Jewiſh objections about Predictions of temporal Bleſſings anſwered.* XV. *In what caſes Miracles were expected from the Prophets: when they were to confirm the truth of their Religion. Inſtanced in the Prophet at* Bethel, Elijah, E-

liſha

liſha *and* Moſes *himſelf*; XVI. *whoſe Divine Authority that it was proved by Miracles, is demonſtrated againſt the modern* Jews, *and their pretences anſwered.* p. 110

CHAP. VII.

The eternity of the Law of *Moſes* diſcuſſed.

I. *The ſecond caſe wherein Miracles may be expected, when a Divine poſitive Law is to be repealed, and another way of worſhip eſtabliſhed inſtead of it. The poſſibility in general of a repeal of a Divine Law aſſerted; the particular caſe of the Law of* Moſes *diſputed againſt the* Jews: II. *The matter of that Law proved not to be immutably obligatory; becauſe the Ceremonial Precepts were required not for themſelves, but for ſome further ends; that proved from* Maimonides *his confeſſion:* III. *The Precepts of the Ceremonial Law frequently diſpenſed with while the Law was in force. Of the Paſſover of* Hezekiah, *and ſeveral other inſtances.* IV. *It is not inconſiſtent with the wiſdom of* GOD *to repeal ſuch an eſtabliſhed Law.* Abravanel's *Argument anſwered.* V. *Of the perfection of the Law of* Moſes, *compared with the Goſpel.* VI. *Whether* GOD *hath ever declared he would never repeal the Law of* Moſes. VII. *Of adding to the Precepts.* VIII. *Of the expreſſions ſeeming to imply the perpetuity of the Law of* Moſes. *Reaſons aſſigned why thoſe expreſſions are uſed, tho' perpetuity be not implyed.* IX. *The Law of* Moſes *not built upon immutable reaſon, becauſe many particular Precepts were founded upon particular occaſions, as the cuſtoms of the* Zabii; X. *many Ceremonial Precepts thence deduced out of* Maimonides; XI. *and becauſe ſuch a ſtate of things was foretold, with which the obſervation of the Ceremonial Law would be inconſiſtent.* XII. *That largely diſcovered from the Prophecies of the Old Teſtament.* p. 127

CHAP. VIII.

General *Hypotheſes* concerning the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST.

I. *The great prejudice againſt our Saviour among* Jews *and Heathens, was the meanneſs of his appearance. The difference of the Miracles at the delivery of the Law and Goſpel.* II. *Some general* Hypotheſes *to clear the ſubſerviency of Miracles to the Doctrine of* CHRIST. 1. *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence, but Authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Teſtimony of the Revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on Evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of Natural Knowledge.* III. *The Exiſtence of* GOD, *the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matter of Faith proved from the ſame Principle. Our knowledge of any thing ſuppoſeth ſomething incomprehenſible.* IV. *The certainty of Faith as great as that of Knowledge; the grounds of it ſtronger. The conſiſtency of Rational Evi-*

Evidence with Faith. Yet objects of Faith exceed Reason; the abſurdities following the contrary opinion. VI. *The uncertainty of that which is called Reaſon.* VII. *Philoſophical Dictates no ſtandard of Reaſon. Of Tranſubſtantiation and Ubiquity*, &c. *why rejected as contrary to Reaſon. The foundation of Faith in matters above Reaſon.* VIII. *Which is infallible teſtimony; that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved.* 2. Hypoth. *A Divine Teſtimony the moſt infallible. The reſolution of Faith into* GOD's *veracity as its formal object.* IX. 3. Hypoth. *A Divine Teſtimony may be known, tho' God ſpeak not immediately. Of Inſpiration among the* Jews, *and Divination among the Heathens.* XII. 4. Hypoth. *The evidence of a Divine Teſtimony muſt be clear and certain.* XIII. *Of the common motives of Faith, and the obligation to Faith ariſing from them. The original of Infidelity.*

CHAP. IX.

The rational Evidence of the truth of Chriſtian Religion from Miracles.

I. *The poſſibility of Miracles appears from* GOD *and Providence; the evidence of a Divine Teſtimony by them.* GOD *alone can really alter the courſe of Nature. The Devil's power of working Miracles conſider'd. Of* Simon Magus, Apollonius. *The cures in the Temple of* Æſculapius *at* Rome, *&c.* II. GOD, *never works Miracles, but for ſome particular end. The particular reaſons of the Miracles of* Chriſt. *The repealing the Law of* Moſes, *which had been ſettled by Miracles. Why* Chriſt *check'd the* Phariſees *for demanding a Sign, when he himſelf appeals to his Miracles. The power of* Chriſt's *Miracles on many who did not throughly believe.* III. Chriſt's *Miracles made it evident that he was the* Meſſias, *becauſe the Predictions were fulfill'd in him. Why* John Baptiſt *wrought no Miracles.* IV. Chriſt's *Miracles neceſſary for the overthrow of the Devil's Kingdom.* V. *Of the Demoniacs and Lunatics in the Goſpel, and in the Primitive Church. The power of the Name of* Chriſt *over them largely prov'd by ſeveral Teſtimonies.* VI. *The evidence thence of a Divine power in* Chriſt. VII. *Of counterfeit diſpoſſeſſions. Of Miracles wrought among Infidels.* VIII. *Of the future ſtate of the Church.* XI. *The neceſſity of the Miracles of* Chriſt, *as to the propagation of Chriſtian Religion: that prov'd from the condition of the Publiſhers, and the ſucceſs of the Doctrine. The Apoſtles knew the hazard of their employment, before they enter'd into it.* X. *The boldneſs and reſolution of the Apoſtles notwithſtanding this, compar'd with Heathen Philoſophers.* XI. *No motive could carry the Apoſtles thro' their Imployment but the truth of their Doctrine;* XII. *not ſeeking the honor, profit or pleaſure of the World.* XIII. *The Apoſtles evidence of the truth of their Doctrine lay in being eye-witneſſes of our Saviour's Miracles and Reſurrection.* XIV, XV, XVI, VII, XVIII. *That atteſted by themſelves; their ſufficiency thence for preaching the Goſpel.* XIX. *Of the nature of the Doctrine of the Goſpel; contrariety of it to Natural Inclination.* XX. *Strange ſucceſs of it notwithſtanding*

it came not with human power: No Christian Emperor, till the Gospel universally preach'd. XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. *The weakness and simplicity of the instruments which preach'd the Gospel. From all which the great Evidence of the power of Miracles is prov'd* p. 159

CHAP. X.

The difference of true Miracles from false.

I. *The unreasonableness of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, because of Impostures. That there are certain rules of distinguishing true Miracles from false, and Divine from Diabolical, prov'd from* GOD's *intention in giving a power of Miracles, and the Providence of* GOD *in the World.* II. *The inconvenience of taking away the rational grounds of Faith, and placing it on Self-evidence. Of the Self-evidence of the Scriptures, and the insufficiency of that for resolving the Question about the Authority of the Scriptures.* III. *Of the pretended Miracles of Impostors and false Christs, as* Barchochebas, David el-David *and others.* IV. *The Rules whereby to judge true Miracles from false.* 1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Testimony.* V. *No Miracles necessary for the certain conveyance of a Divine Testimony: prov'd from the Evidences that the Scriptures could not be corrupted.* VI. 2. *No Miracles Divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of popish Miracles.* VII. 3. *Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on those who believe them. Of the Miracles of* Simon Magus. VIII. 4. *Divine Miracles tend to the overthrow of the Devil's power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of* CHRIST *to the Devil's design in the World.* IX. 5. *The distinction of true Miracles from others, from the circumstances and manner of their operation. The Miracles of* Christ *compared with those of the Heathen Gods.* X. 6. GOD *makes it evident to all impartial judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed Created Power. This manifested from the unparallel'd Miracles of* Moses *and our Saviour. From all which the rational evidence of Divine Revelation is manifested, as to the Persons whom* GOD *imploys to teach the World.* p. 210

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Being of GOD.

I. *The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of* GOD *and Immortality of the Soul: from them the necessity of a particular Divine Revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine Authority of the Scriptures.* II. *Why* Moses *doth not prove the Being of* GOD, *but suppose it.* III. *The notion of a Deity very consonant to Reason. Of the nature of Ideas, and particularly of the Idea of*

of GOD. IV. *How we can form an Idea of an infinite Being.* V, VI. *How far ſuch an Idea argues Exiſtence.* VII, VIII. *The great unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm demonſtrated. Of the Hypotheſes of the* Ariſtotelian *and* Epicurean *Atheiſts.* IX. *The Atheiſts pretences examin'd and refuted.* X, XI, XII, XIII. *Of the nature of the Arguments whereby we prove there is a* GOD. *Of univerſal conſent and the Evidence of that to prove a Deity and Immortality of Souls.* XIV, XV. *Of neceſſity of Exiſtence imply'd in the notion of* GOD, *and how far that proves the Being of* GOD. XVI. *The order of the World and uſefulneſs of the parts of it, and eſpecially of Man's Body, an argument of a Deity.* XVII. *Some higher Principle proved to be in the World than Matter and Motion.* XVIII. *The nature of the Soul, and poſſibility of its ſubſiſting after death.* XIX. *Strange appearances in Nature not ſolvable by the power of Imagination.*

p. 227

CHAP. II.

Of the Origin of the Univerſe.

I. *The neceſſity of the belief of the Creation of the World in order to the truth of Religion. Of the ſeveral Hypotheſes of the Philoſophers who contradict* Moſes: *with a particular examination of them.* II. *The ancient Tradition of the World conſonant to* Moſes; *prov'd from the* Ionic *Philoſophy of* Thales, *and the* Italic *of* Pythagoras. III. *The* Pythagoric *Cabbala rather* Ægyptian *than* Moſaic. *Of the fluid Matter, which was the material Principle of the Univerſe.* IV. *Of the Hypotheſis of the Eternity of the World aſſerted by* Ocellus Lucanus *and* Ariſtotle. V. *The weakneſs of the Foundations on which that Opinion is built. Of the manner of forming Principles of Philoſophy.* VI. *The poſſibility of Creation prov'd.* [*No arguing from the preſent ſtate of the World againſt its beginning, ſhewed from* Maimonides.] VII. *The* Platoniſts *Argument from the Goodneſs of* GOD *for the Eternity of the World, anſwered.* VIII. *Of the* Stoical *Hypotheſis of the Eternity of Matter; whether reconcilable with the Text of* Moſes. IX. *Of the Opinions of* Plato *and* Pythagoras *concerning the Præ-exiſtence of Matter to the formation of the World.* X. *The contradiction of the Eternity of Matter to the Nature and Attributes of* GOD. XI, XII, XIII. *Of the Atomical Hypotheſis of the Origin of the Univerſe.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. *The World could not be produc'd by a caſual concourſe of Atoms, prov'd from the nature and motion of* Epicurus's *Atoms, and the Phænomena of the Univerſe, eſpecially the production and nature of Animal.* XVIII. *Of the* Carteſian *Hypotheſis, that it cannot ſalve the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity giving motion to Matter.* p. 265

CHAP. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. Epicurus *his Arguments againſt it refuted. The neceſſity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence prov'd from a conſideration of the nature of* God, *and the things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great Objections againſt Providence propounded. The firſt concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. God *cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of Man, doth not charge* God *with Man's fault.* God's *power to govern Man by Laws, tho' he gives no particular reaſon of every poſitive Precept.* VI. *The reaſon of* God's *creating Man with freedom of Will, largely ſhew'd from* Simplicius; *and the true account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. God's *permitting the fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil compar'd with that of Heathen Philoſophers.* IX. *The antiquity of the opinion of aſcribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the judgment of the* Perſians, Ægyptians, *and others about it.* X. *Of* Manichæiſm. XI. XII, XIII, XIV. *The Opinion of the ancient* Greek *Philoſophers; Of* Pythagoras, Plato, *the* Stoics; *the Origin of Evil not from the neceſſity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The remainders of the Hiſtory of the Fall among the Heathens.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the malignity of* Dæmons. XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the ſufferings of the good, and impunity of bad Men. An account of both from Natural Light, manifeſted by* Seneca, Plutarch, *and others.* p. 296

CHAP. IV.

Of the Origin of Nations.

I. *All Mankind deriv'd from* Adam, *if the Scriptures be true.* II. *The contrary ſuppoſition an introduction to Atheiſm.* III. *The truth of the Hiſtory of the Flood. The poſſibility of an univerſal Deluge prov'd.* IV. *The Flood univerſal as to Mankind, whether univerſal as to the Earth and Animals; no neceſſity of aſſerting either.* V. *Yet ſuppoſing the poſſibility of it demonſtrated without creation of new Waters.* VI. *Of the Fountains of the Deep. The proportion which the height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth. No Mountains much above three miles perpendicular. Of the origin of Fountains. The opinion of* Ariſtotle *and others concerning it diſcuſs'd. The true account of them from the vapours ariſing from the maſs of ſubterraneous waters.* VII. *Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from* Buteo *and others.* VIII. *The truth of the Deluge from the teſtimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from* Noah's *Poſterity.* IX. *Of the beginning of the* Aſſyrian *Empire. The multi-*

multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the LXX. Of the time between the Flood and Abraham, *and the advantages of it.* X. *Of the pretence of ſuch Nations, who call'd themſelves* Aborigines. XI. *A Diſcourſe concerning the firſt Planters of* Greece: *the common opinion propounded and rejected. The* Hellens *were not the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece, *but the* Pelaſgi. *The large ſpread of them over the parts of* Greece. XII. *Of their Language different from the* Greeks. XIII. *Whence theſe* Pelaſgi *came; that* Phaleg *was the* Pelaſgus *of* Greece, *and the Leader of that Colony, prov'd from* Epiphanius. XIV. *The Language of the* Pelaſgi *in* Greece *Oriental: thence an account given of the many* Hebrew *words in the* Greek *Language, and the remainders of the Eaſtern Language in the Iſlands of* Greece, *both which not from the* Phœnicians *as* Bochartus *thinks, but from the old* Pelaſgi. XV. *Of the ground of the affinity between the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians. *Of the peopling of* America. p. 333

CHAP. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

I. *That there were ſome remainders of the ancient Hiſtory of the World preſerv'd in the ſeveral Nations after the diſperſion.* II. *How it came to be corrupted: by decay of Knowledge, increaſe of Idolatry, confuſion of Languages.* III. *An Inquiry into the cauſe of that. Difficulties againſt the common opinion that Languages were confounded at* Babel. IV. *Thoſe difficulties clear'd.* V. *Of the fabulouſneſs of Poets. The particular ways whereby the Heathen Mythology aroſe. Attributing the general Hiſtory of the World to their own Nation. The corruptions of* Hebraiſms. *Alteration of Names. Ambiguity of Senſe in the Oriental Languages.* VI. *Attributing the Actions of many to one Perſon, as in* Jupiter, Bacchus, *&c.* VII. *The remainders of Scripture-Hiſtory among the Heathens. The names of* GOD, Chaos, *formation of Man among the* Phœnicians. *Of* Adam *among the* Germans, Ægyptians, Cicilians. Adam *under* Saturn. Cain *among the* Phœnicians. Tubal-Cain *and* Jubal *under* Vulcan *and* Apollo. Naamah *under* Minerva. VIII. Noah *under* Saturn, Janus, Prometheus *and* Bacchus. IX. Noah's *three Sons under* Jupiter, Neptune *and* Pluto. Canaan *under* Mercury, Nimrod *under* Bacchus, Magog *under* Prometheus. *Of* Abraham *and* Iſaac *among the* Phœnicians. X. Jacob's *Service under* Apollo's. *The* Βαιτύλια *from* Bethel. Joſeph *under* Apis. Moſes *under* Bacchus. Joſhua *under* Hercules. Balaam *under the old* Silenus. p. 360

CHAP. VI.

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

I. *Concerning matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contain'd therein. The ground of the diſeſteem of the Scripture is tacit Unbelief.* II. *The Excellency of the Scriptures manifeſted*

manifeſted as to the matters which GOD *hath revealed therein* IV. *The Excellency of the diſcoveries of* GOD's *Nature which are in Scripture.* V. *Of the Goodneſs and Love of* GOD *in* CHRIST. *The ſuitableneſs of thoſe diſcoveries of* GOD *to our Natural Notions of a Deity. The neceſſity of* GOD's *making known Himſelf to us, in order to the regulating our Conceptions of Him.* VI. *The Scriptures give the fulleſt account of the ſtate of Mens Souls, and the corruptions which are in them. The only way of pleaſing* GOD *diſcovered in Scriptures.* VII. *The Scriptures contain matters of greateſt Myſteriouſneſs, and moſt univerſal Satisfaction to Mens Minds.* VIII. *The Excellency of the manner wherein things are reveal'd in Scriptures, in regard of Clearneſs, Authority, Purity,* IX. *Uniformity, and Perſuaſiveneſs.* X. *The Excellency of the Scripture as a Rule of Life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion and the Reaſonableneſs of them. The Greatneſs of the Encouragements to Religion, contain'd in the Scriptures.* XI. *The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace, in order to Man's Salvation.* p. 374

The

The Aſteriſc * *notes the New Part.*

A

Abbeville (Claude) * 73
Abravanel 103, 130
Abulenſis 54
Abydenus 366
Acoſta 249, * 68, * 74, * 89, * 90, * 92, * 116
Acuna * 73
Ader (Gul.) 224
Ælianus * 36, * 41, * 46, * 50
Æſchylus 14
Alcinous * 88
Alexander Aphrodiſienſis * 50
Alexander Polyhiſtor 366
Alſtedius 106
Ambaſſade Memorable * 69
B. Ambroſius 198
Ammianus Marcellinus 27, 199, * 3, * 10
Anaxagoras *and* Anaximenes * 37
Anaximander * 26, * 27, * 37
Andreas Morales * 72
Anthologia Gr. 294
Apollodorus 365
Apollonius 14
Apuleius * 57
Aquinas (Thom.) 113, 303
Arabica Scripturarum Verſio 93
Arias, *vid.* Montanus
Ariſtobulus Judæus 30
Ariſtophanes 37, 350, 358
Ariſtoteles 4, * 31, * 37, * 49, *&c. Metaphyſ.* 76, 248, 270, * 38, * 39, * 41, * 53. *De Cælo* 266, 272. *Polit.* * 49. *de Meteor.* * 91. *Phyſ.* 272. *Hiſt. Anim.* * 20, * 21, * 23, * 25, * 31, * 55. *De Partib. Anim.* 258, * 23, * 31, * 35, * 55
Arnobius 197, 198, 199, 209, 223, 372
Arrianus *Hiſt.* 44
Athenæus * 50
B. Auguſtinus *de Civ. Dei* 48, 58, 205, 219, 321, 345. *De Doctr. Chriſt.* 191. *de Hæreſ.* 311. *ad Voluſ.* * 87. *De ver. Relig.* 219
Auguſtinus (Antonius) 61

B

Barlæus * 73
Bartoli *Hiſt. Aſiat.* * 70
Battel (Andrew) * 91
Baumgarten (Martinus) * 28
Bellonius Ibid.
Benzo * 72
Berigardus * 28
Bernier * 105, * 106
Beſſarion * 10, * 38, * 50
Bochartus 13, 14, 17, 54, 62, 138, 345, 350, 356, 358. 364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 371, 372, 373, * 13.
Bodini *Method. Hiſt.* 363
Borrichius * 31, * 33
Boxhornius 36, 160
Boyle's *Sceptical Chym.* 270. *Fluidity and Firmneſs* 288. *Final Cauſes* * 20, * 86. *Origin of Forms* * 99. *Veneration of Man's Intellect towards God* * 110, * 113. *Experiment of the Air* * 116
Brerewood 363
Busbequius 364
Buteo *de Area* Noe 345
Buxtorfius 103, 364

C

Cælius Rhodiginus 38, 76, 323, * 49
Cæſar (Julius) * 10
Cæſalpinus (Andreas) * 23
Callimachus 372
Calvinus 93, 363
Camerarius * 28
Capelli (Jacob) *Hiſt. S. & Exot.* 47, 48, 52
Cardan * 23
Carder (Pet.) * 73
Caron * 69
Carteſius 253, 288, 294, 295, * 80, * 81, * 82, * 83, * 84, * 85, * 86, * 93, * 101, *&c.*
Caſaubonus (Iſaac.) *ad* Athenæum 30. *Exerat. ad* Baron. 33. *in* Strab. 39, 77. *ad* Theoph. 372
Caſaubonus (Meric.) *Orig. of Temp. Evils* 322. *de* 4. *Lingu.* 362. *Diatrib. de Lingu. Hebr.* Ibid.
Cauche * 77
Cenſorinus 56, 293
Champlain * 74
Chaumont * 77
Chalcidius *in* Timæum 269, 270, 278, 279, 280, 313
B. Chryſoſtomus 219
Cicero *de Nat. Deor.* 8, 21, 154, 197, 230, 242, 243, 248, 253, 267, 272, 276, 284, 286, 298, 326, 368, * 5, * 6, * 8, * 13, * 19, * 36, * 38, * 56, * 59. * 65, *De Fato* 290. *Academ. Quæſt.* * 24, * 51, * 59. *De Oratore* * 44, * 48. *ad Quint.* * 48. *Tuſc. Quæſt.* * 11, * 55, * 57, * 59, * 65. *de Divinat.* 25, 153, 159, 162, 286, * 44, * 51. *de Legib.* 254, * 57, * 60, * 65. *de Finibus* 286, 289, 298, * 24. *Fragment* 152
Claudianus 325
Clemens Alexand. 2, 12, 14, 15, 37, 77, 78, 79, 365, 366, * 10, * 37
Clutius * 25
Columbus * 71, * 73
Columella * 24
Le Compte * 70, * 78
Concilium Toletan. 116
Conon *apud* Photium 13
Conqueſt *de* Canaries * 73
Conringius 57, 75
Couplet * 69, * 70, * 78, 79
Cuperus * 107
S. Cyprianus 167
S. Cyrillus *c.* Jul. 366, * 56

D.

Van Dalen * 44
Dampier * 73
Dellon * 77
Democritus * 37
Denton * 75
Diodorus Siculus 24, 25, 26, 37, 47, 48, 56, 57, 62, 64, 72, 76, 77, 78, 267, 370, 373, * 3, * 4, * 7, * 9, * 10, * 13, * 20, * 66, * 69
Diogenes Laertius 30, 243, 268, 272, 279, 282, 292, 298, 310, * 15, * 59
Dionyſius Ilegiy. 350
Dionyſius Halicarnaſſ. 178, * 48

E

Edda *Mythol.* * 9
Elmenhorſtius 372
Empedocles *Pythag.* 320, * 10
Entii *Apolog.* * 18, * 22
Epiphanius 354
Epicharmus * 10
Eſtius 303
Etmullerus * 18, * 21
Euripides 309, 351, 373
Euſebii *Præpar. Evang.* 17, 20, 30, 34, 37, 62, 78, 267, 269, 282, 287, 292, 323, 366, 372, * 3, * 5, * 7, * 8, * 13, * 15, * 39, * 50. *Chronic.* 19, 31, 50, 345. *Hiſt. Eccl.* 31, 191, 201, 315
Excerpt. Gem. Sanhedr. 103

F

Fagius (Paulus) 93
Feſtus 14
Firmicus (Julius Mat.) 167
Flacurt * 77
Florus * 57

G

Ganz (David) 215
Gaſſendus 243, 256, 287. *De Logic. Epicur.* 284. *Phyſ.* 287, 289, 296, 340. *Vit. Pieresk.* 342
Gelaldinus 54
Geminus *de Sphæris* 57
Gervaiſe * 78
Gillet * 77
Goedart * 26
Le Grand * 74
Grotius 359, * 10. *De Verit. Rel. Chriſt.* 72, 134, 139, 269, 345, 346. *Opuſc.* 222. *De Jur. B. ac P.* 354. *Annot. in V. T.* 104, 371. *in Evang.* 32, 357. *in Epiſt.* 222

H

Hackluit * 75
Du Hamel * 102, * 103, * 110
Hardecus, *vid.* Peieri Exercit.
Hariot * 75
Harvey *de Generat. Anim.* 285, * 17, * 20
Heinſii *Exercit. in* Heſ. 36. *Exercit. Sacr.* 96. *Ariſtarch.* 323. *in* Clem. Alex. 372
Heraldus 199, 201, 372
Herodotus 13, 14, 24, 38, 44, 56, 78, 357, * 3, * 9, * 10, * 89, * 91
Heſiodus 37, 352
Heſychius 350
Hierocles 308, 319, 320, 321
B. Hieronymus *de Script. Eccl.* 315
Hobbes 262, * 17, * 41, * 60, * 63, * 65, * 67.
Holſtenius *de Vit.* Porphyr. 316
Homeri *Odyſſ.* 39, 270, 334, 356. *Iliad.* 58, 270, 324, 343, 350.
Hook's *Micrography* * 22
Horapollo 57
Horatius 36, 37
Hornius *de Orig. Gentium Americ.* 359. *Defenſ. Diſſert. de ætat. Mundi* 349
Hoſtius *de Arca* Noe 345
Huetius * 84, * 85, * 102, * 105, * 107, * 114.

I.

Jarchi (R. Salomon) 109
Ikkarim, *vid.* Maimonides
Joſephus *c.* Appion. 13, 28, 40, 43, 51, 72, 78, * 42. *Antiq.* 18, 357, 372. *De Bello Jud.* 97
Joſephus de Albo 125, 132
Junius 96, 346
Juſtini *Hiſt.* 31
Juſtini Martyris *Paræn.* 37. *Apol. ſecunda* 323, *Dial. c.* Tryph. 190. Ariſt. *Dogm. everſ.* 274
Juvenæus (Paulus) * 75

K

Kircher *Oedip. Ægypt.* 3, 32, 51, 54, 57, 171, 268. *China illuſtrat.* * 79
Knivet (Anton.) * 73

L

Lactantius *de Orig. Erroris* 46, 198, * 27, * 55, *De Falſa Relig.* 154, * 50. *De Juſtitia* 167, 199, 201. *De Falſa Sap.* 207. *De Ira Dei* * 50
Lactantius *ſeu* Luctatius *in* Statii Thebaid. 13
Laet (Joh.) 346, 359, * 68, * 72, * 74, * 76
Lederer * 75
Lerius * 71, * 73, * 76
Leſcaloper * 63
Libanius 197
Lipſius 76, 249, 279, 364
Liſter * 21, * 26
Livius * 55
Longinus 72
Lopez * 91
Loubere * 77, * 78
Lower * 30
Lucianus 373, * 3
Lucretius 230, 243, 255, 282, 283, 289, 293, * 32, * 33, * 41, * 90
Ludolphus * 76, * 89, * 91, * 92

M

Machiavil 264
Macrobius 46, 75
Maffeius * 69
Magaillans * 70
Maimonides *de Fund. Leg.* 103, 107, 122, 123, 125, 132. *More Nevoch.* 27, 98, 128, 134, 137, 138, 139, 266, 273, 296. *De Idol.* 102, 104, 108
Mair (Jacobus) * 68
Mayer *Prod. Chald.* 363. *Phil. Sacr.* 364, 370
Manaſſeh Ben Iſrael 97, 133, 360
Manilius 263, 264
Maregravius * 75, * 76
Marmora Arundeliana * 14
Martinius 346, * 69, * 70, * 78
Martyr (Petrus) 93
Martyr (Per. Anglerius) * 71, * 72
Maſius *in* Joſh. 94
Mauſſacus *in* Harpocr. 15
Maximus Tyrius 298, 314
Mela (Pomponius) * 9, * 16, * 89
Mercerus 2
Meurſius 14, 270
Mey (Johannes) * 25
Minutius Felix 167, 176, 197, 199

Molinæus 121
Montanus (Arias) 346, 350
Morus (Henricus) *Enchirid. Metaphyſ.* * 109. *Ep. ad Carteſ.* 295. *Antidote againſt Atheiſm* 253, 292, 295. *Myſtery of Godlineſs* 264. *Immortality of the Soul* 295
Muretus *in* Senec. *de Provid.* 282

N

Newton (Iſaac) *Phil. Nat. Princ. Matth.* * 116
Nicephorus 191
Nonnus 373

O

Ocellus Lucanus 272, 273, * 58
Origines *c.* Celſum 9, 32, 93, 139, 143, 166, 168, 182, 184, 186, 203, 206, 207, 209, 214, 222, 300, 323, 324, 382. *Philocal.* 278, 281
Ovidius * 16, * 55, * 56
Ouzelius 372

P

Patricius (Fr.) * 52
Pauſanias 14, 37, 38, 351, 373. * 10, * 14
Pearſon (John) 50
Peieri & Hardeci *Exercit. Med.* * 17
Perſius 323
Petavius *in* Epiphan. 31. *De Doctr. Temp.* 56, 346, 347
Petit (Petrus) * 46, * 102
Philo Alex. 268
Philo Biblius *apud* Euſeb. 17, 20. * 4, * 7
Philo Judæus *de vita* Moſis 78, 96. *Quod Mundus ſit incorrupt.* * 59. *Quod Mundi Opif.* * 56
Philoſtratus 14. *Imag.* 352. *Vit. Apollon.* 370
Photii *Biblioth.* 13, 37, 100. * 21
Pindarus 37
Pineda *de rebus* Salomon 57
Piſo *Hiſt.* Braſil * 22, * 73
Plato * 10, * 51. *in* Crat. 3, * 11. *in* Phæd. 174, 309, 343, * 41. *Sophiſt.* 271. *in Epinom.* 316, * 49. *De Legib.* * 14. *Apol.* Socrat. * 44, * 48. *De Rep.* * 51, * 54. *in* Tim. 269
Plinii *N. Hiſt.* 15, 18, 34, 79, 340. * 7, * 15, * 16, * 19, * 20, * 21, * 22, * 26, * 50, * 51, * 55, * 57, * 77, * 89, * 91
Plinii *Epiſt.* 99, 200, 201
Plutarchus * 3, * 11, * 39. *De Placit. Philoſ.* 268, 282, 326. * 10, * 13, * 15, * 24, * 27, * 36, * 38, * 46. *Sympoſ.* 36, * 27. *Vit.* Demetr. * 42. *De* Pyth. *Oracul.* 36. *in* Æmilian. 340. *in* Alexand. 310. *in* Pericle * 41. *adv.* Colat. 298, * 24, * 42, * 59. *De Odio & Invid.* * 48. *in* Numa * 55, * 60. *De* Herod. 43, 47. *De* Iſide *&* Oſir. 56, 77, 309, 312, 322. * 3, * 4, * 11, * 12. *De Anima procreat.* 279, 290, 313. *De illis qui ſero puniuntur* 303, 326, *&c.*
Poeſis Philoſ. * 10, * 45
Porphyrius *de vita* Pythag. 78, * 11. *De Abſtinent.* 319, * 9
Proclus *in* Timæum Plat. 13, 22. *in Chreſtomath.* 100
Prudentius 167
Ptolemæi *Tetrab.* 26
Purchas's *Pilgrim* * 74, * 77, * 89, * 91, * 92
Pythagoras * 60

Q

Quintilianus 383, * 48, * 51

R

Radzivil * 29
Rambam 215
Ramus * 50
Rawleigh (*Sir* Walter) 339, 340, 348
Ray (John) * 19, * 22
Redi *de Gen. Inſect.* * 21, * 22, * 23
Regis *Phyſ.* * 105, * 107. *Metaphyſ.* * 81. *Reponſe à la Cenſure* * 105, * 106, * 109, * 110, * 111, * 112, * 114.
Relation de la Nigritie * 91
Rhodiginus. *Vid.* Cælius.
Rhodius (Andronicus) * 52
Riolanus * 35
Rochefort * 74
Rohault * 107, * 109, * 110, * 114
Ruſticus Elpidius 116

S.

Salmaſius *in Conſecr. Templ.* 15. *De Anno Clim.* 27. *De Hellen.* 353, 354.
Sandys * 28
Sapient. Secundum Ægypt. 22
Santos (Joh.) * 77
Scaliger (Julius Cæſar) *in* Cardan. 362, * 21, * 23, * 25, * 31, * 53, * 92.
Scaliger (Joſephus) *de vita* Jul. Scal. * 37. *Not. in* Euſeb. *Chron.* 14, 15, 19, 31, 49, *in Fragm. Græc.* 18, 23, 25, 368, 371, 372. *De Emend. Temp.* 29, 32, 34, 46, 56, 59, 60. *Conject. in* Varr. 99. *Ep. ad* Caſaub. *&* *Ep. Gall.* 27. *Can. Iſag.* 19, 43, 44, 52, 58, 358.
Scholia *in* Ariſtophanem 350. *in* Apollonium 351.
Schouten * 68
Selden *de Diis Syris* 27, 138, 368, 372. *De Jure Nat. & Gent.* 27, 268, 335. *De Anno civ. Jud.* 130. *De Synedriis* 104.
Seneca 263, 280, 314, 325, 331, * 59
Servius *in* Virgil. 184
Sextus Empiricus 14, * 13, * 25, * 41, * 45, * 66.
Sherlogi *Antiq. Hebr.* 94
Simplicius *in* Epict. 300, 303, 304, 305, 306, 325. *in Categ. Ariſtot.* * 88
Smith *of Prophecy* 98
Sixtus Senenſis 78
Solinus 48
Spinoza * 63, * 93
Spizel de Iſrael *Americano* 260
Stephanus *Byzant.* 39, 350, 368, 369
Steuchus (Eugub.) * 37
Stobæus 280, * 36, * 38, * 57, * 58, * 88
Strabo 14, 18, 27, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44, 54, 57, 72, 76, 77, 78, 100, 351, 356, 358. * 10, * 36.
Suetonius 160, 201
Suidas 38, * 50
Swammerdam * 25
Sydenham * 100
Symmachi *Epiſt.* 197

T

Tachard * 77
Tacitus 201, 369
Tatianus 28
Techo (Nic.) * 76, * 92
Du Tertre * 74
Tertullianus *Ad Scapulam* 175. *Apol.* 99, 161, 175, 176, 177, 193, 199, 200, 201, 202, 317, 369. *De Præscr. adv. Hæres.* 217, 317. *Adv. Hermog.* 278, 281, 314. *De Anima* 317. *Ad Nationes* 176, 197. *De Spectac.* 356. *De Jejuniis* 104.
Theodoretus 62
Theophrastus * 37
Thevenot * 25, * 28, * 29, * 77
Thucidydes 11
Torniellus 100
Transactions (Philos.) * 89
Trigaultius * 70, * 77
Turnebus 290
Tzetzes *in* Hesiod. 37

V

Du Val * 68
Della Valle (Pietro) * 28
Valerius Maximus * 45
Varenii Geogr. 341
Varro 14
Vettius Valens *apud* Scal. 25
Vaticana Append. 14
Virgilius 334
Vives (Ludovicus) 168, 345
Volkelius 277
Vorstius *ad* Maimon. 98, 109, 132, 215. *Not. in* Abrav. 130
Vossius (Jo. Ger.) *de Idol.* 7, 14, 28, 48, 52, 56, 57, 72, 166, 249, 357, 367, 369, 371, 372, 373. *in* Maim. *de Idol.* 102, 138, *De Sectis Phil.* 268. *De Hist. Græc.* 19, 22, 31, 34, 39. *Chron. Sacr. Isag.* 345
Vossius (Isaacus) *de Ætate Mundi* 23, 51, 52, 348. *Ep. ad* Calv. 345. *De Nilo* * 89. Castig. *adv.* Horn. 347. *De* LXX. *Interpret.* 348. *in* Pompon. Mel. 340
Voyage to Suratt * 68, * 91
Ursini *Exercit.* 20
Usseri *Annales* 347. *Chron. Sacr.* Ibid.

W.

Waltoni *Prolegom. ad Bibl. Polyglot.* 348
Willis *de Cerebro* * 31
Wormianum *Musæum* * 21

X.

Xenophon. * 44, * 45, * 46

ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR, A

RATIONAL ACCOUNT

Of the GROUNDS of

NATURAL and REVEAL'D

RELIGION:

WHEREIN

The Foundations of Religion, and the AUTHORITY of the SCRIPTURES, are Asserted and Clear'd.

WITH

An ANSWER to the MODERN OBJECTIONS

OF

ATHEISTS and *DEISTS.*

In FIVE BOOKS.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,

EDWARD late Lord Bishop of WORCESTER.

LONDON:

Printed by *W. B.* for HENRY MORTLOCK at the Sign of the *Phœnix* in St. *Paul's* Church-yard. 1709.

THE CONTENTS.

BOOK I. *Of the Grounds of Natural and Reveal'd Religion.*
II. *Of the Credibility of the Scriptures compar'd with other Accounts.*
III. *Of the Authority of the Writings of* Moſes, *and the matters contain'd therein.*
IV. *Of the Authority of the Prophetical Writings, and other Books of the Old Teſtament.*
V. *Of the Authority of the Writings of the New Teſtament, and the matters therein contain'd.*

CONTENTS of BOOK I.

A General Diſcourſe in vindication of the Principles of Natural *and* Reveal'd Religion; *with an Anſwer to the Objections of* Atheiſts *and* Deiſts.

CHAP. I.

The general Prejudices againſt Religion in our Age examin'd, and the old Atheiſtical Hypotheſes conſider'd, p. 1

CHAP. II.

The Modern Atheiſtical Hypotheſes examin'd, and the Unreaſonableneſs of them ſhew'd, 80

CHAP. III.

The Reaſonableneſs of Reveal'd Religion ſuperadded to Natural; with an Anſwer to the moſt ſpecious Arguments againſt Revelation.

CHAP. IV.

General Conſiderations about the Divine Revelation contain'd in the Holy Scriptures; as to Antiquity, Integrity, Conſiſtence, and manner of Writing.

CON-

CONTENTS of CHAP. I. BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

The Atheiſtical Pretences *of this Age conſider'd and anſwer'd,* p. 1

An Inquiry into the Atheiſtical Pretences *of this Age,* 2

The firſt, That it is a Contrivance of Politicians, ibid.

The Falſhood of that ſhew'd, from the firſt Hiſtory of Religion in Egypt, 3

In Phœnicia, 4

In Greece, 7

Diodorus Siculus's *Account of the beginning of Religion examined,* 13

The Abſurdity of his Opinion about the Production of Animals, at large made out, 16

The ſeveral Hypotheſes *of* Democritus, *and* Anaximander, *and* Epicurus, *about the Production of Mankind, ſhew'd to be very unreaſonable,* 23

The Opinion of the antient Philoſophers, about the World's being made by Chance *or* Providence, *examin'd and compar'd; and the Foundations of Natural Religion aſſerted by the beſt of them,* 35

The ſecond Pretence, That Religion is owing to Mens Ignorance *and* Superſtitious Fear, *examin'd,* 60

The third, That there are whole Nations without any ſenſe of GOD or Religion, *inquired into, and refuted by particular Obſervations,* 68

CHAP. II.

The Modern Atheiſtical Hypotheſes examin'd, and the Unreaſonableneſs of them ſhew'd, 80

* * * \

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

The Obscurity and Defect of Ancient History.

I. II. III. IV. *The knowledge of* Truth *proved to be the most natural perfection of the Rational Soul*; V. *Yet* Error *often mistaken for Truth: the Accounts of it.* VI. *Want of Diligence in its search*; VII. VIII. *The Mixture of Truth and Falshood: Thence comes either rejecting Truth for the Error's sake, or embracing the Error for the Truth's sake*; IX. *The first instanced in Heathen Philosophers,* XIII. *The second in Vulgar Heathen.* X. XI. XII. *Of* Philosophical Atheism, *and the grounds of it.* XIV. *The History of* Antiquity *very obscure.* XV. *The Question stated, where the true History of Ancient Times is to be found? in Heathen Histories, or only in Scripture?* XVI. *The want of Credibility in* Heathen Histories *asserted and proved by the general Defect for want of timely Records among Heathen Nations; the reason of it shewed from the first Plantations of the World.* XVII. *The manner of them discovered. The Original of* Civil Government. XVIII. *Of* Hieroglyphics. XIX. *The use of* Letters *among the* Greeks *no elder than* Cadmus; XX. *His Time enquired into: no elder than* Joshua: XXI. *The Learning brought into* Greece *by him.*

ENQUIRIES after Truth have that peculiar commendation above all other Designs, that they come on purpose to gratify the most noble Faculty of our Souls, and do most immediately tend to advance the highest perfection of our Rational Beings. For all our most laudable endeavours after Knowledge now, are only the gathering up of some scattered Fragments of what was once an entire Fabric, and the recovery of some precious Jewels which were lost out of sight, and sunk in the shipwrack of Humane Nature. That saying of *Plato, That all Knowledge is Remembrance, and all Ignorance Forgetfulness*, is a certain undoubted truth; if by Forgetfulness be meant the Loss, and by Remembrance the Recovery of those notions and conceptions of things which the Mind of Man once had in its pure and primitive State, wherein the Understanding was the truest Microcosm, in which all the Beings of the inferior World were faithfully represented according to their true, native, and genuine Perfections. GOD created the Soul of Man not only capable of finding out the Truth of I.

things, but furniſhed him with a ſufficient κριτήριον, or Touchſtone to diſcover Truth from Falſhood, by a Light ſet up in his Underſtanding, which if he had attended to, he might have ſecured himſelf from all Impoſtures and Deceits. As all other Beings were created in the full poſſeſſion of the agreeable Perfections of their ſeveral Natures, ſo was Man too; elſe God would have never cloſed the Work of Creation
Gen. 1. 31. with thoſe words, *And God ſaw all that he had made, and behold it was very good*, that is, endued with all thoſe Perfections which were ſuitable to their ſeveral Beings. Which Man had been moſt defective in, if his Underſtanding had not been endow'd with a large ſtock of Intellectual Knowledge, which is the moſt natural and genuine Perfection belonging to his Rational Being. For Reaſon being the moſt raiſed Faculty of Humane Nature, if that had been defective in its diſcoveries of Truth, which is its proper object, it would have argued the greateſt maim and imperfection in the Being it ſelf. For if it belongs to the perfection of the Senſitive Faculties to diſcern what is pleaſant from what is hurtful, it muſt needs be the perfection of the Rational to find out the difference of Truth from Falſhood. Not as tho' the Soul could then have had, any more than now, an actual notion of all the Beings in the World co-exiſting at the ſame time, but that it would have been free from all deceit in its Conceptions of things, which were not cauſed through inadvertency.

II. Which will appear from the ſeveral aſpects Man's Knowledge hath, which are either upwards towards his Maker, or abroad on his Fellow-Creatures. If we conſider that Contemplation of the Soul which fixes it ſelf on that infinite Being which was the cauſe of it, and is properly θεωρία; it will be found neceſſary for the Soul to be created in a clear and diſtinct knowledge of him, becauſe of Man's immediate obligation to obedience unto him. Which muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe the Knowledge of Him, whoſe Will muſt be his Rule: for if Man were not fully convinced in the firſt moment after his Creation of the Being of Him, whom he was to obey, his firſt work and duty would not have been Actual Obedience, but a Search whether there was any ſupreme, infinite, and eternal Being or no; and whereon his Duty to him was founded, and what might be ſufficient declaration of his Will and Laws, according to which he muſt regulate his obedience. The taking off all which doubts and ſcruples from the Soul of Man, muſt ſuppoſe him fully ſatisfied upon the firſt free uſe of Reaſon, that there was an Infinite Power and Being which produced him, and on that account had a right to command him in whatſoever he pleaſed, and that thoſe commands of his were declared to him in ſo certain a way, that he could not be deceived in the judging of them. The clear knowledge of God will further appear moſt neceſſary to Man in his firſt Creation, if we conſider that God created him for this end and purpoſe, To enjoy converſe,
Clemens *Protrept.* p. 63. and an humble familiarity with Himſelf; he had then ἔμφυτον πρὸς τὸν θεὸν κοινωνίαν, in the language of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Converſe with God was as natural to him as his Being was.* For Man, as he came firſt out of God's Hands, was the Reflection of God himſelf on a dark Cloud, the Iris of the Deity; the ſimilitude was the ſame, but the ſub-
Gen. 1. 26. ſtance different: Thence he is ſaid to be created after the Image of God. His knowledge then had been more intellectual than diſcurſive; not ſo much imploying his Faculties in the operoſe deductions of Reaſon (the pleaſant toyl of the Rational Faculties ſince the Fall) but had immediately

diately imploy'd them about the ſublimeſt objects; not about Quiddities and Formalities, but about Him who was the fountain of his Being, and the center of his Happineſs. There was not then ſo vaſt a difference between the Angelical and Humane Life: the Angels and Men both fed on the ſame dainties; all the difference was, They were in the ὑπερῷον, the upper room in Heaven, and Man in the ſummer parlor in Paradiſe.

If we take a view of Man's knowledge as it reſpects his Fellow-Creatures, we ſhall find theſe were ſo fully known to him on his firſt Creation, that he needed not to go to School to the wide World to gather up his conceptions of them. For the right exerciſe of that Dominion which he was inſtated in over the Inferior World, doth imply a particular knowledge of the Nature, Being and Properties of thoſe things which he was to make uſe of, without which he could not have improved them for their peculiar ends. And from this knowledge did proceed the giving the Creatures thoſe proper and peculiar Names which were expreſſive of their ſeveral Natures. For as *Plato* tells us, ὃ πάντα δημι- Plato *in* ουργὸν ὀνομάτων θεῖ, ἀλλὰ μόνον σκεῦον τ' ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσῃ ὄνομα ὃν ἐκφέρῃ: *The Impoſition of Names on things belongs not to every one, but only to him that hath a full proſpect into their ſeveral Natures.* For it is moſt agreeable to Reaſon, that Names ſhould carry in them a ſuitableneſs to the things they expreſs; for Words being for no other end but to expreſs our Conceptions of things, and our Conceptions being but εἰκόνες τῶν δυνάμεων πραγμάτων, as the ſame Philoſopher ſpeaks, *The Reſemblances and Repreſentations of the things*, it muſt need follow, that where there was a true knowledge, the Conceptions muſt agree with the Things; and Words being to expreſs our Conceptions, none are ſo fit to do it, as thoſe which are expreſſive of the ſeveral Natures of the things they are uſed to repreſent. For otherwiſe all the uſe of Words is to be a meer Vocabulary to the Underſtanding, and an Index to Memory, and of no further uſe in the purſuit of knowledge, than to let us know what Words men are agreed to call things by. But ſomething further ſeems to be intended in their firſt Impoſition, whence the *Jews* call it הברלת המינים as *Mercer* tells us, *a Separation and Diſtinction of* Mercerus *the ſeveral kind of Things:* and *Kircher* thus Paraphraſes the Words of *in Gen.* 2. *Moſes*; *and whatſoever* Adam *called every living creature, that was the* Kircher *Name thereof: i. e.* ſaith he, *Fuerunt illis vera & germana Nomina &* Oedip. Æ- *rerum Naturis propriè accommodata.* But however this be, we have this gypt. Tom. further evidence of that Height of knowledge which muſt be ſuppoſed cap. 1. in the firſt Man, that as he was the Firſt in his Kind, ſo he was to be the Standard and Meaſure of all that followed, and therefore could not want any thing of the due perfections of Humane Nature. And as the *Shekel* of the Sanctuary was, if not double to others, (as Men ordinarily miſtake) yet of a full and exact weight, becauſe it was to be the Standard for all other weights (which was the cauſe of its being kept in the Temple) ſo if the Firſt Man had not double the proportion and meaſure of knowledge which his Poſterity hath, if it was not running over in regard of Abundance, yet it muſt be preſſed down and ſhaken together in regard of weight; elſe he would be a very unfit Standard for us to judge by, concerning the due and ſuitable Perfections of Humane Nature.

But we need not have run ſo far back as the Firſt Man, to evince the knowledge of Truth to be the moſt natural Perfection of the Soul of

Man; for even among the preſent ruines of Humane Nature, we may find ſome ſuch noble and generous Spirits, that diſcern ſo much beauty in the face of Truth, that to ſuch as ſhould enquire what they find ſo attractive in it, their anſwer would be the ſame with *Ariſtotle*'s in a like caſe, it was τοῖς ἐρώτημα, *the Queſtion of thoſe who never ſaw it.* For ſo pleaſing is the enquiry, and ſo ſatisfactory the finding of Truth after the ſearch, that the reliſh of it doth far exceed the greateſt Epicuriſm of *Apicius*, or the moſt coſtly entertainments of *Cleopatra*; there being no Guſt ſo exquiſite as that of the Mind, nor any Jewels to be compared with Truth. Nor do any perſons certainly better deſerve the name of Men, than ſuch who allow their Reaſon a full employment, and think not the Erectneſs of Man's Stature a ſufficient diſtinction of him from Brutes. Of which thoſe may be accounted only a higher ſpecies, who can patiently ſuffer the impriſonment of their Intellectuals in a dungeon of Ignorance, and know themſelves to be Men only by thoſe characters, by which *Alexander* knew himſelf not to be a God, by their proneneſs to Intemperance and Sleep. So ſtrange a *Metempſychoſis* may there be without any change of Bodies; and *Euphorbus* his Soul might become a Brute without ever removing its lodging into the Body of an Aſs. So much will the Soul degenerate from it ſelf, if not improved; and in a kind of ſullenneſs ſcarce appear to be what it is, becauſe it is not improved to what it may be.

V. But, you'll ſay, if this knowledge of Truth be ſo great, ſo natural, ſo valuable a Perfection of Humane Nature, whence comes ſo much of the World to be over-run with Ignorance and Barbariſm? whence come ſo many pretenders to Knowledge, to court a Cloud inſtead of *Juno*? to pretend a love to Truth, and yet to fall down and worſhip Error? If there were ſo great a ſympathy between the Soul and Truth, there would be an impatient deſire after it, and a moſt ready embracing and cloſing with it. We ſee the Magnet doth not draw the Iron with greater force, than it ſeems to run with impatience into its cloſeſt embraces. If there had been formerly ſo intimate an acquaintance between the Soul and Truth, as *Socrates* fanſied of Friends in the other World, there would be an harmonious cloſure upon the firſt appearance, and no divorce to be after made between them.

True, but then we muſt conſider there is an intermediate ſtate between the former acquaintance, and the renewal of it, wherein all thoſe remaining Characters of mutual knowledge are ſunk ſo deep, and lie ſo hid, that there needs a new fire to be kindled to bring forth thoſe latent Figures, and make them again appear legible. And when once thoſe tokens are produced of the former Friendſhip, there are not more impatient longings, nor more cloſe embraces between the touched Needle and the Magnet, than there are between the Underſtanding and diſcovered Truth. But then withall, we are to conſider that they are but few whoſe Souls are awakened out of that Lethargy they are fallen into in this degenerate condition: the moſt are ſo pleaſed with their Sleep, that they are loth to diſturb their reſt; and ſet a higher price upon a lazy Ignorance, than upon a reſtleſs Knowledge. And even of thoſe, whoſe Souls are as it were between ſleeping and waking, what by reaſon of the remaining confuſion of the ſpecies in their Brains, what by the preſent dimneſs of their Sight, and the hovering uncertain Light they are to judge by, there are few that can put a difference between a meer Phantaſm and a real Truth. Of which theſe rational

accounts

accounts may be given, *viz.* Why ſo few pretenders to Knowledge do light on Truth.

VI. (1.) First, *Want of an impartial diligence in the ſearch of it.* Truth now muſt be ſought, and that with care and diligence, before we find it; Jewels do not uſe to lie upon the ſurface of the Earth: High-ways are ſeldom paved with Gold; what is moſt worth our finding, calls for the greateſt ſearch. If one that walks the Streets ſhould find ſome ineſtimable Jewel, or one that travels the Road meet with a bag of Gold, it would be but a ſilly deſign of any to walk the Street, or travel the Road, in hopes to meet with ſuch a purchaſe to make them rich. If ſome have happily light on ſome valuable Truths, when they minded nothing leſs than them, muſt this render a Diligence uſeleſs in inquiries after ſuch? No: Truth, tho' ſhe be ſo fair and pleaſing as to draw our affections, is yet ſo modeſt as to admit of being courted; and, it may be, deny the firſt ſuit, to highten our importunity. And certainly nothing hath oftner forbid the Banns between the Underſtanding and Truth inquired after, than Partiality and Preoccupation of Judgment, which makes Men enquire more diligently after the Dowry than the Beauty of Truth; its correſpondency to their Intereſts, than its evidence to their Underſtandings. An uſeful Error hath often kept the keys of the Mind for free admiſſion, when important Truths, but contrary to mens Preconceptions or Intereſt, have been forbidden entrance. Prejudice is the wrong byaſs of the Soul, that effectually keeps it from coming near the mark of Truth; nay, ſets it at the greateſt diſtance from it. There are few in the World that look after Truth with their own Eyes, moſt make uſe of Spectacles of others making, which makes them ſo ſeldom behold proper lineaments in the face of Truth; which the ſeveral tinctures from Education, Authority, Cuſtom and Prediſpoſition do exceedingly hinder men from diſcerning.

VII. (2.) Another Reaſon why there are ſo few who find Truth, when ſo many pretend to ſeek it, is, *That near reſemblance which Error often bears to Truth.* It hath been well obſerv'd, that Error ſeldom walks abroad the World in her own raiments; ſhe always borrows ſomething of Truth, to make her more acceptable to the World. It hath been always the ſubtilty of grand Deceivers to graft their greateſt Errors on ſome material Truths, to make them paſs more undiſcernible to all ſuch who look more at the Root on which they ſtand, than on the Fruits which they bring forth. It will hereafter appear how moſt of the groſſeſt of the Heathen Errors have, as *Plutarch* ſaith of the *Ægyptian* Fables, ἀμυδρὰς τινας ἐμφάσεις τ ἀληθείας, *ſome faint and obſcure reſemblances of Truth*; nay more than ſo, as moſt pernicious weeds are bred in the fatteſt ſoils, their moſt deſtructive Principles have been founded on ſome neceſſary and important Truths. Thus Idolatry doth ſuppoſe the Belief of the exiſtence of a Deity; and Superſtition the Immortality of the Souls of Men. The Devil could never have built his Chapels, but on the ſame ground whereon God's Temples ſtood; which makes me far leſs wonder than many do, at the meeting with many expreſſions concerning theſe Two grand Truths in the Writings of ancient Heathens; knowing how willing the Devil might be to have ſuch Principles ſtill owned in the World, which by his depraving of them, might be the nouriſhers of Idolatry and Superſtition. For the general knowledge of a Divine Nature, ſuppoſing men ignorant of the true God, did only lay a foundation to erect his idolatrous Temples upon; and the Belief of the Soul's

ſurviving

ſurviving the Body after death, without knowledge of the true way of attaining Happineſs, did make men more eager of embracing thoſe Rites and Ceremonies, which came with a pretence of ſhewing the way to a bleſſed Immortality.

VIII. Which may be a moſt probable reaſon, why Philoſophy and Idolatry did increaſe ſo much together as they did; for tho' right Reaſon fully improved, would have overthrown all thoſe curſed and idolatrous practices among the Heathens; yet Reaſon only diſcerning ſome general Notions without their particular application and improvement, did only diſpoſe the moſt ordinary ſort of people to a more ready entertainment of the moſt groſs Idolatry. For hereby they diſcern the neceſſity of ſome kind of Worſhip, but could not find out the right way of it; and therefore they greedily followed that which was commended to them, by ſuch who did withall agree with them in the common Sentiments of Humane Nature: Nay, and thoſe Perſons themſelves who were the great maintainers of the ſublimer Notions concerning God and the Soul of Man, were either the great Inſtruments of advancing that horrid Superſtition among them, as *Orpheus* and *Apollonius*, or very forward complyers with it, as many of the Philoſophers were. Altho' withall it cannot be denied to have been a wonderful diſcovery of Divine Providence, by theſe general Notions to keep waking the inward Senſes of Mens Souls, that thereby it might appear when Divine Revelation ſhould be manifeſted to them, that it brought nothing contrary to the common Principles of Humane Nature, but did only rectifie the depravations of it, and clearly ſhew men that way which they had long been ignorantly ſeeking after. Which was the excellent advantage the Apoſtle made of the Inſcription on the Altar at *Athens* to the unknown
17. 23. God; *Whom*, ſaith he, *ye ignorantly ſerve, him I declare unto you.* And which was the happy uſe the Primitive learned Chriſtians made of all thoſe Paſſages concerning the Divine Nature, and the Immortality of the Souls of Men, which they found in the Heathen Writers, thereby to evidence to the World that the main *Poſtulata* or Suppoſitions of Chriſtian Religion were granted by their own moſt admired men: and that Chriſtianity did not raſe out, but only build upon thoſe common Foundations, which were entertained by all who had any Name for Reaſon.

IX. Tho' this, I ſay, were the happy effect of this building Errors on common Truths to all that had the advantage of Divine Revelation to diſcern the one from the other; yet as to others who were deſtitute of
(1.) it, they were liable to this twofold great inconvenience by it. Firſt, *for the ſake of the apparent rottenneſs of the Superſtructures, to queſtion the ſoundneſs of the Foundations on which they ſtood.* And this I doubt not was the caſe of many conſiderative Heathens, who obſerving what monſtrous and unreaſonable way of Worſhip obtaining among the Heathen, and not being able by the ſtrength of their own Reaſon, thro' the want of Divine Revelation, to deduce any certain inſtituted Worſhip, they were ſhrewdly tempted to renounce thoſe Principles, when they could not but abhor the Concluſions drawn from them; for there is nothing more uſual than for men who exceedingly deteſt ſome abſurd Conſequence they ſee may be drawn from a Principle ſuppoſed, to reject the Principle it ſelf for the ſake of that Conſequence; which it may be doth not neceſſarily follow from it, but thro' the ſhortneſs of their own Reaſon doth appear to them to do ſo. Thus when the intelligent

Heathen

Heathen did apparently ſee that from the Principles of the Being of God, and the Immortality of Souls, did flow all thoſe natural and inhumane Sacrifices, all thoſe abſurd and ridiculous Rites, all thoſe execrable and profane Myſteries; out of a loathing the immoralities and impieties which attended theſe, they were brought to queſtion the very truth and certainty of thoſe Principles which were capable of being thus abuſed.

X. And therefore I am very prone to ſuſpect the Apology uſually made for *Protagoras*, *Diagoras*, and ſuch others of them who were accounted Atheiſts, to be more favourable than true, *viz.* That they only rejected thoſe Heathen Deities, and not the Belief of the Divine Nature. I ſhould think this account of their reputed Atheiſm rational, were it any ways evident that they did build their Belief of a Divine Nature, upon any other grounds than ſuch as were common to them with thoſe whoſe worſhip they ſo much derided. And therefore when the Heathens accuſed the Chriſtians of Atheiſm, I have full and clear evidence that no more could be meant thereby than the rejection of their way of Worſhip; becauſe I have ſufficient aſſurance from them that they did believe in a Divine Nature, and an inſtituted Religion moſt ſuitable to the moſt common received Notions of God, which they owned in oppoſition to all Heathen Worſhip. Which I find not in the leaſt pretended to by any of the forementioned perſons, nor any thing of any different way of Religion aſſerted, but only a deſtruction of that in uſe among them.

XI. And altho' the caſe of *Anaxagoras Clazomenius*, and the reſt of the *Ionic* Philoſophers, might ſeem very different from *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, and thoſe beforementioned, becauſe altho' they denied the Gods in vulgar repute to be ſuch as they were thought to be (as *Anaxagoras* call'd the Sun μύδρον διάπυρον, *a mere globe of fire*, for which he was condemned at *Athens* to baniſhment, and fined five *Talents*; yet the Learned *Voſſius* puts in this Plea in his behalf, That he was one that aſſerted the Creation of the World to flow from an eternal Mind:) altho' therefore, I ſay, the caſe of the *Ionic* Philoſophers may ſeem far different from the others, becauſe of their aſſerting the Production of the World (which from *Thales Mileſius* was conveyed by *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* to *Anaxagoras*) yet to one that throughly conſiders what they underſtood by their Eternal Mind, they may be ſooner cleared from the imputation of Atheiſm, than Irreligion. which two certainly ought in this caſe to be diſtinguiſhed; for it is very poſſible for men, meeting with ſuch inſuperable difficulties about the caſual concourſe of Atoms for the production of the World, or the eternal exiſtence of Matter, to aſſert ſome Eternal Mind, as the firſt Cauſe of theſe things, which yet they may imbrace only as an Hypotheſis in Philoſophy to ſolve the Phænomena of Nature with, but yet not to make this Eternal Mind the object of adoration. And ſo their aſſerting a Deity was only on the ſame account as the Tragedians uſed to bring in their Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, when their Fables were brought to ſuch an iſſue, and perplexed with ſo many difficulties, that they ſaw no way to clear them again, but to make ſome God come down upon the Stage to ſolve the difficulties they were ingaged in; or, as *Seneca* ſaith of many great Families, when they had run up their Genealogies ſo high that they could go no further, they then fetch'd their Pedigree from the Gods: So when theſe Philoſophers ſaw ſuch incongruities in aſſerting an infinite and eternal Series of Matter,

Voſſ. *de Idololat.* c. 1.

ter, they might by this be brought to acknowledge ſome active Principle which produced the World, tho' they were far enough from giving any religious worſhip to that Eternal Mind.

XII. Thus even *Epicurus* and his Followers would not ſtick to aſſert the Being of a God, ſo they might but circumſcribe him within the Heavens, and let him have nothing to do with things that were done on Earth. And how uncertain the moſt dogmatical of them all were, as to their opinions concerning the Being and Nature of their Gods, doth fully appear from the large Diſcourſes of *Tully* upon that ſubject: where is fully manifeſted their variety of opinions and mutual repugnancies, their ſelf-contradictions and inconſtancy in their own Aſſertions; which hath made me ſomewhat inclinable to think that the reaſon why many of them did to the world own a Deity, was, that they might not be Martyrs for Atheiſm: Which *Tully* likewiſe ſeems to acknowledge, when ſpeaking of the puniſhment of *Protagoras* for that Speech of his; *De diis neque ut ſint, neque ut non ſint, habeo dicere: Ex quo,* ſays he, *equidem exiſtimo tardiores ad hanc ſententiam profitendam multos eſſe factos, quippe cum pœnam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuiſſet.* So that for all the verbal aſſerting of a Deity among them, we have no certain evidence of their firm belief of it, and much leſs of any worſhip and ſervice they owed unto it. And tho', it may be, they could not totally excuſs the Notions of a Deity out of their minds, partly thro' that Natural Senſe which is engraven on the Souls of Men; partly, as being unable to ſolve the difficulties of Nature without a Deity; yet the obſerving the notorious vanities of Heathen Worſhip, might make them look upon it as a mere Philoſophical ſpeculation, and not any thing that had an influence upon the government of mens lives: For, as in Nature, the obſerving the great mixture of Falſhood and Truth, made the *Academicks* deny any certain κριτήριον, or *Rule of judging Truth*; and the *Scepticks* take away all certain Aſſent: ſo the ſame conſequence was unavoidable here, upon the ſame principle. And that made even *Plato* himſelf ſo ambiguous and uncertain in his Diſcourſes of a Deity; ſometimes making him an Eternal Mind, ſometimes aſſerting the whole World, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, Souls and all, to be Gods, and even thoſe that were worſhip'd among the Heathens, as *Tully* tells us out of his *Timæus* and *De Legibus*; which, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* there ſpeaks, *Et per ſe ſunt falſa & ſibi invicem repugnantia.* This is the firſt inconvenience following the mixture of truth and falſhood, *For the ſake of the falſhood to queſtion the truth it ſelf it was joyned with.*

Cicero *de Nat. Deor. l.* 1. *c.* 63.

XIII. (2.) The other is as great which follows, when truth and falſhood are mixed, *For the ſake of the Truth to embrace the Falſhood.* Which is a Miſtake as common as the other, becauſe men are apt to think, that things ſo vaſtly different as Truth and Falſhood could never blend or be incorporate together; therefore when they are certain they have ſome truth, they conclude no falſhood to be joyned with it. And this I ſuppoſe to have been the caſe of the more credulous and vulgar Heathen, as the other was of the Philoſophers; for they, finding Mankind to agree in this, not only that there is a God, but that he muſt be worſhip'd, did without ſcruple make uſe of the way of worſhip among them, as knowing there muſt be ſome, and they were ignorant of any elſe. And from hence they grew as confident believers of all thoſe Fables and Traditions on which their Idolatry was founded, as of thoſe firſt Principles and Notions from which the neceſſity of Divine Worſhip did ariſe.

And

And being thus habituated to the belief of these things; when Truth it self was divulged among them, they suspected it to be only a corruption of some of their Fables. This *Celsus* the *Epicurean* on all occasions in his Books against the *Christians* did fly to. Thus he saith the building of the Tower of *Babel*, and the confusion of Tongues, was taken from the Fable of the *Aloïdæ* in *Homer*'s *Odysseis*; the story of the Floud, from *Deucalion*; Paradise, from *Alcinoüs* his Gardens; the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, from the Story of *Phaëton*. Which *Origen* well refutes, from the far greater antiquity of those relations among the *Jews*, than any among the *Greeks*: and therefore the corruption of the tradition was in them, and not in the *Jews*. Which must be our only way for finding out which was the original, and which the corruption; by demonstrating the undoubted antiquity of one beyond the other, whereby we must do as *Archimedes* did by the Crown of *Hiero*, find out the exact proportions of Truth and Falshood which lay in those Heathen Fables. Orig. c. Cels. l. 4. p. 174, 175.

XIV. And this now leads to the third Account, Why Truth is so hardly discerned from Error, even by those who search after it, which is *The great obscurity of the History of Ancient Times*, which should decide the Controversie. For there being an universal agreement in some common principles, and a frequent resemblance in particular traditions, we must of necessity, for the clearing the truth from its corruption, have recourse to ancient History, to see if thereby we can find out where the Original ttadition was best preserved, by what means it came to be corrupted, and whereby we may distinguish those corruptions from the Truths to which they are annexed. Which is the design and subject of our future discourse, *viz.* 'To demonstrate that there was a certain 'original and general tradition preserved in the World concerning the 'eldest Ages of the World; that this tradition was gradually corrupted 'among the Heathens; that notwithstanding this corruption there were 'sufficient remainders of it to evidence its true original; that the full account of this tradition is alone preserved in those Books we call *Scriptures*: That where any other History seems to cross the report contained in them, we have sufficient ground to question their credibility; and that there is sufficient evidence to clear the undoubted certainty of that History which is contained in the Sacred Records of 'Scripture. Wherein we shall observe the same method, which *Thales* took in taking the hight of the Pyramids, by measuring the length of their shadow; so shall we the hight and antiquity of Truth from the extent of the fabulous Corruptions of it. Which will be a work of so much the greater difficulty, because the truth we pursue after takes cover in so great antiquity, and we must be forced to follow its most flying footsteps thro' the dark and shady paths of ancient History. For tho' History be frequently called the Light of Truth, and the Herald of Times, yet that Light is so faint and dim, especially in Heathen Nations, as not to serve to discover the face of Truth from her counterfeit, Error; and that Herald so little skill'd, as not to be able to tell us which is of the elder House. The reason is; tho' Truth be always of greater Antiquity, yet Error may have the more wrinkled face, by which it often imposeth on such who guess antiquity by deformity, and think nothing so old as that which can give the least account of its own age. This is evidently the case of those who make the pretence of ancient History a plea for Infidelity, and think no argument more plausible to impugn the certainty of Divine Revelation, than the seeming repug-

nancy of ſome pretended Hiſtories with the account of ancient time reported in the *Bible*. Which being a pretext ſo unworthy, and deſigned for ſo ill an end, and ſo frequently made uſe of, by ſuch who account Infidelity a piece of antiquity as well as of reaſon, it may be worth our while to ſhew, That the Scriptures are no more liable to be baffled with Reaſon, than to be confuted by Antiquity.

XV. In order therefore to the removing of this ſtumbling-block in our way, I ſhall firſt evince, *That there is no certain credibility in any of thoſe ancient hiſtories which ſeem to contradict the Scriptures*, nor any ground of reaſon why we ſhould aſſent to them, when they differ from the *Bible:* and then prove, That all thoſe undoubted characters of a moſt certain and authentick hiſtory are legible in thoſe records contained in Scripture. Whereby we ſhall not only ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of infidelity, but the rational evidence which our faith doth ſtand on as to theſe things. I ſhall demonſtrate the firſt of theſe, *viz.* That there is no ground of aſſent to any ancient hiſtories which give account of things different from the Scriptures, from theſe arguments; The apparent defect, weakneſs and inſufficiency of them as to the giving an account of elder times; The monſtrous confuſion, ambiguity and uncertainty of them in the account which they give; The evident partiality of them to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. I begin with the firſt of theſe, the defect and inſufficiency of them to give ſuch an account of elder times as may amount to certain credibility: which if cleared, will of it ſelf be ſufficient to manifeſt the incompetency of thoſe records, as to the laying any foundation for a firm aſſent to be given to them. Now this defect and inſufficiency of thoſe hiſtories is either more general, which lies in common to them all; or ſuch as may be obſerved in a particular conſideration of the hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations, which have pretended higheſt to antiquity.

XVI. The general defect is, *The want of timely records to preſerve their hiſtories in.* For it is moſt evident, that the trueſt hiſtory in the world is liable to various corruptions thro' length of time, if there be no certain way of preſerving it entire. And that, thro' the frailty of memory in thoſe who had integrity to preſerve it; through the gradual increaſe of barbariſm and ignorance, where there are no ways of inſtruction; and thro' the ſubtilty of ſuch, whoſe intereſt it may be to corrupt and alter that tradition. If we find ſuch infinite variety and difference in men's accounts, as to the hiſtories of their own times, when they have all poſſible means to be acquainted with the truth of them; what account can we imagin can be given, where there was no way of preſerving to poſterity the moſt authentick relation of former Ages? Eſpecially, it being moſt evident, that where any certain way of preſerving tradition is wanting, a People muſt ſoon degenerate into the greateſt ſtupidity and barbariſm: becauſe all will be taken up in minding their own petty concerns, and no encouragement at all given to ſuch publick ſpirits, who would mind the credit of the whole Nation. For what was there for ſuch to employ themſelves upon, or ſpend their time in, when they had no other kind of learning among them, but ſome general traditions conveyed from father to ſon, which might be learned by ſuch who followed nothing but domeſtick employments? So that the Sons of *Noah*, after their ſeveral diſperſions and plantations of ſeveral Countries, did gradually degenerate into ignorance and barbariſm: For, upon their firſt ſetling in any Country, they found it employment ſufficient to cultivate

tivate the Land, and make habitations to live in, and to provide themſelves of neceſſaries for their mutual comfort and ſubſiſtence. Beſides this, they were often put to removes from one place to another, where they could not conveniently reſide; which *Thucydides* ſpeaks much of as to the ancient ſtate of *Greece*: and it was a great while before they came to imbody themſelves together in Towns and Cities, and from thence to ſpread into Provinces, and to ſettle bounds and extents of their Territories. The firſt Age after the plantation of a Country being thus ſpent, the next ſaw it neceſſary to fall cloſe to the work of huſbandry, not only to get ſomething out of the earth for their ſubſiſtence; but when by their diligence they had ſo far improved the Ground, that they had not only enough for themſelves, but to ſpare to others, they then found out a way for commerce one with another by exchange. This way of traffick made them begin to raiſe their hopes higher, of enriching themſelves; which when ſome of them had done, they bring the poorer under their power, and reign as Lords over them; theſe rich, with their dependents, ſtrive to outvye each other; whence came wars and mutual contentions, till they who got the better over their adverſaries, took ſtill greater authority into their hands: thence at firſt every City almoſt, and adjacent Territory, had a King over it; which by conflicting with each other, at laſt brought ſeveral Cities and Territories under the power of one particular perſon, who thereby came to reign as ſole Monarch over all within his Dominions.

XVII. For altho' there be ſome reaſon to think, that the Leaders of ſeveral Colonies had at firſt ſuperiority over all that went with them; yet there being evidence in few Nations of any continued ſucceſſion of Monarchs from the poſterity of *Noah*, and ſo great evidence of ſo many petty Royalties almoſt in every City (as we read of ſuch multitudes of Kings in the ſmall Territory of *Canaan*, when *Joſhua* conquered it,) this makes it at leaſt probable to me, that after the death of the firſt Leader, by reaſon of their poverty and diſperſedneſs of habitations, they did not incorporate generally into any Civil government under one head, but did riſe by degrees in the manner before ſet down; but yet ſo, that in the petty diviſions ſome prerogative might be given to him who derived his pedigree the neareſt from the firſt Founder of that plantation; which in all probability is the meaning of *Thucydides*, who tells us, when the riches of *Greece* began to increaſe, and their Power improved, Tyrannies were erected in moſt Cities, πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ὅπου ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πάλαι καὶ βασιλεῖαι, *for before that time Kingdoms with honors limited were hereditary*; for ſo the Scholiaſt explains it, πάλαι καὶ βασιλεῖαι ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων παραλαμβανόμεναι κατὰ διαδοχὴν γένους. This then being the ſtate and caſe of moſt Nations in the firſt ages after their plantation, there was no likelihood at all of any great improvement in knowledge among them; nay ſo far from it, that for the firſt ages, wherein they conflicted with poverty and neceſſity, there was a neceſſary decay among them, of what knowledge had been conveyed to them: becauſe their neceſſities kept them in continual employment; and after they conquered Them, they began to conquer each other: ſo that till ſuch time as they were ſettled in peace under eſtabliſhed Common-wealths, there was no leiſure nor opportunity for any Arts or Sciences to flouriſh, without which all certain Hiſtories of their own former ſtate muſt vaniſh and dwindle into ſome fabulous ſtories. And ſo we find they did in moſt Nations; which thence are able to give no other account of themſelves,

Thucyd. *l.* I. *p.* 10. *Ed. Port.*

but that they ſprung out of the earth where they lived; from which opinion the *Athenians* uſed to wear of old their golden Graſhoppers, as *Thucydides* relates. What account can we then expect of ancient times from ſuch Nations which were ſo defective in preſerving their own Originals?

XVIII. Now this defectiveneſs of giving teſtimony of ancient times by theſe Nations, will further appear by theſe two conſiderations: *Firſt*, What ways there are for communicating knowledge to poſterity. *Secondly*, How long it was ere theſe Nations came to be Maſters of any way of certain communicating their conceptions to their Succeſſors. Three general ways there are whereby knowledge may be propagated from one to another; by repreſentative Symbols, by Speech, and by Letters. The firſt of theſe was moſt common in thoſe elder times, for which purpoſe *Clemens Alexandrinus* produceth the teſtimony of an ancient Grammarian *Dionyſius Thrax* in his Expoſition of the ſymbol of the Wheels:

Clem. Alexan. Strom. l. 5. ἐσήμαινον γὰρ ἃ διὰ λέξεως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ συμβόλων ἔνιοι τὰς πράξεις: *That ſome perſons made a repreſentation of their actions to others, not only by ſpeech, but by ſymbols too.* Which any one who is any ways converſant in the Learning of thoſe ancient times, will find to have been the chief way of propagating it (ſuch as it was) from one to another: as is evident in the Hieroglyphicks of the *Ægyptians*, and the cuſtom of Symbols from thence derived among the *Grecian* Philoſophers, eſpecially the *Pythagoreans*. It was the ſolemn cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to wrap up all the little knowledge they had, under ſuch myſtical repreſentations, which were unavoidably clog'd with two inconveniences very unſuitable to the propagation of knowledge, which were Obſcurity and Ambiguity. For it not only coſt them a great deal of time to gather up ſuch Symbolical things which might repreſent their conceptions; but when they had pitched upon them, they were liable to a great variety of Interpretations, as is evident in all thoſe remainders of them, preſerved by the induſtry of ſome ancient Writers. As in their κρυσοῖσι, or *golden Images of their Gods*, they had ingraved two Dogs, an Hawk and an Ibis. By the Dogs ſome underſtood the two Hemiſpheres, others the two Tropicks; by the Hawk ſome underſtood the Sun, others the Æquinoctial; by the Ibis, ſome the Moon, others the Zodiack, as is evident in *Clemens*, who reports it. This way then is a moſt unfit way to convey any ancient tradition; by being both obſcure, ambiguous, and unable to expreſs ſo much as to give any certain light to future ages of the paſſages of the precedent.

XIX. The other ways of conveying knowledge, are either by Speech, or by Letters. The firſt muſt be by ſome vocal Cabala, delivered down from father to ſon: but Words being of ſo periſhing a nature, and man's Memory ſo weak and frail in retaining them, it is neceſſary for a certain communication of knowledge, that ſome way ſhould be found out more laſting than Words, more firm than Memory, more faithful than Tradition: which could not otherwiſe be imagined, than that the Author of his own conceptions ſhould himſelf leave them to the view of all poſterity; in order to which, ſome way muſt be contrived whereby mens Voices might be ſeen, and mens Fingers ſpeak. But how to expreſs all kind of ſounds, with the ſeveral draughts of a pen, and to confine them within the compaſs of twenty-four letters, is deſervedly called by *Galileo, admirandarum omnium inventionum humanarum ſignaculum, the choiceſt of all humane inventions.* And had we no other evidence of the

great

great obſcurity of ancient hiſtory, the great difference as to the firſt inventor of letters, would be a ſufficient demonſtration of it. For almoſt every Nation hath had a ſeveral Author of them: The *Jews* derive them from *Adam* or *Moſes*; the *Ægyptians* attribute their invention to *Thoyt* or *Mercury*; the *Grecians* to *Cadmus*; the *Phœnicians* to *Taautus*; the *Latins* to *Saturn*; others to the *Æthiopians:* and leſt the *Pygmies* ſhould be without their enemies, ſome think they were found out *à grunm volatu*, from the manner of the flying of Cranes. Thus it hath happened with moſt Nations; what was firſt among themſelves, they thought to be the firſt in the world.

XX. But by whomſoever they were firſt invented, we are certain they were but lately in uſe in that Nation, which hath moſt vainly arrogated the moſt to it ſelf in point of Antiquity, and yet had the leaſt reaſon, I mean, the *Grecians*. Thence the Ægyptian Prieſt *Patenit* truly told *Solon, the Greeks were always children*, becauſe they had nothing of the antiquities of former ages. If we may believe *Joſephus*, they had no Writings earlier than *Homer*; but herein he is conceived to have ſerved his cauſe too much, becauſe of the Inſcription of *Amphitryo* at *Thebes* in the Temple of *Apollo Iſmenius* in the *Ionic* letters and two others of the ſame age to be ſeen in *Herodotus*; and becauſe of the Writings of *Lycus*, *Orpheus*, *Muſæus*, *Orochantius Troezenius*, *Thaletas*, *Meleſander*, and others. This we are certain of, the *Grecians* had not the uſe of letters among them 'till the time of *Cadmus* the *Phœnician*'s coming into *Greece*, whither he came to plant a Colony of *Phœnicians*, whence aroſe the ſtory of his purſuit of *Europa*, as *Conon* in *Photius* tells us.

Procl. in Tim. Plat. *Joſeph. c. App. lib. 1.* *Herodot. lib. 5.* *V. Bochar. Geograph. Sacr. p. 2. l. 2. c. 20.* *Conon apud Phot. Bibl. l. 37.*

And it is very probable, which learned men have long ſince obſerved, that the name *Cadmus* comes from the *Hebrew* קדם *Kedem*, and may relate as an appellative either to his Dignity, as *Junius* in his *Academia* conjectures, or more probably to his Country, the Eaſt, which is frequently call'd *Kedem* in Scripture. Some have conjectured further, that his proper name was עוג *Og*; upon what reaſon I know not, unleſs from hence, that thence by a duplication of the word came the *Greek* Ὠγυγος, who ſeems to have been no other than *Cadmus*, as will appear by comparing their ſtories together. Only one was the name his memory was preſerved by at *Athens*, where the *Cadmeans* inhabited, as appears by the *Gephyræi*, who *Herodotus* tells us were *Phœnicians* that came with *Cadmus*; and others fanſie the *Academia* there was originally called *Cadmea*; and the name *Cadmus* was preſerved chiefly among the *Bœotians* in memory of the Country whence he came: it being likely to be impos'd by them upon his firſt landing in the Country; as many learned perſons conceive, the name of an *Hebrew* was given to *Abraham* by the *Canaanites*, upon his paſſing over the river *Euphrates*. On this account then it ſtands to reaſon, that the name which was given him as a ſtranger, ſhould be longeſt preſerved in the place where it was firſt impoſed. Or if we take קדם in the other ſenſe, as it imports Antiquity; ſo there is ſtill a higher probability of the affinity of the names of *Cadmus* and *Ogyges*; for it is certain, that the *Greeks* had no higher name for a matter of antiquity, than to call it Ὠγύγιον, as the Scholiaſt on *Heſiod*, *Heſychius*, *Suidas*, *Euſtathius* on *Dionyſius*, and many others obſerve. And which yet advanceth the probability higher, *Lucatius* or *Lactantius* the Scholiaſt on *Statius*, tells us, the other *Greeks* had this from the *Thebanes*; for, ſaith he, *Thebani res antiquas Ogygias nominabant*. But that which puts it almoſt beyond meer probability, is, that

Hiſt. l. 5. *Lactantius in Statii Theb. l. 1.*

Varro,

Varro, *Feſtus*, *Pauſanias*, *Apollonius*, *Æſchylus*, and others make *Ogyges* the Founder of the *Bœotian Thebes*, which were thence called *Ogygiæ*; and *Strabo* and *Stephanus* further ſay, that the whole Country of *Bœotia* was called *Ogygia*: now all that mention the Story of *Cadmus*, attribute to him the founding of the *Bœotian Thebes*. And withall it is obſervable, that in the *Vatican* Appendix of the *Greek Proverbs*, we read *Cadmus* called *Ogyges*; Ὠγύγια κακά, ὅτι τὴν ὀχλησάν, ἐπεὶ συνέζη Κάδμον τὸν Ὠγύγην διὰ τὰς θυγατέρας κακοῖς περιπεσεῖν. *Meurſius* indeed would have it corrected, Κάδμον τὸν Ὠγύγε, as it is read in *Suidas*; but by the favour of ſo learned a man, it ſeems more probable that *Suidas* ſhould be corrected by that; he bringing no other evidence of any ſuch perſon as *Cadmus* a Son of *Ogyges*, but only that reading in *Suidas*; whereas we have diſcovered many probable grounds to make them both the ſame. That which I would now infer from hence is, the utter impoſſibility of the *Greeks* giving us any certain account of ancient times, when a thing ſo modern in compariſon as *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is thought by them a matter of ſo great antiquity, that when they would deſcribe a thing very ancient, they deſcribed it by the name of *Ogyges*, who was the ſame with *Cadmus*. Now *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is generally, by Hiſtorians, placed about the time of *Joſhua*, whence ſome (I will not ſay how happily) have conjectured, that *Cadmus* and his company were ſome of the *Canaanites* who fled from *Joſhua*, as others are ſuppoſed to have done into *Africa*, if *Procopius* his Pillar hath ſtrength enough to bear ſuch a conjecture. But there is too great a confuſion about the time of *Cadmus* his arrival in *Greece*, to affirm any thing with any great certainty about it.

Vatic. App. Cent. 4. Prov. 52.

Meurſius de Regno Att. Lib. 8. c. 5.

Yet thoſe who diſagree from that former Computation, place it yet lower. *Voſſius* makes *Agenor Cadmus*'s Father contemporary with the latter end of *Moſes*, or the beginning of *Joſhua*; and ſo *Cadmus* his time muſt fall ſomewhat after. *Jac. Capellus* placeth *Cadmus* in the third year of *Othoniel*. The Author of the *Greek* Chronicle, in the *Marmora Arundeliana*, makes his coming to *Greece* to be in the time of *Helen* the ſon of *Deucalion*; which *Capellus* fixeth on the 73. of *Moſes*, *A. M.* 2995. But Mr. *Selden* conceives it ſomewhat lower: and ſo it muſt be, if we follow *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who places it in the time of *Lynceus* King of the *Argives*, which he ſaith was ἐνδεκάτῃ ὕστερον Μωσέως γενεᾷ, *in the eleventh Generation after Moſes*, which will fall about the time of *Samuel*: But tho' it ſhould be ſo late, it would be no wonder it ſhould be reckoned a matter of ſo great antiquity among the *Grecians*; for the eldeſt Records they have of any King at *Athens*, began at the time of *Moſes*, whoſe contemporary *Cecrops* is generally thought to be; for at *Cecrops* his time it is the Marble Chronicle begins. Now that the *Grecians* did receive their Letters from the *Phœnicians* by *Cadmus*, is commonly acknowledged by the moſt learned of the *Greeks* themſelves, as appears by the Ingenuous confeſſion of *Herodotus*, *Philoſtratus*, *Critias* in *Athenæus*, *Zenodotus* in *Laertius*, *Timon Phliaſius* in *Sextus Empiricus*, and many others: ſo that it were to no purpoſe to offer to prove that, which they who arrogate ſo much to themſelves, do ſo freely acknowledge. Which yet hath been done to very good purpoſe by *Joſeph Scaliger* and *Bochartus*, and many others from the form of the Letters, the order of the name of them. It ſeems probable that at firſt they might uſe the form of the *Phœnician* Letters, in which *Herodotus* tells us the three old Inſcriptions were extant; and *Diodorus* tells us, that the braſs

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.

Strom. 1.

Scalig. Not. in Euſeb. Chron. n. 1617.

Bochart Geogr. p. 3. l. 1. cap. 20.

braſs pot which *Cadmus* offered to *Minerva Lindia*, had an inſcription on it in the *Phœnician* Letters: but afterwards the form of the Letters came by degrees to be changed, when for their greater expedition in writing they left the old way of writing towards the left hand, for the natural and expedite way of writing towards the right, by which they exchanged the ſites of the ſtrokes in ſeveral Letters, as it is obſerved by the fore-cited Learned Authors.

Not that the old *Ionic* Letters were nearer the *Phœnician*, and diſtinct from the modern, as *Joſ. Scaliger* in his learned Diſcourſe on the original of the *Greek* Letters, conceives; for the *Ionic* Letters were nothing elſe but the full Alphabet of twenty-four, with the additions of *Palamedes*, and *Simonides Ceus*; as *Pliny* tells us, that all the *Greeks* conſented in the uſe of the *Ionic* Letters: but the old *Attic* Letters came nearer the *Phœnician*, becauſe the *Athenians*, long after the Alphabet was increaſed to xxiv, continued ſtill in the uſe of the old 16, which were brought in by *Cadmus*; which muſt needs much alter the way of writing: for in the old Letters they writ THEOΣ for Θεὸς, which made *Pliny*, with a great deal of learning and truth, ſay, that the old *Greek* Letters were the ſame with the *Roman*. Thence the *Greeks* called their ancient Letters Ἀττικὰ γεγράμματα, as appears by * *Harpocration* and *Heſychius*; not that they were ſo much diſtinct from others, but becauſe they did not admit of the addition of the other eight Letters.

Scalig. ibid.

Plin. Hiſt. 7. cap. 57.

XXI.

We ſee then the very Letters of the *Greeks* were no elder than *Cadmus*; and for any conſiderable Learning among them, it was not near ſo old. Some aſſert indeed that Hiſtory began from the time of *Cadmus*; but it is by a miſtake of Him for a younger *Cadmus*, which was *Cadmus Mileſius*, whom *Pliny* makes to be the firſt Writer in Proſe; but That he after attributes to *Pherecydes Syrius*, and Hiſtory to *Cadmus Mileſius*: and therefore I think it far more probable, that it was ſome writing of this latter *Cadmus*, which was tranſcribed and epitomized by *Bion Proconeſius*, altho' *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſeems to attribute it to the elder. We ſee how unable then the *Grecians* were to give an account of elder times, that were guilty of ſo much infancy and nonage, as to begin to learn their Letters almoſt in the noon-tide of the World, and yet long after this to the time of the firſt *Olympiad* all their relations are accounted fabulous. A fair account then we are like to have from them of the firſt Antiquities of the World, who could not ſpeak plain truth, 'till the World was above three thouſand years old; for ſo was it when the *Olympiads* began.

V. Mauſſacum in Harpocr.

Salmaſ. in Conſecr. Templ. p. 30.

Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. 5. c. 29. l. 7. c. 57.

Clem. Strom. l. 6.

So true is the obſervation of *Juſtin Martyr*, οὐδὲν Ἕλλησι περὶ τῶν Ὀλυμπάδων ἀκριβὲς ἱστόρηται; *the Greeks had no exact hiſtory of themſelves before the Olympiads*; but of that more afterwards.

This is now the firſt Defect which doth infringe the credibility of theſe Hiſtories, which is *the want of timely and early Records* to digeſt their own Hiſtory in.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory.

I. *The particular defect in the Hiſtory of the moſt learned Heathen Nations.* II. *Firſt the* Phœnicians. *Of* Sanchoniathon, *his Antiquity and Fidelity.* III. *Of* Jerom-baal, Baal-Berith. IV. *The Antiquity of* Tyre. Scaliger *vindicated againſt* Bochartus. V. Abibalus. VI. *The vanity of the* Phœnician *Theology.* VII. *The imitation of it by the* Gnoſtics. VIII. *Of the* Ægyptian *Hiſtory.* IX. *The Antiquity and Authority of* Hermes Triſmegiſtus. X. *Of his Inſcriptions on Pillars, tranſcribed by* Manetho. XI. *His Fabulouſneſs thence diſcovered.* Terra Seriadica. XII. *Of* Seth's *Pillars in* Joſephus, *and an account whence they were taken.*

I. HAving already ſhewed a general defect in the ancient Heathen Hiſtories, as to an account of ancient times; we now come to a cloſer, and more particular conſideration of the Hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations which have born the greateſt name in the world for Learning and Antiquity. There are four Nations chiefly which have pretended the moſt to antiquity in the learned World, and whoſe Hiſtorians have been thought to deliver any thing contrary to Holy Writ in their account of ancient times, whom on that account we are obliged more particularly to conſider; and thoſe are the *Phœnicians*, *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and *Græcians*; we ſhall therefore ſee what evidence of credibility there can be in any of theſe, as to the matter of antiquity of their Records, or their Hiſtories taken from them. And the credibility of an Hiſtorian depending much upon the certainty and authority of the Records he makes uſe of, we ſhall both conſider of what value and antiquity the pretended Records are, and particularly look into the age of the ſeveral Hiſtorians. As to the *Græcians*, we have ſeen already an utter impoſſibility of having ancient Records among them, becauſe they wanted the means of preſerving them, having ſo lately borrowed their Letters from other Nations. Unleſs as to their account of times they had been as careful, as the old *Romans* were, to number their years by the ſeveral *clavi* or *nails*, which they fixed on the Temple-doors: which yet they were not in a capacity to do; not growing up in an entire body, as the *Roman* Empire did; but lying ſo much ſcattered and divided into ſo many petty Republicks, that they minded very little of concernment to the whole Nation. The other three Nations have deſervedly a name of far greater antiquity than any the *Græcians* could ever pretend to; who yet were unmeaſurably guilty of an impotent affection of Antiquity; and arrogating to themſelves, as growing on their own ground, what was with a great deal of pains and induſtry gathered but as the gleanings from the fuller harveſt of thoſe Nations they reſorted to. Which is not only true as to the greateſt part of their learning, but as to the account likewiſe they give of ancient times; the chief and moſt ancient Hiſtories among them being only a corruption of the Hiſtory of the elder Nations, eſpecially *Phœnicia*

nicia and *Ægypt*: for of these two *Philo Byblius* the translator of the ancient *Phœnician* Historian *Sanchoniathon*, saith, *they were* παλαιότατοι τῆς Βαρβάρων, παρ' ὧν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ παρέλαβον ἄνθρωποι, *the most ancient of all the Barbarians, from whom the others derived their Theology*; which he there particularly instanceth in. *Philo Bybl. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 8. p. 23. Ed. R. St.*

II. We begin therefore with the *Phœnician* History, whose most ancient and famous Historian is *Sanchoniathon*, so much admired and made use of by the shrewdest antagonist ever Christianity met with, the Philosopher *Porphyrius*. But therein was seen the wonderful Providence of God, that out of this *Eater* came forth *Meat*, and out of the *Lion*, *Honey*; that the most considerable testimonies by him produced against our Religion, were of the greatest strength to refute his own. For he being of too great Learning to be satisfied with the vain pretences of the *Græcians*, he made it his business to search after the most ancient Records, to find out somewhat in them to confront with the antiquity of the Scriptures; but upon his search could find none of greater veneration than the *Phœnician* History, nor any Author contending for age with this *Sanchoniathon*. Yet when he had made the most of his Testimony, he was fain to yield him younger than *Moses*, tho' he supposeth him elder than the *Trojan* Wars. And yet herein was he guilty of a most gross ἀντιστιχία, not much exceeding the *Græcians* in his skill in Chronology, when he makes *Semiramis* coexistent with the Siege of *Troy*: as is evident in his testimony produced at large by *Eusebius* out of his first *Book against the Christians*; nay, he goes to prove the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s History by the agreement of it with that of *Moses* concerning the *Jews*, both as to their Names and Places, ἰσχυεῖ ὃ τὰ περὶ Ἰουδαίων ἀληθέστατα, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τόποις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν αὐτῶν τὰ συμφωνότατα: whereby he doth evidently assert the greater Truth and Antiquity of *Moses* his History, when he proves the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s from consonancy with that. *Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 10. c. 8. p. 285.*

III. Two things more *Porphyry* insists on to manifest his credibility; the one I suppose relates to what he reports concerning the *Jews*, the other concerning the *Phœnicians* themselves. For the first, that he made use of the Records of *Jerom-baal* the Priest of the God *Ieuo*, or rather *Iao*; for the other, that he used all the Records of the several Cities, and the sacred Inscriptions in the Temples. Who that *Jerom-baal* was, is much discussed among Learned men, the finding out of which hath been thought to be the most certain way to determine the age of *Sanchoniathon*. The learned *Bochartus* conceives him to be *Gideon*, who in Scriptures is called *Jerub-baal*, which is of the same sense in the *Phœnician* Language, only after their custom changing one *b* into *m*, as in *Ambubajæ*, *Sambuca*, &c. But admitting the conjecture of this learned person concerning *Jerub-baal*, yet I see no necessity of making *Sanchoniathon* and him contemporary; for I no where find any thing mentioned in *Porphyry* implying that, but only that he made use of the Records of *Jerub-baal*, which he might very probably do at a considerable distance of time from him; whether by those ὑπομνήματα, we mean the Annals written by him, or the Records concerning his actions: either of which might have given *Sanchoniathon* considerable light in the history either of the *Israelites* or *Phœnicians*. And it is so much the more probable, because presently after the death of *Gideon*, the *Israelites* worshipped *Baal-berith*; by which most probably is meant the Idol of *Berith* or *Berytus*, the place where *Sanchoniathon* lived; by which means the *Bochart. Geogr. Sac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.* *Judg 8. 33.*

Berytians might come eaſily acquainted with all the remarkable paſſages of *Jerub-baal*.

IV. But I cannot conceive how *Sanchoniathon* could be contemporary with *Gideon*, (which, if he were, he falls 182 years ſhort of *Moſes*,) eſpecially becauſe the building of *Tyre*, which that Author mentions as an ancient thing (as hath been obſerved by *Scaliger*) is by our beſt Chronologers placed about the time of *Gideon*, and about 65 years before the deſtruction of *Troy*. I know *Bochartus*, to avoid this argument, hath brought ſome evidence of ſeveral places called *Tyrus* in *Phœnicia*, from *Scylax* his *Periplus*; but none that there was any more than one *Tyrus* of any great repute for antiquity. Now this *Tyrus Joſephus* makes but 240 years elder than *Solomon*'s Temple, and *Juſtin* but one year elder than the deſtruction of *Troy*. Neither can any account be given why *Sidon* ſhould be ſo much celebrated by ancient Poets, as *Strabo* tells us, when *Tyre* is not ſo much as mentioned by *Homer*; if the famous *Tyre* were of ſo great antiquity and repute as is pretended. It cannot be denied but that there is mention in Scripture of a *Tyre* elder than this we ſpeak of, *Joſhua* 19. 29. which ſome think to be that which was called *Palætyrus*, which *Strabo* makes to be 20 furlongs diſtant from the great *Tyre*; but *Pliny* includes *Palætyrus* within the circumference of *Tyre*, and ſo makes the whole circuit of the City to be 19 miles. It is not to me ſo certain to what place the name *Palætyrus* refers, whether to any *Tyrus* before the firſt building of the great *Tyre*, or to the ruins of the great *Tyre* after its deſtruction by *Nebuchadnezzar*, compared with the new *Tyre*, which was built more inward to the Sea, and was after beſieged by *Alexander* the Great. It may ſeem probable that *Palætyrus* may relate to the ruins of the great *Tyre*, in that it was after included in its circuit, and chiefly becauſe of the prediction in *Ezekiel* 26. 4. *Thou ſhalt be built no more*; for the *Tyre* erected after, was built not on the Continent, but almoſt in the Sea. If ſo, then *Palætyrus* or the *old* famous *Tyrus* might ſtand upon a rock upon the brink of the Continent: and ſo the great argument of *Bochartus* is eaſily anſwered, which is, *that after it is mentioned in* Sanchoniathon's *Hiſtory, that* Hypſouranius *dwelt in* Tyre, *upon the falling out between him and his brother* Uſous, Uſous *firſt adventured* εἰς θάλασσαν ἐμβῆναι, *to go to Sea*, which ſaith he, *evidently manifeſts that the* Tyre *mentioned by* Sanchoniathon *was not the famous Inſular* Tyrus, *but ſome other* Tyre. This argument, I ſay, is now eaſily anſwered, if the famous *Tyre* before its deſtruction by *Nebuchadnezzar* did ſtand upon the Continent; for then it might be the old famous *Tyre* ſtill, notwithſtanding what *Sanchoniathon* ſpeaks of the firſt venturing to Sea after *Tyre* was built. So then I conceive theſe ſeveral ages agreeable to the ſame *Tyre*; the firſt was when it was a high ſtrong Rock on the Sea-ſide without many Inhabitants; ſo I ſuppoſe it was when mentioned by *Joſhua*, as a bound of the tribe of *Aſher*. The ſecond age was, when it was built a great City by the *Sidonians* upon the former place, and grew very populous and famous, which laſted 'till *Nebuchadnezzar*'s time; after this, tho' it were never built upon the Continent again, yet a little farther into the Sea, a new and goodly City was erected, which was *New Tyre*, and the remains on the Continent ſide *Palætyrus*. Thus far then we have made good *Scaliger*'s opinion againſt *Bochartus*, that the famous *Sanchoniathon* is not ſo old as he is pretended to be.

Scalig. Not. in Frag. Græc. p. 40.

Joſeph. Ant. l. 8.

Strabo l. 16.

Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. 5. c. 19.

Which

V. Which will be further manifeſt, if that *Abibalus*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* is ſuppoſed to dedicate his Hiſtory, were the father to *Hiram*, contemporary with *Solomon*, as *Joſ. Scaliger* ſuppoſeth, who was 154 years after the deſtruction of *Troy*. In the *Tyrian* Dynaſties produced by *Scaliger* out of the *Phœnician* Annals, this *Abibalus* is the firſt who occurs, and is contemporary with *David*: *Sanchoniathon* then is of no great antiquity, if this were the time he lived in. But *Bochartus* well obſerves, that it is not ſpoken of *Abibalus* King of *Tyre*, but of *Abibalus* King of *Berytus*, whom we may allow to be ſomewhat nearer the time of *Moſes* than the other *Abibalus*, as the *Phœnician* Annals make it appear, as *Porphyry* tells us; but yet we find his antiquity is not ſo great as to be able to conteſt with *Moſes*, as *Porphyry* himſelf confeſſeth; altho' we may freely acknowledge him to be far elder than any of the *Greek* Hiſtorians; which is all *Voſſius* contends for, and ſufficiently proves: but we are far from yielding him contemporary with *Semiramis*, as *Porphyry* would have him, and yet makes him junior to *Moſes*, and to live about the time of the *Trojan* war, which is to reconcile the diſtance of near 800 years: ſuch miſerable confuſion was there in the beſt learned Heathens in their computation of ancient times.

Scal. Not. in Euſeb. Chr. p. 12. Scal. Can. Iſag. l. 2.

Voſſ. de Hiſt. Græc. l. 1. c. 1.

VI. Having thus cleared the Antiquity of *Sanchoniathon* and the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, we are next to conſider the Fidelity of it. This *Sanchoniathon* is highly commended for, both by *Porphyry*, and his Tranſlator into *Greek Philo Byblius*, who lived in *Adrian*'s time; and *Theodoret* thinks his name in the *Phœnician* language ſignifies φιλαλήθης, which *Bochartus* endeavours to fetch from thence, and conceives the name to be given him when he ſet himſelf to write his Hiſtory; and he wiſheth, and ſo do we, that he had been then *vir ſui nominis*, and made it appear by his writing that he had been a *Lover of Truth*. *Philo* ſaith he was ἀνὴρ πολυμαθὴς καὶ πολυϖράγμων, *a very learned and inquiſitive man*; but either he was not ſo diligent to enquire after, or not ſo happy to light on any certain Records; or if he did, he was not over-much a Lover of truth, in delivering them to the world. How faithful he was in tranſcribing his Hiſtory from his Records, we cannot be ſufficient judges of, unleſs we had thoſe Books of *Taautus*, and the ſacred Inſcriptions, and the Records of Cities which he pretends to take his Hiſtory from, to compare them together. But by what remains of his Hiſtory, which is only the firſt Book concerning the *Phœnician* Theology, extant in *Euſebius*, we have little reaſon to believe his Hiſtory of the World and eldeſt times, without further proof than he gives of it, there being ſo much obſcurity and confuſion in it, when he makes a *Chaos* to be the firſt beginning of all things, and the Gods to come after; makes Αὐτόχθων γήϊνος to be the ſon of *Chryſor* or *Vulcan*, and again the ſame γήϊνος, *the man born of earth*, to be ſeveral generations after Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος, who were the firſt mortal men; and yet from the two brethren Τεχνίτης and Αὐτόχθων came two Gods, whereof one was called Ἀγρὸς, and the other Ἀγρότης, and this latter was worſhipped with as much veneration as any of their Gods.

VII. Yet from theſe things, as fooliſh and ridiculous as they are, it is very probable the *Gnoſtics* and the ſeveral ſubdiviſions of them might take the riſe of their ſeveral *Æones* and συζυγίαι: for here we find Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος made two of the number of the Gods; but the reſt of the names they, according to their ſeveral ſects, took a liberty of altering according to their ſeveral fancies. This is far more probable to me,

than that either *Heſiod*'s Θεογονία ſhould be the ground of them; or the opinion of a late *German* Divine, who conceives that *Philo Byblius* did in imitation of the *Gnoſtics*, form his holy ſtory of the *Phœnicians* Theology. For altho' I am far from believing what *Kircher* ſomewhere tells us, that he had once got a ſight of *Sanchoniathon*'s Original Hiſtory (it being not the firſt thing that learned men hath been deceived in) yet I ſee no ground of ſo much peeviſhneſs, as becauſe this Hiſtory pretends ſo much antiquity, we ſhould therefore preſently condemn it as a figment of the Tranſlator of it. For had it been ſo, the Antagoniſts of *Porphyry*, *Methodius*, *Apollinarius*, but eſpecially *Euſebius*, ſo well verſed in antiquities, would have found out ſo great a cheat. Altho' I muſt confeſs they were oft-times deceived with *Piæ Fraudes*; but then it was when they made for the Chriſtians, and not againſt them, as this did. But beſides a fabulous confuſion of things together, we have ſome things delivered concerning their Gods, which are both contrary to all natural notions of a Deity, and thoſe very common principles of Humanity, which all acknowledge. As when Κρόνος or *Saturn*, ſuſpecting his ſon *Sadidus*, deſtroyed him with his own hands, and warred againſt his father *Uranus*, and after deſtroyed him likewiſe, and buried his brother *Atlas* alive in the earth; which being taken, as *Philo Byblius* contends they ought to be, in the literal ſenſe, are ſuch incongruities to all notions of a divine nature, that it is the greateſt wonder there ſhould be any that ſhould believe there was any God, and believe theſe were Gods together.

Joh. Urſinus Exerc. 3. ſect. 1.

But altho' there be ſo many groſs Fables and Inconſiſtencies in this *Phœnician* Theology, that are ſo far from meriting belief in themſelves, that it were a ſufficient forfeiture of reaſon to ſay they were credible; yet when we have a greater light in our hands of divine revelation, we may in this dungeon find out many excellent remainders of the ancient tradition, tho' miſerably corrupted; as, concerning the Creation, the Original of Idolatry, the Invention of Arts, the Foundation of Cities, the Story of *Abraham*, of which in their due place. That which of all ſeems the cleareſt in this Theology, is the open owning the original of Idolatry to have been from the conſecration of ſome eminent perſons after their death, who had found out ſome uſeful things for the world while they were living: which the ſubtiler *Greeks* would not admit of, *viz.* that the perſons they worſhip'd were once Men; which made them turn all into Allegories and Myſtical Senſes to blind that Idolatry they were guilty of the better among the ignorant: which makes *Philo Byblius* ſo very angry with the *Neoteric Græcians*, as he calls them, ὡς ἂν βεβιασμένως καὶ ἐκ ἀλληθῶς τὰς περὶ θεῶν μύθους ἐπ' ἀλληγορίας καὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις τε καὶ θεωρίας ἀνάγωσι: *That with a great deal of force and ſtraining they turned all the ſtories of the Gods into Allegories and Phyſical Diſcourſes.* Which is all the ingenuity that I know is to be found in this *Phœnician* Theology, that therein we find a free acknowledgment of the beginning of the Heathen Idolatry: and therefore *Sanchoniathon* was as far from advancing *Porphyry*'s Religion, as he was in the leaſt from overthrowing the credibility of Chriſtianity.

Philo Bybl. ap. Euſeb. Præp. l. 1. c. 6. p. 23.

VIII. The next we come to then, are the *Ægyptians*; a people ſo unreaſonably given to Fables, that the wiſeſt action they did, was to *conceal* their Religion; and the beſt offices their Gods had, was to *hold their fingers in their mouths*, to command ſilence to all that came to worſhip them. But we deſign not here any ſet diſcourſe concerning the vanity of the *Ægyptian* Theology, which yet was ſo monſtrouſly ridiculous, that

that even thoſe who were over-run with the height of Idolatry themſelves, did make it the object of their ſcorn and laughter. And certainly had we no other demonſtration of the greatneſs of Man's apoſtaſy and degeneracy, the *Ægyptian* Theology would be an irrefragable evidence of it: for who could but imagine a ſtrange lowneſs of ſpirit in thoſe, who could fall down and worſhip the baſeſt and moſt contemptible of creatures? Their Temples were the beſt Hieroglyphics of themſelves, fair and goodly ſtructures without, but within ſome deformed creatures enſhrined for veneration. But tho' the *Ægyptians* had loſt their credit ſo much as to matter of Religion; yet it may be ſuppoſed, that they who were ſo famed for wiſdom and antiquity, ſhould be able to give a full and exact account of themſelves thro' the ages of the world. And this they are ſo far from being defective in, that if you will believe them, they will give you an account of themſelves many thouſands of years before ever the world was made, but the peculiar vanity of their Chronology will be handled afterwards: That we now enquire into, is, what certain Records they had of their own antiquity, which might call for aſſent from any unprejudiced mind; whether there be any thing really anſwering that loud and unparallell'd cry of antiquity among the *Ægyptians*, whereby they will make all other Nations in compariſon of them, to be but of yeſterday, and to know nothing. We queſtion not now their pretence to wiſdom and learning, but are the more in hopes to meet with ſome certain way of ſatisfaction concerning ancient times, where learning is ſuppoſed to have flouriſhed ſo much, even when *Greece* it ſelf was accounted barbarous.

IX. The great baſis of all the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory depends on the credit of their ancient *Hermes*, whom out of their veneration they called *Triſmegiſtus*; for to him they aſcribe the firſt invention of their Learning, and all excellent Arts; from him they derive their Hiſtory; their famous hiſtorian *Manetho* profeſſing to tranſcribe his Dynaſties from the Pillars of *Hermes*. We ſhall therefore firſt ſee of what credit and antiquity *Hermes* himſelf was, and of what account particularly thoſe Pillars were which uphold all the Fabric of *Manetho* his Dynaſties. For *Hermes* himſelf the ſtory concerning him is ſo various and uncertain, that ſome have from thence queſtioned whether ever there were ſuch a perſon or no, becauſe of the ſtrangely different account that is given of him. *Cotta* in *Tully*, in order to the eſtabliſhing his Academical doctrine of with-holding Aſſent, mentions no fewer than five *Mercuries*, of which, two he makes *Ægyptian*, one of them the *Hermes* we now ſpeak of, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, and was the Author both of their Laws and Letters. The *Ægyptians*, as appears by *Diodorus*, make him to be a ſacred Scribe to *Oſiris*, and to have inſtructed *Iſis*; and when *Oſiris* went upon any warlike expedition, he committed the management of affairs to him for his great wiſdom. The *Phœnicians* preſerve his memory among them too: for *Philo Byblius* ſaith, That *Sanchoniathon* deſcribed his Theology from the Books of *Taautus*, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, who was the firſt inventor of Letters, and was a Counſellor to *Saturn*, whoſe advice he much relied on. What now muſt we pitch upon in ſo great uncertainties? How come the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Theology to come both from the ſame perſon, which are conceived ſo much to differ from each other? If we make the ſtories of *Oſiris* and *Iſis* to be fabulous, and merely allegorical, as *Plutarch* doth, then *Mercury* himſelf muſt become an Allegory,

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Allegory, and the Father of Letters must be an Hieroglyphic. If we admit the *Ægyptian* narrations to be real, and seek to reduce them to truth, and thereby make *Osiris* to be *Mitsraim* the son of *Cham*, who first ruled in *Ægypt*: All that we can then affirm of *Hermes* is, That he might be some useful person, who had a great influence both upon the King and State, and did first settle the Nation in a politick way of government, whose memory on that account the *Ægyptians* might preserve with the greatest veneration; and when they were once fallen into that idolatry of consecrating the memories of the first contributors to the good of mankind, they thought they had the greatest reason to adore his memory, and so by degrees attributed the invention of all useful things to him. For so it is apparent they did, when *Jamblichus* tells us, The *Ægyptians* attributed all their Books to *Mercury*, as the Father of them: because he was reputed the father of wit and learning, they made all the off-springs of their brains to bear their father's name. And this hath been the great reason the world hath been so long time imposed upon with varieties of Books going under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*. For he was not the first of his kind, who in the early days of the Christian World obtruded upon the World that *Cento* or confused mixture of the *Christian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* Doctrines, which is extant still under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*; whose vanity and falshood hath been sufficiently detected by learned men. There were long before his time extant several *Mercurial* Books, as they were called, which none of the wiser Heathens did ever look on as any other than fables and impostures, as appears by *Porphyry*'s letter to *Anebo* the *Ægyptian* Priest, and *Jamblichus* his answer to it in his Book of the *Ægyptian* Mysteries.

Jamblic. de Myst. l. 1.

X. We have then no certainty at all, notwithstanding the great fame of *Hermes*, of any certain records of ancient times, unless they be contained in those sacred Inscriptions from whence *Manetho* took his History. It must be acknowledged that the most ancient way of preserving any monuments of learning in those elder times, was by these Inscriptions on Pillars, especially among the *Ægyptians*, as is evident from the several testimonies of *Galen*, *Proclus*, *Jamblichus*, and the Author of the Book called *Sapientia secundum Ægyptios*, adjoyned to *Aristotle*; who all concur in this, that whatever laudable invention they had among them it was inscribed on some Pillars, and those preserved in their Temples, which were instead of Libraries to them. *Manetho* therefore to make his story the more probable, pretends to take all his relations from these sacred Inscriptions; and as *Eusebius* tells us, translated the whole *Ægyptian* History into *Greek*, beginning from their Gods, and continuing his History down near the time of *Darius Codomannus*, whom *Alexander* conquered: for in *Eusebius* his *Chronica* mention is made of *Manetho* his History, ending the xvi[th] year of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, which, saith *Vossius*, was in the second year of the 107[th] *Olympiad*. This *Manetho Sebennyta* was High Priest of *Heliopolis* in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, at whose request he writ his History, which he digested into three Tomes, the first containing the 11 Dynasties of the Gods and Heroes; the second, 8 Dynasties; the third 12; all containing, according to his fabulous computation, the sum of 53535 years. These Dynasties are yet preserved, being first epitomized by *Julius Africanus*, from him transcribed by *Eusebius* in his *Chronica*, from *Eusebius* by *Georgius Syncellus*, out of whom they are produced by *Jos. Scaliger*, and may be seen both in his *Eusebius*, and his *Canones Isagogici*. Now

Gal. l. 1. c. Jul. c. 1. Procl. in Tim. p. 31. Jamb. de Myst. c. 2. sect. 1. Sap. Sec. Ægypt. c. 1. f. 1.

Vossius de Hist. Græc. l. 1. c. 14.

Now *Manetho*, as appears by *Euſebius*, voucheth this as the main teſtimony of his credibility, that he took his Hiſtory, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ γῇ κειμένων τηλῶν, ἱερᾷ διαλέκτῳ καὶ ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι κεχαραγμένων ὑπὸ Θωὺθ τοῦ πρώτου Ἑρμοῦ, καὶ ἐρμηνευθεισῶν μετὰ τὸν Κατακλυσμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν γράμμασιν ἱερογλυφικοῖς, καὶ ἀποτεθεισῶν ἐν βίβλοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγαθοδαίμονος τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ, πατρὸς δὲ τοῦ Τάατ, ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγυπτίων; *from ſome Pillars in the Land of* Seriad, *in which they were inſcribed in the Sacred Dialect by the firſt* Mercury Thoyth, *and after the floud were tranſlated out of the Sacred Dialect into the Greek Tongue in Hieroglyphic Characters, and are laid up in Books among the Reveſtries of the* Ægyptian *Temples, by* Agathodæmon, *the ſecond* Mercury, *the Father of* Tat. Certainly this fabulous Author could not in fewer words have more manifeſted his own impoſtures, nor blaſted his own credit more than he hath done in theſe; which it is a wonder ſo many learned Men have taken ſo little notice of, which have found ſo frequent occaſion to ſpeak of *Manetho* and his Dynaſties. This I ſhall make appear by ſome great Improbabilities, and other plain Impoſſibilities which are couched in them. The improbabilities are, *firſt*, ſuch Pillars, being in ſuch a place as *Seriad*, and that place no more ſpoken of either by himſelf or by any other *Ægyptians*, nor any uſe made of theſe Inſcriptions by any other but himſelf. As to this *terra Seriadica* where it ſhould be, the very learned and inquiſitive *Joſeph Scaliger* plainly gives out, and ingenuouſly profeſſeth his ignorance. For in his Notes on the Fragments of *Manetho* in *Euſebius*, when he comes to that ἐν γῇ τῇ Σηριαδικῇ, he only ſaith, *Quæ nobis ignota quærant ſtudioſi.* But *Iſaac Voſſius*, in his late Diſcourſes *De ætate mundi*, cries Εὕρηκα, and confidently perſuades himſelf that it is the ſame with *Seirah*, mentioned *Judges* 3. 16. Indeed were there nothing elſe to be conſidered but affinity of names, it might well be the ſame: but that פסילים, which we render the *ſtone-quarries*, ſhould ſignifie the Pillars of *Mercury*, is ſomewhat hard to conceive. The *Seventy* render it, as himſelf obſerves, τὰ γλυπτὰ, by which they underſtand *graven Images*: So the word is uſed 2 *Chron.* 33. 19. *Deut.* 7. 5. *Iſai.* 10. 19. The vulgar *Latin* renders it, *ad locum Idolorum*; which were the certain interpretation, if *Chytræus* his conjecture were true, that *Eglon* had lately ſet up Idols there; but if it be meant of Pillars, I cannot but approve of *Junius* his interpretation, which I conceive bids faireſt to be the genuine ſenſe of the place, *viz.* that theſe Stones here were the Twelve ſtones pitched by *Joſhua* in *Gilgal* after the *Iſraelites* paſſed over *Jordan*; and theſe Stones are ſaid to be by *Gilgal*, *Judges* 3. 19. So that notwithſtanding this handſome conjecture, we are as far to ſeek for the Pillars of *Mercury* as ever we were, and may be ſo to the world's end. *Secondly*, the ſtanding of theſe Pillars during the Floud, which muſt be ſuppoſed certainly to have ſome ſingular virtue in them to reſiſt ſuch a torrent of Waters, which overthrew the ſtrongeſt built Houſes, and moſt compacted Cities. The plain Impoſſibilities are, *firſt*, that *Manetho* ſhould tranſcribe his Dynaſties from the beginning of the Hiſtory of *Ægypt*, to almoſt the time of *Alexander*, out of the ſacred Inſcriptions of *Thoyth*, who lived in the beginning of the very firſt Dynaſty according to his own computation. Sure this *Thoyth*, was an excellent Prophet, to write an Hiſtory for above 50000 years to come, as *Manetho* reckons it. *Secondly*, it is as well ſtill, that this Hiſtory after the Floud ſhould be tanſlated into Hieroglyphic Characters. What kind of Tranſlation

XI. (1.) *Scalig. Not. in gr. Euſeb. p. 408. Iſ. Voſſ. de æt. mund. c. 10.* Joſh. 4. 19, 20, 21. (2.) (1.) (2.)

is that? we had thought Hieroglyphics had been repreſentations of Things, and not of Sounds and Letters, or Words: How could this Hiſtory have at firſt been written in any tongue, when it was in Hieroglyphics? Do Hieroglyphics ſpeak in ſeveral Languages, and are they (3.) capable of changing their Tongues? But *thirdly*, it is as good ſtill, that the ſecond *Mercury* or *Agathodæmon* did tranſlate this Hiſtory ſo ſoon after the Floud into *Greek*: Was the *Greek* Tongue ſo much in requeſt ſo ſoon after the Floud, that the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory for the ſake of the *Greeks* muſt be tranſlated into their Language? Nay, is it not evident *Herod. l. 2. Diod. l. 1. c. 67.* from *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*, that the *Grecians* were not permitted ſo much as any commerce with the *Ægyptians*, till the time of *Pſammetichus*, which fell out in the 26th Dynaſty of *Manetho*, and about a Century after the beginning of the *Olympiads*. We ſee then how credible an Author *Manetho* is, and what truth there is like to be in the account of ancient times given by the *Ægyptian* Hiſtorians, when the chief of them ſo lamentably and ominouſly ſtumbles in his very entrance into it.

And yet as fabulous as this account is, which *Manetho* gives of his taking his Hiſtory from theſe Pillars before the Floud, I cannot but think that *Joſephus*, an Author otherwiſe of good credit, took his famous ſtory of *Seth*'s Pillars, concerning Aſtronomical obſervations before the Floud, from this ſtory of *Manetho*; and therefore I cannot but look upon them with as jealous an eye as on the other, altho' I know how fond the world hath been upon that moſt ancient monument, as is pretended, of learning in the world. *Du Bartas* hath writ a whole Poem on theſe Pillars, and the truth is, they are fitter ſubjects for Poets than any elſe, as will appear on theſe conſiderations. *Firſt*, how ſtrangely improbable is it, that the poſterity of *Seth*, who, as is pretended, did foreknow a deſtruction of the world to be by a Floud, ſhould buſie themſelves to write Aſtronomical obſervations on Pillars, for the benefit of thoſe who ſhould live after it? Could they think their Pillars ſhould have ſome peculiar exemption above ſtronger ſtructures, from the violence of the rough and furious waters? If they believed the Floud abſolutely univerſal, for whom did they intend their obſervations? if not, to what end did they make them, when the perſons ſurviving might communicate their inventions to them? But, *Secondly*, if either one or both theſe Pillars remained, whence comes it to paſs that neither the *Chaldæans*, nor any of the eldeſt pretenders to Aſtronomy, ſhould neither mention them, nor make any uſe of them? Nay, *Thirdly*, whence came the ſtudy of Aſtronomy to be ſo lamentably defective in thoſe ancient times, if they had ſuch certain obſervations of the heavenly bodies gathered by ſo much experience of the perſons who lived before the Floud? *Fourthly*, How comes *Joſephus* himſelf to neglect this remarkable teſtimony of the Scripture-hiſtory in his Books againſt *Appion*, if he had thought it were ſuch as might be relyed on? *Fifthly*, How comes *Joſephus* ſo careleſly not to ſet down the place in *Syria* where theſe Pillars ſtood, that inquiſitive Perſons might have ſatisfy'd themſelves with the Sight of the Pillar at leaſt, and what kind of characters thoſe obſervations were preſerved in? But now, if we compare this of *Joſephus* with *Manetho* his ſtory, we ſhall find them ſo exactly reſemble each other, that we may judge all thoſe Pillars to have been taken out of the ſame Quarry. Two things make it yet more probable: *Firſt*, The name of the place wherein they ſtood, which *Euſtathius* in *Hexaemeron* takes out of *Joſephus*, and calls Σιριαδ, the very

ſame

ſame place with that in *Manetho.* The other is the common uſe of the name of *Seth* among the *Ægyptians*, as not only appears by *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, but by this very place of *Manetho*; where it follows, ἐν βίβλῳ Σώθεως a book of his bearing the Title, which *Vettius Valens Antiochenus* tells us is not called Σῶθις but Σήθ. Now therefore *Joſephus*, who frequently uſeth the teſtimony of Heathen Writers, and frequently of this *Manetho*, endeavoured to bring this fabulous relation of *Manetho* as near the truth as he could; therefore inſtead of *Thoyth* he puts *Seth*, and inſtead of the fabulous hiſtory of *Ægypt*, the inventions of the Patriarchs, and *Syria* inſtead of *Seriadica*, a Country too large to find theſe pillars in.

Vettius Val. apud Scal. not. Gr. p. 438.

CHAP. III.

Of the *Chaldæan* Hiſtory.

I. *The conteſt of Antiquity among Heathen Nations, and the ways of deciding it.* II. *Of the* Chaldæan *Aſtrology, and the foundation of Judicial Aſtrology.* III. *Of the* Zabii, *their Founder, who they were; no other than the old* Chaldees. IV. *Of* Beroſus *and his Hiſtory.* V. *An account of the fabulous Dynaſties of* Beroſus *and* Manetho; VI. *From the Tranſlation of the Scripture-hiſtory into Greek in the time of* Ptolemee. VII. *Of that Tranſlation and the time of it.* VIII. *Of* Demetrius Phalereus. Scaliger's *arguments anſwered.* IX. Manetho *writ after the Septuagint, proved againſt* Kircher; *his arguments anſwered. Of Rabbinical and Arabic Authors, and their little credit in matter of Hiſtory.* X. *The time of* Beroſus *enquired into; his Writing contemporary with* Philadelphus.

THE next whom our Enquiry leads us to, are the *Chaldæans*, a Nation of great and undoubted Antiquity, being in probability the firſt formed into a National Government after the Floud, and therefore the more capable of having theſe Arts and Sciences flouriſh among them, which might preſerve the memory of eldeſt times to the view of poſterity. And yet even among theſe who enjoyed all the advantages of eaſe, quiet, and a flouriſhing Empire, we find no undoubted or credible Records preſerved, but the ſame vanity as among the *Ægyptians*, in arrogating Antiquity to themſelves beyond all proportion of reaſon or ſatisfaction from their own Hiſtory, to fill up that vaſt meaſure of time with: which makes it moſt probable, what *Diodorus* obſerves of them, *That in things pertaining to their Arts, they made uſe of Lunar years of 30 days*; ſo they had need, when *Tully* tells us that they boaſted of obſervations of the Stars for 470000 years. It had been impoſſible for them to have been ſo extravagant in their accounts of themſelves, had they but preſerved the Hiſtory of their Nation in any certain Records. For want of which, the Tradition of the eldeſt times varying in the ſeveral families after their diſperſion, and being gradually corrupted by the

I.

Diodor. Biblioth. l. 1. Cicero de Divin. l. 2.

policy of their Leaders, and those corruptions readily embraced by the predominancy of self-love in the several Nations, thence arose those vain and eager contests between the *Chaldæans*, *Scythians*, *Ægyptians*, and *Æthiopians*, concerning the antiquity of their several Nations: which may be seen in *Diodorus*, and others: by which it most evidently appears that they had no certain history of their own Nations, for none of them insist upon any Records, but only upon several probabilities from the nature of their Country, and the Climates they lived under. Neither need *Psammetichus* have been put to that ridiculous way of deciding the controversy by his two Infants bred up without any converse with Men, concluding the language they spake would manifest the great antiquity of the Nation it belonged to: Whereas it is more than probable they had spoken none at all, had they not learned the inarticulate voice of the Goats they had more converse with than Men. The making use of such ways to decide this controversy doth not only argue the great weakness of those times as to natural knowledge; but the absolute defect and insufficiency of them, as to the giving any certain account of the state of ancient times.

II. Of which the *Chaldæans* had advantages above all other Heathen Nations, not only living in a setled Country, but in or near that very place where the grand Ancestours of the world had their chief abode and residence. Whereby we see how unfaithful a thing Tradition is, and how soon it is corrupted or fails, where it hath no sure records to bottom its self upon. But indeed it is the less wonder that there should be a confusion of Histories, where there had been before of Tongues; and that such whose design and memory God had blasted before, should afterwards forget their own original. But as if the *Chaldæans* had retained something still of their old aspiring mind to reach up to Heaven; the only thing they were eminent for, and which they were careful in preserving of, was Some Astronomical observations, which *Tully* tells us *they had a great conveniency for, by reason of the plain and even situation of their Country*; whereby they might have a larger prospect of the heavenly bodies, than those who lived in mountainous Countries could have. And yet even for this (which they were so famous for, that the name *Chaldæans* passed for *Astrologers* in the *Roman* Empire) we have no great reason to admire their excellency in it, considering how soon their skill in Astronomy dwindled into that which by a great *Catachresis* is called *Judicial* Astrology. The original of which is most evident among Them, as all other Heathen Nations, to have been from the Divinity which they attributed to the Stars; in which yet they were far more rational than those who now admire that Art: For, granting their Hypothesis, that the Stars were Gods, it was but reasonable they should determine contingent effects; but it is far from being so with Them who take away the foundation of all those celestial Houses, and yet attribute the same effects to them, which they did, who believed a Divinity in them. The *Chaldæans*, as *Diodorus* relates, set 30 Stars under the Planets; these they called Βαλαίους Θεούς; Others they had as Princes over these, which they called τοὺς Θεοὺς Κυρίους; the former were as the privy Counsellours, and these the Princes over them, by whom in their courses they supposed the course of the Year to be regulated. See then what a near affinity there was between Astrology and Divinity of the Stars, which makes *Ptolemee* call them *Atheists* who condemned Astrology, because thereby they destroyed the main of their Religion, which was

Diodor. l. 2. Biblioth.

Ptolem. Tetrab. l. 1.

the

the worſhipping the Stars for Gods. But it ſeems by *Strabo*, that one of the Sects of the *Chaldæans* did ſo hold to Aſtronomy ſtill, that they wholly rejected *Genethlialogy*: which cauſed a great diviſion among the *Orchoëni* and *Borſippeni*, two Sects among them, ſo called from the places of their habitations. *Strabo Geograph. l. 16.*

III. And if we reckon the *Zabii* among the *Chaldæans*, as *Maimonides* ſeems to do, we have a further evidence of the Planetary Deities ſo much in requeſt among the *Chaldæans*; for the deſcription he gives of them is to this purpoſe, *That they had no other Gods but the Stars to whom they made Statues and Images, to the Sun Golden, to the Moon Silver, and ſo to the reſt of the Planets of the Metals dedicated to them. Thoſe Images derived an influence from the Stars to which they were erected, which had thence a faculty of foretelling future things*; which is an exact deſcription of the Στοιχεῖα or *Taliſmans* ſo much in requeſt among the Heathens; ſuch as the *Palladium* of *Troy* is ſuppoſed by learned men to have been. Theſe *Taliſmans* are by the *Jews* called *David's bucklers*, and are much of the ſame nature with the ancient *Teraphim*, both being accurately made according to the poſitions of the Heavens; only the one were to foretel future things, the other for the driving away ſome calamity. Concerning theſe *Zabii*, *Maimonides* tells us, *That the underſtanding their Rites would give a great deal of light to ſeveral paſſages of Scripture which now lie in obſcurity:* but little is ſuppoſed to be yet further known of them than what *Scaliger* hath ſaid, That they were the more Eaſtern *Chaldæans*; which he fetcheth from the ſignification of the word. Several of their Books are extant, ſaith *Scaliger*, among the *Arabians*, but none of them are yet diſcovered to the *European* world. *Salmaſius* thinks, theſe *Zabii* were the *Chaldæans* inhabiting *Meſopotamia*, to which is very conſonant what *Maimonides* ſaith, that *Abraham had his education among them. Said Batricides*, cited by Mr. *Selden*, *attributes the original of their Religion to the time of* Nahor, *and to* Zaradchath *the Perſian as the Author of it*; who is conceived to be the ſame with *Zoroaſter*, who in all probability is the ſame with the *Zertooſt* of the *Perſees*, a Sect of the ancient *Perſians* living now among the *Banyans* in the *Indies*. Theſe give a more full and exact account concerning the original, birth, education, and enthuſiaſms or revelations of their *Zertooſt*, than any we meet with in any *Greek* Hiſtorians; three books they tell us of, which *Zertooſt* received by Revelation, or rather one book conſiſting of three ſeveral tracts, whereof the firſt was concerning Judicial Aſtrology, which they call *Aſtoodeger*; the ſecond concerning *Phyſic*, or the knowledge of Natural things; the third was called *Zertooſt*, from the bringer of it, containing their Religious rites; the firſt was committed to the *Jeſopps* or *Magi*, the ſecond to *Phyſicians*, the third to the *Darooes* or Churchmen, wherein are contained the ſeveral precepts of their Law; we have likewiſe the rites and cuſtoms of theſe *Perſees* in their worſhip of Fire, with many other particular rites of theirs, publiſhed ſome time ſince by one *Mr. Lord*, who was a long time reſident among them at *Surat*; by which we may not only underſtand much of the Religion of the ancient *Perſians*, but, if I miſtake not, ſomewhat of the *Zabii* too. My reaſons are, becauſe the ancient *Zaradcha* or *Zoroaſter* is by *Said Batricides* made the Author of the *Zabii*, as we have ſeen already, who was undoubtedly the founder of the *Perſian* worſhip, or rather a promoter of it among the *Perſians*; for *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us, that he was inſtructed in the rites of the *Chaldæans*, which he added to the *Perſian* rites. Beſides

Maimon. More Nevo. p. 3. c. 29.

v. Scaliger Ep. ad Caſaubon. & Ep. Gallic. Selden de Diis Syris, l. 1. c. 2. Salmaſ. de An. Clim. p. 578.

Selden de jure nat. & gent. l. 2. c. 7.

Am. Marc. Hiſt. l. 23.

their agreement in the chief point of Idolatry, the worſhip of the Sun, and conſequently the Πυραιθεῖα or Symbol of the Sun, the eternal Fire, is evident; which, as far as we can learn, was the great and moſt early Idolatry of the Eaſtern Countries. And further we find God in *Leviticus* 26. 30. threatning to deſtroy their חמנים *their Images of the Sun*, ſome render it; but moſt probably by that word is meant the Πυραιθεῖα, *the Hearths* where they kept their perpetual Fire, for thoſe are חמנים from חמה, which is uſed both for the *Sun* and *Fire*. Now hence it appears that this Idolatry was in uſe among the Nations about *Palæſtine*; elſe there had been no need of ſo ſevere a threatning againſt it: and therefore moſt probably the rites of the *Zabii* (which muſt help us to explain the reaſons of ſome particular poſitive precepts in the *Levitical* Law relating to Idolatry) are the ſame with the rites of the *Chaldæans* and *Perſians*, who all agreed in this worſhip of the Sun and Fire; which may be yet more probable from what *Maimonides* ſaith of them, *Gens Zabia erat gens quæ implevit totum orbem*; it could not be then any obſcure Nation, but ſuch as had the largeſt ſpread in the Eaſtern Countries, which could be no other than the ancient *Chaldæans*, from whom the *Perſians* derived their worſhip. It may not ſeem altogether improbable that *Balaam* the famous Southſayer was one of theſe *Zabii*, eſpecially if according to *Salmaſius* his judgment, they inhabited *Meſopotamiâ*; for *Balaam*'s Country ſeems to be there; for it is ſaid, *Num.* 22. 5. *that he dwelt in Pethor by the river*, i. e. ſaith the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt, *in Peor of Syria by Euphrates*, which in Scripture is called *the river*, Eſa. 8. 7. But from this great obſcurity as to the hiſtory of ſo ancient and ſo large a people as theſe *Zabii* are ſuppoſed to be, we have a further evidence to our purpoſe of the defectiveneſs and inſufficiency of the Eaſtern Hiſtories as to the giving any full account of themſelves and their own original.

V. Voſſ. Idol. l. 2. c. 9.

IV. We are told indeed by ſome, that *Nabonaſſar* did burn and deſtroy all the ancient Records of the *Chaldæans* which they had diligently preſerved among them before, on purpoſe to raiſe the greater reputation to himſelf, and blot out the memory of his uſurpation, by burning the Records of all their own ancient Kings. Which is a conceit I ſuppoſe hath no other ground than that the famous *Æra* ſo much celebrated by Aſtronomers and others, did bear the name of *Nabonaſſar*. Which (if we ſhould be ſo greedy of all empty conjectures, which tend to our purpoſe, as to take them for truths) would be a very ſtrong evidence of the falſhood and vanity of the *Chaldæans* in their great pretences to Antiquity. But as the caſe ſtands in reference to their Hiſtory, we find more evidence from Scripture to aſſert their juſt antiquity, than ever they are able to produce out of any undoubted Records of their own. Which yet hath been endeavoured by an Author both of ſome credit and antiquity, the true *Beroſus*, not the counterfeit of *Annius*, whoſe vizard we ſhall have occaſion to pull off afterwards. This *Beroſus* was, as *Joſephus* and *Tatianus* aſſure us, *a Prieſt of* Belus, *and a* Babylonian *born, but afterwards flouriſhed in the Iſle of* Cos, *and was the firſt who brought the* Chaldæan *Aſtrology in requeſt among the* Greeks; in honour to whoſe name and memory, the *Athenians* (who were never backward in applauding thoſe who brought them the greateſt News, eſpecially if ſuitable to their former Superſtition) erected a Statue for him with a gilded tongue. A good Emblem of his Hiſtory, which made a fair and ſpecious ſhew, but was not that within, which it pretended to be: eſpecially where he pretends

Joſeph. c. App. l. 1. Tatian. c. Græcos.

to

to give an account of the moſt ancient times, and reckons up his two Dynaſties before the time of *Belus*: but of them afterwards. It cannot be denied but ſome Fragments of his hiſtory, which have been preſerved from ruin by the care and induſtry of *Joſephus*, *Tatianus*, *Euſebius* and others, have been very uſeful, not only for proving the truth of the hiſtory of Scripture to the Heathens; but alſo for illuſtrating ſome paſſages concerning the *Babylonian* Empire: as making *Nabopolaſſar* the Father of *Nebuchadonoſor*, of which *Scaliger* hath fully ſpoken in his Notes upon thoſe Fragments. *Scaliger Append. ad l. de Emend. Temp.*

V. Far be it from me to derogate any thing even from prophane Hiſtories, where they do not interfere with the Sacred Hiſtory of Scripture; and it is certainly the beſt improvement of theſe to make them *draw water to the Sanctuary*, and to ſerve as ſmaller Stars to conduct us in our way, when we cannot enjoy the benefit of that greater Light of Sacred Hiſtory. But that which I impeach theſe prophane hiſtories of, is only an inſufficiency as to that account of ancient times: wherein they are ſo far from giving light to ſacred Records, that the deſign of ſetting of them up ſeems to be for caſting a cloud upon them. Which may ſeem ſomewhat the more probable in that thoſe monſtrous accounts of the *Ægyptian* and *Chaldæan* Dynaſties did never publickly appear in the world in the *Greek* Tongue 'till the time that our ſacred Records were tranſlated into *Greek* at *Alexandria*. For 'till that time when this authentic hiſtory of the world was drawn forth from its privacy and retirement into the public notice of the world about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, [being as it were lockt up before among the *Iſraelites* at *Judæa*] theſe vain pretenders to antiquity thought not themſelves ſo much concerned to ſtand up for the credit of their own Nations. For 'till that time the credulous world, not being acquainted with any certain report of the creation and propagation of the world, was apt to ſwallow any thing that was given forth by thoſe who were had in ſo great eſteem as the *Chaldæan* and the *Ægyptian* Prieſts were. Becauſe it was ſuppoſed that thoſe perſons, who were freed from other avocations, had more leiſure to inquire into theſe things; and becauſe of their myſterious hiding what they had from the vulgar, they were preſumed to have a great deal more than they had. But now when the *Sun of Righteouſneſs* was approaching this Horizon of the world, and in order to that the Sacred Hiſtories like a Day-ſtar was to give the world notice of it, by which the former ſhadows and miſts began to fly away, it concerned all thoſe whoſe intereſt lay in the former ignorance of mankind, as much as they could, to raiſe all their *Ignes Fatui*, and whatever might tend to obſcure that approaching Light, by invalidating the credit of that which came to beſpeak its acceptance.

VI. It is very obſervable, what gradations and ſteps there were in the world to the appearance of that Grand light, which came down from Heaven to direct us in our way thither; how the world not long before was awakened into a greater inquiſitiveneſs than ever before, how knowledge grew into repute, and what methods divine providence uſed to give the inquiſitive world a taſte of truth at preſent to ſtay their ſtomachs, and prepare them for that further diſcovery of it afterwards. In order to this that Nation of the *Jews* which was an incloſed garden before, was now thrown open, and many of the plants removed and ſet in foreign Countries, not only in *Babylon* (where even after their return were left three famous Schools of Learning, *Sora*, *Pombeditha*, and

and *Neharda*) but in *Ægypt* too, where multitudes of them by *Alexander*'s favour were ſettled at *Alexandria*, where they had opportunity to ſeaſon thoſe two great Fountains, whence the current of knowledge ran into the reſt of the world. And now it was not in *Jewry only that God was known*, but *He whoſe name was great in Iſrael* did make way for the knowledge of himſelf among all the Nations of the earth. And that All-wiſe God who directed the *Magi* by a ſtar to Chriſt, making uſe of their former skill in Aſtronomy to take notice of that Star which came now on a peculiar errand to them to lead them to their Saviour (the great God condeſcending ſo far to mankind, as to take advantage of particular inclinations, and to accommodate himſelf to them; for which purpoſe it is very obſervable that he appeared in another way to the Wiſe-men, than to the poor Shepherds) the ſame God made uſe of the curioſity and inquiſitiveneſs after knowledge, which was in *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* (which he is ſo much applauded for by *Athenæus* and others) to bring to light the moſt advantageous knowledge, which the world ever had before the coming of Chriſt in the fleſh. And that great Library of his erecting at *Alexandria* did never deſerve that title 'till it had lodged thoſe ſacred Records, and then it did far better than the old one of *Oſymanduas*, of which Hiſtorians tells us this was the Inſcription 'Ιατρειον ψυχης, *The ſhop of the Soul's Phyſic.*

V. Caſaub. ad Athenæum, l. 5. c. 9.

VII. But this being a matter of ſo much concernment in order to our better underſtanding the original of the vaſt accounts of time among the *Chaldæans* and *Ægyptians*, and a ſubject not yet touched by any, we ſhall a little farther improve the probability of it, by taking a more particular account of the time when the Scriptures were firſt tranſlated, and the occaſion might thereby be given to theſe *Ægyptians* and *Chaldæans* to produce their fabulous account into the view of the world. Whether the Scriptures had been ever before tranſlated into the *Greek* language, (tho' it be aſſerted by ſome ancient Writers of the Church,) is very queſtionable, chiefly upon this account, that a ſufficient reaſon cannot be aſſigned of undertaking a new tranſlation at *Alexandria* if there had been any extant before. Eſpecially if all thoſe circumſtances of that tranſlation be true, which are commonly received and delivered down to us, with almoſt an unanimous conſent of the perſons who had greater advantages of knowing the certainty of ſuch things, than we can have at this great diſtance of time. And therefore certainly every petty conjecture of ſome modern, tho' learned men, ought not to bear ſway againſt ſo unanimous a tradition in a matter of fact, which cannot be capable of being proved, but by the teſtimony of former ages. And it is ſomewhat ſtrange that the ſingle teſtimony of one *Hermippus* in *Diogenes Laertius* (whoſe age and authority is ſomewhat doubtful) concerning only one Particular referring to *Demetrius Phalereus*, ſhould be thought of force enough among perſons of judgment as well as learning, to infringe the credibility of the whole ſtory delivered with ſo much conſent, not only by *Chriſtian*, but *Jewiſh* Writers; the teſtimony of one of which (every whit as conſiderable as *Hermippus*) viz. *Ariſtobulus Judæus* a *Peripatetical* Philoſopher, in an epiſtle to *Ptolemee Philometor*, doth plainly aſſert that which was ſo much queſtioned concerning *Demetrius Phalereus.*

Diog. Laer. Vit. Demetrii.

Apud Euſeb. præp. Ev. l. 13.

VIII. But whatever the truth of all the particular circumſtances be, which I here enquire not after, nor the authority of that *Ariſtæus* from whom the ſtory is received, nor whether this Tranſlation was made by *Jews* ſent

ſent out of *Judæa*, or by *Jews* reſiding at *Alexandria*; it ſufficeth for our purpoſe that this Tranſlation was made before either the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties of *Beroſus*, or the *Ægyptian* of *Manetho*, were publiſhed to the world. In order to which it is neceſſary to ſhew in what time this Tranſlation was effected; and herein that chanel of Tradition, which conveys the truth of the thing in one certain courſe, runs not with ſo even a ſtream concerning the exact time of it; all indeed agree that it was about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, but in what years of his reign, is very dubious. *Joſeph Scaliger* who hath troubled the waters ſo much concerning the particular circumſtances of this Tranſlation, yet fully agrees that it was done in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; only he contends with *Africanus* that it ſhould be done in the 132^d *Olympiad*, which is in the 33^d year of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; but *Euſebius* and *Jerom* place it in the very beginning of his reign, which I think is far more probable, and that in the time when *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* reigned with his Father *Ptolemæus Lagi*: for ſo it is moſt certain he did for two years before his fathers death. By which means the great difficulty of *Scaliger* concerning *Demetrius Phalereus* is quite taken off; for *Hermippus* ſpeaks nothing of *Demetrius* his being out of favour with *Philadelphus* during his father's life, but that upon his father's death, he was baniſhed by him, and died in his baniſhment, ſo that *Demetrius* might have the overſight of the Library at *Alexandria*, and be the main inſtrument of promoting this Tranſlation, and yet thoſe things be after true which *Hermippus* ſpeaks, viz. when *Ptolemæus Lagi* or *Sotor* was now dead. For it ſtands not to reaſon that during his father's life *Philadelphus* ſhould diſcover his diſpleaſure againſt *Demetrius*, it being conceived upon the advice given to his father for preferring the ſons of *Arſinoe* to the Crown before the ſon of *Berenice*. Moſt likely therefore it is that this Tranſlation might be begun by the means of *Demetrius Phalereus* in the time of *Philadelphus* his reigning with his father; but, it may be, not finiſhed till after the death of *Soter*, when *Philadelphus* reigned alone. And by this now we can perfectly reconcile that difference which is among the Fathers concerning the time when this Tranſlation was made. For *Irenæus* attributes it to the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*; *Clemens Alexandrinus* queſtions whether in the time of *Lagi* or *Philadelphus*; the reſt of the Chorus carry it for *Philadelphus*; but the words of *Anatolius* in *Euſebius* caſt it fully for both; for there ſpeaking of *Ariſtobulus*, he ſaith, *He was one of the Seventy who interpreted the Scriptures to* Ptolemæus Philadelphus *and his father, and dedicated his Commentaries upon the Law to both thoſe Kings. Hæc ſane omnem ſcrupulum eximunt*, ſaith * *Voſſius* upon producing this teſtimony, *this puts it out of all doubt*; and to the ſame purpoſe ſpeaks the learned *Jeſuit Petavius* in his Notes on *Epiphanius*.

Scaliger Animad. ad Num. Euſ. 1734.

V. Scaliger ib. Theocr. Schol. ad. Idyl. 17. *Juſt. l.* 16. *Euſ. Chro. Gr.*

Euſeb. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 7. *c.* 26.

* *Voſſius de Hiſt. Græc. lib.* 1. *c.* 12. *Petav. ad Epiph. pag.* 380.

Having thus far cleared the time when the tranſlation of the Scriptures into *Greek* was made, we ſhall find our conjecture much ſtrengthened, by comparing this with the age of the forementioned Hiſtorians, *Manetho* and *Beroſus*. *Manetho* we have already made appear to have lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, and that, ſaith *Voſſius*, after the death of *Soter*. It is evident from what remains of him in *Euſebius* his *Chronica*, that he not only flouriſhed in the time of *Philadelphus*, but writ his hiſtory at the ſpecial command of *Philadelphus*, as manifeſtly appears by the remaining Epiſtle of *Manetho* to him, ſtill extant in *Euſebius*. This command of *Philadelphus* might very probably be occaſioned upon the view of that account, which the holy Scriptures, being then tranſlated

IX.

Euſ. Chro. Gr. p. 6.

ſlated into *Greek*, did give of the World, and the propagation of Mankind; upon which, we cannot imagine but ſo inquiſitive a perſon as *Philadelphus* would be very earneſt to have his curioſity ſatisfyed, as to what the *Ægyptian* Prieſts (who had boaſted ſo much of antiquity) could produce to confront with the Scriptures. Whereupon the task was undertaken by this *Manetho*, High-Prieſt of *Heliopolis*, whereby thoſe things which the *Ægyptian* Prieſts had to that time kept ſecret in their Cloiſters, were now divulged and expoſed to the judgment of the learned world; but what ſatisfaction they were able to give inquiſitive minds, as to the main Ζητούμενον, or *matter enquired after*, may partly appear by what hath been ſaid of *Manetho* already, and by what ſhall be ſpoken of his Dynaſties afterwards.

But all this will not perſuade *Kircher*; for, whatever *Scaliger*, nay, what *Manetho* himſelf ſaith to the contrary, He with theconfidence and learning of a *Jeſuite* affirms, that this *Manetho* is elder than *Alexander* the Great. For theſe are his words, *Frequens apud priſcos hiſtoricos Dynaſtiarum Ægyptiacarum fit mentio, quarum tamen alium Authorem non habemus niſi Manethonem Sebennytam, Sacerdotem Ægyptium, quem ante tempora Alexandri, quicquid dicat Scaliger, in Ægypto floruiſſe comperio.* Certainly ſome more than ordinary evidence may be expected after ſo confident an affirmation; but whatever that perſon be in other undertakings, he is as unhappy a perſon in Philology, as any that have pretended ſo much acquaintance with it. One would think, he that had been twenty years, as he tells us himſelf, courting the *Ægyptian* Myſteries for compaſſing his *Oedipus*, ſhould have found ſome better arguments to prove an aſſertion of this nature, than meerly the teſtimony of *Joſephus*, the *Hebrew* book *Juchaſin*, and ſome *Arabic* Writers, not one of all which do mention the thing they are brought for, *viz. that* Manetho *was elder than* Alexander. All the buſineſs is, they quote him as an ancient Writer; but what then? The Author of the book *Juchaſin* was *Abraham Zachuth*, a *Jew* of *Salamanca*, who writ in the year of our Lord 1505. and this book was firſt printed at *Conſtantinople* 1556. Might not this man then well mention *Manetho* as an ancient Writer, if he flouriſhed above 1600 years before him, in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*? And what if ſome *Arabic* Writers mention him? Are they of ſo great antiquity and credit themſelves, that it is an evidence *Manetho* lived in *Alexander*'s time to be praiſed by them? It would be well, if *Kircher*, and other learned men, who think the world is grown to ſo great ſtupidity, as to believe every thing to be a jewel which is far fetched, would firſt aſſert and vindicate the antiquity and fidelity of their *Arabic* Authors, ſuch as *Gelaldinus*, *Abenephi*, and many others, before they expect we ſhould part with our more authentic Records of Hiſtory for thoſe fabulous relations which they are ſo full fraught withal. Were it here any part of my preſent buſineſs, it were an eaſy matter ſo to lay open the ignorance, falſity, and fabulouſneſs of thoſe *Arabians* whom that author relies ſo much upon, that he could not be freed from a deſign to impoſe upon the world, who makes uſe of their teſtimony in matter of ancient times without a *Caveat*. I know none fit to believe theſe *Arabick* Writers as to theſe things, but thoſe who have faith enough to concoct the *Rabbins* in matter of Hiſtory; of whom *Origen* ſaith, Πάντα μὲν τῶν Ἰουδαίων τῶν νῦν μῦθοι καὶ λῆρος. who are, as *Grotius* truly ſaith, *peſſimi hiſtoriæ Magiſtri*; *nam ex quo patria expulſi ſunt, omnis apud illos hiſtoria craſſis erroribus & fabulis eſt inquinata,*

Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. Syn. c. 9.

Origen. C. Celſ. l. 2.

Grotius Annot. in Matth. 24. 24.

quibus

quibus & proinde nihil credendum eſt, niſi aliunde teſtes acceſſerint. And *Iſ. Caſaubon* paſſeth this ſharp, but due cenſure upon them, *Rabbinis, ubi de lingua Hebraica agitur & vocis alicujus proprietate, vel aliquo Talmudico inſtituto merito à Chriſtianis tribui non parum; ubi vero à verbis venitur ad res, aut ad hiſtoriam, vel rerum antiquarum veteris populi explicationem, niſi falli & decipi volumus, nihil admodum eſſe illis fidei habendum. Sexcentis argumentis hoc facile probarem, ſi id nunc agerem.* And in reference to their Ancient Rites as well as Hiſtory *Joſeph Scaliger* hath given this verdict of them, *Manifeſta eſt Judæorum inſcitia, qui cum uſu veterum rituum etiam eorum cognitionem amiſerunt, ut multa quæ ad eorum ſacra & hiſtoriam pertinent, longe melius nos teneamus quam ipſi.* The ſame which theſe very learned perſons ſay of *Rabbinical*, may with as much truth be ſaid of theſe *Arabic* Writers, in matters of ancient hiſtory, which I have here inſerted, to ſhew the reaſon why I have thought the teſtimony of either of theſe two ſorts of perſons ſo inconſiderable in the matter of our future diſcourſe; which being hiſtorical, and that of the greateſt antiquity, little relief is to be expected from either of them in order thereto. But to return to *Kircher*. It is freely granted, that *Joſephus*, an Author of credit, and age ſufficient to give his opinion in this caſe, doth very frequently cite *Manetho* in his *Ægyptian* Hiſtory; particularly in his learned books againſt *Appion*; but where he doth give the leaſt intimation of *Manetho* being elder than *Alexander*, I am yet to ſeek. But *Kircher* will not yet leave the matter ſo, but undertakes to give an account of the miſtake; which is, That there were two *Manetho*'s beſides, and both *Ægyptians*, mentioned by *Suidas*; one a *Mendeſian*, who writ of the Preparation of the *Ægyptian* Κῦφι, a kind of Perfume uſed by the *Ægyptian* Prieſts. The other a *Dioſpolitan*, who writ ſome Phyſiological and Aſtronomical Treatiſes, whoſe works he hears are preſerved in the Duke of *Florence* his Library; and this was he (ſaith he) who lived in the times of *Auguſtus*, whom many by the equivocation of the name have confounded with the ancient Writer of the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties. Is it poſſible ſo learned a *Jeſuite* ſhould diſcover ſo little judgment in ſo few words? For, *firſt*, who ever aſſerted the writer of the Dynaſties to have lived in the time of *Auguſtus?* Yet, *ſecondly*, if that *Manetho*, whom *Suidas* there ſpeaks of, lived in *Auguſtus* his time according to *Kircher*, then it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the Compiler of the Dynaſties did: for it is evident to any one that looks into *Suidas*, that he there ſpeaks of the ſame *Manetho*, for theſe are his words: Μανεθὼς ὁ Διοσπολεως ὁ Αἰγύπτιος, ὁ Σεβεννύτης, φυσιολογικὰ, &c. Can any thing be more plain than that he here ſpeaks of *Manetho Sebennyta*, who was the Author of the Dynaſties, tho' he might write other things beſides, of which *Suidas* there ſpeaks? But *Kircher* very wiſely, in tranſlating *Suidas* his words, leaves out Σεβεννύτης, which decides the controverſy, and makes it clear, that he ſpeaks of the ſame *Manetho* of whom we have been diſcourſing. Thus it ſtill appears that this *Manetho* is no elder than the time of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, which was the thing to be proved.

Caſaub. Exercit. ad Baron. 16. S. 8.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 6.

Now for *Beroſus*, altho' the *Chaldæans* had occaſion enough given them before this time to produce their Antiquities by the *Jews* converſe with them in *Babylon*; yet we find this Author the firſt who durſt adventure them abroad, ſuch as they were, in *Greek*. Now that this *Beroſus* publiſhed his Hiſtory after the time mentioned, I thus prove. *Tatianus Aſſyrius* tells us that he writ the *Chaldaïc* Hiſtory in three Books, and dedi- X.

cated them to *Antiochus*, τῷ μὲν Σελεύκου τρίτῳ, as it is read in the fragment of *Tatianus*, preserved in *Eusebius*; but it must be acknowledged that in the *Paris* edition of *Tatianus*, as well as the *Basil*, it is thus read, καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου γενοὺς, Ἀντίοχῳ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν τρίτῳ, here it relates to the *third* from *Alexander*, in the other, to the *third* from *Seleucus*; Now if we reckon the *third* so as to take in the person from whom we reckon for the *first*, according to the reading in *Eusebius*, it falls to be *Antiochus* called Θεὸς; according to the other reading it falls to be *Antiochus Soter*; for *Seleucus* succeded *Alexander* in the Kingdom of *Syria*; *Antiochus Soter*, *Seleucus*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς, *Antiochus Soter*. But according to either of these readings, our purpose is sufficiently proved. For *Antiochus Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the *sixth* year of *Ptol. Philadelphus* in *Ægypt*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς succeded him in the 22d year of *Philadelphus*; now the soonest that the history of *Berosus* could come forth, must be in the reign of *Antiochus Soter*, which according to our accounts is some competent time after the translation of the Scripture into *Greek*. But if it were not till the time of *Antiochus* Θεὸς, we cannot but imagine that the report of the account of ancient times in the Scriptures was sufficiently divulged before the publishing of this history of *Berosus*; and, it may be, *Berosus* might somewhat sooner than others understand all transactions at *Alexandria*, because the place of his chief residence was where *Ptolemee Philadelphus* was born, which was in the Isle of *Cos*. But *Vossius* goes another way to work, to prove the time of *Berosus*, which is this. He quotes it out of *Pliny* that *Berosus* recorded the history 480 years, which, saith he, must be reckoned from the Æra of *Nabonassar*. Now this began in the second year of the 8th *Olympiad*, from which time if we reckon 480 years, it falls upon the latter end of *Antiochus Soter*; and so his History could not come out before the 22d of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, or very little before. Thus we have made it evident, That these two great Historians are younger even than the translation of the Bible into *Greek*, by which it appears probable that they were provoked to publish their fabulous Dynasties to the world. And so much to shew the insufficiency of the *Chaldæan* History, as to the account of ancient times: Which we shall conclude with the censure of *Strabo*, a grave and judicious Author, concerning the antiquities of the *Persians*, *Medes*, and *Syrians*; *which*, saith he, *have not obtained any great credit in the world*, διὰ τὴν τῶν συγγραφέων ἁπλότητα καὶ φιλομυθίαν, *because of the simplicity and fabulousness of their Historians*. From hence we see then that there is no great credibility in those Histories, which are impeached of falshood by the most grave and judicious of Heathen Writers.

Euseb. præp. Evang. l. 10. p. 289. ed. R. Steph.

V. Scal. de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 392.

Vossius de Hist. Græc. li. 1. c. 13.

Plin. hist. nat. l. 7. c. 57.

Strab. l. 11.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The defect of the *Grecian* History.

I. *That manifested by three evident arguments of it.* (1) *The fabulousness of the Poetical age of* Greece. *The Antiquity of Poetry.* II. *Of* Orpheus *and the ancient Poets. Whence the Poetical Fables borrowed.* III. *The advancement of Poetry and Idolatry together in* Greece. IV. *The different censures of* Strabo *and* Eratosthenes *concerning the Poetical age of* Greece; *and the reasons of them.* V. (2.) *The eldest Historians of* Greece *are of suspected credit. Of* Damastes, Aristeus, *and others;* VI. *of most of their eldest Historians we have nothing left but their Names, of others only the Subjects they treated of, and some Fragments.* VII. *The highest Antiquity of the* Greeks *not much older than* Cyrus *or* Cambyses. VIII. (3.) *Those that are extant either confess their ignorance of eldest times, or plainly discover it. Of the first sort are* Thucydides *and* Plutarch. IX. *Several evidences of the* Grecians *ignorance of the true original of Nations.* X. *Of* Herodotus *and his mistakes.* XI. *The* Greeks *ignorance in Geography discovered, and thence their insufficiency as to an account of ancient History.*

DEscend we now to the History of *Greece*; to see whether the Metropolis of Arts and Learning can afford us any account of ancient times, that they may be able to make us in the least question the account given of them in sacred Scriptures. We have already manifested the defect of *Greece* as to letters and ancient Records, but yet it may be pretended that her Historians, by the excellency of their wits and searching abroad into other Nations, might find a more certain account of ancient times, than other Nations could obtain. There is no body, who is any thing acquainted with the *Grecian* humour, but will say they were beholding to their Wits for most of their Histories; they being some of the earliest Writers of Romances in the world, if all fabulous narrations may bear that name. But laying aside at present all their Poetic *Mythology*, as it concerns their Gods, (which we may have occasion to enquire into afterwards) we now examine only their credibility, where they pretend to be most historical. Yet how far they are from meriting belief even in these things, will appear to any that shall consider; *first*, That their most ancient Writers were Poetical and apparently fabulous; *secondly*, That their eldest Historians are of suspected credit even amongst themselves; *thirdly*, That their best Historians either discover or confess abundance of ignorance as to the history of ancient times. *First*, That their first Writers were poetical, and apparently fabulous. *Strabo* undertakes to prove that Prose is only an imitation of Poetry, and so Poetry must needs be first written. *For*, saith he, *at first Poetry only was in request; afterwards in imitation of that*, Cadmus, Pherecydes, *and* Hecatæus *writ their histories, observing all other laws of Poetry, but only the measures of it; but by degrees Writers began to take greater liberty, and so* I. Strabo l. 1.

brought it down from that lofty ſtrain it was then in, to the form now in uſe: as the Comical ſtrain is nothing elſe but a depreſſing the ſublimer ſtyle of Tragedy. This he proves, becauſe ἄδειν did anciently ſignify the ſame with φράζειν; for Poems were only λόγοι μεμελισμένοι, Leſſons fit to be ſung among them: thence, ſaith he, is the original of the Ῥαψῳδίαι, &c. for theſe were thoſe Poems which were ſung ἐπὶ ῥάβδῳ, when they held a branch of Laurel in their hands, as *Plutarch* tells us they were wont to ſing *Homer*'s *Ilias*; others were ſung to the Harp, as *Heſiod*'s Ἔργα: beſides, ſaith *Strabo*, that Proſe is called ὁ πεζὸς λόγος, argues that it is only a bringing down of the higher ſtrain in uſe before. But however this were in general; as to the *Grecians*, it is evident that Poetry was firſt in uſe among them; for in their elder times when they firſt began to creep out of Barbariſm, all the Philoſophy and Inſtruction they had was from their Poets, and all couched in Verſe; which *Plutarch* not only confirms, but particularly inſtanceth in *Orpheus*, *Heſiod*, *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes*, *Empedocles*, and *Thales*; and hence *Horace de arte Poëtica* ſays of the ancient Poets before *Homer*,

Plutarch. Sympoſ.

Plutarch. de Pyth. Orac. p. 403.

——*fuit hæc ſapientia quondam*
Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra prophanis:
Concubitu prohibere vago: dare jura maritis:
Oppida moliri: leges incidere ligno.
Sic honor & nomen divinis vatibus atque
Carminibus venit.

From hence, as *Heinſius* obſerves, the Poets were anciently called Διδάσκαλοι; and the ancient ſpeeches of the Philoſophers containing matters of Morality, were called Ἀσματα καὶ Ἀδόμενα, of which many are mentioned in their Lives by *Diogenes Laertius*; in the ſame ſenſe were *Carmina* anciently uſed among the *Latines* for Precepts of Morality, as in that collection of them, which goes under the name of *Cato*, (which ſome think to be an ancient piece, but with a falſe inſcription, but *Boxhornius* thinks it to be of ſome Chriſtians doing in the decay of the *Roman* Empire,) *Si Deus eſt animus, nobis ut Carmina dicunt. Carmina*, ſaith *Heinſius*, i. e. *dicta Philoſophorum*; *cauſa eſt, quia dicta illa brevia, quibus ſententias ſuas de Deo deque reliquis includebant, ἀδόμενα dicebant*, i. e. *Carmina.*

Heinſ. Diſſ. in Heſ. cap. 6.

Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. c. 14.

II. When Poetry came firſt into requeſt among the *Grecians*, is ſomewhat uncertain; but this is plain and evident, that the intention of it was not meerly for inſtruction, but, as *Strabo* expreſſeth it, διαγωγὴν καὶ θέατρον τοῦ πλήθους, *the more gently to draw the people on to idolatry.* For as he ſaith, *it is impoſſible to perſwade women and the promiſcuous multitude* ‘ *to religion by meer dry reaſon or philoſophy, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας,* ‘ *τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιίας καὶ τερατείας; but for this*, ſaith he, *there is need* ‘ *of ſuperſtition, and this cannot be advanced without ſome fables and wonders.* ‘ For, ſaith he, *the Thunderbolts, Shields, Tridents, Serpents, Spears at-* ‘ *tributed to the Gods are meer fables, and ſo is all the ancient Theology; but* ‘ *the Governours of the Commonwealth made uſe of theſe things the better to* ‘ *awe the ſilly multitude, and to bring them into better order.* I cannot tell how far this might be their end, ſince theſe things were not brought in ſo much by the ſeveral Magiſtrates, as by the endeavour of particular Men, who thought to raiſe up their own eſteem among the vulgar by ſuch things, and were imployed by the great Deceiver of the world as his grand inſtruments to advance Idolatry in it. For which we are to conſider, that altho' there were groſs Ignorance; and conſequently Superſtition

Strabo l. 1. p. 13.

perſtition enough in *Greece* before the Poetic age of it, yet their ſuperſtitious and idolatrous worſhip was not ſo licked and brought into form, as about the time of *Orpheus*, from whom the Poetic age commenceth: who was as great an inſtrument of ſetting up Idolatry, as *Apollonius* was afterwards of reſtoring it, being both perſons of the higheſt eſteem and veneration among the heathen. Much about the ſame time did thoſe live in the world who were the firſt great promoters of Superſtition and Poetry, as *Melampus*, *Muſæus*, *Arion Methymnæus*, *Amphion* of *Thebes*, and *Eumolpus Thrax*, none of whom were very diſtant from the time of *Orpheus*. Of whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* thus ſpeaks, Περοσχήματι μουσικῆς λυμηνάμενοι τὸ ἦθος ἐντέχνῳ τινὶ γοητείᾳ—τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὅτι τὰ εἴδωλα χειραγωγῶσι θεῶσι. *Theſe under a pretence of Muſick and Poetry corrupting the lives of men, did by a kind of artificial Magic firſt draw them on to the practice of Idolatry.* For the novelty and pleaſingneſs of Muſic and Poetry did preſently inſinuate it ſelf into the minds of men, and thereby drew them to a venerable eſteem both of the Perſons and practices of thoſe who were the Authors of them. So *Conon* in *Photius* tells us that *Orpheus* was exceedingly acceptable to the people for his skill in Muſic, which the *Thracians* and *Macedonians* were much delighted with: From which aroſe the fable of his drawing trees and wild beaſts after him, becauſe his Muſic had ſo great an influence upon the civilizing that people, who were almoſt grown rude thro' Ignorance and Barbariſm: and *Horace explains it*,

Clem. Al. Protreptic. p. 3.

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 186. ſect 45.

Horat. Ep. ad Piſon.

Sylveſtres homines ſacer interpreſque Deorum
Cædibus & victu fœdo deterruit Orpheus,
Dictus ab hoc lenire Tigres rabidoſque Leones.

This *Orpheus* by *Mythologiſts* is uſually called the ſon of *Calliope*, but may with better reaſon be called the Father of the whole Chorus of Muſes, than the Son of one of them; ſince *Pindar* calls him Πατέρα ἀοιδᾶς, and *John Tzetzes* tells us he was called the ſon of *Calliope*, ὡς καλλιλογίας ποιητικῆς εὑρετὴς καὶ ὕμνων τῶν εἰς τοὺς θεούς, *as the inventor of poetical elegance, and the ſacred Hymns which were made to the Gods:* (which the old *Romans* called *Aſſamenta*) and *Juſtin Martyr* calls him τὸν πολυθεότητος πρῶτον διδάσκαλον, *the firſt teacher of Polytheiſm and Idolatry.*

Schol. in Heſiod. p. 1.

Parænef. 1.

For this *Orpheus* having been in *Ægypt*, as *Pauſanias*, *Diodorus*, and *Artapanus* in *Euſebius* all confeſs, he brought from thence moſt of the Magical rites and ſuperſtitious cuſtoms in uſe there, and ſet them up among the *Grecians*; ſo *Diodorus* acknowledgeth in the ſame place; and it is likewiſe evident by what *Ariſtophanes* ſaith in his Βάτραχοι, III.

Pauſ. Eliac. 2. Diod. Bibl. lib. 1. Euſ. Præp. l. 10.

Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε, φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι.

Ariſtoph. Ran. Act. 4. ſc. 2.

Orpheus *firſt inſtructed them in the ſacred myſteries, and to abſtain from ſlaughter*, which is to be underſtood of the Θυσίαι, *the killing of beaſts in ſacrifice*, which probably was in uſe among them before, as a remainder of ancient tradition, till *Orpheus* brought his *Ægyptian* doctrine into requeſt among them. The myſteries of *Oſiris*, ſaith *Diodorus*, were tranſplanted into *Greece* under the name of *Dionyſius* or *Bacchus*, and *Iſis* under *Ceres* or *Magna Mater*, and the puniſhment and pleaſures after this life from the rites of Sepulture among them; *Charon*'s wafting of Souls, from the lake *Acheruſia* in *Ægypt*, over which they were wont to ſend the

Paus. Lac. p. 95. Corinth. p. 72. the dead bodies. *Pauſanias* tells us, that the *Spartans* derived the worſhip of *Ceres Chthonia* from *Orpheus*, and the *Æginetæ* the worſhip of *Hecate*. Beſides which he inſtituted new rites and myſteries of his own, *Vide Cæl. Rhod. Ant. Lect. l. 15. p. 9.* in which the initiated were called Ὀρφεωτελεσταί: and required a moſt ſolemn oath from all of them never to divulge them, which was after obſerved in all thoſe prophane myſteries which in imitation of theſe were ſet up among the *Greeks*. *Strabo* thinks the myſteries of *Orpheus* were in *Stab. l. 10. Herod. Euterp. p. 134. Ed. H. St.* imitation of the old *Cotyttian* and *Bendidian* myſteries among the *Thracians*; but *Herodotus* with more probability parallels them and the *Dionyſian* with the *Ægyptian*, from which we have already ſeen that *Orpheus* derived His; who is conceived by *Georgius Cedrenus* and *Timotheus* in *Euſebius*, to have lived about the time of *Gideon* the Judge of *Iſrael*; but there is too great confuſion concerning his age, to define any thing certainly about it. Which ariſeth moſt from the ſeveral perſons going under this name, of which, beſides this, were in all probability two more; the one an Heroic Poet, called by *Suidas*, *Ciconæus*, or *Arcas*, *Suid. in Ὀρφ.* who lived two ages before *Homer*, and he that goes under the name of *Orpheus*, whoſe Hymns are ſtill extant, but are truly aſcribed to *Onomacritus* the *Athenian*, by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tatianus Aſſyrius*, *Suidas*, and others; who flouriſhed in the times of the *Piſiſtratidæ* at *Athens*. We are like then to have little relief for finding out of truth in the Poetic age of *Greece*, when the main deſign of the Learning then uſed was only to inſinuate the belief of Fables into the people, and by that to awe them into Idolatry.

IV. If we come lower down to the ſucceding Poets, we may find Fables increaſing ſtill in the times of *Homer*, *Heſiod*, and the reſt, which made *Eratoſthenes*, a perſon of great judgment and learning (whence he was called *alter Plato*, and Πένταθλος, and τὸ Βῆτα, becauſe he carried, if not the *firſt*, yet the *ſecond* place in all kind of Literature) condemn the ancient Poetry as γραώδη μυθολογίαν, *a company of old Wives tales*, which were invented for nothing but to pleaſe ſilly people, and had no real learning or truth at all in them: For this, tho, he be ſharply cenſured by *Strabo*, in his firſt book, who undertakes to vindicate the Geography of *Homer* from the exceptions of *Eratoſthenes*; yet himſelf cannot but confeſs that there is a very great mixture of old fables in all their Poets, *which is*, ſaith he, *partly to delight the people, and partly to awe them. For the minds of men being always deſirous of novelties, ſuch things do hugely pleaſe the natural humours of weak people; eſpecially if there be ſomething in them that is* θαυμαστὸν ἢ παράτοπον, *very ſtrange and wonderful, it increaſeth the delight in hearing it*; ἅπερ ἐπὶ τὸ μανθάνειν φίλτρον, *which draws them on to a deſire of hearing more of it. And by this means*, ſaith he, *are children firſt brought on to learning, and all ignorant perſons are kept in awe; nay, and the more learned themſelves* (partly for want of reaſon and judgment, and partly from the remainder of thoſe impreſſions which theſe things made upon them when they were children) *cannot ſhake off that former credulity which they had as to theſe things.* By which diſcourſe of *Strabo*, tho' intended wholly by him in vindication of poetic Fables, it is plain and evident what great diſſervice hath been done to Truth by them, by reaſon they had no other Records to preſerve their ancient Hiſtory but theſe fabulous Writers. And therefore ſuppoſing a mixture of truth and falſhood together, which *Strabo* contends for; yet what way ſhould be taken to diſtinguiſh the true from the falſe, when they had no other certain Records? And beſides, he himſelf

himſelf acknowlegeth how hard a matter it is even for wiſe men to excuſs thoſe fabulous narrations out of their minds, which were inſinuated unto them by all the advantages which prejudice, cuſtom and educacion could work upon them. Granting then there may be ſome truth at the bottom of their fabulous narrations;

Ὡς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνήρ, *Homer. Odyſſ. 3.*

which may be gilded over with ſome pleaſant tales, as himſelf compares it; yet how ſhall thoſe come to know that it is only gilded, that never ſaw any pure metal, and did always believe that it was what it ſeemed to be? Had there been any Κριτήριον, or Touch-ſtone to have differenced between the one and the other, there might have been ſome way for a ſeparation of them; but there being none ſuch, we muſt conclude, that the fabulous narrations of Poets inſtead of making truth more pleaſant by their fictions, have ſo adulterated it, that we cannot find any credibility at all in their narrations of elder times, where the truth of the ſtory hath had no other way of conveyance but thro' their fictions.

V. But tho' Poets may be allowed their liberty for repreſenting things to the greateſt advantage to the palates of their Readers, yet we may juſtly expect, when men profeſs to be Hiſtorical, they ſhould deliver us nothing but what upon ſtricteſt examination may prove undoubted truth. Yet even this were the *Greeks* far from; for *Strabo* himſelf confeſſeth of their eldeſt Hiſtorians, Καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι δὲ ἱστορικοὶ καὶ φυσικοὶ μυθογράφοι, *their firſt Hiſtorians both of perſons and things were fabulous.* *Diodorus* particularly inſtanceth in their eldeſt Hiſtorians, as *Cadmus Mileſius*, *Hecataeus*, and *Hellanicus*, and condemns them for fabulouſneſs. *Strabo* condemns *Damaſtes Sigeenſis* for vanity and falſhood, and wonders at *Eratoſthenes* for making uſe of him; yet this man is of great antiquity among them, and his teſtimony uſed by Authors of good credit, as *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis*, *Plutarch*, and others. Nay, *Pliny* profeſſeth to follow him, and ſo he doth *Ariſteas Proconneſius* in his *Arimaſpia*, which may render the credit of his Hiſtory very ſuſpicious; with whom it was a ſufficient ground of credibility to any ſtory, That he found it in ſome *Greek* Authors. *Strabo* reckons *Damaſtes* with *Euhemerus Meſſenius* and *Antiphanes Bergæus*; which latter was ſo noted a lyar, that from him, as *Stephanus* tells us, Βεργαΐζειν was uſed as a proverb for *to ſpeak never a word of truth.* *Ariſteas Proconneſius* lived in the time of *Cyrus*, and writ a Hiſtory of the *Arimaſpi*, in three Books, who ſeems to have been the Sir *John Mandevil* of *Greece*, from his ſtories of the *Arimaſpi* with one eye in their foreheads, and their continual fighting the *Gryphens* for gold; yet the ſtory was taken upon truſt by *Herodotus*, *Pliny*, and many others; tho' the experience of all who have viſited thoſe northern Climates do ſufficiently refute theſe follies. *Strabo* ſaith of this *Ariſteas*, that he was ἀνὴρ γόης ἕν τις ἄλλος, *one inferior to none for juggling*, which cenſure was probably occaſioned by the common ſtory of him, that he could let his ſoul out of his body when he pleaſed and bring it again; yet this Juggler did *Celſus* pitch on to confront with our bleſſed *Saviour*, as *Hierocles* did on *Apollonius*: ſo much have thoſe been to ſeek for Reaſon, who have ſought to oppoſe the doctrine of Faith.

Strab. l. 1. *V. Caſaub. in Strab. l. 1.* *Voſſ. de hiſt. Græc. l. 4. c. 5.* *Stephan. in* Βέργη. *Strab. l. 13.*

VI. But further, what credit can we give to thoſe Hiſtorians who have ſtriven to confute each other, and lay open one anothers falſhood to the world. Where was there ever any ſuch diſſonancy in the ſacred Hiſtory of Scripture?

Scripture? doth the Writer of one book discover the weakness of another? do not all the parts so exactly agree, that the most probable suspicion could ever fall into the heart of an Infidel, is, that they were all written by the same person, which yet the series of times manifests to have been impossible? But now, if we look into the ancient *Greek* Historians, we need no other testimony than themselves to take away their credibility. The Genealogies of *Hesiod* are corrected by *Acusilaus*, *Acusilaus* is condemned by *Hellanicus*, *Hellanicus* accused of falshood by *Ephorus*, *Ephorus* by *Timæus*, *Timæus* by such who followed him, as *Josephus* fully shews. Where must we then fix our belief? upon all in common? that is the ready way to believe contradictions: for they condemn one another of falshood. Must we believe one, and reject the rest? but what evidence doth that one give why he should be credited more than the rest? And their eldest Historians are acknowledged to be most fabulous: [which is a most irrefragable argument against the *Grecian* history:] For our only recourse for deciding the controversy among the younger Historians, must be to the elder: and there we are further to seek than ever; for the first ages are confessed to be Poetical, and to have no certainty of truth in them. So that it is impossible to find out any undoubted certainty of ancient times among the *Greek* Historians; which will be yet more evident when we add this, That there are very few extant of those Historians, who did carry the greatest name for Antiquity.

Joseph. c. Appion. l. 1.

VII. The highest Antiquity of the *Greek* Historians doth not much exceed the time of *Cyrus* and *Cambyses*, as *Vossius* hath fully demonstrated in his learned Book, *De Historicis Græcis*, and therefore I shall spare particular enquiries into their several ages. Only these two things will further clear the insufficiency of the *Greek* History, as to an account of ancient times: *First*, That of many of these old Historians we have nothing left but their mere names, without any certainty of what they treated. Such are *Sisyphus Cous*, *Corinnus*, *Eugeon Samius*, *Deïochus Proconnesius*, *Eudemus Parius*, *Democles Phigaleus*, *Amelesagoras Chalcedonius*, *Xenomedes Chius*, and several others whose names are recorded by several Writers, and listed by *Vossius* among the Historians; but no evidence what subject of history was handled by them. *Secondly*, That of those whose not only memories are preserved, but some evidence of what they writ, we have nothing extant till the time of the *Persian* war. For all that was writ before, is now consumed by time, and swallowed up in that vast and all-devouring Gulph; in which yet their heads still appear above the waters, to tell us what once they informed the world of. It cannot be denied, but if many of those ancient Histories were yet remaining, we might probably have some greater light into some matters of fact in the elder times of *Greece*, which now we are wholly to seek for, unless we think to quench our thirst in the muddy waters of some fabulous Poets. For what is now become of the antiquities of *Ionia* and the city *Miletus* written by *Cadmus Milesius*, supposed to be the first Writer of History? where lie the *Genealogies* of *Acusilaus Argivus*? where is now extant the *History of the Gods* written by *Pherecydes Syrius*, *Pythagoras* his Master? or the *Chronica* of *Archilochus* who flourished about the 20th *Olympiad*? or those of *Theagenes Rheginus*? Where may we hope to meet with *Pherecydes Lerius* his *Attic Antiquities*, or his *Catalogue of Cities and Nations*? or *Hecatæus* his *Description* of *Asia*, and some suppose of *Libya* and *Europe* too? or the *Originals of Nations and Founders*

Founders of Cities written by *Hellanicus?* How may we come by the *Perſic*, *Greek* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory of *Charon Lampſacenus*; the *Lydian* Hiſtory of *Xanthus Lydius*; the *Samian* Antiquities of *Simmias Rhodius*; the *Corinthian* Hiſtory of *Emelus Corinthius*; *Panyaſis* his Antiquities of *Greece*; the *Scythian* Hiſtory of *Anacharſis*; the *Phrygian* of *Diagoras*; the *Chaldaïc* and *Perſian* of *Democritus*; the *Sicilian* and *Italian* of *Hippys Rheginus*; the *Telchiniac* Hiſtory of *Teleclides?* All theſe are now buried with many more in the rubbiſh of time, and we have nothing but meer skeletons of them left, to tell us, that once ſuch perſons were, and thought themſelves concerned to give the world ſome account of their being in it. Whereby may be likewiſe ſeen the remarkable providence of God, concerning the Sacred Hiſtory, which tho' of far greater antiquity than any of theſe, hath ſurvived them all, and is ſtill preſerved with us with as much purity and incorruption as a Book paſſing thro' ſo many hands was capable of. But of that in its due place.

VIII. But yet if the *Greek* Hiſtorians that are yet extant, were of more undoubted credit than thoſe that are loſt, we might eaſily bear with our loſing ſome old Stories, if we gained ſome authentick Hiſtory by it accompliſhed in all its parts: but even this we are far from in the *Greek* Hiſtory; for the Hiſtorians themſelves do either confeſs their own ignorance of ancient times, or do moſt palpably diſcover it, which was the *third* and laſt conſideration touching the credibility of the *Grecian* Hiſtory. That moſt grave and accurate Hiſtorian *Thucydides* than whom ſcarce ever any *Grecian* diſcovered more an impartial love to the truth in what he writ, doth not only confeſs, but largely prove the impoſſibility of an exact account to be given of the times preceding the *Peloponneſian* War, in the entrance into his Hiſtory: *For*, ſaith he, *the matter preceding that time cannot now through the length of time be accurately diſcovered or found out by us.* All that he could find in the ancient ſtate of *Greece* was a deal of confuſion, unquiet ſtations, frequent removals, continual piracies, and no ſettled form of Commonwealth. What certain account can be then expected of thoſe times, when a moſt judicious Writer, even of *Athens* its ſelf, acknowledgeth ſuch a *Chaos* in their ancient Hiſtory? And *Plutarch*, a later Author indeed, but ſcarce behind any of them, if we believe *Taurus* in *A. Gellius*, for learning and prudence, dares not, we ſee, venture any further back than the time of *Theſeus*; for before that time, as he compares it, as Geographers in their Maps, when they have gone as far as they can, fill up the empty ſpace with ſome unpaſſable Mountains, or frozen Seas, or devouring Sands; ſo thoſe who give an account of elder time, are fain to infert τερατώδη καὶ τραγικὰ, ſome wonderful and tragical Stories, which (as he ſaith) have neither any truth nor certainty in them. Thus we ſee thoſe who were beſt able to judge of the *Greek* Antiquities, can find no ſure footing to ſtand on in them; and what baſis can we find for our Faith, where they could find ſo little for their Knowledge? And thoſe who have been more daring and venturous than theſe perſons mentioned, what a labyrinth have they run themſelves into? how many confuſions and contradictions have they involved themſelves in? Sometimes writing the paſſages of other Countries for thoſe of *Greece*, and at other times ſo confounding times, perſons and places, that one might think they had only a deſign upon the underſtandings of their Readers, to make them play at Blind-mans-buff in ſearching for the Kings of *Greece*.

IX. But as they are ſo confuſed in their own Hiſtory, ſo they are as ignorant and fabulous when they dare venture over their own threſholds and look abroad into other Countries; we certainly owe a great part of the lamentable ignorance of the true original of moſt Nations to the pitiful account the *Greek* Authors have given of them; which have had the fortune to be entertained in the world with ſo much eſteem and veneration, that it hath been thought learning enough to be acquainted with the account which they give of Nations. Which I doubt not hath been the great reaſon ſo many fabulous relations, not only of Nations but Perſons and ſeveral Animals never exiſting, have met with ſo much entertainment from the leſs inquiſitive world. The *Greek* Writers, it is evident, took up things upon truſt as much as any people in the world did, being a very weak and inconſiderable Nation at firſt: and afterwards the knowledge they had was generally borrowed from other Nations, which the wiſe men only ſuited to the temper of the *Greeks*, and ſo made it more fabulous than it was before. As it was certainly the great defect of the Natural Philoſophy of the *Greeks*, (as it hath been ever ſince in the world) that they were ſo ready to form Theories upon ſome Principles or Hypotheſes, which they only received by tradition from others, without fetching their knowledge from the experiments of Nature; and to theſe they ſuited all the phænomena of nature; and what was not ſuitable was rejected as monſtrous and anomalous; ſo it was in their Hiſtory, wherein they had ſome fabulous Hypotheſes they took for granted without enquiring into the truth and certainty of them, and to theſe they ſuit whatever light they gained in after-times of the ſtate of foreign Nations, which hath made Truth and Antiquity wreſtle ſo much with the corruption which eat into them thro' the pride and ignorance of the *Greeks*. Hence they have always ſuited the Hiſtory of other Nations with the account they give of their own; and where nothing could ſerve out of their own Hiſtory to give an account of the Original of other Nations, they (who were never backward at fictions) have made a Founder of them ſuitable to their own language. The truth is, there is nothing in the world uſeful or beneficial to mankind, but they have made ſhift to find the Author of it among themſelves. If we enquire after the original of Agriculture, we are told of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*; if of Paſturage, we are told of an *Arcadian Pan*; if of Wine, we preſently hear of a *Liber Pater*: if of Iron inſtruments, then who but *Vulcan?* if of Muſic, none like to *Apollo*. If we preſs them then with the Hiſtory of other Nations, they are as well provided here: if we enquire an account of *Europe*, *Aſia*, or *Libya*; for the firſt we are told a fine ſtory of *Cadmus*'s Siſter; for the *ſecond* of *Prometheus*'s Mother of that name, and for the *third* of a Daughter of *Epaphus*. If we are yet ſo curious as to know the original or particular Countries; then *Italy* muſt find its name from a Calf of *Hercules*, becauſe Ἰταλὸς in *Greek* will ſignifie ſome ſuch thing; *Sardinia* and *Africa* muſt be from *Sardos* and *Afer* two ſons of *Hercules*; but yet if theſe will not ſerve, *Hercules* ſhall not want for children to people the world; for we hear of *Scythes*, *Galatas*, *Lydus*, ſome other ſons of his, that gave names to *Scythia*, *Lydia*, and *Galatia*; with the ſame probability that *Media* had its name from *Medea*, and *Spain* and *Luſitania* from *Pan* and *Luſus*, two companions of *Bacchus*. If *Perſia* want a founder, they have one *Perſeus* an *Argive* ready for it; if *Syria*, *Babylonia*, and *Arabia* want reaſons of their names, the prodigal *Greeks* will give *Apollo* three ſons, *Syrus*,

rus, *Babylon* and *Arabs*, rather than they ſhall be heretical *Acephaliſts*. This vanity of theirs was univerſal, not confined to any place or age, but as any Nation or People came into their knowledge, their Gods were not ſo decrepit, but they might father one ſon more upon them, rather than any Nation ſhould be *filia Populi*, and want a father. Only the grave *Athenians* thought ſcorn to have any Father aſſigned them; their only ambition was to be accounted *Aborigines & genuini Terræ*, to be the eldeſt ſons of their *teeming mother the Earth*, and to have been born by the ſame equivocal generation that Mice and Frogs are, from the impregnated ſlime of the earth. Are we not like to have a wonderful account of ancient times from thoſe who could arrogate to themſelves ſo much knowledge from ſuch ſlender and thin accounts of the Originals of people which they gave, and would have the world entertain with the greateſt veneration upon their naked words? Have we not indeed great reaſon to hearken to thoſe who did ſo frequently diſcover their affection to Fables, and manifeſt their ignorance when ever they venture upon the hiſtory of other Nations?

X. The truth is, *Herodotus* himſelf (whom *Tully* calls the *Father of Hiſtory*, which title he deſerves at leaſt in regard of antiquity, being the eldeſt of the extant *Greek* Hiſtorians) hath ſtood in need of his Compurgators, who yet have not been able to acquit him of fabulouſneſs, but have ſought to make good his credit by recrimination, or by making it appear that *Herodotus* did not fully believe the ſtories he tells, but took them upon truſt himſelf, and ſo delivers them to the world. Some impute it to the ingenuity of *Herodotus*, that he calls his Books of Hiſtory by the name of the *Muſes*, on purpoſe to tell his Readers they muſt not look for meer Hiſtory in him, but a mixture of ſuch relations, which tho' not true, might yet pleaſe and entertain his Readers. Tho' others think they were not ſo inſcribed by himſelf, but the names were given to them by the *Greeks* from the admiration his Hiſtory had among them. However this were, this we are certain, that *Herodotus* was not firſt ſuſpected of falſhood in theſe latter Ages of the world, but even among the *Greeks* themſelves there have been found ſome that would undertake to make good that charge againſt him. For ſo *Suidas* tells us of one *Ælius Harpocration*, who writ a Book on purpoſe to diſcover the falſhood of *Herodotus*, Περὶ τῆς κατηγορίας τῶν Ἡροδότου ἱστοριῶν. *Plutarch* his Books are well known *Of the ſpight or malignity* of *Herodotus*, but the occaſion of that is ſufficiently known likewiſe, becauſe *Herodotus* had given no very favourable character of *Plutarch*'s Country. *Strabo* likewiſe ſeems to accuſe *Herodotus* much of nugacity and mixing prodigious fables with his Hiſtory; but, I confeſs, obſerving the grounds on which *Plutarch* inſiſts againſt *Herodotus*, I am very prone to think that the ground of the great pique in ſome of the *Greek* Writers againſt *Herodotus*, was, that he told too many tales out of School, and had diſcovered too much of the Infancy of *Greece*, and how much the *Grecians* borrowed of the *Ægyptian* ſuperſtitions: which *Plutarch* expreſly ſpeaks of, that *Herodotus* was too much led aſide, ταῖς Αἰγυπτίων ἀλαζονείαις καὶ μυθολογίαις τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ ἁγνότατα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν ἀνατρέπων. Altho' therefore *Herodotus* may not be much to blame in the things which the *Grecians* moſt charge him with, yet thoſe who favour him moſt cannot excuſe his palpable miſtakes in ſome things, and ignorance in others. *Joſephus* thinks he was deceived by the *Ægyptian* Prieſts in things relating to the ſtate of their affairs, of which *Joſ. Scaliger* gives many

Strabo l. 17.

Plutarch. de Herod. Mal. p. 857.

Joſeph. c. App. l. 1.

Scal. Can. Iſagog. l. 3.

many accounts; *Either*, ſaith he, *the perſons who gave him his intelligence were ignorant themſelves*; *or elſe*, *like true* Ægyptians, *they were cunning enough, and impoſed upon* Herodotus *being a ſtranger and unacquainted with their artifices*; *or elſe he did not underſtand his Interpreter, or was deceived by him*; or laſtly, Herodotus *might have ſo much of a* Grecian *in, as to adulterate the true Hiſtory with ſome fables of his own*; wherefore he rather adheres to *Manetho* than *Herodotus* as to the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory: who yet elſewhere (I will not ſay with what conſtancy to himſelf) vouchſafes him this high *Elogium*, that he is, *Scrinium originum Græcarum & Barbararum, auctor à doctis nunquam deponendus.*

Idem ad num. Euſ. 1572.

XI. It cannot be denied but a great deal of very uſeful Hiſtory may be fetched out of him; yet who can excuſe his ignorance, when he not only denies there is an Ocean compaſſing the Land, but condemns the Geographers for aſſerting it? Unleſs this might be any plea for his ignorance in Geography, that he had ſo many great names beſides him guilty of the ſame: Witneſs *Ariſtotle*'s ſuſpicion that the *Indies* ſhould be joyned to *Europe* about the *Streights*, where they feigned *Hercules* his Pillars to be. And the *Theræans* ignorance where any ſuch place as *Libya* was, when the Oracle bid them plant a Colony there. Would it not have been worth one's while to have heard the great noiſe the Sun uſed to make every night when he douſed his head in the Ocean, as none of the moſt ignorant *Greeks* imagined? And to have ſeen the Sun about *Hercules* his Pillars to be a hundred times bigger than he appeared to them, as they commonly fanſied. Was not *Alexander*, think we, well tutored in his Coſmography by his Maſter *Ariſtotle*, when he writ word to his Mother, he had found out the head of *Nilus* in the *Eaſt Indies?* as *Arrian* relates the ſtory. No wonder then his Souldiers ſhould miſtake the mountain *Paropamiſus* in the *Indies* for *Caucaſus* near *Colchis*, when even their learned men thought *Colchis* the utmoſt boundary of the world on that ſide, as *Hercules* his Pillars on this. What a lamentable account then were they able to give of the moſt ancient times, who were ſo ignorant of the ſtate of the world in their own time, when Learning was in its height in *Greece*, and frequent diſcoveries daily made of the world, by the wars which were made abroad? *Eratoſthenes* confeſſeth the *Grecians* were ignorant of a great part of *Aſia* and the Northern parts of *Europe* before *Alexander*'s expedition; and *Strabo* confeſſeth as much of the Weſtern parts of *Europe* till the *Roman* expeditions thither. *Palus Mæotis* and *Colchis*, ſaith he, were not fully known till the time of *Mithridates*, nor *Hyrcania*, *Bactriana*, and *Scythia*, till the *Parthian* wars. *Eratoſthenes* mentions ſome who thought the *Arabian* Sea to be only a Lake. And it further argues their ignorance in Geography, that the later Geographers always correct the errors of the elder, as *Ptolemee* doth *Marinus*, *Eratoſthenes* thoſe before him, *Hipparchus Eratoſthenes*, and *Strabo* not only both them, but *Eudoxus*, *Ephorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Polybius*, *Poſidonius*, and almoſt all that had writ before him. I inſiſt on theſe things, not that I would deſtroy the credibility of any Humane Hiſtory, where the Authors are guilty of any miſtakes (for that were to take away the credit of all Humane Hiſtory) but to ſhew how inſufficient thoſe Hiſtorians are to give us a certain account of the original of Nations, who were ſo unacquainted with the ſtate of thoſe Nations which they pretend to give an account of. For where there is wanting Divine Revelation (which was not pretended by any *Greek* Hiſtorians; and if it had, had been eaſily refuted) there

Herod. l. 2. c. 5.

Arrian. Hiſt. Alex. l. 6.

Strabo l. 1.

there must be supposed a full and exact knowledge of all things pertaining to that which they pretend to give an account of; and if they discover apparent defect and insufficiency (which hath been largely manifested as to them, in the precedent discourse) we have ground to deny the credibility of those Histories upon the account of such defect and insufficiency. So much then will abundantly suffice for the making good the first argument against the credibility of Profane Histories, as to the account which they give of Ancient times, different from the Word of God.

CHAP. V.

The general uncertainty of Heathen Chronology.

I. *The want of credibility in Heathen History further proved from the uncertainty and confusion in their accounts of Ancient times. That discovered by the uncertain form of their Years.* II. *An enquiry into the different forms of the Ægyptian Years; the first of thirty Days,* III. *The second of four Months; of both Instances given in the Ægyptian history.* IV. *Of the Chaldæan accounts, and the first Dynasties mentioned by* Berosus, *how they may be reduced to probability.* V. *Of the Ægyptian Dynasties of* Manetho. *Reasons of accounting them fabulous, because not attested by any credible authority, and rejected by the best Historians.* VI. *The opinion of* Scaliger *and* Vossius, *concerning their being contemporary, propounded,* VII. *and rejected with reasons against it.* VIII. *Of the ancient division of* Ægypt *into* Nomi *or Provinces, and the number of them, against* Vossius *and* Kircher.

THE next thing to manifest how little there is of credibility in the account of ancient times, reported by the Histories of Heathen Nations, is, the uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity in the account they give of those times. If we suppose them not defective as to their records, if yet we find the account given so perplexed, ambiguous and confused, that we can find no certainty of the meaning of it, we have very little reason to entertain it with any certain assent unto it. Now this will be made evident by these things. 1. The uncertainty of their Chronology, whereon their whole account depends. 2. The multitude of Impostures taken from ancient Histories. 3. The uncertain meaning of those Characters wherein their ancient histories were preserved. I begin with the great uncertainty of the heathen Chronology. which will be manifested by two things: *First*, the uncertain form of their years: *Secondly*, the want of certainty of their Διαγράμματα, or certain fixed *Epocha's* from which to derive their account of ancient times. *First*, the uncertain form of their years; this of it self is sufficient to destroy the credibility of their accounts of antiquity, if it be manifested that they had different forms of years in use among them; and it be uncertain to which to refer their accounts they give; for if I.

years

years be ſometimes lunar, ſometimes ſolar, and ſometimes but of thirty days, ſometimes of four months, ſometimes of three hundred and ſixty days, ſometimes three hundred and ſixty five, ſometimes four times three hundred ſixty five in their *tetraëteris*, ſometimes eight times in their *octaëteris*, ſometimes more, what certainty can we poſſibly have which of them to fix their accounts to? Eſpecially when they only give them in general, and never tell us which of them they mean, which may make them ſhrewdly ſuſpicious, that their intent is only to impoſe on our underſtandings, and not to deal fairly and truly with us. We ſhall therefore ſo much explain the different form of their years, as thereby to ſhew what uncertainties we are left to by them: Where we meddle not with their Tropical and Aſtronomical years, but chiefly thoſe which were in civil uſe among the ſeveral Nations we ſpeak to. A year is nothing elſe but a Syſtem of days, and is therefore capable of as great variety, as days are in being joyned together; but uſually there were ſome other leſſer Syſtems of days than thoſe which are called years, out of which the other doth reſult. Such is the ἑπτὰ ἡμερον, or the week, which, as *Joſeph Scaliger* ſaith, was *res omnibus Orientis populis ab ultima uſque antiquitate uſitata, a thing in continual uſe among the Eaſtern Nations*, tho' it be but of late reception into the parts of *Europe*, and no elder than Chriſtianity among them. Among the *Romans* was uſed an ὀκτὰ ἡμερον, which was for the ſake of *Nundinæ*; returning every ninth day. The *Mexicans*, as *Scaliger* tells us, reckon all by a τεσσαρα-δεκὰ ἡμερον, *a Syſtem of thirteen days.* Next to theſe were their Months; which were either Lunar or Solar. The Lunar were either from the Moon's return to the ſame point of the Zodiac again, called περίοδος σελήνης, which was leſs than twenty eight days; but this was of no uſe in civil computations; or elſe from one conjunction of the Moon with the Sun to another, which was called σύνοδος σελήνης; or elſe from the firſt phaſis of the Moon, the ſecond day after its *coïtus*, called φάσις and ἀπόκρυσις σελήνης; ſome, as the *Grecians*, reckoned their Lunar Months from the *coïtus*, as *Scaliger* proves out of *Vitruvius*; others from the *phaſis*, as ſome Eaſtern Nations did; as the *Jews* began their obſervation of the New Moons from the firſt *phaſis* or appearance of her after the *coïtus*. The Solar Months were either natural, ſuch as were defined by the Sun's paſſage from one ſign of the *Zodiac* to another; or civil, whereby the Months were equally divided into 30 days apiece, as in the *Grecian* and *Ægyptian* year.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 1.

II. Having thus far ſeen of what the year conſiſts, we now proceed to ſhew that the ancient Nations did not obſerve one conſtant form of year among them, but had ſeveral in uſe, to which their accounts may be referred. And becauſe the *Ægyptians* are ſuppoſed to have been beſt skilled as to the form of the year, according to that of *Macrobius*, *Anni certus modus apud ſolos ſemper Ægyptios fuit:* We ſhall particularly demonſtrate the variety of years in uſe among them: By which we ſhall ſee what great uncertainty there is in their accounts of their Dynaſties. For firſt it is evident that the time of 30 days was among the ancient *Ægyptians* accounted a year, for which we have the teſtimony of *Plutarch* in *Numa.* Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ μηνιαῖος ἦν ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς, εἶτα τετράμηνος; *The Ægyptians had at firſt a year conſiſting of one month, and after of four:* So *Varro* in *Lactantius* gives an account of the great Age of ſome men in ancient times, who are ſuppoſed to have lived 1000 years; *Ait enim apud Ægyptios pro annis menſes haberi, ut non Solis per 12 ſigna circuitus faciat*

Macrob. Saturn. l. 1. c. 12.

Lactant. de Origin. l. 2. c. 12.

faciat annum, ſed Luna quæ orbem illum ſigniferum 30 *dierum ſpacio illuſtrat.* It is then evident that this year of thirty days was in uſe among the *Ægyptians*; the only ſcruple is whether it was uſed in their ſacred accounts or no; and that it was, we have a pregnant teſtimony in *Plutarch* in the forecited place; ſpeaking of the *Ægyptians* great pretence to antiquity, he gives this account of it; πλῆθος ἀμήχανον ἐτῶν ὅτι ταῖς γενεαλογίαις καταχρῶνται, μῆνας εἰς ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν παραμυθούμενοι. *They reckon an infinite number of years in their accounts, becauſe they reckon their months inſtead of years.*

According to this computation, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the vaſt accounts of the *Ægyptian* antiquity to ſome proportion, and to reconcile their exorbitant Dynaſties with ſobriety and truth, eſpecially as to the account given of them by *Diodorus Siculus*; for ſo *Diodorus* gives in their accounts, that the Gods and Hero's reigned in *Ægypt* for the ſpace of near 18000 years, and the laſt of them was *Orus* the ſon of *Iſis:* From the reign of Men in *Ægypt* he reckons about 9500 years to the time (if we admit of *Jacob Capellus* his correction of πενταποσίων for πενταχιλίων in *Diodorus*) of his entrance into *Ægypt*, which was in the 180 *Olympiad.* Now as the aforeſaid learned Author obſerves, *Diodorus* came into *Ægypt*, *A. M.* 3940. *V. C.* 694. the mortal Men then had reigned in *Ægypt* 9500 years, which taking it for theſe Lunar years of 30 days, makes of *Julian* years 780. the Hero's and Gods 18000 months, that is of *Julian* years 1478; from theſe two ſumms together are gathered 2258 years, which being deducted from the year of the world 3940, falls in the year of the world 1682 about which time *Miſraim*, who was the great hiſtorical *Oſiris* of *Ægypt* (ſo called by a light variation of his former name) might be well ſuppoſed to be born; for that was in the year of *Noah* 630; and ſo *Orus* might be born, who was the ſon of *Oſiris*, about the year of the world 1778. Between whoſe time and *Alexander* the great his Conqueſt of *Ægypt*, the *Ægyptians*, as the ſame *Diodorus* tells us, reckon little leſs than 23000 years: Now according to this computation of 30 days for a year, we may reconcile this to truth too; for from 1778 to 3667 of the world, which falls upon the 417 year of *Nabonaſſar*, there is an interval of 1889 years, which makes of theſe Lunar years of 30 days, ſaith *Capellus*, 22996 and 15 days, which comes very near, if not altogether up to the *Ægyptian* Computation: So when the *Ægyptians*, according to *Diodorus*, makes no leſs than 10000 years diſtance between their *Hercules* and *Hercules Bœotius*, the ſon of *Alcmena*, it muſt be underſtood of theſe Lunar years; for granting what the *Ægyptians* ſay, that *Hercules Bœotius* lived but one generation before the *Trojan* war, and ſo his time to fall out about 2783; reckoning now backward from thence, and deducting from that year of the world 10000 months of 30 days, or *Julian* years 831, and 130 days, the time of the *Ægyptian Hercules* will fall about the year of the world, 1962, about which time we may well ſuppoſe him to live or die. And according to this computation we are to underſtand what the *Ægyptians* told *Herodotus*, that from their firſt King or Prieſt of *Vulcan*, till the time of *Sethos* (in whoſe time *Sennacherib* attempted the conqueſt of *Ægypt*) there had been paſſed 341 *Generations*, and as many Kings and High-Prieſts, and 11340 years, reckoning three Generations to make up a Century. But now, if we underſtand this prodigious computation according to this form of years, we may ſuſpect the *Ægyptians* of an intention to deceive

Herodotus

Diodor. lib. 1.

Hiſt. ſacr. & Exot. A. M. 1682.

Herodotus and the credulous *Greeks*, but yet not impeach them of direct falſhood, it being thus reconcilable to truth. For according to this account 100 years makes 3000 days, and a Generation 1000; ſo many days the Kings or Prieſts of *Vulcan* may be allowed to reign; ſo 340 Generations of 1000 days apiece, make up 340000 days, to which, if we add the 200 days which *Sethos* had now reigned upon *Sennacherib*'s invaſion, we have 340200 days, which makes up of theſe years of 30 days apiece 11340, which is the number aſſign'd by *Herodotus*. *Jacobus Capellus* thinks the *Epocha* from whence theſe years are to be reckoned, is from *A. M.* 2350, when *Mephres* began to reign in *Ægypt*, from whence if we number theſe 340200 days, or 11340 monthly years, which makes up of *Julian* years 931, and 152 days, the number falls *A. M.* 3282; about which time in probability *Sennacherib* invaded *Ægypt*. Thus we ſee by making uſe of thoſe Lunar years, that it is poſſible to reconcile ſome of the *Ægyptian* extravagant accounts to ſome probability and conſiſtency with truth; but however we owe very little thanks to the *Ægyptians* for it, who deliver theſe things in groſs, without telling us which years they mean, and thereby evidence their intent to deceive all who have ſo little wit as to be deceived by them.

Capell. Hiſt. ſacr. & Exot. p. 198.

III. The next kind and form of the *Ægyptian* year, was that which conſiſted of four equal Months, amounting to 120 days; the uſe of this kind of year among them is atteſted by *Plutarch* in the fore-cited place, and by *Diodorus*, who gives an account of this kind of year among the *Ægyptians*. *Solinus* ſeems to mention this as the only year in requeſt among the *Ægyptians:* and ſo S. *Auguſtin*, *Perhibentur* Ægyptii *quondam tam breves annos habuiſſe ut quaternis menſibus finirentur.* This renders then the *Ægyptian* accounts yet more uncertain, and only leaves us to gueſs with the greateſt probability of reaſon, what form of year was meant by them in their computations. So when *Diodorus* ſpeaks ſo much in favour of the old *Ægyptian* Kings and Laws, and produceth this from the *Ægyptian* Prieſts, as the beſt evidence of the excellent temper of their Government, that they had Kings of their own Nation for the ſpace of 4700 years, till the time of *Cambyſes* his inroad into *Ægypt*, which was in the third year of the 63 *Olympiad.* Now beſides the apparent contradiction of theſe accounts to the other already explained, if we take them in groſs, as the *Ægyptians* give them, it is evident this can be no otherwiſe true, than by taking theſe accounts in that form of years now mentioned by us. For theſe 4700 years, taking them for 120 days apiece, make up of *Julian* years 1544, which being deducted from the year of the World 3475, which was the time when *Cambyſes* invaded *Ægypt*, the remainder is *A. M.* 1931, about which time we may fix the death of *Orus*, from whom their proper Kings commenced. And of theſe years, *Voſſius* tells us, we are to underſtand what they report of the long lives of their ancient Kings, when they attribute to each of them the ſpace of 300 years: as when they attribute 1000, and more to their eldeſt Kings, we are to underſtand them of ſimple Lunar years of 30 days, by which theſe *Gigantic* meaſures of the term of their lives, may without the help of *Procruſtes* be cut ſhort according to the proportion of Men's ordinary age in thoſe eldeſt times. So when *Diodorus* reckons from the death of *Proteus* to his own time *A. M.* 3940, 3400 years, it muſt be underſtood of theſe years of four equal months; for ſo thoſe 3400 years make up of *Julian* years 1117, which being deduced from 3940 the remainder is 2823; about

Diod. l. 1.

Solin. Polyhiſt. c. 3.

Auguſt. de Civ. Dei, l. 12. *c.*10.

Diod. l. 1.

*Voſſius de Idolat. l.*1. *c.* 28.

bout which year of the world *Proteus* may be ſuppoſed to live, which was about the time of the *Judges* in *Iſrael.*

Neither was this only the *Ægyptians* way, but in probability the ancient *Chaldæans* obſerved the ſame, which may be a ground likewiſe of thoſe unmeaſurable accounts among them in their firſt Dynaſties, as is evident in the Fragments of *Abydenus* and *Apollodorus* out of *Beroſus*, where the times of their firſt Kings are reckoned not by years, but Σάροι, Νέιροι, and Σῶσσι, now according to them every Σάρος contained 3600 years, Νέιρος 600, Σῶσος 60. Now who can imagine that *Alorus* and the ten Kings from him to *Xiſuthrus* ſhould reign 120 *Sari* as their computation is, which reckoning for every *Saros* 3600 years, makes up 432000 years? A very fair ſum for the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties before the time of *Xiſuthrus*, by whom in probability *Noah* was by them underſtood. There have been only two ways thought on of dealing with theſe computations; either rejecting them as wholly fabulous, and founded on no evidence or records of Hiſtory, as we have ſeen already; only they might retain (being ſo near the place of the ſettlement of *Noah* and his poſterity after the floud) the memory not only of the floud (of which it is evident they had ſeveral remainders preſerved in their Traditions) but likewiſe of the ages of men preceding the floud, wherein they were right, reckoning from *Alorus* the firſt to *Xiſuthrus*, i. e. from *Adam* to *Noah*, ten Generations; but as to the names of thoſe ten perſons, and the times they lived in, being wholly ignorant thro' the unfaithfulneſs of tradition, they took their liberty not only of coyning names, but of ſetting what age to them they pleaſed themſelves. And to this purpoſe *Scaliger* obſerves that ſome of their firſt Kings are reckoned before the floud, which ſaith he, is denied by *Georgius Syncellus* without any ſhew of reaſon. Thus far then we may admit of the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties as to ſome part of the Tradition, but rejecting their names and computations as fabulous. The other way of explaining theſe Dynaſties, is by the ſeveral ways of computation among them: For the learned Monks, *Panodorus* and *Anianus*, underſtand thoſe vaſt ſums, not of years, but days, and ſo make a *Saros* to contain 120 months of 30 days apiece, which, ſaith *Scaliger*, make ten *Chaldee* years, and a *Nirus* 20 equal months, and a *Soſos* two: according to which computation the 100 *Sari* make but 1200 years. But this computation of theirs is rejected by *Georgius Syncellus*, becauſe he ſuppoſeth *Euſebius* ſo well verſed in theſe things, that he would never have ſet them down for years, if the *Chaldæans* had not underſtood them ſo, and therefore he would not trouble himſelf in reducing Fables to true Hiſtory, as he expreſſeth it, whoſe words are at large produced by *Scaliger* in the fore-cited place. And it will appear more neceſſary to reject thoſe *Chaldæan* Computations, if we take the ſums of their years in the ſenſe which *Salmaſius* gives of them in the Preface to his Book, *De annis Climactericis* (from whom *Pyrerius* the Author of the *Præadamites* hath borrowed moſt of his Arguments as to theſe things.) According to him then, every Σάρος contained no leſs than 6000 years, as the *Toman* among the *Perſians* contained 10000: but becauſe that learned man hath only given us his *reperi Scriptum*, without any certain foundation for ſo large an account of thoſe ſums, we ſhall take them in as favourable a ſenſe as we can. In order to which a very learned man of our own hath found a third interpretation of the Σάρος in the *Chaldee* accounts, from a correction of *Suidas* by the MS. in the *Vatican* Library,

IV.

Scal. Not. in Gr. Euſeb. p. 406.

brary, according to which he thus reads the words, Οἱ γὰρ ἐκ σάρων ποιοῦσιν ἐνιαυτὸς βοκβ' καὶ τὸν Χαλδαίων ἀριθμὸν, εἴπερ ὁ σάρος ποιεῖ μῆνας Σελήνιακοὺς ακβ', οἷοι γίνονται οἱ ἐνιαυτοὶ οἱ μῆνες ἐξ: *And ſo the ſenſe*, ſaith he, *is clear*; Σάρῳ *according to the* Chaldee *account comprehends* 222 *months, which come to eighteen years and ſix months*; *therefore* 120 Σάροι *make* 2220 *years, and therefore* (he adds) *for* βοκβ', *I read, leaving out the laſt* β, βοκ'. Now according to this ſenſe of 120 *Sari* to comprehend the ſumm of 2220 years, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the fragment of *Beroſus* concerning the ten Kings before the floud reigning 120 *Sari*, to ſome degree of probability: as to which I ſhall only ſuppoſe theſe two things. *Firſt*, that the ancient *Chaldæans* had preſerved among them ſome Tradition of the number of the chief perſons before the flood; for we find them exactly agreeing with the Scriptures as to the number, tho' differing as to the names of them, which may be ſeen in the Fragments of *Africanus*, preſerved in *Euſebius* his *Greek Chronica*. *Secondly*, that *Beroſus* from whom *Apollodorus* and *Alexander Polyhiſtor* deliver theſe computations, might, as to the account of the times of thoſe perſons, follow the tranſlation of the *Septuagint*. For I have already made it evident that *Beroſus* did not publiſh his Hiſtory till after the *Septuagint* was abroad; now according to the computation of the *Septuagint* of the ages before the floud, theſe 120 *Sari* of the ten Kings will not much diſagree from it. For theſe make 2220 years of theſe ten perſons, and the *Septuagint* in all make 2242; ſo that if inſtead of βοκβ' in *Suidas*, we only read it βομβ', we have the exact computation of the *Septuagint* in theſe 120 *Sari*; but of this let the learned judge.

D. Pearſon on the Creed, p. 115. 1. edit.

Euſeb. p. 5.

V. We now come to the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties of *Manetho*, as to which I doubt we muſt be fain to take the ſame courſe that *Euſebius* did with the *Chaldæan*, μὴ συμβιβάζειν τὸ ψεῦδος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, *not to trouble our ſelves overmuch in ſeeking to reconcile fables to truth*. Great pains is taken by ſome very learned men to reduce the diſorderly Dynaſties of *Manetho* to ſome probable account; but I muſt confeſs upon an impartial Examination of them, that I think they have ſtriven, if not to make an *Æthiopian* white, yet an *Ægyptian* to ſpeak truth concerning his own Country, which are almoſt of an equal impoſſibility. *Joſeph Scaliger* who firſt in this latter age of the world produced them into the light out of *Georgius Syncellus*, hath a more favourable opinion of them, than of the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus* and others, but upon what account I cannot imagine. Is it becauſe four Dynaſties, according to his own computation, exceed the Creation of the world according to the true account? for which he is fain to make uſe of his *Tempus prolepticum* and *Julian* period, which reacheth 764 years beyond the age of the world, and was invented by him from the multiplication of the great *Cycle* into the *Indiction*, i. e. of 532 into 15. Or is it becauſe forſooth *Manetho* hath digeſted all into better order, and reckoned up the ſeveral Dynaſties which lay confuſed in other Authors? but this only ſhews him a more cunning impoſtor who ſaw the former accounts given by others would not ſerve the turn, and therefore pretends to more exactneſs and diligence, that he might more eaſily deceive his Readers. But ſetting aſide thoſe things which have been ſaid already concerning *Manetho*, I have theſe things which make me reject his Dynaſties as fabulous: *Firſt*, the vaſt difference between *Manetho* his accounts and all others who have written the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory, in the order and names of Dynaſties. Where do we ever read of the ſeveral Dynaſties of the *Thinites*,

Thinites, *Memphites*, *Soïtes*, *Dioſpolitans* and many others, but in himſelf? It is very ſtrange that neither *Herodotus*, nor *Eratoſthenes*, nor *Diodorus*, who have all written a ſucceſſion of the *Ægyptian* Kings, ſhould neither by their own induſtry, nor by all the intereſt they had in *Ægypt*, get any knowledge of theſe methodically digeſted Dynaſties. Beſides, had there been any hiſtorical certainty in theſe Dynaſties of *Manetho*, whence comes it to paſs that they ſhould be ſo ſilently paſſed over by thoſe who were *Ægyptian* Prieſts themſelves, and undertook to write the Hiſtory of *Ægypt?* Such were *Chæremon*, who was an Ἱερογραμματεὺς, *a ſacred Scribe*, and *Ptolemæus Mendeſius* who was an *Ægytian* Prieſt, as *Euſebius* tells us, and comprehended the Hiſtory of *Ægypt* in three Books. Now had this Hiſtory been ſo authentical as is pretended, whence come ſo many and great contradictions between them? inſomuch that * *Joſephus* ſaith, *If that which they report were true it were impoſſible they ſhould ſo much differ; but they labour in the invention of lyes, and write neither agreeably to the truth, nor to one another.* So that it is next to a miracle almoſt to ſee how prodigiouſly fond of theſe Dynaſties *Kircher* is, and what pains he hath taken to no purpoſe about them; *ſcio multos eſſe*, ſaith he, *qui hujuſmodi Dynaſtias meras nugas & commenta putant*; very true; but why is not he of the ſame mind too? he confeſſeth himſelf to have been ſo once; but ſince he hath converſed more with the Oriental Traditions, he hath found them not to be ſo fabulous as many make them. It ſeems then the *Baſis* of the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties as well before the floud as after, muſt lie in this Oriental Tradition; a thing, which ſome, to ſhew their great skill in thoſe Eaſtern Languages, are grown very fond of. But as far as I can yet ſee, they ſail to *Ophir*, not for *Gold*, but *Peacocks*; and the next Legend the world hath ſhould be called *Legenda Orientalis*. For can any thing be more irrational, abſurd and fabulous, than thoſe *Arabic* Traditions which that Author ſcrapes as much for, as *Æſop's* Cock did on the dunghil? but there is no jewel to be found among them; Unleſs we ſhould take thoſe fifteen hard names of men for ſuch which by the *Arabic* Writers are ſaid to have ſucceeded each other in *Ægypt* before the floud, *viz. Nacraus*, *Nathras*, *Meſram*, *Henoah*, *Arjak*, *Haſilim*, *Huſal*, *Tatraſan*, *Sarkak*, *Schaluk*, *Surith*, (who they ſay built the Pyramids) *Hugith*, *Manaus*, *Aphrus*, *Malinus*, *Abn Ama Pharaun*, in whoſe time they ſay the floud came. But ſhould we be ſo little befriended by reaſon as to grant all this, what advantage will this be to *Manetho*, who ſpeaks not of Kings, but whole Dynaſties? ſo that it ſtill appears theſe Dynaſties are fabulous, not being atteſted by any credible witneſſes. *Secondly*, All thoſe who profeſs to follow *Manetho*, differ ſtrangely from one another, as *Joſephus*, *Africanus*, *Euſebius*, *George the Syncellus* of the Patriarch *Taraſius:* and *Scaliger*, who hath taken ſo much pains in digeſting of them, yet he is condemned by others ſince; and *Iſaac Voſſius* gives a particular caution to his Reader, *In his Dynaſtiis compingendis nequaquam eſſe ſequendum ordinem & calculum* Scaligeri. What ſhould be the reaſon of this diverſity, but that they thought them not ſo authentic, but they might cut off, alter and tranſpoſe, as they ſaw occaſion? which is moſt plain and evident in *Euſebius*, who makes no difficulty of cutting off one whole Dynaſty, and dividing another into two, only to reconcile the diſtance between *Thuoris* the Ægyptian King, and *Teutamus*, the Aſſyrian Emperor, and the deſtruction of *Troy*; and therefore leaves out four Aſſyrian Kings, and a whole

* *Joſeph. c. App. l. 1.*

Kircher. Oed. Ægyp. To. 1. Synt. 1. c. 9.

Iſ. Voſſius de ætate Mundi, cap. 10.

whole Dynasty of the Ægyptians, to make a *synchronism* between those three.

VI. But yet there hath been something very fairly offered to the world, to clear the truth, if not *Manetho*, in order to his Dynasties, *viz.* that the subtile *Ægyptian*, to inhance the antiquity of his own Country, did take implicite years for solid, and place those in a succession which were contemporary one with another; This indeed is a very compendious way to advance a great sum of years with a very little charge: Wherein he hath done, saith *Capellus*, as if a *Spaniard* in the *Indies* should glory of the antiquity of the Dynasties of *Spain*, and should attribute to the Earls of *Barcelona* 337 years, to the Kings of *Arragon* 498, to the Kings of *Portugal* 418, to the Kings of *Leon* 545, of *Castile* 800 years, and yet all these Dynasties rise from the year of our Lord 717, when the *Saracens* first entred *Spain*. There are very few Nations, but will go near to vie antiquity with the *Ægyptians*, if they may thus be allowed to reckon successively all those petty Royalties which anciently were in most Nations; as might be particularly instanced in most great Empires, that they gradually rise from the subduing and incorporating of those petty Royalties into which the several Nations were cantonized before. And there seems to be very strong ground of suspicion that some such thing was designed by *Manetho*, from the 32[d] Dynasty which is of the *Diospolitan Thebans*; for this Dynasty is said to begin from the tenth year of the 15[th] Dynasty of the *Phœnician* Pastors in the time of *Saïtes:* now, which is most observable, he that begins this Dynasty, is of the very same name with him who begins the very first Dynasty of *Manetho*, who is *Menes*, and so likewise his Son *Athothis* is the same in both: Which hath made many think, because *Menes* is reckoned first, not only in both these, but in *Diodorus*, *Eratosthenes* and others, that this *Menes* was he who first began the Kingdom of *Ægypt*, after whose time it was divided into several Dynasties. Which makes *Scaliger* say, *Illa vetustissima regna fuerunt instar latrociniorum; ubi vis, non lex aut successio aut suffragia populi reges in solio regni collocabant.* This opinion of the co-existence of these Dynasties is much embraced by *Vossius* both Father and Son, and by the Father made use of to justifie *Scaliger* from calumniators, who made as tho' *Scaliger* did in effect overthrow the authority of the Scriptures by mentioning with some applause the Dynasties of *Manetho*.

Capell. Hist. sacr. & exot. A. M. 3308.

Scalig. can. Isag. l. 3.

Ger. Voss. Idol. l. 1. *c.* 28.

Is. Voss. de æt. mund. c. 10.

VII. But to this opinion, how plausible soever it seems, I offer these exceptions. *First*, As to that *Menes* who is supposed to be the first Founder of the Ægyptian Kingdom, after whose death it is supposed that *Ægypt* was divided into all these Dynasties; I demand who this *Menes* was; was he the same with him whom the Scripture calls *Misraim*, who was the first Planter of *Ægypt?* this is not probable, for in all probability His name must be sought among the Gods, and not the Mortals that reigned. If we suppose him to be any other after him, it will be hard giving an account how he came to have the whole power of *Ægypt* in his hands, and soon after him it should be divided. For Kingdoms are oft-times made up of those petty Royalties before; but it will be very hard finding instances of one person's enjoying the whole power, and so many Dynasties to arise after his decease, and to continue coexistent in peace and full power so long as these several Dynasties are supposed to do. Besides, is it not very strange, that no Historian should mention such a former distribution of several Principalities so anciently

anciently in *Ægypt?* But that which to me utterly overthrows the coexiſtence of theſe Dynaſties in *Ægypt*, is, by comparing with them what we find in Scripture of greateſt antiquity concerning the Kingdom of *Ægypt*; which I cannot but wonder that none of thoſe learned men ſhould take notice of. When the Ægyptian Kingdom was firſt founded, 'tis not here a place to enquire; but it is evident that, in *Abraham*'s time, there was a *Pharaoh* King of *Ægypt* (whom Archbiſhop *Uſher* thinks to have been *Apophis*) not *Abimelech* the firſt King of *Ægypt*, as *Conſtantinus Manaſſes* reports in his Annals (by a ridiculous miſtake of the King of *Gerar* for the King of *Ægypt*.) This *Pharaoh* was then certainly King of all the Land of *Ægypt*, which ſtill in Scripture is called *the Land of Miſraim* from the firſt Planter of it: and this was of very great antiquity; and therefore *Funccius* (tho' improbably) thinks this *Pharaoh* to have been *Oſiris*, and *Rivet* thinks *Miſraim* might have been alive till that time; here then we find no Dynaſties coexiſting, but one Kingdom under one King. If we deſcend ſomewhat lower, to the times of *Jacob* and *Joſeph*, the evidence is ſo undoubted of *Ægypt*'s being an entire Kingdom under one King, that he may have juſt cauſe to ſuſpect the eyes either of his body or his mind that diſtruſts it. For what more evident, than that *Pharoah* who preferred *Joſeph*, was *King of all the land of* Ægypt? *Were not the ſeven years of famine over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 55. *Was not* Joſeph *ſet by* Pharaoh *over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 41, 43, 45. *And did not* Joſeph *go over all the land of* Ægypt *to gather Corn?* Gen. 41. 46. *Nay did he not buy all the land of* Ægypt *for* Pharaoh? *Gen.* 47. 20. Can there poſſibly be given any fuller evidences of an entire Kingdom, than theſe are, that *Ægypt* was ſuch then? Afterwards we read of one King after another in *Ægypt* for the ſpace of nigh two hundred years, during the children of *Iſrael*'s ſlavery in *Ægypt*; and was not he, think we, King over all *Ægypt*, in whoſe time the children of *Iſrael* went out thence? And in all the following Hiſtory of Scripture, is there not mention made of *Ægypt* ſtill as an entire Kingdom, and of one King over it? Where then is there any place for theſe contemporary Dynaſties in *Ægypt?* No where that I know of, but in the Fancies of ſome learned men.

Gen. 12.

VIII. Indeed there is one place that ſeems to give ſome countenance to this opinion; but it is in far later times than the firſt Dynaſties of *Manetho* are ſuppos'd to be in, which is in *Iſai.* 19. 2. Where God ſaith, *He would ſet the* Ægyptians *againſt the* Ægyptians, *and they ſhall fight every one againſt his brother, city againſt city, and kingdom againſt kingdom.* Where it ſeems that there were ſeveral Kingdoms then exiſtent among the *Ægyptians*; but the *Septuagint* very well renders it νομὸς ἐπὶ νομόν. Now νομὸς among the *Ægyptians*, as *Epiphanius* and others tell us, notes τὴν ἑκάστης πόλεως περιοικίδα ἤτοι παροικίαν, *the precincts of every great City*, ſuch as our Counties are, and therefore *Pliny* renders νομοὶ by *præfecturæ*; theſe were the ſeveral Provinces of *Ægypt*, of which there were thirty ſix in *Ægypt*, ten in *Thebais*, ten in *Delta*, the other ſixteen in the midland parts; ſo that by kingdom againſt kingdom, no more is meant than one Province being ſet againſt another. *Iſaac Voſſius* thinks the number of the ancient *Nomi* was twelve, and that over every of theſe was a peculiar King; and that this number may be gathered from the Dynaſties of *Manetho*, ſetting aſide the Dynaſties of the *Perſians*, *Æthiopians*, and *Phœnicians*: *viz.* the *Thinites*, *Memphites*, *Elephantines*, *Heracleopolitans*, *Dioſpolitan Thebans*, the leſſer *Dioſpolitans*, *Xoites*, *Tanites*,

nites, *Bubaſtites*, *Saites*, *Mendeſians*, and *Sebennytes*: and ſo that *Ægypt* was anciently a *Dodecharchy*, as *England* in the *Saxons* time was a *Heptarchy*. But as it already appears, there could be anciently no ſuch *Dodecharchy* in *Ægypt*; ſo it is likewiſe evident that this diſtribution of *Ægypt* into *Nomi* is a later thing, and by moſt Writers is attributed to *Seſooſis* or *Seſoſtris*, whom *Joſephus* ſuppoſed to be *Seſack* King of *Ægypt*, contemporary with *Rehoboam*. Indeed if we believe *Gelaldinus* the *Arabic* Hiſtorian cited by *Kircher*, the moſt ancient diſtribution of *Ægypt* was into four parts. *Miſraim* held one part to himſelf, and gave his Son *Copt* another, *Eſmun* a third, and *Atrib* a fourth part; which diviſion the ſame Author affirms to have continued till the time of *Joſeph*, who made a new diſtribution of the whole Land: After him *Seſoſtris* divided the whole into thirty ſeveral *Nomi*; ſo *Kircher* will needs have it, that of the three ſeveral parts of *Ægypt*, each might have for ſome myſtical ſignification its ten *Nomi*, of which every one had its diſtinct and peculiar God it worſhipp'd, and a particular Palace in the Labyrinth, and a peculiar *Sanhedrin* or Court of Juſtice belonging to it. But it evidently appears by that vain-glorious *Oedipus*, that it is a far eaſier matter to make new Myſteries, than to interpret old ones, which as it might be eaſily diſcovered is the main foundation whereon that ſtructure ſtands, ſo we have ſome evidence of it in our firſt entrance into it, in this part of the *Chorography* of *Ægypt*. For from whence had he this exact diviſion of *Ægypt* into thirty *Nomi*, ten of which belonged to the upper *Ægypt*, or *Thebais*, ten to *Delta*, or the lower *Ægypt*, and the ten remaining to the midland Country? Hath he this from *Ptolemee*, whoſe Scheme of the ſeveral *Nomi* he publiſheth? No, *Ptolemee* and *Pliny*, by his own confeſſion, afterwards add many others to theſe, as *Omphile*, *Phanturites*, *Tanites*, *Phatnites*, *Neut*, *Heptanomos*, &c. Hath he it from *Strabo*, whoſe authority he cites for it? No ſuch matter. For *Strabo* ſaith expreſly, that *Thebais* had ten *Nomi*, *Delta* ten, and the midland ſixteen; only ſome are of opinion, ſaith he, that there were as many *Nomi* as Palaces in the Labyrinth, which were toward thirty; but yet the number is uncertain ſtill. We ſee by this, how ominous it is for an *Oedipus* to ſtumble at the threſhold, and how eaſie a matter it is to interpret Myſteries, if we may have the making of them. We ſee then no evidence at all for theſe contemporary Dynaſties of *Manetho*; which yet if we ſhould grant, would be a further argument of the uncertainty of heathen *Chronology*, when among them implicit years are given out to the world for ſolid; ſo that which way ſoever *Manetho* his Dynaſties be taken, they will prove the thing in hand, whether we ſuppoſe them at leaſt moſt part fabulous, or ſhould grant he had taken thoſe in ſucceſſion to each other, which were coexiſtent with one another.

Vid. Boch. Geogr. p. 1. l. 4. c. 4. Kircher Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. Syntag. 1. c. 4.

Idem Synt. 1. c. 2. p. 7.

Strab. l. 17.

CHAP. VI.

The uncertain Epocha's of Heathen Chronology.

I. *An account of the defect of Chronology in the eldest times. Of the Solar Year among the* Ægyptians, *the original of the Epacts, the antiquity of Intercalation among them. Of the several Canicular Years; the difference between* Scaliger *and* Petavius *considered. The certain Epocha's of the* Ægyptian *History no elder than* Nabonassar. II. *Of the* Grecian *accounts. The fabulousness of the Heroical age of* Greece. III. *Of the ancient* Grecian *Kingdoms. The beginning of the* Olympiads. IV. *The uncertain Origins of the Western Nations. Of the* Latin *Dynasties. The different* Palilia *of* Rome. *The uncertain reckoning* Ab Urbe condita. V. *Of impostures as to ancient Histories. Of* Annius, VI. Inghiramius, *and others.* VII. *Of the characters used by Heathen Priests:* VIII. *No sacred characters among the* Jews. IX. *The partiality and inconsistency of heathen Histories with each other. From all which the want of credibility in them as to an account of ancient times is clearly demonstrated.*

THE next thing to evidence the uncertainty of the heathen *Chronology*, is the want of certain *Parapegmata*, or some fixed periods of time, according to which the account of times must be made. For if there be no certain *Epocha's* by which to reckon the succession of ages, the distance of intervals, and all intervening accidents, we must of necessity fluctuate in continual uncertainties, and have no sure foundation to bottom any account of ancient times upon. The great reason of this defect, is, the little care which those who lived in the eldest times had to preserve the memory of any ancient tradition among themselves, or to convey it to posterity in such a way as might be least liable to imposture. Of all kinds of Learning, *Chronology* was the most rude in eldest times; and yet that is well called by *Scaliger*, *The life and soul of History*, without which *History* is but a confused lump, a mere *Mola*, an indigested piece of flesh, without life or form. The ancient accounts of the world were merely from year to year, and that with abundance of obscurity, uncertainty and variety: sometimes going by the course of the Moon; and therein they were as mutable as the Moon her self, how to conform the year regularly to her motion: and it was yet greater difficulty to regulate it by the course of the Sun, and to make the accounts of the Sun and Moon meet. There was so much perplexity and confusion about the ordering of a single year, and so long in most Nations before they could bring it into any order, that we are not to expect any fixed periods by which to find out the succession of ages among them. Among the *Ægyptians* who are supposed most skilful in the account of the year, it was a long time before they found out any certain course of it. It is agreed by most, that when the Ægyptian Priests had found out the form of the year by the course of the Sun which is attributed I.

tributed by *Diodorus* to the *Heliopolitan* Priests) yet the year in common use was only of 360 days, which in any great period of years must needs cause a monstrous confusion, by reason that their Months must of necessity by degrees change their place, so that in the great Canicular year of 730 *Thoyth*, which was the beginning of the Summer *Solstice* in the entrance into that period, would be removed into the midst of Winter, from whence arose that Ægyptian fable in *Herodotus*, that in the time of their eldest Kings, the Sun had twice changed his rising and setting; which was only caused by the variation of their Months, and not by any alteration in the course of the Sun. Which defect the Ægyptian Priests at last observing, saw a necessity of adding five days to the end of the year w^ch^ thence were called ἐπαγόμεναι, which implies they were not anciently in use among them, being afterwards added to make up the course of the year. Which the *Ægyptians* give an account of, as *Plutarch* tells us under this fable: *Mercury being once at dice with the Moon, he got from her a 72^d^ part of the year, which he after added to the 360 days which were anciently the days of the year, which they called* ἐπαγομένας, *and therein celebrated the Festivals of their Gods.* Thence the names of the several ἐπαγόμεναι were taken from the Gods; the first was called Ὄσιρις, it being celebrated in honor of him; the second Ἀρῆρις, by which *Scaliger* understands *Anubis*, but *Vossius* more probably the senior *Orus*; the third to *Typho*; the fourth to *Isis*; the fifth to *Nephtha* the wife of *Typho*, and sister to *Isis*. This course of the year *Scaliger* thinks that the *Ægyptians* represented by the Serpent called Νειώ, being described in a round circle biting some part of his tail in his mouth; whereby, saith he, they would have it understood that the form of the year was not perfect without that adjection of five days to the end of the year: For to this day, saith he, the *Coptites* and ancient *Ægyptians* call the end of the year Νειώ. It seems that afterwards they understood likewise the necessity of intercalation of a day every fourth year, for the sake of the redundant quadrant each year above 365 days; which course of four years they called Canicular year, because they observed its defect in that time one whole day from the rising of the Dog-star: and besides that they called it Ἡλιακὸν ἔτος, and Ἔτος Δεύτερον, *& lustrum Sothiacum*, from Σῶθις the Dog-star: but *Censorinus* denies any use of intercalation among the *Ægyptians* in their civil year, altho' their Sacred and Hieroglyphical years might admit of it. And upon this ground, I suppose the controversy between those two learned persons, *Scaliger* and *Petavius*, concerning the antiquity of Intercalation among the *Ægyptians* may be reconciled. For on the one side it is apparent, that the ordinary or civil year did want intercalation, by this testimony of *Censorinus*; *Eorum annus civilis solos habet dies* 365 *sine ullo incercalari*; *itaque quadriennium apud eos uno circiter die minus est quam naturale quadriennium*; and thence, saith he, it comes to pass, that in 1461 years, which was the great *Heliacal* year, it returns to the same beginning; for then the Dog-star ariseth again upon the first day of the month *Thoyth*, as it did at the beginning of this great Canicular year; and that this kind of civil year did continue among them in the time of *Censorinus* (which was of the *Dionysian* account 238) appears by this, that he saith in the year wherein he wrote his book the *New-moon* of *Thoyth* was before the seventh day of the Calends of *July*, whereas a hundred years before, it was before the 12 of the Calends of *August*; whence it is evident, that the *Julian* year, whatever some learned men pretendt o the contrary, was not in ordinary

Diodor. l. 1. c. 50.

Herod. Euterp. Vide Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 3. p. 195.

Plutarch de Iside & Osiride.

Voss. de Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Censorin. de die Nat. c. 18.

V. Petav. de doctr. Temp. l. 3. c. 2.

ordinary uſe among the *Ægyptians* in that time; and that *Soſigenes* when he corrected the *Roman* Account, and brought in the form of the *Julian* year, did not take his pattern from the Ægyptian year, but from the *Grecians* of *Alexandria*, who did make uſe of the Quadrant added to the 365 years, which the *Ægyptians* did not, as appears further by the Golden circle in the monumnet of *Oſimanduas* (which *Diodorus* ſpeaks of out of *Hecatæus Mileſius*) which was of 365 cubits compaſs, and divided into ſo many ſegments for every day with the obſervations of the riſing and ſetting of the ſeveral Stars, and the effects portended by them. And the reaſon why this year continued in civil uſe among the *Ægyptians*, is well aſſigned by *Geminus*, that the *Ægyptians* according to a ſuperſtitious obſervation they had, would needs have their Feſtivals run through every day in the year. But now on the other ſide, it is as evident that by continual obſervation the wiſeſt of the Ægyptian Prieſts did diſcern the neceſſity of intercalation, and that there wanted ſix hours in every year to make it compleat, which every four years would make the intercalation of a day neceſſary; ſo much by *Diodorus* is affirmed of the *Theban* Prieſts, who were the beſt Aſtronomers; and by *Strabo* both of the *Theban* and *Heliopolitan*; and ſo likewiſe *Horapollo*, whoſe work was to interpret the more abſtruſe learning of the Ægyptian Prieſts: *When* (ſaith he) *the* Ægyptians *would expreſs a year, they name a Quadrant, becauſe from one riſing of the ſtar* Sothis *to another the fourth part of a day is added, ſo that the year conſiſts of* 365 *days*; (and a quadrant muſt be added, becauſe of the antecedents and conſequents) therefore every fourth year they reckon a ſupernumerary day. How unjuſtly *Petavius* hath charged *Scaliger* with falſhood in reference to this teſtimony of *Horapollo*, meerly becauſe the citation did not appear in that Chapter mentioned by *Scaliger* in the Book which *Petavius* uſed, hath been already obſerved by learned men. Whereupon *Voſſius* condemns *Petavius* of ſtrange incogitancy, becauſe in three Editions mentioned by him, *Scaliger*'s citation was right: but *Conringius* hath ſince pleaded in behalf of *Petavius*, that he might make uſe of the Edition of *Cauſinus* diſtinct from the other three; whereby we ſee how ſmall a matter will beget a feud between learned men, eſpecially where prejudice hath lodged before; as is too evident in *Petavius* his rough dealings on all occaſious, with that very deſerving perſon *Joſeph Scaliger*. But to return, from hence by degrees the *Ægyptians* proceded to make greater periods of years (as *Eudoxus* carried his *Octaeteris* into *Greece* from the Canicular year of the *Ægyptians*) they framed from this a great Canicular year, which had as many years as the *Julian* hath days; and laſtly, the greateſt Canicular year, which comprehended four of the greater, and conſiſted of a period of 1461 years. But thus we ſee, that the great periods of years among them riſe gradually, as they grow more skilful in the underſtanding the nature of the year; and that they had anciently no certain periods to govern themſelves by in their computation of ancient times. Nay the *Ægyptians* have not, as appears, any certain *Epocha* to go by, elder than the Ægyptian years of *Nabonaſſar*, and afterwards from the death of *Alexander*, and *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, and *Auguſtus* his Victory at *Actium*.

Kircher Oed. Ægyp. To. 3. Claſſ. 7. c. 2.

Diod. l. 1. c. 49.

Geminus de ſphæra cap. 6.

Diodor. l. 1. c. 50. Strab. l. 17. Horapollo. Hieroglyp. l. 1. c. 5.

Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Conring. de Hermet. Med. c. 12.

II. If from the *Ægyptians* we remove our diſcourſe unto the *Grecians*, we are ſtill plunged into greater uncertainties, it being acknowledged by themſelves that they had no certain ſucceſſion of time before the *Olympiads*. To which purpoſe the teſtimony of *Varro* in *Cenſorinus* is generally

taken notice of, diſtributing time into three parts, reckoning two of them to be unknown and fabulous, and the hiſtorical part of time to begin with the firſt *Olympiad*. Indeed *Scaliger* and ſome others are loath to reject all that ſecond part of time as fabulous, which was in the interval between *Deucalion*'s flood and the *Olympiads*; and therefore they had rather call it Heroical, tho' much corrupted with fables, and to think that it was hiſtorical as to perſons, but fabulous as to the actions of thoſe perſons. But granting this; yet we are wholly to ſeek for any certain account of the ſucceſſion of time and perſons for want of ſome certain *Epocha*'s, which like the Pole Star ſhould guide us in our paſſage thro' that vaſt Ocean of the *Grecian* Hiſtory. It muſt be confeſſed that ſome of the learned Heathens have taken a great deal of pains this way to find out ſome certain Periods to fix on in the time before the *Olympiads*; as *Philochorus*, *Apollodorus*, and *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis*, and others, who out of their skill in Aſtronomy ſought to bring down ſome certain intervals between the deſtruction of *Troy*, and the firſt *Olympic* games of *Pelops*, reſtored by *Hercules* and *Atreus*. But granting that their *Epocha*'s were fixed and certain, that the deſtruction of *Troy* was upon the 23 of *Thargelion*, the 11th month of the *Attic* account, and that the *Olympic* game fell out anſwerably to the ninth of our *July*, and theſe things were evidently proved from Aſtronomical obſervations; yet how vaſt an account of time is loſt quite beyond the ſiege of *Troy*? And beſides that, as to all other accidents in the Intervals between theſe two *Epocha*'s which could not be proved by Celeſtial obſervations concurrent with them, they were left at a very great uncertainty ſtill; only they might gueſs whether they approached nearer to one *Epocha* than the other by the ſeries of Families and their Generations (three of which made a Century of years) whereby they might come to ſome conjectures, but could not arrive at any certainty at all.

Scalig. not in Can. Iſagoge. l. 3.

III. But that which is moſt to our purpoſe is, that all the Hiſtory of the original of *Greece*, the foundations of their ſeveral Kingdoms, the ſucceſſion of their firſt Kings, and all that comes under the name of the Hiſtory of their ancient times, is clearly given over by their own moſt skilful Chronologers, as matters out of the reach of any clear evidence. Thence comes ſuch great differences concerning the antiquity of their ancient Kingdoms; the *Argolic* Kingdom by *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſ.* is ſuppoſed to be the eldeſt, and the *Attic* younger than it by 40 Generations, which according to their computation comes to 1000 years, which is impoſſible; and yet the *Arcadians*, who gave themſelves out to be elder than the Moon, are ſuppoſed to be younger by him than the Graſhoppers of *Athens* by nine Generations; and the *Phthiotica*, under *Deucalion*, younger than *Arcadica* by 42 Generations, which *Scaliger* might well ſay were impoſſible and inconſiſtent. The *Sicyonian* Kingdom is by moſt ſuppoſed to be of greateſt antiquity among the *Grecians*, from which *Varro* began his Hiſtory, as S. *Auſtin* tells us; and yet as to this, *Pauſanias* only reckons the names of ſome Kings there, without any ſucceſſion of time among them; and yet as to thoſe names *Africanus* (and *Euſebius* from him) diſſent from *Pauſanias*; and which is moſt obſervable, *Homer* reckons *Adraſtus*, who is the 23d in the account of *Africanus*, to be the firſt that reigned in *Sicyon*, whoſe time was after the inſtitution of the *Olympic* Game by *Pelops*: of him thus *Homer*,

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 16. c. 2.

Homer. Iliad. 2.

Καὶ Σικυῶν ὃϑ' ἄρ' Ἀδρῆστος πρῶτ' ἐμβασίλευεν.

whereby

whereby he expreſſeth *Adraſtus* to be the firſt King of *Sicyon*; and not as *Scaliger* would interpret it, that *Adraſtus* was firſt King of the *Sicyonians*, before he was of the *Argives*; for in the time of *Adraſtus* at *Sicyon*, either *Atreus*, or *Thyeſtes* was King of the *Argives*: for in the ſecond year of *Phæſtus* and *Adraſtus* his ſuppoſed predeceſſor in *Sicyon*, *Atreus* reſtored the *Olympic* Game of *Pelops*, in the 41 year of their reign, and they reigned at *Argi* 65 years: Now that *Phæſtus* at *Sicyon* is ſuppoſed to reign but eight years; and therefore the reign of *Adraſtus* at *Sicyon* falls in with that of *Atreus* and *Thyeſtes* at *Argi* or *Mycenæ*. Thus we ſee now, how uncertain the account of times was before the beginning of the *Olympiads* among the *Grecians*, which is fully acknowledged by *Diodorus*, and the very reaſon given which we here inſiſt on, Διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἀδιάπτωτα παρειλῆφθαι περὶ τούτων πεπυσμένον, *That there was no certainty in the ancient Grecian hiſtory, becauſe they had no certain term* (which he calls *parapegma*, as others *Epocha*; and *Cenſorinus*, *Titulus*) *from whence to deduce their accounts.* But now from the time of the *Olympiads* (i. e. from the firſt of them after their reſtoration by *Iphitus*, wherein the names of the Conquerors were ingraven in braſs Tablets for the purpoſe) the ſucceſſion of time is moſt certain and hiſtorical among the *Grecians*; by which account we have from thence a certain way of commenſurating the ſacred and prophane Hiſtory. All the difficulty is in what year of ſacred Hiſtory the *Olympiads* began, which *Scaliger* thus finds out. *Cenſorinus* writes (in the year of *Chriſt* 238 which was of the *Julian* period 4951.) that, that year was from the firſt *Olympiad* of *Iphitus* 1014, the firſt *Olympiad* was of the *Julian* period 3938. which was according to our learned Primate *A. M.* 3228, and the 35 of *Uzziah* King of *Judah*, or the 34, as *Capellus* thinks: So that from henceforward we have a clear account of times, which we have demonſtrated to have been ſo uncertain before.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5.

IV. If we come to the *Greeks* further into theſe *European* parts, we ſhall find as much darkneſs and obſcurity as to ancient times, if not more, than in thoſe already diſcours'd of. For the truth is, the account of times before the *Romans* in *Italy*, *Germany*, old *Gallia* or *Britain*, are ſcarce fit to be diſcourſed of under any head than that of impoſture. Not that I think thoſe Nations had lain in a perpetual ſleep, till the *Romans* waked them into ſome kind of civility but that they had no certain way of conveying down the tranſactions of their own and former times to the view of poſterity. On which account we may juſtly reject all thoſe pretended ſucceſſions of Kings here in *Britain* from *Gomer* and *Brute* as fabulous. And it will be the leſs wonder it ſhou'd be ſo in thoſe then accounted barbarous Nations, when even among thoſe who were the Planters of knowledge and civility among others, the account of their ancient times is ſo dark, confuſed and uncertain. As it would ſufficiently appear to any that would take the pains to examine the ſucceſſion of the two firſt Dynaſties among the *Latines*; the firſt before *Æneas* his coming into *Italy*; and the ſecond of the *Æneadæ* after. And certainly it will be ſufficient ground to queſtion the account of times before; if in the third Dynaſty, when the ſucceſſion ſeems ſo clear, and ſo certain an *Epocha* as the building of *Rome*, to deduce their accounts from their Chronology be uncertain, which I ſhall briefly ſpeak to. For altho' *Porcius Cato* have in *Dionyſius* the honour of finding out the firſt *Palilia* of the City of *Rome* (which was the Feaſt obſerved to the honour of the Goddeſs *Pales* in the time of which, the foundations of

Rome were laid) yet there appears no great certainty in his undertaking; for therein he was after contradicted by the learned *Roman*, *Varro*. *Dionyſius* tells us that *Cato* found by the *Cenſors* Tables the exact time from the expulſion of the Kings, to the time of the City's being taken by the *Gauls*; from which time to his own, he could not miſs of it from the *Faſti Conſulares*; ſo that it cannot be denied but that *Cato* might have a certain account of times from the *Regifugium* to the time he writ his *Origines*. But what certainty *Cato* could have from the firſt *Palilia* of the City to the expulſion of *Tarquin*, we cannot underſtand. For the ſucceſſion of Kings muſt needs be very uncertain, unleſs it be demonſtrated from ſome public monuments, or certain records, or ſome public actions certainly known to have fallen out preciſely in ſuch a year of their ſeveral Reigns. Now none of theſe do occurr in the *Roman* Hiſtory, in all that interval from the *Palilia* to the *Regifugium*; ſo that not only the whole interval, but the time of every particular King's Reign, are very uncertain. And therefore *Varro* being deſtitute of any demonſtration of that time, had recourſe to *L. Tarrutius Firmanus*, to ſee if by his skill in Aſtronomy he could certainly find out the firſt *Palilia* of *Rome*: His anſwer was, that he found that the City was built in the time of an Eclipſe of the Sun, which was in the third year of the ſixth *Olympiad*; according to which account *Varro* proceded, and thence aroſe the difference between the *Palilia Catoniana* and *Varroniana*; the latter falling out in the 23[d] of *Iphitus*, the other in the 24[th]. But if we believe *Joſeph Scaliger*, there could not be an Eclipſe of the Sun, at the time affirmed by *Tarrutius*: But yet granting an Eclipſe of the Sun then, what certainty can we have of the ſucceſſion of the ſeveral Kings afterwards without which there can be no certain computation *ab Urbe condita?* If then the *Romans*, who had ſo great advantage of knowing times, and were withal ſo inquiſitive concerning the building of their city (which was a thing of no very remote diſtance) could attain to no abſolute certainty about it, what certainty can we expect as to an account of far ancienter times, either from them or others, when they had no Cenſors Tables, nor *Faſti Conſulares* to be guided by? And thus much may ſerve to ſhew the great uncertainty of heathen Chronology, as to the giving an account of ancient times.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 358.

V. And yet were it only an uncertainty as to Chronology, we might better bear with it; for the miſtake meerly in computation of times were not ſo dangerous (any further than the credibility of the Hiſtory depends on the computation, as in point of antiquity) if we were but certain that the perſons and actions related of them were ſuch as they are reportedto be. But that which adds much to the confuſion and uncertainty of heathen Hiſtory, is, the frequency of impoſtures, which are more hard to be diſcovered, in that there are no authentic Hiſtories of thoſe times extant, which hath both given occaſion to variety of impoſtures, and much hindred their diſcovery. For the curioſity of men leading them back into a ſearch after ancient times, it makes them exceeding credulous in embracing whatever pretends to give them any conduct thro' thoſe dark and obſcure paths of ancient Hiſtory. And the world hath never been wanting of ſuch as would be ready to abuſe the ſimple credulity of well-meaning, but leſs wary men; but thoſe ages have been moſt *feracious* in the production of ſuch perſons, which have pretended to more learning than they had. The pretence of Learning made ſuch perſons appear, and the want of it made them not be diſcovered. Thus

it

it was not only of old among the *Chaldæan* and *Ægyptian* Prieſts, and the *Grecian* Poets, and Hiſtorians, of whom we have ſpoken already; but even among thoſe who might have learned more truth from the Religion they profeſſed, than to think it ſtood in need of their lyes. For there can be no greater diſparagement offered to truth, than to defend it with any thing but it ſelf, nothing laying truth ſo open to ſuſpicion, as when falſhood comes to be his advocate. And a falſe teſtimony diſcovered, doth more prejudice to a good cauſe, than it could any ways advantage it, were it not diſcovered. And therefore their labours have been as ſerviceable to the world who have diſcovered Impoſtures, as thoſe who have directly maintained truth againſt its open oppoſers; thoſe being ſo much more dangerous, in that they appear in the diſguiſe of truth, and therefore are with more difficulty diſcovered. Such a one was that *Ignis fatuus* that appeared in a kind of twilight in the *Chriſtian* world between the former darkneſs of Barbariſm, and the approaching light of knowledge: I mean *Annius Viterbienſis*, who like *Hannibal* in paſſing the *Alps*, not finding a way ready to his mind, ſets himſelf to burning the woods and firing the rocks, and diſſolving them with vinegar to make a paſſage thro' them: So *Annius* being beſet in thoſe ſnowy and gray-headed *Alps* of ancient Hiſtory, and finding no way clear for him according to his fancy, he labours to burn down all certain Records, to eat thro' the credit of undoubted Authors, to make a more free paſſage for his own Hiſtory, which he deduceth ſuitably to Scripture from the concurrent teſtimony of the eldeſt Hiſtorians. To which purpoſe, a new *Beroſus*, *Manetho*, *Philo*, *Metaſthenes* (as he miſtook for *Megaſthenes*) and *Xenophon* muſt put on a grave diſguiſe, and walk abroad the world with a mantle of Antiquity about their ſhoulders, altho' they wear nothing elſe but airy Phantaſms, covered over with the *Cowl* of the Monk of *Viterbo*. For being himſelf ſomewhat more verſed in the Hiſtory of thoſe elder times than generally perſons were in the age he lived in, he made that unhappy uſe of his skill, to play the Mountebank with his Learning; and to abuſe the credulity of thoſe who have better ſtomachs than palates, and ſooner ſwallow down the compoſitions that are given them, than find out the ingredients of them. Thus *Annius* puts a good face on his New-old Authors, bids them be bold and confident, and they would fare the better. And the truth is, they tell their ſtory ſo punctually in all circumſtances, in thoſe things which had no certain conveyance to poſterity, that that were ſufficient ground to any intelligent perſon to queſtion their authority. But leſt his Authors ſhould at any time want an Interpreter to make out their full meaning, he ſets himſelf a large Commentary upon them, and certainly he was the fitteſt perſon in the world to do it; for, *cujus eſt condere, ejus eſt interpretari*; none ſo fit to explain *Annius*, as *Annius* himſelf. The whole ſtory of this impoſture, how he made the Inſcriptions himſelf, and hid them under ground, how they were digged thence and brought to *Annius*; how *Annius* cauſed them to be ſent to the Magiſtrates, and after publiſhed them in the equipage they are in, is at large related by that learned Biſhop * *Antonius Auguſtinus*, from *Latinus Latinius*.

* *Anton. Auguſt. Dialog.* II.

VI. From a like quarry to this, came out thoſe other famous Inſcriptions, walking under the ſpecious title of *Antiquitatum Etruſcarum fragmenta*, wherein, beſides many palpable incongruities to the cuſtoms of thoſe eldeſt times, diſcovered partly by *Leo Allatius* in his Diſcourſe concerning them,

them, there are ſo many particular ſtories and circumſtances related concerning *Noah*'s being in *Italy*, and other things ſo far beyond probability of Reaſon, that it is a wonder there are yet any perſons pretending to Learning, who ſhould build their diſcourſes upon ſuch rotten and ſandy foundations as theſe Inſcriptions are. But tho' *Ixion* might, *Jupiter* would never have been deceived with a *Cloud* inſtead of *Juno*; ſo, tho' perſons unacquainted with the lineaments of Truth, may be eaſily impoſed on with appearances inſtead of her: yet ſuch perſons who have ſagacity enough to diſcern the air of her countenance from the paint of forgeries, will never ſuffer themſelves to be over-reached by ſuch vain pretenders. But theſe Impoſtors are like the Aſtrologers at *Rome*, ever baniſhed, and yet ever there; and ſo theſe are ever exploded by all lovers of truth, yet always find ſome to applaud and entertain them. Altho' it be more difficult to do ſo now in the preſent light of Knowledge, and all advantages for Learning, than it was in thoſe elder times, when the heathen Prieſts pretended to the Monopoly of Learning among themſelves, and made it one of their great deſigns to keep all others in dependance on themſelves, thereby to keep up their veneration the better among the people. And therefore all the Records they had of Learning or Hiſtory, were carefully lockt up, and preſerved among the Prieſts; and leaſt at any time others might get a view of them, they were ſure to preſerve them in a peculiar Character diſtinct from that in civil and common uſe. By which means the heathen Prieſts had all imaginable opportunities and conveniences for deceiving the ſilly people, and thereby keeping them in an obſequious ignorance, which is never the Mother of any true Devotion, but of the greateſt Superſtition.

VII. It is well known of the *Ægyptian* Prieſts, that the ſacred Characters of their Temples were ſeldom made known to any but ſuch as were of their own number and family, (the Prieſthood being there hereditary) *Diod. l. 3.* or ſuch others as by long converſe had inſinuated themſelves into their ſociety, as ſome of the *Greek* Philoſophers and Hiſtorians had done. And yet we have ſome reaſon to think they were not over-free and communicative to ſome of them, by the ſlender account they give of ſeveral things, which are ſuppoſed to be well known among the *Ægyptians*. That the *Phœnician* Prieſts had their peculiar and ſacred Characters too, is evident from the words of *Philo Byblius* concerning *Sanchoniathon*, if we take *Bochartus* his Expoſition of them: He tells us that his Hiſtory *Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.* was compared, τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδύτων εὑρεθεῖσιν, ἀποκρύφοις Ἀμμωνέων γράμμασιν ἃ ἐκ ἦν πᾶσι γνώριμα, *with the Inſcriptions in the Temples written in the Ammunean letters, which are known to few: Literæ Ammuneorum* (ſaith *Bochartus*) *ſunt literæ Templorum, literæ in ſacris exceptæ.* For חמה is *Boch. in Geogr. ſac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.* the Sun, thence חמן the *Temple of the Sun*, whom the *Phœnicians* worſhip'd as their principal Deity, under the name of *Beel-ſamen, the Lord of Heaven.* The ſame Author tells us out of *Diogenes Laertius*, of a Book of *Democritus*, περὶ τῆς ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἱερῶν γραμμάτων. by which it is evident that the *Babylonian* Prieſts had their ſacred Characters too: And of a Teſtimony of *Theodoret* of all the *Grecian* Temples, *Quæſt. in Gen. 1.* Ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς ναοῖς ἴδιοι τινὲς ἦσαν χαρακτῆρες γραμμάτων, οἷς ἱερατικοῖς προσηγόρευον, *That they had ſome peculiar Characters which were called ſacred.* But that learned Author thinks there is no neceſſity of underſtanding it peculiarly of the *Grecians*, becauſe the *Greek* Fathers called all Heathens by the name of *Greeks*: but if ſo, the teſtimony is the larger

larger, and amounts to an universal testimony of the heathen Temples.

VIII. Neither was this only peculiar to them, if we believe some persons of greater Learning than Judgment, who attribute this distinction of sacred and vulgar Characters to the *Jews* as well as others, but without any probability of reason. For these learned men being strongly possessed with the opinion of the modern *Jews* concerning the antiquity of the present *Hebrew* Characters, and finding themselves pressed not only with the testimony of some ancient *Rabbins*, but with the stronger evidence of the ancient *shekels* about *Solomon*'s time, inscribed with the *Samaritan* letters, have at last found this Evasion, that the *Samaritan* letters were in vulgar use; but the present Characters were then sacred and not made common till after the time of the Captivity. But this seems to be a meer shift, found out by some modern *Jews*, and greedily embraced by their followers, because thereby they are in hopes to evade the strength of the contrary arguments, which otherwise they can find no probable solution of. And a meer shift it will appear to be, to any one that considers on how little ground of reason it stands: For none of those reasons which held for such a distinction of Characters among the Heathens, can have any place among the *Jews*. For it was never any part of God's design to have the Law kept from the peoples view. Truth is never so fearful of being seen abroad; it is only falshood that walks under disguises, and must have its hiding-places to retreat to: Nay, God expressly commanded it as a duty of all the *Jews*, to search and study his Law, which they could not do, if it were locked up from them in an unknown Character. Did not God himself promulge it among the people of *Israel* by the ministry of *Moses?* Did he not command it to be *as frontlets between their eyes*, and *signs upon their hands*: not that *Phylacteries* should be made of the Law to wear, as the *Pharisees* interpreted it, and others from them have mistaken; but that they should have the Law in continual remembrance, as if it were always between their eyes, and engraven upon their hands. Again, if we suppose the Law to be among the people, but in the vulgar character, I would fain know, what sanctity, majesty, and authority there was in that character more than in the words and matter? and if there were, how comes the vulgar use of it to be no where forbidden? and how durst *Ezra*, as is supposed, after the Captivity, prophane so sacred a thing by exposing it to common use? But granting them yet further, that it was lawful, but not useful, to make use of that sacred Character; I demand then how comes that disuse to continue so punctually till the time of *Ezra*, and that it should never be divulged before? when there was so great reason to make it common, since the square letters are less operose, more expedite and facile, than the *Samaritan*, which is, when time serves, used as a plea for their great antiquity. But yielding yet more, that the sacred Character was only used for the authentic copy of the Law, which was to decide all differences of other copies (which some run to as their last shift) I appeal to any man's reason, whether this be not the most improbable of all? For how could such a copy be the judge of all others, which could not be read or understood by those who appealed to it? Or was the knowledge and reading of this Character peculiar to the High-Priest, and conveyed down as a *Cabala* from one to another? but how many incongruities would follow hence, in case one High-Priest should die before his Son was capable of understanding the Letters, and so that sacred Treasure must needs be lost;

Exod. 13. 16. Deut. 6. 8.

loſt; or had they it all by inſpiration, and underſtood the ſacred Character by *Urim* and *Thummim*? Thus every way, this opinion among the *Jews* is preſſed with inconveniences, but it was moſt ſuitable to the heathen Prieſts to maintain a *Meum* and *Tuum* between their own Character and the vulgar. For hereby they prohibited all prying into their myſteries by any, but thoſe who had the ſame intereſt with themſelves, and therefore were unlikely to diſcover any thing that might leſſen their reputation. Whereas, had there been nothing but truth in their Records, or that truth had been for their intereſt, what need had there been of ſo great reſervedneſs and privacy? but when the diſcovery of truth would undeceive the world, it was their intereſt to lock it up, and to give out ſuch things to the vulgar, which might advance themſelves and pleaſe them; which artifices of theirs give no ſmall ground to queſtion the credibility of their Hiſtories.

IX. Eſpecially if we add what we promiſed in the laſt place, to ſhew the want of credibility in the report of ancient times among them, which was not only defectiveneſs, and uncertainty, but apparent partiality to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. How evident is it in all theſe Nations we have ſpoken to, how much they ſtrive to inhance the reputation of their own Nation, and to that end blend the Hiſtory of other Nations with their own, to make theirs ſeem the greater? How much do the *Ægyptians* tell us of the excellency of their ancient Laws and Government? and yet how evident is it, from their own Hiſtories, that no ſuch Laws were obſerved by their Kings as they ſpeak of? Can we think that ſuch Kings as *Chemmis* and the reſt of them, who built thoſe vaſt ſtructures of the Pyramids, and employed Myriads of men for ſo many years for the doing of them, would be content to be ſo dieted by their Laws, as *Hecatæus* and *Diodorus* tell us they were to be? Nay it ſeems to be very ſuſpicious, that the great enterprizes of their famous *Seſooſis* are meerly fabulous; and ſome think, an attributing to themſelves, what was done by the *Aſſyrian* Emperor in his time. By which we may gueſs, what to think of the great conqueſts of *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, and their ſubduing almoſt the whole world to them. And it is moſt evident how partial the *Ægyptians* are in diſſembling their greateſt loſſes; as is clear in the ſtory of the conqueſt of *Pharaoh Necho* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, Jer. 46. 12. of which there is not the leaſt mention in *Herodotus* or *Diodorus*. But on the contrary, *Herodotus* tells us this *Necos*, as he calls him, conquered the *Syrians* at *Magdalos*, and the ſtory of *Vaphres* and *Amaſis* in him ſeems to be only a diſguiſe of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s conqueſt; only leſt men ſhould think them conquered by a Foreigner, they make *Amaſis* to be an *Ægyptian Plebeian*. Again, what a vaſt number of Cities doth *Diodorus* tell us of, that were in *Ægypt* in their eldeſt times? no leſs than 18000, when yet himſelf confeſſeth in the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*, there were reckoned but ſomewhat above 3000 Cities, and then *Ægypt* was the moſt populous that ever it had been. How probable doth this ſound, that in thoſe eldeſt times ſuch vaſt multitudes of Cities ſhould be erected? But the truth is, it is not unſuitable to their opinion of the production of the firſt men; which were cauſed, they ſay, by the heat of the Sun, and the mud of *Nilus*; and it is certain then they might be the moſt populous Nation in the world: for there could be no defect as to either efficient or material cauſe, there being mud enough to produce Myriads, and the Sun hot enough to impregnate it. The partiality of other Nations hath been already diſcourſed of in our paſſage;

Herodot. lib. 2.

Diodor. l. 1.

and

and ſo likewiſe hath their mutual repugnancy to, and inconſiſtency with, each other: Which yet might be more fully manifeſted from the contradictions in reference to the Ægyptian Hiſtory between *Manetho*, *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Eratoſthenes*, and all who have ſpoken of it: as to the *Aſſyrian* Empire between *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, and *Julius Africanus*: as to the *Perſian* Empire between *Herodotus* and *Cteſias*, and thoſe in no inconſiderable things, as is evident in *Photius* his *Excerpta* out of him. Among the *Grecians* we have already diſcover'd it as to their Hiſtory and Geography; and if we ſhould enter into their *Theology*, and the Hiſtory of that, we ſhould find their other differences inconſiderable, if compared with theſe. Of which we may partly make a conjecture by the incredible ſpite that is born by the graveſt *Greek* Authors, as *Strabo*, *Plutarch*, and others, towards *Euhemerus Siculus*, for offering to deliver the hiſtory of *Jupiter*, which he ſaith, he tranſcribed from the *Golden Pillar in the Temple of* Jupiter Triphyllius *in* Panchotis.

But I ſuppoſe enough hath been diſcovered already, to prove that there is no credibility in any of thoſe Heathen Hiſtories, which pretend to give an account of ancient times; there being in all of them ſo much defect and inſufficiency, ſo great uncertainty and confuſion, ſo much partiality and inconſiſtency with each other. It remains now that I proceed to demonſtrate the credibility of that account of ancient times, which is reported in the Sacred Scriptures, which will be the ſecond part of our Task.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

The certainty of the Writings of *Moſes.*

In order to the proving the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, ſeveral Hypotheſes laid down. I. *The firſt concerns the reaſonableneſs of preſerving the ancient Hiſtory of the World in ſome certain Records, from the importance of the things,* II. *and the inconveniencies of meer Tradition or conſtant Revelation.* III. *The ſecond concerns the certainty that the Records under* Moſes *his name, were undoubtedly his. The certainty of a matter of fact enquired into in general, and proved as to particular,* IV. *by univerſal conſent,* V. *and ſettling a Common-wealth upon his Laws.* VI, VII. *The impoſſibility of an Impoſtor as to the Writings of* Moſes *demonſtrated. The pleas to the contrary largely anſwered.*

I. HAVING ſufficiently demonſtrated the want of credibility in the account of the ancient times, given by thoſe Nations who have made the greateſt pretence to Learning and Antiquity in the World, we now proceed to evince the credibility and certainty of that account which is given us in Sacred Scriptures: In order to which I ſhall premiſe theſe following Hypotheſes.

Hypoth. 1. *Firſt, It ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that an account of things ſo concerning and remarkable, ſhou'd not be always left to the uncertainty of an Oral Tradition; but ſhou'd be timely entred into certain Records, to be preſerv'd to the memory of poſterity.* For it being of concernment to the World, in order to the Eſtabliſhment of Belief, as to future things, to be ſettled in the Belief, that all things paſt were manag'd by Divine Providence; there muſt be certain Records of former Ages, or elſe the mind of Man will be perpetually hovering in the greateſt uncertainties: Eſpecially where there is ſuch a mutual dependance and concatenation of one thing with another, as there is in all the Scripture-hiſtory. For take away but any one of the main Foundations of the *Moſaical* Hiſtory, all the Superſtructure will be exceedingly weakned, if it doth not fall quite to the ground. For Man's obligation to Obedience unto GOD, doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe his Original to be from him; his hearkning to any propoſals of favour from GOD, doth ſuppoſe his Apoſtaſie and Fall; GOD's deſigning to ſhew mercy and favour to fallen Man, doth ſuppoſe that there muſt be ſome way whereby the Great Creator muſt reveal himſelf as to the Conditions on which fallen Man may expect a recovery; the revealing of theſe Conditions in ſuch a way whereon

whereon a ſuſpicious (becauſe guilty) Creature may firmly rely, doth ſuppoſe ſo certain a recording of them, as may be leaſt liable to any ſuſpicion of impoſture or deceit. For altho' nothing elſe be in it ſelf neceſſary from God to Man, in order to his Salvation, but the bare revealing in a certain way the Terms on which he muſt expect it; yet conſidering the unbounded Nature of Divine Goodneſs, reſpecting not only the good of ſome particular Perſons, but of the whole Society of Mankind, it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon that ſuch a Revelation ſhou'd be ſo propounded, as might be with equal certainty convey'd to the community of Mankind. Which cou'd not with any ſuch evidence of credibility be done by private and particular Revelations (which give ſatisfaction only to the inward Senſes of the partakers of them) as by a public recording of the matters of Divine Revelation by ſuch a Perſon who is enabled to give the World all reaſonable ſatisfaction, that what he did was not of any private deſign of his own head; but that he was deputed to it by no leſs than Divine Authority. And therefore it ſtands to the higheſt reaſon, that where Divine Revelation is [illegible]ary for the certain requiring of Aſſent, the matter to be believ'd ſhou'd have a certain uniform conveyance to Mens minds, rather than that perpetually new Revelations ſhou'd be requir'd for the making known of thoſe things; which being once recorded, are not liable to ſo many impoſtures, as the other way might have been under pretended Revelations. For then Men are not put to a continual Trial of every Perſon pretending Divine Revelation, as to the evidences which he brings of Divine Authority, but the great matters of concernment being already recorded and atteſted by all rational evidence as to the truth of the things, their minds therein reſt ſatisfy'd without being under a continual heſitancy, leſt the Revelation of one ſhou'd contradict another.

II. For ſuppoſing that God had left the matters of Divine Revelation unrecorded at all, but left them to be diſcover'd in every Age by a Spirit of Prophecy, by ſuch a multitude as might be ſufficient to inform the World of the truth of the things; we cannot but conceive that an innumerable company of croaking *Enthuſiaſts* wou'd be continually pretending Commiſſions from Heaven, by which the minds of Men wou'd be left in continual diſtraction, becauſe they wou'd have no certain infallible Rules given them, whereby to difference the good and evil Spirit from each other. But now ſuppoſing God to inſpire ſome particular Perſons, not only to reveal, but to record Divine Truths, then whatever evidences can be brought atteſting a Divine Revelation in them, will likewiſe prove the undoubted certainty and infallibility of thoſe Writings, it being impoſſible that Perſons employ'd by a God of truth, ſhou'd make it their deſign to impoſe upon the World; which gives us a rational account, why the wiſe God did not ſuffer the Hiſtory of the World to lie ſtill unrecorded, but made choice of ſuch a Perſon to record it, who gave abundant evidence to the World that he acted no private deſign, but was peculiarly employ'd by God himſelf for the doing of it, as will appear afterwards. Beſides, we find by our former Diſcourſe, how liable the moſt certain Tradition is to be corrupted in progreſs of time, where there are no ſtanding Records, tho' it were at firſt deliver'd by Perſons of undoubted credit. For we have no reaſon to doubt, but that the Tradition of the old World, the Flood and the conſequences of it, with the nature and worſhip of the true God, were at firſt ſpread over the greateſt part of the World in its

first Plantations; yet we see how soon for want of certain conveyance, all the ancient Tradition was corrupted and abus'd into the greatest Idolatry. Which might be less wonder'd at, had it been only in those parts which were furthest remote from the seat of those grand Transactions; but thus we find it was even among those Families who had the nearest residence to the place of them, and among those Persons who were not far of in a lineal descent from the Persons mainly concern'd in them; as is most evident in the Family out of which *Abraham* came (who
Josh. 24. 2. was himself the tenth from *Noah*) yet of them it is said, *That they served other Gods.* How unlikely then was it, that this Tradition shou'd be afterwards preserv'd entire, when the People God had peculiarly chosen to himself, were so mixed among the *Ægyptians*, and so prone to the Idolatries of the Nations round about them, and that even after God had given them a written Law attested with the greatest Miracles? What wou'd they have done then, had they never been brought forth out of *Ægypt* by such Signs and Wonders, and had no certain Records left to preserve the memory of former Ages? Thus we see how much it stands to the greatest reason, that so memorable things shou'd be digested into Sacred Records.

Hypoth. 2. Secondly, *We have as great certainty that* Moses *was the Author of the Records going under his name, as we can have of any matter of fact done at so great a distance of time from us.* We are to consider that there are two very distinct questions to be thought of, concerning a Divine Revelation, to any Person at a considerable distance of time from us; and those are what evidences can be given that the matters recorded are of a true Divine Revelation; and what evidence we have of the truth of the matter of fact, that such things were recorded by such Persons. They who do not carefully distinguish between these two Questions, will soon run themselves into an inextricable Labyrinth, when they either seek to understand themselves, or explain to others the grounds on which they believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. The first step in order to which, must be the proving the undoubted certainty of the matter of fact, or the truth of the History, that such Persons were really existent, and did either do or record the things we speak of: After this succeeds the other, to prove not only the real existence of the things, but that the Persons who recorded the things were assisted by an Infallible Spirit; then there can be no reason at all to doubt, but those Records are the Word of God. The first of these, is, that which at present we enquire after, the certainty of the matter of fact, that the Records under the name of *Moses* were undoubtedly his. And here it will be most unreasonable for any to seek for further evidence and demonstration of it, than the matter to be prov'd is capable of. But if they shou'd, I suppose we have sufficient reason to demonstrate the folly of such a demand, and that on these accouuts.

1. Whoever yet undertook to bring matters of fact into Mathematical demonstrations, or thought he had ground to question the certainty of any thing that was not prov'd in a Mathematical way to him? who wou'd ever undertake that *Archimedes* was kill'd at *Syracuse*, by any of the Demonstrations he was then about? or that *Euclide* was the undoubted Author of the *Geometry* under his name? or do Men question these things for want of such Demonstrations? Yet this is all we at present desire, only the same liberty here which is us'd in any thing of a like nature.

2. I demand of the Person who denies this Moral certainty to be sufficient

cient for an assent, whether he doth question every thing in the World, which he was not present at the doing of himself? If he be peremptorily resolv'd to believe nothing but what he sees, he is fit for nothing but a Voyage to *Anticyræ*, or to be soundly purg'd with *Hellebore*, to free him from those cloudy humours that make him suspect the whole World to be an imposture. But we cannot suppose any Man so destitute of Reason, as to question the truth of every matter of fact which he doth not see himself; if he doth then firmly believe any thing, there must be suppos'd sufficient grounds to induce him to such a belief. And then what ground can there be to question the certainty of such things, which have as great evidence as any of those things have, which he most firmly believes? and this is all we desire from him.

3. Do we not see that the most concerning and weighty actions of Mens lives, are built on no other foundation than this Moral certainty? yet Men do not in the least question the truth of the thing they rely upon: As is most evident in all Titles to Estates deriv'd from Ancestors, either by Donation or Purchase: In all Trading, which go's upon the Moral certainty, that there are such places as the *Indies*, or *France* or *Spain*, &c. In all Journeyings, that there is such a place, as that I am going to, and this is the way thither; for these we have but this Moral certainty; for the contrary to both these are possible, and the affirmatives are indemonstrable. In eating and drinking there is a possibility of being poisoned by every bit of meat, or drop of drink; do we therefore continually doubt, whether we shall be so or no? Chiefly this is seen in all natural affection and piety in Children towards Parents, which undoubtedly suppose the truth of that, which it was impossible they cou'd be witnesses of themselves, their coming out of their Mothers wombs. And doth any one think this sufficient ground to question his Mother, because the contrary is impossible to be demonstrated to him? In short then, either we must destroy all Historical Faith out of the World, and believe nothing (tho' never so much attested) but what we see our selves, or else we must acknowledge, that a Moral certainty is a sufficient foundation for an undoubted assent, not such a one *cui non potest subesse falsum*, but such a one *cui non subest dubium*, *i. e.* an *Assent undoubted*, tho' not infallible. By which we see what little reason the *Atheist* on one side can have to question the truth of the Scriptures, as to the History of it; and what little ground the *Papists* on the other side have to make a pretence of the necessity of Infallibility, as to the proposal of such things where Moral certainty is sufficient, that is, to the matter of fact.

IV. Which I now come to prove, as to the subject in hand; *viz.* That the Writings of *Moses* are undoubtedly his. Which I prove by a two-fold Argument: 1. *An universal consent of Persons, who were best able to know the truth of the things in question.* 2. *The settling of a Commonwealth upon the Laws delivered by* Moses. 1. The universal consent of Persons most capable of judging in the case in hand. I know nothing the most scrupulous and inquisitive mind can possibly desire in order to satisfaction, concerning any matter of fact, beyond an Universal Consent of such Persons who have a greater capacity of knowing the truth of it than we can have: And those are all such Persons who have liv'd nearest those times when the things were done, and have best understood the Affairs of the times, when the things were pretended to be done. Can we possibly conceive that among the People of the *Jews*, who were so exceedingly

ceedingly prone to tranſgreſs the Law of *Moſes*, and to fall into Idolatry, but if there had been any the leaſt ſuſpicion of any falſity or impoſture in the Writings of *Moſes*, the ring-leaders of their revolts wou'd have ſufficiently promulged it among them, as the moſt plauſible plea to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God? Can we think that a Nation and Religion ſo maligned as the *Jewiſh* were, cou'd have eſcaped diſcovery, if there had been any deceit in it, when ſo many lay in wait continually to expoſe them to all contumelies imaginable? Nay, among themſelves in their frequent Apoſtaſies, and occaſions given for ſuch a pretence, how comes this to be never heard of, nor in the leaſt queſtioned, whether the Law was undoubtedly of *Moſes* his writing or no? What an excellent plea wou'd this have been for *Jeroboam*'s Calves in *Dan* and *Bethel*: for the *Samaritans* Temple on Mount *Gerizim*, cou'd any the leaſt ſuſpicion have been rais'd among them, concerning the authenticneſs of the fundamental Records of the *Jewiſh* Commonwealth? And which is moſt obſervable, the *Jews* who were a people ſtrangely ſuſpicious and incredulous, while they were fed and cloathed by Miracles, yet cou'd never find ground to queſtion this. Nay, and *Moſes* himſelf, we plainly ſee, was hugely envied by many of the *Iſraelites* even in the Wilderneſs, as is evident in the conſpiracy of *Corah* and his complices, and that on this very ground, That he took too much upon him; how unlikely then is it, that amidſt ſo many enemies he ſhou'd dare to venture any thing into public Records, which was not moſt undoubtedly true; or undertake to preſcribe a Law to oblige the People to poſterity? Or that after his own Age any thing ſhou'd come out under his name, which wou'd not be preſently detected by the Emulators of his glory? What then, is the thing it ſelf incredible? ſurely not, that *Moſes* ſhou'd write the Records we ſpeak of. Were not they able to underſtand the truth of it? What? not thoſe who were in the ſame Age, and convey'd it down by a certain Tradition to poſterity? Or did not the *Iſraelites* all conſtantly believe it? What? not they, who wou'd ſooner part with their Lives and Fortunes, than admit any variation or alteration as to their Law?

V. Well, but if we ſhou'd ſuppoſe the whole *Jewiſh* Nation partial to themſelves, and that out of honor to the memory of ſo great a Perſon as *Moſes*, they ſhou'd attribute their ancient Laws and Records to him: Which is all that Infidelity it ſelf can imagine in this caſe; yet this cannot be with any ſhadow of Reaſon pretended. For,

1. Who were thoſe Perſons, who did give out this Law to the *Jews* under *Moſes* his name? Certainly they, who undertake to contradict that which is receiv'd by common conſent, muſt bring ſtronger and clearer Evidence, than that on which that conſent is grounded; or elſe their Exceptions deſerve to be rejected with the higheſt indignation. What Proof can be then brought, that not only the *Jewiſh* Nation, but the whole Chriſtian World hath been ſo lamentably befool'd to believe thoſe things with an undoubted aſſent, which are only the contrivances of ſome cunning Men?

2. At what time could theſe things be contriv'd? Either while the memory of *Moſes* and his actions were remaining, or afterwards. Firſt, How cou'd it poſſibly be, when his memory was remaining? for then all things were ſo freſh in their memories, that it was impoſſible a thing of this univerſal nature cou'd be forged of him. If after, then I demand, whether the People had obſerv'd the Law of *Moſes* before or no? if not,

not, then they must certainly know it at the time of its promulgation to be counterfeit; for had it been from *Moses*, it wou'd have been observ'd before their times; if it was observ'd before then either continually down from the time of *Moses*, or not? If continually down, then it was of *Moses* his doing, if we suppose him to have had that Authority among the People, which the Objection supposeth; if not, then still the nearer *Moses* his time, the more difficult such a counterfeiting cou'd be; because the Constitutions which *Moses* had left among them, wou'd have remain'd in their memories, whereby they wou'd easily reject all pretences and counterfeits.

3. How can we conceive the Nation of the *Jews* wou'd have ever embraced such a Law, had it not been of *Moses* his enacting among them in that state of time when he did? For then the People were in fittest capacity to receive a Law, being grown a great People, and therefore necessary to have Laws; newly delivered from bondage, and therefore wanting Laws of their own; and entring into a settled state of Commonwealth, which was the most proper season of giving Laws.

VI. These considerations make it so clear, that it is almost impossible to conceive the Nation of the *Jews* cou'd have their Laws given to them but at the time of their being in the Wilderness, before they were settled in *Canaan*. For suppose we at present, to gratify so far the Objection, that these Laws were brought forth long after the constitution of the Government and the National settlement, under *Moses* his name; how improbable, nay how impossible is it to alter the fundamental Laws of a Nation after long settlement? what confusion of interests doth this bring? what disturbance among all sorts of People, who must be dissei's'd of their rights and brought to such strange unwonted customs, so seemingly against their interests, as many of the Constitutions among the *Jews* were? For can we imagine, that a People always devoted to their own interest, wou'd after it had been quietly settled in their Land, by Constitutions after the customs of other Nations, presently under a pretence of a copy of Laws found (that were pretended to be given by one in former Ages of great esteem, call'd *Moses*) throw open all their former inclosures, and part with their former Laws, for these of which they have no evidence, but the words of those that told it them? We have a clear Instance for this among the *Romans*; altho' there were great evidence given of the undoubted certainty, that the Books found in *Numa*'s grave by *Petilius* were his, yet because they were adjudg'd by the Senate to be against the present Laws, they were without further enquiry adjudg'd to be burnt. Was not here the greatest likelihood that might be, that these shou'd have taken place among the *Romans*, for the great veneration for wisdom which *Numa* was in among them, and the great evidence that these were certain remainders of his, wherein he gave a true account of the superstitions in use among them? yet lest the state shou'd be unsettled by it, they were prohibited so much as a public view, when the *Prætor* had sworn they were against the established Laws. Can we then conceive the *Jewish* Nation wou'd have embraced so burdensome and ceremonious a Law as *Moses*'s was, had it been brought among them in such a way as the Books of *Numa*, tho' with all imaginable evidence, that it was undoubtedly his, especially when they were engag'd to the observation of some Laws or Customs already, by which their Commonwealth had been establish'd? And withal these Laws of *Moses* seeming so much against the interest and good husbandry of a Nation, as all the neighbour Nations

Nations thought, who for that accuſed them to be an idle and ſlothful People, as they judged by their reſting wholly one Day in ſeven, the great and many ſolemn Faſts they had, the repairing of all the Males to *Jeruſalem* thrice a Year; the Sabbatical Years, Years of *Jubilee*, &c. Theſe things were apparently againſt the intereſt of ſuch a Nation, whoſe great ſubſiſtence was upon paſturage and agriculture. So that it is evident theſe Laws reſpected not the outward intereſt of the Nation, and ſo cou'd not be the contrivance of any Politicians among them, but did immediately aim at the honor of the God whom they ſerv'd, for whom they were to part even with their civil intereſts: The doing of which by a People generally taken notice of for a particular love of their own concernments, is an impregnable argument theſe Laws cou'd not take place among them, had they not been given by *Moſes* at the time of their unſettlement, and that their future ſettlement did depend upon their preſent obſervation of them; which is an evidence too that they cou'd be of no leſs than Divine original: Which was more than I was to prove at preſent.

VII. Were not theſe Writings undoubtedly *Moſes*'s; whence ſhou'd the neighbour Nations about the *Jews*, notwithſtanding the hatred of the *Jewiſh* Religion, retain ſo venerable an opinion of the wiſdom of *Moſes*? The *Ægyptians* accounted him one of their *Prieſts* (which notes the eſteem they had of his learning) as appears by the teſtimonies produced out of *Chæremon* and *Manetho* by *Joſephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaks of him with great reſpect among the famous Legiſlators, and ſo doth *Strabo*, who ſpeaks in commendation of the Religion eſtabliſh'd by him. The teſtimony of *Longinus* is ſufficiently known, that *Moſes was no man of any vulgar wit* (ὁ τυχὼν ἀνήρ.) *Chalcidius* calls him *ſapientiſſimus Moſes* (altho' I muſt not diſſemble that *Chalcidius* hath been, I think, undeſervedly reckoned among heathen Writers, tho' he comments on *Plato*'s *Timæus*, it being moſt probable that he was a Chriſtian *Platoniſt*, which might more probably make *Vaninus* call him *circumforaneum blateronem*) but tho' we exempt *Chalcidius* out of the number of thoſe Heathens, who have born teſtimony to the wiſdom of *Moſes*, yet there are number enough beſides him produced by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Cyril*, and others, whoſe evidence is clear and full to make us undoubtedly believe, that there cou'd never have been ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition concerning the Writings and Laws of *Moſes*, had they not been certainly his, and convey'd down in a continual ſucceſſion from his time to our preſent age. Which will be yet more clear, if we conſider in the ſecond place, That the National Conſtitution and ſettlement of the *Jews*, did depend on the truth of the Laws and Writing of *Moſes*. Can we have more undoubted evidence, that there were ſuch Perſons as *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and *Numa*, and that the Laws bearing their names were theirs, than the Hiſtory of the ſeveral Commonwealths of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Rome*, who were governed by thoſe Laws? When Writings are not of general concernment, that may be more eaſily counterfeited; but when they concern the Right, Privileges, and Government of a Nation, there will be enough whoſe intereſt will lead them to prevent impoſtures. It is no eaſy matter to forge a *Magna Charta*, and to invent Laws; Men's caution and prudence is never ſo quick-ſighted as in matters which concern their Eſtates and Freeholds. The general intereſt of Men lies contrary to ſuch impoſtures, and therefore they will prevent their obtaining among them. Now the Laws of *Moſes* are incorporated into the very

Joſeph. C. App. l. 1. *Diod. l. 1.* *Strab. Geograph. 16.* *Longin. de ſublim.* *V. Voſſ. de Idol. l. 2. c. 45.* *V. Grot. de Ver. Relig. Chr. l. 2.*

very Republic of the *Jews*, and their Subſiſtence and Government depends upon them, their Religion and Laws are ſo interwoven one with the other, that one cannot be broken off from the other. Their Right to their temporal poſſeſſions in the land of *Canaan* depends on their owning the Sovereignty of GOD who gave them to them; and on the truth of the Hiſtory recorded by *Moſes* concerning the Promiſes made to the Patriarchs. So that on that account it was impoſſible thoſe Laws ſhou'd be counterfeit on which the welfare of a Nation depended, and according to which they were governed ever ſince they were a Nation. So that I ſhall now take it to be ſufficiently proved, that the Writings under the name of *Moſes* were undoubtedly his; for none, who acknowledge the Laws to have been his, can have the face to deny the Hiſtory, there being ſo neceſſary a connexion between them; and the Book of *Geneſis* being nothing elſe but a general and very neceſſary introduction to that which follows. I deny not but the Hiſtory of *Moſes* might, according to the Tradition of the *Jews*, and the Belief of others, be reviſed by *Ezra*, or the Men of the great Synagogue after the *Jew*'s return from Captivity, as appears by the names of Places, and other paſſages not ſuitable to the time of *Moſes*; but I utterly deny that the *Pentateuch* was not of *Moſes* his penning, or that it was only a Collection out of the Diaries and Annals of the Nation: For throughout the Scripture the very hiſtorical paſſages are attributed to *Moſes*, and in all probability the *Samaritan Pentateuch* bears date before the Captivity; by which it ſtill appears that thoſe Books are truly the Books of *Moſes*.

CHAP. II.

Moſes his certain knowledge of what he writ.

I. *The third Hypotheſis concerns the certainty of the matter of* Moſes *his Hiſtory, that gradually proved: Firſt,* Moſes *his knowledge cleared, by his education, and experience, and certain information.* II. *His education in the wiſdom of* Ægypt; *what that was.* III. *The old* Ægyptian *learning enquired into;* IV. *the conveniences for it.* V. *Of the* Ægyptian *Prieſts,* Moſes *reckoned among them for his knowledge.* VI. *The Mathematical, Natural, Divine, and Moral learning of* Ægypt. VII. *Their Political wiſdom moſt conſiderable.* VIII. *The advantage of* Moſes *above the Greek Philoſophers, as to wiſdom and reaſon.* Moſes *himſelf an eye-witneſs of moſt of his hiſtory:* IX. *The certain uninterrupted tradition of the other part among the* Jews, *manifeſted by rational evidence.*

HAving thus far cleared our way, we come to the third *Hypotheſis*, which is, *There are as manifeſt proofs of the undoubted truth and certainty of the Hiſtory recorded by* Moſes, *as any can be given concerning any thing which we yield the firmeſt aſſent unto.* Here it muſt be conſidered, that we proceed in a way of rational evidence to prove the truth of the thing in hand, as to which, if in the judgment of impartial Perſons the I. *Hypoth.* 3.

arguments produced be ſtrong enough to convince an unbyaſſed mind: It is not material, whether every wrangling *Atheiſt* will ſit down contented with them. For uſually perſons of that inclination, rather than judgment, are more reſolved againſt light than inquiſitive after it, and rather ſeek to ſtop the chinks at which any light might come in, than open the Windows for the free and cheerful entertainment of it. It will certainly be ſufficient to make it appear, that no Man can deny the truth of that part of Scripture which we are now ſpeaking of, without offering manifeſt violence to his own faculties, and making it appear to the World, that he is one wholly forſaken of his own Reaſon: which will be ſatisfactorily done, if we can clear theſe things: *Firſt*, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be ignorant of the things he undertook to write of, and ſo be deceived himſelf. *Secondly*, That it was utterly impoſſible he ſhou'd have any deſign in deceiving others in reporting it. *Thirdly*, That it is certain from all rational evidence, that he hath not deceiv'd the World, but that his Hiſtory is undoubtedly true. *Firſt*, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceiv'd himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he writ of. Two things are requiſitive to prevent a Man's being deceiv'd himſelf. *Firſt*, That he be a perſon of more than ordinary judgment, Wiſdom, and Knowledge. *Secondly*, That he have ſufficient information concerning the things he undertakes to write of. If either of theſe two be wanting, it is poſſible for a Man of integrity to be deceiv'd; for an honeſt Heart hath not always an *Urim* and *Thummim* upon it; nor is Fidelity always furniſh'd with the acuteſt intellectuals. The ſimplicity of the Dove is as liable to be deceiv'd its ſelf, as the ſubtilty of the Serpent is to deceive others; but where the wiſdom of the Serpent is, to prevent being deceiv'd, and the Dove's innocency in not deceiving others, there are all the qualifications can be deſir'd in any one who undertakes only to tell the truth. *Firſt* then, that *Moſes* was a Perſon of a great Underſtanding, and ſufficiently qualify'd to put a difference between Truth and Falſhood, will appear, *Firſt*, from the ingenuity of his Education, *Secondly*, from the ripeneſs of his Judgment, and greatneſs of his Experience when he penned theſe things.

Firſt, We begin with his education. And here we require at preſent no further aſſent to be given to what is reported concerning *Moſes* in Scripture, than what we give to *Plutarch*'s Lives, or any other relations concerning the actions of Perſons who lived in former Ages. Two things then we find recorded in Scripture concerning *Moſes* his Education; *That he was brought up in the Court of* Ægypt, and *that he was skilled in all the learning of the* Ægyptians; and theſe Two will abundantly prove the ingenuity of his Education, *viz.* That he was a Perſon both converſant in civil Affairs, and acquainted with the abſtruſer parts of all the *Ægyptian* Wiſdom.

Heb. 11. 25.
Act. 7. 22.

II. And I confeſs there is nothing to me which doth advance ſo much the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning, as that the Spirit of God in Scripture ſhou'd take ſo much Notice of it, as to ſet forth a Perſon (otherwiſe renowned for greater accompliſhments) by his skill in this. For if it be below the wiſdom of any ordinary Perſon, to ſet forth a Perſon by that which in its ſelf is no matter of commendation; how much leſs can we imagine it of that infinite wiſdom which inſpired *Stephen* in that Apology which he makes for himſelf againſt the *Libertines*, who charged him with contempt of *Moſes* and the Law? And therefore certainly this was ſome very obſervable thing, which was brought in

as

as a ſingular commendation of *Moſes*, by that perſon whoſe deſign was to make it appear how high an eſteem he had of him. And hence it appears that Learning is not only in its ſelf a great accompliſhment of human nature, but that it ought to be looked upon with veneration, even in thoſe who have excellencies of a higher nature to commend them. If a Pearl retains its excellency when it lies upon a dunghil, it can certainly loſe nothing of its luſtre by being ſet in a Crown of gold; if Learning be commendable in an *Ægyptian*, it is no leſs in *Moſes*, where it is enamell'd with more noble perfections, than of it ſelf it can reach unto. All the queſtion is, Whether the ancient Learning of the *Ægyptians* was ſuch as might be ſuppos'd to improve the reaſon and Underſtanding of Men to ſuch an height, as thereby to make them more capable of putting a difference between Truth and Falſhood? Whether it were ſuch an overflowing *Nilus* as wou'd enrich the Underſtandings of all thoſe who were in a capacity to receive its Streams? The truth is, there want not grounds of ſuſpicion, that the old *Ægyptian* Learning was not of that elevation which the preſent diſtance of our Age makes us apt to think it was. And a learned Man hath in a ſet Diſcourſe endeavoured to ſhew the great defects that there were in it: Neither can it, I think, be deny'd, but according to the reports we have now concerning it, ſome parts of their Learning were frivolous, others obſcure, a great deal Magical, and the reſt ſhort of that improvement, which the acceſſion of the parts and induſtry of after Ages gave unto it. But yet it is again as evident, that ſome parts of Learning were invented by the *Ægyptians*, others much improved, and that the *Greeks* did at firſt ſet up with the ſtock they borrow'd out of *Ægypt*, and that Learning chiefly flouriſh'd there, when there was (I had almoſt ſaid) an *Ægyptian* darkneſs of Ignorance overſpreading the face of *Greece* as well as other Nations.

Conring. de Hermet. Medic. c. 10, 11, 12.

III. Which will appear by theſe conſiderations, The great antiquity of their repute for Learning, the great advantages they had for promoting it, and the parts of Learning moſt in uſe among them. This tho' it may ſeem a digreſſion here, will yet tend to promote our deſign, by ſhewing thereby how qualify'd and accompliſh'd *Moſes* was to deliver to the World an Hiſtory of ancient times. If we believe *Macrobius*, there was no people in the World cou'd vye for Learning with the *Ægyptians*, who makes *Ægypt* in one place, *the Mother of all Arts*, and in another, the *Ægyptians*, *omnium Philoſophiæ diſciplinarum parentes*, *The fathers of all the Philoſophic Sciences*; he derives elſewhere the original of all *Aſtronomy* from them, *quos conſtat primos omnium cœlum metiri, & ſcrutari auſos*: tho' it be more probable that the Nativity even of Aſtronomy it ſelf was firſt calculated by the *Chaldæans*, from whom it was convey'd to the *Ægyptians*. He likewiſe appropriates all divine knowledge to them, where he ſaith they were *Soli rerum divinarum conſcii*, and after calls *Ægypt divinarum omnium diſciplinarum compotem*. It is ſufficiently notorious what great repute the *Ægyptian* Learning hath been in, with ſome in our latter times, in that our Chymiſts look upon it as the greateſt honour to their profeſſion, that they think they can claim kindred of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, and derive the pedigree of their Chymiſtry from the old *Ægyptian Hermes*. But that vain pretence is ſufficiently refuted by the fore-mentioned learned Man *Couringius*, in his Tract on this ſubject, *de Hermetica Medicina*. *Franciſcus Patricius* profeſſeth himſelf ſo great an admirer of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, that he thought it wou'd be no bad exchange, if the *Peripatetic* Philoſo-

Macrob. Saturn. l. 1. *cap.* 15. *in Somn. Scip. lib.* 1. *c.* 19.

Ibid. c. 21.

Id. Saturn. l. 1. *c.* 14. *l.* 7. *c.* 13.

phy were extruded, and the old *Ægyptian* received inſtead of it. But the World is now grown wiſer, than to receive his *Hermes Triſmegiſtus* for the Author of the old *Ægyptian* Philoſophy, the credit of his Author being for ever blaſted, and the doctrine contained in the Books under his name, manifeſted to be a mere *Cento*, a confus'd mixture of the *Chriſtian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* doctrine together. So that we cou'd hardly maintain the juſtneſs of the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning from any thing now extant of it; but yet we ſee no reaſon to queſtion it, eſpecially ſince it is ſo honourably ſpoken of in Sacred Writ, and ſeems in it to have been made the ſtandard and meaſure of humane Wiſdom. For which we have this obſervable teſtimony, that when the Wiſdom of *Solomon* is ſpoken of with the greateſt advantage and commendation, it is ſet forth with this character, *that it exceeded the wiſdom of all the children of the Eaſt Country, and all the wiſdom of* Ægypt. Whence it is moſt natural and eaſy to argue, That certainly their learning muſt be accounted the greateſt at that time in the World; or elſe it cou'd not have been inferred, that *Solomon* was wiſer than all men, becauſe his wiſdom excelled theirs, unleſs we ſuppoſe their wiſdom to have been the greateſt in that Age of the World, when the wiſdom of *the Græcians* (altho' in that time *Homer* is ſuppoſed to flouriſh) was not thought worthy the taking notice of. We ſee from hence then, as from an irrefragable teſtimony, that the wiſdom of the *Ægyptians* anciently was no trivial *Pedantry*, nor mere ſuperſtitious and Magical Rites, but that there was ſomething in it ſolid and ſubſtantial, or it had not been worth triumphing over by the wiſdom of *Solomon*: It being true of that, what *Lipſius* ſaith of the *Roman* Empire, *Quicquid dignum vinci videbatur, vicit; cætera non tam non potuit quam contempſit*; it was an argument of ſome great worth, that it was overtopp'd and conquer'd by it.

1 King. 4. 29. 30, 31.

Lipſius de Magnitud. Rom. l. 1 c. 3.

IV. Thus we ſee how juſt the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning is from teſtimony, and we ſhall find as great reaſon for it, when we conſider the great advantages the *Ægyptians* had for promoting of Learning among them. Two ways Men come to knowledge, either by Tradition from others, or by Obſervation of their own; what the *Ægyptians* had the firſt way, will be ſpoken to afterwards; we now conſider the latter of theſe. All Knowledge ariſing from Obſervation, muſt be either of thoſe Sciences which immediately conduce to the benefit of Men's lives, or ſuch whoſe end is to improve Men's rational faculties in the knowledge of things. The former neceſſity will put men upon the finding out, the latter require *feceſſum & otia*, freedom from other imployments, a mind addicted to them, and induſtry in the ſtudy of them, and a care to preſerve their inventions in them. The ſtudy of *Geometry* among the *Ægyptians*, ow'd its original to Neceſſity; for the river *Nile* being ſwell'd with the ſhowers falling in *Ethiopia*, and thence annually overflowing the Country of *Ægypt*, and by its violence overturning all the marks they had to diſtinguiſh their Lands, made it neceſſarry for them upon every abatement of the floud to ſurvey their Lands, to find out every one his own by the quantity of the ground upon the ſurvey. The neceſſity of which put them upon a more diligent enquiry into that ſtudy, that thereby they might attain to ſome exactneſs in that, which was to be of ſuch neceſſary, conſtant and perpetual uſe. Thence we find the invention of Geometry particularly attributed by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo* and others, to the *Ægyptians*. This skill of theirs they after improved into a greater benefit, *viz.* the conveying the water of *Nile* into thoſe places where it had

Vid. Ariſt. Metaph. 1. l. c. 1.

Herodot. lib. 2. Diodor. l. 1 Strabl 17. Cæl. Rhod. l. 18. c. 34.

had not overflown to so great a height, as to give them hopes of an ensuing plenty; which they did by the artificial cutting of several Channels for that end, wherein, saith *Strabo*, the *Ægyptians Art and Industry out-went Nature it self.* By this likewise they observ'd the height of the overflowing of the river, whereby they knew what Harvest to expect the following year; which they did by a Well near *Memphis* (from the use of it called Νειλομέτριον) upon the walls of which were the marks of several cubits, which they observe and publish it to all, that they might provide themselves accordingly. We see what grounds there are, even from profit and advantage, to make us believe that the *Ægyptians* were skill'd in Geometry, and the knowledge relating thereto.

V. And for the promoting of all other knowledge, whose end is Contemplation, the very constitution of their Commonwealth did much conduce thereto: For thereby it was provided that there shou'd always be a sufficient number of persons freed from all other Employments, who might devote themselves to a sedulous enquiry into the natures of things. Such were the Ægyptian Priests, who by the peculiar nature of the Ægyptian superstitions, were freed from that burdensome service of sacrificing beasts, which the Priests of other Nations were continually employ'd about, and so they enjoy'd not only an easie but a very honourable employment; for they were the persons of the greatest honour, esteem, and authority among the *Ægyptians*, of which rank, as far as I can find, all were accounted, who were not Souldiers, Husbandmen, or Artificers. For *Strabo* mentions no Nobility at all in *Ægypt* distinct from the Priests; for he divides the whole Commonwealth into Souldiers, Husbandmen and Priests. And telling us that the other two were employ'd about matters of War, and the King's revenues in Peace, he adds, οἱ δ' ἱερεῖς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἤσκουν καὶ ἀστρολογίαν, ὁμιληταί τε μᾶλλον βασιλέων ἦσαν, *The Priests minded the study of Philosophy and Astronomy, and convers'd most with their Kings:* And after, speaking of their Kings being study'd in their Arts, as well as others of the Priests, he adds, μεθ' ὧν τὸ πλεῖον ὁ βίος, *with whom they spent most of their lives.* Agreeable to this, *Plutarch* tells us, that the Kings themselves were often Priests; and adds out of *Hecataeus*, that the Kings us'd to drink Wine by measure, ἱερεῖς ὄντες, *because they were Priests*; for as he saith, the Kings of *Ægypt* were chosen, either out of the rank of Priests or Souldiers, τὸ μὲν δι' ἀνδρείαν, τὸ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν γένος ἀξίωμα καὶ τιμὴν ἔχοντος· *those two orders being of the greatest honour, the one for valour, and the other for wisdom*; and if the King were chosen out of the Souldiers, he was presently entred among the Priests, to learn their Mystical Sciences. *Diodorus* seems to reckon some great persons after the Priests, and distinct from the Souldiery; but if he means by these any other than some of the other two professions, I must say, as *Casaubon* doth in another case of *Diodorus*, *Sane* Strabonis *auctoritas multis Siculis apud me prævalet.* Diodorus *his testimony not to be weighed with* Strabo's. From whence we may understand the reason why that *Potipherah*, whose Daughter *Joseph* married, is called כֹּהֵן, which some render the Priest, others the *Prince of On*; but these two we see are very consistent, their Priests being their great Princes; and *Heliopolis*, or *On*, of which *Potipherah* was Prince or Priest, being the chief Seat and University of the Priests of *Ægypt.* Now it is evident from *Clemens Alexandrinus*, that the *Ægyptians* did not communicate their Mysteries promiscuously to all, but only to such as were in succession to the Crown, or else to those of the Priests and their Children,

Strab. l. 17.

Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir.

Diod. l. 1.

Casaub. Not. in Strab. l. 17.

Gen. 41. 45.

Clem. Alex. Strom l. 5.

dren, who were moſt apt and fit for them, both by their diet, inſtruction, and family. For this was unalterably obſerved among them, that there was a continued ſucceſſion of a profeſſion in their ſeveral families, both of Prieſts, Souldiers, and Husbandmen, whereby they kept their ſeveral orders without any mixture or confuſion, which is confeſs'd both by *Herodotus* and *Diodorus:* So that by this Conſtitution Learning was among them confin'd to the Prieſts, which highly advanceth the probability of that Tradition, preſerv'd among the *Ægyptians* concerning *Moſes* (which likewiſe ſtrongly proves our preſent deſign) *viz. Manetho*'s Records, as *Joſephus* tells us, that *Moſes* was one of the Prieſts at *Heliopolis*, and that his name among them was *Oſarſiphus*, who changing his name, was called *Moſes*; and in the time of *Amenophis* conducted the leprous people out of *Ægypt* (ſo the *Ægyptians* out of their hatred of the *Iſraelites* call them.) And *Chæremon* another Ægyptian Prieſt in the ſame Author, calls *Moſes* a Scribe, and *Joſeph* (by whom probably he means *Joſhua*) a ſacred Scribe, and ſaith, that the Ægyptian name of *Moſes* was *Tiſithen*, and of *Joſeph*, *Poteſeph*. Now this tradition did in all probability ariſe from the repute of *Moſes* his learning and wiſdom; which being among them proper to their Prieſts, they thence aſcrib'd that name to him, altho' probably he might come to the knowledge of all their Myſteries, from the relation he had to *Pharaoh*'s Daughter.

Herodot. l. 1. *Diod. l. 1. c. 71.* *Joſeph. l. 1. C. App.*

VI. We come now to conſider the parts of the Ægyptian Learning, in which the Scripture tells us *Moſes* was skill'd: This by *Philo Judæus* is branched into *Arithmetic*, *Geometry*, *Muſic*, and *Hieroglyphical Philoſophy:* But *Sixtus Senenſis* more comprehenſively from *Diodorus*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, divides it into four parts, *Mathematical*, *Natural*, *Divine* and *Moral*. Their skill in the Mathematical parts of Learning hath been partly ſhew'd already, and might be more largely from that skill in them, which the *Grecians* gain'd from the *Ægyptians*, as both *Jamblichus* and *Porphyry* ſpeak of *Pythagoras*, that he gain'd his skill in Geometry chiefly from the *Ægyptians:* for theſe as *Porphyry* ſaith, of a long time had been very ſtudious of Geometry, as the *Phœnicians* of Arithmetic, and the *Chaldæans* of Aſtronomy. But *Jamblichus* (and I think deſervedly) takes notice of the τὸ δυσπροσδεκτὸν, the *difficult acceſs* of the Ægyptian Prieſts, eſpecially as to acquaintance with their Myſteries; and ſo *Strabo* calls them, μυσικὸς καὶ δυσμεταδότους, ſuch who concealed their learning under many Symbols, and were not eaſily drawn to unfold it. And yet we might think the two and twenty years time which *Pythagoras* is thought to have ſpent among them, had been enough to have inſinuated himſelf into their utmoſt acquaintance, and to have drawn from them the knowledge of their greateſt Myſteries; but yet we have no great reaſon to think he did, if we believe the ſtory in *Diogenes Laertius* of his ſacrificing an *Hecatomb* for the finding out that Demonſtration, which is now contain'd in the 47 propoſition of the firſt of *Euclide*. Yet this did not abate the *Græcians* eſteem of the *Ægyptians* Mathematical Learning; for in *Plato*'s time, *Eudoxus Cnidius* went into *Ægypt* on purpoſe to acquire it; and *Democritus* his boaſt, that none of the *Arſepedonaptæ* in *Ægypt* (ſo their Prieſts were call'd, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Euſebius* tell us, who relate the ſtory) exceded him in the Mathematics, proves, at leaſt inferred, that they were then in greateſt eſteem for them. Their great skill in Aſtronomy is atteſted by *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Herodotus*, and others, and by their finding out the courſe of the year by the motion of the Sun, which was the

Philo Jud. de vita Moſis. *Sixt. Senen. l. 2. p. 39.* *Jambl. de vitâ Pyth. l. 1. 29.* *Porphyr. de vit. Pyth. p. 182.* *Strab. l. 17.* *Clem. Al. Strom. l. 1.* *Euſ. Præp. l. 10. c. 2.* *Diodor. l. 1. c. 49, 50.* *Strab. l. 17.* *Herodot. l. 2.*

invention

invention of the *Heliopolitan* Priests. How much they valued Geography, appears from *Clemens* his description of the ἱερογραμματεὺς, or *sacred Scribe*, in the solemn procession; for he was requir'd to be skilful in Hieroglyphics, Cosmography, Geography, the motions of the Planets, the Chorography of *Ægypt*, and description of the *Nile*. *Eustathius* in his Notes on *Dionysius*, attributes the invention of Geographical Tables to *Sesostris*, who caused the Lands he had conquered to be described in Tables, and so communicated to the *Ægyptians*, and from them to others. Their skill in Natural Philosophy cou'd not be very great, because of their Magic and Superstition, whereby they were hindred from all experiments in those Natural things, which they attributed a Divinity to; but they seem to have been more exact and curious in Natural History; for any prodigies, or any thing that was anomalous in Nature, they did, saith *Strabo*, φιλοπραγμονέστερον ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα, *with a great deal of curiosity insert in their sacred Records*; and *Herodotus* adds, *that more things of that nature are observed by them than by any other Nation*; which, saith he, they not only diligently preserve, but frequently compare together, and from a similitude of prodigies gather a similitude of events. But that which gained the *Ægyptians* the greatest repute abroad, seems to have been their early skill in *Physic*, which is so much spoken of by *Homer*, *Plato*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, that it were impertinent troubling a Reader's patience with the proof of that which is so generally confess'd. A great evidence of the antiquity of this study among them is (if *Manetho* may be so far credited) that *Athotis*, the second King of the first Dynasty of the *Thinites*, was a Physician himself, and writ some Books of *Anatomy*; and the second King of the third Dynasty of the *Memphites*, was, for his skill in *Physic*, honoured among them by the name of *Æsculapius*. *Pliny* affirms it to have been the custom of their Kings to cause dead bodies to be dissected, to find out the nature of Diseases; and elsewhere tells us, that the original of *Physic* among them was from the relation of those who by any remedy were cured of any Disease, which for a memorial to posterity were recorded in their Temples. Their Hieroglyphical and Mystical Learning hath made the greatest noise in the world and the least of Substance in it; which whoever will not be convinced of without perusal of *Kircher*'s *Oedipus Ægyptiacus*, will at last find it fully done to his hand by the successless endeavours of that otherwise learned Man. I cannot think any rational Man cou'd think that study worth his pains, which at the highest can amount but to a conjecture; and when it is come to that with a great deal of pains, it is nothing but some ordinary and trivial observation. As in that famous Hieroglyphic of *Diospolis*, so much spoken of by the Ancients, where was a Child to express coming into the World, an old Man for going out of it, an Hawk for God, an *Hippopotamus* for Hatred, and a Crocodile for Impudence; and all to express this venerable *Apophthegm*, *O ye that come into the World, and that go out of it, God hates impudence.* And therefore certainly this kind of Learning deserves the highest form among the *difficiles Nugæ*; and all these Hieroglyphics put together, will make but one good one, and shou'd be for *Labour lost.*

Clemens Strom. l. 6. p. 631. ed. Par.

Plin. Nat. hist. l. 19. c. 5. l. 29. c. 1.

There is yet one part of Learning more among them, which the *Ægyptians* are esteemed for, which is the Political and Civil part of it, which may better be called Wisdom, than most of the foregoing; two things VII.

things ſpeak much the wiſdom of a Nation, good Laws, and a prudent management of them: their Laws are highly commended by *Strabo* and *Diodorus*; and it is none of the leaſt commendations of them, that *Solon* and *Lycurgus* borrowed ſo many of their Conſtitutions from them; and for the prudent management of their Government, as the continuance of their State ſo long in peace and quietneſs, is an invincible demonſtration of it; ſo the report given of them in Scripture adds a further teſtimony to it; for therein the King of *Ægypt* is called the Son of the Wiſe, as well as the Son of ancient Kings; and his Counſellors are called *wiſe Counſellors of* Pharaoh, and the *wiſe Men*; whereby a more than ordinary prudence and policy muſt be underſtood. Can we now imagine ſuch a perſon as *Moſes* was, bred up in all the ingenuous Literature of *Ægypt*, converſant among their wiſeſt perſons in *Pharaoh's* Court, having thereby all advantages to improve himſelf, and to underſtand the utmoſt of all that they know, ſhou'd not be able to paſs a judgment between a mere pretence and Impoſture, and real and important Truths? Can we think that one who had intereſt in ſo great a Court, all advantages of raiſing himſelf therein, ſhou'd willingly forſake all the pleaſures and delights at preſent, all his hopes and advantages, for the future, were he not fully perſuaded of the certain and undoubted truth of all thoſe things which are recorded in his Books? Is it poſſible a Man of ordinary wiſdom ſhou'd venture himſelf upon ſo hazardous, unlikely and dangerous employment, as that was *Moſes* undertook, which could have no probability of ſucceſs, but only upon the belief that God who appeared unto him, was greater than all the Gods of *Ægypt*, and cou'd carry on his Deſign by his power, maugre all the oppoſition which the Princes of the world cou'd make againſt it? And what poſſible ground can we have to think that ſuch a perſon, who did verily believe the truth of what God reveal'd unto him, ſhou'd dare to write any otherwiſe than as it was revealed unto him? If there had been any thing repugnant to common Reaſon in the Hiſtory of the Creation, the Fall of Man, the univerſal Deluge, the propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*, the Hiſtory of the *Patriarchs*, had not *Moſes* rational faculties as well as we? nay, had he them not far better improved than any of ours are? and was not he then able to judge what was ſuitable to Reaſon, and what not? and can we think he wou'd then deliver any thing inconſiſtent with Reaſon or undoubted Tradition then, when the Ægyptian Prieſts might ſo readily and plainly have triumphed over him, by diſcovering the falſhood of what he wrote? Thus we ſee that *Moſes* was as highly qualify'd as any of the acuteſt heathen Philoſophers cou'd be, for diſcerning Truth from Falſhood; nay, in all probability he far excelled the moſt renowned of the *Græcian* Philoſophers in that very kind of Learning wherewith they made ſo great noiſe in the World, which was originally Ægyptian, as is evident in the whole ſeries of the *Græcian* Philoſophers, who went Age after Age to *Ægypt*, to get ſome ſcraps of that Learning there, which *Moſes* cou'd not have but full meals of, becauſe of his high place, great intereſt, and power in *Ægypt*. And muſt thoſe hungry Philoſophers then become the only Maſters of our Reaſon, and their Dictates be receiv'd as the ſenſe and voice of Nature, which they either receiv'd from uncertain Tradition, or elſe deliver'd in oppoſition to it, that they might be more taken notice of in the World? Muſt an αὐτὸς ἔφα be confronted with, *Thus ſaith the Lord?* and a few pitiful Sym-

Iſa 19.11, 12.

bols

bols vye authority with Divine Commands? and *Ex nihilo nihil fit* be ſooner believ'd than, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth?* What irrefragable evidence of Reaſon is that ſo confident a preſumption built upon, when it can ſignifie nothing without this *Hypotheſis*, That there is nothing but Matter in the World? and let this firſt be prov'd, and we will never ſtick to grant the other. I may confidently ſay, the great gullery of the world hath been, taking philoſophical Dictates for the ſtandard of Reaſon, and unprov'd *Hypotheſes* for certain Foundations for our diſcourſe to rely upon. And the ſeeking to reconcile the Myſteries of our Faith to theſe, hath been that which hath almoſt deſtroy'd it, and turn'd our Religion into a mere philoſophical Speculation. But of this elſewhere. We ſee then that inſiſting merely on the accompliſhment and rational perfections of the perſons who ſpeak, we have more reaſon to yield credit to *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, than to any Philoſophers in their Speculations.

VIII. And that which in the next place ſpeaks *Moſes* to be a perſon of wiſdom, and judgment, and ability to find out truth, was his Age and Experience when he deliver'd theſe things to the World. He vented no crude and indigeſted conceptions, no ſudden and temerarious fancies, the uſual iſſues of teeming and juvenile Wits; he liv'd long enough to have experience to try, and judgment to diſtinguiſh a mere outſide and varniſh, from what was ſolid and ſubſtantial. We cannot then have the leaſt ground of ſuſpicion, that *Moſes* was any ways unfit to diſcern Truth from Falſhood, and therefore was capable of judging the one from the other.

But tho' perſons be never ſo highly accompliſh'd for parts, learning, and experience, yet if they want due information of the certainty of the things they deliver, they may be ſtill deceiv'd themſelves; and if they preſerve it for poſterity, be guilty of deceiving others. Let us now therefore ſee whether *Moſes* had not as great advantages for underſtanding the truth of his Hiſtory, as he had judgment to diſcern it. And concerning all thoſe things contained in the four laſt Books of his, to his own death, it was impoſſible any ſhou'd have greater than himſelf, writing nothing but what he was *pars magna* himſelf of, what he ſaw and heard, and did; and can any teſtimony be deſired greater than his whoſe actions they were, or who was preſent at the doing of them; and that not in any private way, but in the moſt public capacity? For altho' private perſons may be preſent at great actions, yet they may be guilty of miſ-repreſenting them, for want of underſtanding all circumſtances precedent, and ſubſequent, or for want of underſtanding the deſigns of the chief inſtruments of action: but when the perſon himſelf, who was the chief in all, ſhall undertake to write an exact Hiſtory of it, what evidence can be deſired more certain than that is, that there cou'd be no defect as to information concerning what was done? The only ſcruple then that can be made, muſt be concerning the paſſages of former times which *Moſes* relates. And here I doubt not but to make it appear, that inſiſting only on all that can be deſired in a bare Hiſtorian (ſetting aſide Divine Revelation) he had as true and certain information of the Hiſtory of thoſe former Ages, as any one can have of things at that diſtance from themſelves; and that is, by a certain uninterrupted tradition of them, which will appear more clear and evident in that Nation of which *Moſes* was, than in any other Nation in the World: and that on theſe two accounts: Firſt, *The undoubted lineal deſcent from Fa-*

ther to Son in the Jewiſh Nation. Secondly, *Their intereſt lying ſo much in the preſerving this Tradition entire.*

IX. Firſt, *That there was a certain unmixed lineal deſcent from Father to Son in the Jewiſh Nation:* the great cauſe of moſt of the confuſion in the Tradition of other Nations, was the frequent mixing of ſeveral Families one with another; now that God might as it were on purpoſe ſatisfie the World of the *Iſraelites* Capacity to preſerve the Tradition entire, he prohibited their mixture by Marriages with the People of other Nations and Families. So that in *Moſes* his time it was a very eaſie matter to run up their lineal deſcent as far as the Flood, nay, up to *Adam*; for *Adam* converſed ſometimes with *Lamech*, *Noah*'s Father; for *Lamech* was born *A.M.* 874. *Adam* died 930. ſo that 56 years, according to that computation, were *Adam* and *Lamech* contemporary. Can we then think *Noah* ignorant of the ancient Tradition of the World, when his Father was ſo long *co-ævous* with *Adam*; and *Mathuſelah* his Grand-father, who was born *A.M.* 687. died not till *A.M.* 1656. according to our moſt learned *Primate* of *Armagh*, *i.e.* was 600 years contemporary with *Noah*. *Sem* his Son was probably living in ſome part of *Jacob*'s time, or *Iſaac*'s at leaſt; and how eaſily and uninterruptedly might the general Tradition of the ancient Hiſtory be continued thence to the time of *Moſes*, when the number of Families agreeing in this Tradition was increaſed, and withal incorporated by a common ligament of Religion? I demand then, where can we ſuppoſe any ignorance or cutting off this general Tradition in ſo continued a ſucceſſion as here was? Can we imagine that the Grand-children of *Jacob* cou'd be ignorant of their own pedigree, and whence they came into *Ægypt?* can we think a thing ſo late and ſo remarkable as the account of their coming thither, ſhou'd be forgotten, which was attended with ſo many memorable circumſtances, eſpecially the ſelling and advancement of *Joſeph*, whoſe memory it was impoſſible ſhou'd be obliterated in ſo ſhort a time? Cou'd *Jacob* be ignorant of the Country whence his Grand-father *Abraham* came? eſpecially when he liv'd ſo long in it himſelf, and married in that branch of the Family that was remaining there, when he had ſerved his Uncle *Laban?* Cou'd *Abraham*, when he was contemporary with *Sem*, be ignorant of the truth of the Floud, when *Sem*, from whom he derived himſelf, was one of the perſons who eſcaped it in the Ark? Cou'd *Sem* be ignorant of the actions before the Floud, when *Adam*, the firſt Man, lived ſo near the time of *Noah?* and, cou'd *Noah* then be ignorant of the Creation and the fall of Man? Thus we ſee it almoſt impoſſible, that any age among them then cou'd be ignorant of the paſſages of the precedent, which they were ſo few Generations removed from, that they cou'd with eaſe derive themſelves from the Firſt Man. What then can we ſay? that any of theſe had a deſign of deceiving their Poſterity, and ſo corrupted the Tradition? beſides, that it cou'd be hardly poſſible at that time, when there were ſo many remaining teſtimonies of former times; what end can we imagin that any Parents ſhou'd have in thus deceiving their Children, or what advantage ſhou'd come to them by ſuch a deceit? Nay, I ſhall now manifeſt in the ſecond place, That the whole intereſt of their Children lay in preſerving this Tradition certain and entire. For their hopes of poſſeſſing *Canaan* and title to it, depended upon the promiſe made unto *Abraham* 400 years before; which wou'd not only keep awake their ſenſe of the Divine Providence, but wou'd make them careful

ful during their Bondage to preſerve their Genealogies, becauſe all the Right they cou'd plead to their poſſeſſions in *Canaan*, was from their being of *Abraham*'s Seed. And beſides this, on purpoſe to be a memorial to them of paſſages between God and *Abraham*, they had in their fleſh a badge of Circumciſion, which wou'd ſerve to call to mind thoſe tranſactions which had been between God and their Fore-fathers. Theſe things then do fully demonſtrate, that inſiſting only on Rational Evidence, the *Iſraelites* were the moſt certain conſervators of the ancient Hiſtory of the World; and can we think, that *Moſes* who was the Ruler among them, ſhou'd not fully underſtand thoſe things which every *Iſraelite* cou'd ſcarce be ignorant of, and might correct the miſtakes of *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, if he had been guilty of any ſuch? Theſe things I ſuppoſe have made the firſt Propoſition evident, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceived himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he reports to others, both becauſe he had abilities ſufficient to diſcover Truth from Falſhood, and ſufficient information of the paſſages of former times.

CHAP. III.

Moſes his fidelity proved.

I. Moſes *conſidered as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law giver; his fidelity in both proved; clear evidences that he had no intent to deceive in his Hiſtory, freedom from private intereſt, impartiality in his relations, plainneſs and perſpicuity of ſtile.* II. *As a Law-giver he came armed with Divine Authority, which being the main thing, is fixed on to be fully proved from his actions and writings.* III. *The power of Miracles the great evidence of Divine Revelation. Two grand Queſtions propounded. In what caſes Miracles may be expected, and how known to be true. No neceſſity of a conſtant power of Miracles in a Church:* IV. *Two caſes alone wherein they may be expected. When any thing comes as a Law from God, and when a Divine Law is to be repealed. The neceſſity of Miracles in thoſe caſes as an evidence of Divine Revelation aſſerted.* V. VI. VII. *Objections anſwered. No uſe of Miracles when the Doctrine is ſettled and owned by Miracles by the firſt Revelation. No need of Miracles in reformation of a Church.*

I. THe ſecond Propoſition contains the proof of *Moſes* his fidelity, That he was as far from having any intent to deceive others, as he was from being deceived himſelf. Two ways *Moſes* muſt be conſidered, as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law-giver; the only inducement for him to deceive as an Hiſtorian, muſt be ſome particular intereſt which muſt draw him aſide from an impartial delivery of the truth; as a Law-giver, he might deceive, if he pretended Divine Revelation for thoſe Laws which were only the iſſues of his own Brain, that they might be re-

ceived with a greater veneration among the People, as *Numa Pompilius* and others did. Now if we prove that *Moſes* had no intereſt to deceive in his Hiſtory, and had all rational evidence of Divine Revelation in his Laws, we ſhall abundantly evince the undoubted fidelity of *Moſes* in every thing recorded by him. We begin then with his fidelity as an Hiſtorian; and it being contrary to the common intereſt of the World to deceive and be deceived, we have no reaſon to entertain any ſuſpicions of the veracity of any perſon where we cannot diſcern ſome peculiar intereſt that might have a ſtronger byaſs upon him than the common intereſt of the World. For it is otherwiſe in Morals than in Naturals; for in Naturals, we ſee that every thing will leave its proper intereſt to preſerve the common intereſt of Nature; but in Morals, there is nothing more common than deſerting the common intereſt of Mankind, to ſet up a peculiar intereſt againſt it: It being the trueſt deſcription of a Politician, that he is one who makes himſelf the centre, and the whole World his circumference; that he regards not how much the whole World is abuſed, if any advantage doth accrue to himſelf by it. Where we ſee it then the deſign of any perſon to advance himſelf or his poſterity, or to ſet up the credit of the Nation whoſe Hiſtory he writes, we may have juſt cauſe to ſuſpect his partiality, becauſe we then find a ſufficient inducement for ſuch a one to leave the common road of Truth, and to fall into the paths of deceit. But we have not the leaſt ground to ſuſpect any ſuch partiality in the Hiſtory of *Moſes*; for nothing is more clear than that he was free from the ambitious deſign of advancing himſelf and his poſterity, who notwithſtanding the great honour he enjoy'd himſelf, was content to leave his poſterity in the meaneſt ſort of attendance upon the Tabernacle. And as little have we ground to think he intended to flatter that Nation, which he ſo lively deſcribes, that one wou'd think he had rather a deſign to ſet forth the frowardneſs, unbelief, unthankfulneſs, and diſobedience of a Nation towards a gracious God, than any ways inhance their reputation in the world, or to ingratiate himſelf with them by writing this Hiſtory of them. Nay, and he ſets forth ſo exactly the leſſer failings and groſſer enormities of all the Anceſtors of this Nation, whoſe acts he records, that any impartial Reader will ſoon acquit him of a deſign of flattery, when after he hath recorded thoſe faults, he ſeeks not to extenuate them, or bring any excuſe or pretence to palliate them. So that any obſerving Reader may eaſily take notice, that he was carried on by a higher deſign than the common people of Hiſtorians are; and that his drift and ſcope was to exalt the goodneſs and favour of God, towards a rebellious and obſtinate people. Of which there can be no greater nor more lively demonſtration, than the Hiſtory of all the tranſactions of the *Jewiſh* Nation, from their coming forth of *Ægypt*, to their utter ruin and deſolation. And *Moſes* tells them as from God himſelf, *it was neither for their number, nor their goodneſs, that God ſet his love upon them, but he loved them, becauſe he loved them, i. e.* no other account was to be given of his gracious dealing with them, but the freeneſs of his own bounty, and the exuberancy of his goodneſs towards them. Nay, have we not cauſe to admire the ingenuity as well as veracity of this excellent perſonage, who not only lays ſo notorious a blot upon the ſtock of his own Family *Levi*, recorded ſo punctually the inhumanity and cruelty of him, and *Simeon* in their dealings with the *Sechemites*; but likewiſe inſerts that curſe which was left upon their

Deut. 7. 7, 8.

Gen. 34. 25.

Gen 49. 5, 6, 7.

memory

memory for it, by their own Father at his deceaſe! And that he might not leave the leaſt ſuſpicion of partiality behind him, he hath not done as the Statuary did, (who engraved his own name ſo artificially in the Statue of *Jupiter*, that one ſhou'd continue as long as the other,) but what the other intended for the praiſe of his skill, *Moſes* hath done for his ingenuity, that he hath ſo interwoven the Hiſtory of his own failings and diſobedience with thoſe of the Nation, that his ſpots are like to continue as long as the whole web of his Hiſtory is like to do. Had it been the leaſt part of his deſign to have his memory preſerved with a ſuperſtitious veneration among the *Jews*, how eaſy had it been for him to have left out any thing that might in the leaſt intrench upon his reputation? but we find him very ſecure and careleſs in that particular; nay, on the other ſide, very ſtudious and induſtrious in depreſſing the honour and deſarts of Men, and advancing the power and goodneſs of God. And all this he doth, not in an affected ſtrain of *Rhetoric*, whoſe proper work is *impetrare fidem mendacio*, and as *Tully* ſomewhere confeſſeth, *To make things ſeem otherwiſe than they are*; but that innate ſimplicity and plainneſs, and yet withal with that *Imperatoria brevitas*, that Majeſty and Authority, that it is thereby evident he thought not to court acceptance, but to demand belief: Nor had any ſuch pitiful deſign of pleaſing his Readers with ſome affected phraſes, but thought that Truth it ſelf had preſence enough with it, to command the ſubmiſſion of our Underſtandings to it.

II. Eſpecially when all theſe were delivered by ſuch a one who came ſufficiently armed with all motives of credibility and inducements to aſſent, by that evidence which he gave, that he was no pretender to Divine Revelation, but was really imploy'd as a peculiar inſtrument of State under the God and Ruler of the whole World. Which if it be made clear, then all our further doubts muſt preſently ceaſe, and all impertinent diſputes be ſilenced, when the Supreme Majeſty appears impowering any perſon to dictate to the World the Laws they muſt be governed by. For if any thing be repugnant to our Rational Faculties, that is, that God ſhou'd dictate any thing but what is moſt certainly true, or that the Governour of the World ſhou'd preſcribe any Laws, but ſuch as were moſt juſt and reaſonable. If we ſuppoſe a God, we cannot queſtion veracity to be one of his chiefeſt Attributes, and that it is impoſſible the God of truth ſhou'd imploy any, to reveal any thing as from him, but what was undoubtedly true. So that it were an argument of the moſt groſs and unreaſonable incredulity, to diſtruſt the certainty of any thing which comes to us with ſufficient evidence of Divine Revelation, becauſe thereby we ſhew our diſtruſt of the veracity of God himſelf. All that we can deſire then, is only reaſonable ſatisfaction concerning the evidence of Divine Revelation in the perſon whoſe words we are to credit, and this our gracious God hath been ſo far from denying Men, that he hath given all Rational Evidence of the truth of it. For it implying no incongruity at all, to any notions of God or our ſelves, that God ſhou'd, when it pleaſes him, ſingle out ſome inſtrument to manifeſt his will to the World; our enquiry then leads us to thoſe things which may be proper Notes and Characters of ſuch a perſon who is employ'd on ſo high an Embaſſy. And thoſe are chiefly theſe two, If his actions be ſuch as cou'd not flow from the power of mere Natural Cauſes; and, If the things he reveals be ſuch as cou'd not proceed from any created Underſtanding. *Firſt* then, for his Actions,

theſe

theſe ſtriking moſt upon our outward Senſes, when they are any thing extraordinary, do tranſmit along with the impreſſions of them to the Underſtanding, an high opinion of the perſon that doth them: whereas the mere height of knowledge, or profoundneſs of things diſcovered, can have no ſuch preſent power and influence upon any, but ſuch as are of more raiſed and inquiſitive minds. And the World is generally more apt to ſuſpect its ſelf deceived with Words, than it can be with Actions; and hence Miracles, or the doing of things above the reach of Nature, hath been always embraced as the greateſt teſtimony of Divine Authority and Revelation. For which there is this evident Reaſon, That the courſe of Nature being ſettled by Divine Power, and every thing acting there by the force of that Power it receiv'd at firſt, it ſeems impoſſible that any thing ſhou'd really alter the ſeries of things, without the ſame power which at firſt produced them. This then we take for granted, That where-ever ſuch a Power appears, there is a certain evidence of a Divine Preſence going along with ſuch a Perſon who enjoys it. And this is that which is moſt evident in the actions of *Moſes*, both as to the Miracles he wrought both in *Ægypt* and the Wilderneſs, and his miraculous deliverance of the *Iſraelites* out of *Ægypt*, this latter being as much above the reach of any merely Civil Power, as the other above Natural.

We therefore come to the Rational Evidence of that Divine Authority whereby *Moſes* acted, which may be gathered from that Divine Power which appeared in his Actions, which being a matter of ſo great weight and importance (it being one of the main Baſes whereon the Evidence of Divine Revelation, as to us, doth ſtand) and withal of ſo great difficulty and obſcurity, (cauſed thro' the preferring ſome Parties in Religion above the common intereſt of it) it will require more care and diligence to ſearch what influence the Power of Miracles hath upon the proving the Divine Commiſſion of thoſe who do them. Whether they are ſuch undoubted Credentials, that where-ever they are produced, we are preſently to receive the Perſons who bring them, as Extraordinary Embaſſadors from heaven, employ'd on ſome peculiar Meſſage to the Sons of Men? For the full ſtating of this Important Queſtion, two things muſt be cleared: *Firſt*, in what caſes Miracles may be expected as Credentials to confirm an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven? *Secondly*, What Rational Evidences do attend thoſe Miracles, to aſſure us they are ſuch as they pretend to be?

III. *Firſt*, For the cauſes wherein theſe Miracles are to be expected as inducements to, or confirmations of our Faith, concerning the Divine imployment of any perſons in the World. And here I lay down this as a certain Foundation, That a power of Miracles is not conſtantly and perpetually neceſſary in all thoſe who manage the affairs of Heaven here on Earth, or that act in the name of God in the World. When the Doctrine of Faith is once ſettled in Sacred Records, and the Divine Revelation of that Doctrine ſufficiently atteſted, by a Power of Miracles in the Revealers of it, What imaginable neceſſity or pretext can there be contrived for a power of Miracles, eſpecially among ſuch as already own the Divine Revelation of the Scriptures? To make then a power of working Miracles to be conſtantly reſident in the Church of God, as one of the neceſſary Notes and Characters of it, is to put God upon that neceſſity which common Nature is freed from, *viz.* of multiplying things without ſufficient cauſe to be given for them; and to leave Men's Faith

Faith at a ſtand, when God hath given ſufficient teſtimony for it to rely upon. It is a thing too common and eaſy to be obſerved, that ſome perſons out of their eagerneſs to uphold the intereſt of their own party, have been fain to eſtabliſh it upon ſuch grounds, which when they are ſufficiently ſearched to the bottom, do apparently undermine the common and ſure Foundations whereon the Belief of our common Chriſtianity doth mainly ſtand. It were eaſy to make a large Diſcourſe on this Subject, whereby we may rip open the wounds that Chriſtianity hath receiv'd, thro' the contentions of the ſeveral parties of it; but this imputation cannot with ſo much reaſon be faſtn'd on any party, as that which is nailed to a pretended Infallible Chair; for which we need no other inſtance, than this before us. For while the leaders of that party make a Power of Miracles to be a neceſſary Note of the true Church, they unavoidably run Men upon this dangerous precipice, not to believe any thing as a matter of Faith, where they find not ſufficient Miracles to convince them that is the true Church which propounds it to them. Which neceſſarily follows from their acknowledg'd principles; for it being impoſſible, according to them, to believe any thing with a Divine Faith, but what is propounded by the Church as an infallible Guide; and it being impoſſible to know which is this infallible Guide, but by the Notes and Characters of it, and one of thoſe Notes, being a Power of Miracles, I cannot find out my Guide but by this Power; and this Power muſt be preſent in the Church, for nothing of former Ages concerning Faith, as the Miracles of *Chriſt*, his Reſurrection, &c. is to be believ'd, but on the Church's account) and therefore where Men do not find ſufficient conviction from preſent Miracles, to believe the Church to be an infallible Guide, they muſt throw off all Faith concerning the Goſpel; for as good never a whit, as never the better. And therefore it is no wonder *Atheiſm* ſhou'd be ſo thriving a plant in *Italy*; nay under, if not within the walls of *Rome* it ſelf, where inquiſitive Perſons do daily ſee the jugglings and impoſtures of Prieſts in their pretended Miracles, and from thence are brought to look upon Religion its ſelf as a mere impoſture, and to think no *Pope* ſo infallible, as he that ſaid, *Quantum nobis profuit hæc de Chriſto fabula?* Such horrid conſequences do Men drive others, if not bring themſelves, to, when they employ their parts and induſtry rather to uphold a corrupt intereſt, than to promote the Belief of the acknowledg'd principles of Chriſtian Faith. But as long as we aſſert no neceſſity of ſuch a power of Miracles to be the Note of any true Church, nor any ſuch neceſſity of an infallible Guide, but that the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles, were ſufficient evidences of a Divine Spirit in them; and that the Scriptures were recorded by them to be an infallible Rule of Faith; here we have more clear reaſon as to the primary motives and grounds of Faith, and withal the infallible veracity of God in the Scriptures, as the laſt reſolution of Faith. And while we aſſert ſuch an infallible Rule of Faith, delivered to us by ſuch an unanimous conſent from the firſt delivery of it, and then ſo fully atteſted by ſuch uncontroulable Miracles, we cannot in the leaſt underſtand to what end a power of Miracles ſhou'd now ſerve in the Church, eſpecially among thoſe who all believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. Indeed before the great harveſt of Converts in the primitive times were brought in, both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, and the Church fully ſettled in receiving the Canon of the Scriptures univerſally, we find God did continue this power among them; but after

ter the Books of the New Teſtament were generally embraced as the Rule of Faith among Chriſtians, we find them ſo far from pretending to any ſuch Power, that they reject the pretenders to it, ſuch as the *Donatiſts* were, and plead upon the ſame accounts, as we do now againſt the neceſſity of it. We ſee then no reaſon in the world for Miracles to be continued where the Doctrine of Faith is ſettled, as being confirmed by Miracles in the firſt Preachers of it.

IV. There are only theſe two caſes then, wherein Miracles may juſtly and with reaſon be expected. *Firſt*, When any perſon comes as by an extraordinary commiſſion from God to the World, either to deliver ſome peculiar meſſage, or to do ſome more than ordinary ſervice. *Secondly*, When ſomething that hath been before eſtabliſh'd by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and ſome other way of worſhip eſtabliſh'd inſtead of it. *Firſt*, When any comes upon an extraordinary meſſage to the World, in the name of, and by commiſſion from God, then it is but reaſon to require ſome more than ordinary evidence of ſuch Authority. Becauſe of the main importance of the duty of giving credit to ſuch a perſon, and the great ſin of being guilty of rejecting that Divine Authority which appears in him. And in this caſe we cannot think that God wou'd require it as a Duty to believe, where he doth not give ſufficient arguments for Faith, nor that he will puniſh perſons for ſuch a fault, which an invincible ignorance was the cauſe of. Indeed God doth not uſe to neceſſitate Faith, as to the act of it, but he doth ſo clearly propound the object of it, with all arguments inducing to it, as may ſufficiently juſtify a Believer's choice in point of reaſon and prudence, and may leave all Unbelievers without excuſe. I cannot ſee what account a Man can give to himſelf of his Faith, much leſs what Apology he can make to others for it, unleſs he be ſufficiently convinced in point of the higheſt reaſon, that it was his duty to believe; and in order to that conviction, there muſt be ſome clear evidence given, That what is ſpoken hath the impreſs of Divine authority upon it. Now what convictions there can be to any ſober mind concerning Divine Authority in any perſon without ſuch a Power of Miracles going along with him, when he is to deliver ſome new Doctrine to the World to be believ'd, I confeſs I cannot underſtand. For altho' I doubt not but where-ever God doth reveal any thing to any perſon immediately, he gives demonſtrable evidence to the inward ſenſes of the Soul, that it comes from himſelf; yet this inward ſenſe can be no ground to another perſon to believe his Doctrine Divine, becauſe no Man can be a competent judge of the actings of the Divine Spirit from ſtrong impreſſions of fancy by the force and energy of them. If it be ſaid, *That we are bound to believe thoſe, who ſay they are fully ſatisfy'd of their Divine Commiſſion.* I anſwer *Firſt*, This will expoſe us to all deluſions imaginable; for if we are bound to believe them becauſe they ſay ſo, we are bound to believe all which ſay ſo; and none are more confident pretenders to this than the greateſt deceivers, as the experience of our Age will ſufficiently witneſs. *Secondly*, Men muſt neceſſarily be bound to believe contradictions; for nothing is more ordinary, than for ſuch confident pretenders to a Divine Spirit, to contradict one another, and it may be, the ſame perſon in a little time contradict himſelf: and muſt we ſtill be bound to believe all they ſay? If ſo, no Philoſophers wou'd be ſo much in requeſt, as thoſe *Ariſtotle* diſputes againſt in his *Metaphyſics*, who thought a thing might be, and not be, at the ſame time. *Thirdly*, The ground of Faith at laſt will

Object.

Anſw.

be

be but a mere humane teſtimony, as far as the perſon who is to believe is capable of judging of it. For the Queſtion, being, Whether the perſon I am to believe hath Divine Authority for what he ſaith, What ground can I have to believe that he hath ſo? Muſt I take his bare affirmation for it? If ſo, then a mere humane teſtimony muſt be the ground of Divine Faith, and that which is laſt reſolved into: If it be ſaid, *That I am to believe the Divine Authority by which he ſpeaks, when he ſpeaks in the name of God:* I anſwer, The Queſtion will again return, how I ſhall know he ſpeaks this from Divine Authority? and ſo there muſt be a progreſs *in infinitum*, or founding Divine Faith on a mere humane teſtimony, If I am to believe Divine Revelation merely on the account of the perſon's affirmation who pretends to it. For in this caſe it holds good, *Non apparentis & non exiſtentis eadem eſt ratio*; if he be divinely inſpired, and there be no ground inducing me to believe that he is ſo, I ſhall be excuſed, if I believe him not, if my wilfulneſs and lazineſs be not the cauſe of my unbelief.

If it be ſaid, *That God will ſatisfy the minds of good Men concerning the truth of Divine Revelation.* I grant it to be wonderful true; but all the Queſtion is *de modo*, how God will ſatisfy them? whether merely by Inſpiration of his own Spirit in them, aſſuring them that it is God that ſpeaks in ſuch perſons; or by giving them Rational Evidence, convincing them of ſufficient grounds to believe it. If we aſſert the former way, we run into theſe inconveniences: *Firſt*, We make as immediate a Revelation in all thoſe who believe, as in thoſe who are to reveal Divine Truths to us; for there is a new Revelation of an object immediately to the mind; *viz. That ſuch a perſon is inſpired of God*; and is not after the common way of the Spirit's illumination in Believers, which is by enlightning the faculty, without the propoſition of any new object, as it is in the work of Grace: So that according to this opinion, there muſt be immediate Inſpiration as to that act of Faith, whereby we believe any one to have been divinely inſpired, and conſequently to that whereby we believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. *Secondly*, Doth not this make the faireſt plea for Men's unbelief? For, I demand, Is it the duty of thoſe who want that immediate Illumination to believe or no? If it be not their duty, Unbelief can be no ſin to them; if it be a duty, it muſt be made known to be a duty; and how can that be made known to them to be a duty, when they want the only and neceſſary means of Inſtruction in order to it? Will God condemn them for that, which it was impoſſible they ſhou'd have, unleſs God gave it them? And how can they be left inexcuſable, who want ſo much as rational inducements to Faith? for of theſe I now ſpeak, and not of efficacious perſuaſions of the Mind, when there are rational arguments for Faith propounded. But, *Laſtly*, I ſuppoſe the caſe will be clear'd, when we take notice what courſe God hath always taken to give all rational ſatisfaction to the minds of Men, concerning the perſons whom he hath imploy'd in either of the forementiond caſes. *Firſt*, for thoſe who have been imploy'd upon ſome ſpecial meſſage and ſervice for God, he hath ſent them forth ſufficiently provided with manifeſtations of the Divine Power whereby they acted; as is moſt clear and evident in the preſent caſe of *Moſes*, *Exodus* 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. where *Moſes* puts the caſe to God which we are now debating of. Suppoſing, ſaith he, that I ſhou'd go to the *Iſraelites* and tell them, God had appeared to me, and ſent me to deliver them, and they ſhou'd ſay, God had not appear'd unto me;

V.

how ſhou'd I ſatisfy them? God doth not reject this objection of *Moſes* as ſavouring of unbelief, but preſently ſhews him how he ſhou'd ſatisfy them, by cauſing a Miracle before his face, *turning his rod into a ſerpent*; and God gives this as the reaſon of it, *verſ.* 5. *That they may believe that the Lord God of their Fathers, the God of* Abraham, *the God of* Iſaac, *and the God of* Jacob, *hath appeared unto thee.* It ſeems God himſelf thought this wou'd be the moſt pregnant evidence of God's appearing to him, if he wrought Miracles before their faces. Nay, leſt they ſhou'd think one ſingle Miracle was not ſufficient, God in the immediate following verſes adjoyns two more, which he ſhou'd do in order to their ſatisfaction; and further, *verſ.* 21. God gave him a charge to do all thoſe wonders before *Pharaoh*, which he had put into his hand: and accordingly we find *Pharaoh* preſently demanding a Miracle of *Moſes*, *Exodus* 7. 9. which accordingly *Moſes* did in his preſence, tho' he might ſuppoſe *Pharaoh*'s demand not to proceed from deſire of ſatisfaction, but from ſome hopes that for want of it, he might have rendred his credit ſuſpected among the *Iſraelites*.

VI. Indeed after God had delivered his people, and had ſettled them in a way of ſerving him according to the Laws delivered by *Moſes*, which he had confirm'd by unqueſtionable Miracles among them, we find a caution laid in by *Moſes* himſelf againſt thoſe which ſhou'd pretend ſigns and wonders to draw them off from the Religion eſtabliſh'd by the Law of *Moſes*. And ſo likewiſe under the Goſpel, after that was eſtabliſhed by the unparallell'd Miracles of our Saviour and the Apoſtles, we find frequent cautions againſt being deceiv'd by thoſe who came with pretences of doing great Miracles. But this is ſo far from infringing the credibility of ſuch a Teſtimony which is confirm'd by Miracles, that it yields a ſtrong confirmation to the truth of what I now aſſert. For the Doctrine is ſuppos'd to be already eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, according to which we are to judge of the ſpirits of ſuch pretenders. Now it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that when a Religion is once eſtabliſh'd by uncontrouled Miracles, we ſhou'd not hearken to every whiffling Conjurer that will pretend to do great feats, to draw us off from the truth eſtabliſh'd. In which caſe, the ſureſt way to diſcover the Impoſture is, to compare his pretended Miracles with thoſe true and real ones which were done by *Moſes* and *Chriſt*; and the ground of it is, becauſe every perſon is no competent judge of the truth of a Miracle; for the Devil, by his power and ſubtilty, may eaſily deceive all ſuch as will be led by the noſe by him in expectation of ſome wonders to be done by him. And therefore as long as we have no ground to queſtion the certainty of thoſe Miracles which were wrought by *Chriſt* or *Moſes*, I am bound to adhere to the Doctrine eſtabliſh'd by thoſe Miracles, and to make them my rule of judging all perſons who ſhall pretend to work Miracles: Becauſe, 1. I do not know how far God may give Men over to be deceiv'd by lying wonders, who will not receive the truth in the love of it; *i. e.* thoſe that think not the *Chriſtian Religion* ſufficiently confirm'd by the Miracles wrought at the promulgation of it. God in juſtice may permit the Devil to go further than otherwiſe he cou'd, and leave ſuch perſons to their own credulity, to believe every impoſture and illuſion of their ſenſes for true Miracles. 2. That Doctrine which was confirm'd by undoubted Miracles, hath aſſur'd us of the coming of Lying Wonders, whereby many ſhou'd be deceiv'd. Now this part of the Doctrine of the Goſpel is as certainly true as any of the reſt

Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3.

for

for it was confirm'd by the ſame Miracles that the other was; and beſides that, the very coming of ſuch Miracles is an evidence of the truth of it, it falling out ſo exactly according to what was fore-told ſo many hundred years ſince. Now if this Doctrine be true, then am I certain the intent of theſe Miracles is to deceive, and that thoſe are deceiv'd who hearken to them; and what reaſon then have I to believe them? 3. To what end do theſe Miracles ſerve? Are they to confirm the truths contain'd in Scripture? But what need they any confirmation now, when we are aſſur'd by the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles*, that the Doctrine by them preach'd came from God? and ſo hath been receiv'd upon the credit of thoſe Miracles ever ſince. Were theſe truths ſufficiently prov'd to be from God before or no? If not, then all former Ages have believ'd without ſufficient ground for Faith; if they were, then what ground can there be to confirm us in them now? Certainly God, who never doth any thing but for very great purpoſes, will never alter the courſe of Nature, merely for ſatisfaction of Men's vain curioſities.

VII. But it may be it will be ſaid, It was ſomething not fully reveal'd in Scripture which is thus confirm'd by Miracles: but where hath the Scripture told us, that any thing not fully reveal'd therein, ſhou'd be afterwards confirm'd? Was the Scripture an infallible rule of Faith, while this was wanting in it? Did *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles diſcharge their places, when they left ſomething unreveal'd to us? Was this a Duty before theſe Miracles or no? if it was, what need Miracles to confirm it? if not, *Chriſt* hath not told us all neceſſary conditions of Salvation. For whatever is required as a Duty, is ſuch, as the neglect of it runs Men upon damnation. *Laſtly*, Men's Faith will be left at continual uncertainties; for we know not according to this principle, when we have all that is neceſſary to be believ'd, or do all that is neceſſary to be practis'd in order to Salvation. For if God may ſtill make new Articles of Faith, or conſtitute new duties by freſh Miracles, I muſt go and enquire what Miracles are wrought in every place, to ſee I miſs nothing that may be neceſſary for me, in order to my happineſs in another World.

If Men pretend to deliver any Doctrine contrary to the Scripture; then it is not only neceſſary that they confirm it by Miracles, but they muſt manifeſt the falſity of thoſe Miracles on which that Doctrine is believ'd, or elſe they muſt uſe another Miracle to prove that God will ſet his Seal to confirm both parts of a contradiction to be true. Which being the hardeſt task of all, had need be prov'd by very ſufficient and undoubted Miracles, ſuch as may be able to make us believe thoſe are Miracles, and are not, at the ſame time, and ſo the ſtrength of the Argument is utterly deſtroy'd by the *medium* produc'd to prove it by.

By this Diſcourſe theſe Two things are clear; *Firſt*, That no pretences of Miracles are to be hearkn'd to, when the Doctrine we are to believe is already eſtabliſh'd by them if thoſe miracles tend in the leaſt to the derogation of the truth of what was eſtabliſh'd by thoſe former Miracles. *Secondly*, That when the full Doctrine we are to believe is eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, there is no neceſſity at all of new Miracles, for confirmation of any of the truths therein deliver'd. And therefore it is a moſt unreaſonable thing to demand Miracles of thoſe to prove the truth of the Doctrine they deliver, who do firſt ſolemnly profeſs to deliver nothing but what was confirm'd by Miracles in the firſt delivery of it, and is contain'd in the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtament; and

ſecondly do not pretend to any immediate Commiſſion from Heaven, but do nothing but what in their Conſciences they think every true Chriſtian is bound to do; much more all Magiſtrates and Miniſters, who believe the truth of what they profeſs, which is in their places to reform all Errors and Abuſes which are crept into the Doctrine or Practice of *Chriſtianity*, thro' the Corruption of Men or Times. And therefore it is a moſt unjuſt and unreaſonable demand of the *Papiſts*, when they require Miracles from our Firſt Reformers, to prove the truth of their Doctrine with. Had they pretended to have come with an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven to have added to the Doctrine of the Goſpel, there had been ſome plea for ſuch a demand; but it was quite otherwiſe with them: Their only deſign was, *to whip the buyers and ſellers out of the Temple*, to purge the Church from its abuſes: And altho' that by *Jerome* was thought to be one of our Saviour's greateſt Miracles, yet this by us is conceiv'd to be no other than the duty of all Magiſtrates, Miniſters, and private Chriſtians; theſe by their Prayers, Miniſters by their Doctrine, and Magiſtrates by their juſt Authority.

CHAP. IV.

The fidelity of the Prophets ſucceeding *Moſes*.

I. *An order of Prophets to ſucceed* Moſes, *by God's own appointment in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The Schools of the Prophets.* III. *The original and inſtitution of them.* IV. *The Cities of the Levites. The occaſion of their firſt inſtitution.* V. *The places of the Schools of the Prophets, and the tendency of the inſtitution there to a prophetical office.* VI. *Of the Muſic us'd in the Schools of the Prophets.* VII. *The Roman Aſſamenta, and the Greek Hymns in their ſolemn worſhip.* VIII. *The two ſorts of Prophets among the* Jews, *Leiger and extraordinary. Ordinary Prophets taken out of the Schools, prov'd by* Amos *and* Saul.

I. BUt altho' now under the Goſpel (the Revelation of God's Will being compleated by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles) we have no reaſon either to expect new Revelations, or new Miracles for confirming the Old; yet under the Law, God training up his People by degrees till the coming of *Chriſt*, there was a neceſſity of a new ſupply of Divine Meſſengers (call'd *Prophets*) to prepare the People, and make way for the coming of *Chriſt*. As to whom theſe two things are conſiderable.

Firſt, Thoſe Prophets whoſe work was to inform the People of their duties, or to reprove them for their ſins, or to prepare them for the coming of the *Meſſias* (which were their chief tasks) had no need to confirm the truth of their doctrine or commiſſion from Heaven by the working of Miracles among them. And that on theſe two accounts.

Firſt, Becauſe God did not conſummate the Revelation of his Mind and Will to the *Jews* by the Miniſtry of *Moſes*, but appointed a ſucceſſion of Prophets to be among them, to make known his Mind unto them. Now, in this caſe, when the prophetical office was eſtabliſh'd among

among them, what neceſſity was there that every one that came to them upon an Errand from God, ſhou'd prove his Teſtimony to be true by Miracles, when in the diſcharge of his Office he deliver'd nothing diſſonant from the Law of *Moſes?* It is one argument God intended a ſucceſſion of Prophets, when he laid down ſuch Rules in his Law for the judging of them, whether they were truly inſpir'd or no, *Deut.* 18. 21, 22. And in that ſame place God doth promiſe a ſucceſſion of Prophets, *Deut.* 18. 15, 18. *A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up unto thee like unto me; to him ſhall ye hearken.* Which words, tho' in their full and compleat ſenſe they do relate to *Chriſt* (who is the great Prophet of the Church) yet who ever attends to the full ſcope of the words, will eaſily perceive that the immediate ſenſe of them doth relate to an order of Prophets, which ſhou'd ſucceed *Moſes* among the *Jews*; between whom and *Moſes* there wou'd be a great ſimilitude as to their Birth, Calling, and Doctrine, tho' not a juſt equality, which is excluded, *Deut.* 34. 10, 11. and the chief reaſon why it is ſaid there that the other Prophets fell ſo much ſhort of *Moſes* is, in regard of the Signs and Wonders which he wrought, as is there largely expreſs'd. Nor may it ſeem ſtrange, that by a Prophet ſhou'd be underſtood an order or ſucceſſion of Prophets when it is acknowledg'd by moſt *Proteſtants*, that by ὁ Ἀντίχριστος, *the Antichriſt*, is underſtood a Rank and Succeſſion of ſeveral Perſons in the ſame name and function: And that it is to be underſtood in thoſe words concerning a ſucceſſion of Prophets, will appear by the occaſion of their being brought in; for ver. 14. God prohibits them to hearken after the manner of their Neighbour-nations, to Obſervers of times and Diviners, and then brings in the following words, *ver.* 15. as to the reaſon of that Prohibition, that *God would raiſe up a Prophet among themſelves like unto* Moſes, *and to him ſhould they hearken.* Now let any rational Man judge whether it were ſo probable an Argument to keep them from hearkening to Diviners of other Nations, that there ſhou'd be a Prophet ariſe 2000 years after like unto *Moſes*, as that he wou'd raiſe up a continued ſucceſſion of Prophets among themſelves, to whom they ſhou'd hearken. Thus *Origen* in his excellent Book againſt *Celſus*, ſhews the neceſſity of the Prophetical Office among the *Jews* from hence; *For*, ſaith he, *it being written in their Law that the Gentiles hearkened unto Oracles and Divinations; but God would not ſuffer it to be ſo among them, it preſently follows, A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up in the midſt of thee*, &c. *Therefore*, ſaith he, *when the Nations round about them had their Oracles, and ſeveral ways of Divination, all which were ſtrictly prohibited among the* Jews, *if the* Jews *had no way of foreknowing things to come, it had been almoſt impoſſible, conſidering the great curioſity of humane nature, to have kept them from deſpiſing the Law of* Moſes, *or apoſtatizing to the heathen Oracles, or ſetting up ſomething like them among themſelves.* Which Interpretation of his ſeems to have a great deal of Reaſon, not only from the Coherence of the words here, but from the *Analogy* of many other Precepts of the Law of *Moſes*, which it is moſt certain have a reſpect to the cuſtoms of the Idolatrous Nations round about them. Another reaſon why it is moſt probable, that by this is underſtood a ſucceſſion of Prophets, is the charge which follows againſt falſe Prophets, and the Rules to diſcover them, *ver.* 20, 21, 22. which had not been ſo pertinent and coherent, if the oppoſition did not lie between the order of true Prophets among the *Jews*, and the falſe Prophets, which ſhou'd riſe up in the midſt of them.

V. Arabic. verſ. & Calv. in loc. P. Fagium, Pet. Mart. Loc. Com. Claſſ. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 12. Origin. con. Celſum, lib. 1. Deut. 18. 14.

And

And that which yet further juſtifies this Interpretation, is, that there is no other place in the whole *Pentateuch* which doth expreſly ſpeak of a ſucceſſion of Prophets, if this be not underſtood of it; and is it any ways probable a matter of ſo great moment and conſequence ſhou'd be wholly pretermitted? Eſpecially when we find it ſo exactly perform'd in the ſucceeding Ages of the Jewiſh Commonwealth; their immediate Ruler like Dictators at *Rome*, after *Moſes*'s death, being moſt rais'd up by immediate incitation and impulſe from God, and many of them inſpir'd with a Spirit of Prophecy. How ſhou'd the *Jews* have expected theſe, or obey'd them when they appear'd, had not God foretold it to them, and provided them for it by the Law of *Moſes*.

II. Neither did theſe Prophets ariſe ſingly among them, like blazing Stars, one in an Age, to portend future Events, but whole Conſtellations of them ſometimes united together; yea, ſo many ſmaller Prophets were ſometimes united together, as made a perfect *Galaxy*, when they were entred into Societies, and became Schools of the Prophets; for ſuch we frequently read of in Scripture. The Original and Inſtitution of which may caſt a further light into our preſent deſign, and ſhew us the little reaſon the *Jews* cou'd have to expect Miracles from them to confirm their Doctrine, who were brought up in the knowledge of their Law, and were call'd out of their ſeveral Societies into the prophetical office by the immediate incitation of God himſelf. Which being ſo commonly known among them, there needed no ſuch extraordinary proofs to manifeſt the Divine Authority by which they were employ'd. Two things then we ſhall endeavour to clear: *Firſt*, The Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets; and *Secondly*, That it was the ordinary courſe for the Prophets by employments to be taken forth of theſe Societies wherein they were educated. *Firſt*, for the Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets. The firſt Seminaries, or places of Inſtitution among the *Jews*, were the Cities of the *Levites*, which were diſperſed up and down in the ſeveral Tribes of *Iſrael*; God thereby turning that into a Bleſſing, which Gen. 49. 7. was pronounc'd as a curſe upon *Levi* by his Father *Jacob*, viz. *that he ſhould be divided in* Jacob, *and ſcattered in* Iſrael. But tho' the fulfilling of that Prophecy might be the primary ground of that ſcattering, yet it is evident that God aim'd at ſome further good in it, both in reference to the *Levites* and the *Iſraelites*. *Lyra* undertakes to aſſign four Joſh. 21. reaſons of this Diſtribution of the Cities of the *Levites* among the Tribes. (1.) Becauſe if they had liv'd but in one Tribe, the Worſhip of God wou'd have ſeem'd to have been confin'd to that Tribe. (2.) Becauſe they wou'd have been a burden to that Tribe they had their habitations in. (3.) From the equity of being maintain'd by all who ſerv'd for all. (4.) Becauſe it was their office to teach the People, and therefore it was neceſſary they ſhou'd live among them. Theſe Reaſons are *Abulenſis in Joſh.* 21. *c.* 7 & 8. moſt of them oppos'd by *Abulenſis*, but defended by others. The laſt is that which moſt inſiſt on, it being the peculiar office of the *Levites* to *V. Sherlog. Antiq. Hebraic. l.* 2. *c.* 3. *ſ.* 4. teach the People; ſo 2 *Chron.* 35. 4. *And ſaid unto the Levites, qui erudiebant omnem Iſraelem*, as *Vatablus* renders it, *who taught all Iſrael*; and *Maſius* inſiſts on that as the great reaſon of their diſperſion, to be *Maſius in Joſh. c.* 14. ready to teach the Law among the *Iſraelites*. But yet all thoſe who are agreed that Teaching the Law was the Duty of the *Levites*, are not yet agreed of the manner of that Teaching; for there being two parts of their Law, the one Ceremonial and Judicial, and the other Moral and Spiritual,

Spiritual, the Queſtion is, Whether of theſe two did belong to, or was perform'd by the *Prieſts* and *Levites*. There are many who underſtand all that Office of Teaching, which belong'd to the *Prieſts* and *Levites* to be merely concerning the Ceremonial Law, *i. e.* deciding all Caſes and Controverſies which ſhou'd ariſe concerning their Ceremonial Worſhip, which in *Levit.* 10. 10. is call'd *putting a difference between holy and unholy, and between clean and unclean.* But it ſeems ſomewhat ſtrange that God ſhou'd take ſo great care about the Shell and Outſide of his Worſhip, and none at all for the Moral and Spiritual part of it, eſpecially when he had ſet apart a whole Tribe merely for his own ſervice, and freed them from all other employments, that they might have a greater liberty to attend upon the things relating to his ſervice; eſpecially when it is mention'd as the Duty of the *Prieſts* and *Levites*, *to teach all the ſtatutes which the Lord had ſpoken to them by the hand of* Moſes, and that *they ſhall teach* Jacob *thy ſtatutes, and* Iſrael *thy law.* Which notwithſtanding what *Abarbinel* and others ſay, muſt certainly comprehend as well the Moral as the Ceremonial part of *Moſes* his Law. And the *Prieſts lips are ſaid to preſerve knowledge: and God ſaith they ſhould ſeek the law at his mouth; for he is the meſſenger of the Lord of Hoſts.* Do theſe things import no more than mere deciding the caſes of the Ceremonial Law? But whatever God's intention in the inſtitution of the *Levites* was, we find not much in Scripture of what they did for the promoting the Moral and Spiritual part of Divine Worſhip; but it is no news to hear that Societies inſtituted for good and pious ends, ſhou'd degenerate from the firſt intention of the Founders of them; and thus it is probable it was with the *Levites*, who finding the moſt of their benefit and advantage to come in by the Ceremonial Caſes, might grow more negligent of the Moral part of Divine Service, which brought no ſecular emolument to them.

Lev. 10. 10. Deut. 33. 10. Mal. 2. 7.

III. And thence we read not of theſe Schools of the Prophets, which were Societies in order to Spiritual Inſtruction, till about the time of *Samuel*; and many think him to have been the firſt Author of them. For it is evident, that about his time the Prieſthood was grown to a great degeneracy, and Men thereby eſtranged from the Worſhip of God, ſo that there ſeem'd almoſt a neceſſity then of reſtoring ſome Societies, who might have a ſpecial eye to the Spiritual part of God's Worſhip and Service. The occaſion of the Inſtitution of them, ſeems to have been from the reſort which the People had to the high places for ſacrificing, during the captivity or uncertain abode of the *Ark of God*, after the deſolation of *Shiloh*: now the People reſorting to theſe places to perform their Solemnities, it was ſo ordered, that a company of Prophets ſhou'd be there preſent to *bleſs the Sacrifices*, and inſtruct the People. Two of theſe places with the Societies in them we find mention'd in the time of *Samuel*. The *firſt* mention'd 1 *Sam.* 10. 5, 10. which cannot be *Ramah*, altho' the *Syriac* and *Arabic* Verſions ſo render it. For *Samuel* had his own reſidence in *Ramah* whither *Saul* went to him, 1 *Sam.* 9. 18, 19. but in this Chapter we find *Samuel* ſending *Saul* on a journey from him beyond *Bethel*, and the plain of *Tabor*, and there tells him he ſhou'd meet with the *company of the Prophets upon the hill of God*, ver. 5. Some think it was called the *Hill of God*, becauſe of its height, as *the Cedars of God*, and *the Mountains of God for the higheſt*; ſo *Tirinus* underſtands it, but *Menochius* far more probably, *quia in ea erat cœtus & veluti ſchola prophetarum.* The *Chaldee* Paraphraſt renders it, *ad collem*

1 Sam. 3. 1. 1 Sam. 9. 12, 13. 1 Sam. 7. 1.

collem in quo arca Domini. *R. Solomon* makes the Hill to be *Kirjah-jearim*, and therefore call'd *the hill of God*; because the *Ark* was there in the *house of* Abinadab *in the hill.* But *Lyra* thinks he hath prov'd, that before this time the *Ark* was remov'd from *Kirjah-jearim* to *Mizpah*; but *Abulensis* more probably conceives it was never remov'd thither, and thinks this hill of God to be no other than *Gibeah* of *Benjamin*, where *Saul* inhabited; and thence the wonder was the greater, to see him prophesie among those who had known his former life and education. The other place is *Naioth* in *Ramah*, where was a *high place*, whither the People came to sacrifice; this *Ramah* seems to have been the place of *Samuel*'s nativity, call'd *Ramathaim Sophim*, which the *Syriac* version renders *collis specularum* (some who wou'd be ready to improve every thing for their purpose, wou'd think it was so call'd in allusion to the imployment of the young Students there. So *Heinsius* conceives שרה צפים to be understood, *Numb.* 23. 14. the place of *Watchmen*, from which word saith he, without doubt, the *Greeks* deriv'd their σοφοι, who were wont in such high places to observe the course and motions of the Heavens; But to pass by such frivolous conjectures.) It seems a great deal more probable, that this *Ramah* which the *Septuagint* by a light mutation of the initial letters, calls Ἀρεμαθαὶμ, was the same with *Arimathea*, the Town of *Joseph* mention'd in the Gospel. But the place where the School of the Prophets was, seems to have been, with greatest conveniency, for a place of Education, at some distance from the Town. *Vatablus* conceives it was built in the fields of *Ramah*, and the word *Naioth*, saith *Pet. Martyr*, properly signifies *pastures*, and some *remote places quæ fere sunt studiis aptissima.* The *Chaldee* Paraphrast renders *Naioth* by בית אולבנא, *a College or School of prophetical Education:* Over this College *Samuel* himself was President, as most understand that place, 1 *Sam.* 19. 20. *And when they saw the company of Prophets prophesying, and* Samuel *standing as appointed over them*; *Jonathan* renders it, *Et Samuelem stantem docentem super eos.* To which we may well apply the words of *Philo*, speaking of the *Jewish* manner of Instruction, τῶ μὲν ἡγεμόνι ὑφηγεμένω καὶ διδάσκοντι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐπιδιδόντων εἰς καλοκαγαθίαν καὶ βελτιωμένων πάντε ἔθη καὶ τὸν βίον. *The President going before and teaching, the rest increasing in goodness, and improving in life and manners.*

1 Sam. 19. 18, 20.
1 Sam. 1. 1.
Heins. Exercit. Sacr. l. 1. c. 2.
Phil. Jud. de. v. Mos. l. 3.

IV. Neither can we think so good and useful an Institution shou'd presently degenerate, or be turned into another Chanel; and therefore some conceive that the most noted Prophets to the time of *David* were the Presidents of these Colleges; such as besides *Samuel* were *Helcana*, *Gad*, *Nathan*, *Heman*, and *Jeduthun*; and that they selected out the choicest and most hopeful of the young *Levites*, and here educated them, together with the *Nazarites* which came out of other Tribes. And it seems very probable, that in all the most noted high places whither they went to sacrifice, there were such Schools erected after the first Institution of them. Thence we read of such multitudes of the Prophets together, in the time of *Ahab*, 1 *Kings* 18. 4. for when *Jezabel* cut off the Prophets of the Lord, *Obadiah took an hundred, and hid them in caves*; and certainly their number was very great, when an hundred might be sav'd without missing. The chief places where they resided, seem to have been *Bethel*, 2 *Kings* 2. 3. and *Jericho*, which was a large College; for therein we read of *fifty sons of the Prophets standing together out of their number*, 2 Kings 2. 5, 7, 15. and *Gilgal*, which

which had been *a place of Religion* from the first entrance into *Canaan*; there we find *the sons of the Prophets sitting before Elisha*, 2 Kings 4. 38. It seems most probable that the purity of God's Worship among the ten Tribes after the defection in the time of *Jeroboam* was preserv'd by the Prophets in their *several Schools and places of habitation*; which hath sufficient foundation in that place, 2 *Kings* 4. 23. where the *Shunamite*'s husband asks her, *Wherefore she would go to the man of God that day, seeing it was neither new-moon nor Sabbath.* Whereby it is both evident, that the Prophets did undertake the office of instructing the People on their solemn Festivals, and that it was their custom to resort to them for that end. Thus we see what care God took for the instruction of his People, in a time of so general an Apostasie as that of the ten Tribes was, when the Church of God cou'd not be known by that constant Visibility and outward Glory, which some speak so much of, but was then clouded in obscurity, and shrouded it self under the Mantles of some Prophets which God continued among them, and that not by any lineal succession neither, tho' the *Jews* wou'd fain make the gift of Prophecy to be a kind of *Cabbala* too, and convey'd in a constant succession from one Prophet to another. Neither were these Schools of the Prophets only in *Israel*, but in *Judah* likewise was God known, and his Name was great among these Schools there. In *Jerusalem* it self there was a College where *Huldah* the Propheteſs liv'd, 2 *Kings* 22. 14. some render *Mishna in secunda urbis parte*; for *Jerusalem* was divided into the Upper and Nether part of the City. *Abulensis* and *Lyra* will have it refer to the three Walls of the City in which the three chief parts of it were compriz'd; in the *first*, the Temple and the King's Palace; in the *second*, the Nobles and the Prophets Houses; and in the *third*, the common People. *Josephus* seems to favour the division of the City into three parts; but *Pineda* thinks the *second* part of the City was most inhabited by Artificers, and that the Prophets, and the Wise Men, and such as frequented the Temple most, dwelt in the City of *David* within the first Wall; and therefore he conjectures that the College was upon Mount *Sion*, (and so properly call'd *Sion* College) and he explains that *House*, which *Wisdom is said to have built, and hewn out her seven pillars*, Prov. 9. 1. by this College, which he supposeth was built by *Solomon* in Mount *Sion*, and thence *ver.* 3. *she is said to cry upon the highest places of the City.* Thus much may serve concerning the Original and Institution of these Schools of the Prophets.

V. Manass. Ben Israel. Concil. in Exod. 9. 35.

Joseph. de bell. Jud. l. 6. *c.* 6. *Pineda de reb. Solom. l.* 3. *c.* 28.

I now come to the *Second* thing promis'd concerning the Schools of the Prophets, which is, *That it was God's ordinary Method to call those persons out of these Schools, whom he did employ in the discharge of the Prophetical Office.* Two things will be necessary for the clearing of this: *First*, What Tendency their Education in those Schools had towards the fitting them for their Prophetical Office. *Secondly*, What Evidence the Scripture gives us that God called the Prophets out from these Colleges. The *first* of these is very requisite to be clear'd, because the Prophetical Office depending upon immediate Inspiration, it is hard to conceive what influence any antecedent and preparatory dispositions can have upon receiving the Prophetical Spirit. It is commonly known how much the generality of *Jewish* Writers do insist on the necessity of these qualifications antecedent to a Spirit of Prophecy. 1. An excellent Natural Temper. 2. Good Accomplishments both of Wit and Fortunes. 3. Separation from the World. 4. Congruity of place

V.

which they make proper to *Judæa.*) 5. Opportunity of time. 6. And Divine Inſpiration. Theſe are ſo largely diſcours'd of by many Learned Men from *Jewiſh* Writers, that it will be both tedious and impertinent to recite much of their Opinions concerning them: who, ſince they have loſt the gift of Prophecy, ſeem to have loſt too that Wiſdom and Natural Underſtanding, which they make one of the moſt neceſſary qualifications of a Prophet. It is not eaſy to imagine what ſubſerviency Riches cou'd have to a prophetical Spirit, unleſs the *Jews* be of *Simon Magus* his Opinion, that theſe gifts of the Holy Ghoſt may be purchas'd with Money; and if ſo, they think themſelves in as likely a way to bid fair for a Prophetical Spirit, as any People in the World. Or is it that they think it impoſſible any without them ſhou'd have that free, cheerful and generous Spirit, which they make ſo neceſſary to a Prophetic Spirit, that it is an Axiome of great Authority with them, *Spiritus ſanctus non reſidet ſuper hominem mœſtum:* and they think *Eliſha* his fit of paſſion did excuſs his Prophetic Spirit from him, which he was fain to retrieve again with a fit of Muſic. There are only two ſorts of thoſe antecedent diſpoſitions which ſeem to bear any affinity with the Prophetic Spirit: And thoſe are ſuch as tended to the improvement of their Natural Faculties, and ſuch as tended to their advancement in piety, and conſequently to the ſubduing all irregular motions in their Souls: Not that either of theſe did concur by way of efficiency to the production of a Spirit of Prophecy (which is an opinion *Maimonides* ſeems very favourable to) but that God might make choice particularly of ſuch perſons, to remove all prejudices againſt them in thoſe they were ſent unto. For nothing cou'd poſſibly diſſatisfy them more concerning Divine Inſpiration, than if the perſon who pretended to it were of very weak and ſhallow intellectuals, or known to be of an irregular converſation. In order therefore to the fuller ſatisfaction of Men concerning theſe two qualifications, this Inſtitution of them in the Schools of the Prophets was of great ſubſerviency, becauſe therein their only Employment was to improve in knowledge, and eſpecially in true piety. This latter being the moſt neceſſary diſpoſition, ſince the Apoſtle hath told us that the Prophets were *Holy men, who ſpake as they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt.* And in order to this, the greateſt part we can find of the exerciſes of thoſe who were educated in theſe Schools of the Prophets, were Inſtructions in the Law, and the ſolemn celebration of the praiſes of God: Which appears in Scripture to have been their chief employment as Prophets, and by which they are ſaid to propheſie: So at *Gibeah* at the Oratory there, *we find a company of Prophets coming down from the high place with a Pſaltery, a Tabret and Pipe, and a Harp before them, and propheſying.*

V. G. Vor. in Maim. fin lam. leg. c. 7. Sect. 1. Mr. Smith of Prophecy, c. 8.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 36.

2 Pet 1.21.

1 Sam. 10. 5.

VI. It may ſeem ſomewhat ſtrange to conſider what relation theſe Muſical Inſtruments had to the propheſying here mention'd. Are Muſical Notes like ſome Seeds Naturaliſts ſpeak of, which will help to excite a prophetic Spirit? Or do they tend to elevate the Spirits of Men and ſo put them into a greater capacity of *Enthuſiaſm?* Or is it becauſe Muſic is ſo excellent for allaying the tumults of inward paſſions; and ſo fitting the Soul for the better entertainment of the Divine Spirit? Or was all this propheſying here ſpoken of nothing elſe but Vocal and Inſtrumental Muſic? So ſome indeed underſtand it, that it was only the praiſing God with Spiritual Songs and Melody; wherein one as the *Præcentor* began a Hymn, which the reſt took from him and carry'd on. I confeſs it carries

ries the faireſt probability with it, that this propheſying with Muſical Inſtruments was at their places and times of ſacrifice, an adjunct, if not a part of the ſolemn ſervice of God: which was manag'd chiefly by the Choire of the Sons of the Prophets which were reſident there, and were train'd up in all exerciſes of piety and devotion. But yet I cannot ſee any reaſon to think that all this propheſying was merely ſinging of Hymns, and playing upon their Muſical Inſtruments to them, as ſome imagine, becauſe there ſeems to be implied ſome immediate impulſes of a prophetic Spirit, by what *Samuel* ſaid to *Saul*, that when he came among the Prophets, *the Spirit of the Lord would come upon him, and he ſhould propheſy with them, and he ſhould become another man.* What ſtrange impulſe and wonderful transformation was this merely for *Saul* to joyn with the Prophets in their praiſes of God? And this needed not ſo much admiration as follow'd there upon this action of *Saul*'s, that it ſhou'd become a Proverb, *Is* Saul *alſo among the Prophets?* Certainly *Saul* was a very great hater of all ſpiritual Muſic before, if it became a Proverb merely for his being preſent at, or joyning with this company in ſinging their Hymns. Therefore others think that thoſe who are ſaid particularly to propheſy at theſe Muſic meetings, were ſome perſons as chief among the reſt, who having their ſpirits elevated by the Muſic, did compoſe Hymns upon the place by a Divine Energy inwardly moving their Minds. So that there were properly Divine Raptures in ſome of them, which tranſported them beyond the ordinary power of Fancy or Imagination, in dictating ſuch Hymns as might be ſuitable for the deſign of celebrating the honour of God.

1. Sam. 10. 6.

1 Sam. 10. 12.

VII. Neither may it ſeem ſtrange that ſuch an *Enthuſiaſtic* Spirit ſhou'd ſeize on them only at ſuch ſolemn times, ſince we read in the New Teſtament of a like exerciſe of ſuch gifts in the Church of *Corinth*, 1 *Cor.* 14. 26. where we ſee in *coming together every one had a Pſalm, a Doctrine, a Tongue, a Revelation*, &c. Whereby it appears that they were inſpir'd upon the place; *etiam extemporales Hymni ſæpe ab afflatu erant*, as *Grotius* there obſerves; as we ſee it in frequent inſtances in Scripture, of *Simeon* and *Anna*, *Moſes* and *Miriam*, *Deborah* and *Iſaiah*; and in the Chriſtian Church after that Land-flood of Inſpired Gifts was much abated in the Church, they kept up a cuſtom much like to theſe *extemporal* Hymns, as appears evidently by *Tertullian*, *poſt aquam manualem & lumina ut quiſque de Scripturis ſanctis vel de proprio ingenio poteſt, provocatur in medium Deo canere*: After they had ended their Love-Feaſts, they begun their Hymns, which were either taken from the Scriptures, or of their own compoſition. Which *Pliny* takes notice of as a great part of the Chriſtian worſhip, that they did *ſecum invicem carmen Chriſto quaſi Deo dicere*, *they joyned in ſinging hymns to Chriſt as* God. Nay, we find ſomething very parallel to this preſerv'd among the ruins of the Heathen worſhip; ſuch were the *Aſſamenta* among the old *Romans*, which were peculiarly ſung to the honour of ſome particular God; thence the *Aſſamenta Janualia*, *Junonia*, *Minervia*, which were *privata poemata & carmina in ſingulos eos Deos conſcripta*, as the learned *Joſeph Scaliger* obſerves. So likewiſe the *Greeks* had their ſolemn Hymns to their Gods, ſome to the propitious Gods, which they call'd κλητοὶ ὕμνοι, and the *Latins* properly *Indigitamenta*, and *Carmen calatorium*; others they had to their *Vejoves*, or *Lævalumina*, which they call'd ἀ μνους ἀποτρόπαιοι the *Latins*, *Carmen Averruncale*; but beſides theſe, they had ſome peculiar to the ſeveral Deities, as ὁ ὕπνος to *Diana*, Παιὰν to *Apollo*, Ἰὴλε

Tertull. Apol. c. 39.

Plin. Ep. l. 10. Ep. 97.

Scal. conj. in Varr. p. 121.

Proclus ap. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 239. to *Ceres*, *Dithyrambus* to *Bacchus*, *Adonidia* to *Adonis*, as *Proclus* tells us in his *Chreſtomathia*. And it is withal evident, that the Heathens thought ſome of their Prieſts inſpired while they were performing theſe ſolemn Devotions to the Gods (which probably was by *Satan*, as many other things in Heathen worſhip, taken up in imitation of theſe inſpired Hymns, and Muſic us'd by the Sons of the Prophets) but their Hymns were ſo compos'd, as to be fit rather to tranſport Men beyond the power of their reaſon, than to compoſe and ſweeten it, which was ſuitable to the fanatic *Enthuſiaſm*, which was ſo common among them. So *Proclus* tells us that the *Io-Bacche* was βεβαπτισμένῳ πολλῷ φρυάγματι, *full* of *noiſe* and *din*; and the *Dithyrambus* was κεκινημένῳ καὶ πολὺ τὸ ἐνθουσιῶδες, μετὰ χορείας ἐμφαίνων, *a kind of extatic Morice-dance*, and their Prieſts were apprehended by them to be under a real *Enthuſiaſm*, at theſe ſolemnities. So the *Corybantes* are deſcrib'd rather like mad Men than mere *Enthuſiaſts* by *Strabo*; they were ἐνθουσιαστικοί τινες καὶ Βακχικοί, as he deſcribes them, *dancing about with their cymbals and drums, and arms and pipes*, (as tho' a *Bedlam* had been broke looſe among them) yet this was in high eſteem among them; for, as *Strabo* after ſaith, ὅ τε ἐνθουσιασμὸς ἐπίνευσίν τινα θείαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ, καὶ τῆς μαντικῆς γένει πλησιάζειν, *this Enthuſiaſm ſeemed to have a Divine touch with it, and to come very near to a prophetic ſpirit.*

Strabo l. 10.

But tho' the propheſying with Muſic among the Sons of the Prophets, might be by ſome *Extemporary* Hymns immediately dictated by the *Præcentor* of the Chorus; yet we are not to imagine any ſuch frantic actions among them as were among the *Curetes* and *Corybantes*, it being always the Devil's temper to over-do, when he ſtrives to imitate, and inſtead of ſolemn and ſet devotions, to carry Men beyond all ſenſe and reaſon. The Spirit of God did never dictate any *Io-Bacche*'s or *Dithyrambs* to tranſport and amuſe the ſpirits of Men; but thoſe ſweet Airs which both compoſe and elevate the ſpirits of all that heard them. For in probability the ſpirits of all theſe Prophets were as Lutes tun'd to the ſame height, that when the Spirit of God did ſtrike upon one of them, the reſt preſently anſwer'd to it, and ſo made up an entire Conſort among them. So *Menochius* thinks the Spirit of God not only moved the ſpirit of him who was the *Præcentor*, but the reſt likewiſe who joyn'd with him; and they are ſaid to prophecy, ſaith *Torniellus*, *forte quod non quaſcunque ſed Propheticas duntaxat cantiones præcinerent*; but from hence we clearly ſee what the great Employment was in theſe Schools of the Prophets, which, as the ſame Author expreſſeth it was *ſtatis horis de rebus divinis diſſerere, & divinis laudibus vacare*; and thereby we underſtand what reference this Inſtitution had in order to the prophetical Office, becauſe the Spirit of God did much appear among them, and all their Exerciſes tended to piety, and ſo did remove all prejudices from their perſons, when God did ſend them abroad afterwards.

Torniellus Annal. ad An. Mun. 2945. *Sect.* 14.

VIII. And ſo it is evident he frequently did, not to ſay always, for that were to put too great a reſtraint upon the boundleſs Spirit of God: For ſometimes, as will appear afterwards, God ſent the Prophets upon extraordinary meſſages, and then furniſh'd them with ſufficient Evidence of their Divine Commiſſion, without being beholding to the Teſtimonials of the Schools of the Prophets. But beſides theſe, God had a kind of Leiger-Prophets among his People; ſuch were the moſt of thoſe whom we read of in Scripture, which were no Pen-men of the ſacred Scripture; ſuch

ſuch in *David*'s time we may conceive *Gad* and *Nathan*, and afterwards we read of many other Prophets and Seers among them, to whom the People made their reſort: Now theſe in probability were ſuch as had been train'd up in the prophetic Schools, wherein the Spirit of God did appear, but in a more fixed and ſettled way than in the extraordinary Prophets, whom God did call out on ſome more ſignal occaſions, ſuch as *Iſaiah* and *Jeremiah* were. We have a clear foundation for ſuch a diſtinction of Prophets in thoſe words of *Amos* to *Amaziah*, Amos 7. 14. 15. *I was no Prophet, neither was I a Prophets ſon; but I was a herdſman, and a gatherer of ſycamore fruits: And the Lord took me as I followed the flock; and the Lord ſaid unto me, Go propheſy to my people* Iſrael. Some underſtand the firſt words, *I was no Prophet*, that he was not born a Prophet, as *Jeremiah* was, not deſign'd and ſet apart to it from his Mother's womb; but I rather think by his not being a Prophet, he means he was none of thoſe reſident Prophets in the Colleges or Schools of them, not any of thoſe who had led a prophetic life, and withdrawn themſelves from converſe with the world; nor *was I* (ſaith he) *the ſon of a Prophet, i. e.* not brought up in Diſcipleſhip under thoſe Prophets, and thereby train'd up in order to the prophetic function. *Non didici inter diſcipulos Prophetarum*, as *Pellican* renders it; *nec inſtitutione quâ filii Prophetarum quaſi ad donum Prophetiæ à parentibus præparabantur*, ſaith *Eſtius*. *Non à puero educatus in Scholis Propheticis*; ſo *Calvin* and moſt other modern Interpreters underſtand it, as well as *Abarbinel* and the Jewiſh Writers. Whereby it is evident that God's ordinary way for the Prophets, was to take ſuch as had been train'd up and educated in order to that end, altho' God did not tie up himſelf to this method, but ſometimes call'd one from the Court, as he did *Iſaiah*; ſometimes one from the herds, as here he did *Amos*, and bid them *go propheſy to the houſe of* Iſrael. There was then a kind of ſtanding College of Prophets among the *Iſraelites*, who ſhined as fixed Stars in the firmament; and there were others who had a moſt planetary motion, and withal a more lively and reſplendent Illumination from the fountain of prophetic Light. And further it ſeems that the Spirit of Prophecy did not ordinarily ſeize on any, but ſuch whoſe Inſtitution was in order to that end, by the great admiration which was caus'd among the People at *Saul*'s ſo ſudden propheſying, that it became a Proverb, *Is* Saul *alſo among the Prophets?* which had not given the leaſt foundation for an Adage for a ſtrange and unwonted thing, unleſs the moſt common appearances of the Spirit of Prophecy had been among thoſe who were trained up in order to it. Thus I ſuppoſe we have fully cleared the firſt reaſon why there was no neceſſity for the ordinary Prophets, whoſe chief office was inſtruction of the People, to prove their commiſſion by Miracles, becauſe God had promis'd a ſucceſſion of Prophets by *Moſes*, and theſe were brought up ordinarily to that end among them; ſo that all prejudices were ſufficiently remov'd from their perſons without any ſuch extraordinary power as that of Miracles.

1 Sam. 10. 12, 19, 24.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The tryal of the Prophetical Doctrine.

I. *Rules of trying Prophets eſtabliſhed in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The puniſhment of pretenders. The ſeveral ſorts of falſe Prophets. The caſe of the Prophet at* Bethel *diſcuſſed.* III. *The tryal of falſe Prophets belonging to the great Sanhedrin.* IV. *The particular rules whereby the doctrine of Prophets was judged. The proper notion of a Prophet, not foretelling future contingencies, but having immediate divine Revelation.* V. *Several Principles laid down for clearing the doctrine of the Prophets.* 1. *That immediate dictates of natural light are not to be the meaſure of divine Revelation. Several grounds for divine Revelation from natural light.* VI. 2. *Whatever is directly repugnant to the dictates of nature, cannot be of divine Revelation.* VII. 3. *No divine Revelation doth contradict a divine poſitive Law without ſufficient evidence of God's intention to repeal that Law.* VIII. 4. *Divine Revelation in the Prophets, was not to be meaſured by the words of the Law, but by the intention and reaſon of it. The prophetical office a kind of chancery to the Law of* Moſes.

I. THE ſecond Reaſon why thoſe Prophets whoſe main office was inſtruction of the People, or merely foretelling future events, needed not to confirm their Doctrine by Miracles, is, becauſe they had certain rules of tryal by their Law whereby to diſcern the falſe Prophets from the true. So that if they were deceiv'd by them, it was their own oſcitancy and inadvertency which was the cauſe of it. God in that *Law* which was confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly divine, had eſtabliſh'd a Court of tryal for prophetic Spirits, and given ſuch certain Rules of procedure in it, that no Men needed to be deceiv'd, unleſs they wou'd themſelves. And there was a greater neceſſity of ſuch a certain way of tryal among them, becauſe it could not otherwiſe be expected but in a Nation where a prophetic Spirit was ſo common, there wou'd be very many pretenders to it, who might much endanger the Faith of the People, unleſs there were ſome certain way to find them out. And the more effectually to deter Men either from counterfeiting a prophetic Spirit, or from hearkning to ſuch as did, God appointed a ſevere puniſhment for every ſuch pretender, *viz.* upon legal conviction, that he be puniſhed with death. Deut. 18. 20. *But the Prophet which ſhall preſume to ſpeak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to ſpeak, or that ſhall ſpeak in the name of other Gods, ſhall ſurely die,* The *Jews* generally underſtand this of ſtrangling, as they do always in the Law, when the particular manner of death is not expreſſed. And therein a falſe Prophet and a Seducer were diſtinguiſhed each from other, that a mere Seducer was to be ſtoned to death under ſufficient teſtimony, *Deut.* 13. 6, 10. But the falſe Prophet is there ſaid in general only to be put to death,

V. Maimon. de Id. l. c. 5. ſ. 1. & ib. Voſſium.

death, *Deut.* 13. 1, 5. The main difference between the Seducer and falſe prophet was, that the Seducer ſought by cunning perſuaſions and plauſible arguments, to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God; but the falſe Prophet always pretended divine revelation for what he perſuaded them to, whether he gave out that he had that Revelation from the true God, or from Idols and falſe Gods. So that the mere pretence to divine Revelation was that which God wou'd have puniſhed with ſo great ſeverity.

II. The *Jews* tell us of three ſorts of Prophets who were to be puniſhed with death by Men, and three other ſorts who were reſerved to divine puniſhment: Of the firſt rank were theſe; 1. He that propheſied that which he had not heard, and for this they inſtance in *Zedekiah* the ſon of *Chenaanah*, who made him horns of iron, and ſaid, *Thus ſaith the Lord*, this was the Lying Prophet. 2. He that ſpeaks that which was revealed not unto him, but to another, and for this they inſtance in *Hananiah* the ſon of *Azur*, (but how truly I ſhall not determine) this was the Plagiary Prophet. 3. He that propheſied in the name of an Idol, as the Prophets of *Baal* did, this was the Idol Prophet. Theſe three, when once fully convicted, were to be put to death. The other rank of thoſe which were left to God's hand conſiſted of theſe; 1. He that ſtifles and ſmothers his own prophecy, as *Jonas* did, by which it may ſeem that when the Divine Spirit did overſhadow the Underſtanding of the Prophets, yet it offered no violence to their Faculties, but left them to the free determination of their own Wills in the execution of their Office; but this muſt be underſtood of a lower degree of Prophecy for at ſome times their Prophecies were *as fire in their bones*, that they were never at any reſt till they had diſcharged their Office. But withal by the example of *Jonas*, we ſee, that tho' the Spirit of Prophecy, like the Fire, on the Altar, cou'd only be kindled from Heaven, yet it might be deſtroyed when it was not maintained with ſomething to feed upon; or when it met not with ſuitable entertainment from the Spirits of thoſe it fell upon, it might retreat back again to Heaven, or at leaſt lie hid in the embers, till a new blaſt from the Spirit of God doth ἀναζωπυρεῖν, *retrieve* it into its former *heat* and *activity*. Thus it was with *Jonas*. 2. The other was, He that deſpiſed the words of a true Prophet; of ſuch God, ſaith, *Deut.* 18. 19. *And it ſhall come to paſs, that whoſoever will not hearken to my words which ye ſhall ſpeak in my name, I will require it of him.* Which *Maimonides* explains by מיתה בידי שמים, *death by the hands of God*, which he thus diſtinguiſheth from the *Cereth*, that he makes the death *per manus cœli*, to be leſs than the *Cereth*, becauſe this latter continued in the Soul after death, but the other was expiated by death; but generally they interpret it of a ſudden death, which falls upon the perſon. 3. The laſt is, He who hearkens not to the words of his own Prophecy; of which we have a moſt remarkable inſtance in Scripture concerning the Prophet whom God ſent to *Bethel* (whom *Tertullian* calls *Sameas*, the *Jews*, *Hedua*) whom God deſtroy'd in an unuſual manner for not obſerving the command which God had given him, *not to eat bread nor drink water at* Bethel, *nor turn again by the way he came.* Neither was it any excuſe to this Prophet, that the old Prophet at *Bethel told him that an Angel ſpake unto him by the word of the Lord that he ſhould turn back.* For, 1. Thoſe whom God reveals his will unto, he gives them full aſſurance of it, in that they have a clear and diſtinct perception of God upon their own Minds; and ſo they have no doubt,

V. Except. Gem. San. hedr. c. 10. ſ. 3.

1 King. 22. 11.

Jer 28. 11.

Jer. 20. 9.

Maim. de fundam. legis, c. 9. ſ. 4. V. Abarbinel de Cereth. apud Buxtorf. de ſponſ. & divort. p. 182.

1 King 13. 9. Ver. 18.

doubt, but it is the Word of the Lord which comes unto them; but this Prophet cou'd have no ſuch certainty of the Divine Revelation which was made to another, eſpecially when it came immediately to contradict that which was ſo ſpecially enjoyn'd him. 2. Where God commands a Prophet to do any thing in the purſuit of his Meſſage, there he can have no ground to queſtion whether God ſhou'd countermand it or no by another Prophet; becauſe that was in effect to thwart the whole deſign of his Meſſage. So it was in this action of the Prophet; for God intended his not eating and drinking in *Bethel* to teſtify how much he loathed and abominated that place ſince its being polluted with Idolatry. 3. He might have juſt cauſe to queſtion the integrity of the old Prophet, both becauſe of his living in *Bethel*, and not openly, according to his office, reproving their Idolatry, and that God ſhou'd ſend him out of *Judæa* upon that very errand, which wou'd not have ſeem'd ſo probable, if there had been true Prophets reſident upon the place. 4. The thing he deſired him to do, was not an act of that weight and importance, on which God us'd to ſend his Word to any Prophets, much leſs by one Prophet to contradict what he had ſaid by another; and therefore *Tertullian* ſaith of him, *pœnam deſerti jejunii luit*, God puniſh'd him for breaking his faſt at *Bethel*; and therefore that Meſſage of this Prophet ſeem'd to gratify more Man's carnal appetite, than uſually the actions of Prophets did, which were moſt times matters of hardſhip and uneaſineſs to the fleſh. 5. However all theſe were, yet he yielded too ſoon, eſpecially having ſo much reaſon on his ſide as he had; being well aſſured that God had commanded him, he had reaſon to ſee ſome clear Evidence of a countermand, before he altered his mind: if he had ſeen any thing upon tryal which might have ſtaggered his faith, he ought to have made his immediate recourſe to God by Prayer for the ſettlement of his mind, and removal of this great temptation. But ſo eaſily to hearken to the words of a lying Prophet, which contradicted his own Meſſage, argued either great Unbelief as to his own Commiſſion, or too great Eaſineſs and Inadvertency in being drawn aſide by the old Prophet. And therefore God made that old Prophet himſelf in the midſt of his entertainment, as with a *Hand-writing againſt the wall*, to tell him *he was weighed in the balance*, and *found too light*; and therefore his Life ſhou'd be taken from him. Thus we ſee how dangerous a thing it was either to counterfeit a Spirit of Prophecy, or to hearken to thoſe who did.

Tertullian. de jejuniis, cap. 16.

III. It is the generally received opinion among the Jewiſh Doctors, that the cognizance and tryal of falſe Prophets did peculiarly belong to the great *Sanhedrin*. And that this was one end of its Inſtitution. So *Maimonides* after he has largely diſcourſed of the puniſhment of a Seducer, and ſpeaking of that of a falſe Prophet, he lays this down as a ſtanding Rule among them, ואיזהן נביא חשקר אלא בנד של עא *No falſe Prophet was to be judged but in the Court of Seventy one*; which was the number of the great *Sanhedrin*. And there is ſomething looks very like this in the proceedings of the People of *Iſrael* againſt the Prophet *Jeremiah*; for the People, the Prieſts and the Prophets, they laid hold on him; and immediately after we read that the Princes of *Judah* (by whom *Grotius* underſtands the *Senators* of the great *Sanhedrin*) *they came up from the King's houſe to the houſe of the Lord, and ſat down in the entry of the new gate of the Lord's houſe*; which probably was the place where the great *Sanhedrin* ſat) where after a particular Examination of *Jeremiah*,

Maimon. de Idololat. c. 5. ſ. 11.

Jer. 26. 8.

Ver. 10.

V. Grot. in loc. & Seld. de Syn. l. 2. c. 15. ſ. 4. & l. 3. c. 6. ſ. 4.

Jer 26. 16.

Jer. 3. 6.

ah, they acquit him as a *perſon not worthy to die* upon a counterfeiting Prophecy, but declare *that he ſpake unto them in the name of the Lord.* And in this ſenſe *Grotius* likewiſe underſtands what is ſaid of *Zedekiah* concerning *Jeremiah* to the Princes of *Judah* afterwards, *Behold he is in your hand; for the King is not he that can do ought againſt you*; *i. e.* ſaith *Grotius*, *In manibus Synedrii cujus eſt judicare de Propheta vero aut falſo.* And to this many make thoſe words of our Saviour refer, *That it is impoſſible a Prophet ſhould periſh out of* Jeruſalem, becauſe the ſeat of the great *Sanhedrin* was in *Jeruſalem*; and ſo elſewhere our Saviour ſaith, *O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, thou that killeſt the Prophets, and ſtoneſt them which are ſent unto thee:* becauſe there it was the true Prophets were deſtroy'd as tho' they had been falſe ones, and God's own Meſſengers puniſhed with the death of Seducers, which was Lapidation. And on this very account many are of opinion that our Saviour was condemned by the *Sanhedrin* at *Jeruſalem*; which is ſuppoſed to have been aſſembled in the houſe of *Caiaphas* the High-Prieſt, when *Chriſt* was carried thither for Examination; which ſome think to have been at his Lodgings in the Temple, others at his Palace in the City. For we read that the Chief Prieſts, and the Elders, and all the Council were met together at the High-Prieſts Palace in order to our Saviour's Tryal. The next Morning they were met early together again in order to the further ſcanning of this buſineſs; but they ſeem not to examine *Chriſt* concerning a true Spirit of Prophecy, but concerning his being the *Meſſias*, and calling himſelf *the Son of God*; and ſo they would ſeem rather to proceed upon the Law againſt Blaſphemy, than that againſt falſe Prophets.

Luk. 13. 33. Matth. 23. 70. Matth. 26. 59. Matth. 26. 63.

IV. But that which was the greateſt ſecurity of the People againſt the Impoſture of falſe Prophets, was the certain Rules of judging them which were laid down in the Law of *Moſes*: which may be comprehended under theſe two Heads, ſuch as concern their Doctrine, or ſuch as concern their Predictions, *Firſt*, ſuch as concerned the Prophets Doctrine, which ſhou'd eſpecially be looked after, becauſe the main office of a Prophet was to be *interpres & internuncius divinæ voluntatis*, to be *a revealer of God's Will to Men.* For the primary Notion of a Prophet doth not lie in foretelling future events, but in declaring and interpreting to the world the Mind of God, which he receives by immediate Revelation from himſelf. So that the receiving what he makes known by immediate Revelation, is that which formally conſtitutes a Prophet; but it is wholly extrinſecal and accidental what time his Prophecy reſpects, whether paſt, preſent, or to come; but becauſe future contingencies are the furtheſt out of the reach of humane underſtanding, therefore the predictions of ſuch have been chiefly looked on as the chief Note and Character of a Prophet, as being apprehended to be the ſtrongeſt evidence of Divine Revelation. And hence it is in Scripture that the Patriarchs as *Abraham* and others are called Prophets, not becauſe of any prediction utter'd by them, but becauſe of the frequency of immediate Divine Revelations among them. And hence likewiſe thoſe in the New Teſtament who expounded the Scriptures by immediate Inſpiration, are called Prophets; and this was the Ἀποκάλυψις ſpoken of by the Apoſtle, the Expoſition of the hidden Myſteries of the Old Teſtament by an immediate Inſpiration. And there is no word in the *Hebrew* for a Prophet, which may not equally reſpect all differences of time, but every one doth import immediate Inſpiration; for נביא properly is one *qui revelat abſcondita*; ראה a *Seer* chiefly reſpects the clear repreſen-

Pſal. 105. 15. Gen. 20. 7. 1 Cor. 14. 26.

Vide Alſtedii Trifol. proph. p. 53

tation of the intellectual ſpecies by the *lumen propheticum* to the understanding, and חזה carries an equal indifferency to all circumſtances of time.

V. This being then the chief notion of a Prophet, whatever he declared as the Mind and Will of God, muſt be ſearched and examined, to ſee what conſonancy it hath thereto. For the queſtion which *Moſes* ſuppoſeth; is founded upon clear and evident reaſon, *And if thou ſhalt ſay in thine heart, How ſhall we know the Word which the Lord hath ſpoken?* For it being plain that there may be falſe Prophets as well as true, we had need of ſome certain rules to judge of what is delivered for Divine Revelation. For the clearing of which important Queſtion, I lay down theſe principles.

Deut. 18. 21.

1. *The immediate dictates of natural light are no ſufficient ſtandard to judge of Divine Revelation by.* I mean not in reference to conſonancy or repugnancy to natural light, but in reference to the extent and latitude of Divine Revelation, *i. e.* that natural light doth not contain in it whatever may be known of God or of his Will; and that upon theſe reaſons: 1. It implies no repugnancy to any dictate of nature, that God ſhou'd reveal any thing more of his Mind and Will, than is contained in the light of nature. 2. Nature reacheth, as to matters concerning Religion, no further than the obligation to Duty, but leaves the particular determination of the manner of obedience to divine poſitive Laws, as is clear in reference to the time, place, and particular duties of worſhip. 3. Nature owning an univerſal obligation to the Will of God in whatever he ſhall command, doth ſuppoſe a power in God to command what he pleaſeth. 4. Nature is ſenſible of its own decays; and the imperfection of its own light, and therefore ſeems rather to require further illumination than to put any bar againſt it. 5. Man's happineſs being a free gift of God's, it ſtands to the higheſt reaſon that he ſhou'd have the preſcribing of the conditions which are in order to it; now theſe conditions being the reſults, not of God's nature, but of his arbitrarious Will, it is impoſſible that natural light cou'd ever reach to the full diſcovery of them. 6. It hath been the general ſenſe of all Nations in the World, that God may reveal more of his Will than Nature can reach unto; which ſenſe diſcovers it ſelf in two things. 1. Praying to their ſeveral Gods for direction. 2. Hearkening after pretended Oracles, which the Devil cou'd never have had that advantage of deceiving the World by, had it not been for this general ſenſe of Mankind, that there wanted ſome particular Revelation from God to make Men happy. So then this may be aſſumed as a principle, That God may reveal more of his Mind and Will to Mankind, than he hath done by the dictates of mere natural light and reaſon.

2. *Whatever ſpeaks a direct repugnancy to any of the fundamental dictates of nature cannot be of Divine Revelation.* For thoſe being founded, not upon any poſitive or arbitrary Will, but upon thoſe inward impreſſions which are derived from the Divine Nature its ſelf, it cannot in reaſon be ſuppoſed that God ſhou'd commiſſion any to enervate his own Fundamental Law; and ſo by one Will to contradict another. *Placitum Regis* muſt never ſtand againſt the *Placita Coronæ*: Thoſe things which depend upon Fundamental and Eſtabliſhed Laws, hold good againſt any poſitive ſentence or declaration of a Prince's Will; Becauſe he is ſuppoſed to have bound up himſelf by the eſtabliſhed Laws; and therefore any thing elſe which comes from him, contrary to them, is ſuppo-

ſed

ſed not to be the Will of the Prince, but of the perſons perſuading him to it. But this now cannot be ſuppoſed in God, that he ſhou'd be any ways drawn to caſſate the Obligation of what is imprinted upon the Souls of Men as his own Law. But yet we muſt diſtinguiſh between nulling the general Obligation, and altering the particular nature of any thing which depends upon that general Law; the *firſt* in any caſe is impoſſible, that any Divine Revelation ſhou'd make it not to be Man's Duty to obey his Maker, or not to be a ſin to commit Murder, to lye, or to ſteal from another; but there may come a particular Revelation from God to alter the reſpects and nature of ſuch things as do immediately depend upon his own dominion; as the lives of perſons and the properties of things are; and thus God did reveal to *Abraham* that he ſhou'd go and Sacrifice his Son, which had been no murder, when done upon God's immediate command, and a ſacrifice to himſelf, and therefore wou'd have been acceptable as a teſtimony of entire obedience (which God did accept without the act) and ſo the *Iſraelites* taking the *Ægyptians* Jewels, and diſpoſſeſſing the *Canaanites*, did depend upon God's immediate diſpoſal of theſe things to them, which otherwiſe had been a ſin in them, and no doubt was ſo to any that were unſatisfy'd whether God had immediately commanded it or no. Or from hence to infer any general rule, is no doubt a breach of Divine Commands, and contrary to his Nature and Will.

VII. 3. *Where God hath eſtabliſhed a poſitive Law, preſcribing a form and manner wherein he will be worſhipped, it is ſufficient evidence of a falſe Prophet, to go about to null the obligation of that Law; unleſs there be as great evidences given, that God did intend the eſtabliſhing a new Law by that Perſon, as he did at firſt the inſtitution of the old by the hand of* Moſes. This latter clauſe is inferted, to ſhew that the ſucceeding of the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, into the place of the Law of *Moſes*, doth not bear any repugnancy to the *Hypotheſis* laid down, there being greater evidences of God's intending the aboliſhing the Ceremonial Law by the Goſpel of *Chriſt*, than there were of the eſtabliſhment of it by *Moſes*. But of thoſe afterwards. I now only ſpeak of ſuch as upon the mere pretence of Divine Revelation, ſhou'd deſtroy any precept of an eſtabliſhed poſitive Law; and this as far as we can find, was the great Rule the *Jews* went by; if any thing were ſpoken by any Prophet, contrary to the Law of *Moſes*, or tending to the alteration of the worſhip of God eſtabliſhed thereby, he was accounted a falſe Prophet. The modern *Jews* to juſtify themſelves in their own Belief, as to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, extend this further than the Law doth; for they inlarge it to all the precepts of the Ceremonial Law; whereas God in the Law ſeems to limit it to the Moral Law, and chiefly inſiſts on the three firſt precepts of the *Decalogue*; and therefore condemns ſuch a *one* as *ſpake in the name of the Lord, when he had not commanded them*, Deut. 18. 20. and ſuch *endeavoured to bring in idolatry*, Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. where tho' the falſe Prophet ſhou'd offer to do ſigns and wonders before them, yet if his intention were to draw them to worſhip falſe Gods, they were not to hearken unto him. And therefore *Maimonides*, where he largely diſputes about the truth of Prophecies, lays this down as a certain Rule: *Si Propheta ſurrexerit, atque magna miracula aut prodigia fecerit, & adlaboraverit falſitatis convincere prophetiam* Moſis *M. N. iſtum non audimus, quia certò novimus prodigium præſtigiis aut incantionibus productum eſſe*, as *Vorſtius* renders him. *If a Prophet do never ſo great Miracles, and ſeeks to convince* Moſes *Maimon. de fund. leg. c. 8. ſ. 7*

of falſhood, we are not to hearken to him; for we know that they are not done by the power of God, but by the illuſion of the Devil. And elſewhere he tells us, that if any pretends to prophecy בשם עבויים *in the name of Idols, they muſt not ſo much as diſpute with him, nor anſwer him, nor deſire any Signs or Miracles from him; and if of himſelf he ſhews any, we are not to regard or mind them; for,* ſaith he, *whoever doth but doubt in his mind concerning them he breaks that Command, And thou ſhalt not hearken to the words of that prophet.* So that the Doctrine once eſtabliſhed, ought to be our moſt certain Rule, according to which we muſt judge of all pretenders to Miracles; if their deſign be to draw Men off from God's Word, we are not to hearken to what they either ſay or do.

Idem de Idololat. leg. c. 5. ſ. 9.

Deut. 13. 3.

VIII. 4. *The Doctrine of thoſe Prophets who ſeek not to introduce Idolatry, muſt not be meaſured by a ſtrict conformity to the words of* Moſes *his Law, but to the main reaſon and intention of it.* The great reaſon of this is, becauſe God did not intend the *Jews* ſhou'd always reſt in the *Pædagogy* of the Ceremonial Law, but ſent them Prophets to train them up by degrees, and to fit them for a ſtate of better perfection; and therefore it wou'd be very unreaſonable to judge whether they were true Prophets or no, exactly by that which they came gradually to wean them from; which were all one, as to try one whether he were grown a Man or no, by the Swadling clouts he wore when he was a Child. God tempered the Ceremonial Law much according to the condition and capacity of the perſons it was preſcribed to, and therefore the Sanctions of it did immediately reſpect their temporary concerns; but we are not to think the end of that diſpenſation was to be merely a Covenant for the Land of Promiſe; but as the Cherubims in the Temple did always look towards the Mercy-ſeat, ſo did this whole *œconomy* look towards the coming of the *Meſſias.* But it was with the generality of the *Jews*, as it is with ignorant people who looking up to the Heavens, cannot fanſie the Stars to be any bigger than they ſeem to them; but *Aſtronomers* by the help of their *Optic-tubes* and *Teleſcopes*, do eaſily diſcern the juſt magnitude of them; ſo the *Jews* ordinarily thought there was no more in theſe Types and Shadows, than was viſibly repreſented to them; but ſuch as had the help of the Divine Spirit (the beſt *Teleſcope* to diſcern the *Day-ſtar* from on high with) cou'd eaſily look thro' thoſe Proſpectives, into the moſt glorious Myſteries of the Goſpel of *Jeſus Chriſt.* Theſe Types being like triangular Priſmes, that muſt be ſet in a due light and poſture, before they can repreſent that great variety of Spiritual Myſteries which was contained in them. Now the great office of the Prophet was to adminiſter this Light to the people, and to direct them in thoſe excellent pieces of Perſpective, wherein by the help of a Prophetic-glaſs, they might ſee the Son of God fully repreſented to their view. Beſides this, the prophetical office was a kind of Chancery to the Moſaic Law, wherein the Prophets did interpret the *Pandects* of the Law *ex æquo & bono*, and frequently ſhewed in what caſes God did diſpenſe with the outward letter of it, to exalt the more the inward ſenſe and reaſon of it. Hence the Prophets ſeem many times to ſpeak contemptibly of the outward preſcribed Ceremonies, when their intent is not to condemn the obſervation of them, but to tell the people there were greater things which God looked at, than the outward obſervation of ſome Ceremonial precepts, and that God would never accept of that by way of commutation for real and internal goodneſs. Hence the Prophets * by their own practice, did frequently ſhew that the Law of *Moſes* did not

* Pſal. 50. 8. 51. 16. Iſa. 1. 11. 13. 66. 3. Jer. 7. 21, 22, 23.

ſo

ſo indiſpenſibly oblige Men, but that God wou'd accept of thoſe actions which were performed without the regularity required by the Law of *Moſes*; and thus he did of ſacrificing upon high places, not only before the building of the Temple, but ſometimes after, as he accepted of the ſacrifice of *Elijah* on Mount *Carmel*, even when high places were forbidden. Which the *Jews* are become ſo ſenſible of, that they grant that a true Prophet may ſometimes command ſomething to be done in violation of the Law of *Moſes*, ſo he doth not draw people to Idolatry, nor deſtroy the obligation of Moſes his Law. But this they reſtrain to לפי שעה ſomething done in caſe of neceſſity, and that it ſhou'd not paſs into a precedent or a perpetual Law; and therefore their rule is לפי שעה שימענו לו בכל. *The prophet was to be hearkened to in every thing he commanded in a caſe of neceſſity.* By this it is clear that the Prophets were not to be try'd by the Letter of the Law of *Moſes*, but by the end and the reaſon of it. Thus much I ſuppoſe will make it clear what Rules the people had to try the Prophets Doctrine by, without Miracles.

1 Kings 18. 38.

Vid. Jarchi Deut. 18. 21.

Et Vorſt. ad Maim. de fund. c.o. ſ. 5, 6, 7.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The Tryal of Prophetical Predictions and Miracles.

I. *The great difficulty of trying the truth of prophetical Predictions from* Jer. 18. 7, 8, &c. *Some general* Hypotheſes *promiſed for the clearing of it.* II. *The firſt concerns the grounds why Predictions are accounted an evidence of Divine Revelation. Three Conſectaries drawn thence.* III. *The ſecond, the manner of* God's *Revelation of his Will to the Minds of the Prophets. Of the ſeveral degrees of Prophecy.* IV. *The third is, that* God *did not always reveal the internal purpoſes of his Will unto the true Prophets.* V. *The grand Queſtion propounded, How it may be known when Predictions expreſs* God's *decrees, and when only the ſeries of cauſes. For the firſt ſeveral rules laid down.* 1. *When the Prediction is confirm'd by a preſent Miracle.* 2. *When the things foretold exceed the probability of ſecond cauſes.* VI. 3. *When confirm'd by* God's *oath.* VII. 4. *When the Bleſſings foretold are purely ſpiritual.* VIII. *Three rules for interpreting the Prophecies which reſpect the ſtate of things under the Goſpel.* IX. 5. *When all circumſtances are fortold.* 6. *When many Prophets in ſeveral ages agree in the ſame predictions.* X. *Predictions do not expreſs* God's *unalterable purpoſes, when they only contain comminations of judgments, or are predictions of temporal Bleſſings.* XI. *The caſe of the* Ninevites, Hezekiah, *and others, opened.* XII, XIII. *Of repentance in* God, *what it implies.* XIV. *The Jewiſh objections about predictions of temporal Bleſſings anſwered.* XV. *In what caſes Miracles were expected from the Prophets: when they were to confirm the truth of their Religion. Inſtanced in the Prophet at* Bethel, Elijah, Eliſha *and* Moſes *himſelf*; XVI. *whoſe divine authority that it was proved by Miracles, is demonſtrated againſt the modern* Jews, *and their pretences anſwered.*

I. THE next thing which the Rules of Tryal concerned, was the predictions of the Prophets. Concerning which God himſelf hath laid down this general Rule, *Deut.* 18. 22. *When a Prophet ſpeaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to paſs, that is the thing which the Lord hath not ſpoken, but the Prophet hath ſpoken it preſumptuouſly; thou ſhalt not be afraid of him. Grotius* underſtands this place of the Prophet's telling the people he would do ſome Miracles to confirm his Doctrine; but, if thoſe Miracles were not done as he ſaid, it was an evident demonſtration of a falſe Prophet. It is certain it was ſo; for then his own mouth told him he was a lying Prophet; but theſe words ſeem to refer rather to ſomething future than preſent, and are therefore generally

generally underſtood concerning the truth of predictions; which was a matter of very difficult tryal, in regard of the goodneſs or the juſtice of God, ſo frequently interpoſing between the prediction and the event. That place which makes it ſo difficult to diſcern the truth of a prediction by the event, is *Jer.* 18.7, 8, 9, 10. *At what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to deſtroy it; If that Nation againſt whom I have pronounced, turn from evil, I will repent of the evil I had thought to do unto them; And at what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my ſight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I ſaid I would benefit them:* By which place it ſeems clear, that even after the predictions of Prophets, God reſerved a liberty to himſelf, either to repent of the evil or the good that was foretold concerning any people; how then can the fidelity of a Prophet be diſcovered by the event when God may alter the event, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet? This being a caſe very intricate and obſcure, will call for the more diligence in the unfolding of it: In order to which, we ſhall firſt premiſe ſome general *Hypotheſes* and then come to the particular reſolution of it. The general *Hypotheſes* will be concerning the way and method of God's revealing future contingencies to the Prophets, without which it will be impoſſible to reſolve the particular emergent caſes concerning predictions.

II.

1. *Hypoth.* *The prediction of future events is no further an argument of a prophetic Spirit, than as the foreknowledge of thoſe things is ſuppoſed to be out of the reach of any created underſtanding*; and therefore God challengeth this to himſelf in Scripture as a peculiar prerogative of his own, to declare the things that are to come, and thereby manifeſts the Idols of the *Gentiles* to be no Gods, *becauſe they could not ſhew to their worſhippers the things to come*, Iſa. 44. 6, 7. From this *Hypotheſis* theſe three Conſectaries follow:

1. That the events that are foretold, muſt be ſuch as do exceed the reach of any created Intellect; for otherwiſe it cou'd be no evidence of a Spirit of true Prophecy; ſo that the foretelling of ſuch events as depend upon the ſeries of Natural Cauſes, or ſuch as tho' they are out of the reach of Human Underſtanding, yet are not of the Diabolical, or ſuch things as fall out caſually true, but by no certain grounds of prediction, can none of them be any argument of a Spirit of Prophecy.

2. That where there were any other evidences, that the Prophet ſpake by Divine Revelation; there was no reaſon to wait the fulfilling of every particular prophecy before he was believed as a Prophet. If ſo, then many of God's chiefeſt Prophets cou'd not have been believed in their own Generations becauſe their Prophecies did reach ſo far beyond them, as *Iſaiah*'s concerning *Cyrus*, the Prophet at *Bethel* concerning *Joſias*: and all the prophecies concerning the Captivity and Deliverance from it, muſt not have been believed till fulfilled, that is, not believed at all: for when prophecies are accompliſhed they are no longer the objects of Faith, but of ſenſe. Where then God gives other evidences of Divine Inſpiration, the credit of the Prophet is not ſuſpended upon the minute accompliſhment of every event foretold by him. Now it is evident there may be particular Divine Revelation of other things beſides future contingencies, ſo that if a reaſon may be given, why events once foretold may not come to paſs, there can be no reaſon why the credit of any prophecy ſhou'd be invalidated on that account; becauſe every event is not exactly correſpondent to the prediction. It is moſt certain that what

what ever comes under Divine Knowledge, may be divinely revealed for the manifeſtation which is cauſed by any light, may extend it ſelf to all things to which that light is extended: but that light which the Prophet ſaw by was a Divine Light, and therefore might equally extend it ſelf to all kind of objects; but becauſe future contingencies are the moſt remote from humane knowledge, therefore the foretelling of theſe hath been accounted the great evidence of a true Prophet; but yet there may be a knowledge of other things in a lower degree than future contingencies, which may immediately depend upon Divine Revelation; and theſe are,

1. Such things which cannot be known by any particular Man, but yet
2 King. 5. 26. are certainly known by other Men; as the preſent knowledge of things done by perſons at a remote diſtance from them: thus *Eliſha* knew what *Gehazi* did, when he followed *Naaman*; and thus the knowledge of the
1 Cor. 14. 25. thought of another's heart depends upon immediate Divine Revelation, whereas every one may certainly know the thought of his own heart; and therefore to ſome thoſe things may be matters of ſenſe or evident demonſtration, which to another may be a matter of immediate Revelation.

2. Such things as relate not to future contingencies, but are matters of Faith exceeding the reach of human apprehenſion; ſuch things as may be known when revealed, but cou'd never have been found out without immediate Revelation; ſuch all the Myſteries of our Religion are, the Myſtery of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Hypoſtatical Union*, the Death of the Son of God for the pardon of the ſins of Mankind. Now the immediate Revelation of either of theſe two ſorts of objects ſpeaks as much a truly Prophetical Spirit, as the prediction of future contingencies. So that this muſt not be looked on as the juſt and adequate rule to meaſure a Spirit of prophecy by; becauſe the ground of judging a prophetical Spirit by that, is common with other things without that, ſeeing other object are out of the reach of humane Underſtanding as well as future events, and therefore the diſcovery of them muſt immediately flow from Divine Revelation.

3. The Revelation of future events to the Underſtanding of a Prophet, is never the leſs immediate, altho' the event may not be correſpondent to the prediction. So that if it be manifeſted that God immeately reveal ſuch future contingencies to a Prophet, he wou'd be nevertheleſs a true Prophet whether thoſe predictions took effect or no. For a true Prophet is known by the truth of Divine Revelation to the perſon of the Prophet, and not by the ſucceſs of the thing, which, as is laid down in the *Hypotheſis*, is no further an evidence of a true Prophet, than as it is an argument *à poſteriori* to prove Divine Revelation by. If then the alteration of events after predictions be reconcilable with the truth and faithfulneſs of God, there is no queſtion but it is with the truth of a prophetical Spirit, the formality of which lies in immediate Revelation.

III. *The Prophets cou'd not declare any thing more to the people than was immediately revealed unto themſelves.* What was preſently revealed, ſo much they knew, and no more, becauſe the Spirit of prophecy came upon them *per modum impreſſionis tranſeuntis*, as the Schools ſpeak, and not *per modum habitus*; the *lumen propheticum* was in them, not as *lumen in corpore lucido*, but as *lumen in aëre*; and therefore the Light of Revelation in their Spirits depended upon the immediate irradiations of the Divine Spirit. The Prophets had not always a power to propheſie when

2. *Hyperth.*

when they wou'd themſelves; and it is ſaid, when they propheſy'd, that the *Word of the Lord came unto them.* And therefore the Schools determine, that a Prophet upon immediate Revelation did not know *omnia prophetabilia* (as they ſpeak in their barbarous language) *all things* which *God might reveal*; the reaſon whereof *Aquinas* thus gives; *The ground,* 2.2.q.171. art.2.—4. ſaith he, *of the connexion of divers objects together is ſome common tie or principle, which joyns them together; as charity or prudence is in moral vertues; and the right underſtanding of the principles of a ſcience, is the ground why all things belonging to that ſcience are underſtood; but now in Divine Revelation; that which connects the objects of Divine Revelation is God himſelf; now becauſe he cannot be fully apprehended by any humane intellect, therefore the underſtanding of a Prophet cannot comprehend all matters capable of being revealed, but only ſuch as pleaſeth God himſelf freely to communicate to the Prophet's underſtanding by immediate Revelation.* This is further evident by all thoſe different degrees of illumination and prophecy, which the *Jews* and other Writers ſpeak ſo much of, *viz.* of Dreams and Viſions, the inſpirations of the Holy Spirit, the *Gradus Moſaicus*, the External Voice, &c. Now in every one of theſe degrees the Prophet cou'd go no further than his preſent Revelation extended; and therefore *Aquinas* determines, That the Underſtandings of the Prophets were *inſtrumenta deficientia reſpectu principalis agentis, i. e.* that in prophetical illumination the Mind of the Prophet was ſo moved by the Spirit of God, as an inſtrument in the hand of an Artificer, which bears no proportion with the skill of the work-man: And therefore the Mind of a Prophet is moved ſometimes only to apprehend the thing repreſented (which they call *Inſtinctus Divinus*, of which they ſay a Prophet may have no certainty whether it comes from God or no) ſometimes it is moved ſo far as to know certainly that this Revelation is from God (this they call *Lumen Propheticum*;) ſometimes a Prophet may be moved to ſpeak thoſe things which he fully underſtands; ſo it was with moſt of the true Prophets; but ſometimes Men may be moved to ſpeak that which they underſtand not, as is plain in *Caiaphas*, and probable in *Balaam.* Sometimes a thing was repreſented to the Fancy of one, without any poſſibility of underſtanding the meaning of thoſe imaginary ſpecies, as in *Pharaoh*'s and *Nebuchadnezzar*'s Dreams; and to another may be given the true judgment of thoſe motions of Fancy without the repreſentation of the things, to them, as in *Joſeph* and *Daniel.* Now in theſe and many other different impreſſions of this prophetical Spirit, the Prophets, to whom the things were revealed, cou'd go no further than the degree of the Revelation made to them did extend. 2.2.q17.3. art. 3.

IV. *God did not always reveal to the Prophets the internal counſels and decrees of his own Will, but often only the method and ſeries of his providence in the adminiſtration of things in the world.* Which is the ground of that threefold diſtinction of prophecy in the Schools, into *Prophetia prædeſtinationis*, *Prophetia præſcientiæ*, and *Prophetia comminationis*; which is taken from the ordinary Gloſs upon *Matth.* 1. where they are thus explain'd; *The Prophecy of Predeſtination* is, when the event depends wholly upon God's Will, without any reſpect to ours, as the prophecy of the *Incarnation of Chriſt*; and the *Prophecy of Preſcience* is of ſuch things as depend upon the liberty of Man's Will; and the *Prophecy of Commination* only denotes God's denunciations of heavy judgments againſt a people. But *Aquinas* doth better reduce the two former to one, and the ground of the difference is to be fetched from the different ways 3. Hypoth.

whereby God knows things in the world; which is either as they are in their cauſes, and ſo they note the order and ſeries of things in the world, with the mutual reſpects and dependences they have upon one another, and this refers to God's adminiſtration of things in the world; or elſe God looks upon them as they are in themſelves, or according to his own poſitive determinations of them; and now in this ſenſe they are unalterable; but in the other they are not; but God may alter thoſe reſpects of things when he pleaſeth. Now tho' theſe different manners of knowledge can never be conceiv'd ſeparate from one another in the Divine Uuderſtanding, yet in the Revelation made to the Mind of a Prophet, they may be disjoyn'd from each other, becauſe God doth not always reveal things in the higheſt degree to the Prophets; for no free Agent doth always act as far as he can. And therefore prophetical Revelation is ſometimes a repreſentation of God's internal Decrees, and then they always take effect; and ſometimes only the order of Cauſes and Effects, and they may admit of an alteration, and the prophecy nevertheleſs be true, becauſe then it referr'd only to the ſeries of Cauſes in the world, according to which the Events wou'd follow, if God himſelf did not interpoſe. Theſe things being thus premis'd, we come to particular Reſolutions, which muſt ariſe from the Evidences that may be given when prophetical predictions did expreſs God's internal purpoſe and decree, and when only the order of the Cauſes in the world; for in theſe latter it is apparent that events might not anſwer predictions, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet: which is a matter of greater difficulty, *viz.* to find out the exact differences of theſe two, till the event hath made it apparent which came from God's unalterable purpoſe, and which not. But tho' it be a ſubject little ſpoken to either by *Jewiſh* or *Chriſtian* Writers, yet we are in hopes there may be ſome ſuch clear Notes of diſtinction diſcovered between them, even *à priori*, which may ſufficiently clear God's faithfulneſs, and the Prophet's truth, tho' the event be not always correſpondent to the words of a prediction.

V. I begin then with the evidences that may be given when predictions do flow from internal purpoſe and decree.

1. *Every prediction confirm'd by a preſent Miracle, doth not expreſs merely the order of cauſes, but the determinations of God's will*, becauſe there can be no ſufficient reaſon given why the order of cauſes in Nature ſhou'd be altered to expreſs the dependances of things on each other; for herein a Miracle wou'd rather tend to weaken than ſtrengthen Faith, becauſe the end of the Miracle wou'd be to confirm their Faith as to events following upon their cauſes; but now the *medium* us'd for that end ſeems to prove the contrary, *viz.* That God can alter the ſeries of cauſes when he pleaſes himſelf, by working Miracles, and therein going contrary to the courſe of Nature; and therefore a Miracle ſeems to be a very incongruous argument in this, becauſe it ſelf is an evidence that may be, which it comes to prove ſhall not be. But when Prophets come to declare the internal purpoſes of the Will of God concerning future contingencies, no argument can be more ſuitable to demonſtrate the truth of what is ſpoken, than the working of a preſent Miracle, for this demonſtrates to the ſenſes of Men, that however unlikely the event may be to them which is foretold, yet with God all things are poſſible and that it is very unlikely God wou'd ſend ſuch a Meſſenger to declare a falſhood, whom he entruſted with ſo great a power as that of working Miracles. Thus it was in that remarkable prophecy concerning *Joſias*

ſias by the Man of God at *Bethel*, 260 years before his Birth, which tho' it were to come to paſs ſo long after, God confirm'd it by a Sign, which was *the renting of the Altar, and the pouring out of the aſhes upon it, and the withering of* Jeroboam's *hand.* We cannot therefore in reaſon think that God wou'd ſet ſo clear a Seal to any Deed which he did intend himſelf to cancel afterwards. 1 King. 13. 3.

2. *Predictions expreſs God's inward purpoſe, when the things foretold do exceed all probabilities of ſecond cauſes*; in which cauſe tho' thoſe words of *Tertullian* ſeem very harſh, *credo quia impoſſibile*; yet taking that Impoſſibility as relating to ſecond cauſes, and the ground of Faith to be ſome divine prediction, we ſee what reaſon there may be for them: For the more unlikely the thing is to be effected by ſecond cauſes, the greater evidence it is, that the Prophets in foretelling it did not reſpect the mere order of things in the world, but the unalterable counſels of the will of God, which therefore wou'd certainly have their timely accompliſhments. When therefore any Prophets did foretel things above the reach of Natural cauſes, and thoſe things did not come to paſs, it was a certain evidence of a falſe Prophet, as the contrary was of a true one; for none cou'd know ſo long before-hand ſuch things as were above all humane power, but ſuch to whom God himſelf, who alone was able to effect them, did reveal and communicate the knowledge of them. And hence we ſee in Scripture thoſe predictions which have ſeemed the greateſt improbabilities with them, have had the moſt punctual accompliſhments, as the *Iſraelites* returning out of *Ægypt* at the end of 430 years; their deliverance by *Cyrus* after the Captivity in *Babylon*, which ſeemed ſo improbable a thing, that when God ſpeaks of it, he uſhers it in with this preface, *That he fruſtrateth the tokens of the lyers, and maketh the diviners mad, but confirmeth the word of his ſervant, and performeth the counſel of his meſſengers that ſaith to Jeruſalem, Thou ſhalt be inhabited,* &c. The more unlikely then the thing was to come to paſs, the greater evidence there was in ſo clear a prophecy of it ſo long before (above 100 years) and ſo exact a fulfilling of it afterwards preciſely at the expiring of the LXX years from the firſt Captivity. Gal. 3. 17. Iſa. 44 25, 26, 28.

VI. 3. *Predictions concerning future events, which are confirmed by an oath from God himſelf, do expreſs the immutable determinations of God's will.* For which we have the greateſt aſſurance we can deſire from that remarkable expreſſion of the Apoſtle to the *Hebrews*, Heb. 6. 17, 18. *Wherein God willing more abundantly to ſhew to the heirs of promiſe the immutability of his counſel, confirmed it by an oath, that by two immutable things in which it was impoſſible for God to lye, we might have a ſtrong conſolation,* &c. Wherein the Apoſtle obviates and removes all doubts and miſpriſions, leſt God after the declaring of his Will ſhou'd alter the event foretold in it, and that he doth both by ſhewing that God had made an abſolute promiſe, and withal to prevent all doubts, leſt ſome tacite condition might hinder performance, he tell us that God had annexed his oath to it, which two things were the moſt undoubted evidences of the immutability of God's counſel. The word Ψεύδεας here us'd, doth in Scripture often note the fruſtrating of Mens hopes and expectations; ſo it is us'd *Heb.* 3. 17. Ψεύσεται ἔργον ἐλαίας, we render it the *labour of the Olive ſhall fail.* So Hoſ. 9. 2. καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἐψεύσατο αὐτούς, *and the new Wine ſhall fail in her.* Thus the meaning here is, that by two immutable things in which it is impoſſible God ſhou'd fruſtrate the expectations of Men, or alter the events of things after he had declared them. For God's oath is an evi-

dent demonſtration of the immutability of his Will in all predictions to which this is annexed, and doth fully exclude that which the Scripture calls repenting in God, that is, doing otherwiſe than the words did ſeem to expreſs, becauſe of ſome tacite conditions underſtood in them. So we find *Pſal.* 89. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. *If they break my ſtatutes, and keep not my commandments, then will I viſit their tranſgreſſion with the rod, and their iniquity with ſtripes; nevertheleſs my loving kindneſs will I not utterly take from him, nor ſuffer my faithfulneſs to fail; my covenant will I not break; nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips. Once have I ſworn by my holineſs, that I will not lye unto* David. *His ſeed ſhall endure for ever, and his throne as the Sun before me.* Wherein we ſee what way God takes to aſſure us of the immutability of his Covenant with his people, by the oath which he adjoyns to his promiſes; whereby God doth moſt fully expreſs the unalterable determinations of his own Will, in that he ſwears by his own Holineſs that he wou'd not lye unto *David*, i. e. that he wou'd faithfully perform what he had promis'd to him. And therefore *Tertullian* well ſaith, *Beati ſumus quorum cauſa Deus jurat, ſed miſeri & deteſtabiles ſi ne juranti quidem credimus.* It is happy for us believing Creatures, that God ſtoops ſo low as to confirm his Covenant with an oath; but it will be ſad and miſerable for ſuch as dare not venture their Faith upon it, when God hath annex'd his oath unto it. It is thought by Expoſitors, that there is a peculiar emphaſis in thoſe words, אחת נשבעתי *Once have I ſworn*, thereby noting the irrevocable nature of God's oath, that there is no need of repetition of it as among Men, becauſe when once God ſwears by himſelf it is the higheſt demonſtration that no conditions whatever ſhall alter his declared purpoſe. And therefore the Council of *Toledo* well explains the different nature of God's Oath, and his repentance in Scripture; *Jurare namque Dei eſt à ſe ordinata nullatenus convellere; pœnitere vero eadem ordinata cum voluerit immutare*; God is ſaid to ſwear when he binds himſelf abſolutely to performance: and to repent, when things fall out contrary to the declaration of God's Will concerning them; for ſo it muſt be underſtood to be only *mutatio ſententiæ*, and not *conſilii*, that the alteration may be only in the things, and not in the eternal purpoſe of God. But ſince it is evident in Scripture, that many predictions do imply ſome tacite conditions, and many declarations of God's Will do not expreſs his internal purpoſes, it ſeem'd neceſſary in thoſe things which God did declare to be the irrevocable purpoſes of his Will, there ſhou'd be ſome peculiar mark and character ſet upon them for the confirmation of his people's Faith, and this we find to be the annexing an oath to his promiſes. Thus it is in that grand Inſtrument of peace between God and his people, the covenant of Grace, wherein God was pleas'd ſo far to ſtrengthen the Faith of his people in it, that he ratifies the articles of peace therein contain'd, but eſpecially the Act of Grace, on his own part with an oath, thereby to aſſure them it was never his purpoſe to repeal it, nor to fail of performance in it. For we are not to think that an oath lays any greater obligation upon God for performance, than the mere declaration of his Will; it being a part of immutable juſtice, and conſequently neceſſarily imply'd in the Divine nature, to perform promiſes when once made; but God's Oath reſpects us, and not himſelf, *viz.* that it might be a teſtimony unto us that God's Will thereby declar'd is his eternal and unchangeable Will, and ſo the mercies thereby promis'd are ſure mercies; ſuch as are ἀμεταμέλητα, *without any repentance on God's part.*

Concil. Tolet. 8. *c.* 2.

Iſa. 55. 3.

4. *Pre-*

4. *Predictions made by the Prophets concerning Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, do expreſs God's internal purpoſe, and therefore muſt have their certain accompliſhment in the time prefix'd by the Prophets.* The grand reaſon of this propoſition, is, that the beſtowing of Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, doth immediately flow from the Grace and Favour of God, and depends not upon conditions on our part, as procuring cauſes of them, and therefore there can be no account given why God ſhou'd ſuſpend the performance of ſuch promiſes, which wou'd not more ſtrongly have held why he ſhou'd not have made any ſuch promiſes at all. And therefore when we ſee that notwithſtanding the higheſt demerits, God made ſuch free promiſes, we can have no reaſon to think that any other demerits interpoſing between the promiſes and performance, ſhou'd hinder the accompliſhment of them: unleſs it be inſerted in the promiſes themſelves, which is contrary to the nature of free promiſes: Upon this ground all the promiſes relating to the Goſpel ſtate, and to the Covenant of Grace therein contain'd, muſt have their due accompliſhment in the time and manner prefix'd by the Prophets: and therefore the *Jews* are miſerably blind when they ſuppoſe the reaſon why the promiſe of the *Meſſias* is yet deferr'd after ſo long expectation of him, is, the ſins of their people; for this ſeems to ſuppoſe that God's promiſe of the *Meſſias* did depend upon their own righteouſneſs and worthineſs above all other people, which if it doth they are like to be the moſt miſerable and deſperate people the world hath: and beſides, if God's intuition of ſin makes him defer the coming of the *Meſſias*, his foreſight of ſin wou'd have hinder'd him from ever promiſing a *Meſſias* to come: but this was ſo far from being a hindrance of God's promiſe that the main end of the coming of the *Meſſias* was *to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to make an end of ſin, and to bring in everlaſting righteouſneſs.* And we ſee where-ever the Prophets inſiſt on the Covenant of Grace, the promiſe contain'd in it is *the blotting out of tranſgreſſions*, and *remembring ſins no more*, and that merely on the account of God's free Love and for his own Name's ſake: This can be no reaſon then why predictions concerning ſpiritual Bleſſings ſhou'd have their exact accompliſhment, becauſe there can be no bar againſt free Love, and the beſtowing of ſuch Mercies which do ſuppoſe the greateſt unworthineſs of them, as Goſpel Bleſſings do. VII. Dan. 9. 24.

The great difficulty lies in explaining the prophetical phraſes concerning the Goſpel ſtate, which ſeem to intimate a greater advancement and flouriſhing of peace and holineſs therein, than hath as yet been ſeen in the Chriſtian World; which gives the *Jews* the greater occaſion to imagine that the ſtate ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, is not yet eſtabliſhed in the World. But all the difficulty herein ariſeth from the want of conſideration of the Idiotiſms of the prophetical language, eſpecially where it reſpects the ſtate of things under the Goſpel, concerning which, we may obſerve theſe following Rules. VIII.

1. *The Prophets under the Old Teſtament, when they ſpeak of things to come to paſs in the New, do ſet them forth by the repreſentation of ſuch things as were then in uſe among themſelves*; thus the ſpiritual Worſhip of the Goſpel is propheſy'd of, under the notion of the legal Worſhip among the *Jews*; the converſion of *Ægypt* to the Goſpel, is foretold *Iſaiah* 19. 19, 21. by the ſetting up an Altar, and *offering ſacrifice to the Lord:* and the *Converſion of the Gentiles* in general, by the *offering up of incenſe*, Mal. 1. 11. and the ſervice of God under the Goſpel, is ſet forth by

going

going up to Jeruſalem, *and keeping the feaſt of Tabernacles there*, Zach. 14. 16. and the *plentiful effuſion of the Spirit of God in the miraculous gifts*, which attended the preaching of the Goſpel, is ſet forth by the Prophet, *Joel* 2. 28. by *propheſying, and dreaming dreams, and ſeeing viſions*; not that theſe things ſhou'd really be under Goſpel times; but that the Prophets meaning might be the better underſtood by thoſe he ſpake unto, he ſets forth the great meaſure of gifts and Goſpel light under thoſe things which were accounted as the higheſt attainments among themſelves. So the great meaſure and degree of holineſs which was to be under Goſpel times, is ſet forth by the Prophet *Zachary*, Zach. 14. 20. by the placing of the Motto which was among the *Jews* only upon the *High-Prieſt's forehead*, that this ſhou'd be ſo common under the Goſpel, that even *the bells of the horſes ſhould bear it*, *i. e.* thoſe things which ſeem moſt remote from a ſpiritual uſe, ſhou'd be devoted to it, as the Bells were, which were commonly hang'd upon their war-horſes in thoſe mountainous Countries; and in the latter part of that verſe, the height and progreſs of Goſpel holineſs is deſcrib'd under that phraſe, *That the pots in the Lords houſe ſhould be as bowls before the Altar*, *i. e.* ſhou'd be advanc'd from a lower and more ignoble ſervice, to a higher and more ſpiritual degree of holineſs. Now the *Jews* when they obſerve theſe and many other prophetical paſſages relating to the time of the *Meſſias* to run in the old ſtrain of the Law, they preſently conclude that the *Meſſias* muſt not innovate any thing concerning their way or worſhip, but only be ſome great Prince to give them temporal deliverances, and ſo expound all theſe Texts in a literal ſenſe, which were only expreſs'd in ſuch a ſtrain, the better to help the capacities of thoſe they ſpake them to.

2. *Things abſolutely foretold to come to paſs in Goſpel times in a general manner, are to be underſtood comparatively in reference to what was before.* For when the meaſure of their grace or knowledge was ſo far above what was then among the *Jews*, that there was ſcarce any proportion between them, the Prophets made uſe of ſuch expreſſions to ſet it forth by, which might raiſe up the dull apprehenſion of the *Jews* to conceive the juſt meaſure and fulneſs of it. Thus when the Prophets foretel the grand increaſe of ſpiritual knowledge in Goſpel times, they do it in this phraſe, *They ſhall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, ſaying, Know the Lord, for all ſhall know me from the leaſt to the greateſt*, Jer. 31. 33. Where it was far from the Prophets meaning to exclude all uſe of teaching under the Goſpel, (which is contrary to the end of all the Ordinances of the Goſpel; but becauſe teaching doth commonly ſuppoſe great ignorance, he ſets forth the abundance of knowledge which ſhou'd be then, by the excluſion of that which doth imply it. So when it is ſaid that *they ſhall be all taught of God*, the meaning is not, that every one that lives in the Goſpel ſtate, ſhou'd be thus effectually taught by the Spirit of God; but that the number of ſuch under the Goſpel, ſhou'd ſo far exceed thoſe under the Law, that they cou'd hardly apprehend the diſproportion between them, unleſs it had been ſet forth in ſo large an expreſſion. Which leads me to the next Rule.

3. *Things foretold as univerſally or indefinitely to come to paſs under the Goſpel, are to be underſtood as to the duty of all, but as the event only of God's choſen people.* Thus when there is ſo great peace propheſy'd to be in Goſpel times, that then *men ſhould beat their ſwords into plow-ſhares, and*

Iſa. 2. 4. 11. 6, 7.

ſpears

ſpears into pruning-hooks; that the Wolf ſhould lie down with the Lamb, and Leopard with the Kid; that Nation ſhould not lift up ſword againſt Nation, nor learn war any more; with many others to the ſame purpoſe; all theſe ſpeeches are to be underſtood of what the nature and deſign of the Goſpel tends to, and what is the duty of all that profeſs it, and what wou'd effectually be in the Chriſtian world, did all that profeſs the Chriſtian Doctrine, heartily obey the Dictates of it; and ſo far as the Goſpel doth prevail upon any, it ſo far cicurates their wild and unruly natures, that of furious Wolves they become innocent Lambs, and of raging Lions, tender Kids; ſo far from hurting and injuring others, that they dare not entertain any thoughts of ill-will or revenge towards their greateſt enemies. And thus we may ſee, that notwithſtanding the ſeeming repugnancies of the prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the ſtate of the New, with the events which have been obſerv'd in it, yet that all thoſe predictions which concern'd the beſtowing of the ſpiritual Bleſſings which concern'd the Goſpel ſtate, have had their punctual accompliſhment in the ſenſe they were intended.

IX. 4. *Predictions concerning future events where not only the thing its ſelf is foretold, but the ſeveral circumſtances of perſons, time, and place enumerated, are to have their due accompliſhment, and conſequently expreſs God's inward purpoſes.* For thoſe promiſes or comminations which are capable of alteration by ſome tacit conditions imply'd in them, do moſt commonly run in general terms; or elſe are ſpoken by way of immediate addreſs to the perſons concern'd in order to the ſtirring them up the more to the duty God aims at by thoſe comminations; as when *Jonas* limited the *Ninevites* deſtruction to forty days. But when prophecies are recorded, not by way of commination but mere prediction, and particular circumſtances ſet down, it ſtands to reaſon that ſuch prophecies muſt have their certain accompliſhment; and that *firſt*, becauſe God by ſetting down the circumſtances would give them greater evidences that the predictions came from himſelf; as when the Prophet at *Bethel* not only foretold the deſtruction of the Altar there, but particularly named the Man that ſhou'd do it: viz. *Joſias*. So when God by *Iſaiah* call'd *Cyrus* by name, it was doubtleſs a great confirmation to them, that the deliverance of the *Jews* ſhould be by that perſon. *Secondly*, becauſe the circumſtances are intended for Land-marks to know the certainty of the accompliſhment of the prophecy. For when they find the circumſtances fall out exactly according to the prediction, they have no ground to queſtion the accompliſhment of the prophecy. And hence it was that in the grand prophecy of the coming of the *Meſſias* all particular circumſtances were ſo long before foretold. The firſt dawning of his day being to *Adam* after his fall, when the nature he ſhou'd be born of was foretold, *viz.* not Angelical but Human, of the Seed of the Woman. To *Abraham* it was further revealed of what Nation of Mankind, *viz.* from his Poſterity; to *Jacob* at what time, when the *Scepter ſhould be departed from* Judah; and from what Tribe, *viz.* his own; to *Iſaiah* of what perſon in that Family, a Virgin; to *Micah* in what place, *viz. Bethlehem*; and to *Daniel* at what preciſe time, toward the expiring of his ſeventy weeks; which according to the moſt probable computation of them did commence from the ſeventh year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and ſo the 490 years expired near upon our Saviour's paſſion. Now certainly the particular enumeration of all theſe circumſtances ſpoken of ſo long before, and falling out ſo exactly, cou'd not but give the greateſt conviction

ction and evidence, that our bleſſed Saviour was that perſon ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, in whom all theſe ſeveral lines did meet as in their center.

5. Laſtly, *Predictions then expreſs divine purpoſes when many Prophets in ſeveral ages concur in the ſame predictions*; becauſe it is hardly ſeen but all thoſe tacit conditions which are ſuppos'd in general promiſes or comminations may be alter'd in different ages; but when the conditions alter, and the predictions continue the ſame, it is a ſtronger evidence it is ſome immutable counſel of God which is expreſs'd in thoſe predictions. And in this caſe one prediction confirms the foregoing, as the *Jews* ſay of Prophets; *One Prophet that hath the teſtimony of another Prophet, is ſuppos'd to be true*; but it muſt be with this ſuppoſition, that the other Prophet was before approv'd to be a true Prophet. Now both theſe meet in the prophecies concerning our Saviour; for to him bear all the Prophets witneſs; and in their ſeveral ages they had ſeveral things reveal'd to them concerning him; and the uniformity and perfect harmony of all theſe ſeveral prophecies by perſons at ſo great diſtance from each other, and being of ſeveral intereſts and imployments, and in ſeveral places, yet all giving light to each other, and exactly meeting at laſt in the accompliſhment, do give us yet a further and clearer evidence, that all thoſe ſeveral beams came from the ſame Sun, when all thoſe ſcattered Rays were at laſt gathered into one Body again at the appearance of the Sun of Righteouſneſs in the World.

X. Thus have we now cleared when predictions are expreſſive of God's internal purpoſes; by obſervation of which Rules we may eaſily reſolve the other part of the difficulty, when they only expreſs the ſeries and dependencies of things which wou'd have their iſſue and accompliſhment, if God by his immediate hand of Providence did not cut off the entail of effects upon their natural cauſes. Now as to theſe prophecies which concern things conſidered in themſelves, and not preciſely as they are in the counſel of God, we are to obſerve theſe Rules.

1. *Comminations of judgments to come do not in themſelves ſpeak the abſolute futurity of the event, but do only declare what the perſons to whom they are made are to expect, and what ſhall certainly come to paſs, unleſs God by his mercy interpoſe between the threatning and the event.* So that comminations do ſpeak only the *debitum pœnæ*, and the neceſſary obligation to puniſhment; but therein God doth not bind up himſelf as he doth in abſolute promiſes; the reaſon is becauſe comminations confer no right to any, which abſolute promiſes do; and therefore God is not bound to neceſſary performance of what he threatens. Indeed the guilt, or obligation to puniſhment is neceſſary, where the offence hath been committed to which the threatning was annexed; but the execution of that puniſhment doth ſtill depend upon God's arbitrarious Will, and therefore he may ſuſpend or remove it upon ſerious addreſſes made to himſelf in order to it. For ſince God was pleas'd not to take the preſent forfeiture of the firſt grand tranſgreſſion, but made ſuch a relaxation of that penal Law, that conditions of pardon were admittable, notwithſtanding ſentence paſs'd upon the malefactors, there is ſtrong ground of preſumption in Humane Nature that God's forbearance of Mankind notwithſtanding ſin, doth ſuppoſe his readineſs to pardon offenders upon their repentance, and therefore that all particular threatnings of judgments to come, do ſuppoſe incorrigibleneſs in thoſe they are pronounc'd againſt: Upon which the foundation of hope is built, that if timely repentance

pentance do intervene, God will remove thoſe judgments which are threatned againſt them.

And this was certainly the caſe of the *Ninevites* upon *Jonas* his preaching among them. For when the threatning was ſo peremptory, *Yet forty days and* Nineve *ſhall be deſtroyed*, all the hope they cou'd have of pardon muſt be from the general perſwaſions of Men's Souls of God's readineſs to remove judgments upon repentance. For otherwiſe there had been no place for any thing but deſpair, and not the leaſt encouragement to ſupplicate the Mercy of God, which we ſee they did in a moſt ſolemn manner after they were convinc'd theſe comminations came from God himſelf by the mouth of his Prophet. Some think that *Jonas* together with the threatning of judgment did intermix exhortations to repentance; but we can find no probability at all for that on theſe two accounts: Firſt, *Jonas* then wou'd not have been ſo unwilling to have undertaken this meſſage; for as far as we can ſee, the harſhneſs of it was the main reaſon he thought to have avoided it by flying to *Tarſhiſh*. Secondly, *Jonas* wou'd have had no pretence at all for his anger and diſpleaſure at God's pardoning *Nineve*; which is moſt probably conceiv'd to have been, becauſe the *Ninevites* might now ſuſpect him to be no true Prophet, becauſe the event anſwer'd not his prediction. Now there had been no reaſon at all for this, if he had mix'd promiſes together with his threatnings; for then nothing wou'd have fall'n out contrary to his own predictions. And therefore it ſeems evident that the meſſage *Jonas* was ſent with, was only the commination of their ſpeedy ruin, which God did on purpoſe to awaken them the ſooner, and with greater earneſtneſs to repentance, when the judgment was denounc'd in ſo peremptory a manner; altho' it ſeems *Jonas* had before ſuch apprehenſions of the *merciful nature of God*, and his readineſs to pardon, that he might ſuppoſe God's intention by this ſevere denunciation of judgment, might be only to take occaſion upon their repentance, to ſhew his goodneſs and bounty to them. But this was no part of his inſtructions, which he durſt not go beyond in his preaching, whatever his private opinion might be; for the Prophets were to utter no more in their preaching or particular meſſages than was in their commiſſion, and were not to mix their own words with the Word of the Lord. XI. Jonah 3. 4. Jonah 4. 2.

And by this we may further underſtand the denunciation of death to *Hezekiah* by the Prophet *Iſaiah*, *Set thy houſe in order, for thou ſhalt die and not live.* I queſtion not but the Prophet reveal'd to *Hezekiah* as much as God had reveal'd to him (for to ſay as *Molinæus* doth, that the Prophet ſpake theſe words of his own head, before he fully underſtood God's mind, is very harſh and incongruous) but God might at firſt diſcover to *Iſaiah* not his internal purpoſe, but what the nature of the diſeaſe wou'd bring him to (unleſs his own immediate hand of Providence interpos'd) which meſſage he wou'd have *Iſaiah* carry to *Hezekiah* for the tryal of his Faith, and exciting him to the more lively acts of Grace, and for a further demonſtration of God's goodneſs to him in prolonging his Life beyond humane probability and the courſe of Second Cauſes. Now what repugnancy is there to the truth and faithfulneſs of God, that God ſhou'd conceal from his Prophets in their Meſſages the internal purpoſes of his Will, and in order to the doing good to Men ſhou'd only reveal what wou'd certainly have come to paſs unleſs himſelf had otherwiſe determin'd it. And thus the repentance which is attributed to God XII. Iſa. 38. 1. *Molin. Vates, l. 1. c. 26.*

in reference to theſe denunciations of judgments, is far from importing any real mutation in the internal purpoſes of God (a rock ſome have ſplit themſelves upon) but it only ſignifies the outward changing of the Scene towards Men, and acting otherwiſe than the words of the Prophets did ſeem to import; and all the alteration is in the outward diſcovery of his Will, which is certainly far from being any colluſion in God: Unleſs we muſt ſuppoſe God ſo bound up, that he hath no liberty of uſing his own methods for bringing Men to repentance, or for tryal of his People's graces, but muſt in every inſtance of his Word declare nothing but his own internal purpoſes, which is contrary to the general method of God's dealing with the World, which is, to govern Men by his own Laws, and thereby to awaken them to duty, and deter from ſin by his annex'd threatnings, without revealing any thing of his internal purpoſes concerning the ſtate and condition of any particular perſons at all; which threatnings of his, tho' pronounced with the greateſt ſeverity, do not ſpeak God's inward reſolutions as to any particular perſon, but what all muſt expect if they continue impenitent and incorrigible. For the only conditions imply'd in theſe threatnings being repentance, it neceſſarily follows, that where that is wanting, theſe Hypothetical comminations are abſolute predictions of what ſhall certainly come to paſs on all thoſe who are deſtitute of the condition ſuppos'd in them.

XIII. So that where any comminations are pronounced by any in a prophetical way concerning any perſon or people, and no alteration happen at all in them, but they continue impenitent and incorrigible, there the not coming of them to paſs may be a token of a falſe Prophet. For in this caſe the only tacite condition imply'd in theſe threatning prophecies is ſuppos'd to be wanting, and ſo the comminations muſt be underſtood as abſolute predictions: Now in thoſe comminations in Scripture, which are abſolutely expreſs'd, but conditionally underſtood, we find ſomething interpoſing, which we may rationally ſuppoſe was the very condition underſtood. As *Abimelech's* reſtoring of *Sarah* was the ground why the ſentence of death after it was denounced, was not executed upon him: So *Ahab's* Humiliation, *Hezekiah* his earneſt Prayer, the *Ninevites* Repentance, all interpos'd between ſentence and execution, whereby we may be fully ſatisfy'd of the reaſon why theſe denunciations did not take effect: But where the perſons continue the ſame after threatnings that they were before, there is no reaſon why the ſentence ſhou'd be ſuſpended, unleſs we ſhou'd ſuppoſe it to be a mere effect of the patience and long-ſuffering of God, leading Men to repentance and amendment of life: Which is the ground the *Jews* give, why the not fulfilling of denunciations of judgment was never accounted ſufficient to prove a Man a falſe Prophet; to which purpoſe theſe words of *Maimonides* are obſervable in his *Jeſode Thorah*, where he treats particularly on the ſubject of Prophecies: *If a Prophet foretell ſad things, as the death of any one, or famine, or war, or the like; if theſe things come not to paſs, he ſhall not be accounted a falſe Prophet; neither let them ſay, Behold he hath foretold, and it comes not to paſs; for our bleſſed God is ſlow to anger, and rich in mercy, and repenteth of the evil; and it may be that they repent, and God may ſpare them, as he did the Ninevites, or defer the puniſhment, as he did* Hezekiah's. Thus we ſee that prophetical comminations do not expreſs God's internal purpoſes, and therefore the event may not come to paſs, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet.

Gen. 20. 8.

1 King. 21. 19.

Maim. de fund. leg. c. 10. *ſ.* 6.

2. *Pre-*

2. *Predictions concerning temporal bleſſings, do not always abſolutely ſpeak the certainty of the event, but what God is ready to do, if they to whom they are made continue faithful to him:* For which we have ſufficient ground from that place of *Jeremiah* 18. 9, 10. *At what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my ſight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I ſaid I would benefit them.* So *Iſaiah* 1. 19, 20. *If ye be willing and obedient, ye ſhall eat the good of the land; but if ye refuſe and rebel, ye ſhall be devoured with the ſword; for the mouth of the Lord hath ſpoken it.* Whereby we ſee it evident, that all promiſes of Temporal Bleſſings are not to be taken abſolutely, but with the condition of obedience. But this the *Jews* can by no means digeſt, whoſe Rule is, that all prophecies of good things to come muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, or he was no true Prophet who ſpake them: For, ſaith *Maimonides, Whatever good thing God hath promiſed, altho' it be promiſed under a condition, he never revokes it; and we never find that God repented him of any good thing promis'd, but in the deſtruction of the firſt Temple, when God had promis'd to the righteous, they ſhou'd not die with the wicked; but he repented him of his words.* But it is very plain to any one that conſiders the *Jewiſh* Interpretations of Scripture that in them they have always an eye to themſelves, and will be ſure not to underſtand thoſe Scripture which ſeem to thwart their own intereſt, as is moſt apparent in the preſent caſe; for the grand reaſon why the *Jews* inſiſt ſo much on the punctual accompliſhment of all Promiſes of good to be the ſign of a true Prophet is, to uphold their own intereſt in thoſe Temporal Bleſſings which are propheſy'd of concerning them in the Old Teſtament; altho' one wou'd think the want of correſpondency in the event in reference to themſelves, might make them a little more tender of the honour of thoſe Prophecies which they acknowledge to be divine; and have appear'd to be ſo in nothing more than the full accompliſhment of all thoſe threatnings which are denounced againſt them for their diſobedience, even by the mouth of *Moſes* himſelf, *Deut.* 28. from the 15th to the end. Can any thing be more plain and evident, than that the enjoyment of all the privileges conferr'd upon them, did depend upon the condition of their continuing faithful to God's Covenant? The only place of Scripture produced by them with any plauſibility, is that *Jer.* 28. 9. *The Prophet which propheſieth of peace, when the word of the Prophet ſhall come to paſs, then ſhall the Prophet be known that the Lord hath truly ſent him.* For reconciling of which place with thoſe already mention'd, we are to underſtand that here was a particular conteſt between two Prophets, *Hananiah* and *Jeremiah*; *Jeremiah* he foretold evil to come, tho' unwillingly, *ver.* 6. *Hananiah* he propheſyed peace. Now *Jeremiah*, according to God's peculiar directions and inſpiration, appeals to the event to determine whoſe prophecy was the trueſt: Now, ſaith *Jeremiah*, if the prophecy of *Hananiah* concerning peace be fulfill'd, then he is the true Prophet, and I the falſe. And in this caſe when two Prophets propheſy contrary things, it ſtands to reaſon that God will not reveal any thing by the mouth of his own Prophet which ſhall not infallibly come to paſs, that thereby the truth of his own Prophet may be fully manifeſted. Beſides *Jeremiah* refers not merely to the event foretold, but gives a ſudden ſpecimen of his own truth in another prophecy concerning the death of *Hananiah*, which was punctually accompliſh'd the ſame year, *ver.* 17. And which is moſt conſiderable to our purpoſe, both theſe Prophets

XIV. *Ibid. ſ.* 7, 8.

conſidered the ſame people under the ſame circumſtances, and with the ſame conditions; and ſo *Jeremiah*, becauſe of their incorrigibleneſs, foretells deſolation certainly to come; notwithſtanding this, *Hananiah* foretells peace and ſafety, which was contrary directly to God's method of proceeding, and ſo the falſity of his prophecy wou'd infallibly be diſcovered by the event. So that notwithſtanding this Inſtance, it appears evident, that predictions of temporal Bleſſings do ſuppoſe conditions, and ſo have not always the event fulfilled, when the people do not perform their condition of obedience. And thus we have now laid down the Rules whereby the truth of prophecies was to be judg'd; by which it appears what little need the conſtant Prophets had to appeal to Miracles to manifeſt the certainty of Divine Revelation in them. So we have finiſhed our firſt Propoſition concerning the manner of trying Divine Revelation in the Prophets God ſent among his people.

XV. We now come to the ſecond general Propoſition concerning the Prophets. 2. *Prop.* *Thoſe Prophets whom God did imploy upon ſome extraordinary meſſage for confirming the truth of the Religion eſtabliſhed by him, had a power of Miracles conferred upon them in order to that end.* So that we muſt diſtinguiſh the ordinary imployment of Prophets, which was either Inſtruction or Prediction of future events among God's own people, from their peculiar meſſages when they were ſent to give evidence to the truth of that way of Religion which was then ſettled by God's own appointment. Now the Prophets generally did ſuppoſe the truth of their Religion as owned by thoſe they were ſent to, and therefore it had been very needleſs imploying a power of Miracles among them to convince them of that which they believed already. For we never read among all the revolts of the people of the *Jews*, that they were lapſed ſo far as totally to reject the Law of *Moſes*, (which had been to alter the conſtitution of their Common-wealth) altho' they did enormouſly offend againſt the precepts of it, and that in thoſe things wherein the honour of God was mainly concerned, as is moſt plain in their frequent and groſs Idolatry: Which we are not ſo to underſtand as tho' they wholly caſt off the worſhip of the true God, but they ſuperinduced (as the *Samaritans* did) the worſhip of Heathen Idols with that of the God of *Iſrael*. But when the revolt grew ſo great and dangerous that it was ready to ſwallow up the true worſhip of God unleſs ſome apparent evidence were given of the falſity of thoſe Heathen mixtures, and further confirmation of the truth of the eſtabliſhed Religion, it pleaſed God ſometimes to ſend his Prophets on this peculiar meſſage to the main inſtruments of this revolt, as is moſt conſpicuous in that dangerous deſign of *Jeroboam*, when he out of a politic end ſet up his two Calves in oppoſition to the Temple at *Jeruſalem*; and therein it was the more dangerous in that in all probability he deſigned not the alteration of the wor-
1 King. 12. 27. ſhip it ſelf, but the eſtabliſhment of it in *Dan* and *Bethel*. For his intereſt lay not in drawing of the people from the worſhip of God, but from his worſhip at *Jeruſalem*, which was contrary to his deſign of cantonizing the Kingdom, and taking the greateſt ſhare to himſelf. Now that God might confirm his peoples Faith in this dangerous juncture of time, he ſends a Prophet to *Bethel*, who by the working of preſent Mi-
1 King. 13. 2. racles there, *viz. the renting the Altar and withering of* Jeroboam's *hand*, did manifeſt to them that theſe Altars were diſpleaſing to God, and that
1 King. 18. 38. the true place of worſhip was at *Jeruſalem*. So in that famous *Fire-Ordeal* for trying the truth of Religion between God and *Baal* upon Mount

Carmel

Carmel by *Elijah*, God was pleas'd in a miraculous way to give the most pregnant testimony to the truth of his own worship by causing a *fire* to come down from Heaven and *consume the sacrifice*, by which the Priests of *Baal* were confounded, and the people confirmed in the Belief of the only true God: for presently upon the sight of this Miracle the people fall on their faces and say, *The Lord he is God, The Lord he is God.* 1 King. 18. 39. Whereby we plainly see what clear evidence is given to the truth of that Religion, which is attested with a power of Miracles. Thus the Widow of *Sarepta* which was in the Country of *Zidon*, was brought to believe *Elijah* to be a true Prophet by his raising up her Son to Life. And the Woman said to *Elijah*, *Now by this I know that thou art a Man of God, and that the word of the Lord by thy mouth is truth.* 1 King. 17. 24. So we see how *Naaman* was convinc'd of the true God by his miraculous cure in *Jordan* by the appointment of *Elisha*, *Behold now I know that there is no God in all the earth, but in* Israel; by which instances it is demonstrable that 2 King. 5. 15. either the Faith of all these persons was built upon weak and insufficient grounds, or that a power of Miracles is an evident confirmation of the truth of that Religion which is establish'd by them. For this we see was the great end for which God did imploy any of his Prophets to work Miracles, *viz.* to be as an evident demonstration of the truth of what was revealed by him. So that this power of Miracles is not meerly a motive of credibility, or a probable inducement to remove prejudice from the person, as many of our Divines speak, but it doth contain an evident demonstration to Common Sense of the truth of that Religion which is confirm'd by them.

XVI. And thus we assert it to have been in the case of *Moses*, the truth of whose message was attested both among the *Ægyptians*, and the *Israelites* by that power of Miracles which he had. But herein we have the great Patrons of *Moses* our greatest enemies, *viz.* the present *Jews*; who by reason of their enmity to the Doctrine of CHRIST, which was attested by unparallell'd Miracles, are grown very shy of the Argument drawn from thence: Insomuch that their great Dr. *Maimonides* lays down this for a confident Maxim, משה רבנו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות: *The Israelites did not believe in* Moses *our Master for the sake of the Miracles which he wrought.* *Maim. de fund. leg. c. 8. s. 1.* Did they not? the more shame for them: and if they did, the more shame for this great *Rabbi* thus to belye them. But the reason he gives for it is, *Because there may remain some suspicion in ones mind, that all Miracles may be wrought by a power of Magic* or *Incantation:* Say ye so? what, when *Moses* confounded all the Magicians in *Ægypt*, and made themselves who were the most cunning in these things confess it was the finger of God, and at last give out as not able to stand before *Moses?* might one still suspect all this to be done by a Magical power? *Credat Judæus Appella, non ego.* This is much like what another of their Doctors says, whom they call the Divine Philosopher, that *Elisha* his raising the Child to Life, and curing *Naaman*'s Leprosy, and *Daniel*'s escaping the Lions, and *Jonas* out of the Whale's Belly, might all come to pass by the influence of the Stars, or by *Pythonism.* *Jos. Albo. l. 1. c. 18.* Very probable! but it is most true which *G. Vortius* there observes of the *Jews*, *Nihil non nugacissimi mortalium fingunt ne cogantur agnoscere virtute ac digito quasi ipsius Dei Jesum nostrum effeciss̃e miracula sua.* All their design in this is, only to lessen the Miracles of our Blessed Saviour, and to derogate all they can from the Belief of them. Hence they tell us, that nothing is so easy to be done as Miracles; the

mer(

mere recital of the *Tetragammaton* will work wonders, and that by this *Jeremiah* and our Saviour did all their Miracles: It is well yet that he did no more than one of their own Prophets had done before him; but where I wonder do we read that ever the pronouncing of four Letters raiſed one from the dead, who had lain four days in the grave? or by what power did *Chriſt* raiſe himſelf from the dead; (which was the greateſt Miracle of all) cou'd his dead Body pronounce the *Tetragrammaton* to awaken its ſelf with? But *Maimonides* further tells us, that the Miracles which *Moſes* wrought among the *Iſraelites* were merely for neceſſity, and not to prove the truth of his Divine Commiſſion, for which he inſtanceth in dividing the Red ſea, the raining of Manna, and the deſtruction of *Corah* and his complices. But ſetting aſide that theſe two latter were the immediate hand of God, and not Miracles done by *Moſes*; yet it is evident that the intent of them was to manifeſt a Divine Preſence among them: and in the tryal of *Corah Moſes* appeals to God's immediate Providence to manifeſt whether God had immediately imploy'd him or no. For it is evident by the Text, that the main charge they laid againſt *Moſes*, was ambition and uſurpation; *Is it a ſmall thing, ſay they, that thou haſt brought us up out of a Land that floweth with milk and honey, to kill us in the wilderneſs, except thou make thy ſelf altogether a prince over us?* Whereby it is evident they thought that *Moſes* acted out of a private deſign, and aimed at his own honour and authority; which was an imputation of the higheſt nature that cou'd be alledged againſt him. Now ſee how *Moſes* proceeds to clear himſelf, (which is ſufficient to ſtop the mouths of theſe incredulous *Jews*) for he lays the greateſt evidence of his Divine Commiſſion upon a preſent Miracle. And *Moſes* ſaid, *Hereby ſhall ye know that the Lord hath ſent me to do all theſe works; for I have not done them of mine own mind; If theſe men die the common death of all men, then the Lord hath not ſent me*, &c. Can any thing be more plain than that the only intent of this Miracle was to make it appear, that *Moſes* took not his office upon him, but was immediately ſent and imploy'd by God in what he did. But that which will put an end to this controverſy, is God's giving *Moſes* a power to work Miracles for that very end, that the *Iſraelites* ſhou'd believe him, *Exodus* 8. 8, 9. And can we think they wou'd have ever left *Ægypt* as they did, and followed *Moſes* into the wilderneſs, unleſs they had been fully convinced he was a deliverer ſent from God? It is true (that which the *Jews* ſpeak ſo much of) the *ſtatio in monte Sina* was a great confirmation both to their own Faith and to *Moſes* his, according to what God had told him, *Exod.* 3. 12. but yet it follows not hence they had no firm bottom for their Faith to ſtand on before (for then they might have been drowned in the Red ſea as well as the *Egyptians*) but God's knowing their incredulity and readineſs to diſobey his Law, did at the promulgation of it teſtify to their eyes and ears his own preſence in the midſt of them. And this certainly was one of the greateſt Miracles of all: and therefore to oppoſe this to the evidence that is produced by Miracles is only to oppoſe a power of working Miracles to a power of doing them. So vain and empty then, ſo falſe and fallacious, yea ſo directly contrary to Holy Scripture is that *Axiome* of the *Jews*, *Prophetiæ veritas non confirmatur miraculis:* for Miracles are ſufficient evidences of Divine Revelation in any whom God imploys, to all but ſuch as are reſolved not to believe them; and as one well ſaith, *Pertinaciæ nullum remedium poſuit Deus*; *God never works Miracles to convince obſtinate Atheiſts*

Numb. 16. 13.

V. 28, 29.

Exod. 19. 9.

theists and wilful Infidels. This now is the first case wherein Miracles are to be expected, which is, when God imploys any upon an extraordinary message, to be as credentials to confirm their Divine Commission.

CHAP. VII.

The eternity of the Law of *Moses* discussed.

I. *The second case wherein Miracles may be expected, when a Divine positive Law is to be repealed, and another way of worship established instead of it. The possibility in general of a repeal of a Divine Law asserted; the particular case of the Law of* Moses *disputed against the* Jews: II. *the matter of that Law proved not to be immutably obligatory; because the ceremonial precepts were required not for themselues, but for some further end; that proved from* Maimonides *his confession:* III. *the precepts of the Ceremonial Law frequently dispensed with while the Law was in force. Of the Passover of* Hezekiah, *and several other instances.* IV. *It is not inconsistent with the wisdom of* God *to repeal such an established Law.* Abravanel's *arguments answered.* V. *Of the perfection of the Law of* Moses, *compared with the Gospel.* VI. *Whether* God *hath ever declared he would never repeal the Law of* Moses. VII. *Of adding to the precepts.* VIII. *Of the expressions seeming to imply the perpetuity of the Law of* Moses. *Reasons assigned why those expressions are used, tho' perpetuity be not implyed.* IX. *The Law of* Moses *not built upon immutable reason, because many particular precepts were founded upon particular occasions, as the customs of the* Zabii; X. *many ceremonial precepts thence deduced out of* Maimonides; XI. *and because such a state of things was foretold with which the observation of the Ceremonial Law would be inconsistent.* XII. *That largely discovered from the prophecies of the Old Testament.*

I Now come to the second case wherein Miracles may be justly expected, which is, *When something which hath been before established by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and some other way of Worship to be set up instead of it.* Two things are very necessary to be spoken to for the clearing of this Proposition: First, *Whether a Law once established by God himself be capable of a repeal*; Secondly, *What necessity there is of Miracles to manifest God's intention of repealing a former Law.* These two contain the main foundation of the Dispute between the *Jews* and Us, *viz. Whether the Law of* Moses *was ever to be laid aside, and whether the Miracles of our Blessed Saviour were sufficient evidences of God's intention by him to repeal the former Law established by* Moses? I begin with the *first*, Whether a Divine Law in general or the Law of *Moses* in particular I.

may

may be abrogated or repealed, after God himſelf had made it evident that the promulgation of it was from himſelf. This muſt be confeſſed the ſtrongeſt and moſt plauſible plea the preſent *Jews* have for their Infidelity, and therefore the eternity of the Law of *Moſes* is made by them one of the fundamental Articles of their preſent Creed, and is pleaded for with the greateſt ſubtility by their great R. *Abravanel*, who ſpends his whole 13th Chapter *de capite fidei* upon it, but with what ſucceſs, will be ſeen in our clearing of it. There are but three things can be ſuppoſed as the grounds why a Law once promulged by God himſelf, ſhou'd not be capable of Repeal; and thoſe are either firſt, *Becauſe the things themſelves commanded in that Law are of ſuch nature, that they are not capable of being diſpenſed with:* Or ſecondly, *that it is not conſiſtent with the wiſdom of God to repeal a Law once eſtabliſhed:* Or thirdly, *that the reaſon of the Law continuing always the ſame, it would argue mutability in God to revoke that Law, and eſtabliſh another inſtead of it:* If we can therefore demonſtrate, *That the matter of the Law of* Moſes *is of a poſitive and mutable nature, that is ſuitable to the wiſdom of God to alter it*, and *that ſufficient account in reaſon may be given for the alteration of it*; Then there can be no imaginable neceſſity that a Law once having God for its Author, muſt therefore derive from him an eternal and immutable obligation.

II. Firſt then as to the matter of the Law; and here it muſt be ſuppos'd, that in the matter of Controverſy between us and the *Jews*, the queſtion is not of any of thoſe things which are therefore commanded, becauſe they are intrinſecally good, as the precepts of the Natural or Moral Law; but of thoſe things which are therefore only good, becauſe God commands them, *i. e.* things merely poſitive, whoſe worth and value ariſeth not from the intrinſic weight of the things, but from the external impreſs of Divine Authority upon them. Now it is no queſtion on either hand whether God may require theſe things or no; nor whether theſe things will be acceptable unto God, ſo long as he requires them; but whether, when once required, the obligation to them can never ceaſe. Such kind of things among the *Jews* we ſuppoſe all the Rites and Ceremonies of the Law to be; *viz.* Circumciſion, Diſtinction of Meats and Days, Cuſtoms of ſacrificing, and ſuch like, and whatever other Laws reſpected them as a diſtinct and peculiar Common-wealth. All theſe we ſay are ſuch as do not carry an immutable obligation along with them; and that on theſe accounts.

1. Firſt, *Becauſe theſe things are not primarily required for themſelves, but in order to ſome further end.* Things that are required upon their own account, carry an indiſpenſable obligation in them to their performance; but where things are commanded not for themſelves, but the Legiſlator doth expreſs ſome particular grounds of requiring them, there the end and intention of the Legiſlator is the meaſure of their obligation. To which purpoſe *Maimonides* excellently ſpeaks, when he ſays, *That the particular manner of worſhip among the* Jews, *as ſacrifices and oblations, were ſecundum intentionem ſecundam Dei, God's ſecondary intention and deſign; but prayer, invocation, and the like, were nearer God's primary intention: Now*, ſaith he, *for the firſt, they are no further acceptable to God, than as all the circumſtances of time, place, and perſons are obſerved, which are preſcribed by God himſelf; but the latter are acceptable in any perſon, time, or place. And for this cauſe*, ſaith he, *it is that we find the Prophets often reproving men for their too great ſedulity in bringing oblations, and inculcating*

Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 32.

inculcating this to them, that God did not intend these as the principal instances of his worship, and that God did not need any of these things. So 1 *Sam.* 15. 22. *Behold to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken, than the fat of rams:* Isa. 1. 11. *To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord.* And especially *Jerem.* 7. 22, 23. *For I spake not to your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Ægypt, concerning burnt-offerings; but this thing I commanded them, saying, Obey my voice and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people.* Of which words *Maimonides* saith, *Scrupulum moverunt omnibus, quos mihi videre aut audire contigit*; For say they, How can it be that God did not command them concerning Sacrifices, when a great part of the Law is about them: But *Maimonides* well resolves the doubt thus, *That God's primary Intention, and that which he chiefly looked at, was obedience; but God's Intention in sacrifices and oblations, was only to teach them the chief thing, which was obedience.* This then is of the number of those things which are spoken absolutely, but to be understood comparatively; as, *I will have mercy and not sacrifice. My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. It is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost,* &c. So that we see all the goodness which is in these things, is convey'd into them by that which is morally good, which is obedience; and God did never regard the performance of those Laws any further than as it was an expression of obedience, and it was conjoyn'd with those other moral duties which were most agreeable to the Divine Nature. And in this sense many understood that difficult place, *Ezek.* 20. 25. *And I gave them* חקים לא טובים *statutes that were not good*, i. e. say they, *comparatively with these things which were simply and in themselves good*; to which purpose they give this Rule: *Aliquid negatur inesse alicui, quod alterius comparatione existimatur exiguum.* But I rather think that which the *Chaldee* Paraphrast suggests, and others explain further, to be the meaning of that place, *viz.* that by the Precepts that were not good, is meant the cruel and tyrannical impositions of those enemies God for their sins did deliver them over to, which were far from being acceptable to them, which is frequently the sense of Good in Scripture. Thus we see one reason why the Ceremonial Precepts do not in themselves imply an immutable obligation, because they are not commanded for themselves, but in order to a further end.

III. 2. *Because God hath frequently dispensed with the Ceremonial Precepts when they were in greatest force, if the end of them could be attained without them.* Thus the Precept of Circumcision slept during the *Israelites* travels in the Wilderness. Thus *David* ate of the *Shew-bread*, which is expresly forbidden in the Law; the *Jews* think to evade this by distinguishing between the Bread of Confession in the *Eucharistical* Offering, mentioned *Leviticus* 7. 13. and the proper *Shew-bread*: Exod. 29. Now they say *David* ate only of the First, and not of the Second; but 33. this is *Glossa Aurelianensis*, which overthrows the Text; for it is expresly said, that the ground why the Priest gave him Holy Bread, was because there was none there but לחם הפנים, *the shew-bread*, 1 *Sam.* 21. 6. A like violation of the Law without reproof, is commonly supposed by the *Jews* to have been in the siege of *Jericho*, *viz.* in the case of the *Sabbath*. But it is more plain in that *Anomalous Passover* observed by *Hezekiah*, which many of the *Jews* themselves acknowledge was not observed as the *Second Passover*, provided by the Law to be celebrated on the 14 day of the *second month by those who were debarred of* Numb. 9. 11.

the first for their legal uncleanness; but they suppose it to have been intended for the *Legal Passover*; only because the fourteenth of *Nisan* was passed before the Sanctification of the *Temple was finished*, lest they should celebrate none at all that year, they tell us that *Hezekiah* with the consent of the Rulers, did make an Interculation that year of a whole Month, and so *Nisan* was reckon'd for the second *Adar*, and *Jiar* for *Nisan*, from whence they say that *Hezekiah* did intercalate *Nisan* in *Nisan*, that is, added another *Nisan* to the first. But where do we read any such thing permitted in the Law as the celebrating the First *Passover* the 14th of the second Month? But granting that it was observed as a second *Passover*, because of the want of Legal Sanctification both in Priests and People; yet we find great irregularities in the observation of it; for it is expressly said, *That a multitude of the people had not cleansed themselves, yet they did eat the Passover otherwise than it was written.* And yet it is said upon *Hezekiah's prayer*, *that the Lord hearkned to* Hezekiah, , *and healed every one.* So that we see God himself did dispense with the strict Ceremonial Precepts of the Law, where Men did look after the main and substantial parts of the worship God required from them. Nay God himself hath expressly declared his own Will to dispense with the Ritual and Ceremonial Law, where it comes to stand in competition with such things as have an eternal Goodness in them, when he saith, *He desired mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings.* Thus we plainly see that the Ceremonial Law, however positive it was, did yield as to its obligation, when any thing that was Moral, stood in competition with it. And so the *Jews* themselves suppose an open violation of the Judicial Law to have been in the hanging up of *Saul's* Sons, a long time together, directly contrary to *Deut.* 21. 23. which they conceive to have been from the 16 of *Nisan* to the 17 of *Marcheshvan*, which is as much as from our *March* to *September*, whereas the Law saith expressly that the *body of one that is hanged shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt in any wise bury him that day.* One of the *Jewish Rabbies*, as *G. Vorstius* tells us, is so troubled at this, *That he wisheth that place in* Samuel *expunged out of Scripture, that the Name of God might be sanctified.* But whether this were done על פי הביד, *by the command of the Oracle or no*, or whether only by a general Permission, we see it was *acceptable unto God*; for upon that the *Gibeonites famine* was *removed, and God was intreated for the land.* Thus we have now proved that there is no immutable and indispensable obligation which ariseth from the things themselves.

2 Chron. 29. 17.

Vid. Selden de Anno civili Jud. cap. 9.

2 Chron. 30. 18.

Ver. 20.

Hos. 6. 6.

2 Sam. 21. 9, 10.

Vorst. Not. in Abrav. c. 13.

IV. Secondly, It is no way inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to repeal such a Law when once established. The main argument of that learned *R. Abravanel*, whereby he wou'd establish the eternity of the Law of *Moses*, is fetched from hence, *That this Law was the result of the Wisdom of God, who knows the suitableness of things he appoints to the ends he appoints them for; as God hath appointed bread to be the food of Man's body: Now we are not to enquire why God hath appointed bread and no other thing to be the food of Man; no more*, saith he, *are we to enquire why God hath appointed this Law rather than another for the food of our Souls; but we are to rest contented with the counsels of God, tho' we understand not the reason of them.* This is the substance of that Argument, which he more largely deduceth. To which we answer, that his Argument holds good for Obedience to all God's positive Precepts of what kind or nature soever they be, so long as we know their Obligation to continue; but all the

Abravanel Rosh. Amanana, c. 13.

the queſtion is, whether every poſitive Precept muſt always continue to oblige. And thus far his ſimilitude will hold good, that whatever God doth command, we are to look upon it to be as neceſſary to our Souls, as bread to our Bodies; but hence it follows not that our Souls muſt be always held to the ſame poſitive Precepts, any more than our Bodies to the ſame kind of food. Nay, as in our Bodies we find ſome kind of food always neceſſary, but the kind of it to alter according to age, health, and conſtitutions; ſo we ſay ſome kind of Divine Revelation is always neceſſary; but God is graciouſly pleaſed to temper it according to the age and growth of his People; ſo he fed them as with Milk in their Non-age, with a Ritual and Ceremonial Law, and trained them up by degrees under the Nurſery of the Prophets, till the Church was grown to age, and then God fed it with the ſtrong Meat, which is contained in God's Revelation of his Will by the Goſpel of his Son. And therein was abundantly ſeen God's πολυποίκιλος σοφία, his *variegated Wiſdom*, that he made choice of ſuch excellent and proportionable ways to his People's capacity to prepare them gradually for that full and compleat Revelation, which was reſerved for the time of the appearance of the true *Meſſias* in the World. For can any thing be more plain than the gradual progreſs of divine Revelation from the beginning of the World? That fair reſemblance and portraicture of God himſelf, and his Will upon his Word (if I may ſo expreſs it) had its Ground-work laid upon Man's firſt Apoſtacy in the Promiſe made *Gen.* 3. 15. whereon ſome further lines were drawn in the times of the Patriarchs, but it had its σκιαγραφία, it was ſhadowed out the moſt in the Typical and Ceremonial Law, but was never filled up to the life, nor had its perfect ζωογραφία, 'till the Son of God himſelf appeared unto the World. If then it be inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God to add any thing to the Law of *Moſes*, why not to the Revelation made to *Adam* or the Patriarchs? or eſpecially to the ſeven Precepts of *Noah*, which they ſuppoſe to have been given to all Mankind after the Flood? If it were not repugnant to the Wiſdom of God to ſuperadd Rituals and Ceremonials to Morals and Naturals, why ſhall it be to take down the ſcaffolds of Ceremonies, when God's Spiritual Temple the Church of God is come to its full height? Is there not more reaſon that Rituals ſhou'd give place to Subſtantials, than that ſuch ſhou'd be ſuper-induced to Morals?

V. There are only two things can be pleaded by the *Jews* why it ſhould be more repugnant to the Wiſdom of God to add to the Law of *Moſes*, than to any former Revelation, which are the greater perfection they ſuppoſe to be in this Revelation above others, and that God in the promulgation of it did expreſs that he would never alter it. But both theſe are manifeſtly defective and inſufficient, in order to the end for which they are produced. For *firſt*, what evidence is there that the Law of *Moſes* contained ſo great perfection in it, as that it was not capable of having any additions made to it by God himſelf? We ſpeak not now of the perfection of the Moral Law, which it is granted contained in it the foundation of all poſitive Precepts; for this we never contend for the abrogation of, but the Ritual Law is that we meddle with; and is it poſſible any Men ſhou'd be ſo little befriended by Reaſon as to think this to be the utmoſt pitch of what God cou'd reveal to the World, as to the way of his own Worſhip? Let any indifferent rational perſon take the Precepts of the Goſpel, and lay them in the balance with thoſe of the Ceremonial Law, and if he makes any ſcruple of deciding on Pſal. 19. 10.

which ſide the over-weight lies, we may have cauſe to ſuſpect him forſaken of that little Reaſon which gave him the name of Man. Let but the fifth of *Matthew* be laid againſt the whole book of *Leviticus*, and then ſee whether contains the more excellent Precepts and more ſuitable to the Divine Nature? I ſpeak not this to diſparage any thing which had once God for the Author of it, but to let us ſee how far God was from the neceſſity of Natural Agents to act to the height of his ſtrength in that diſcovery of his Will. God is wiſe as well as righteous in all his ways; as he can command nothing but what is juſt; ſo he will command nothing but what is good, nay excellent in its kind. But tho' all the Stars be in the ſame Firmament, *yet one Star differs from another in glory*; though they may be all Pearls, yet ſome may be more *Orient* than others are; every place of Holy Scripture may have its Crown, but ſome may have their *Aureolæ*, a greater excellency, a fuller and larger capacity than the other hath; every parcel of Divine Revelation may have ſome perfection in its kind, yet there may be ſome *monſtra perfectionis* in *Scaliger*'s expreſſion that may far out-vye the Glory and Excellency of the reſt. Can we think the miſts and umbrages of the Law could ever caſt ſo glorious a Light as the Sun of Righteouſneſs himſelf in his Meridian Elevation? As well may we think a dark ſhady paſſage more magnificent and glorious than the moſt princely Palace, a Picture drawn in charcoal more exquiſite and curious than the lines of *Apelles*, ſome imperfect rudiments more exact and accurate than the moſt elaborate work, as go about to compare the Law of *Moſes* with the Goſpel of *Jeſus Chriſt* in point of excellency and perfection. Let the *Jews* then boaſt never ſo much of their *gradus Moſaicus*, and how much it exceeds the degree of Revelation in other Prophets, we know if his light be compar'd with what the Goſpel communicates, *Moſes* himſelf ſaw but as in a glaſs darkly, and not in *ſpeculo lucido*, as the *Jews* are wont to ſpeak. We honour *Moſes* much, but we have learnt to honour him at whoſe Transfiguration he was preſent, more; neither can that be thought any diſparagement to him, who accounted *the reproach of Chriſt greater riches than the treaſures of Ægypt.*

VI. *But it may be, tho' the Law in its ſelf be not ſo abſolutely perfect, yet God may have declared he will never alter it, and then it is not conſiſtent with Divine Wiſdom to repeal it.* Very true: God will never alter what he hath ſaid he will not; but where is it that he hath thus bound up himſelf? Is it in that noted place to this purpoſe, *Thou ſhalt not add thereto nor diminiſh from it?* So indeed *Maimonides* argues; but therein more like a *Jew* than himſelf; and yet one of his own Nation therein far more ingenuous than he, gives a moſt ſufficient anſwer to it, which is *R. Joſ. Albo*, whoſe words are thus produced by *Vorſtius* and others; *The Scripture only admoniſheth us, that we ſhould not add to nor diminiſh from God's commands according to our own wills; but what hinders*, ſaith he, *but God himſelf may according to his own Wiſdom add or diminiſh what pleaſeth?* But are they in good earneſt when they ſay God bound up himſelf by this Speech? whence came then all the Prophetical Revelations among the *Jews?* did theſe add nothing to the Law of *Moſes*, which was as much the Will of God when revealed by them, as any thing was revealed by *Moſes* himſelf? or will they ſay that all thoſe things were contained for the ſubſtance in the Law of *Moſes*, as to what concerned practice? Very true; but not in the Ceremonial, but the Moral Law; and ſo we ſhall not ſtick to grant that the whole duty of Man may be reduced

Deut. 12. 32.

Maimon de de fund. leg. c 9. ſ. 1. Ikkarim l. 3. c. 14.

duced to that. But if adding to the Precepts be the doing of God's Commands in another way than he hath preſcribed, and diminiſhing from them be merely not to do what God hath commanded, as ſome conceive, then theſe words are ſtill more remote from the ſenſe affixed on them by the incredulous *Jews*. For why may not God himſelf add to his own Laws, or alter the form of them, altho we are always bound directly to follow God's declared will? May not God enlarge his own Will, and bring his Scholars from Rudiments of their non-age to the higher knowledge of thoſe who are full grown? or muſt the World of neceſſity do that which the old *Roman* ſo much abhorred, *ſeneſcere in elementis, wax gray in learning this A, B, C?* or was the Ceremonial Law like the *China* Characters, that the World might ſpend its Age in conning of them? But it appears that there was no other meaning in that ſtrict prohibition, than that Men ſhou'd not of their own heads offer to find out new ways of worſhip as *Jeroboam* did, but that God's Revelation of his own Will in all its different degrees was to be the adequate Rule of the way and parts of his own worſhip. And I wou'd fain know of the *Jews* whether their own ſevere and ſtrict Prohibitions of things not at all forbidden in the Law of God, and that on a religious account, as סיג לתורה *a boundary to the Law*, come not nearer the adding to God's Law, than God's own further declaration of his Will doth? All the diſpute then muſt be, not whether God may add to his own Law, but whether the Goſpel be a prohibited addition to the Law of *Moſes*; that is whether it be only the invention of Men, or it be the expreſs declaration of the Will of God? As to which controverſy, he is no true Chriſtian who dare not readily joyn iſſue with them, and undertake to prove by all the Arguments by which they believe the Law of *Moſes* to have been of Divine Revelation, that the Goſpel of *Chriſt* is a clear Manifeſtation of the Will of God. But of that afterwards.

VII. From hence it is evident that God hath not by this place tied up himſelf from any further Manifeſtation of his Mind beyond the Law of *Moſes*; but it may be they may put a greater confidence in thoſe expreſſions which ſeem neceſſarily to imply a perpetual and unalterable obligation in the Law of *Moſes*: For, ſaith the late learned *Rabbi Manaſſeh Ben Iſrael*, *If by ſuch expreſſions as thoſe are uſed in Scripture which ſeem to import the perpetuity of the Law of* Moſes, *ſomewhat elſe ſhould be meant than they ſeem to expreſs; what did* Moſes *and the Prophets in uſing them but lay a ſtumbling-block in the ways of Men, whereas they might have ſpoken clearly, and told us there ſhould a time come when the Ceremonial Law ſhould oblige no longer?* This being a charge of ſo high a nature, muſt not be diſmiſt without a particular enquiry into the expreſſions which are the ground and reaſon of it. The places moſt inſiſted on by the *Jews* are *Deut.* 29. 29. *Things which are revealed belong to us and to our Children* עד עולם *for ever.* So *Levit.* 23. 14. the precept of offering the firſt fruits is there called חקת עולם *a ſtatute for ever*; and that of the *Paſſover*, *Exod.* 12. 17. where the ſame expreſſion is uſed. From hence they infer that no alteration can happen as to the Ceremonial Law, ſince God himſelf hath declared that it ſhall continue for ever. To this common argument of the *Jews*, it is in general reply'd, That the word in which the main force of the argument lies, doth not carry with it an abſolute perpetuity, but it ſignifies according to the ſubject it is joyned with. So when it is apply'd to God, it ſignifies Eternity, not

Manaſſ. Concil. in Levit. 9. 7.

not ſo much from the mere importance of the word, as from the neceſ-
Maimon. More Nev. p. 2. c. 28. ſary exiſtence of the Divine Nature. Thence *Maimonides* himſelf can ſay, *Proinde ſciendum eſt quod Olam non neceſſario ſignificet æternitatem, niſi ei conjungantur Ed* (עד *vel* עד) *idque vel poſt illud ut Olam vaed, vel ante at Ad Olam.* Altho' this Rule of his hath no certainty at all in it, as appears from his Collection of it, which is becauſe it is ſaid, *Pſal.* 10. 16. *The Lord he is King Olam vaed, for ever and ever:* but as I ſaid already, that it is not from the ſignification of the word, but the nature of the thing. And it is moſt plain in Scripture that עולם is ſo far from implying a neceſſary perpetuity, that it is apply'd to ſuch things as can have no long duration, as *Exod.* 21. 6. *and he ſhall ſerve him,* לעולם, that is, (as the *Jews* themſelves expound it) *to the next Jubilee, tho' it were near or a far off.* So 1 *Sam.* 1. 22. where *Samuel* is ſaid *to abide before the Lord* ערעולם *for ever,* where we find *Maimonides* his *Ad Olam* in a ſenſe very far ſhort of Eternity; this is ſo plain that the formerly cited *R. Joſeph Albo* doth in terms confeſs it, and produceth a multitude of other places to the ſame purpoſe. For which tho' he be ſufficiently cenſured by his Brethren, yet we may ſee there may be ſome ingenuity left in a *Jewiſh Rabbi,* even in the grand diſpute concerning the Eternity of the Law of *Moſes.*

VIII. All the difficulty now is to aſſign ſome rational accounts why ſuch Precepts which God did not intend ſhou'd be always obligatory, yet ſhou'd be enforced upon them in ſuch expreſſions which may ſeem at leaſt to imply a Perpetuity. Of which theſe may be given. Firſt, *That theſe Precepts to which theſe expreſſions are annexed, ſhou'd not be looked on as mere ambulatory Laws that did only concern them in their travels thro' the Wilderneſs, and not continue obligatory when they were ſettled in* Canaan. For which purpoſe we are to obſerve, That tho' all the Laws were given in one body in the Wilderneſs, yet the obligation to all of them did not commence at the ſame time, neither were they to continue for the ſame duration; theſe three ſorts of Precepts may be obſerved among them; firſt ſuch as concerned them only in their preſent condition, as that about the Tabernacle, which was then a moveable Temple among them, ſuitable to their condition; but when they were ſettled, God was to have a ſettled Houſe too. So that Precept of going without *the camp,* Deut. 32. 12. had an immediate reſpect to their Peregrination. *Secondly,* Such Precepts as were given them, but they were not bound to perform them 'till their ſettlement in *Canaan, as driving out the Canaanites,* Numb. 33. 52. *building the Temple in the place which God ſhou'd chooſe, erecting Judicatories in their ſeveral Cities, chooſing a King,* &c. *Thirdly,* There were ſuch Precepts as concern them where-ever they were, whether in the Wilderneſs or in *Canaan*; now theſe are the Precepts which are ſaid to be perpetual. This is the ac-
Grot. de Verit. Rel. Chriſt. l. 5. ſ. 7. count given of it by *H. Grotius*; but becauſe this may be liable to ſome Exceptions, I therefore add, *Secondly,* That the reaſon of thoſe expreſſions being annexed to the Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, is, *Becauſe they were to continue obligatory 'till ſuch a remarkable period of time came which ſhould alter the ſtate of things among them.* And ſuch a period of time the coming of the *Meſſias* is by themſelves ſuppoſed to be, when in their famous computation they make three *Epocha's,* Before the Law, Under the Law, and the Coming of the *Meſſias.* And it is evident yet by them, that they do ſtill expect a wonderful alteration of the ſtate of things when the *Meſſias* comes; doth it not therefore ſtand to reaſon

that

that לעולם ſhou'd be added to ſuch things which were to continue 'till ſo great alteration as ſhou'd be on the coming of the *Meſſias*, eſpecially if the Coming of the *Meſſias* had been deferred ſo long as they falſly ſuppoſe it to be? But however, granting that a new ſeries of times or αἰὼν is to commence from the *Meſſias*, there is very great reaſon why that expreſſion ſhou'd be added to thoſe things which were to continue as long as the αἰὼν did, *i. e.* 'till *Meſſias* came, which we freely acknowledge. And in this ſenſe is עולם often taken for ſuch a durati on of things which had ſome remarkable period to conclude it, as in the caſe of the *Jubilee*, in the Servant mentioned, and the ſpecial imployment which God called *Samuel* to, in this caſe, as to the event, or the end of his life in *Hannah*'s deſignation, when ſhe ſaid he ſhou'd attend upon the Lord for ever. *Thirdly*, Thoſe Precepts are ſaid *to endure for ever, which would ſtill have continued obligatory, unleſs God himſelf had altered the obligatian of them by a new Revelation of his Will.* For in this caſe it is moſt certain that all poſitive Precepts coming immediately from God, do carry with them an unalterable obligation, unleſs the Legiſlator himſelf do in as evident a way repeal them as he did once eſtabliſh them; that is in ſuch Laws which depend merely upon God's Poſitive and Arbitrary Will. For in this caſe God allows none to alter any thing concerning his Law; but indiſpenſable obedience is our duty 'till God himſelf repeal his former Laws. And this we aſſert to be the caſe of the Goſpel. So that it appears plainly that it implies nothing inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God to repeal an eſtabliſhed Poſitive Law, tho' ſome expreſſions to prejudiced minds ſeem to imply a perpetuity in it.

IX. We come therefore to the third thing which may make a Poſitive Law unalterable, which is, when the reaſon of it is immutable; for then, ſay they, it wou'd argue mutability in God to repeal it. If we can therefore make it evident that the Ceremonial Law was not eſtabliſhed on an immutable Reaſon, and that the Reaſon on which it was eſtabliſhed doth ſuppoſe a ſtate of things to come, in which it ſhou'd expire, then there cannot be the leaſt pretence of mutability in God on the repeal of ſuch a Law. Firſt, *That it was not eſtabliſhed upon an immutable Reaſon:* The immutable Reaſon of a Law muſt either be fetched from the nature of the things commanded, or the grounds of the eſtabliſhing of it; we have already proved that the nature of the Poſitive Precepts of the Ceremonial Law do not carry in them an intrinſecal goodneſs. And here the Sophiſtry of the *Jews* is apparently diſcovered, that when they are preſſed with this, they take ſanctuary in the *Decalogue*, or ſome Spiritual Precepts, which comprehend in them the general foundation of the Law; as *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. whereas theſe are very remote from the matter in controverſy, which concerns not what Precepts were moral in their Law, but what were purely ceremonial; which were ſo far from being founded on an immutable Reaſon, that the particular occaſion of the giving of many of them, is particularly aſſigned them by their own Writers; eſpecially in the main parts of the Ceremonial Worſhip of God among them, the reaſons of which *Maimonides* ſaith may be deduced from the Cuſtoms of the *Zabaiſts*, the knowledge of whoſe Opinions and Cuſtoms, he tells us, is *porta magna ad reddendas præceptorum cauſas, gives much light to the Law of* Moſes; and particularly of himſelf, he ſaith, *Quod multarum legum rationes & cauſæ mihi innotuerint ex cognitione fidei, rituum*

Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 29.

rituum & cultus Zabiorum; that he came to the right underſtanding of many of the Laws of *Moſes* by his knowledge in the Rites and Cuſtoms of theſe *Zabaiſts*. Granting therefore the *Hypotheſis* of this learned *Rabbi*, that the Precepts of the Law had moſt of them a particular reſpect to the idolatrous Cuſtoms of theſe People; what will hence follow but only this, that the reaſon of the Ceremonial Precepts did reſpect the Cuſtoms in uſe when they were given, and ſo are not founded upon an immutable Reaſon? And the more the Precepts are whoſe Reaſon is to be fetched from hence, the more plain and evident is the thing we intended by it, *viz. That the Ceremonial Law is not founded upon an unalterable Reaſon.*

X. Now from this one head of the idolatrous Cuſtoms of thoſe Nations about them hath that learned Author deduced the Reaſons of very many of the moſt obſcure Commands of the Ceremonial Law: As that concerning *rounding the corner of their heads*, which *Herodotus* tells us was the Cuſtom of the *Arabians*, and others of the *Babylonian* Prieſts; by both which the *Zabii* may be meant, the ſuperſtition of the *Zabii* being *Chaldæan*, as I have ſhewed already, and their Name, as ſome conceive, from *Saba* the Son of *Chus*, whoſe poſterity were ſeated in *Arabia*, near to the Red Sea; and that which confirms this opinion, is, that the *Sabeans* did as *Philoſtorgius* ſaith, *Worſhip the Sun and Moon*, as the *Zabaiſts* did in *Maimonides*; and withal *Bochartus* makes it evident from *Strabo*, that ſome of the *Babylonians* called *Gerrhæi*, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Country of the *Sabeans*, whereby this originally *Chaldaic* ſuperſtition might ſpread its ſelf in theſe parts near the confines of *Judæa*, which might be the cauſe why all thoſe Rites, which were uſed by theſe idolatrous People, are ſo ſeverely forbidden to the *Jews*: God thereby ſetting up a Wall of Separation between his People and the Nations round about them, by making the Cuſtom of the *Jews* almoſt *Antipodes* to theirs; as thoſe of *Japan* are to them of *China*. Upon the ſame ground it is ſuppoſed that other Precepts were made againſt *wearing a garment of linen and woollen*, becauſe the idolatrous Prieſts *uſed to go ſo cloathed*, as *Maimonides* tells us out of their Books, and likewiſe that prohibition of a *woman's wearing the armour of a man, and a man's wearing the garments of a woman* is very probably ſuppoſed to have had its original from that idolatrous Cuſtom mentioned by the ſame Author, *Ut vir geſtet Veſtimentum muliebre coloratum quando ſtat coram ſtella Veneris; ſimiliter ut mulier induat loricam & arma bellica quando ſtat coram ſtella Martis*; but that Author doth not deny a further reaſon to be couched in it for the preſervation of publick honeſty. Many other Precepts are drawn from the ſame fountain by that ſame Author, as *the ſowing of divers ſeeds in the ſame ground*; *the forbidding the eating of the fruit of their trees for the firſt three years after they came to* Canaan; that being the furtheſt time wherein the trees of their own plantation wou'd begin to bear in that Country. Now it was the Cuſtom of all thoſe idolatrous People, that the firſt time any tree did bear, part of the fruit was to be burnt up in an offering to the Idol, and the other part eaten in the Idol-Temple; or elſe they ſuppoſed their trees wou'd never proſper: Now in oppoſition to this, God bids them bring the fruit of the Fourth year to him, and eat of the Fifth themſelves, *that it may yield unto you the increaſe thereof.* So the Idolaters threatned all parents that their Children wou'd never live, unleſs they *cauſed them to paſs thro' the fire*; from which Cuſtom *Maimonides* ſaith, *Some even in his time would take the children that were new born*

Levit. 19. 27. *V. Voſſ. in Maimon. de Idololat. c. 12.*

Bochart. Phaleg l. 4. c. 8.

Levit. 19. 19. *Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 37.* Deut. 22. 5. *V. Selden de Diis Syriis, Synt. 2. cap. 4.*

Lev. 19. 19. Lev. 19. 23.

Levit. 19. 24, 25.

born, and move them up and down over a fire wherein odoriferous ſmells were caſt. Thence comes that ſtrict Prohibition of *giving the children to* Moloch, which was by that Cuſtom of paſſing through the fire. To this ſame Head, the ſame Author refers that of *not eating the member of a living creature*, which we render *fleſh with the life thereof*; which was forbidden, as he elſewhere tells us, not only for avoiding cruelty, but becauſe the *Heathen Nations were wont in their idolatrous Feaſts to take a member off from a living creature, and eat it afterwards*; and in them likewiſe he ſuppoſeth they uſed the *boiling the fleſh and the milk together, which*, ſaith he, *beſides that it affords a moſt groſs nouriſhment, ſavours of their idolatrous practices too*; *and therefore*, ſaith he, *it is obſervable that twice where this Precept is mentioned, it follows that of the ſolemn appearance of the males at* Jeruſalem *trice a year, whereby it ſeems to be imply'd that this action had relation to ſome great ſolemnity.* Theſe and ſeveral other Precepts of the Law of *Moſes* are deduced by that very learned *Rabbi* from idolatrous Cuſtoms, as the occaſions of them; which ſeem to have the more reaſon in them, becauſe that God did in the general ſo ſtrictly *forbid the Jews to walk after the cuſtom of the Nations about them.* Thence *Origen* takes notice of the τὸ ξενίζον τῶν νόμων. καὶ πῶς ἰδιότροπον καθ' αὐτὰς πολιτείαν; for which he ſaith, they were διαβεβλημένοι, *reproached by the Heathens, becauſe their Laws and Polity were ſo different from the Cuſtom of other Nations.* Thus we ſee then that many Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, were founded neither on the goodneſs of the things themſelves, nor on any unalterable reaſon, but were enforced on a peculiar reaſon on the People of the *Jews* at that time, as they were a People ſeparated from the reſt of the world for the worſhip of the true God. And for the other great offices wherein their Religion did ſo much conſiſt, *viz.* Sacrifices, Diſtinction of Meats, Obſervation of Feſtivals, Circumciſion, and ſuch like: The particular account and reaſon of them is either ſo evident in the Law its ſelf, or ſo fully acknowledg'd by their own Writers, that it is here ſuperfluous to inſiſt on them; eſpecially ſince ſo many have done that ſo largely already (particularly *Grotius*) whoſe labours I intend not to tranſcribe.

Levit. 20. 2, 3. Gen. 9. 4. *Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 48.* Exod. 23. 17, 19. 34. 26. Levit. 20. 23. *Origen. contra Celſum l. 4.* *Grot. de veritate Rel. Chriſt. l. 5.*

XI. I come therefore to the ſecond thing, which is, *That the Ceremonial Law was ſo far from being founded on an immutable reaſon, that while it was in its greateſt force ſuch a ſtate of things was plainly foretold, with which the obſervation of that Law would be inconſiſtent.* For which we are to conſider, that tho' the Law of *Moſes* ſeemed outwardly to reſpect the temporal advantages of the People embracing it in the Land of *Canaan*; yet there was a Spring of Spiritual Promiſes whoſe head was higher than *Jordan* was, that ran down from the Patriarchs, and was more fully opened to ſome of them, which tho' it ſeemed to run under ground in the midſt of the Ceremonial Obſervations of the Law; yet it frequently brake forth and opened its ſelf in the midſt of them, and by degrees in the Prophetical Age did make its ſelf a larger Channel, 'till in the time of the *Meſſias* by its force and violence it overthrew thoſe banks which ſtood in the way of it, and overſpread the face of the whole Earth. It is evident by the whole ſeries of the Scripture of the Old Teſtament, that God's ultimate intention was not to confine the ſaving Knowledge of his Will only to the *Jews*; for the great Promiſe to *Abraham* was, *That in his ſeed all the nations of the earth ſhould be bleſſed*; And as *Abraham rejoyced to ſee that day afar off*; ſo good *Jacob*, when he leaned on his *Jacob's* Staff, took the height of that *Day-Star*

from on high, which tho' like ſome of the fix'd Stars, might not for ſome time be viſible to the inferior World; yet foretold the time when he ſhou'd deſcend into a lower Orb, and become conſpicuous in our Horizon. And conſequently to his appearance in the World, wou'd be the drawing not ſo much the Eyes as the Hearts of the World to him;
Gen. 2. 49. 10. for no ſooner is it mentioned that *Shiloh comes when the Scepter departs from Judah*; but it immediately follows, *And to him ſhall the gathering of the people be.* Thus we ſee before ever the Law of *Moſes* came to incloſe the People of the *Jews* as *Gods peculiar people*, there was a deſign on foot, for inlarging the bounds of God's Inheritance, and *making the uttermoſt parts of the earth his Son's poſſeſſion.* Can we then think that the Law which came afterwards, cou'd diſannul the Covenant made
Gal. 4. 17. 430 years before, as the Apoſtle excellently reaſons? Can we believe the Moſaical diſpenſation was the utmoſt of what God did intend, when God had before promiſed that the Bleſſing of *Abraham* ſhou'd come
Rom. 4. 10. 11. upon us *Gentiles* alſo? To which purpoſe it is very obſervable, that *Abraham was juſtify'd not in circumciſion, but in uncircumciſion; for he received the ſign of circumciſion, a ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith, being uncircumciſed, that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumciſed; that righteouſneſs might be imputed unto them alſo.* Whereby it is evident that the great Bleſſings promiſed to *Abraham*, did not reſpect him merely as Progenitor of the *Iſraelites*, but in a higher capacity, as *Father of the faithful*; and that ground of his acceptance with God did not depend on any Ceremonial Rite, ſuch as Circumciſion was, God imputing his Faith for Righteouſneſs before his being circumciſed. But becauſe the time was not yet come wherein the grand Myſtery of Man's Salvation by the death of the Son of God was to be revealed; therefore when God called the Nation of the *Jews* from their bondage, he made choice of a more obſcure way of repreſenting this Myſtery to them through all the umbrages of the Law: and withall inforced the Precepts with ſuch terrible ſanctions of curſes to *all that continued not in all that was written in that Law to do it*, to make them the more apprehenſive that the ground of their acceptance with God, cou'd not be the performance of the Precepts of that Law, but they ought to breathe after that higher diſpenſation wherein the way and method of Man's Salvation ſhould be fully *revealed when the fulneſs of time was come.* Now therefore God left them under the tutorage and *Pædagogy* of the Law, which ſpake ſo ſeverely to them, that they might not think this was all God intended in order to the happineſs of Men, but that he did reſerve ſome greater thing in ſtore to be enjoy'd by his People when they were come to Age.

XII. So that tho' the Ceremonies of the Law had not a Mouth to ſpeak out *Chriſt*; yet they had a Hand to point to him; for they were the ſhadow or dark repreſentation of that which was to be drawn afterwards to the greateſt life. And this was underſtood by all thoſe whoſe hearts were carried beyond the outward ſapleſs Letter of the Law, to the more inward and ſpiritual meaning of it, (there being an ἐσωτερικὰ and ἐξωτερικὰ in the Law as well as Philoſophy,) theſe Myſteries were too not ſo veiled and hidden, but all that were ἐπόπται, *fully initiated*, might fully underſtand them; which made that true Spiritual *Cabbala*, which was conſtantly preſerved among the *Iſraelites*, which was more largely commented on by the Prophets of ſucceeding Ages; whoſe care it was to unlock this *Cabbala*, and to raiſe up the hearts of the People in a higher

a higher expectation of the great things which were to come. Thence we not only read of the ſolemn Prayer of the Church of the *Jews*, that the knowledge of God might be *diſperſed over all the Nations of the earth*, but we have many Prophecies *that when the mountain of the Lord's houſe ſhou'd be exalted, all nations ſhould flow unto it: that from the riſing of the Sun to the going down thereof, God's name ſhall be great among the Gentiles, and in every place incenſe ſhould be offered to his name, and a pure offering, for his name ſhall be great among the Heathen.* That the Inſcription on the High-Prieſt's Forehead, *Holineſs to the Lord*, ſhou'd by reaſon of the large diffuſion of a Spirit of Holineſs in the days of the Goſpel, *be ſet upon the bells of Horſes, that the pots in the Lord's houſe ſhould be as the bowls before the Altar, i. e.* that when the Levitical Service ſhou'd be laid aſide, and that Holineſs, which was that appropriated to the Prieſts and Inſtruments of the Temple, ſhou'd be diſcerned in thoſe things which ſeemed moſt remote from it. That a *Prieſthood after another order than that of* Aaron *ſhould be eſtabliſhed*, viz. *after the order of* Melchiſedec; and that he that was the *Prieſt after this order, ſhould judge among the Heathen, and wound the heads over many Countries; that in the day of his power the People* ſhou'd not be frighted to obedience with thunder-claps and earth-quakes, (as at Mount *Sinai*) but ſhou'd come and *yield themſelves* as a *free-will offering* unto him, and yet their number be as great as the *drops of the dew which diſtil in the morning.* That *God out of other Nations would take unto himſelf for Prieſts and for Levites; that the deſire of all Nations ſhould ſpeedily come; that the Meſſenger of the Covenant ſhould come unto his Temple*; nay, that *ſeventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy City; that then the Viſion and Prophecy ſhould be ſealed up; that the Sacrifice and Oblation ſhould be cauſed to ceaſe; that the City and the Sanctuary ſhould be deſtroyed, and the end thereof ſhall be with a flood, and unto the end of the War deſolations are determined; that after threeſcore and two weeks* Meſſias *ſhould be cut off, but not for himſelf; that by him tranſgreſſion ſhould be finiſhed, and reconciliation for iniquity ſhould be made, and everlaſting righteouſneſs ſhould be brought in.* And leſt all theſe things ſhould be apprehended to be only a higher advancing of the Levitical Worſhip, and the way of external Ceremonies, God expreſly ſaith, *That he would make a new Covenant with the Houſe of* Iſrael, *and with the Houſe of* Judah; *not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers, in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out of the Land of* Ægypt, *which my Covenant they brake, although I was an husband to them, ſaith the Lord: But this ſhall be the Covenant that I will make with the Houſe of* Iſrael *after thoſe days, ſaith the Lord; I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write in their hearts, and will be their God, and they ſhall be my people.* Can any one that now conſiders ſeriouſly the ſtate of things thus deſcribed as it ſhould come to paſs, ever imagine that the Levitical Service was ever calculated for this State? Was God's Worſhip to be confin'd to his Temple at *Jeruſalem*, when all the Nations of the Earth ſhould come to ſerve him? Was the High-Prieſt to make an Atonement there, when an Order of Prieſthood different from the *Aaronical* ſhould be ſet up? Muſt the Tribe of *Levi* only attend at the Temple, when God ſhould take the Prieſts and *Levites* out of all Nations that ſerve him? What wou'd become of the magnificence and glory of the Temple, when both City and Sanctuary ſhall be deſtroyed, and that muſt be within few prophetical Weeks after the *Meſſias* is cut off? And muſt the Covenant of God made with the *Iſraelites*

Pſal. 67. 2. Iſaiah 2. 2 Mal. 1. 11. Zach. 14. 20. Pſal. 110. 4, 5, 6. Ver. 3. Iſa. 66 21. Hag. 2. 7. Mal. 3. 1. Dan. 9. 24. 26. 27. Jer. 31. 31. 32.

continue for ever, when God expreſly ſaith, he wou'd make a New one, and that not according to the Covenant which he made with them then? It is ſo evident then as nothing can well be more, that under the Old Teſtament, ſuch a ſtate of Religion was deſcrib'd and promis'd, with which the Levitical Worſhip wou'd be inconſiſtent; and ſo that the Ceremonial Law was not at firſt eſtabliſhed upon an immutable Reaſon, which was the thing to be proved.

CHAP. VIII.

General *Hypotheſes* concerning the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST.

I. *The great prejudice againſt our Saviour among* Jews *and Heathens, was the meanneſs of his appearance. The difference of the Miracles at the delivery of the Law and Goſpel.* II. *Some general* Hypotheſes *to clear the ſubſerviency of Miracles to the Doctrine of* CHRIST. 1. *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence, but Authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Teſtimony of the Revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on Evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of Natural Knowledge.* III. *The Exiſtence of* GOD, *the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matter of Faith proved from the ſame Principle. Our knowledge of any thing ſuppoſeth ſomething incomprehenſible.* IV. *The certainty of Faith as great as that of Knowledge; the grounds of it ſtronger. The Conſiſtency of Rational Evidence with Faith. Yet objects of Faith exceed Reaſon; the abſurdities following the contrary opinion.* VI. *The uncertainty of that which is called Reaſon.* VII. *Philoſophical Dictates no ſtandard of Reaſon. Of Tranſubſtantiation and Ubiquity,* &c. *why rejected as contrary to Reaſon. The foundation of Faith in matters above Reaſon.* VIII. *Which is infallible Teſtimony; that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved.* 2. Hypoth. *A Divine Teſtimony the moſt infallible. The reſolution of Faith into* GOD's *veracity as its formal object.* IX. 3. Hypoth. *A Divine teſtimony may be known, tho' God ſpeak not immediately. Of Inſpiration among the* Jews, *and Divination among the Heathens.* XII. 4. Hypoth. *The evidence of a Divine Teſtimony muſt be clear and certain.* XIII. *Of the common motives of Faith, and the obligation to faith ariſing from them. The original of Infidelity.*

I. HAving now cleared that the Law of *Moſes* was capable of a repeal, I come to the ſecond Enquiry, *Whether the Miracles of our Saviour did*

did give a ſufficient Evidence of his power and Authority to repeal it. I ſhall not (to prevent too large an excurſion) inſiſt on any other Evidences of our Saviour's being the promiſed *Meſſias*, but keep cloſe to the matter of our preſent debate, concerning the Evidence which ariſeth from ſuch a power of Miracles as our Saviour had in order to his eſtabliſhing that Doctrine which he came to publiſh to the World. The great ſtumbling-block in reference to our Bleſſed Saviour among both the *Jews* and learned *Heathens*, was the meanneſs of his appearance in the World, not coming attended with that ſtate and magnificence, which they thought to be inſeparable from ſo Great a Perſon. The *Jews* had their ſenſes ſo poſſeſſed with the Thunderings and Lightnings on Mount *Sinai*, that they cou'd not imagine the ſtructure of their Ceremonial Worſhip cou'd be taken down with leſs noiſe and terror than it was erected. And withal collecting all thoſe paſſages of the Old Teſtament, which ſeemed to foretel ſuch glorious things of the days of the *Meſſias*, (which either refer to his ſecond Coming, or muſt be underſtood in a Spiritual ſenſe) they having their Minds oppreſſed with the ſenſe of their preſent calamities apply'd them wholly to an external Greatneſs, whereby they might be delivered from the Tyranny of the *Roman* Power. The *Heathens*, as appears by *Celſus* and others, thought it very ſtrange, that the Son of God ſhou'd appear in the World with ſo little Grandeur, and have no greater Train than twelve ſuch obſcure Perſons as the Apoſtles were. For, ſaith *Celſus*, Ὅσπερ ὁ ἥλιος πάντα τὰ ἄλλα φωτίζων πρῶτον αὐτὸν δεικνύῃ, ὅτως ἔχειν πεποιηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ· *As the Sun, which enlightens all other things, doth firſt diſcover himſelf, ſo it was fitting the Son of God ſhould do when he appeared to the World.* And ſo we ſay he did to all ſuch whoſe Minds were not blinded thro' obſtinacy and wilful ignorance. For altho this Son of Righteouſneſs was pleas'd for the better carrying on his deſign in the World to wrap up himſelf in a cloud, yet his glory cou'd not be confin'd within it, but did break thro' that dark veil of his Humane Nature, and did diſcover its ſelf in a moſt clear and convincing manner. His appearances indeed were not like thoſe upon Mount *Sinai*, becauſe his deſign was not to amuſe Men with the Glory of his Majeſty, and to terrify them from Idolatry, (which was a great reaſon of thoſe dreadful *Phænomena* at the delivery of the Law) but he came to draw all Men to him by the power and Energy of his Grace, and therefore afforded them all Rational Convictions in order to it. And therefore the quality of our Saviour's Miracles was conſiderable, as well as the greatneſs of them. The intent of them all was to do good, and thereby to bring the World off from its ſin and folly, to the embracing of that holy Doctrine which he came to publiſh to the World.

Apud Orig. l. 2.

II. Now that ſuch a Power of Miracles in our Saviour had the greateſt ſubſerviency to the giving full and convincing Evidence that he was the Perſon he declared himſelf to be, and that his Doctrine was thereby ſo clearly atteſted, that it was nothing but obſtinacy which cou'd withhold aſſent, will appear by theſe following *Hypotheſes* which I lay down in order to the proving it.

1. *Hypoth.* *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on the Evidence of the things themſelves, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, there the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Teſtimony of him that revealed it to be infallible.* Several things are neceſſary to be proved for the clearing this Propoſition.

1. *That*

1. *That it is not repugnant to Reaſon, that a Doctrine ſhould be true which depends not upon the Evidence of the thing it ſelf.* By evidence of the thing I underſtand ſo clear and diſtinct a Perception of it, that every one who hath the uſe of his rational Faculties, cannot but upon the firſt apprehenſions of the Terms yield a certain aſſent to it; as That the whole is greater than a part; That if we take away equal things from equal, the remainder muſt be equal. Now we are to obſerve, that as to all theſe common Notices of Humane Nature which carry ſuch Evidence with them, the certainty of them lies in the Propoſition as it is an act of the Mind abſtracted from the things themſelves; for theſe do not ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of the things; but whether there be any ſuch things in the World or no as Whole or Parts, the Underſtanding is aſſured that the Idea of the whole carries more in its repreſentation than that of a part does. This is the great Reaſon of the certainty and evidence of *Mathematical* truths, not as ſome imagine, becauſe Men have no intereſt, or deſign, in thoſe things, and therefore they never queſtion them, but becauſe they proceed not upon ſenſible but abſtracted matter, which is not liable to ſo many doubts as the other is: for that a Triangle hath three Angles no Man queſtions; but whether ſuch ſenſible parts of Matter make a Triangle, may be very queſtionable. Now that the truth of Beings, or the certainty of Exiſtence of things cannot be ſo certain as *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, appears from hence: becauſe the manner of conveyance of theſe things to my Mind cannot be ſo clear and certain as in purely Intellectual operations, abſtracted from exiſtent Matter. For the higheſt Evidences of the Exiſtence of things muſt be either the judgment of Senſe, or clear and diſtinct perception of the Mind: now proceeding in a mere Natural way, there can be no infallible certainty in either of theſe; For the Perception of the Mind in reference to the exiſtence of things being cauſed ſo much thro' thoſe *Ideas* or *Phantaſms* which are conveyed to the Underſtanding thro' the impreſſions of Senſe, if theſe may be demonſtrated to be fallacious, I may well queſtion the certainty of that, which I am certain I have been deceived by; ſuppoſing then I ſhou'd queſtion the truth of every thing which is conveyed in an uncertain way to my Mind, I may ſoon out go even *Pyrrho* himſelf in real *Scepticiſm*. Neither can I conceive how clear and diſtinct perception of any thing, tho' not coming thro' the ſenſes, doth neceſſarily infer the exiſtence of the thing; for it only implies a Non-repugnancy of it to our Natural Faculties, and conſequently the bare poſſibility of it. For otherwiſe it were impoſſible for us to have a clear perception of any thing any longer than it exiſts; nay, than we know it to exiſt; for Exiſtence or Non-Exiſtence is all one to the Underſtanding, while it is not aſſured of either. And it is withal evident that things imaginary may clearly affect the Mind as well as real, for I may have as real and diſtinct Perception of a *Phœnix* in my Mind, as of a *Partridge*; doth it therefore follow that the one is really exiſtent as well as the other? and it will be a very hard matter to aſſign a certain difference between Imagination and pure Intellection in ſuch things, which tho' not actually exiſtent, yet imply no repugnancy at all to the Faculties of Mens Minds. It is evident then, that there cannot be ſo great certainty of the exiſtence of things as there may be of *Mathematical* Demonſtrations.

III. And if that Principle be ſuppoſed as the foundation of all *Phyſical* certainty as to the Being of things, *viz.* That there is a God, who being

ing infinitely good, will not ſuffer the Minds of Men to be deceived in thoſe things which they have a clear and diſtinct perception of (without which ſuppoſition we cannot be aſſured of the certainty of any operations of the Mind, becauſe we cannot know but we were ſo made, that we might be then moſt deceived, when we thought our ſelves moſt ſure:) If this Principle, I ſay, be ſuppoſed as the foundation of all certain Knowledge, then from it I infer many things which are very much advantageous to our certainty in matters of Faith.

1. *That the foundation of all certainty lies in the neceſſary exiſtence of a Being abſolutely perfect.* So that unleſs I know that there is a God, I cannot be aſſured that I know any thing in a certain manner; and if I know there is a God, I muſt neceſſarily apprehend him to be abſolutely perfect; becauſe the grounds of my Knowledge, that there is a God, are from thoſe abſolute perfections, which there are in him; and if I cou'd ſuppoſe him not abſolutely perfect, I muſt ſuppoſe him not to be God; for that is neceſſarily imply'd in his Definition. Now then if all certainty doth ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a Being ſo abſolutely perfect, I muſt, before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of Knowledge, Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs in this God; for thoſe are things which all who underſtand them will grant to be perfections; and if they be in God, they muſt be abſolute, *i. e.* infinite. And if they be infinite, it neceſſarily follows that they muſt tranſcend our apprehenſions; ſo that now we have gained this Principle in order to Faith, that we muſt grant ſomething to be unconceivable before we can come certainly to know any thing. From whence it follows that thoſe who will not believe any thing to be true, becauſe it is above their apprehenſions, muſt deny the foundation of all certainty, which (as we have proved) doth ſuppoſe ſomething to be infinite, or above our capacity to comprehend.

2. *That we have as great certainty of whatever is revealed to us from God, as we can have of the truth of any thing which we moſt clearly underſtand.* For the truth of Knowledge depending on this ſuppoſition, That there is a God, whoſe goodneſs will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in the things we clearly underſtand; there is the ſame foundation for the act of Faith as for that of Knowledge, *viz.* That God will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in matters which himſelf hath reveal'd to us. Nay, there ſeems to be greater on theſe accounts. *Firſt*, That there is not ſo great danger to be deceiv'd in reference to objects of ſenſe, as there is in reference to objects of Divine Revelation: becauſe objects of ſenſe make a continual impreſſion upon the organs of ſenſe; and as to theſe things we ſee the whole World agrees in them ſo far as they are neceſſary to life, and withal they bear a greater correſpondency to the preſent ſtate of imperfection which the Soul is now in: but now matters of Divine Revelation are of a more ſublime and ſpiritual nature, which Mens Minds on that account are more apt to doubt of, than of things obvious to ſenſe; and withal they call the Mind ſo much off from ſenſe, that on theſe accounts the proneneſs to doubt is greater, and therefore the foundation of Certainty from God's not ſuffering us to be deceiv'd muſt be ſtronger. *Secondly*, There is not ſo great danger in being deceiv'd as to matters of ſenſe or knowledge, as there is in things of Divine Revelation. For we ſee, granting ſenſe to be deceiv'd, and that we have no certainty at all in natural things, yet affairs of Life are managed ſtill; Mens outward welfare depends not on the judgment of ſenſe; IV.

the

the Merchant hath never the leſs gold in his Ship, becauſe his ſenſe deceives him in judging that the Earth moves from him, when the Ship moves from it. The Sun doth never the leſs enlighten the World, tho' our Senſes be all of *Epicurus* his Mind, that the Sun is no bigger than he ſeems to be; but now as to Matters of Divine Revelation, they are things of the moſt unſpeakable weight and importance, which depend upon our believing or disbelieving them. And therefore if the Goodneſs of God be ſuch as it will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in our judgment of material and ſenſible Beings; how much leſs in reference to the foundation of our certainty as to things divinely reveal'd? We ſee then what Rational Evidence there is not only conſiſtent with, but neceſſarily imply'd in the foundation of Faith, even as great as in any thing which we do moſt perfectly know; ſo that the in-evidence, which is ſo much ſpoken of as an ingredient of the nature of Faith, muſt not be underſtood of the foundation whereon the act of Faith doth ſtand, but of the condition of the object, which being a matter of Divine Revelation, is a thing not obvious to our Senſes. In which ſenſe the Apoſtle ſpeaks, that Faith is ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος βλεπομένων, *The firm expectation of things hoped for, and ſtrong conviction of things which are not ſeen:* In which words, as *Eraſmus* obſerves, is contain'd only an high *Encomium* of Faith, and no dialectical Definition of it; *viz.* that Faith ſoars above things of ſenſe or preſent enjoyment; yea, tho' the objects of it be never ſo remote from either, yet where there is ſufficient Evidences of Divine Revelation, Faith boggles at no difficulties, but is firmly reſolv'd that that God who hath reveal'd theſe things, can and will bring them to paſs in his own time. There is not then any ſuch contrariety between the foundation of Faith and Knowledge, as the Schoolmen have perſuaded the World; we ſee both of them proceed on the ſame foundation of certainty; all the difference is, Faith fixeth on the veracity of God immediately in reference to a Divine Teſtimony; Knowledge proceeds upon it, ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation as to the thing it doth diſcover.

V. 3. We hence infer, That if the certainty of our Knowledge depends on this Principle, That God will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd, then we are bound to believe whatever God doth reveal to us, tho' we may not be able to comprehend the nature of the things revealed. For as to theſe things, we have the ſame ground of certainty which we have as to any Natural Cauſes; for as to them, we now ſuppoſe from the former Principles, that ſetting aſide the exiſtence of God, we cou'd have no certainty of them, but that the formal Reaſon of our certainty is reſolv'd into this, That God's Goodneſs will not ſuffer the Underſtanding to be deceiv'd as to theſe things: the ſame I ſay as to Spiritual Myſteries reveal'd by God; the ground of our certainty lies not in the Evidence of the things, but in the undoubted veracity of God, who hath reveal'd them. All that I can imagine poſſible to be reply'd to this, is, That God's veracity aſſures us in Natural Cauſes that we are not deceiv'd, only where we have a clear and diſtinct perception of the things, but now in matters above our Reaſon to comprehend, there can be no clear and diſtinct Perception. To this I anſwer,

Firſt, It is evident in the foundation of all certainty of Knowledge, that there may be a clear and diſtinct Perception of that which we cannot comprehend, *viz.* of a Being abſolutely perfect; for if we have not a clear and diſtinct Perception of God, the foundation of all certainty

is

is deſtroy'd, which is the neceſſary Exiſtence of ſuch a Being; and he that ſhall ſay he cannot have a clear Perception of God without comprehending him, doth contradict himſelf; for if he be a Being infinite, he muſt be incomprehenſible; therefore there may be a clear Perception, where the object it ſelf is above our capacity. Now whatever foundation there is in Nature for ſuch a Perception without Comprehenſion; that and much more is there in ſuch things as are reveal'd by God, tho' above our Apprehenſion: For the Idea of God upon the Soul of Man cannot be ſo ſtrong an Evidence of the Exiſtence of a Being above our Apprehenſion, as the Revelation of matters of Faith is, that we ſhou'd believe the things ſo reveal'd, tho' our Underſtandings loſe themſelves in ſtriving to reach the natures of them, and the manner of their Exiſtence.

Secondly, That which is the only foundation of a ſcruple in this caſe is a Principle moſt unreaſonable in it ſelf, That we are to embrace nothing for truth, tho' divinely reveal'd, but what our Reaſon is able to comprehend as to the nature of the thing, and the manner of its exiſtence; on which account the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Satisfaction*, and conſequently the whole Myſtery of the Goſpel of CHRIST muſt be rejected as incredible, and that on this bare pretence, becauſe altho' many expreſſions in Scripture ſeem to import all theſe things, yet we are bound to interpret them to another ſenſe, becauſe this is incongruous to our Reaſon. But altho' *Chriſtianity* be a Religion which comes in the higheſt way of Credibility to the Minds of Men, altho' we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have ſufficient reaſon to make it appear that it is reveal'd by God; yet that any thing ſhou'd be queſtioned whether it be of Divine Revelation, merely becauſe our Reaſon is to ſeek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a moſt abſurd and unreaſonable pretence: And the Aſſertors of it muſt run themſelves on theſe unavoidable abſurdities.

Firſt, Of believing nothing either in Nature or Religion to be true, but what they can give a full and ſatisfactory account of, as to every mode and circumſtance of it. Therefore let ſuch perſons firſt try themſelves in all the appearances of Nature; and then we may ſuppoſe they will not believe that the Sun ſhines till they have by demonſtrative Arguments prov'd the undoubted truth of the *Ptolemaic* or *Copernican Hypotheſis*; that they will never give credit to the flux and reflux of the Sea, till they clearly reſolve the doubts which attend the ſeveral opinions of it. That there is no ſuch thing as Matter in the World, till they can ſatisfactorily tell us how the Parts of it are united; nor that there are any Material Beings, till they have reſolv'd all the perplexing difficulties about the ſeveral Affections of them; and that themſelves have not ſo much as a rational Soul, till they are bound to ſatisfy us of the manner of the union of the Soul and Body together. And if they can expedite all theſe, and many more difficulties about the moſt obvious things (about which it is another thing to frame handſome and conſiſtent *Hypotheſes*, than to give a certain account of them) then let them be let looſe to the matters of Divine Revelation; as to which yet (if they cou'd perform the other) there were no reaſon for ſuch an undertaking; for that were,

Secondly, To commenſurate the Perfections of God with the narrow capacity of the humane Intellect; which is contrary to the natural Idea of God; and to the manner whereby we take up our conceptions of

God: for the Idea of God doth ſuppoſe Incomprehenſibility to belong to his Nature; and the manner whereby we form our Conceptions of God, is, by taking away all the imperfections we find in our ſelves, from the Conception we form of a Being abſolutely perfect, and by adding Infinity to all the Perfections we find in our own Natures. Now this method of proceeding doth neceſſarily imply a vaſt diſtance and diſproportion between a finite and infinite Underſtanding. And if the Underſtanding of God be infinite, why may not he diſcover ſuch things to us, which our ſhallow Apprehenſions cannot reach unto? What ground or evidence of Reaſon can we have that an infinite Wiſdom and Underſtanding, when it undertakes to diſcover matters of the higheſt nature and concernment to the World, ſhou'd be able to deliver nothing but what comes within the compaſs of our imperfect and narrow Intellects? And that it ſhou'd not be ſufficient that the matters reveal'd do none of them contradict the prime Reſults or common Notions of Mankind (which none of them do) but that every particular mode and circumſtance, as to the manner of exiſtence in God, or the extent of his omnipotent Power, muſt paſs the ſcrutiny of our Faculties, before it obtains a *placet* for a Divine Revelation?

VI. *Thirdly*, It muſt follow from this Principle, That the Pretenders to it muſt affirm the Rules or Maxims which they go by in the judgment of things, are the infallible ſtandard of Reaſon: Elſe they are as far to ſeek in the judgment of things as any others are. They muſt then, to be conſiſtent with their Principle, affirm themſelves to be the abſolute Maſters of Reaſon: Now Reaſon conſiſting of Obſervations made concerning the natures of all Beings, for ſo it muſt be conſidered, as it is a Rule of judging, (*viz.* as a *Syſtem* of infallible Rules collected from the natures of things) they who pretend to it, muſt demonſtrate theſe general Maxims according to which they judge, to be collected from an univerſal undoubted Hiſtory of Nature, which lies yet too dark and obſcure for any to pretend to the full Knowledge of, and wou'd be only a demonſtration of the higheſt Arrogance after ſo many ſucceſleſs endeavours, of the moſt ſearching Wits, in any ſociety of Perſons to uſurp it to themſelves, eſpecially if ſuch Perſons are ſo far from ſearching into the depths of Nature, that they ſuffer themſelves very fairly to be led by the Noſe by the moſt Dogmatical of all Philoſophers; and that in ſuch Principles which the more inquiſitive World hath now found to be very ſhort, uncertain and fallacious. And upon ſevere enquiry we ſhall find the grand Principles which have been taken by theſe adorers of Reaſon, for almoſt the ſtandard of it, have been ſome *Theories* which have been taken up merely from obſervation of the courſe of Nature by ſuch Perſons, who ſcarce own'd any hand of Providence in the World. Now it cannot otherwiſe be conceiv'd but that theſe *Theories* or Principles formed from ſuch a narrow inſpection into the natures of things, muſt make ſtrange work when we come to apply thoſe things to them, which were never look'd at in the forming of them: Whence came thoſe two receiv'd Principles, That nothing can be produc'd out of nothing; That there is no poſſible return from a privation to a habit, but from thoſe Philoſophers who believ'd there was nothing but matter in the World; or if they did aſſert the Exiſtence of a God, yet ſuppoſed him unconcerned in the Government of the World. Whence come our Maſters of Reaſon to tell us, That the Soul cannot ſubſiſt after death without the Body? from what Philoſophy was this derived? certainly

tainly from that which was very loath to acknowledge the immortality of the Soul of Man: and any one who ſtrictly obſerves the cloſe coherence of the Principles of the *Peripatetic* Philoſophy, will find very little room left for an eternal Being to interpoſe it ſelf in the World; and therefore ſome have ſhrewdly obſerv'd that *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks more favourably of the Being of God in his *Exoterics*, than in his *Acromatics*, which all that know the reaſon of the Names, will gueſs at the reaſon of. I demand then, Muſt the received Principles of Philoſophy, and thoſe ſhort imperfect *Theories* which were formed more from Tradition than Experience, by the ancient *Greeks*, be taken from the ſtandard of Reaſon or no? If they muſt, we may ſoon forſake not only the ſublimer Myſteries of the *Trinity*, *Divinity* of CHRIST, *Reſurrection*, &c. but we ſhall ſoon ſhake hands with *Creation*, *Providence*, if not *Immortality* of *Souls*, and the Being of God himſelf. If theſe things be diſown'd as the ſtandard of Reaſon, let us know what will be ſubſtituted in the room of them; and what Laws our Faith muſt be try'd by. Are they only *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, or the undoubted common Notions of Humane Nature, which whoſoever underſtands aſſents to them? let any of the forementioned Myſteries be made appear to contradict theſe, and we will readily yield up our ſelves captives to Reaſon: But in the mean time let no *jejune* unproved *Hypotheſes* in *Philoſophy*, be ſet as Judges over matters of Faith, whoſe only warrant for that office muſt be *Stat pro ratione voluntas.* Let the Principles we proceed by, be firſt manifeſted to be collected from a moſt certain and univerſal inſpection into the nature of all Beings, let the manner of proceſs be ſhewed how they were collected (leſt they labour with the common fault of the *Chymiſts*, of eſtabliſhing *Hypoſtatical* Principles from the Experiments of ſome particular Bodies, which others do as evidently refute) and laſtly, let it be made appear that theſe Principles, thus collected, will ſerve indifferently for all Beings, ſpiritual as well as material, infinite as well as finite, and when this Task is exactly perform'd, we will make room for Reaſon to ſit upon the Bench, and bring the Scripture as the priſoner to its Bar.

VII. *Fourthly*, According to this Principle, what certainty can we have at all of any thing we are to believe? who hath fixed the bounds of that which Men call Reaſon? how ſhall we know that thus far it will come and no further? If no Banks be raiſed againſt it to keep it in its due Channel, we may have cauſe to fear it may in time overthrow not only the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Reſurrection of the dead*, but all other Articles of the Creed too. What Preſcription can be pleaded by one ſort of Men for Reaſon more than for another? One will not believe this Article of his Faith, becauſe againſt his Reaſon; and why not another reject another Article on the ſame pretence? for whatever the ground of Unbelief be, if it be but baptized by the name of Reaſon, it muſt by this Principle paſs uncontrouled. If a ſullen Philoſopher ſhall tell us, that the Notion of an immaterial ſubſtance contradicts his Reaſon as much as *the Trinity* doth theirs, and that the Univerſe is nothing elſe but a Syſtem of Bodies; by what Artifice will our Maſter of Reaſon purge away all that black Choler, that ſo clouds his Mind, that he cannot ſee the Notion of a Spirit thro' it? And ſuch a one will make a hard ſhift, but he will reconcile his Opinion with Scripture too; and therefore why ſhou'd he be bound up to Mens Explications of Scripture, when there is no neceſſity, that he can ſee, of underſtanding it in any other way

than his own? If another ſhou'd come and tell us, that we muſt be all *Anthropomorphites*, and that otherwiſe the Scripture were not intelligible; ſhall not this Man put in for Reaſon too? Nay, *laſtly*, if another ſhall come and ſpeak out, and tell us Religion is but a device of ſubtle Men, that all things come to paſs thro' chance, that the World was made by a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, and that all are fools which are not *Atheiſts*, and that it is impoſſible to apprehend the Being of a God, and therefore by the ſame Reaſon that they reject ſome Myſteries of Religion, he rejects the foundation of all; becauſe an infinite Being is incomprehenſible: whither now hath our Reaſon carried us? while we pretend to reject any thing as divinely revealed, merely on that account, that it is above our Reaſon? But it may be reply'd, *On what account then do we reject the Doctrine of* Tranſubſtantiation, *and the ubiquity of the Body of* Christ, *as repugnant to Reaſon, if we do not make Reaſon judge in matters of Faith?* I anſwer, 1. We reject theſe opinions not only as repugnant to Reaſon, but as inſufficiently proved from Scripture; whereas we here ſuppoſe (it not being our preſent buſineſs to prove it) that the ſeveral Doctrines of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation Reſurrection of Bodies*, &c. are only rejected on that account, that tho' Scripture ſeems to ſpeak fair for them, yet it is otherwiſe to be interpreted, becauſe ſuppoſed to be repugnant to Reaſon. 2. Thoſe Doctrines before mentioned are eminently ſerviceable to promote the great end of the Goſpel, and are inlaid in the very foundation of it, as that of the *Trinity*, and *Divinity* of Christ; but theſe we now mention are no ways conducible to that end, but ſeem to thwart and overthrow it; and *Tranſubſtantiation* eſtabliſheth a Worſhip contrary to the Goſpel. 3. All the foundation of *Tranſubſtantiation* is laid upon ambiguous places of Scripture, which muſt of neceſſity have ſome Tropes and Figures in them; but the Doctrine of the *Trinity* is not only contained in plain Scripture, but is evidenced by viſible appearance, as particularly at the Baptiſm of our Saviour. 4. There is far greater ground why we ſhou'd reject *Tranſubſtantiation* and *Ubiquity*, as inconſiſtent with Reaſon, than that they ſhou'd the *Trinity*, on this account, becauſe the grounds of Reaſon on which we reject thoſe opinions, are fetched from thoſe eſſential and inſeparable properties of Bodies, which are inconſiſtent with thoſe opinions; now theſe are things within the reach of our Underſtandings (in which caſe God himſelf ſometimes appeals to Reaſon) but it is quite another caſe, when we ſearch into the incomprehenſible Nature of God, and pronounce with confidence that ſuch things cannot be in God, becauſe we cannot comprehend them; which gives a ſufficient anſwer to this objection. The ſubſtance then of this Diſcourſe is, that whatever Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted to be of Divine Revelation, is to be embraced and believed as undoubtedly true, tho' our Reaſon cannot reach to the full apprehenſion of all the Modes and Circumſtances of it. So that as to theſe ſublime Myſteries our Faith ſtands upon this twofold bottom. *Firſt*, That the Being, Underſtanding, and Power of God doth infinitely tranſcend ours, and therefore he may reveal to us matters above our reach and capacity. *Secondly*, That whatever God doth reveal is undoubtedly true, tho' we may not fully underſtand it; for this is a moſt undoubted Principle, That God cannot and will not deceive any in thoſe things which he reveals to Men. Thus our firſt Suppoſition is cleared, That it is not repugnant to Reaſon, that a Doctrine may be true, which depends not on the evidence of the thing it ſelf.

The

The Second is, *That in matters whose truth depends not on the evidence of the things themselves, infallible testimony is the fullest demonstration of them.* For these things not being of *Mathematical* evidence, there must be some other way found out for demonstrating the truth of them. And in all those things whose truth depends on Testimony, the more creditable the Testimony is, the higher Evidence is given to them; but that Testimony which may deceive, cannot give so pregnant an Evidence as that which cannot; for then all imaginable objections are taken off. This is so clear, that it needs no further Proof; and therefore the Third follows.

That there are certain ways whereby to know that a Testimony delivered is infallible; and that is fully proved by these two Arguments. 1. That it is the duty of all those to whom it is propounded to believe it; now how cou'd that be a duty in them to believe, which they had no ways to know whether it were a Testimony to be believed, or no? 2. Because God will condemn the World for Unbelief: In which the Justice of God's proceeding doth necessarily suppose that there were sufficient Arguments to induce them to believe, which cou'd not be, unless there were some certain way supposed whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible. These three things now being supposed, *viz.* That a Doctrine may be true which depends not on evidence of Reason; that the greatest demonstration of the truth of such a Doctrine, is its being delivered by infallible Testimony; and that there are certain ways whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible: Our first Principle is fully confirmed, which was, *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence of Reason, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony of him that reveals it to be infallible.*

The next Principle or *Hypothesis* which I lay down, is, *That there can be no greater evidence that a Testimony is infallible, than that it is the Testimony of God himself.* The truth of this depends upon a common Notion of Humane Nature, which is the Veracity of God in whatever way he discovers himself to Men; and therefore the ultimate Resolution of our Faith, as to its formal object, must be alone into the Veracity of God revealing things unto us; for the *Principium certitudinis*, or foundation of all certain assent can be fetched no higher, neither will it stand any lower than the infallible Verity of God himself; and the *Principium patefactionis*, or the ground of discovery of Spiritual truth to our Minds must be resolved into Divine Testimony, or Revelation. These two then not taken asunder, but jointly, *God, who cannot lye, hath revealed these things*, is the only certain foundation for a Divine Faith to rest it self upon. But now the particular exercise of a Divine Faith lies in a firm assent to such a particular thing as divinely reveal'd; and herein lies not so much the Testimony, as the peculiar energy of the Spirit of God in inclining the Soul to believe peculiar objects of Faith, as of Divine Revelation. But the general ground of Faith, which they call the formal object, or the *ratio propter quam credimus*, is the general infallibility of a Divine Testimony. For in a matter concerning Divine Revelation, there are two great Questions to be resolved: The first is, Why I believe a Divine Testimony with a firm assent? The Answer to that is, Because I am assur'd, that whatever God speaks is true: the other is, Upon what grounds do I believe this to be a Divine Testimony? The resolution of which, as far as I can understand, must be fetch'd from

VIII. 2. *Hypoth.*

from thoſe rational Evidences whereby a Divine Teſtimony muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from one merely Humane and fallible. For the Spirit of God in its workings upon the Mind, doth not carry it on by a brutiſh impulſe, but draws it by a Spiritual diſcovery of ſuch ſtrong and perſuaſive grounds to aſſent to what is reveal'd, that the Mind doth readily give a firm aſſent to that which it ſees ſuch convincing Reaſon to believe. Now the ſtrongeſt reaſon to believe, is the manifeſtation of a Divine Teſtimony; which the Spirit of God ſo clearly diſcovers to a true Believer, that he not only firmly aſſents to the general foundation of Faith, the Veracity of God, but to the particular object propounded, as a matter of Divine Revelation. But this latter Queſtion is not here the matter of our Diſcourſe; our Propoſition only concerns the general foundation of Faith, which appears to be ſo rational and evident, as no Principle in Nature can be more. For if the Teſtimony on which I am to rely be only God's, and I be aſſur'd from Natural Reaſon, that his Teſtimony can be no other than infallible, wherein doth the certainty of the foundation of Faith fall ſhort of that in any *Mathematical* demonſtration? Upon which account a Divine Teſtimony hath been regarded with ſo much veneration among all who have own'd a Deity, altho' they have been unacquainted with any certain way of Divine Revelation. And the reaſon why any rejected ſuch a Teſtimony among the *Heathens*, was either, becauſe they believed not a *Deity*; or elſe that the particular Teſtimonies produced were mere frauds and impoſtures, and therefore no Divine Teſtimony, as it was given out to be. But the Principle ſtill remain'd indiſputable, that on ſuppoſition the Teſtimony were what it pretended to be, there was the greateſt reaſon to believe it, altho' it came not in ſuch a way of probation, as their Sciences proceeded in. From which Principle aroſe that ſpeech of *Tully*, which he hath tranſlated our of *Plato's Timæus*; *Ac difficillimum factu à Diis ortis fidem non habere, quamquam nec argumentis nec rationibus certis eorum ratio confirmetur.* By which we ſee what a preſumption there was of Truth, where there was any evidence of a Divine Teſtimony. And no doubt upon the advantage of this Principle it was the Devil gain'd ſo great credit to his Oracles; for therein he did the moſt imitate Divine Revelation. From hence then we ſee what a firm bottom Faith in the general ſtands upon, which is nothing ſhort of an infallible Divine Teſtimony: other things may conduce by way of ſubſerviency for the diſcovery of this; but nothing elſe can be a ſure foundation for a Divine Faith, but what is a Teſtimony of God himſelf.

Fragm. Cicer.

IX. *A Teſtimony may be known to be divine and infallible, tho' God himſelf do not ſpeak in an immediate way.* By being known, I do not mean the firm perſwaſion of a Mind enlightned by the Spirit of God, but that there are ſufficient Evidences *ex parte rei*, to convince Men of it, which are not wilfully blind and obſtinate, *i. e.* that the ground of unbelief in any cannot be imputed to the defect of ſufficient Motives to Faith, but to their own perverſeneſs and prejudice in not diſcerning them. Now that God may reveal and declare his Mind to the World, not in an immediate way, but by ſome Inſtruments he may make uſe of to that end, is not only evident from the great ſutableneſs of ſuch a way to the conditions of the Perſon he ſpeaks to, but from the general perſuaſion of the World concerning the poſſibility of Inſpiration. The *Jews* are ſo far from denying this, that it is the very foundation of their Religion as well as ours; God diſcovering the moſt of his Will to them by the Prophets,

3. *Hypoth.*

phets, or by Persons divinely inspir'd. And this general consent of all other Nations, that there is such a Principle as Divination in the World, doth make it evident, that it carries no repugnancy at all to Natural Light, supposing that there is a God, that he shou'd reveal his Mind by some particular Persons unto the World. For which purpose the testimony of *Tully* in the entrance of his Books *de Divinatione*, is very considerable. *Vetus opinio est jam usque ab Heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque & populi Romani & omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci μαντικὴν appellant*, i. e. *præsensionem & scientiam rerum futurarum*; and soon after adds, *gentem quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam, neque tam immanem atque barbaram, quæ non significari futura, & à quibusdam intelligi, prædicique posse censeat.* He makes it appear to be an universal sentiment of all Nations in the World, and instanceth particularly in the *Assyrians*, *Ægyptians*, *Cilicians*, *Pisidians*, *Pamphylians*, *Grecians*, *Romans*, *Etrurians*, and others. It is true indeed he after mentions some Philosophers who deny'd it; but they were most part the followers of *Epicurus*, who deny'd any *Providence*, and therefore might well take away *Divination:* but if *Xenophanes Colophonius* had any followers who asserted the one, and deny'd the other (as *Tully* seems to intimate that he was alone in that persuasion) yet we may probably suppose the reason of their rejecting it might be the Impostures which went under the name of *Divination* among them; which are excellently discover'd by that Prince of *Roman* Philosophers as well as Orators, in his second Book of *Divination*: But it is apparent by the same Author, that the generality of Philosophers consented with the People in this persuasion, as the Followers of those three great Sects of *Socrates*, *Pythagoras* and *Aristotle*, were all approvers of it; but of all Persons the *Stoics* were the most zealous contenders for it, especially *Chrysippus*, *Diogenes Babylonius*, *Antipater* and *Possidonius*. Some indeed rejected some ways of *Divination*, yet embraced others, as *Dicæarchus* and *Cratippus*, who rejected all but Dreams and Ecstasies; but in the general we find these two Principles went together among them, the existence of a *Deity*, and the certainty of *Divination*; so that from *Divination* they prov'd a *Deity*, and from a *Deity Divination. Si sunt genera divinandi vera, esse Deos; vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent*, as *Quintus Cicero* there speaks: and at last thus triumphs in the multitude of his witnesses, *An dum bestiæ loquantur exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non simus?* It may not be amiss to produce the chief Argument on which the *Stoics* insisted to prove the necessity of *Divination*, supposing the existence of a *Deity*. *If there be Gods*, say they, *and they do not reveal to Men things to come; it either is because they do not love them, or because they do not know themselves what shall come to pass, or they think it is of no concernment to Men to know future things, or that it doth not become their Majesty to reveal them, or that they cannot reveal them to Men if they would: but neither is it true that they do not love Men; for the Gods are of a bountiful nature, and friends to Mankind; neither can they be ignorant of future things, because they are appointed and decreed by them; neither is it of no concernment to Men to know future things; for that makes them more cautious if they know them; neither is it repugnant to their Majesty to reveal them, for nothing is more noble than bounty and doing good; and they must needs know these things; therefore they may make them known to others; and if they do make them known, there must be some way*

Cicero l. 2. de Divin.

way whereby to know that they do ſo; or elſe they ſignifie them to no purpoſe. If now inſtead of the knowledge of future contingencies, and the multitude of their Gods, they had inſiſted on the diſcovery and revelation by the true God of thoſe ways, which may lead Men to eternal Happineſs; that Argument had been ſtrong and convincing, which as it ſtands is ſophiſtical and fallacious. So that it is very plain, that not only a poſſibility of *Divination* was acknowledg'd by thoſe who wanted Divine Revelation, but that this *Divination* did not ariſe from mere Natural Cauſes, but from an *afflatus Divinus*, and a *concitatio quædam animi*, as they there ſpeak, which imports nothing ſhort of Divine Inſpiration. Nay the opinion of this was ſo common among them, that they thought any extraordinary Perſons had ſomething of Divine Enthuſiaſm in them, as *Tully* elſewhere tells us, *Nemo vir magnus ſine aliquo afflatu Divino unquam fuit.* Altho' then theſe Heathens were greatly miſtaken as to thoſe things they took for a Divine *Afflatus* and *Divination*, yet we cannot conceive ſo general a Senſe ſhou'd be imprinted on the minds of Men of ſuch a thing as that was, were it not a thing highly conſonant to Principles of Reaſon, that God ſhou'd communicate his mind to the World by the Inſpiration of ſome Perſons. And therefore I conceive that *Cicero* and his Brother *Quintus*, who manage that excellent diſpute of *Divination* between them, have divided the Truth between them too. For on the one ſide *Quintus* evidently proves the poſſibility of the thing, the conſequence of it upon the acknowledgement of a Deity, and the general conſent of Mankind in the owning of it; and on the other ſide *Tully* himſelf excellently lays open the vanity, folly and uncertainty, not only of the common ways of *Divination*, but of the Oracles which were in ſuch great eſteem among the Heathens. And altho' *Tully* doth ſo ſharply and ſarcaſtically anſwer the Argument from the common conſent of Men; *quaſi vero quidquam ſit tam valde, quam nihil ſapere, vulgare; as though nothing Men did more generally agree in, than in being Fools:* yet as it is evident that the ground of that Scoff was from the ſeveral manners of *Divination* then in uſe, ſo it cannot be thought to be a general impeachment of Human Nature in a thing ſo conſequent upon the being of a God, which as himſelf elſewhere proves, is as clear from reaſon as from that *Teſtimonium gentium in hac una re non diſſidentium*, as the Chriſtian *Cicero*, *Lactantius* ſpeaks, *The conſent of Nations, which ſcarce agree in any thing elſe, but that there is a God.* That which we now inferr from hence is, That God may make known his Mind in a way infallible, tho' not immediate; for in caſe of Inſpiration of mere Men, it is not They ſo much which ſpeak, as God by them; and in caſe that God himſelf ſhou'd ſpeak thro' the veil of Humane Nature, the Teſtimony muſt needs be infallible, tho' the appearance of the Divinity be not viſible.

Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deorum.

Lactant. de fall. relig. cap. 2.

X. *Hyp. 4.* *Thoſe evidences whereby a Divine Teſtimony may be known, muſt be ſuch as may not leave Mens minds in ſuſpence, but are of their own nature convincing proofs of it.* For altho' as to the event ſome may doubt, and others disbelieve the Teſtimony ſo prov'd; yet it is ſufficient for our purpoſe, that in the nature of the things (ſuppoſing them to be ſuch as we ſpeak of) they are ſufficient for the eviction that the Teſtimony atteſted by them is divine and infallible. I know it is a great diſpute among many, whether thoſe things, which are uſually call'd the common Motives of Faith, do of their own nature only induce a probable perſuaſion of the truth of the Doctrine as probable which they are join'd with, or

elſe

elſe are they ſufficient for the producing a firm aſſent to the Doctrine as true? I grant they are not demonſtrative ſo as to inforce aſſent; for we ſee the contrary by the experience of all Ages; but that they are not ſufficient foundation for an unprejudic'd Mind to eſtabliſh a firm aſſent upon, is a thing not eaſie to be granted; chiefly upon this account, that an obligation to believe doth lie upon every one to whom theſe evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are ſufficiently diſcover'd. And otherwiſe of all ſins the ſin of Unbelief, as to God revealing his mind, were the moſt excuſable and pardonable ſin; nay, it wou'd be little leſs than a part of prudence; becauſe what can it be accounted but temerity and imprudence in any to believe a Doctrine as true, only upon probable inducements? and what can it be but wiſdom to with-hold aſſent upon a mere Veriſimilitude? conſidering what the *Lyrick* Poet hath long ſince truly told us;

ἢ πέ τι ἢ βεσσῇ Φρένα
ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον
δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις
ἀξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.

Pindar Olymp. Od. 1.

That a Falſhood may frequently ſeem truer to common underſtandings than Truth it ſelf: and as *Menander* ſpeaks, τὸ πιθανὸν ἐμὲν δ' ἀληθείας ἔχ' ἐνίοτε μείζω, ἢ πιθανωτέραν ὄχλῳ, *that a mere veriſimilitude may have more force on vulgar minds than Truth hath.* If therefore there be no evidences given ſufficient to carry the minds of Men beyond mere probability, what ſin can it be in thoſe to disbelieve who cannot be obliged to believe as true what is only diſcover'd as probable? I cannot therefore ſee how an obligation to believe a Divine Teſtimony is conſiſtent with their opinion, who make the utmoſt which any outward evidences can extend to, to be only the bare credibility of the Doctrine atteſted by them. I can very well ſatisfie my ſelf with the ground and reaſon why the more ſubtle Wits of the Church of *Rome* do aſſert this; for if nothing elſe can be produced by all motives of Faith but only a probable perſuaſion of the Truth of Chriſtian Doctrine, then here comes in the faireſt pretence for the Infallibility of their Church: for otherwiſe they tell us we can have no foundation for a Divine Faith; for how can that be a foundation for Divine Faith, which can reach no higher than a Moral Inducement, and beget only a probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt? But on what account thoſe who diſown the Infallibility of the Church of *Rome* in the propoſal of matters of Faith, ſhou'd yet conſent with thoſe of it in an *Hypotheſis* taken up in probability, merely out of ſubſerviency to that moſt advantageous piece of the myſtery of Iniquity, is not eaſie to reſolve. Unleſs the over-fondneſs of ſome upon the Doctrine of the Schools, more than of the Goſpel, hath been the occaſion of it. For how agreeable can that opinion be to the Goſpel, which ſo evidently puts the moſt defenſive weapons into the hands of Unbelief? For doubtleſs in the judgment of any rational Perſon, a mere probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt, where an aſſent to it as true is requir'd, can never be look'd on as an act of Faith: for if my aſſent to the Truth of the thing be according to the ſtrength of the Arguments inducing me to believe, and theſe Arguments do only prove a probability of Divine Teſtimony, my aſſent can be no ſtronger than to a thing merely probable; which is, that it may be, or not be

true; which is not properly aſſent, but a ſuſpending our judgments till ſome convincing Argument be produced on either ſide. And therefore according to this opinion thoſe who ſaw all the Miracles which Chriſt did, cou'd not be bound to believe in Chriſt, but only to have a favourable opinion of his Perſon and Doctrine, as a thing which tho' not evidenc'd to be true by what he did, yet it was very piouſly credible; but they muſt have a care withal of venturing their Belief too far, only on ſuch Moral Inducements as Miracles were, for fear they ſhou'd go further than the force of the Arguments wou'd carry them. Had not this opinion now, think we, been a very probable way to have converted the World upon the Preaching of Chriſt and his Apoſtles; when Joh. 10. 38. Chriſt ſaith, *though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him?* Nay, ſaith this opinion, that is more than we are bound to do; tho' we ſee thy Works we are not bound to believe thy Teſtimony to be Divine and certainly true: but we will do all we are bound to do; we will entertain a favourable opinion of thy Perſon and Doctrine, and wait for ſomewhat elſe, but we do not well know what, to perſuade us to believe. When Heb. 2. 3. 4. the Apoſtles preach the danger of Unbelief, becauſe *the Doctrine of the Goſpel was confirmed by ſigns and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghoſt*; what a fair anſwer doth this opinion put into the mouths of Infidels, that notwithſtanding all theſe Signs and Wonders, they were never bound to believe the Goſpel as a certain Truth, and therefore they hope the danger is not ſo great in neglecting the Salvation promis'd by the Goſpel?

XI. I cannot conceive that Men otherwiſe learned and ſober, ſhou'd with ſo much confidence aſſert that the rational evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are inſufficient to prove a Doctrine true, unleſs it be from hence, that they find that notwithſtanding the ſtrongeſt evidences many Perſons continue in Unbelief. For ſay they, *If theſe Arguments were ſcientifical and demonſtrative*, (as they ſpeak) *of the truth of the Doctrine atteſted by them, then all perſons to whom they are propounded, muſt certainly believe.* But this is very eaſily anſwer'd; for we ſpeak not of internal, but outward Evidence; not of that in the Subject, but of the Object, or more fully of the Reaſon of the thing, and not the Event in us; for doubtleſs there may be undoubted Truth and Evidence in many things which ſome perſons either cannot or will not underſtand. If *Epicurus* ſhou'd contend ſtill that the Sun and Stars are no bigger than they ſeem to be, will it hence follow that there can be no rational Demonſtration of the contrary? Nay, if the way of demonſtration be offer'd him, and Teleſcopes put into his hands, yet if he be reſolv'd to maintain his credit, and therefore his Opinion, and will not uſe the Teleſcopes, or ſuſpect ſtill they are intended only to deceive his ſight; what poſſible way will there be of convincing ſuch a Perſon, tho' the thing be in its ſelf demonſtrable? Now if the ſtrength of Prejudice or maintaining of Credit can prevail ſo much in matters of Mathematical evidence, to with-hold aſſent; what power may we think a corrupt Intereſt may have upon the Underſtanding, as to the Arguments which tend to prove the truth of that Doctrine, which is ſo repugnant to that carnal Intereſt which the heart is already devoted to! Our bleſſed Saviour hath himſelf given us ſo full an account of the original and cauſes of Unbelief in the perſons he convers'd with, that that may yield us a ſufficient Anſwer to this Objection. He tells us the ground of it was not want of light,

nay,

nay, there was light ſufficient to convince any, but that thoſe to whom the light came *lov'd darkneſs rather than it, becauſe their deeds were evil. That they could not believe while they received honour one of another, and ſought not the honour which was of God only*, i. e. That they were ſo greedy of Applauſe from each other, that they wou'd not impartially ſearch into the truth of that Doctrine, which did touch their Sores ſo to the quick, that they had rather have them feſter upon them, than go to the trouble of ſo ſharp a cure. That the reaſon ſo few follow'd him was becauſe *the way was narrow and the gate ſtrait which men muſt go in at*; and therefore no wonder ſo few of the rich and proud Phariſees cou'd get in at it; they were partly ſo ſwell'd with a high opinion of themſelves, and partly ſo loaden with their riches, that they thought it was to no purpoſe for them to think of going in at ſo ſtrait a gate, while they were reſolv'd to part with neither.

Joh. 3. 19. Joh. 5. 44. Mat. 7. 14.

That the final ground of the rejection of any, was not want of evidence to bring them to believe, nor want of readineſs in Chriſt to receive them if they did, but it was *a peeviſh, wilful, obſtinate, malicious ſpirit that they would not come to Chriſt*, nor believe his Doctrine (for thoſe import the ſame) but when the moſt convincing Miracles were us'd, they wou'd rather *attribute them to the Prince of Devils than to the power of God*. And tho' our Saviour preſently by rational and demonſtrative Arguments did prove the contrary to their faces; yet we ſee thereby it was a Reſolution not to be convinc'd, or yield to the Truth, which was the cauſe why they did not believe. Now from this very inſtance of our Saviour's proceedings with the *Phariſees* by rational Arguments, I demand, whether theſe Arguments of our Saviour were ſufficient foundations for a Divine Aſſent to that Truth, that our Saviour did not his Miracles by any Diabolical but by Divine power, or no? If they were, then it is evident that rational Evidence may be a foundation for Divine Faith, or that ſome motives to believe may be ſo ſtrong, as to be ſufficient evidence of the Truth and certainty of the Doctrine: If theſe Arguments were not ſufficient proofs of what our Saviour ſpake, then welfare the *Phariſees*; it ſeems they ſaid nothing but what might be thus far juſtify'd, that the contrary to it cou'd not be demonſtrated. And if the evidence of our Saviours Miracles were ſo great, as ſome ſuppoſe, that the *Phariſees* cou'd not but be convinced that they were Divine; but out of their malice and envy they uttered this Blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt, to keep the people from following Chriſt; then we hence infer two things: *Firſt, How ſtrong an evidence there was in the Miracles of Chriſt*, when it convinced his moſt reſolute enemies that they were Divine. *Secondly, What power a corrupt will may have over a convinced Underſtanding.* For altho the Will may not hinder the conviction, yet it may ſoon ſtifle it, by ſuggeſting thoſe things to the Mind which may divert it from thoſe convictions of Truth; and ſeek to find out any ways to diſgrace it. It wou'd be no difficult task to diſcover in all thoſe inſtances wherein the Unbelief of Men is diſcover'd in the New Teſtament, that the Perſons guilty of it did not proceed like rational Men, or ſuch as deſir'd Truth, but were wholly carried away thro' paſſion, intereſt, prejudice, diſaffection, or ſome other cauſe of that nature, which may give us a ſufficient account why thoſe perſons did not believe, altho' there might be clear and undoubted evidence to perſuade them to it. But altho' I aſſert that theſe rational evidences are ſufficient arguments of the truth of the Doctrine they come to

Joh. 5. 40. Matth. 11. 24.

manifeſt; yet I wou'd not be ſo underſtood, that I thereby reſolve all Religion into a mere act of Reaſon and Knowledge, and that no more power is requir'd in the Underſtanding to believe the Goſpel, than to believe a *Mathematical* Demonſtration: which is another Objection ſome lay in the way of this Opinion; but it is not difficult getting over it. For the ſufficiency which I attribute to rational Evidence, is not abſolute and ſimple, but *in ſuo genere*, as an objective Evidence. Notwithſtanding this the whole work of the Spirit of God in its peculiar energy and way of operation upon the Soul, is left intire to it ſelf: But then when the Spirit works as to the planting of a truly Divine Faith, I do not think that it only perſuades the Soul of the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, but withal repreſents the truths reveal'd by that Teſtimony, with all that excellency and ſuitableneſs that there is in them, that by the moſt agreeable, yet effectual influence of the Spirit upon the Soul, it cheerfully embraceth that Truth which is reveal'd, and cordially yields up it ſelf in obedience to it. This is the Divine Faith which the Scripture acquaints us with, and not ſuch a one as merely believes the truth of a Divine Teſtimony: and as to the production of this Faith, I acknowledge mere rational Evidence to be inſufficient, becauſe they proceed in two very different ways; the one is to ſatisfy Mens Minds in the truth of the Doctrine, the other is to bring them effectually to adhere unto it. The aſſerting of the one therefore doth no more tend to deſtroy the other, than the ſaying that a Teleſcope will help us to diſcover very much of the heavenly Bodies, doth imply that a blind Man may ſee them, if he makes but uſe of them. Altho' therefore the natural Man cannot ſavingly apprehend the things of God; yet there may be ſo much rational Evidence going along with Divine Revelation, that ſuppoſing Reaſon to be pure, and not corrupted and ſteep'd in Senſe as now it is, it wou'd diſcover Spiritual Evidence to be the moſt real and convincing Evidence. Thus far we have prov'd, *That where there is any infallible Teſtimony, there is ſufficient rational Evidence going along with it, to make it appear that it is from God.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The rational Evidence of the truth of Christian Religion from Miracles.

I. *The possibility of Miracles appears from* God *and Providence; the evidence of a Divine Testimony by them.* God *alone can really alter the course of Nature. The Devil's power of working Miracles consider'd. Of* Simon Magus, Apollonius. *The cures in the Temple of* Æsculapius *at* Rome, *&c.* II. God *never works Miracles, but for some particular end. The particular reasons of the Miracles of* Christ. *The repealing the Law of* Moses, *which had been settled by Miracles. Why* Christ *check'd the* Pharisees *for demanding a Sign, when himself appeals to his Miracles. The power of* Christ's *Miracles on many who did not throughly believe.* III. Christ's *Miracles made it evident that he was the* Messias, *because the Predictions were fulfill'd in him. Why* John Baptist *wrought no Miracles.* IV. Christ's *Miracles necessary for the overthrow of the Devil's Kingdom.* V. *Of the Demoniacs and Lunatics in the Gospel, and in the Primitive Church. The power of the Name of* Christ *over them largely prov'd by several Testimonies.* VI. *The evidence thence of a Divine Power in* Christ. VII. *Of counterfeit dispossessions. Of Miracles wrought among Infidels.* VIII. *Of the future state of the Church.* IX. *The necessity of the Miracles of* Christ, *as to the propagation of Christian Religion: that prov'd from the condition of the Publishers, and the success of the Doctrine. The Apostles knew the hazard of their employment, before they entred into it.* X. *The boldness and resolution of the Apostles notwithstanding this, compar'd with heathen Philosophers.* XI. *No motive cou'd carry the Apostles thro' their employment, but the truth of their Doctrine;* XII. *not seeking the honour, profit or pleasure of the World.* XIII. *The Apostles evidence of the truth of their Doctrine lay in being eye-witnesses of our Saviour's Miracles and Resurrection.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. *That attested by themselves; their sufficiency thence for preaching the Gospel.* XIX. *Of the nature of the Doctrine of the Gospel; contrariety of it to Natural Inclinations.* XX. *Strange success of it, notwithstanding it came not with humane power: No Christian Emperour till the Gospel universally preach'd.* XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. *The weakness and simplicity of the instruments which preach'd the Gospel. From all which the great Evidence of the power of Miracles is prov'd.*

Of

I. 5. *Hypoth.* *OF all rational Evidences which tend to confirm the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, there can be none greater than a power of working Miracles for confirmation that the Teſtimony which is reveal'd is infallible.* The poſſibility of a power of Miracles cannot be queſtion'd by any who aſſert a *Deity* and a *Providence*; for by the ſame Power that things were either at firſt produced, or are ſtill conſerv'd (which is equivalent to the other) the courſe of Nature may be alter'd, and things caus'd which are beyond the power of inferiour Cauſes: For tho' that be an immutable Law of Nature as to *Phyſical* Beings, that every thing remains in the courſe and order wherein it was ſet at the Creation; yet that only holds till the ſame power which ſet it in that order ſhall otherwiſe diſpoſe of it. Granting then the poſſibility of Miracles, the ſubject of this *Hypotheſis* is: That a power of Miracles is the cleareſt Evidence of a Divine Teſtimony, which will appear from theſe following Conſiderations.

1. God *alone can really alter the courſe of Nature.* I ſpeak not of ſuch things which are apt only to raiſe admiration in us, becauſe of our unacquaintedneſs with the cauſes of them, or manner of their production, which are thence call'd *Wonders*, much leſs of mere juggles and impoſtures, whereby the Eyes of Men are deceiv'd; but I ſpeak of ſuch things as are in themſelves either contrary to, or above the courſe of Nature, *i. e.* that order which is eſtabliſh'd in the Univerſe. The Devil no queſtion may, and doth often deceive the World, and may by ſubtility and the agility of his nature, perform ſuch things as may amuſe the Minds of Men, and ſometimes put them to it, to find a difference between them and real Miracles, if they only make their Senſes judges of them. And ſuch kind of Wonders, tho' they are but ſparingly done, and with a kind of ſecreſy (as tho' they were conſulting with *Catiline* about the burning *Rome*) yet the Devil wou'd have ſome (eſpecially when Ignorance and Superſtition are aſcendants) to keep up his intereſt in the World. Or elſe, when he is like to be diſpoſſeſs'd and thrown out of all, he tries his utmoſt to keep as many to him as may be: Thus when the Spirit of God appear'd in the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apoſtles and the Primitive Church, he then conjur'd up all the infernal Powers to do ſomething parallel, to keep poſſeſſion of his idolatrous Temples, as long as he cou'd. Thus we find *Simon Magus* dogging the Apoſtles (as it were) at the heels, that by his Magic he might ſtagger the People concerning the Miracles wrought by the Apoſtles: After him *Apollonius* appear'd upon the Stage; but his wonders are ſuch pitiful things, compar'd with thoſe wrought by *Chriſt* or his Apoſtles, that it cou d be nothing but malice in *Hierocles* to mention him in competition with *Chriſt*. But thoſe things which ſeem a great deal more conſiderable than either of theſe, were, The cure of a blind Man by *Veſpaſian* in *Ægypt*, mention'd by *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, wherein there was a palpable imitation of our Saviour's curing the blind Man in the Goſpel; for the Man told *Veſpaſian*, *Reſtituturum oculos ſi inſpuiſſet*, *That he ſhould receive his ſight by his ſpittle:* So *Spartianus* tells us of a Woman that was cur'd of her blindneſs by kiſſing the knees of the Emperour *Adrian*; and * *Boxhornius* hath produced an old Table in the Temple of *Æſculapius* at *Rome* of ſeveral diſeaſed perſons that were cured there: *A blind Man in the time of* Antoninus *was cured by this Oracle; he muſt come to the Altar, and kneel there; from the right ſide he muſt turn to the left, and put five fingers upon the Altar, and then lift up his hands and touch his eyes and ſo was cured: Another called* Lucius *cured of the pain of his ſide,*

Sueton. Veſp. cap. 7.

* *Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. qu. 7.*

ſide, by mixing the aſhes of the Altar with the wine, and applying it to his ſide; another cured of ſpitting of blood by the kernel of a pine-apple and honey, uſed three days; a fourth cured of Blindneſs by the blood of a white cock and honey uſed three days upon his eyes. Theſe are the moſt conſiderable of all the pretended Miracles done about that time, when the noiſe of the Chriſtian Miracles were ſpread ſo far and done ſo frequently, that they challenged the Heathens again and again to bring forth any perſon poſſeſs'd with a Devil; if he did not confeſs to them that he was a Devil, tho' he made the Heathens believe that he was a God, they were contented to leave their blood in the place.

For thus *Tertullian* ſpeaks in his *Apology* to them: *Edatur hic aliquis ſub tribunalibus veſtris, quem dæmone agi conſtet: juſſus à quolibet Chriſtiano loqui ſpiritus ille, tam ſe Dæmonem confitebitur de vero, quam alibi Deum de falſo: æque producatur aliquis ex iis qui de deo pati exiſtimantur, qui aris inhalantes numen de nidore concipiunt, qui ructando curantur, qui anhelando profantur. Iſta ipſa Virgo cœleſtis pluviarum pollicitatrix, iſte ipſe Æſculapius Medicinarum demonſtrator, alias de morituris ſcordii & denatii & Aſclepiadoti ſubminiſtrator, niſi ſe Dæmones confeſſi fuerint, Chriſtiano mentiri non audentes, ibidem illius Chriſtiani procaciſſimi ſanguinem fundite. Quid iſto opere manifeſtius, quid hac probatione fidelius? ſimplicitas veritatis in medio eſt; virtus illi ſua aſſiſtit; nihil ſuſpicari licebit, magia aut aliqua fallacia fieri. Dictis non ſtetis, ſi oculi veſtri & aures permiſerint vobis.* In theſe very daring words, we ſee how the Chriſtians appeal'd to their Senſes, even with the hazard of their own lives, that they wou'd make even *Æſculapius* himſelf confeſs what he was, and by whoſe power all the cures were wrought upon the Dreamers in his Temples. And for the manner of the Devil's cures, the ſame Author explains it thus. *Lædunt primo, dehinc remedia præcipiunt ad miraculum nova, ſive contraria, poſt quæ deſinunt lædere, & curaſſe creduntur.* *They firſt poſſeſs the bodies themſelves* (as Demoniacs were common in thoſe times) *and affect it with various diſtempers, afterwards upon uſing the ſtrange remedies preſcribed by* Æſculapius, *they forſake their ſtation, and the perſon is cured.* And for the cures perform'd by the Emperours, thoſe who conſider what various artifices were about that time uſed to procure an opinion of Divinity in the Emperours, will not much wonder that ſuch reports ſhou'd be ſpread of them, or that any perſons ſhou'd fain theſe diſtempers to give themſelves out to be cured by them. But granting ſomewhat wonderful in theſe, what are they, compar'd with thoſe done by *Chriſtians?* and who ever wou'd lay down his life to atteſt any of them? So that tho' the Devil by his ſubtilty may eaſily impoſe upon Spectators eyes, yet it was impoſſible for him by any power of his own to alter the courſe of Nature, or produce any real Miracle. For every true Miracle is a production of ſomething out of nothing (which cannot be done by leſs than an omnipotent arm) and that either in the thing it ſelf, when it is of that nature that it cannot be produced by any Second Cauſes, as the raiſing of the dead; in the manner of doing it, when tho' the thing lies within the poſſibility of Second Cauſes, yet it is perform'd without the help of any of them, as in the cure of diſeaſes without any uſe of means, *by a word ſpeaking, the touch of a garment*, &c. Now that all thoſe Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of the Chriſtian Doctrine were ſuch true and proper Miracles, will be diſcover'd afterwards.

Tertull. Apol. c. 23.

Ibid. c. 22.

2. God *never alters the courſe of Nature, but for ſome very conſiderable end.* II.

end. For otherwiſe when he did it, it wou'd not be taken notice of nor thought to be an alteration of the order of Nature, but only ſome rare contingiences which lie hid in the order of Cauſes, but only break out at ſome times: of which ſort are all thoſe things which the ignorant World is apt to account as Prodigies. Of all which rare contingences in Nature, I ſay, as the *Roman* Orator doth, *Si quod raro fit, id portentum putandum eſt, ſapientem eſſe portentum eſt; ſæpius enim mulum peperiſſe arbitror, quam ſapientem fuiſſe. If all rare contingences be accounted prodigies, a wiſe Man is certainly the greateſt Prodigy.* But theſe are quite of another nature from true Miracles, which are immediately produced by a Divine Power, and intended for a confirmation of ſome Divine Teſtimony. There are now ſeveral weighty Reaſons, which might make Miracles neceſſary in the time of our Saviour, as an Evidence of his Divine Authority and Power.

Cicero de Div. l. 2.

1. *That he came to take down that way of worſhip, which had been at firſt ſettled by a power of Miracles in* Moſes. God wou'd not be ſo much wanting to the Faith of that People, which had receiv'd their Law by Signs and Wonders from Heaven, but that there ſhou'd be as ſtrong an Evidence given to them, that the fulneſs of time was come when that diſpenſation was to have an end, and to give place to one more perfect, which was to be eſtabliſh'd inſtead of it. Upon which account the *Jews* might rationally enquire after a Sign, where any new Revelation was diſcover'd, which might null the obligation of any former Law: and when they enquire ſo much after a Sign, our Saviour doth not reject the enquiry as in it ſelf unreaſonable, but as made in an unreaſonable manner; for they wou'd not be contented with the Miracles which our Saviour wrought, which ſufficiently manifeſted a Divine Power; but all that they deſired was, *A Sign from Heaven*, i. e. ſuch as were done at the giving of the Law, the Thundring and Lightnings there; or, as the *raining of Manna in the wilderneſs*: Now our Saviour juſtly checks this demand as importunate and impudent; partly as knowing upon what account they asked it, merely to tempt him and not out of any real deſire of ſatisfaction; and partly becauſe on that abundant Evidence which was given in the Miraculous cures which were wrought by him, which were more ſutable to that deſign of doing good in the World, than all the Thunder-claps on Mount *Sinai* were: neither were the People in a condition to be fed by *Manna* as they were in the Wilderneſs, God graciouſly ſuiting the diſcoveries of his Power to the peculiar advantages of the People which they were made to, and the diſpenſation they uſher'd in. Thoſe terrible Signs at Mount *Sinai* being very ſuitable to the ſeverity and rigor of the Law: and the gracious Miracles of our Saviour to the ſweetneſs and grace of the Goſpel. And on this account our Saviour charged the *Jews* with Hypocriſy in requiring a σημειον, as ſomething above δυναμις, a *Prodigy* rather than a Miracle; *An evil and adulterous generation ſeeketh after a Sign, and there ſhall no Sign be given it but that of the Prophet* Jonas, *i. e.* this People which are ſo far from the Faith of *Abraham*, (and therefore are ſuppoſititious Children) that no Miracles which I do, will convince them, but they ſeek only to have their Humours gratify'd more than their Faith confirm'd by ſome Prodigy from Heaven, ſhall not by me be thus gratify'd; but having done enough already to perſuade them, if they had any heart to believe, inſtead of a Sign from Heaven, they ſhall have only one from the Earth, and that not ſo much intended for the converſion of

Matth. 12 38. 16. 1.

Math. 12. 39.

ſuch

ſuch wilful Unbelievers, as for the teſtifying my innocency to the World, *viz.* his Reſurrection from the dead. And ſo elſewhere when the *Jews*, demand a Sign, it was upon the doing of that, which if they had attended to, had been a ſufficient Sign to them, *viz. his driving the buyers and ſellers out of the Temple:* Which being a thing permitted by the *Sanhedrin* and the *Prieſts*, how cou'd they think ſo mean a Perſon, in appearance, as our Saviour was, cou'd ever have effected it, had it not been for a Divine Majeſty and Power which appear'd in him? It was not then the expectation of Miracles which our Saviour rebuked in the *Jews*, but being unſatisfy'd with the kind and nature of our Saviour's Miracles. It was their Hypocriſy and unbelief which *Chriſt* condemn'd, notwithſtanding the frequent Miracles which he wrought among them: For we plainly find our Saviour very often appealing to his Miracles as the evidences of his Divine Commiſſion: *If I had not done the works among them which no man elſe did, they had not had ſin*, i. e. in not believing me. Whereby *Chriſt* both ſets forth the neceſſity of his working Miracles, in order to the conviction of the World, and the greatneſs of the Miracles which he wrought: he did thoſe no Man elſe had done, no not *Moſes* and *Elias*, in curing all manner of diſeaſes by the Word of his Mouth; and thoſe Miracles which they had done, he exceeded them in the manner of doing them. *Moſes* fed them with bread from Heaven; but *Chriſt* multiply'd on Earth ſome *few loaves* and *fiſhes*, to the *feeding* of *many thouſands*: *Elias* indeed raiſed one from the dead; but *Chriſt* raiſed more, and one after he had been *four days* in the *grave*. And upon this very evidence of our Saviour's Miracles we find many believing on him. And even of thoſe who were not ſo far wrought upon as to become followers of Chriſt, as the only *Meſſias*, yet we find them ſo far perſuaded by the power of his Miracles, that they looked upon him as a great Prophet, or one that was ſent from God. So *Nicodemus*, who came firſt to Chriſt more as a rational Enquirer than a Believer, yet we ſee he was *perſuaded that he was a teacher come from God, becauſe no man could do the miracles which Chriſt did unleſs God were with him.* And before him many of the *Jews* at *Jeruſalem believed in his name when they ſaw the miracles which he did*; yet theſe perſons *Chriſt would not truſt himſelf with, becauſe he knew their hearts* were not ſubdued to his Doctrine, tho' their underſtandings were convinced by his Miracles. And after this other of the *Jews* that looked not on him as the *Meſſias*, yet it is ſaid they believ'd on him on the account of his Miracles. *And many of the people believed on him, and ſaid, When Chriſt cometh will he do more Miracles than theſe which this man hath done?* Altho' herein they were moſt unreaſonable in believing the Evidence, and not the Truth atteſted by it, in believing Chriſt to be one ſent from God by his Miracles, and yet not believing him to be the *Meſſias*, which was the thing atteſted by them. Not that mere Miracles wou'd prove the Perſon to be the *Meſſias* who did them, but the Miracles prov'd the Teſtimony to be Divine; now that which Chriſt deliver'd to them as a Divine Teſtimony, was his being the *Meſſias* and therefore by the ſame reaſon they believ'd him to be ſent from God, they ought to have believ'd him to be the *Meſſias*; for one ſent from God cou'd never falſifie in the main of his Meſſage, as this was of our Saviour's preaching. And hence it is obſervable our Saviour did not ſhew forth his Divine Power till he entred upon his Office of Preaching; thereby making it appear he intended this as the great evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he preached

Joh 2. 18.

Joh. 5. 36. 10. 25. Joh. 15. 20.

Joh. 1. 49. 2. 11.

Joh. 3. 2.

Joh. 2. 23.

Joh. 7. 31.

to them. And herein the blind man in the Goſpel ſaw more Truth and Reaſon than the whole Court of *Sanhedrin*, before which in probability he was convented about his cure by Chriſt; for when they ſought to get ſomething out of him in diſparagement of our Saviour's perſon and miracle, he ſharply and roundly tells them, when they ſaid they knew
Joh. 9. 29, 30. God ſpake to *Moſes*, *but for this fellow, we know not from whence he is*; *Why herein*, ſaith he, *is a marvellous thing, that ye know not from whence*
Ver. 33. *he is, and yet he hath opened mine eyes. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing*; (as tho' he had ſaid) is it not plain that this man is imploy'd by God in the World by the Miracles which he doth? for otherwiſe God wou'd not ſo readily aſſiſt him in doing ſuch great Works
Ver. 31. *for we know that God heareth not ſinners: but if any man be a worſhipper of God, and doth his will, him he heareth*; *i. e.* if this man pretended a Commiſſion from Heaven falſly (whereby he wou'd be the greateſt of Sinners) can we think God wou'd ſo miraculouſly aſſiſt him? but we know by our Law, if one comes with a Commiſſion from God, and draw men not to Idolatry, which is meant by a worſhipper of God; ſuch a one God is preſent with, and we are bound to believe him. And for this very miracle, or curing one born blind, was the like ever heard of before? did ever *Moſes* or the Prophets do it? Thus we ſee what ſtrong Rational Evidence there was in this Miracle of Chriſt in the judgment of this blind man, which he utter'd with ſo much reaſon before the Court of *Sanhedrin*, when he knew how like he was to be excommunicated for it; and yet this very perſon was as yet ignorant that
Ver. 36. Chriſt was the true *Meſſias*, as appears by the Sequel of the Chapter;
Ver. 38. but upon Chriſt's Revelation of himſelf to him, *he preſently believed on him.* How ſtrangely irrational were the *Jews* then in rejecting our Saviour, when his Miracles not only exceeded thoſe of *Moſes* both in number and quality; but which was more, they ſaw themſelves the Miracles which Chriſt did, but they received thoſe of *Moſes* only upon the credit of their Fathers! And from the ſtrength of the Evidence ariſing from the power of Miracles it is that St. *Peter* tells the promiſcuous Aſſembly, *Act.* 2. 22. *That Jeſus of* Nazareth *was a man approved of God among them, by miracles, wonders and ſigns, which God did by him in the midſt of them, as they themſelves alſo knew.* He appeals to their own knowledge, which he wou'd not certainly have done, had it not been in a caſe beyond all diſpute among them. Which was a thing ſo notorious among them, that we find the *Phariſees* themſelves confeſſing it;
Joh. 11. 47. *What do we? For this man doth many miracles:* Now then in a Nation whoſe Religion had been eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, and the certainty of the truth of it, among thoſe who then profeſs'd it, did depend ſo much upon the conſtant credit which the report of the Miracles done at the ſettling of their Law had among them; what cou'd be a more rational and convincing way of proceeding, than for our Saviour to manifeſt by a greater Power of Miracles in himſelf the undoubted credentials of his Commiſſion from Heaven; and that he was the true *Meſſias*, which was foretold by their own moſt ſacred and authentical Records? Which will appear more,

III. *Becauſe the power of miracles did evidently declare that he was the very*
Hyp. 2. *perſon promiſed.* For if the exact correſpondency of the event to the Predictions in a Nation owning them as Divine, be an undoubted evidence, that they are exactly fulfill'd; our Saviour was moſt certainly the Perſon ſo often ſpoken of in the Old Teſtament. For many of the Prophecies

Prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the *Meſſias*, if they were not fulfill'd in Chriſt, in the conditions the *Jews* have been in ſince their diſperſion, (which fell out exactly according to the Prediction of Chriſt) it is impoſſible that they ſhou'd be fulfill'd at all. So that either the Predictions muſt loſe their Divine Authority, or they muſt be accompliſhed in our bleſſed Saviour. For as *Tertullian* ſharply ſays to the *Jews*, *Redde ſtatum Judææ quem Chriſtus inveniat, & alium contende venire*; *Let the people of the Jews be in their former condition, and then plead for a Meſſias to come.* For can any thing be more plain than that the *Meſſias* was to be born in *Bethlehem* of *Judæa?* but where is that now? and how long ſince the *Jews* enjoy'd any civil Polity there? What is become of the ſecond Temple, in the time of which the Deſire of all Nations ſhou'd come. Is not *Jeruſalem* already deſtroy'd, and the Oblation there long ſince ceaſed, which was to come to paſs ſo ſoon after the *Meſſias*, and did accordingly? Is not *the Scepter yet departed from* Judah, and *the Lawgiver from between his feet*, and is not *Shiloh* yet come? What ſtrange unintelligible Weeks were thoſe of *Daniel*, if they were extended to ſo indefinite a period; what certain ground cou'd from hence be gather'd of any time wherein their Accompliſhment was to be expected? But not to Expatiate on thoſe things which are already ſo largely prov'd beyond all poſſibility of contradiction, by the ancient and modern learned Writers the *Jews*: To inſiſt therefore on our preſent buſineſs; are not the Prophecies concerning the Miracles which the *Meſſias* ſhou'd work, exactly fulfill'd in Chriſt? *Then the eyes of the blind ſhall be opened, and the ears of the deaf ſhall be unſtopped; then ſhall the lame man leap as an Hart, and the tongue of the dumb ſhall ſing.* He muſt be a great ſtranger in the Hiſtory of the New Teſtament that is to ſeek for an exact fulfilling of this Prophecy. Nay, and the *Jewiſh Midraſch*, upon *Pſal.* 146. 8. ſaith, that when *Meſſias comes, he ſhould open the eyes of the blind*; and the *Jews* themſelves often ſpeak of the great Miracles which the *Meſſias* ſhou'd do when he appears; and therefore out of their own mouths will they be condemned, when the Miracles of Chriſt make it ſo evident that he was the true *Meſſias*. Hence when *John Baptiſt* ſent his Diſciples to Chriſt for them to be fully ſatisfy'd concerning him; he bids them tell him, *the blind receive their ſight, and the lame walk, and the lepers are cleanſed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raiſed up*, &c. as tho' the mentioning of theſe Miracles was ſufficient to make it appear to them who he was whom they came to enquire after. And therefore it is obſervable that *John Baptiſt* himſelf, tho' greater than the Prophets, nay, *than whom there was not a greater born of women*, by our Saviour's own Teſtimony; yet of him it is ſaid, *that he wrought no miracle*: of which no account can be given ſo probable and rational, as that God in his infinite Wiſdom was pleas'd ſo to order it, that the Evidence of our Saviour's being the *Meſſias* might be made more clear by the Miracles which he wrought, that the minds of the People might not be diſtracted between *John* and *Chriſt*; he therefore reſerv'd the glory of Miracles wholly to the name of *Chriſt*, that there might be no pretence of Competition between *John* and *him*.

Tertull. C. Judæos, c. 13.

Iſa. 35. 5, 6.

V. Grot. in Joh. 9. 32.

Mat. 11. 5.

Mat. 11. 9, 11.

Joh. 10. 41.

Another reaſon of the neceſſity of Miracles in our Saviour by way of Rational Evidence, is, *the overthrowing the power and kingdom of the Devil in the world.* For which purpoſe it is obſervable that the Devil had ſcarce ever greater power over the Bodies of Men as well as their Souls, than at that time; thence we read of ſuch a multitude of *Demo-*

IV. *Hyp.* 3.

niacs in the Goſpel. For it ſeems very harſh to interpret thoſe merely of Epileptical and Lunatic Perſons, both becauſe the δαιμονιζόμενοι, and Mat.4. 24. σεληνιαζόμενοι, and παραλυτικοί, are mention'd diſtinctly, and that it appears by the Primitive Church afterwards how frequent it was to eject the Devil out of poſſeſſed perſons. Nay, ſo far am I from thinking that the Demoniacs were mere Lunatics, that I rather think with *Voſſius* that the Lunatics were truly Demoniacs, only they were not conſtantly under the power of the Devil, but as their paroxyſms return'd upon them, the Devil loving to Fiſh in ſuch troubled Waters. And thence the ſame perſon is called a Lunatic in one place, who is called a Demoniac in another; becauſe he did *ruere in principiis lunationum*, as the *Arabic* verſion expreſſeth it; or as *Ruſticus Elpidius* more fully explains it,

Voſſius de Idolat. l. 2. c. 19.

Mat. 17. 14. Luke. 9. 39.

Ruſt. Elpid. lib. 5.

Repſerat in medium rabies horrenda furoris
Dæmonis afflatu, propria qui peſte nocivus
Allidit captas fœdo diſcrimine mentes,
Menſtrua deciduos cum Luna recolligit ignes.

Theophylact is of opinion, that the *Jews* in the time of our Saviour ſup-
Mat.8. 28. poſ'd, that the Souls of dead men became Demons, and thence we read in Scripture of the Demoniacs among the Tombs: but it is far more probable which *Grotius* conceives, that the *Jews* were of opinion, that the Souls of dead men did hover up and down about their Bodies, and that theſe were ſo long under the Devils power, which many of the *Jews* to this day believe, and make uſe of the inſtance of the *Pythoniſs* raiſing *Samuel*; on which account the Devils, to favour an Opinion ſo advantageous to their intereſt, might appear with greater terror and fury about their burying places, as we ſee they did in thoſe poſſeſſed perſons. But on whatever account it was, we find it evident that about the time of our Saviour's appearance, and ſome time after, the truly ἐνεργούμενοι were very frequent; whether it were that the Devil by ſuch frequent poſſeſſions of perſons, and making them to do ſuch ſtrange things, might thereby endeavour to invalidate the evidence of our Saviour's Miracles (from whence it is probable the *Phariſees* raiſed their Calumny, that Chriſt did Miracles by *Beelzebub*, becauſe they ſaw ſo many ſtrange appearances caus'd by poſſeſſed perſons) or whether it were thro' the Admirable Providence of God, which might give Satan the greater liberty at that time, on purpoſe to heighten the glory of our Saviour in diſpoſſeſſing of him, and thereby to give the higheſt Rational Evidence, that his Power was of God, which tended ſo much to the deſtruction of the Kingdom of Satan.

V. And hence the Primitive Chriſtians did ſo much triumph, and as it were inſult over the Devil where-ever they found him, making him to remove his lodgings from poſſeſs'd perſons, by a Writ of Ejection from the Name of Chriſt. Thence *Origen* rationally concludes that Chriſt had his Power given him from above, becauſe at his very Name the
Orig. c. Celſ. l. 3. Devils forſook the bodies which they had poſſeſs'd, Εἰ γὰρ μὴ δεδόθη ἦν αὐτῷ δεδεῖσθαι σύσσασις, ἐξ ἂν καὶ δαίμονες τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἀπαγγελλομένῳ μόνον εἴκοντες ἀνεχώρουν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν πολεμουμένων. And he elſewhere tells us, that even the meaneſt ſort of Chriſtians without any Ceremony, but merely by their Prayers, did ordinarily eject the Devil out of mens
Lib. 7. bodies: ὡς ἐπίπαν γὰρ ἰδιώται τὸ τοιοῦτον περάτωσι, παρισάσης δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ χρείας καὶ τοῦ τῶν δαιμόνων εὐτελὴς καὶ ἀδυνὲς, ὃ πάντως βούλεται τοῦ

ἐτέ-

ἠτιμωμένην καὶ εἶξαν ὑπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ Ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ σώματος σοφοῦ τινὸς καὶ δυνατοῦ ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς περὶ τῆς πίστεως ἀποδείξεσι. *Ordinary Chriſtians,* ſaith he, *moſt commonly do this, the Grace of Chriſt by its word thereby diſcovering the contemptibleneſs and infirmity of the Devils, that in order to their Ejection they did not want any learned or experienced Chriſtian,* And for this they appeal to the Heathens themſelves, as appears not only by the challenge of *Tertullian* already mention'd, but by the Teſtimony of almoſt all of them who have writ againſt the Heathens in vindication of the Chriſtian Religion. Thence *Minutius Felix, Hæc omnia ſciunt plerique, pars veſtrum, ipſos dæmonas de ſemetipſis confiteri, quoties à nobis tormentis verborum, & orationis incendiis de corporibus exiguntur. Ipſe Saturnus, & Serapis, & Jupiter, & quicquid dæmonum colitis, victi dolore quod ſunt eloquuntur, nec utique in turpitudinem ſui nonnullis præſertim veſtrum aſſiſtentibus, mentiuntur. Ipſis teſtibus eos eſſe Dæmonas, de ſe verum confitentibus credite; adjurati enim per Deum verum & ſolum, inviti, miſeri corporibus inhorreſcunt; & vel exſiliunt ſtatim, vel evaneſcunt gradatim, prout fides patientis adjuvat, aut gratia curantis aſpirat.* Can we now think the Devil ſhou'd not only forſake his Tyranny over the bodies of men, but let go ſo advantageous a pillar of his Tyranny over the Conſciences of men in Idolatrous worſhip, as the concealing himſelf was, had he not been forc'd to it by a Power far greater than his own? So *Cyprian ad Demetrianum,* appeals to him being the Proconſul of *Africa,* about the ſame thing (who had written ſharply againſt the Chriſtians) for ſpeaking of the Devils whom they worſhipped in their Idols, *O ſi audire eos velles & videre, quando à nobis adjurantur & torquentur Spiritualibus flagris & verborum tormentis de obſeſſis corporibus ejiciuntur, quando ejulantes & gementes voce humana, & poteſtate divina flagella & verbera ſentientes, venturum judicium confitentur; veni & cognoſce vera eſſe quæ dicimus:* and a little after, *videbis ſub manu noſtra ſtare vinctos, & tremere captivos, quos tu ſuſpicis & veneraris ut Dominos.* Did ever any of the Heathen Magicians (of which there were good ſtore) extort ſuch things from the Devils, as the Chriſtians did, merely by their Prayers, and Invocations of the name of God and Chriſt? did they ever make them confeſs to be what they were, not only in poſſeſs'd bodies but in their Temples too? that was beyond the power of their *Epheſian* Letters, or any of their Magical Incantations. Did the Devils ever dread ſo much the Name of *Socrates* or *Ariſtides* as they did that of God and Chriſt? Of which *Lactantius* thus ſpeaks, *Quo audito tremunt, exclamant, & uri ſe verberarique teſtantur, & interrogati qui ſint, quando venerint, quando in hominem irrepſerint, confitentur ſic extorti, & excruciati virtute divini numinis exulant; propter hæc verba & minas, ſanctos & juſtos viros ſemper oderunt.* And even *Apollo* himſelf at the name of Chriſt trembled as much as ever the *Pythian* Propheteſs did in her greateſt furies; ſo *Prudentius* tells us.

Minut. Felix. p. 31. ed. Oxz.

Cyprian. ad Demetr. ſ. 12.

Lactant. de juſtitia, lib. 5. c. 21.

Torquetur Apollo
Nomine percuſſus Chriſti, nec fulmina verbi
Ferre poteſt; agitant miſerum tot verbera linguæ,
Quot laudata Dei reſonant miracula Chriſti.

Prudent. Apotheoſ.

To theſe we may add what *Firmicus* ſaith to the ſame purpoſe, *Ecce Dæmon eſt quem colis; cum Dei & Chriſti ejus nomen audierit, contremiſcit, & ut interrogantibus nobis reſpondeat trepidantia verba, vix ſe colligit;*

Firmicus de errore prof. relig.

adhærens

adhærens homini laceratur, uritur, vapulat, & ſtatim de commiſſis ſceleribus confitetur. By which Teſtimonies it appears what power over Satan, when he was in his Kingdom, the Chriſtians by the power of Chriſt had; not as tho the bare name of Chriſt had ſo great an efficacy in the ejection of Devils, as *Origen* ſeems to be of opinion (in a diſcourſe about the efficacy of Names, unworthy of ſo great a Philoſopher) but that God might manifeſt to the World the truth that was contain'd in that Name, he did give a power to ſuch as made uſe of it, of working Miracles by it. And thence we read in Scripture, that ſome who were not throughly Chriſtians, but yet profeſs'd the Truth of the Goſpel, and that what they did was for the honour of Chriſt, *had a power of caſting out Devils and doing many wonderful things thro' his name.*

Origen. l. 1. c. Celſ.

Matt. 7. 22.

VI. By theſe and many other Teſtimonies which might be produced out of the Primitive Church, we find an exact accompliſhment of our Saviour's promiſe to his Diſciples when he took his leave of them. *And theſe ſigns ſhall follow them that believe, In my name ſhall they caſt out Devils*, &c. This power then in the Primitive Church had a twofold Argument in it, both as it was a manifeſtation of the truth of the Predictions of our Saviour, and as it was an Evidence of the Divine Power of *Chriſt*, when his Name ſo long after his Aſcenſion had ſo great a command over all the Infernal Spirits; and that ſo evidently, that at that time when the *Chriſtians* did as it were tyrannize over *Satan* ſo in his own territories, yet then the greateſt of his *Magicians* had no Power to hurt the bodies of the *Chriſtians*, which is a thing *Origen* takes much notice of. For when *Celſus* ſaith from *Diogenes Ægyptius* that *Magic* cou'd *only hurt ignorant and wicked Men, and had no power over Philoſophers*; *Origen* replies, *firſt*, that *Philoſophy* was no ſuch charm againſt the power of *Magic*, as appears by *Mæragenes* who writ the Story of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, the famous Magician Philoſopher, who therein mentions how *Euphrates* and an *Epicurean* (ἐκ ἀγενεῖς φιλόσοφοι, *no vulgar Philoſophers*) were catched by the *Magic* of *Apollonius*, (and altho' *Philoſtratus* diſowns this Hiſtory of *Mæragenes* as fabulous, yet he that thinks *Philoſtratus* for that, to be of any greater credit, is much deceived, of whom *Lud. Vives* gives this true Character, that he doth *magna Homeri mendacia majoribus mendaciis corrigere, Mend one hole and make three,*) but ſaith *Oregen*, as to the *Chriſtians*, this is undoubtedly true: Διαβεβαιώμεθα ἢ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ πείρᾳ ἐπιγνόντες, ὅτι οἱ κατὰ χριστιανισμὸν διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τὸ ὅτι πάσι θεραπεύοντες θεὸν, ἐν βιοῦντες κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον αὐτοῦ ταῖς προσευχαῖς ἢ εὐχαῖς συνεχέστερον ἐν δεόντως νυκτὸς ἐν ἡμέρας χρώμενοι, ὅτε μαγείᾳ ὅτε δαιμονίοις εἰσὶν ἀλωτοί. *This*, ſaith he, *we are moſt certain of, and have found it by experience true, that thoſe who according to the Principles of Chriſtianity do worſhip God over all, thro' Jeſus, and do live according to the Goſpel, being conſtant in their ſolemn Prayers night and day, are not obnoxious to the power of any Magic or Devils whatever.* Now then if the Devil who had then ſo much power over others, had none upon the true followers of *Chriſt*; and if inſtead of that they had ſo great a commanding Power over the Devil even in things which tended moſt to his diſadvantage, not only diſlodging him out of Bodies, but out of his idolatrous Temples; what can be more evident, than that this power which was ſo efficacious for the overthrowing the Kingdom of *Satan*, muſt needs be far greater than the power of *Satan* is? For it is an undoubted Maxim in Natural Reaſon, That *whatever is put out of its former place by force and violence, is extruded by ſomething ſtronger than*

Lud. Vives de trad. diſc. l. 5.

Origen. contr. Celſ. l. 6. p. 302.

than its ſelf; for if the force on either ſide were equal, there cou'd be no diſpoſſeſſing of either; if any thing then be caſt out of its former poſſeſſion unwillingly, it is an undeniable proof there was ſome power greater than his who was diſpoſſeſſed. Now we cannot conceive, if there be ſuch malignant Spirits, as by many undeniable proofs it is evident there are, that they ſhou'd willingly quit their poſſeſſions to ſuch a Doctrine which tends to the unavoidable ruin of their Intereſt in the World: if then the power of this Doctrine hath overthrown the Devil's Kingdom in the World, where-ever it hath been truly entertain'd, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that this power is far above the power of any damned Spirits. Now what folly and madneſs was it in the *Heathens* to worſhip thoſe for Gods, which they cou'd not but ſee, if they wou'd open their eyes, were under ſo great ſlavery to a power above them, which cou'd make them confeſs what was moſt to their diſadvantage in the preſence of their great adorers?

VII. Neither ought the many Counterfeits and Impoſtures which have been in the World in this kind ſince the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtian Religion (among the advancers of particular intereſts and deſigns) make us ſuſpect the truth of thoſe things which were done in the firſt Ages of the Church of *Chriſt*. For, *firſt*, it ſtands to the greateſt Reaſon, that the ſtrongeſt Arguments for the truth of a Religion ought to be fetched from the Ages of its firſt appearance in the World; if then the Evidence be undoubted as to thoſe firſt times, we ought to embrace our Religion as true, whatever the impoſtures have been among thoſe who have apparently gone aſide from that purity and ſimplicity of the Goſpel, which had ſo great power. Then, *ſecondly*, if all that hath been done in this kind of ejecting Devils, where Chriſtianity is own'd, be acknowledg'd for impoſtures; one of theſe two things muſt be ſuppoſed as the ground of it: either that there was no ſuch thing as a real diſpoſſeſſion by the Devil, or elſe there was no ſuch thing as a diſpoſſeſſing him. If the *firſt*, then hereby will be ſeen a confirmation of our former Argument, that where Chriſtianity is own'd, by the power of that, the Devil is more curb'd and reſtrain'd, than where it is not, or elſe is much over-run with ignorance and ſuperſtition. Of the latter, the Ages of the Chriſtian Church, from the 10th Century to the beginning of the 16th Current, are a clear Evidence; Of the *firſt*, all thoſe who have been converſant in the places where *Paganiſm* or groſs *Idolatry* do yet reign, will bring in their creditable Teſtimonies, how tyrannical the power of the Devil is yet among them. If it be not ſo then, where careful endeavours have been uſed for retrieving the ancient purity of Chriſtian Doctrine and Worſhip, we ought to impute it to the power of him who is ſtronger than *Satan*, who where-ever he comes to dwell, doth diſpoſſeſs him of his former habitations. If the *ſecond* then be entertained as the ground of concluding all things as impoſtures, which are accounted diſpoſſeſſions of *Satan*, *viz.* that he never is really diſpoſſeſſed; then it muſt either be ſaid, that where he is once ſeized, there is no poſſibility of ejecting him; which is to ſay, that the Devil hath an abſolute and infinite power, and that there is no power greater than his, which is to own him for God; or elſe that God ſuffers him to tyrannize where and how he will, which is contrary to Divine Providence, and the care God takes of the World, and of the good of Mankind; or elſe, *laſtly*, that thoſe Perſons who pretend to do it, are not ſuch Perſons who are armed ſo much with the power of *Chriſt*, nor

poſſeſs

poſſeſſed with ſuch a due Spirit of the Goſpel, which hath command over theſe infernal Spirits. And this in the caſes pretended by the great Juglers and Impoſtors of the Chriſtian World, the *Popiſh* Prieſts have been ſo notorious, that none of their party of any great faith or credit would ſtand to vouch them. And we have this impregnable Argument againſt all ſuch Impoſtures, that the matters which they by ſuch actions would give an Evidence to, being ſo vaſtly different from, if not in ſome things diametrically oppoſite to the firſt delivery and deſign of the Chriſtian Faith, it is inconſiſtent with the way uſed for the confirmation of Chriſtian Religion in the firſt publiſhing of it: to atteſt the truth of ſuch things by any real Miracles: For ſo it would invalidate the great force of the Evidences of the truth of Chriſtianity, if the ſame Argument ſhou'd be uſed for the proving of that which in the judgment of any impartial Perſon was not delivered, when the truth of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* was confirmed by ſo many and uncontrouled Miracles. But hereby we ſee what unconceivable prejudice hath been done to the true primitive Doctrine of the Goſpel; and what ſtumbling-blocks have been laid in the way of conſiderative Perſons, to keep them from embracing the truly Chriſtian Faith, by thoſe who wou'd be thought the infallible Directors of Men in it, by making uſe of the Broad-ſeal of Heaven (ſet only to the truth of the Scriptures) to confirm their unwritten and ſuperſtitious ways of worſhip. For if I once ſee that which I looked on as an undoubted Evidence of Divine Power, brought to atteſt any thing directly contrary to Divine Revelation; I muſt either conclude that God may either contradict himſelf by ſealing both parts of a contradiction, which is both blaſphemous, and impoſſible; or that that Society of Men which own ſuch things is not at all tender of the honour of Chriſtian Doctrine, but ſeeks to ſet up an intereſt contrary to it, and matters not what diſadvantage is done to the grounds of Religion by ſuch unworthy pretences: and which of the two is more rational and true, let every one's Conſcience judge. And therefore it is much the intereſt of the Chriſtian World to have all ſuch Frauds and Impoſtures diſcovered, which do ſo much diſſervice to the Chriſtian Faith, and are ſuch ſecret fomenters of *Atheiſm* and *Infidelity*. But how far that promiſe of our Saviour: *That they which believe in his Name, ſhall caſt out Devils and do many Miracles,* may extend even in theſe laſt Ages of the World to ſuch generous and Primitive-ſpirited Chriſtians, who out of a great and deep ſenſe of the truth of Chriſtianity and tenderneſs to the Souls of Men, ſhou'd go among *Heathens* and *Infidels* to convert them only to Chriſt (and not to a ſecular intereſt, under pretence of an infallible Head) is not here a place fully to enquire. I confeſs I cannot ſee any reaſon why God may not yet for the conviction of *Infidels*, employ ſuch a power of Miracles, altho' there be not ſuch neceſſity of it, as there was in the firſt propagation of the Goſpel, there being ſome Evidences of the power of Chriſtianity now, which were not ſo clear then, (as the overthrowing the kingdom of *Satan* in the World; the prevailing of Chriſtianity, notwithſtanding force uſed againſt it; the recovery of it from amidſt all the corruptions which were mixed with it; the conſent of thoſe parties in the common foundations of Chriſtianity, which yet diſagree from each other with great bitterneſs of Spirit,) tho' I ſay it be not of that neceſſity now, when the Scriptures are convey'd to us in a certain uninterrupted manner; yet God may pleaſe out of his abundant proviſion for the ſatisfaction of the Minds of Men, concern-

Matth. 16. 17.

ning

ning the truth of Christian Doctrine, to employ good Men to do something which may manifest the power of Christ to be above the Devil's, whom they worship. And therefore I shou'd far sooner believe the relation of the Miracles of *Xaverius* and his Brethren employ'd in the conversion *Infidels*, than *Lipsius* his *Virgo Hallensis* and *Asprecollis*, cou'd it but be made evident to me that the design of those Persons had more of *Christianity* than *Popery* in it; that is, that they went more upon a design to bring the Souls of the *Infidels* to Heaven, than to enlarge the Authority and Jurisdiction of the *Roman* Church.

VIII. But what-ever the truth of those Miracles, or the design of those persons were, we have certain and undoubted Evidence of the Truth of those Miracles, whereby Christianity was first propagated, and the Kingdom of Satan over-thrown in the World; Christ thereby making it appear that his Power was greater than the Devil's *who had possession, because he over-came him, took from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divided his spoils*; i. e. dispossess'd him of Mens Bodies, and his Idolatrous Temples, silenced his Oracles, nonplust his Magicians, and at last, when Christianity had overcome by suffering, wrested the worldly Power and Empire out of the Devil's hands, and employ'd it against himself. Neither may we think, because since that time the Devil hath got some ground in the world again by the large spread of *Mahometism*, and the general Corruptions in the Christian world, that therefore the other was no argument of Divine Power; because the truth of Christianity is not tied to any particular places; because such a falling away hath been foretold in the Scripture, and therefore the truth of them is prov'd by it; and because God himself hath threatned that those who will not receive the Truth in the love of it, shall be *given up to strong delusions*. Doth not this then instead of abating the strength of the Argument, confirm it more, and that nothing is fallen out in the Christian world, but what was foretold by those whom God employ'd in the converting of it? But we are neither without some fair hopes even from that Divine Revelation which was seal'd by uncontroul'd Evidence, that there may be yet a time to come when Christ will recover his Churches to their pristine Purity and Simplicity; but withal, I think we are not to measure the future Felicity of the Church by outward Splendor and Greatness (which too many so strongly fansie) but by a recovery of that true Spirit of Christianity which breathed in the first Ages of the Church, what-ever the outward condition of the Church may be: For if worldly greatness, and ease, and riches, were the first Impairers of the purity of Christian Religion, it is hard to conceive how the restoring the Church of Christ to its true Glory, can be by the advancing of that, which gives so great an occasion to Pride and Sensuality, which are so contrary to the design of Christian Religion; unless we suppose Men free from those Corruptions, which continual experience still tells the World the Rulers as well as Members of the Christian Society are subject to. Neither may that be wonder'd at, when such unevenness of parts is now discover'd in the great Luminaries of the World, and the Sun himself is found to have his *Maculæ*, as tho' the Sun had a purple Fever, or as *Kircher* expresseth it, *Ipse Phœbus, qui rerum omnium in universo naturæ Theatro, aspectabilium longè pulcherrimus omnium opinione est habitus hoc seculo tandem fumosa facie, ac infecto vultu maculis prodiit; diceres eum variolis laborare senescentem*: I speak not this as tho' an outward flourishing condition of the Church were inconsistent with its Purity; for

Luk. 11. 21, 22.

Kircher. Propyl. Agonist. ad Oedipum, cap. 2.

then the way to refine it, were to throw it into the flames of Perſecution; but that the advancement of the flouriſhing condition of the Church, is not merely by outward Pomp and Grandeur, and that the Purity of the Church is not inconſiſtent with a ſtate of outward difficulties, which the experience of the Primitive Church gives an irrefragable demonſtration of. Thus much may ſerve to ſhew the neceſſity of a Power of Miracles, conjoyned with the Chriſtian Doctrine, to manifeſt the truth of it by overthrowing the Kingdom of that great *Antichriſt* the Devil, who had uſurped ſo much Tyranny over the World.

IX. The laſt Reaſon why a power of Miracles was ſo neceſſary for confirming the Truth of the Goſpel, is, *becauſe the Goſpel was to be propagated over the World without any other rational evidence than was contained in the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it.* Now the admirable ſucceſs which this Doctrine found in the World, conſidering all the Circumſtances of it, do make it clear what certainty there was that the Miracles which were wrought were true, and they were certain Evidences that the Doctrine atteſted by them was from God. Now this will appear from theſe two things:

1. *That no rational account can be given why the Apoſtles ſhould undertake to publiſh ſuch a Doctrine, unleſs they had been undoubtedly certain that the Doctrine was true, and they had ſufficient Evidence to perſuade others to believe it.*

2. *That no ſatisfactory account can be given, conſidering the nature of the Doctrine of Chriſt, and the manner of its propagation, why it ſhould meet with ſo great acceptance in the World, had there not been ſuch convincing Evidence as might fully perſuade Men of the truth of it.*

I begin with the *firſt, from the Publiſhers of this Doctrine in the World.* All that I here require by way of a *Poſtulatum* or Suppoſition, are only theſe two things, which no Man right in his wits I ſuppoſe will deny: 1. *That Men are ſo far rational Agents, that they will not ſet upon any work of moment and difficulty, without ſufficient grounds inducing them to it*; and ſo much the greater the work is, the more ſure and ſtedfaſt had the grounds need to be which they proceed upon. 2. *That the Apoſtles or firſt Publiſhers of the Chriſtian Doctrine were not men diſtracted, or bereft of their wits, but acted by principles of common ſenſe, reaſon and underſtanding, as other men in the World do:* Which if any one ſhou'd be ſo far beſide his wits as to queſtion, if he have but patience and underſtanding enough to read and conſider thoſe admirable Writings of theirs which are convey'd to us by as certain uninterrupted a Tradition as any thing in the world hath been, by that time he will ſee cauſe to alter his Judgment, and to ſay that *they are not mad, but ſpeak the words of the greateſt Truth and Soberneſs.* Theſe things ſuppoſed, I now proceed to the proving of the thing in hand, which will be done by theſe three things; Firſt, *That the Apoſtles could not but know how hazardous an employment the preaching of the Goſpel would be to them.* Secondly, *That no motive can be conceived ſufficient for them to undertake ſuch an employment, but the infallible Truth of the Doctrine which they preached.* Thirdly, *That the greateſt aſſurance they had themſelves of the truth of their Doctrine, was by being eye-witneſſes of the Miracles of Chriſt.*

Firſt, *That the Apoſtles could not but underſtand the hazard of their employment, notwithſtanding which they cheerfully undertook it.* That Men armed with no external Power, nor cried up for their Wit and Learning, and carrying a Doctrine with them ſo contrary to the general Inclinations

of

of the World, having nothing in it to recommend it to Mankind but the Truth of it, ſhou'd go about to perſuade the World to part with the Religion they owned, and was ſettled by their Laws, and to embrace ſuch a Religion as called them off from all the things they loved in this World, and to prepare themſelves by Mortification and Self-denial for another World, is a thing to Humane Reaſon incredible, unleſs we ſuppoſe them acted by a higher Spirit than Mankind is ordinarily acted by. For what is there ſo deſirable in continual Reproaches and Contumelies? what delight is there in Racks and Priſons? what agreeableneſs in Flames and Martyrdoms to make Men undergo ſome, nay all of theſe, rather than diſown that Doctrine which they came to publiſh? Yet theſe did the Apoſtles cheerfully undergo in order to the Converſion of the World to the truth of that Doctrine which they deliver'd to it. And not only ſo, but tho' they did foreſee them, they were not diſcouraged from this undertaking by it. I confeſs, when Men are upon hopes of profit and intereſt in the World, engaged upon a deſign which they promiſe themſelves impunity in, having Power on their ſide, tho' afterwards things ſhou'd fall out contrary to their expectation, ſuch Perſons may die in ſuch a Cauſe, becauſe they muſt, and ſome may carry it out with more reſolution, partly thro' an innate fortitude of Spirit, heightned with the advantages of Religion, or an Enthuſiaſtic temper. But it is hard to conceive that ſuch perſons wou'd have undertaking ſo hazardous an employment, if before-hand they had fore-ſeen what they muſt have undergone for it. But now the Apoſtles did fore-know that Bonds and Impriſonment, nay Death it ſelf muſt be undergone in a violent manner, for the ſake of the Doctrine which they preached; yet notwithſtanding all this, they go boldly and with reſolution on with their work, and give not over becauſe of any Hardſhips and Perſecutions they met withal. One of the chiefeſt of them, St. *Peter*, and as forward as any in preaching the Goſpel, had the very manner of his death fore-told him by Chriſt himſelf, before his Aſcenſion; yet ſoon after we find him preaching Chriſt in the midſt of thoſe who had Crucify'd him, and telling them to their faces the greatneſs of their ſin in it, and appealing to the Miracles which Chriſt had done among them, and *bidding them repent and believe in him whom they had crucified, if ever they would be ſaved:* And this he did, not only among the People who gave their conſent to the Crucifying of Chriſt; but ſoon after, being convented together with *John*, before the Court of *Sanhedrin* (probably the very ſame which not long before had ſentenced Chriſt to death) for a Miracle wrought by them, with what incredible boldneſs doth he to their faces tell them of their Murdering of Chriſt; and withall, that their was no other way to ſalvation but by him whom they had Crucified! *Be it known unto you all* (ſaith *Peter* to the *Sanhedrin*) *and to all the people of* Iſrael, *that by the name of Jeſus Chriſt whom ye have crucified, whom God raiſed from the dead, even by him doth this man ſtand here before you whole. Neither is there ſalvation in any other: for there is none other name under Heaven given among men, whereby we muſt be ſaved.* What an heroic freedom of Spirit appears in theſe words! what magnanimity and courage was there now in that Perſon, who durſt in the face of this Court tell them of their Murther, and that there was no Salvation but by him whom they had Crucified! Well might they wonder at the boldneſs of the Men, who fear'd not the ſame Death which they had ſo lately brought their Lord and Maſter to.

Joh. 21. 19.

Act. 2. 22, 23, 38. Act. 3. 13, 14, 15, 19. Act. 4. 5.

Act. 4. 10, 12.

X. Neither was this ſingly the caſe of *Peter* and *John*, but all the reſt of the Apoſtles undertook their work with the ſame reſolution and preparation of Spirit to undergo the greateſt hardſhip in the World for the ſake of the Truths they Preached. And accordingly as (far as Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory can aſcertain us of it,) they did allbut *John* (and that to make good the Prediction of Chriſt) ſuffer violent deaths by the hands of thoſe who perſecuted them merely for their Doctrine. And which is moſt obſervable, when Chriſt deſign'd them firſt of all for this work, he told them before-hand of reproaches, perſecutions, all manner of hardſhips, nay of death it ſelf, which they muſt undergo for his ſake. All that he gave them by way of encouragement, was, that they cou'd only *kill the body* and not the *ſoul*, and therefore *that they ſhould fear him only who could deſtroy both body and ſoul in Hell*; all the ſupport they had, was an expectation in another World, and that animated them to go thro' all the hardſhips of this. Where do we ever read of any ſuch boldneſs and courage in the moſt knowing Philoſophers of the Heathens? with what faintneſs and miſgiving of Mind doth *Socrates* ſpeak in his famous diſcourſe ſuppos'd to be made by him before his death? how uncertainly doth he ſpeak of a State of Immortality? and yet in all probability *Plato* ſet it forth with all advantages imaginable. Where do we ever find that ever any of the great Friends of *Socrates* who were preſent at his death, as *Phædo*, *Cebes*, *Crito* and *Simmias*, durſt enter the *Areopagus*, and condemn them there for the Murther of *Socrates*, tho' this would be far ſhort of what the Apoſtles did? Why were they not ſo charitable as to inform the World better of thoſe grand Truths of the Being of God and Immortality of Souls, if at leaſt they were fully convinced of themſelves? Why did not *Plato* at leaſt ſpeak out, and tell the World the Truth and not diſguiſe his diſcourſes under feigned Names, the better to avoid Accuſation and the Fate of *Socrates?* How doth he mince his excellent matter, and plays as it were at *Bo-peep* with his Readers, ſometimes appearing and then pulling in his Horns again? It may not be an improbable conjecture that the death of *Socrates* was the foundation of the Academy: I mean of that cautelous Doctrine of with-holding Aſſent, and being both *pro* and *con*, ſometimes on this ſide, ſometimes on that: for *Socrates*'s death hath made all his Friends very fearful of being too Dogmatical. And *Plato* himſelf had too much Riches, and withal too much of a Courtier in him to hazard the dear Priſon of his Soul, *viz.* his Body, merely for an *æthereal vehicle*. He had rather let his Soul flutter up and down in *Terreſtrial Matter*, or the Cage it was pent up in, than hazard ſo violent an opening of it by the hands of the *Areopagus*. And the great *Roman* Orator, among the reſt of *Plato*'s Sentiments, had learnt this too; for altho' in his diſcourſes he hath many times ſufficiently laid open the folly of the Heathen Worſhip and Theology, yet he knows not how to bring himſelf off ſafe enough with the People; and will be ſure to be Dogmatical only in this, *That nothing is to be innovated in the Religion of a Commonwealth*, and that the *Cuſtoms of our Anceſtors are inviolably to be obſerved*. Which Principles, had they been true as they were ſafe for the Perſons who ſpoke them, the Chriſtian Religion had never gain'd any entertainment in the World; for where-ever it came, it met with this potent Prejudice that it was look'd on as an Innovation, and therefore was ſhrewdly ſuſpected by the Governours of Common-wealths

Joh. 21. 22.

Mat. 10. 17,18,21, 22, 28.

Plato in *Phæd.*

and

and the Preachers of it punished as factious and seditious Persons; which was all the pretext the wise Politicians of the World had for their cruel and inhumane Persecutions of such multitudes of peaceable and innocent Christians. Now when these things were fore-told by the Apostles themselves before their going abroad so plainly, that with the same Faith they did believe the Doctrine they Preached to be true, they must believe that all these things shou'd come to pass, what courage and magnanimity of Spirit was it in them thus to encounter dangers, and as it were court the Flames? Nay and before the time was come that they must die, to seal the truth of their Doctrine, their whole Life was a continual Peregrination, wherein they were as so many *Jobs* in Pilgrimage, encountred with perils and dangers on every side; of which one of the most painful and successful, St. *Paul*, hath given in such a large Inventory of his perils, that the very reading of them were enough to undo a poor *Epicurean Philosopher*, and at once to spoil him of the two Pillars of his Happiness, the quietness of his Mind and ease of his Body. Thus we see what a hazardous imployment that was which the Apostles went upon, and that it was such as they very well understood the difficulty of before they set upon it. 2. Cor. 6. 4, 5, 8, 9.

Secondly, *We cannot find out any rational motive which could carry them through so hazardous an employment, but the full convictions of their minds of the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine which they deliver'd.* XI. We find before that no vulgar motives in the World cou'd carry them upon that design which they went upon; cou'd they be led by Ambition and Vain-glory, who met with such Reproaches where-ever they went; and not only Persecutions of the Tongue, but the sharper ones of the Hands too? We never read of any but the Primitive Christians who were ambitious of being Martyrs, and thought long till they were in the Flames: which made *Arrius Antonius* being Pro-consul of *Asia*, when Christians in multitudes beset his Tribunal and thronged in to be Condemn'd, say to them, ὦ δειλοὶ, εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνὸς ἢ βρόχους ἔχετε. *O miserable People, had not ye ways enough to end your lives at home, but ye must croud for an execution!* This was a higher ambition by far than any of those *mancipia gloriæ*, those *Chamæleons* that liv'd on the breath of Applause, the Heathen Philosophers ever reached to, who were, as *Tertullian* expresseth it, *Homines gloriæ & eloquentiæ solius libidinosi, unsatiable thirsters after the honour and eloquence of the world*; but the Spirit of a Christian did soar too high to quarry on so mean a Prey. When the more sober Heathens had taken a stricter notice of the Carriages and Lives of the Preachers of the Gospel and all their genuine Followers, they instead of the common and rude name of Impostures, gave them a more civil title of *Philosophers*, and looked upon their Doctrine as a sublimer kind of Philosophy, *Non utique divinum negotium existimant sed magis Philosophiæ genus*, as *Tertullian* tells us, because the Philosophers pretended so much to Moral Vertues which they saw the Christians so excellent in; but as *Tertullian* there replies, *Nemen hoc Philosophorum Dæmonia non fugat, The Devil was never afraid of a Philosopher's beard*, nor were diseases cured by the touch of a Philosophic *pallium*. There was something more Divine in Christians than in the grave Philosophers; and that not only in reference to their lives, and the Divine Power which was seen in them, but in reference to the truth and certainty of their Doctrine, it being a true Character given of both, by that same excellent Writer in behalf of the Christi- *Tertull. ad Scapul. c. 5.* *Idem. Apolog. c. 47.* *Ibid. c. 45.*

ans

Idem ad Nationes. l. 1. c. 4. ans of his time: *Veritatem Philoſophi quidem affectant, poſſident autem Chriſtiani*; *What the Philoſophers deſired only, the Chriſtians enjoy*, which was *Truth*: and as he elſewhere more fully ſpeaks, *Mimice Philoſophi affectant veritatem, & affectando corrumpunt, ut qui gloriam captant*; *Chriſtiani eam neceſſario appetunt, & integri præſtant, ut qui ſaluti ſuæ curant. Truth is the Philoſopher's Miſtreſs, which by courting he vitiates and corrupts, looking at nothing but his own glory: but Truth is the Chriſtian's Matron, whoſe directions he obſerves and follows, becauſe he regards no glory but that to come.* And to let them further ſee what a difference there was between a *Chriſtian* and a *Philoſopher*, he concludes that diſcourſe with theſe words. *Quid adeo ſimile Philoſophus & Chriſtianus? Græciæ Diſcipulus & cœli? famæ negotiator & vitæ? verborum & factorum operator? rerum ædificator & deſtructor? amicus & inimicus erroris? veritatis interpolator & integrator? furator ejus & cuſtos. As much diſtance* (ſaith he) *as there is between* Greece *and* Heaven, *between applauſe and eternal glory, between words and things, between building and deſtroying, between truth and error, between a plagiary and a corrupter of truth, and a preſerver and advancer of it*; *ſo much is there between a Philoſopher and a Chriſtian.* The *Heathens* might ſuſpect indeed ſome kind of affinity between the firſt Preachers of the Goſpel and the ancient Sophiſts of *Greece*, becauſe of their frequent going from place to place, and pretending a kind of *Enthuſiaſm* as they did: but as much difference as there is between a *Knight-Errant* and *Hercules*, between a *Mountebank* and *Hippocrates*, that and much greater there is between a *Greek Sophiſt* and an *Apoſtle*. *Socrates* in *Plato's Euthydemus* hath excellently diſcover'd the vanity and futility of thoſe Perſons under the Perſons of *Euthydemus* and *Dionyſodorus*, and ſo likewiſe in his *Protagoras*; their intent was only like the *Retiaries* in the *Roman* Spectacles, to catch their adverſaries in a Net, to entangle them with ſome captious Queſtion or other: but how vaſtly different from this was the deſign of the Apoſtles, who abhorr'd thoſe endleſs Contentions which then were in the heathen World; and came to ſhew them that *Truth* which was revealed, with an intent of making them better Men!

XII. We ſee the Apoſtles were not carried forth by any mean and vulgar Motives, neither did they drive on any private ends of their own; all that they minded was the promoting of the Doctrine which they preached. Nay they accounted no hazards comparable with the advantage which the World enjoy'd thro the propagation of the Chriſtian Religion. This ſhewed a truly noble and generous Spirit in them, which wou'd not be hinder'd from doing the World good, tho' they found ſo bad entertainment from it; yea they rejoyced in their greateſt ſufferings which they underwent in ſo good a cauſe; wherein thoſe Primitive Chriſtians who were the genuine followers of the Apoſtles, did ſo far imitate them, that, *etiam damnati gratias agunt*, they gave the *Judges thanks* that they thought them worthy to loſe their Lives in a cauſe which they had reaſon to triumph in, tho' they died for it. And when any of them were apprehended, they diſcover'd ſo little fear of puniſhment, *Ut unum ſolummodo quod non ante fuerint pœniteret, That nothing troubled them ſo much as that they had been Chriſtians no ſooner*, as one of their number ſpeaks. And when the *Heathens* uſually ſcoffed at them, and call'd them *Sarmentitii* and *Semaxii*, becauſe they were burn'd upon the Croſs, one of them in the name of the reſt anſwers, *Hic eſt habitus victoriæ noſtræ, hæc palmata veſtis, tali currn triumphamus*; The Croſs was only their Triumphant

Tertullian. Apol. c. 46. Min. Felix. Tertullian. Apol. c. 5.

Triumphant-chariot, which carried them ſooner to Heaven. Now this courage and reſolution of Spirit which was ſeen in the firſt Planters of Chriſtianity in the World, made all ſerious and inquiſitive Perſons look more narrowly into thoſe things, which made Men ſlight ſo much the common bug-bears of Humane Nature, ſufferings and death. *Quis enim non contemplatione ejus concutitur, ad requirendum quid intus in re ſit? quis non ubi requiſivit accedit? ubi acceſſit pati exoptat.* Theſe Sufferings made Men enquire; this Enquiry made them believe; that Belief made them as willing to ſuffer themſelves, as they had ſeen others do it before them. Thus it appear'd to be true in them, *Exquiſitior quæque crudelitas, illecebra magis eſt ſectæ; plures efficimur quoties metimur à vobis; ſemen eſt ſanguis Chriſtianorum; The cruelty of their enemies did but encreaſe their number; the harveſt of their pretended juſtice was but the ſeed-time of Chriſtianity, and no ſeed was ſo fruitful as that which was ſteeped in the Blood of Martyrs.* Thence *Juſtin Martyr* ingenuouſly ſaith of himſelf, That while he was a *Platonic* Philoſopher, he derided and ſcoffed at the Chriſtians; but when he conſider'd their great courage and conſtancy in dying for their Profeſſion, he cou'd not think thoſe cou'd poſſibly be Men wicked and voluptuous, who when offers of Life were made them, wou'd rather chooſe death than deny Chriſt. By which he found plainly that there was a higher Spirit in *Chriſtianity* than cou'd be obtain'd by the ſublime Notions and Speculations of *Plato*, and that a poor ignorant Chriſtian wou'd do and ſuffer more for the ſake of Chriſt than any of the Academy in defence of their Maſter *Plato*. Now ſince all Men naturally abhor ſufferings, what is it which ſhou'd ſo powerfully alter the nature and diſpoſition of Chriſtians above all other Perſons, that they alone ſhou'd ſeem in that to have forgot Humanity, that not only with patience, but with joy they endur'd torments and abode the flames? What! were they all poſſeſſed with a far more than *Stoical Apathy*, that no ſenſe of pain cou'd work at all upon them? or were they all beſotted and infatuated Perſons that did not know what it was they underwent? It is true ſome of the more blind and wilful *Heathens* derided them as ſuch; but who were the moſt infatuated, let any ſober Perſon judge: they who ſlighted and rejected a Doctrine of ſo great concernment, which came atteſted with ſo much reſolution and courage in the Profeſſors of it, or they who were ſo far perſuaded of the truth of it, that they wou'd rather die than deny it? *Dicimus & palam dicimus, & vobis torquentibus lacerati & cruenti vociferamur, Deum colimus per Chriſtum.* They were not aſhamed to believe in the Blood of Chriſt, even when their own Blood ran down before their Eyes, and confeſs Chriſt with their Mouths, when their Bodies were upon the rack. Certainly then there were ſome very powerful and convincing Arguments which buoyed up the Spirits of true Chriſtians in that deluge of Suffering which they were to ſwim thro'; it muſt be a ſtrong and well-grounded Faith which wou'd hold out under ſo great Tryals, and they cou'd not be to ſeek for the moſt perſuaſive Motives to Faith, who were ſo ready to give an account to others of the Hope that was in them, and to perſuade all other Perſons to the embracing of it. With what face and confidence otherwiſe cou'd they perſuade Men to embrace a Doctrine ſo dangerous as that was, had there not been Motives ſufficient to bear up againſt the weight of Sufferings, and Arguments perſuaſive to convince them of the undoubted certainty of that Doctrine which they encouraged them to believe?

Id. ib.

Tertullian. Apol. c. 21.

Now

XIII. Now that which appears to have been the main ground of satisfaction to the Primitive Christians as to the truth and certainty of the Doctrine of Christ, was this, That the Doctrine of the Gospel was at first delivered to the World by those Persons, who were themselves Eye-witnesses of all the Miracles which our Saviour wrought in confirmation of the truth of what he spake. They were such Persons who had been themselves present, not only to hear most of our Saviours admirable discourses when he was in the World, but to see all those glorious things which were done by him, to make it appear that he was immediately sent from God. Let us now appeal to our own Faculties and examine a little what rational Evidence cou'd possibly be desired, that the Doctrine of the Gospel was true, which God did not afford to the World? What cou'd the Persons who were the Auditors of our Saviour desire more as an Evidence that he came from God, than his doing such things which were certainly above any created power, either Humane or Diabolical, and therefore must needs be Divine? What cou'd other Persons desire more who were not present at the doing of these Miracles, but that the report of them shou'd be convey'd to them in an undoubted manner, by those Persons who were Eye-witnesses of them, and made it appear to the World they were far from any intention of deceiving it? Now this makes the Apostles themselves in their own Writings (tho they were divinely inspir'd) appeal to the rational Evidence of the truth of the things, in that they were deliver'd by them who were Eye-witnesses, of them. There St *Peter* speaks thus to the dispersed *Jews* 2 Pet. 1. 16 ὁ γὰρ σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑμῖν τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δύναμιν καὶ παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπόπται γενηθέντες τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος. *For we have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his Majesty.* The power and coming of Christ which the Apostle speaks of, was not as some improbably conceive, either his general coming to Judgment upon the World, or his particular coming upon the Nation of the *Jews*; but by an *Hendyadis*, by his power and coming is meant his powerful appearance in the World, whereby he mightily discover'd himself to be the Son of God. Now this, saith the Apostle, was no σεσοφισμένῳ μύθῳ, not like the *Heathen Mythology* concerning the παρουσίαι and ἐπιφανείαι of their Gods among them (which were so frequently believed among them, that *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* condemns the *Epicureans*, because they did deride τὰς ἐπιφανείας τῶν θεῶν, *the appe-* Dionys. Halic. l. 2 pag. 128. *rances of their Gods in the World)* now, saith the Apostle, assure your selves, this is no such appearance of a God on Earth as that among the *Heathens* was; for, saith he, we our selves who declare these things were ἐπόπται, we fully understood this μέγα μυστήριον, *this great Mystery of godliness*, God *manifest in the flesh*, for we saw his μεγαλειότης, *that great Majesty which attended him in all which he spake or did*; we saw all Act. 2. 11. those μεγαλεῖα τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the great things of God*, which were manifest in him, all those miraculous operations which were wrought by him. Therefore as this was a great confirmation of the Faith of the Apostles themselves that they saw all these things, so we see it was of great concernment to the World in order to their belief that the Gospel was no cunningly-devised fable, in that it was delivered by such who were ἐπόπται, *Eye-witnesses* of what they declared. To the same purpose St. *John* speaks *ad conciliandam fidem*, to make it appear how true what they delivered was, in the entrance of his Epistle; *That which was from*

the

the beginning, which we have heard, which we have ſeen with our Eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life, (*for the life was manifeſted, and we have ſeen it, and bear witneſs, and ſhew unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifeſted unto us*) *That which we have ſeen and heard, declare we unto you.* We ſee what great force and weight the Apoſtle lays upon this, that they delivered nothing but what they had ſeen and heard; as they heard the Doctrine of Chriſt, ſo they ſaw the Miracles which he wrought in confirmation of it. St. *Luke* likewiſe in the beginning of his Goſpel declares that he intended to write nothing but *what he had perfect understanding of from ſuch perſons who had been* αὐτόπται, *Eye-witneſſes and inſtruments themſelves in part of what was written,* for that is meant by ὑπηρέται τοῦ λόγου· *and thoſe things which were written,* he ſaith were πεπληροφορημένα ἐν ἡμῖν πράγματα, *things which are abundantly proved to be true*; for being Matters of Fact, there cou'd be no ſtronger proof of them, than by ſuch who were eye-witneſſes of what they ſpake. And this we find the Apoſtles themſelves very cautious about, in the choice of a new Apoſtle in the room of *Judas*, *Wherefore of theſe Men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord* Jeſus *went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptiſm of* John, *unto that ſame day that he was taken from us, muſt one be ordained to be a witneſs of his Reſurrection from the dead,* (as that which was the great Seal of our Saviour's being the Son of God) therefore we find the Apoſtles ſo frequently atteſting the truth of the Reſurrection of Chriſt, and that themſelves were eye-witneſſes of it. *This Jeſus,* ſaith *Peter, hath God raiſed up, whereof we all are witneſſes.* And again, *And killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raiſed up from the dead, whereof we are witneſſes*; and both *Peter* and *John* to the *Sanhedrin*; *For we cannot but ſpeak the things which we have ſeen and heard.* And the whole College of Apoſtles afterwards, *And we are his witneſſes of the things, and ſo is alſo the Holy Ghoſt, whom God hath given to them that obey him.* In which they give them that two-fold rational Evidence which did manifeſt the undoubted truth of what they ſpake; for they deliver'd nothing but what themſelves were witneſſes of, and withal was declar'd to be true by the power of the Holy Ghoſt in the Miracles which were wrought by and upon Believers. Afterwards we read the ſum of the Apoſtles preaching; and the manner uſed by them to perſuade Men of the truth of it, in the words of *Peter* to *Cornelius* and his company, *How God anointed* Jeſus *of* Nazareth *with the Holy Ghoſt and with power, who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppreſſed of the Devil, for God was with him: And we are witneſſes of all things which he did both in the land of the* Jews *and in* Hieruſalem, *whom they ſlew and hanged on a tree: Him God raiſed up the third day, and ſhewed him openly, not to all the people, but unto witneſſes choſen before of God, even to us who did eat and drink with him after he aroſe from the dead. And he commanded us to preach unto the people, that it is he which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead.* By all which we ſee what care God was pleaſed to take for the ſatisfaction of the World in point of rational Evidence, as to the truth of the matters which were diſcover'd concerning our Saviour *Chriſt*, becauſe he made choice of ſuch Perſons to be the Preachers and Writers of theſe things who were the beſt able to ſatisfy the World about them, *viz.* ſuch as had been eye-witneſſes of them.

1 Joh. 1. 1, 2, 3.

Luk. 1. 1, 2, 3.

Act. 1. 12, 22.

Act. 2. 32. 3. 15. 4. 20. 5. 32.

10. 39, 40, 41, 42.

Now in order to the making it more fully evident what ſtrength there XIV.

was in this Teſtimony given by the Apoſtles to the Miracles of *Chriſt*, we ſhall more fully manifeſt the rational Evidence which attended it in theſe following Propoſitions.

Prop. 1. *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends upon a matter of fact, the truth of the Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted, if the matter of fact be evidently proved in the higheſt way it is capable of.* Thus it is in reference to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*; for the truth of that is ſo interwoven with the truth of the ſtory of *Chriſt*, that if the Relations concerning *Chriſt* be true, his Doctrine muſt needs be Divine and Infallible. For if it be undoubtedly true, that there was ſuch a Perſon as *Chriſt* born at *Bethlehem*, who did ſo many Miracles, and at laſt ſuffered the death of the Croſs, and after he had lain three days in the Grave *roſe again* from the dead; what reaſon imaginable can I have to queſtion, but that the teſtimony of this Perſon was certainly Divine, and conſequently whatever he preached to the World was moſt certain and undoubted truth? So that if we have clear Evidence as to the truth of theſe paſſages concerning our Saviour, we muſt likewiſe believe his Doctrine, which came atteſted with ſuch pregnant Evidences of a Divine Commiſſion which he had from God to the World. No Prince can think he hath any reaſon to refuſe audience to an Embaſſador, when he finds his Credentials ſuch as he may rely upon, altho' himſelf doth not ſee the ſealing of them; much leſs reaſon have we to queſtion the truth of the Doctrine of the Goſpel, if we have ſufficient Evidence of the truth of the matters of fact concerning *Chriſt*, in ſuch a way as thoſe things are capable of being proved.

Prop. 2. *The greateſt evidence which can be given to a matter of fact, is the atteſting of it by thoſe perſons who were eye-witneſſes of it.* This is the foundation whereon the firmeſt Aſſent is built, as to any matter of fact; for altho' we conceive we have reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of a Story, as long as it is convey'd only in a general way, by an uncertain Fame and Tradition; yet when it comes to be atteſted by a ſufficient number of credible Perſons who profeſs themſelves the eye-witneſſes of it, it is accounted an unreaſonable thing to diſtruſt any longer the Truth of it; eſpecially in theſe two caſes. 1. *When the matter they bear witneſs to is a thing which they might eaſily and clearly perceive.* 2. *When many witneſſes exactly agree in the ſame Teſtimony.*

1. *When the matter it ſelf is of that nature that it may be fully perceived by thoſe who ſaw it*; i. e. if it be a common Object of Senſe. And thus it certainly was as to the Perſon and Actions of Jeſus Chriſt. For he was of the ſame nature with Mankind; and they had as great Evidence that they convers'd with Jeſus Chriſt in the Fleſh, as we can have that we converſe one with another. The Miracles of Chriſt were real and viſible Miracles; they cou'd be no illuſions of Senſes, nor deceits of their Eyes; the Man who was born blind and cured by our Saviour, was known to have been born blind thro' all the Country, and his Cure was after as public as his blindneſs before, and acknowledged by the greateſt Enemies of Chriſt at the time of its being done. When Chriſt raiſed up the dead Man at *Naim*, it was before much People, and ſuch Perſons in probability who were many of them preſent at his Death. But leſt there might be any ſuſpicion as to him, that he was not really dead, the caſe is plain and beyond all diſpute in *Lazarus*, who had been to the knowledge of all perſons thereabouts dead four days; here cou'd be no deceit at all when the Stone was rowl'd away, and *Lazarus* came forth in the preſence of them all. And yet further the Death

Joh. 9. 26. Luk. 7. 12. Joh. 11. 39.

and

and Paſſion of our Saviour was a plain object of ſenſe, done in preſence of his greateſt Adverſaries. The Souldiers themſelves were ſufficient Witneſſes of his being really dead, when they came to break his Bones, and ſpared him becauſe they ſaw he was dead already. At his reſurrection the Stone was rowl'd away from the Sepulchre and no body found therein, altho' the Sepulchre was guarded by Souldiers, and the Diſciples of Chriſt all ſo fearful, that they were diſperſed up and down in ſeveral places. And that it was the ſame real Body which he roſe withal, and no *aëreal vehicle*, appears by *Thomas*'s ſcrupuloſity and unbelief, *who would not believe unleſs he put his hands into the hole of his ſide, and ſee in his hands the print of the nails*; now our Saviour condeſcending ſo far as to ſatisfy the incredulity of St. *Thomas*, hath made it thereby evident that the Body which our Saviour roſe from the grave with, was the ſame individual Body which before was crucified and buried in the Sepulchre. And we find all the Apoſtles together upon our Saviour's appearance to them after his Reſurrection, ſo far from being credulous in embracing a Phantaſm, inſtead of Chriſt, that they ſuſpected that it was either a mere Phantaſm, or an evil Spirit which appeared among them; upon which it is ſaid, *They were terrified and affrighted, and ſuppoſed they had ſeen a ſpirit.* Which our Saviour cou'd not beat them of from, but by appealing to the judgment of their Senſes, *Handle me and ſee; for a ſpirit hath no fleſh and bones as ye ſee me have*; and afterwards more fully to convince them, *he did eat in the midſt of them.* Now the more ſuſpicious and incredulous the Apoſtles themſelves at firſt were, the greater evidence is it how far they were from any deſign of abuſing the World in what they after preached unto it, and what ſtrong convicti on there was in the thing it ſelf, which was able to ſatisfie ſuch ſcrupulous and ſuſpicious perſons.

Joh. 20. 25, 27. Luk. 24. 37. Ver. 39. Ver. 43.

2. *When many witneſſes concur in the ſame Teſtimony.* Nothing can diſparage more the Truth of a Teſtimony, than the counter-witneſs of ſuch who were preſent at the ſame actions; but when all the Witneſſes fully agree not only in the ſubſtance, but in all material circumſtances of the Story, what ground or reaſon can there be to ſuſpect a Forgery or Deſign in it; eſpecially when the perſons cannot by any Fears or Threatnings be brought to vary from each other in it? Thus it is in our preſent caſe, we find no real diſſent at all mention'd either as to the Birth, Miracles, Life, Death, or Reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt; all the Witneſſes atteſt the ſame things tho' writing in different places, and upon different occaſions; no alteration in any circumſtance of the Story, out of any deſign of pleaſing or gratifying any Perſons by it. Moſt of our Saviour's Miracles, not only his Apoſtles, but the People and his very Enemies were witneſſes of, whoſe poſterity to this day dare not deny the truth of ſuch ſtrange Works which were wrought by him. And for his Reſurrection, it wou'd be very ſtrange that five hundred Perſons ſhou'd all agree in the ſame thing, and that no Torments or Death cou'd bring any of them to deny the truth of it, had there not been the greateſt certainty in it.

XV. *There can be no reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony which is given by eye-witneſſes, but either from queſtioning their knowledge of the things they ſpake of, or their fidelity in reporting them.* Now there is not the leaſt ground to doubt either of theſe, in reference to thoſe perſons who gave Teſtimony to the World concerning the Perſon and Actions of our bleſſed Saviour. Prop. 3.

For *firſt, they were ſuch as were intimately converſant both with the per-*

ſon and actions of Jeſus Chriſt; whom he had choſen and trained up for that very end, that they might be ſufficiently qualify'd to acquaint the World with the truth of things concerning himſelf after his Reſurrection from the Dead. And accordingly they follow'd him up and down whereſoever he went; they were with him in his Solitudes and Retirements, and had thereby occaſion to obſerve all his Actions, and to take notice of the unſpotted innocency of his Life. Some of his Diſciples were with him in his Tranſfiguration, others in his Agony and bloody Sweat, they heard the Expreſſions which came from his mouth; in all which he diſcover'd a wonderful ſubmiſſion to the Will of God, and a great readineſs of Mind to ſuffer for the good of the World. Now therefore the firſt thing cannot at all be queſtion'd, their means of knowing the truth of what they ſpake.

Neither, *ſecondly*, is there any *reaſon to ſuſpect their fidelity in reporting what they knew:* For, 1. *The truth of this Doctrine wrought ſo far upon them, that they parted with all their worldly ſubſiſtence for the ſake of it.* Altho' their Riches were not great, yet their way of ſubſiſtence in the World was neceſſary; they left their Houſes, their Wives and Children, and all for Chriſt, and that not to gain any higher Preferments in this World (which had they done, it wou'd have rendred their deſign ſuſpicious to the curious and inquiſitive World) but they let go at leaſt a quiet and eaſie life, for one moſt troubleſome and dangerous. So that it is not, how much they parted withal, but how freely they did it, and with what cheerfulneſs they underwent Diſgraces, Perſecutions, nay Death it ſelf for the ſake of the Goſpel. Now can it be imagin'd, that ever Men were ſo prodigal of their Eaſe and Lives, as to throw both of them away upon a thing which themſelves were not fully aſſur'd of the Truth of? It had been the higheſt folly imaginable, to have deceiv'd themſelves in a thing of ſo great moment to them, as the truth of that Doctrine which they preached was; becauſe all their Hopes and Happineſs depended upon the truth of that Doctrine which they preached. And as *Tertullian* obſerves, *Non fas eſt ulli de ſua religione mentiri*; for, ſaith he, *He that ſays he worſhips any thing beſides what he doth, he denies what he doth worſhip, and transfers his worſhip upon another, and thereby doth not worſhip that which he thus denies*; Beſides what probability is there Men ſhou'd lye for the ſake of that Religion, which tells them that thoſe which do ſo will not receive the Reward which is promiſed to thoſe who cordially adhere unto it? Nay, they declar'd themſelves to be the moſt miſerable of all perſons *if their hopes were only in this preſent life.* Can we now think that any who had the common Reaſon of Men wou'd part with all the contentments of this World, and expoſe themſelves to continual hazards, and at laſt undergo death it ſelf for the ſake of ſomething which was merely the Fiction of their own Brains? What ſhou'd make them ſo Sedulous and Induſtrious in preaching ſuch things, that they cou'd *ſay neceſſity was laid upon them, yea, wo was unto them if they preached not the Goſpel*, when they ſaw ſo many Woes attending them in the Preaching of it, had there not been ſome more powerful attractive in the beauty and excellency of the Doctrine which they preached, than any cou'd be in the Eaſe and Tranquility of this preſent World? Thus we ſee the Fidelity of the Apoſtles manifeſted in ſuch a way as no other Witneſſes were ever yet willing to hazard theirs. And therefore *Origen* deſervedly condemns *Celſus* of a ridiculous Impertinency, when he wou'd parallel the Relati-

1 Cor. 15. 19.

1 Cor 9. 16.

Origen. c. Celſum, l. 3. p. 127.

ons

ons of *Herodotus* and *Pindarus* concerning *Ariſteus Proconneſius* with thoſe of the Apoſtles concerning Chriſt; For ſaith he, *Did either of theſe two venture their lives upon the truth of what they writ concerning him, as the Apoſtles did to atteſt the truth of what they preached concerning our Lord and Saviour Jeſus Chriſt?*

XVI. 2. The Fidelity of the Apoſtles is evident in their *manner of reporting the things which they deliver.* For if there may be any thing gather'd from the manner of Expreſſion, or the τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λόγου, concerning the particular Temper and Diſpoſition of the Perſon from whom it comes, we may certainly read the great Fidelity in the Apoſtles from the peculiar manner of their expreſſing themſelves to the World. Which they do,

1. *With the greateſt impartiality:* not declaring only what was glorious and admirable to the World, but what they knew wou'd be accounted fooliſhneſs by it. They who had ſought only to have been admir'd for the rare Diſcoveries which they brought to the World, wou'd be ſure to conceal any thing which might be accounted ridiculous; but the Apoſtles fixed themſelves moſt on what was moſt contemptible in the Eyes of the World, and what they were moſt mocked and derided for, that they delighted moſt in the preaching of, which was the Croſs of Chriſt. *Paul* was ſo much in love with this, which was a ſtumbling-block to the *Jews*, and fooliſhneſs to the *Greeks*, *that he valued the knowledge of nothing elſe in compariſon of the knowledge of Chriſt and him crucified.* Nay he elſewhere ſaith, *God forbid that I ſhould glory ſave in the Croſs of Chriſt.* What now ſhou'd be the reaſon that they ſhould rejoyce in that moſt which was moſt deſpicable to the World, had not they ſeen far greater truth and excellency in it, than in the moſt ſublime ſpeculations concerning God or the Souls of Men in the School of *Plato*, or any other *Heathen* Philoſophers? That all Men ſhou'd be bound in order to their Salvation, to believe in one who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*, was a ſtrange Doctrine to the unbelieving World: but if the Apoſtles had but endeavour'd to have ſuited their Doctrine to the School of *Plato*, what rare Perſons might they have been accounted among the *Heathen* Philoſophers! Had they only in general terms diſcours'd of the Benignity of the Divine Nature, and the Manifeſtations of Divine Goodneſs in the World; and that, in order to the bringing of the Souls of Men to a nearer participation of the Divine Nature, the perfect Idea of true Goodneſs, and the expreſs Image of the Perſon of God, and the reſplendency of his Glory had veil'd himſelf in Humane Nature, and had every where ſcatter'd ſuch beams of light and Goodneſs, as warm'd and invigorated the frozen Spirits of Men with higher ſentiments of God and themſelves, and raiſed them up above the feculency of this terreſtrial Matter to breath in a freſher air, and converſe with more noble objects, and by degrees to fit the Souls of Men for thoſe more pure illapſes of real Goodneſs, which might always ſatisfy the Soul's deſires, and yet always keep them up 'till the Soul ſhou'd be ſunning it ſelf to all eternity under the immediate beams of Light and Love: And that after this Incarnate Deity had ſpread abroad the wings of his Love for a while upon this lower World, 'till by his gentle heat and incubation he had quickned the more pliable World to ſome degree of a Divine Life, he then retreated himſelf back again into the ſuperiour World, and put off that veil by which he made himſelf known to thoſe who are here confin'd to the priſons of their Bodies:

1 Cor. 2. 2. Phil. 8. 3. Gal. 6. 14.

dies: Thus, I ſay, had the Apoſtles minded applauſe among the admired Philoſophers of the *Heathens*, how eaſy had it been for them to have made ſome conſiderable additions to their higheſt ſpeculations, and have left out any thing which might ſeem ſo mean and contemptible as the death of the Son of God! But this they were ſo far from, that the main thing which they preached to the World, was, the vanity of Humane Wiſdom without *Chriſt*, and the neceſſity of all Mens believing in that *Jeſus* who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*.

The Apoſtles indeed diſcover very much, infinitely more than ever the moſt lofty *Platoniſt* cou'd do, concerning the Goodneſs and Love of God to Mankind; but that wherein they *manifeſted the love of God to the World*, was, *that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh but have everlaſting life.* And that *herein was the love of God manifeſted, that while we were yet ſinners, Chriſt died for us.* And that *this was the greateſt truth and worthy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the World to ſave ſinners.* They never dreamt of any Divine Goodneſs which ſhou'd make Men happy without *Chriſt:* No, it was their deſign to perſuade the World that all the communications of God's Goodneſs to the World were wholly in and thro' *Jeſus Chriſt*; and it is impoſſible that any ſhou'd think otherwiſe, unleſs *Plato* knew more of the mind of God than our Bleſſed Saviour, and *Plotinus* than St. *Paul*. Can we think now that the Apoſtles ſhou'd hazard the reputation of their own Wits ſo much as they did to the World, and be accounted bablers, and fools, and mad-men, for preaching the way of Salvation to be only by a Perſon *crucify'd between two thieves at Hieruſalem*, had they not been convinced not only of the truth but importance of it, and that it concern'd Men as much to believe it, as it did to avoid eternal Miſery? Did St. *Paul* preach ever the leſs the Words of truth and ſoberneſs, becauſe he was told to his face, *that his learning had made him mad?* But if he was *beſides himſelf, it was for Chriſt*; and what wonder was it if the *Love of Chriſt* in the Apoſtle ſhou'd make him willing to loſe his reputation for him, ſeeing *Chriſt made himſelf of no reputation*, that he might be in a capacity to do us good? We ſee the Apoſtles *were not aſhamed of the Goſpel of Chriſt*, becauſe they knew *it was the power of God unto ſalvation*; and therefore neither in their preaching nor their Writings wou'd they omit any of thoſe paſſages concerning our Saviour's death, which might be accounted the moſt diſhonourable to his Perſon. Which is certainly as great an Evidence of their fidelity as can be expected; which makes *Origen* ſay, that the Diſciples of *Chriſt* writ all things Φιλαλήθως καὶ εὐγνωμόνως, *with a great deal of candor and love of truth.* ἐκ ὑποκλέψαντες τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ παράδοξα ἱστορίας τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀφανίλω τῷ λόγῳ τῶν χριστιανῶν φέρειν· *not concealing from the World thoſe paſſages of the Life of Chriſt, which would be accounted moſt fooliſh and ridiculous.*

Joh. 3. 16.

Rom. 5. 8.

1 Tim. 1. 15.

Origen. contr. Celſum, l. 3.

2. *With the greateſt plainneſs and ſimplicity of ſpeech.* Such whoſe deſign is to impoſe upon the Minds of Men with ſome cunningly-deviſed fables, love as much ambiguity as ever *Apollo* did in his moſt winding *Oracles*, of whom it is ſaid,

Ambage nexa Delphico mos eſt Deo
Arcana tegere.

Servius in 4. Æneid. *Servius* tells us, that *Jupiter Ammon* was therefore pictur'd with Ramshorns,

horns becauſe his anſwers had as many turnings and windings as they had. But the Horns which *Moſes* was wont to be pictur'd with, did only note the light and perſpicuity (from the ambiguity of קרן, which notes *the ſending forth of rays of light like a horn,*) and yet *Moſes* himſelf was veil'd in compariſon of the openneſs and plainneſs of Speech which was in the Apoſtles. Impoſtors caſt a miſt of many dark and cloudy words before them; but when they are once brought into the open light, their vizard falls off, and their deformity appears. Such Perſons delight in ſoaring quite out of the apprehenſions of thoſe who follow them, and never think themſelves better recompenſed for their pains, than when they are moſt admired and leaſt underſtood. But never was Chriſtianity more diſhonoured, than when Men brought it from its native ſimplicity and plainneſs, into a company of cloudy and inſignificant expreſſions, which are ſo far from making Men better underſtand the truth of it, that it was certainly the Devil's deſign by ſuch obſcure terms to make way for a Myſtery to be advanced, (but it was of Iniquity,) and ſoon after, we ſee the effect of it in another *Oracle* ſet up at *Rome* inſtead of *Delphos*; and all the pretence of it, was the obſcurity ſuppoſed in Scripture. What! Darkneſs come by the riſing of the Sun! Or is the Sun at laſt grown ſo beggarly, that he is fain to borrow light of the Earth? Muſt the Scripture be beholding to the Church for its Clearneſs, and Chriſt himſelf not ſpeak intelligibly, unleſs the *Pope* be his Interpreter? Did Chriſt reveal to the World the way of Salvation, and yet leave Men to ſeek which was it, 'till a Guide, never heard of in the Scripture, come to direct them in the way to it? What ſtrange witneſſes were the Apoſtles, if they did not ſpeak the truth with plainneſs? How had Men been to ſeek as to the truth of Chriſtianity, if the Apoſtles had not declar'd the Doctrine of the Goſpel with all evidence and perſpicuity? Whom muſt we believe in this caſe, the *Apoſtles* or the *Roman Oracles?* The *Apoſtles* they tell us *they ſpeak with all plainneſs of ſpeech*, and for that end purpoſely lay aſide *all excellency of words* and *humane wiſdom*, that Men might not be to ſeek for their meaning in a matter of ſo great a moment; that *the Goſpel was hid to none but ſuch as are loſt, and whoſe eyes are blinded by the God of this World*; that the Doctrine reveal'd by them is a Light to direct us in our way to Heaven, and a Rule to walk by; and it is a ſtrange property of Light to be obſcure, and of a Rule to be crooked. But it is not only evident from the *Apoſtles* own affirmations, that they laid aſide all affected Obſcurity, ambiguous Expreſſions, and Philoſophical Terms, whereby the World might have been to ſeek for what they were to believe, but it is likewiſe clear from the very nature of the Doctrine they preached, and the deſign of their preaching of it. What need *Rhetoric* in plain Truths? or affected Phraſes in giving Evidence? How incongruous wou'd obſcure Expreſſions have been to the deſign of ſaving Souls by the fooliſhneſs of preaching? For if they had induſtriouſly ſpoken in their preaching, above the capacities of thoſe they ſpake to, they cou'd never have converted a Soul without a Miracle: for the ordinary way of converſion muſt be by the Underſtanding; and how cou'd that work upon the Underſtanding, which was ſo much above it? But, ſaith the Apoſtle, *We preach not our ſelves but Chriſt Jeſus the Lord, and our ſelves your ſervants for Jeſus ſake.* If they had ſought themſelves or their own Credit and Reputation, there might have been ſome reaſon that they ſhou'd have uſed the way of the *Sophiſts* among the *Greeks*,

2 Cor. 3. 12. 1 Cor. 2. 1, 4. 1 Cor. 4. 3, 4.

2 Cor. 4. 5.

and

and by declamatory Speeches to have inhanced their eſteem among the vulgar. But the *Apoſtles* diſown'd and rejected all theſe vulgar artifices of mean and low-ſpirited Men; they laid aſide all thoſe enticing words
1 Cor. 2. 4. ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας *of the way of the Heathen Sophiſts*, and declar'd the Te-
2 Cor. 4. 2. ſtimony of God with Spiritual Evidence; *they handled not the Word of God deceitfully, but by manifeſtation of the truth, commended themſelves to every Man's conſcience in the ſight of God*: Now what could be ſo ſutable to ſuch a deſign, as the greateſt plainneſs and faithfulneſs in what they ſpake? We find in the Teſtimony of the *Apoſtles*, ἀδὲν νόθον ἢ κιβδηλευτικὸν ἢ πεπλασμένον ἢ πανοῦργον, as *Origen* ſpeaks, *Nothing that is ſpu-*
Origen. c. Celſ. l. 3. p. 135. *rious or counterfeit, nothing ſavouring of the cunning craftineſs of ſuch as lie in wait to deceive; and*, ſaith he, *it is impoſſible to think that Men never bred up in the Sophiſtry of the Greeks, nor experienced in the Rhetorical inſinuations uſed among them, could ever be able ſo ſuddenly to perſwade the World to embrace that which had been a figment of their own Brains.* The truth is, the *Apoſtles* ſpeak like Men very confident of the truth of what they ſpeak, and not like ſuch who were fain to fetch in the help of all their *Topics*, to find out ſome probable Arguments to make Men believe that which it is probable they did not believe themſelves; which was moſt commonly the caſe of the great *Orators* among the *Heathens*. We find no Pedantic Flouriſhes, no flattering Inſinuations, no affected Cadencies, no ſuch great care of the riſing and falling of Words in the ſeveral Sentences; which make up ſo great a part of that which was accounted *Eloquence* in the *Apoſtles* time. Theſe things were too mean a prey for the Spirits of the *Apoſtles* to quarry upon; every thing in them was grave and ſerious, every Word had its due weight, every Sentence brim-full of Spiritual matter, their whole Diſcourſe moſt becoming the Majeſty and Authority of that Spirit which they ſpake by. And therein was ſeen a great part of the infinite Wiſdom of God in the choice he made of the Perſons who were to propagate the Doctrine of Chriſt in the World, that they were not ſuch who by reaſon of their great repute and fame in the World, might eaſily draw whole Multitudes to embrace their Dictates, but (that there might not be the leaſt foundation for an implicit Faith) they were of ſo mean rank and condition in the World, that in all probability their Names had never been heard of, had not their Doctrine made them Famous. To this purpoſe
Origen. c. Celſ. l. 3. *Origen* excellently ſpeaks, Οἶμαι δὲ τὸν Ἰησοῦν διὰ τοῦτο βεβιωκέναι διδασκάλοις τοῦ δόγματος χρῆναι τοιούτοις, ἵνα μηδεμίαν μὲν ἔχῃ χώραν ὑπόνοια πεπλανημένων σοφισμάτων· λαμπρῶς δὲ τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις ἐμφαίνηται, ὅτι τὸ ἄδολον καὶ ἀπεριτρέπτως τῶν γεγραμμένων, ἐχέσης πολὺ τὸ ἀφελὲς, ἠξιώθη θειοτέρας δυνάμεως, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀνυούσης, ἤπερ ἀνύειν δύναται δοκεῖ ἐμβολὴ λόγων, καὶ λέξεων σωρεύσεις, καὶ μετὰ διαρτύσεων καὶ τεχνολογίας Ἑλληνικῆς ἀπολυθία. *I am of opinion*, ſaith he, *that Jeſus did purpoſely make uſe of ſuch Preachers of his Doctrine, that there might be no place for ſuſpicion that they came inſtructed with the art of Sophiſtry; but that it be clearly manifeſt to all that would conſider it, that there was nothing of deſign in thoſe who diſcovered ſo much ſimplicity in their Writings, and that they had a more Divine Power which was more efficacious than the greateſt volubility of Expreſſions, or ornaments of ſpeech, or the artifices which were uſed in the Grecian compoſitions.*

3. The *Apoſtles* delivered their *Doctrine with the greateſt openneſs and freedom of ſpirit*; they did not give out one thing to the World, and another to their private Diſciples; but with great freedom and boldneſs declared

declared their doctrine in the most public places, and before their greatest enemies. They knew they were looked on as deceivers by the World, but yet they knew themselves to be true, ὡς πλάνοι, καὶ ἀληθεῖς. 2 Cor 6. 8. This is the usual requital good Men have from the World, that they are looked on as the greatest deceivers of it; if it be so with others, they have much less cause to wonder at it, when even He, who by one Prophet is stiled *the desire of Nations*, is by another said *to be despised and rejected of Men*; and when Christ was in the World, he was called ὁ πλάνος, *the deceiver*; no wonder then if his Disciples were accounted such, altho' they manifested their veracity by their open carriage and free speaking to the faces of their greatest adversaries. The *Apostles* neither feared the *Jews* skill in their Law, nor the wisdom and subtilty of the *Greeks:* Saint *Paul* preacheth Christ openly among the *Jews* in their Synagogues, and among the *Athenians* he encounters the *Epicureans* and *Stoics*, and preacheth to them Jesus and the *Resurrection*. If the *Apostles* had any thing of deceivers in them, as to the things they related concerning Christ, they wou'd not certainly have spoken with so much confidence concerning Christ in the presence of those who had been his murtherers; but we see they appeal'd to themselves, as to the Miracles which he had wrought among them, and for his Resurrection they were ready to lay down their Lives in giving Testimony to the truth of it. That his body was gone, was evident; that the *Apostles* shou'd take it away was impossible, considering what guard of Souldiers they had set upon it, and how timorous and fearful the *Apostles* were, that they fled upon Christ's being apprehended. Now what cou'd it be, cou'd make such fearful Persons afterwards so courageous and resolute as they were, had there not been some more than ordinary power to convince and encourage them?

Hag. 2. 7. Isa. 53. 3. Matth. 27. 63. Act. 17. 18.

4. The *Apostles* deliver their *Testimony with the greatest particularity as to all circumstances*. They do not change nor alter any of them upon different Examinations before several Persons; they all agree in the greatest constancy to themselves and uniformity with each other. As to matters of Indifferency, we find the *Apostles* very yielding and condescending; but as to any thing which concern'd their Testimony, most constant and resolved. Had the Gospel been some cunningly-contrived fancy, it had been impossible but so many different Persons, in such different places, and under such different conditions, wou'd have varied as to some material circumstance of it: Or else they would have been so wise as to have deliver'd it in general terms, without insisting much upon such particular circumstances, which if they had been false, might have been very easily disprov'd; but with what particular enumeration of circumstances do the *Apostles* preach Christ to the World? *Peter* tells the *Jews* that it was *Jesus of* Nazareth *whom he preached*; and lest they shou'd think it was not the same Person which rose again, with great boldness and freedom of Spirit he saith unto them, *Therefore let all the house of* Israel *know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.* Yea, that same individual Person who was conversant in the World, and died upon the *Cross*, *is now become a Prince and Saviour, to give repentance to* Israel *and remission of sins*. If there had been any ground of suspicion as to these things, who had been so able to disprove them, or so ready to do it, as those Persons who had crucify'd him? For we cannot conceive but those who had a hand in his death, wou'd endeavour by all possible means to disprove

Act 2. 22. 2. 36. Act. 5. 31, 32.

his Reſurrection from the dead. For what a caſe were they like to be in, if thoſe things which the *Apoſtles* ſo confidently preached were true? If *Chriſt had all power now in his hands*, and *there were ſalvation in no other Name, but only in his whom they had crucify'd*, they were like to be in a moſt deſperate condition; therefore if any Men can be ſuppos'd inquiſitive after the truth of theſe circumſtances, no doubt theſe were: And if they cou'd have found the leaſt flaw in their Teſtimony, the World wou'd ſoon have ring'd of it; and the *Jews* who were then ſo much diſperſed abroad, would have divulg'd it into all parts, the *Apoſtles* wou'd have been told of it as they preached Chriſt in the *Synagogues*. And can we in any reaſon think, but thoſe *Jews* who perſecuted *Paul* as he preached in the *Synagogues* of *Aſia*, and afterwards impeach'd him ſo openly in *Jeruſalem*, wou'd there enquire into all the circumſtances concerning Chriſt, and all the other *Jews* wou'd write to their Friends at *Jeruſalem* to be fully inform'd of thoſe ſtrange things which were told them openly in all places in their *Synagogues* by Men of their own Nation and Language, concerning one *Jeſus* who was crucify'd and *roſe again* from the *dead?* Had there been now any ſo much as plauſible pretext that any of theſe circumſtances were not true, can we think but that a People ſo unmeaſurably given to their own ways and Traditions, wou'd in all places have vented any thing that might have tended to the diſparagement of Chriſt and his *Apoſtles?* But we ſee Malice it ſelf cou'd not find any flaw in the *Apoſtles* Teſtimony; for if it had, we ſhou'd certainly have heard of it, either from the *Jews*, or from the great oppoſers of *Chriſtianity* among the *Heathens*, who pretended to be curious and inquiſitive Perſons, ſuch as *Celſus*, *Julian*, *Hierocles* and *Porphyry* were. What reaſon can we have then in the leaſt to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony, which paſſed ſo uncontrouled in that time when it was alone capable of being diſprov'd, and Mens Intereſt and Deſign wou'd put them ſo much upon it? The ſtrength of which will appear in the next Propoſition, which is,

XVII. Prop. 4. *No Teſtimony ought to be taken againſt a matter of fact thus atteſted, but from ſuch Perſons who had greater knowledge of the things atteſted, and manifeſt greater fidelity in reporting them.* It is eaſy to make it appear, that ſuppoſing any Perſons at that time had contradicted the Teſtimony of the *Apoſtles* concerning our Saviour, yet there had been no reaſon in the world to have hearkned to their Teſtimony in oppoſition to that of the *Apoſtles*; and that on theſe accounts. 1. The *Apoſtles* witneſſed the *Affirmative*, which is more capable of being atteſted than any *Negative* can be. 2. The *Apoſtles* were more converſant with Chriſt than any other Perſons were, becauſe they were choſen for that very end by him to be conſtantly with him: cou'd any therefore be more capable of knowing the truth of all particulars concerning Chriſt than theſe were? Had there been any ground of ſuſpicion concerning the deſign of Chriſt why cou'd not the *Jews* prevail with *Judas* to diſcover it as well as to betray his Perſon? *Judas* had done but a good work, if Chriſt had been ſuch an Impoſtor as the *Jews* blaſphemouſly ſaid he was: what made *Judas* then ſo little ſatisfy'd with his work, that he grew weary of his Life upon it, and threw himſelf away in the moſt horrid deſpair? No Perſon certainly had been ſo fit to have been produced as a witneſs againſt Chriſt, as *Judas* who had been ſo long with him, and had heard his Speeches, and obſerv'd his Miracles; but he had not patience enough to ſtay after that horrid fact to be a witneſs againſt him:

nay

nay he was the greateſt witneſs at that time for him, when he who had betray'd him came to the *Sanhedrin* when conſulting about his death, and told them *that he had ſinned in betraying innocent blood.* What poſ- Mat. 27. 5.
ſible Evidence cou'd have been given more in behalf of our Saviour than that was? When a Perſon ſo covetous as to betray his Maſter for *thirty pieces of ſilver*, was ſo weary of his bargain, that he comes and throws back the Money, and declares the Perſon innocent whom he had betray'd? And this Perſon too was ſuch a one as knew our Saviour far better than any of the Witneſſes whom afterwards they ſuborn'd againſt him, who yet contradicted each other; and at laſt cou'd produce nothing which in the judgment of the heathen Governour cou'd make him judge Chriſt worthy of death. 3. The *Apoſtles* were freer from deſign than any counter-witneſs at that time cou'd be; we have already prov'd the *Apoſtles* cou'd not poſſibly have any other motive to affirm what they did, but full conviction of the truth of what they ſpake; but now if any among the *Jews* at that time had aſſerted any thing contrary to the *Apoſtles*, we have a clear account of it, and what motive might induce them to it; *viz.* the preſerving of their Honour and Reputation with the People, the upholding their Traditions, beſides their open and declar'd enmity againſt Chriſt without any ſufficient reaſon at all for it; now who wou'd believe the Teſtimony of the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* who had ſo great authority among the People, which they were like to loſe, if Chriſt's Doctrine were true, before that of the *Apoſtles* who parted with all for the ſake of Chriſt, and ventur'd themſelves wholly upon the truth of our Saviour's Doctrine? 4. None ever did ſo much to atteſt the *Negative*, as the *Apoſtles* did to prove their Fidelity as to the *Affirmative*. Had ſufficient counter-witneſs been timely produced, we cannot think the *Apoſtles* wou'd have run ſo many continual hazards in preaching the things which related to the Perſon and Actions of Chriſt. Did ever any lay down their Lives to undeceive the World, if the *Apoſtles* were guilty of abuſing it? 5. The number of ſuch Perſons had been inconſiderable in compariſon of thoſe who were ſo fully perſuaded of the truth of thoſe things which concern our Saviour; who were all ready (as moſt of them did) to ſeal the truth of them with their Lives. Whence ſhou'd ſo many Men grow ſo ſuddenly confident of the truth of ſuch things which were contrary to their former Perſuaſions, Intereſt, Education, had they not been deliver'd in ſuch a way, that they were aſſur'd of the undoubted truth of them? which brings me to the laſt Propoſition, which is,

Matters of fact being firſt believ'd on the account of eye-witneſſes, and re- XVIII.
ceiv'd with an univerſal and uncontrouled aſſent by all ſuch perſons who have Prop. 5.
thought themſelves concern'd in knowing the truth of them, do yield a ſufficient foundation for a firm aſſent to be built upon. I take it for granted that there is ſufficient foundation for a firm aſſent, where there can be no Reaſon given to queſtion the Evidence; which that there is not in this preſent caſe, will appear from theſe following conſiderations.

1. *That the multitudes of thoſe perſons who did believe theſe things, had liberty and opportunity to be ſatisfy'd of the truth of them before they believ'd them.* Therefore no Reaſon or Motive can be aſſign'd, on which they ſhou'd be induced to believe theſe things, but the undoubted Evidence of Truth which went along with them. I confeſs in *Mahometiſm* a very great number of perſons have for ſome Centuries of years continu'd in the Belief of the Doctrine of *Mahomet*; but then withal there is a

ſufficient account to be given of that, *viz. the power of the ſword* which keeps them in awe, and ſtrictly forbids all the Followers of *Mahomet* to diſpute their Religion at all, or compare it with any other. Therefore I can no more wonder at this, than I do to ſee ſo great a part of the World under the Tyranny of the great *Turk*: Neither on the other ſide do I wonder that ſuch a multitude of thoſe profeſſing Chriſtianity ſhou'd together with it, believe a great number of erroneous Doctrines, and live in the practice of many groſs Superſtitions, becauſe I conſider what ſtrange prevalency Education hath upon ſofter Spirits and more eaſie intellectuals, and what an awe an Inquiſition bears upon timorous and irreſolv'd Perſons. But now when a great multitude of perſons ſober and inquiſitive, ſhall, contrary to the Principles of their Education, and without fear of any humane Force, (which they beforehand ſee will perſecute them) and after diligent enquiry made into the Grounds on which they believe, forſake all their former Perſuaſions, and reſolvedly adhere to the truth of the Doctrine propounded to them, tho' it coſt them their lives; if this give us not reaſon to think this Doctrine true, we muſt believe Mankind to be the moſt unhappy creatures in the World; that will with ſo much reſolution part with all Advantages of this Life for the ſake of one to come, if that be not undoubtedly certain, and the Doctrine propoſing it infallibly true. It is an obſervable Circumſtance in the propagation of the Chriſtian Religion, that tho' God made choice at firſt of perſons generally of mean rank and condition in the World to be Preachers of the Goſpel, God thereby making it appear that *our faith did not ſtand in the wiſdom of men, but in the power of God*, and therefore *choſe the weak things of the world to confound the ſtrong*; yet ſoon after the Goſpel was preached abroad in the World, we find perſons of great place and reputation, of great parts and abilities engaged in the Profeſſion of the Chriſtian Faith. In the Hiſtory of the *Acts* we read of *Sergius* a Proconſul, of *Dionyſius* the *Areopagite* converted to the Faith, and in the following Ages of the Church many perſons of great eſteem for their excellent Learning and Abilities; ſuch was *Juſtin Martyr*, one who before he became a Chriſtian, was converſant with all Sects of *Philoſophers*, *Stoics*, *Peripatetics*, *Pythagoreans*, and at laſt was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt* till he was converted from *Plato* to *Chriſt*, and then found that true which he ſpeaks of in his *Dialogue* with *Trypho*, that after all his enquiries into Philoſophy, ſpeaking of the Doctrine of Chriſt, παντελῶς μόνην εὑρεῖσκον φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ σύμφορον, *I found this at laſt to be the only ſure and profitable Philoſophy*. And when *Trypho* after derides him as a Man of very eaſie Faith, who wou'd leave the Doctrine of *Plato* for that of Chriſt, (for it ſeems by him the *Jews* then had a more favourable Opinion of the State of *Platoniſts* than *Chriſtians*) *Juſtin* is ſo far from being mov'd with ſuch Reproaches, that he tells him he wou'd undertake to demonſtrate to him, ὅτι οὐ κενοῖς ἐπιτάσαμεν μύθοις, οὐδὲ ἀναποδείκτοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ δυνάμεως βρύουσι, καὶ τεθηλόσι χάριτι: *That the Chriſtians did not give credit to empty Fables, and unprovable Aſſertions, but to ſuch a Doctrine that was full of a Divine Spirit and Power, and flouriſhed with Grace*: The proving of which is the ſubject of that diſcourſe. At *Alexandria* we meet with a ſucceſſion of excellent Perſons, all which were not only Embracers themſelves, but Defenders of the Chriſtian Faith; for ſetting aſide there *Abilius*, *Juſtus*, *Cerdo*, *Eumenes*, *Marcus*, *Celadion*, *Agrippinus*, *Julianus*, *Demetrius*, and others who flouriſhed about the

1 Cor. 2. 5. 1 Cor. 1. 27.

Juſtin. Dialog. cum Tryph. ip. 125. ed. Par.

ſecond

ſecond Century, I ſhall only fix on thoſe perſons, who were famous Enquirers after Truth, and noted for excellency in Heathen Learning; yet theſe perſons after all their enquiries found nothing to fix on but the Chriſtian Faith, and valu'd no other diſcovery of Truth in compariſon with that. Such was *Pantænus*, who as *Euſebius* tells us, was an excellent *Stoic* before he became a Chriſtian, and was after ſo eminent a one, that in imitation of the Apoſtles he went into *India* to convert the Inhabitants to the Chriſtian Faith, and at his return was made Rector of the School at *Alexandria*; which as the ſame Author tells us was much frequented by ſuch who were ἐν λόγῳ καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὰ θεῖα σοφίᾳ δυνατοί, *well skill'd in Humane as well as Divine Learning.* How excellent *Pantænus* was in Humane Learning, may appear in that *Origen* and *Hierome* both make his example their plea for their ſtudying of it. After him ſucceeded *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Pantænus*'s Scholar, a perſon of great depth of learning and exquiſitely skill'd in all Heathen Antiquities, as appears by his remaining Writings. The learning of *Origen* is ſufficiently known, which was in ſuch great reputation in his own time, that not only Chriſtians but Philoſophers flock'd to his Lectures at *Alexandria*, as *Euſebius* tells us, wherein he read the *Mathematics*, and other parts of Philoſophy as well as the Scriptures; and the ſame Author informs us that the Philoſophers did dedicate their Books to him, and ſometimes choſe him as Arbitrator between them in matters of Diſpute; and *Porphyry* himſelf in his Books againſt the Chriſtians vouchſafed a high *Encomium* of *Origen* for his excellent Learning. In *Origen*'s time *Heraclas* a Presbyter of *Alexandria* for five years together frequented the Schools of the Philoſophers, and put on the Philoſophic *pallium* βιβλία τε ἑλλήνων καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οὐ παύεται φιλολόγων, *and was very converſant in the Books of the Grecian Learning.* Beſides theſe we read of *Pierius* and *Achillas* two Presbyters of *Alexandria*, who were τῇ καθ' ἕλληνας παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ διαπεπαιδευμένοι, as *Nicephorus Calliſtus* ſpeaks, *Perſons well skilled in the Grecian Learning and Philoſophy.* If from *Alexandria* we go to *Cæſarea*, there we not only meet with a School of learning among the Chriſtians, but with perſons very eminent in all kinds of learning; ſuch were the famous *Pamphilus* and *Euſebius* ſo great an admirer of him, that ever ſince he is called *Euſebius Pamphilus.* At *Antioch* was *Dorotheus* ἀνὴρ παντοίων λόγων καὶ παιδείας ἐλευθερίας, as *Nicephorus* ſpeaks, *a perſon verſed in all kind of ingenuous Literature.* *Anatolius* Biſhop of *Laodicea*, one verſed in *Geometry*, *Aſtronomy*, and all kind of *Philoſophy*, as well as the Doctrine of Chriſt. Thus we ſee how in thoſe early days of the *Greek* Church what excellent perſons many of thoſe were who were zealous Profeſſors of Chriſtianity; and concerning thoſe of the *Latin* Church, I ſhall only mention that ſpeech of St. *Auſtin* who was himſelf an inſtance of the ſame nature and a Star of the firſt magnitude among them. *Nonne aſpicimus quanto auro & argento & veſte ſuffarcinatus exierit de Ægypto Cyprianus Doctor ſuaviſſimus & Martyr beatiſſimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius? ut de vivis taceam: quanto innumerabiles Græci? quod prior ipſe fideliſſimus Dei ſervus Moſes fecerat, de quo ſcriptum eſt, quod eruditus fuerit omni ſapientia Ægyptiorum.* To whoſe Catalogue of learned perſons, among the *Latin* Chriſtians *Tertullian*, *Arnobius* and ſeveral others may be deſervedly added. But as St. *Auſtin* there well obſerves, *tho' the* Iſraelites *went rich out of* Ægypt, *yet it was their eating the Paſſover which ſaved them from deſtruction*; ſo tho' theſe were accompliſhed with thoſe perfections and riches of the Soul, the ornaments of Learning, yet it was their eating

Euſeb. Hiſt Eccl. l. 5. c. 10.
Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.
Ibid. l. 6. c. 18.
Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.
Nicephor. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 6. c. 35.
Idem, lib. 6. c. 36.
S. Auguſtin. de doctr. Chriſtiana, l. 2. cap. 40.

ting the true Paſſover which was Chriſt, by their adhering to his Doctrine, was that which wou'd be of more advantage to them, than all their Accompliſhments wou'd be. Now then ſince in the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church, we find not only innumerable multitudes of Perſons of great Integrity and Sobriety in their Lives embracing the Doctrine of Chriſt, but ſo many Perſons that were curious enquirers after the truth of things; we can certainly have no reaſon to diſtruſt ſuch a Teſtimony which was receiv'd in ſo unanimous a manner by perſons as able to judge of the truth of things, and as fearful of being deceiv'd in reference to them as any now in the World can be.

XIX. 2. As this Teſtimony was receiv'd by perſons inquiſitive after the Truth of things, ſo *the Doctrine conveyed by it was a matter of the higheſt moment in the world:* and therefore we cannot conceive but perſons ordinarily inquiſitive about other things wou'd be more than ordinarily ſo about this, becauſe their eternal welfare and happineſs did depend upon it. All perſons that are truly Religious, muſt at leaſt be allow'd to be perſons very inquiſitive after the ſtate and condition of their Souls when they ſhall be diſlodged from their Bodies. And if we do but grant this, can we in any reaſon think that ſuch a multitude of perſons in ſo many Ages ſhou'd continue venturing their Souls upon a Teſtimony which they had no aſſurance of the truth of? And that none of all theſe perſons, tho' Men otherwiſe Rational and Judicious, ſhou'd be able to diſcover the Falſity of that Doctrine they went upon, if at leaſt any upon conſideration of it can imagine it to be ſo? It is not reconcilable with the general preſumption of Humane Nature concerning Divine Providence and the Care God takes of the welfare of Men, to ſuffer ſo many perſons who ſincerely deſire to ſerve God in the way which is moſt pleaſing to him, to go on in ſuch a continual Deluſion, and never have it at all diſcover'd to them. If all Men then who have believ'd the Doctrine of Chriſt to be the only way to Salvation have been deceiv'd, either we muſt deny altogether a Divine Providence, or ſay the Devil hath more power to deceive Men than God hath to direct them, which is worſe than the former; or elſe aſſert that there are no ſuch things at all as either God or Devils, but that all things come to paſs by Chance and Fortune: and if ſo, it is ſtill more inexplicable why ſuch multitudes of rational and ſerious Men, and the moſt inquiſitive part of the World as to ſuch things ſhou'd all be ſo poſſeſs'd with the truth and certainty of theſe things; and the more prophane, wicked and ignorant any perſons are, the more prone they are to mock and deride them. If ſuch Men then ſee more into Truth and Reaſon than the ſober and judicious part of Mankind, let us bid adieu to Humanity and adore the Brutes, ſince we admire their judgment moſt who come the neareſt to them.

3. *The multitude of theſe perſons thus conſenting in this Teſtimony, could have no other engagements to this conſent, but only their firm perſuaſion of the truth of the Doctrine conveyed by it*; becauſe thoſe who unanimouſly agree in this thing are ſuch perſons, whoſe other deſigns and intereſts in this World differ as much as any Men's do. If it had been only a conſent of the *Jews*, there might have been ſome probable pretence to have ſuſpected a matter of Intereſt in it; but as to this thing, we find the *Jews* divided among themſelves about it; and the ſtiffeſt deniers of the truth of it, do yet inviolably preſerve thoſe ſacred Records among them, from which the Truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt may be undoubtedly prov'd. Had the Chriſtian Religion been enforced upon

the

the World by the *Roman* Emperors at the time of its first promulgation, there wou'd have been some suspicion of particular design in it; but it came with no other strength but the evidence of its own Truth; yet it found sudden and strange entertainment among persons of all Nations and Degrees of Men. In a short time it had eaten into the Heart of the *Roman* Empire, and made so large a spread therein, that it made *Tertullian* say, *Hesterni sumus, & vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum; sola vobis relinquimus Templa. We have but newly appeared,* saith he, *and yet we have filled all places with our Company, but only your Temples*; and before speaking of the Heathens, *Obsessam vociferantur civitatem, in agris, in castellis, in insulis Christianos, omnem sexum, ætatem, conditionem, etiam dignitatem transgredi ad hoc nomen quasi detrimento mœrent. All sorts and conditions of Men in all places, were suddenly become Christians.* What common tye cou'd there be now to unite all these persons together, if we set aside the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine of Christ which was first preached to them by such who were Eye-witnesses of Christ's Actions, and had left sacred Records behind them, containing the substance of the Doctrine of Christ, and those admirable Instructions which were their only certain Guides in the way to Heaven?

Tertull. Apol. c. 36.

Ibid. c. 1.

4. *Because many persons do join in this consent with true Christians, who yet could heartily wish that the Doctrine of Christianity were not true.* Such are all those persons who are sensual in their Lives, and walk not according to the Rules of the Gospel, yet dare not question or deny the Truth of it. Such who cou'd heartily wish there were no future State, nor Judgment to come, that they might indulge themselves in this World without fear of another; yet their Consciences are so far convinced of, and aw'd by the truth of these things, that they raise many perplexities and anxieties in their Minds which they wou'd most willingly be rid of; which they can never throughly be, till instead of having the name of Christians, they come to live the Life of Christians, and become experimentally acquainted with the Truth and Power of Religion. And withal we find that the more Men have been acquainted with the practice of Christianity, the greater Evidence they have had of the truth of it, and been more fully and rationally persuaded of it. To such I grant there are such powerful Evidences of the truth of the Doctrine of Christ by the effectual workings of the Spirit of God upon their Souls, that all other Arguments, as to their own satisfaction, may fall short of these. As to which those Verses of the Poet *Dantes*, render'd into *Latin* by *F. S.* are very pertinent and significant: for when he had introduced the Apostle *Peter*, asking him what it was which his Faith was founded on, he answers,

Deinde exivit ex luce profunda
Quæ illic splendebat pretiosa gemma,
Super quam omnis virtus fundatur.

i. e. *That God was pleased by immediate revelation of himself, to discover that Divine Truth to the World whereon our Faith doth stand as on its sure foundation*; but when the Apostle goes on to enquire how he knew this at first came from God, his answer to that is,

——*larga*

—— larga pluvia
Spiritus Sancti, quæ eſt diffuſa
Super veteres & ſuper novas membranas,
Eſt ſyllogiſmus ille qui eam mihi concluſit
Adeo acute, ut præ illa demonſtratione
Omnis demonſtratio alia mihi videatur obtuſa.

i. e. *That the Spirit of God doth fully diſcover it ſelf both in the Old and New Teſtament, that all other Arguments are but dull and heavy if compared with this.* It is true they are ſo to a truly inlightned Conſcience which diſcovers ſo much Beauty and Glory in the Scriptures, that they raviſh the Soul, altho' it be unable to give ſo full an account of this unto others who want the Eyes to ſee that Beauty with, which a Heart truly gracious hath. We ſee ordinarily in the World, that the attraction of Beauty is an unaccountable thing; and one may diſcern that which raviſheth him, which another looks on as mean and ordinary; and why may it not be much more thus in Divine objects which want Spiritual Eyes to diſcover them? Therefore I grant that good Men enjoy that ſatisfaction to their own Conſciences, as to the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt, which others cannot attain to; but yet I ſay, that ſuch do likewiſe ſee the moſt ſtrong, rational and convincing Evidence which doth induce them to believe; which Evidence is then moſt convincing, when it is ſeconded by the peculiar Energy of the Spirit of God upon the Souls of true Believers. But yet we ſee that the power and force of the truth of theſe things may be ſo great, even upon ſuch Minds which are not yet moulded into the faſhion of true Goodneſs, that it may awe with its light and clearneſs, where it doth not ſoften and alter by its heat and influence. Now whence can it be that ſuch convictions ſhou'd ſtick ſo faſt in the Minds of thoſe who wou'd fain pull out thoſe piercing arrows, but that there is a greater power in them than they are Maſters of, and they cannot ſtand againſt the force whereby they come upon them; nor find any ſalve to cure the wounds which are made within them, but by thoſe weapons which were the cauſes of them? And therefore when wicked perſons under conflicts of Conſcience, cannot eaſe themſelves by direct *Atheiſm*, or finding reaſon to caſt off ſuch convictions by diſcerning any invalidity in the Teſtimony whereon the truth of theſe things depends, it is a certain Argument that there is abundant truth in that Teſtimony, when Men wou'd fain perſuade themſelves to believe the contrary, and yet cannot.

5. The Truth of this conſent appears, *from the unanimity of it among thoſe perſons who have yet ſtrangely differ'd from each other in many controverſies in Religion.* We ſee thereby this unanimity is no forced or deſign'd thing, becauſe we ſee the Perſons agreeing in this, do very much diſagree from each other in other things. And the ſame grounds and reaſons whereon they diſagree as to others things, wou'd have held as to theſe too, were there not greater evidence of the certainty of theſe things, than of thoſe they fall out about. It hath not yet become a Queſtion among thoſe who differ ſo much about the ſenſe of Scripture, whether the Scripture it ſelf be the Word of God, altho' the very accounts on which we are to believe it to be ſo, hath been the ſubject of no mean Controverſies. All the divided parts of the Chriſtian World do yet fully agree in the matters of fact, viz. *That there was ſuch a Perſon*

ſon as Jeſus Chriſt, *and that he did many great Miracles, that he died on the Croſs at* Jeruſalem, *and roſe again from the dead*; now theſe contain the great foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*, and therefore the multitude of other Controverſies in the World ought to be ſo far from weakning our Faith, as to the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt (which Men of weak judgments and *Atheiſtical* Spirits pretend) that it ought to be a ſtrong confirmation of it, when we ſee Perſons which ſo peeviſhly quarrel with each other about ſome inferior and leſs weighty parts of Religion, do yet unanimouſly conſent in the principal foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*, and ſuch whereon the neceſſity of Faith and Obedience, as the way to Salvation, doth more immediately depend. And this may be one great Reaſon why the infinitely wiſe God may ſuffer ſuch lamentable Contentions and Diviſions to be in the Chriſtian World, that thereby inquiſitive perſons may ſee that if Religion had been a mere Deſign of ſome few politic Perſons, the quarrelſome World (where it is not held in by force) wou'd never have conſented ſo long in the owning ſuch common Principles which all the other Controverſies are built upon. And altho' it be continually ſeen that in divided parties, one is apt to run from any thing which is receiv'd by the other, and Men generally think they can never run far enough from them whoſe Errors they have diſcover'd, that yet this Principle hath not carried any conſiderable party of the Chriſtian World (out of their indignation againſt thoſe great corruptions which have crept into the World under a pretence of Religion) to the diſowning the foundation of *Chriſtian Faith*, muſt be partly imputed to the ſignal hand of Divine Providence, and partly to thoſe ſtrong Evidences which there are of the truth of that Teſtimony which conveys to us the foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*. Thus we ſee now, how great and uncontrouled this conſent is, as to the matters of fact delivered down from the eye-witneſſes of them, concerning the Actions and Miracles of our Bleſſed Saviour, (which are contain'd in the Scriptures as authentic Records of them,) and what a ſure foundation there is for a firm aſſent to the truth of the things from ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition.

XX. Thus far we have now manifeſted the neceſſity of the Miracles of Chriſt, in order to the propagation of *Chriſtianity* in the World, from the conſideration of the Perſons who were to propagate it in the World; the next thing we are to conſider, is, the admirable ſucceſs which the Goſpel met with in the World upon its being preached to it: Of which no rational account can be given, unleſs the Actions and Miracles of our Saviour were moſt undoubtedly true. That the Goſpel of Chriſt had very ſtrange and wonderful ſucceſs upon its firſt preaching, hath been partly diſcover'd already, and is withal ſo plain from the long continuance of it in theſe *European* parts, that none any ways converſant in the Hiſtory of former Ages, can have any ground to queſtion it. But that this ſtrange and admirable ſucceſs of the Doctine of Chriſt ſhou'd be an Evidence of the truth of it, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of it, will appear from theſe two Conſiderations. 1. *That the Doctrine its ſelf was ſo directly contrary to the general inclinations of the World.* 2. *That the propagation of it was ſo much oppoſed by all worldly power.*

1. *That the Doctrine it ſelf was ſo oppoſite to the general inclinations of the World.* The Doctrine may be conſider'd either as to its *credenda*, or matters of Faith; or as to its *agenda*, or matters of Life and Practice;

both these were contrary to the inclinations of the World; the former seem'd hard and incredible, the latter harsh and impossible.

1. The matters of Faith which were to be believ'd by the World, were not such things which we may imagine the vulgar sort of Men wou'd be very forward to run after, nor very greedy to embrace. 1. *Because contrary to the Principles of their Education, and the Religion they were brought up in*; the generality of Mankind is very tenacious of those Principles and Prejudices which are sucked in in the time of Infancy. There are some Religions one would think it were impossible that any rational Men should believe them; but only on this account, because they are bred up under them. It is a very great advantage any Religion hath against another, that it comes to speak first, and thereby insinuates such an apprehension of its self to the Mind that it is very hard removing it afterwards. The understanding seems to be of the nature of those things which are *communis juris*, and therefore *primi sunt possidentis*; when an opinion hath once got possession of the Mind, it usually keeps out whatever comes to disturb it. Now we cannot otherwise conceive but all those Persons who had been bred up under *Paganism* and the most gross Idolatry, must needs have a very potent Prejudice against such a Doctrine which was wholly irreconcilable with that Religion which they had been devoted to. Now the stronger the Prejudice is which is convey'd into Mens Minds by the force of Education, the greater strength and power must there needs be in the Gospel of Christ, which did so easily demolish these strong holds, and captivate the Understandings of Men to the obedience of Christ. To which purpose *Arnobius* excellently speaks in these words to the *Heathens*; *Sed non creditis gesta hæc. Sed qui ea conspicati sunt fieri & sub oculis suis viderunt agi, testes optimi certissimique auctores, & crediderunt hæc ipsi, & credenda posteris nobis haud exilibus cum approbationibus tradiderunt. Quinam isti fortasse quæritis? gentes, populi, nationes & incredulum illud genus humanum. Quod nisi aperta res esset, & luce ipsa quemadmodum dicitur clarior, nunquam rebus hujusmodi credulitatis suæ commodarent assensum. An nunquid dicimus illius temporis homines usque adeo fuisse vanos, mendaces, stolidos, brutos, ut quæ nunquam viderant vidisse se fingerent? & quæ facta omnino non erant falsis proderent testimoniis aut puerili assertione firmarent? Cumque possent vobiscum & unanimiter vivere, & inoffensas ducere conjunctiones, gratuita susciperent odia & execrabili haberentur in nomine? Quod si falsa ut dicitis historia illa rerum est, unde tam brevi tempore totus mundus ista religione completus est? Aut in unam coire qui potuerunt mentem gentes regionibus dissitæ, ventis cœlique convexionibus dimotæ? Asseverationibus illectæ sunt nudis, inductæ in spes cassas, & in pericula capitis immittere se sponte temeraria desperatione volunerunt, cum nihil tale vidissent quod eas in hos cultus novitatis suæ possit excitare miraculo. Imo quia hæc omnia ab ipso cernebant geri & ab ejus præconibus qui per orbem totum missi beneficia patris & munera sanandis animis hominibusque portabant, veritatis ipsius vi victæ, & dederunt se Deo, nec in magnis posuere dispendiis membra vobis projicere, & viscera sua lanianda præbere.* The substance of whose Discourse is, that it is impossible to suppose so many Persons of so many Nations to be so far besotted and infatuated, as not only to believe a Religion to be true which was contrary to that they were educated in, but to venture their Lives as well as Estates upon it, had it not been discover'd to them in a most certain and infallible way by such who had been eye-witnesses of the Actions and Miracles of Christ and his

Arnobius contr. gentes l. 1.

his *Apoſtles*. And as he elſewhere ſpeaks, *Vel hæc ſaltem fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi tempore & parvo immenſi nominis hujus ſacramenta diffuſa ſunt; quod nulla jam natio eſt tam barbari moris, & manſuetudinem neſciens, quæ non ejus amore verſa molliverit aſperitatem ſuam, & in placidos ſenſus aſſumpta tranquilitate migraverit; quod tam magnis ingeniis prædíti Oratores, Grammatici, Rhetores, Conſulti juris ac Medici, Philoſophiæ etiam ſecreta rimantes, magiſteria hæc expetunt, ſpretis quibus paulo ante fidebant, &c.* Will not this perſuade the World what firm foundations the Faith of *Chriſtians* ſtands on, when in ſo ſhort a time it is ſpread over all parts of the World? that by it the moſt inhumane and barbarous Nations are ſoftn'd into more than civility? That men of the greateſt Wits and Parts, *Orators, Grammarians, Rhetoricians, Lawyers, Phyſicians, Philoſophers*, who not? have forſaken their former ſentiments, and adhered to the Doctrine of Chriſt. Now, I ſay, if the power of Education be ſo ſtrong upon the Minds of Men to perſuade them of the truth of the Religion they are bred up under, (which *Atheiſtically* diſpos'd Perſons make ſo much advantage of,) this is ſo far from weakning the truth of *Chriſtianity*, that it proves a great confirmation of it, becauſe it obtain'd ſo much upon its firſt Preaching in the World, notwithſtanding the higheſt prejudices from Education were againſt it. If then Men be ſo prone to believe that to be moſt true, which they have been educated under, it muſt argue a more than ordinary Evidence and Power in that Religion which unſettles ſo much the Principles of Education, as to make Men not only queſtion the truth of them, but to renounce them and embrace a Religion contrary to them. *Ibid. lib. 2. p. 44.*

XXI. Eſpecially when we withal conſider what ſtrong holds theſe Principles of Education were back'd with among the *Heathens*, when the Doctrine of Chriſt was firſt divulg'd among them, *i. e.* what plauſible pretences they had of continuing in the Religion which they were brought up in, and why they ſhou'd not exchange it for *Chriſtianity*; and thoſe were,

1. *The pretended Antiquity of their Religion above the Chriſtian*; the main thing pleaded againſt the *Chriſtians* was *divortium ab inſtitutis majorum*, that they thought themſelves wiſer than their Fore-fathers; and *Symmachus*, *Libanius*, and others plead this moſt in behalf of *Paganiſm*; *ſervanda eſt tot ſæculis fides, & ſequendi ſunt nobis parentes qui ſecuti ſunt feliciter ſuos*; their Religion pleaded Preſcription againſt any other, and they were reſolv'd to follow the ſteps of their Anceſtors wherein they thought themſelves happy and ſecure. *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix* firſt argues much againſt dogmatizing in Religion, but withal ſays it moſt becomes a lover of truth, *Majorum excipere diſciplinam, religiones traditas colere, deos quos à parentibus ante imbutus es timere; nec de numinibus ferre ſententiam, ſed prioribus credere.* So *Arnobius* tells us the main thing objected againſt the *Chriſtians* was *novellam eſſe religionem noſtram, & ante dies natam propemodum paucos, neque vos potuiſſe antequam & patriam linquere, & in barbaros ritus peregrinoſque traduci.* And *Cotta* in *Tully* long before laid this down as the main Principle of *Pagan* Religion, *majoribus noſtris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere, to believe the Tradition of our Fathers, altho' there be no evidence in reaſon for it:* And after he had diſcover'd the vanity of the *Stoical* Arguments about Religion, concludes with this as the only thing he reſolv'd his Religion into, *Mihi unum ſatis erit, majores noſtros ita tradidiſſe, It is enough for* *Tertull. ad Nat. l. 1. cap. 10. Symmach. Ep. l. 10. ep. 61. Liban. orat. de Templis. Minutius Felix. p. 6. Arnob. contra gentes. l. 2. p. 90. Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.*

me that it comes by tradition from our Fore-fathers. *Lactantius* fully ſets forth the manner of pleading us'd by the *Heathens* againſt the *Chriſtians*, in point of Antiquity. *Hæ ſunt religiones quas ſibi à majoribus ſuis traditas, pertinaciſſime tueri ac defendere perſeverant; nec conſiderant quales ſint, ſed ex hoc probatas atque veras eſſe confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt; tantaque eſt auctoritas vetuſtatis, ut inquirere in eam ſcelus eſſe dicatur.* The *Engliſh* is, They accounted Tradition infallible, and knew no other way whereby to find the truth of Religion but by its conveyance from their Fore-fathers. How like herein do they ſpeak to thoſe who contend for the corruptions crept into the *Chriſtian Church?* who make uſe of the ſame pretences for them, *viz.* that they were deliver'd down from their Fathers; *tantaque eſt auctoritas vetuſtatis, ut inquirere in eam ſcelus eſſe dicatur*; *who are we who will ſee further than Antiquity?* But it is no wonder if Antiquity be accompany'd with dimneſs of ſight; and ſo it was undoubtedly as to the *Pagan* World; and as to the *Chriſtian* too, when ſuch a mixture of *Heatheniſm* came into it. And the very ſame Arguments by which the pleaders for *Chriſtianity* did juſtify the truth of their Religion, notwithſtanding this pretended Antiquity, will with equal force hold for a Reformation of ſuch inveterate abuſes, which under a pretence of Antiquity, have crept into the *Chriſtian Church.* *Nullus pudor eſt ad meliora tranſire*, ſaith *Ambroſe* in his Anſwer to *Symmachus*, *what ſhame is it to grow better? Quid facies?* ſaith *Lactantius*, *majoreſne potius an rationem ſequeris? Si rationem mavis, diſcedere te neceſſe eſt ab inſtitutis & auctoritate majorum: quoniam id ſolum rectum eſt, quod ratio præſcribit. Sin autem pietas majores ſequi ſuadet: fateris igitur & ſtultos illos eſſe qui excogitatis contra rationem religionibus ſervierint; & te ineptum qui id colas quod falſum eſſe conviceris.* Where Reaſon and mere Authority of Fore-fathers ſtand in competition, he is more a Child than a Man that knows not on which ſide to give his Suffrage. But with the greateſt ſtrength, and cleareſt reaſon *Arnobius* ſpeaks in this caſe. *Itaque cum nobis intenditis averſionem à Religione priorum, cauſam convenit ut inſpiciatis, non factum; nec quid reliquerimus opponere, ſed ſecuti quid ſimus potiſſimum contueri.* *When you charge us*, ſaith he, *that we are revolted from the Religion of our Fore-fathers, you ought not preſently to condemn the fact, but to examine the reaſons of it; neither ought you ſo much to look at what we have left, as what it is we have embraced.* *Nam ſi mutare ſententiam culpa eſt ulla vel crimen, & à veteribus inſtitutis in alias res novas voluntateſque migrare, criminatio iſta & vos ſpectat, qui toties vitam conſuetudinemque mutaſtis; qui in mores alios, atque alios ritus priorum condemnatione tranſiſtis.* If mere departing from the Religion of our Anceſtors be the great fault, all thoſe who own themſelves to be *Chriſtians*, were themſelves guilty of it when they revolted from *Heatheniſm.* If it be here ſaid that the caſe is different, becauſe there was ſufficient reaſon for it, which there is not as to the corruptions of the *Chriſtian Church*; if ſo, then all the diſpute is taken off from the matter of fact, or the revolt to the cauſes inducing to it; and if the *Proteſtant* be not able as to the cauſes of our Separation from *Rome* to manifeſt that they were ſufficient, let him then be triumph'd over by the *Romaniſt*, and not before. I aſſert then, and that with much aſſurance of Mind, that the Principles of the Reformation are juſtifiable upon the ſame grounds of Reaſon, which the embracing *Chriſtianity* was, when Men of *Heathens* became *Chriſtians*; and that the Arguments made uſe of by *Romaniſts* againſt our Separation from them, are ſuch as wou'd

Lactant. de orig. Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Ambroſ. ep. c. Symmach.

Lactant. de orig. Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Arnobius contr. gent. l. 2.

wou'd have juſtify'd a *Pagan* Philoſopher in not embracing *Chriſtianity*. For if it be unlawful for any party of Men, to divide from others in a matter of Religion which pretends Antiquity and Univerſality, it had been unlawful for a Philoſopher to have deſerted *Paganiſm*, as well as for a *Proteſtant* to depart from *Rome*. For according to the Principles of the *Romaniſts*, the judgment in the cauſe of the Separation, and of the truth of Religion lies in that party from which we depart; if we do now but apply this to the old *Roman* Senate or Emperors in the caſe of *Chriſtian Religion*, and dividing from *Heathen* Worſhip, we ſhall quickly ſee how eaſy a matter it will be to make *Chriſtianity* it ſelf a Schiſm and the Doctrine of Chriſt the greateſt Hereſy. But as ſtrong as thoſe pretences were then, or have been ſince, the power of the Doctrine of Chriſt hath been ſo great, as to conquer them and thereby to manifeſt, that it was of God, when ſuch potent Prejudices were not able to withſtand it. Of which *Antiquity* is the firſt.

2. *The large and univerſal ſpread of Pagan Religion*, when *Chriſtianity* came into the World: there was never ſo great *Catholiciſm*, as in *Heathen* Worſhip, when the *Apoſtles* firſt appear'd in the *Gentile* World. *Inde adeo per univerſa imperia, provincias, oppida, videmus ſingulos ſacrorum ritus gentiles habere, & Deos colere municipes*, ſaith *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix*. The great charge againſt the *Chriſtians* was *Novelliſm*, that they brought in a ſtrange and unheard of Religion. The common Queſtion was *Where was your Religion before* Jeſus *of* Nazareth? as it has been ſince, *Where was your Religion before* Luther? and the ſame anſwer which ſerv'd then, will ſtand unmoveable, *There, where no other Religion is, in the Word of* God. For this was the weapon whereby the Primitive *Chriſtians* defended themſelves againſt the aſſaults of *Paganiſm*, and the Evidences they brought that the Doctrine preach'd by them, and contain'd in the Scriptures, was originally from God, were the only means of overthrowing *Paganiſm*, notwithſtanding its pretended Univerſality. *Minut in Octa. p. 6.*

3. *Settlement by Laws of Heathen Worſhip.* This was ſo much pretended and pleaded for, that as far as we can find, by the Hiſtory of the Primitive Church, the pretence on which the *Chriſtians* ſuffer'd, was Sedition, and oppoſing the eſtabliſh'd Laws. The *Chriſtians* were reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*, as appears by *Tertullian*, among *Unlawful Corporations*; the Politicians and Stateſmen were all for preſerving the Laws; they troubled not themſelves much about any Religion, but only That which was ſettled by Law they ſought to uphold, becauſe the acting contrary to it might bring ſome diſturbance to the civil State. There were ſeveral Laws which the *Chriſtians* were then brought under, and condemn'd for the breach of. 1. The Law againſt *Hetæriæ*, or *Conventicles*, as they were pleas'd frequently to ſtile the Meeting of *Chriſtians* together: thence the places where the *Chriſtians* aſſembled for worſhip, were commonly call'd *Conventicula*; *Ita appellabant loca*, ſaith *Heraldus, ubi congregabantur Chriſtiani oraturi, & verbi divini interpretationem accepturi, ac ſacras Synaxes habituri:* but *Elmenhorſtius* more ſhortly; *Conventicula loca ſunt ubi Chriſtiani congregati orare conſueverunt. The places where the Chriſtians did meet and pray together, were called Conventicles: in Baſilica Sicinnini ubi ritus Chriſtiani eſt conventiculum*, ſaith *Ammianus Marcellinus*; *cur immaniter conventicula dirui?* ſaith *Arnobius*; *qui univerſum populum cum ipſo pariter conventiculo concremavit*, as *Lactantius* likewiſe ſpeaks. Now the reaſon of the Name was, becauſe the *Tertull. Apol. c. 38.* *Herald. Obſervat. in Arnob. l. 4.* *Am. Marc. Hiſt. l. 27.* *Arnob. l. 4.* *Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.*

the Heathens judged these Assemblies of Christians to be illegal Societies. For which we are to understand; that in the time of the *Roman* Emperors, when they grew suspicious of their own safety, they severely prohibited all those *Sodalitia*, or Societies and Colleges, which were very much in use in the *Roman* Common-wealth, in imitation of the ἑταιρίαι in the Cities of *Greece*. These were such Societies of Persons, which voluntarily confederated together either for some particular design, or for preserving Love and Friendship among each other, and thence had their frequent Meetings in common together. Now the more numerous these were, and the more closely they confederated, the more jealous Eye the *Roman* Emperours had upon them, because of some Clandestine design, which they suspected might be carried on for disturbance of the public Peace in such suspicious Meetings. Thence came out many particular Edicts of the Emperours against all such kinds of Societies.

Now when the Christians began to be somewhat numerous, and had according to the Principles of their Religion frequent Assemblies for Divine worship, and did confederate together by such Symbols, of being washed with water, and eating and drinking together (which was all the Heathens apprehended by their use of Baptism, and the Lord's Supper) the Proconsuls and other Magistrates in their several Provinces bring the Christians under these Edicts, and so punish'd them for the breach of the Laws. Which as appears by *Pliny*'s Epistle to *Trajan* was the only account on which the wiser Heathens did proceed against the Christians; for we see he troubled not himself much about the Truth and Evidence of the Christian Religion, but such Persons were brought before him; and after he had Interrogated them whether they were Christians, or no, several times, if they persisted, he then punished them, not so much for their Religion, as for their obstinacy and contempt of Authority. For so much is imply'd in those words of his, *Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe, & inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri: That whatever their Religion was their obstinacy and disobedience deserved punishment.* That which the Christians now pleaded for themselves, why they shou'd not be reckon'd among the Factions of the People, was that which they gave to *Pliny*, that all their fault was, *Quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem; seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent. That they were wont upon their solemn days to meet together for Divine Worship, and to covenant with each other only for the practice of those things which were as much for the good of Mankind as their own,* viz. *that they would not wrong and defraud others, as to their Bodies or Estates,* And *Tertullian* approves of the Law against Factions, as *de providentia & modestia publica, ne civitas in partes scinderetur,* as wisely intended to prevent Seditions; but withal pleads, that the Society of Christians cou'd not be reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*; for saith he, *hæc coitio Christianorum merito sane illicita, si illicitis par; merito damnanda si quis de ea queritur eo titulo quo de factionibus querela est. In cujus perniciem aliquando convenimus? Hoc sumus congregati quod & dispersi; hoc universi quod & singuli; neminem lædentes, neminem contristantes; quum probi, quum boni coeunt, quum pii, quum casti congregantur, non est factio dicenda sed curia. If,* saith he, *the Societies of Christians were like others, there might be some*

Plin. Epist. l. 10. ep. 97.

Tertull. Apol. c. 38.

reason

reaſon to condemn them, under the head of Factions: but as long as we meet together for no Man's injury, that whether divided, or aſſembled, we are ſtill the ſame, that we grieve and injure no body; when ſuch a company of good Men meet together, it is rather a Council than a Faction.

2. Another Law the Chriſtians were brought under, was, That againſt Innovations in Religion; thence it was laid ſo much to the charge of the Chriſtians, that they did ζῆν παρανόμως, *go contrary to the eſtabliſh'd Law*; as *Porphyry* ſaid of *Origen*, becauſe he was a Chriſtian, he did χριστιανὸς ζῆν καὶ παρανόμως; and when he ſpeaks of *Ammonius* revolting from *Chriſtianity* to *Paganiſm*, εὐθὺς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ νόμους πολιτείαν μετεβάλετο, *he turn'd to the way of Life, which was agreeable to the eſtabliſh'd Laws.* Now Chriſtianity was every where look'd on as a great Innovation, inſomuch that the Chriſtians were accuſed to be *legum, morum, naturæ inimici*, as *Enemies to Mankind as well as the Laws*, becauſe they drew Men off from that way of Religion which Mankind had generally agreed in. Thence *Æmilianus* the Præfect of *Ægypt*, when he bids the Chriſtians return to Paganiſm, he us'd theſe Expreſſions, ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τρέπεσθαι· ἐπιλαθέσθαι δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, *to return to the common ſenſe of Mankind, and to forget what was ſo much againſt it*, as he ſuppos'd Chriſtianity to be. When *Paul* preach'd at *Athens*, his firſt Accuſation was, that *he was a Preacher of ſtrange Deities, becauſe he preached to them Jeſus and the Reſurrection.* And *Demetrius* at *Epheſus* knew no ſuch potent Argument againſt *Paul*, as that his Religion *deſtroyed the worſhip of* Diana, *whom all* Aſia *and the world worſhip.* So that the Primitive Chriſtians were then accounted the *Antipodes* to the whole World, on which account they were ſo ſeverely dealt with; moſt Common-wealths obſerving the counſel of *Mæcenas* to *Auguſtus*, in *Dio*, to be ſure to have a watchful eye upon all Innovations in Religion, becauſe they tend ſo much to the diſturbance of the Civil State.

Euſeb. l. 6. Eccleſ. hiſt. cap. 19.

Tertull. Apol. c. 4.

Euſeb. Eccl hiſt. l. 7. c. 11.

Act. 17. 18. 19. 27.

3. The Law of Sacrilege. Thence *Lactantius* calls their Laws, *Conſtitutiones Sacrilegæ. Quin etiam ſceleratiſſimi homicidæ contra pios jura impia condiderunt; nam & conſtitutiones Sacrilegæ, & diſputationes Juriſperitorum leguntur injuſtæ*; and as he tells us, *Domitius Ulpianus* had collected all thoſe *Reſcripta nefaria* together, which concern'd the Chriſtians; from hence it was, Chriſtianity by *Pliny*, is called *amentia*, by *Tacitus exitiabilis ſuperſtitio*, by *Suetonius ſuperſtitio nova & exitiabilis*; ſo much did theſe three great Men agree, in condemning the beſt Religion in the World for madneſs, and new, and deteſtable Superſtition; the ground of the great *pique* was the enmity declar'd by Chriſtians againſt the Idolatrous Temples, and Worſhip of the Heathens.

Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.

Tacit. Ann. l. 15. Sueton in Nerone.

Plin. Ep. l. 10. ep. 97.

4. The Law againſt Treaſon; for ſometimes they proceeded ſo high, as to accuſe the Chriſtians *læſæ Majeſtatis*, and thence they are commonly called *publici hoſtes, enemies to all civil Government.* Which they inferred from hence: 1. *Becauſe they would not ſacrifice for the Emperour's ſafety*; *Ideo committimus*, ſaith *Tertullian*, *in Majeſtatem Imperatorum, quia illos non ſubjicimus rebus ſuis*; *Quia non ludimus de officio ſalutis eorum, qui eam non putamus in manibus eſſe plumbatis.* The Accuſation for Treaſon lay in their refuſing to ſupplicate the Idols for the Emperour's welfare. 2. *Becauſe they would not ſwear by the Emperour's Genius.* Thence *Saturnius* ſaid to the Martyr, *Tantum jura per genium Cæſaris noſtri*, if he wou'd but ſwear by the *Genius* of *Cæſar*, he ſhou'd be ſaved. Yet tho' they refus'd to ſwear by the Emperour's *Genius*, they did not refuſe to teſtify their Allegiance, and to ſwear by the Emperour's ſafety.

Tertull. Apol. 27. c. 35.

Ibid. c. 29

Herald. in Tertull. Apol. cap. 29.

Sed

Tertull. Apol c. 32. *Sed & juramus*, ſaith *Tertullian*, *ſicut non per genios Cæſarum, ita per ſalutem eorum quæ eſt auguſtior omnibus geniis.* 3. *Becauſe they would not worſhip the Emperours as Gods*; which was then grown a common Cuſtom.

Ibid. c. 33. *Non enim Deum Imperatorem dicam, vel quia mentiri neſcio, vel quia illum deridere non audeo, vel quia nec ipſe ſe Deum volet dici ſi homo ſit*, as the ſame Author ſpeaks. Nay the Primitive Chriſtians were very ſcrupulous of calling the Emperour *Dominus*, *hoc enim Dei eſt cognomen*, becauſe the name Lord was an Attribute of God's, and apply'd as his name to him in Scripture. The reaſon of this ſcrupuloſity was not, from any queſtion they made of the Sovereignty of Princes, or their obligation to obedience to them, (which they are very free in the acknowledgment of,) but from a jealouſie and juſt ſuſpicion that ſomething of Divine honour might be imply'd in it, when the Adoration of Princes was

Ibid. c. 34. grown a Cuſtom. Therefore *Tertullian* to prevent miſ-underſtandings, ſaith, *Dicam plane Imperatorem Dominum, ſed more Communi, ſed quando non cogor ut Dominum Dei vice dicam.* They refus'd not the name in a common ſenſe, but as it imply'd Divine honour.

5. *Becauſe they would not obſerve the public Feſtivals* of the Emperours in the way that others did, which it ſeems were obſerved with abundance of Looſeneſs and Debauchery by all ſorts of Perſons; and as *Ter-*

Ibid c. 35. *tullian* ſmartly ſays, *Malorum morum licentia pietas erit; & occaſio luxuriæ religio deputabitur? Debauchery is accounted a piece of Loyalty, and Intemperance a part of Religion.* Which made the Chriſtians rather hazard the reputation of their Loyalty, than bear a part in ſo much Rudeneſs as was then us'd, and then they abhorred all the ſolemn ſpectacles

Tertull. cap. 38. of the *Romans*; *Nihil eſt nobis*, ſaith the ſame Author, *dictu, viſu, auditu, cum inſania Circi, cum impudicitia Theatri, cum atrocitate arenæ, cum Xyſti vanitate. They had nothing to do either with the madneſs of the Cirque, or the immodeſty of the Theatre, or the cruelty of the Amphitheatre, or the vanity of the public Wreſtlings.* We ſee then what a hard Province the Chriſtians had, when ſo many Laws were laid as Bird-lime in their way to catch them, that it was impoſſible for them to profeſs themſelves Chriſtians, and not to run into a *præmunire* by their Laws. And therefore it cannot be conceiv'd that many out of affection of Novelty ſhou'd then declare themſelves Chriſtians, when ſo great hazards were run upon the profeſſing of it. Few ſoft-ſpirited Men, and lovers of their own eaſe, but wou'd have found ſome fine diſtinctions and nice evacuations to have reconcil'd themſelves to the public Laws by ſuch things which the Primitive Chriſtians ſo unanimouſly refus'd, when tending to Prophaneneſs or Idolatry. And from this diſcourſe we cannot but

2 Cor. 10. 4, 5. conclude with the Apoſtle *Paul*, *That the weapons* whereby the Apoſtles and Primitive Chriſtians *encountred* the *Heathen world*, *were not fleſhly or weak*, but exceeding ſtrong and powerful, in that they obtain'd ſo great a conqueſt over the Imaginations and carnal Reaſonings of Men (which were their ſtrong holds they ſecur'd themſelves in) as to make them readily to forſake their Heathen worſhip, and become chearful Servants to Chriſt. Thus we ſee the power of the Doctrine of Chriſt, which prevail'd over the Principles of Education, tho' back'd with pretended Antiquity, Univerſality, and Eſtabliſhment by civil Laws.

XXII. But this will further appear if we conſider that not only the matters of Faith were contrary to the Principles of Education, but becauſe many of them ſeem'd incredible to Men's natural Reaſon; that we cannot think Perſons wou'd be over-forward to believe ſuch things. Every one

one being ſo ready to take any advantage againſt a Religion which did ſo little flatter corrupt Nature either as to its power or capacity; inſomuch that thoſe who preached this Doctrine, declar'd openly to the World, that ſuch Perſons who wou'd judge of the Chriſtian Doctrine, by ſuch principles which mere natural Reaſon did proceed upon (ſuch a one I ſuppoſe it is whom the Apoſtle calls Ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος, one that own'd nothing but natural Reaſon, whereby to judge of Divine Truths) cou'd not entertain matters of Faith, or of Divine Revelation, becauſe ſuch things wou'd ſeem but folly to him that own'd no higher principle than Philoſophy, or that did not believe any Divine Inſpiration; neither can ſuch a one know them, becauſe a Divine Revelation is the only way to come to a thro' underſtanding of them: and a perſon who doth not believe ſuch a Divine Revelation, it is impoſſible he ſhou'd be a competent judge of the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt. So that the only ground of receiving the Doctrine of the Goſpel is upon a Divine Revelation, that God himſelf by his Son and his Apoſtles, hath reveal'd theſe deep Myſteries to the World, on which account it is we are bound to receive them, altho' they go beyond our reach and comprehenſion. But we ſee generally in the Heathen World how few of thoſe did believe the Doctrine of Chriſt in compariſon, who were the great admirers of the Philoſophy, and way of Learning which was then cry'd up: the reaſon was, becauſe Chriſtianity not only contain'd far deeper Myſteries than any they were acquainted with, but deliver'd them in ſuch a way of Authority, commanding them to believe the Doctrine they preached on the account of the Divine Authority of the Revealers of it. Such a way of propoſal of Doctrines to the World the Philoſophy of the *Greeks* was unacquainted with, which on that account they deriided, as not being ſuited to the exact method which their Sciences proceeded in. No doubt had the Apoſtles come among the *Greeks* μετὰ πολλῆς φαντασίας, with a *great deal of pomp and oſtentation*, and had fed Mens curioſities with vain and unneceſſary Speculations, they might have had as many Followers among the *Greeks* for their ſakes, as Chriſt had among the *Jews* for the ſake of the Loaves. But the matters of the Goſpel being more of inward worth and moment, than of outward pomp and ſhew, the vain and empty *Greeks* preſently find a quarrel with the manner of propoſing them; that they came not in a way of clear demonſtration, but ſtood ſo much upon Faith as ſoon as they were deliver'd. Thence *Celſus* and *Galen* think they have reaſon enough to reject the Laws of *Moſes* and Chriſt, becauſe *Celſus* calls them νόμους ἀναποδείκτους, *Galen Chriſtianity* Διατροβὴν ἀναπόδεικτον, that they were ſuch Doctrines which require Faith and Obedience, without giving Mens reaſon an account of the things commanded. As tho' the Authority of a *Legiſlator* ſufficiently manifeſted, were not enough to inforce a Law, unleſs a ſufficient account were given of the thing requir'd to the purblind Reaſon of every individual Perſon acted by paſſions and private intereſts, as to the Juſtice and Equity of it. And ſo the primary obligation on Man's part to Faith and Obedience, muſt ariſe not from the evidence of Divine Authority, but of the thing it ſelf which is reveal'd, to the moſt partial judgment of every one to whom it is propos'd. Which thoſe who know how ſhort the ſtock of Reaſon is at the beſt in Men, and how eaſily that which is, is faſhion'd and moulded according to prejudices and intereſts already entertain'd, will look upon only as a deſign to comply with the carnal deſires of Men, in that thereby none

2 Cor. 2. 14.

Orig. l. 1. c. Celſ. Gal. de diff. puls. lib. 2. c. 4.

ſhall be bound to go any further, than this blind and corrupted Guide ſhall lead them. Now theſe being the terms on which the Goſpel of Chriſt muſt have expected entertainment in the *Gentile* World, how impoſſible had it been ever to have found any ſucceſs among Men, had there not been ſufficient Evidence giving by a power of Miracles, that however ſtrange and incredible the Doctrine might ſeem, yet it was to be believ'd, becauſe there was ſufficient means to convince Men that it was of Divine Revelation.

XXIII. Neither were the matters of Faith only contrary to the inclinations of the World, but ſo were the precepts of Life, or thoſe things in Chriſtianity which concern'd practice. Theſe are two things which are the main ſcope and deſign of Chriſtianity in reference to Mens Lives, and to take them off from their Sins, and from the World; and of all things theſe are they which Mens hearts are ſo bewitch'd with. Now the precepts of the Goſpel are ſuch which require the greateſt *purity of heart and life*, which call upon Men *to deny themſelves, and all ungodlineſs, and worldly luſts, and to live ſoberly, and righteouſly, and godly in this preſent world*; that, *all that name the name of Chriſt muſt depart from iniquity*; that, *all true Chriſtians muſt be cleanſed from all filthineſs of fleſh and ſpirit, and muſt perfect holineſs in the fear of God*. And the Goſpel inforceth theſe precepts of Holineſs with the moſt terrible Denunciations of the wrath of God on thoſe who diſobey them; that, *the Lord Jeſus Chriſt ſhall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt*. That, *the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven againſt all ungodlineſs and unrighteouſneſs of men, who hold the truth in unrighteouſneſs*. That, no perſons who live in the habitual practice of any known ſin, *ſhall inherit the Kingdom of God*. That, *no man ſhould deceive them with vain words, for becauſe of theſe things comes the wrath of God upon the Children of diſobedience*; that Men do but vainly flatter themſelves when they ſeek to reconcile unholy Lives with the hopes of future Happineſs; for *without holineſs no man ſhall ſee the Lord*. And then in reference to the things of this preſent Life which Men buſie themſelves ſo much about, the Goſpel declares, that *they who love this world, the love of the Father is not in them*; that, *the friendſhip of this world is enmity with God*; *and whoſoever will be a friend of the world is an enemy to God*: That *Chriſtians muſt not ſet their affections on Earth, but on the things in Heaven*; That *the converſation of true Chriſtians is in Heaven*. That we ought not to *lay up our treaſure on Earth, but in Heaven*; That, *we muſt not look at the things which are ſeen, but at the things which are not ſeen*; *for the things which are ſeen are temporal, but the things which are not ſeen are eternal*. Now the whole deſign of the Doctrine of Chriſt being to perſuade Men to lead a Holy and Heavenly Life while they are in this World, and thereby to *be made meet to be partakers of the inheritance with the Saints in light*, can we think ſo many Men whoſe hearts were wedded to Sin, and the World cou'd ſo ſuddenly be brought off from both without a Divine Power accompanying that Doctrine which was preached to them? And therefore the Apoſtle ſaith, οὐκ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, *I am not aſhamed of the Goſpel of Chriſt*; i. e. tho' the Goſpel of Chriſt be the only true Myſtery, yet I do not by it as the Heathens are wont to do with their famous *Eleuſinian* Myſteries, which were kept ſo ſecret by all the *Myſtæ* and ἐπόπται; but ſaith he, *I know no reaſon I have to be aſhamed of any thing in the Goſpel, that I*

Matt. 5. 8. 16, 24. Tit. 2. 12. 2 Tim. 2. 19. 2 Cor 7. 1. 2 Theſ. 1. 7, 8. Rom. 1. 18. 1 Cor. 6. 9. 10. Gal. 4. 20. Epheſ. 5. 5, 6. Heb. 12. 14. 1 Joh. 2. 14. Jam. 4. 4. Col. 3. 1, 2. Phil. 3. 20. Matt. 6. 20. 2 Cor. 4. 18. Col. 1. 12. Rom. 1. 16.

ſhould

ſhould labour its concealment to advance its veneration; but the more public the Goſpel is, the more it manifeſts its power; for thro' it God is pleas'd mightily to work, in order to the Salvation both of *Jew* and *Gentile*. And of all the ſucceſs of the Goſpel, that upon the Hearts and Lives of Men deſerves the greateſt conſideration.

The great Efficacy and Power of the Goſpel was abundantly ſeen in that great alteration which it wrought in all thoſe who were the hearty embracers of it. The Philoſophers did very frequently and deſervedly complain of the great inefficacy of all their Moral Precepts upon the minds of Men, and that by all their Inſtructions, *politiora non meliora, ingenia fiunt*, Men improv'd more in Knowledge than Goodneſs; but now *Chriſtianity* not only inforced Duties on Men with greater Power and Authority: For the Scriptures do, as Saint *Auſtin* ſpeaks, *Non tanquam ex Philoſophorum concertationibus ſtrepere, ſed tanquam ex oraculis & Dei nubibus intonare*, not make ſome obſtreperous clamours, like thoſe *tinkling Cymbals*, the Philoſophers, but awe the Souls of Men with the Majeſty of that God from whom they came. Neither was it only a great and empty ſound which was heard in the Preaching of the Goſpel; but when God thundred therein, he broke down the *ſtately Cedars* and *ſhook the Wilderneſs*, and *made the Hinds to calve*, (as it is ſaid of Thunder, call'd the *Voice of the Lord* in Scripture,) he humbl'd the Pride of Men, unſettled the Gentile World from its former foundations, and wrought great alterations on all thoſe who hearkened to it. The whole deſign of the Goſpel is couched in thoſe words which Saint *Paul* tells us were ſpoken to him by Chriſt himſelf, when he appointed him to be an Apoſtle, *to open Mens eyes, and to turn them from darkneſs to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveneſs of ſins, and inheritance among them which were ſanctified by faith in Chriſt.* And the efficacy of this Doctrine in order to theſe great ends, was abundantly ſeen in the preaching of that Apoſtle, who was ſo inſtrumental in converting the World to piety and ſobriety, as well as to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*. What ſtrange Perſons were the *Corinthians* before they became *Chriſtians!* for when the Apoſtle had enumerated many of the vileſt Perſons of the World, he preſently adds, *And ſuch were ſome of you; but ye are waſhed, but ye are ſanctified, but ye are juſtified in the name of the Lord Jeſus, and by the ſpirit of our God.* The more dangerous the diſtemper is, the more malignant its nature; the more inveterate its continuance, the greater the Efficacy of the remedy which works a cure of it. The power of Grace is the more ſeen in converſion, the greater the ſins have been before it. It is an eaſy matter in compariſon to remove a diſeaſe at its firſt on-ſet, of what it is to cure it when it becomes Chronical. The power of the Goſpel wrought upon all ſorts and kinds of Perſons, to manifeſt to the World there was no diſtemper of Men's Souls ſo great, but there was a poſſibility of a Remedy for it; and not only ſo, but pregnant and viſible inſtances were given of the Power and Efficacy of it. *For they themſelves ſhew of us*, ſaith the Apoſtle, *what manner of entring in we had among you, and how ye turned to God from Idols, to ſerve the living and true God, and to wait for his Son from Heaven, whom he raiſed from the dead, even* Jeſus, *which delivered us from the wrath to come.* Now that which manifeſts the exceeding great power and excellency of the Goſpel, was, that it not only turn'd Men from one way of worſhip to another, which is a matter of no great difficulty, but that it turn'd Men together with that from their Luſts and Senſuality, to a

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 2. c. 19.

Pſal. 29. 5, 8, 9.

Act. 26. 18.

1 Cor. 6. 10, 11.

1 Theſſ. 1. 9, 10.

holy and unblameable Life. For Men being more in love with their Sins, than with their Opinions, it muſt needs be a greater Power which draws Men from the practice of habitual Sins, than that which only makes them change their Opinions, or alter the way of worſhip they were brought up in. This is that which *Origen* throughout his Books againſt *Celſus* triumphs in as the moſt ſignal Evidence of a Divine power in the Doctrine of Chriſt, that it wrought ſo great an alteration on all that truly embraced it, that of vicious, debauched, and diſſolute, it made them temperate, ſober, and religious, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀνθρώπους ἐπιστρέφῃ ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως τῶν κακῶν, ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν βίον. *The Doctrine of Chriſt did convert the moſt wicked Perſons who embraced it, from all their debaucheries, to a life moſt ſutable to Nature and Reaſon, and to the practice of all Vertues.* Therefore certainly the Goſpel cou'd not want that commendation among all ingenuous Moraliſts, that it was the moſt excellent inſtrument in the World to reform the lives of Men, and to promote real goodneſs in it. When they cou'd not but take notice of ſo many Perſons continually ſo brought off from their follies and vain converſations, to a life ſerious, ſober, and unblameable; nay and ſome of the *Chriſtians* were of ſo much integrity and goodneſs, that their greateſt Enemies were forced to ſay that their only fault was, that they were *Chriſtians*. *Bonus vir Caius Sejus, tantum quod Chriſtianus. A very good man, only a Chriſtian.* But one wou'd think this ſhou'd have made them have a higher opinion of *Chriſtianity*, when it did ſo ſuddenly make ſo many Men good in the World. Eſpecially when this power was ſo manifeſt on ſuch Perſons who were ſuppos'd uncapable of being reform'd by Philoſophy, young, illiterate, and mean-ſpirited Perſons; therefore it may be juſtly ſuppos'd that it was not by the ſtrength of their own Reaſon that this alteration was wrought within them, but by that Divine power which was able to tame the moſt unruly; to inſtruct the moſt ignorant, to raiſe up the moſt ſordid Perſons to ſuch a Generous temper, as to ſlight the good things of this life, in compariſon with thoſe to come. And ſo remarkable was the difference of life then between thoſe that were *Chriſtians*, and thoſe who were not (as there is ſtill between true *Chriſtians*, and mere Pretenders) that *Origen* dares *Celſus* to compare them in point of Morality with any other Societies in the World. αἱ γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ Χριστῷ καθηλευθεῖσαι ἐκκλησίαι, συνεξελάζουσαι ταῖς ὧν παροικοῦσι δήμων ἐκκλησίαις, ὡς φωστῆρές εἰσιν ἐν κόσμῳ· τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαι καὶ τὰς χείρους τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκκλησίας, τῶν συγχεόντων βελτιόνων ἐλάττους, πολλῶν κρείττους τυγχάνειν τῶν ἐν τοῖς δήμοις ἐκκλησιῶν; *For the Churches of* God, *which are diſcipled to* Chriſt, *being compared with other Societies, ſhine among them like lights in the world. For who can but confeſs, that even the worſer part of the Chriſtian Churches exceeds the beſt of the popular Aſſemblies? For,* as he goes on, *the Church of* God *which is at* Athens, *that is* ἠρεμαία τις καὶ εὐσταθὴς, *very quiet and peaceable, becauſe it ſeeks to approve it ſelf to* God; *but the popular Aſſembly at* Athens, *that is* στασιώδης, *ſeditious and quarelſome, and in nothing comparable to the Church of* God *there. So it is, if we compare the Churches of* Corinth *and* Alexandria *with the Aſſemblies of the People there.* So that any candid Inquirer after Truth will exceedingly wonder (how ſuch fair Iſlands ſhou'd appear *nantes in gurgite vaſto,* in the midſt of ſuch a Sea of wickedneſs as it was in thoſe Cities) how theſe *Churches* of God ſhou'd be planted in ſuch rude and profane places. So the ſame Author goes on to compare the Church's State with that of the Cities, the Church's Officers with theirs;

Origen. c. Celſum, l. 2. p. 78. & lib. 1. p. 21.

Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 3. p. 128.

theirs; and appeals to themſelves, that even thoſe among them who were moſt luke-warm in their Office, did yet far exceed all the City-Magiſtrates in all manner of Vertues. From whence he rationally concludes, εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' ὕτως ἔχει, πῶς οὐκ εὔλογον μὲν νομίζειν καὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἰσαύτα συῆσαι δεδυνημένυ, ὅτι οὐκ ἦ τυχῦσα, θειότης ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ; *If theſe things be ſo, how can it but be moſt rational to adore the Divinity of* Jeſus, *who was able to accompliſh ſuch great things?* And that not upon one or two, but upon ſuch great multitudes as were then converted to the *Chriſtian Faith.* We read of one *Phædon*, and one *Polemon* brought from their debaucheries by *Socrates* and *Xenocrates*, but what are theſe compar'd with thoſe who were turn'd from their Sins to God by the Goſpel of Chriſt! καὶ πάλαι μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, εἷς τις Φαίδων καὶ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ δεύτερος, καὶ εἷς Πολέμων, μεταβαλόντες ἀπὸ ἀσώτυ καὶ μοχθηροτάτυ βίυ, ἐφιλοσόφησαν· πάλαι δὲ τῷ Ἰησοῦ ἃ μόνοι τότε οἱ δώδεκα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ πολλαπλασίες, &c. *The twelve Apoſtles were but the firſt-fruits of that plentiful Harveſt of Converts which followed afterwards.* And altho' *Celſus* (like an *Epicurean*) ſeems to deny the poſſibility of any ſuch thing as Converſion, becauſe cuſtomary ſins become a ſecond Nature, that no puniſhments can reform them; *Yet*, ſaith *Origen*, *herein he not only contradicts us* Chriſtians, *but all ſuch as were* γενναίως φιλοσοφήσαντες, *who own'd any generous principles of Philoſophy, and did not deſpair of recovering vertue, as a thing feaſible by humane nature*; and gives inſtances *ad hominem*, to prove the poſſibility of the thing from the ancient Heroes, *Hercules*, and *Ulyſſes*, from the two Philoſophers, *Socrates* and *Muſonius*, and the two famous Converts to Philoſophy, *Phædon* and *Polemon*. *But yet*, ſaith he, *theſe are not ſo much to be wondred at, that the eloquence and reaſon of the Philoſophers ſhou'd prevail on ſome very few perſons, but that the mean and contemptible language of the Apoſtles ſhou'd convert ſuch multitudes from intemperance to ſobriety, from injuſtice to fair-dealing, from cowardice to the higheſt conſtancy, yea ſo great as to lay down their lives for the ſake of virtue; how can we but admire ſo Divine a Power as was ſeen in it? And therefore*, ſaith he, *we conclude*, ὅτι τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ ἀμείλαι καπάκτν φυσιώσασθαι ἔστν ἃ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύναλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ πανυ χαλεπόν, *That it is ſo far from being impoſſible, that it is not at all difficult for corrupt nature to be chang'd by the Word of* God. *Lactantius* excellently manifeſts that Philoſophy cou'd never do ſo much good in the World as *Chriſtianity* did, becauſe that was not ſuited at all to common capacities, and did require ſo much skill in the Arts to prepare Men for it, which it is impoſſible all ſhou'd be well skill'd in, which yet are as capable of being happy, as any others are. And how inefficacious the Precepts of Philoſophy were, appears by the Philoſophers themſelves, who were far from having command by them over their maſterleſs paſſions, and were fain ſometimes to confeſs that Nature was too head-ſtrong to be kept in by ſuch weak Reins as the Precepts of Philoſophy were: *But*, ſaith he, *what great command Divine Precepts have upon the Souls of Men, daily experience ſhews. Da mihi virum qui ſit iracundus, maledicus, effrenatus; pauciſſimis Dei verbis, tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da cupidum, avarum, tenacem; jam tibi eum liberalem dabo, & pecuniam ſuam plenis manibus largientem. Da timidum doloris ac mortis; jam cruces, & ignes, & taurum contemnet. Da libidinoſum, adulterum, ganeonem; jam ſobrium, caſtum, continentem videbis. Da crudelem, & ſanguinis appetentem; jam in veram clementiam furor ille mutabitur. Da injuſtum, inſipientem, peccatorem; continuo & æquus, & prudens, & innocens erit.* In which words that elegant Writer doth by a Rhetorical

Origen. l. 1. p. 50.

Origen. l. 3. p. 150.

Lactant. de falſ. ſap. l. 3. c. 25.

Cap. 26.

Rhetorical Scheme ſet out the remarkable alteration which was in any who became true *Chriſtians*, that altho' they were paſſionate, covetous fearful, luſtful, cruel, unjuſt, vicious, yet upon their being *Chriſtians*, they became mild, liberal, courageous, temperate, merciful, juſt and unblameable; which never any were brought to by mere Philoſophy, which rather teacheth the Art of Concealing vices than of healing them. But now when *Chriſtianity* was ſo effectual in the cure of thoſe diſtempers, which Philoſophy gave over as beyond its skill and power, when it cur'd them with ſo great ſucceſs, and that not in a *Paracelſian* way, for then to relapſe afterwards with greater violence, but it did ſo throughly unſettle the *fomes morbi*, that it ſhou'd never gather to ſo great a head again; doth not this argue a power more than Philoſophical, and that cou'd be no leſs than Divine Power which tended ſo much to reform the World, and to promote true goodneſs in it?

XXIV. Thus we have conſider'd the contrariety of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* to Mens Natural Inclinations, and yet the ſtrange ſucceſs it had in the World, which in the laſt place will appear yet more ſtrange, when we add the almoſt *continual oppoſition it met with from worldly power and policy*. Had it been poſſible for a cunningly-deviſed fable, or any mere contrivance of Impoſtors to have prevail'd in the World, when the moſt potent and ſubtile Perſons bent their whole Wits and Deſigns for ſuppreſſing it? Whatever it were in others, we are ſure of ſome of the *Roman* Emperours, as *Julian* and *Diocleſian*, that it was their Maſter-deſign to root out and aboliſh *Chriſtianity*; and was it only the ſubtilty of the *Chriſtians* which made theſe Perſons give over their work in deſpair of accompliſhing it? If the *Chriſtians* were ſuch ſubtile Men, whence came all their Enemies to agree in one common calumny, that they were a company of poor, weak, ignorant, inconſiderable Men? and if they were ſo, how came it to paſs that by their power and wiſdom they cou'd never exterminate theſe Perſons; but as they cut them down, they grew up the faſter, and multiply'd by their ſubſtraction of them? There was ſomething then certainly peculiar in *Chriſtianity*, from all other Doctrines, that it not only was not advanc'd by any civil power, but it got ground by the Oppoſition it met with in the World. And therefore it is an obſervable circumſtance, that the firſt Chriſtian Emperour (who acted as Emperour for *Chriſtianity*) viz. *Conſtantine* (for otherwiſe I know what may be ſaid for *Philippus*) did not appear in the World 'till *Chriſtianity* had ſpread it ſelf over moſt parts of the habitable World. God thereby letting us ſee, that tho' the civil Power, when become Chriſtian, might be very uſeful for protecting *Chriſtianity*, yet that he ſtood in no need at all of it, as to the Propagation of it abroad in the World. But we ſee it was quite otherwiſe in that Religion which had *Mars* its Aſcendant, viz. *Mahometiſm*: For like *Paracelſus* his *Dæmon*, it always ſat upon the pummel of the Sword, and made its way in the World merely by force and violence; and as its firſt conſtitution had much of Blood in it, ſo by it hath it been fed and nouriſh'd ever ſince. But it was quite otherwiſe with the *Chriſtian* Religion, it never thriv'd better than in the moſt barren places, nor triumph'd more, than when it ſuffer'd moſt; nor ſpread it ſelf further, than when it encounter'd the greateſt Oppoſition. Becauſe therein was ſeen the great force and efficacy of the Doctrine of Chriſt, that it bore up Mens Spirits under the greateſt miſeries of Life, and made them with cheerfulneſs to undergo the moſt exquiſite torments

which

which the cruelty of Tyrants cou'd invent. The *Stoics* and *Epicureans* Boaſt, that their wiſe Man wou'd be happy in the Bull of *Phalaris*, were but empty and *Thraſonical* words, which none wou'd venture the truth of by an experiment upon themſelves. It was the *Chriſtian* alone, and not the *Epicurean*, that cou'd truly ſay in the midſt of torments, *Suave eſt & nihil curo*, and might juſtly alter a little of that common ſaying of the *Chriſtians*, and ſay, *Non magna loquimur, ſed patimur*, as well as *vivimus*; *The* Chriſtians *did not ſpeak great things, but do and ſuffer them.* And this gain'd not only great reputation of integrity to themſelves, but much advanc'd the honour of their Religion in the World, when it was ſo apparently ſeen, that no force or power was able to withſtand it. Will not this at leaſt perſuade you that our Religion is true and from God, ſaith *Arnobius*? *Quod cum genera pœnarum tanta ſint a vobis propoſita Religionis hujus ſequentibus leges, angeatur res magis, & contra omnes minas atque interdicta formidinum animoſius populus obnitatur, & ad credendi ſtudium, prohibitionis ipſius ſtimulis excitetur?* *Arnob. l. 2. c. gentes.*

——*Itane iſtud non divinum & ſacrum eſt, aut ſine Deo, eorum tantas animorum fieri converſiones, ut cum carnifices unci, aliique innumeri cruciatus, quemadmodum diximus, impendeant crediturus, veluti quadam dulcedine, atque omnium virtutum amore correpti, cognitas accipiant rationes, atque mundi omnibus rebus præponant amicitias Chriſti?* *That no fears, penalties, or torments, were able to make a* Chriſtian *alter his profeſſion, but he wou'd rather bid adieu to his life than to his Saviour.* This *Origen* likewiſe frequently takes notice of, when *Celſus* had objected the Novelty of *Chriſtianity*; *The more wonderful it is* (ſaith *Origen*) *that in ſo ſhort a time it ſhou'd ſo largely ſpread it ſelf in the World; for if the cure of Mens Bodies be not wrought without Divine Providence, how much leſs the cure of ſo many thouſands of Souls which have been converted at once to Humanity and* Chriſtianity, *eſpecially when all the Powers of the World were from the firſt engaged to hinder the progreſs of this Doctrine, and yet notwithſtanding all this oppoſition,* ἐνίκησε, μὴ πεφυκὼς κωλύεσθαι ὡς λόγος Θεοῦ καὶ γενόμενος τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν ἰσχυρότερος, πάσης μὲν Ἑλλάδος, ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῆς βαρβάρου ἐκράτησε, καὶ μετεποίησε μυρίας ὅσας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν θεοσέβειαν, *The Word of* God *prevail'd, as not being able to be ſtopt by Men, and became Maſter over all its enemies, and not only ſpread it ſelf quite thro'* Greece, *but thro' a great part of the World beſides, and converted an innumerable company of Souls to the true worſhip and ſervice of* God. Thus we have now manifeſted from all the circumſtances of the propagation of the Doctrine of Chriſt, what evidence there was of a Divine Power accompanying of it, and how uſeful the firſt Miracles were in order to it. *Origen. l. 1. c. Celſ. p. 21. Vid. etiam l. 2. p. 110.*

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The difference of true Miracles from falſe.

I. *The unreaſonableneſs of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, becauſe of Impoſtures. That there are certain rules of diſtinguiſhing true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical, prov'd from God's intention in giving a power of Miracles, and the Providence of God in the World.* II. *The inconvenience of taking away the rational grounds of Faith, and placing it on ſelf-evidence. Of the ſelf-evidence of the Scriptures, and the Inſufficiency of that for reſolving the queſtion about the Authority of the Scriptures.* III. *Of the pretended Miracles of Impoſtors and falſe Chriſts, as* Barchochebas, David *el*-David *and others.* IV. *The rules whereby to judge true Miracles from falſe.* 1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.* V. *No Miracles neceſſary for the certain conveyance of a Divine Teſtimony: prov'd from the Evidences that the Scriptures cou'd not be corrupted.* VI. 2. *No Miracles Divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of Popiſh Miracles.* VII. 3. *Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on thoſe who believe them. Of the Miracles of* Simon Magus. VIII. 4. *Divine Miracles tend to the overthrow of the Devil's power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of Chriſt to the Devil's deſign in the World.* IX. 5. *The diſtinction of true Miracles from others, from the circumſtances and manner of their operation. The Miracles of Chriſt compar'd with thoſe of the Heathen Gods.* X. 6. *God makes it evident to all impartial judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed Created power. This manifeſted from the unparallell'd Miracles of* Moſes *and our Saviour. From all which the rational evidence of Divine Revelation is manifeſted, as to the Perſons whom God imploys to teach the World.*

1. HAving thus far ſtated the caſes wherein Miracles may juſtly be expected as a rational Evidence of Divine Authority in the Perſons whom God imploys by way of peculiar meſſage to the World, and in the proſecution of this diſcourſe manifeſted the Evidences of Divine Authority in *Moſes* and the Prophets, and in our Saviour and his Apoſtles; the only remaining queſtion concerning this ſubject, is, *How we may certainly diſtinguiſh true and real Miracles from ſuch as are only pretended and counterfeit?* For it being as evident that there have been Impoſtures and Deluſions in the World as real Miracles, the minds of Men will be wholly to ſeek when to rely upon the Evidence of Miracles as an Argument of Divine Authority in thoſe perſons who do them, unleſs a way be found out to diſtinguiſh them from each other. But

if

if we can make it appear, that, unleſs Men thro' weakneſs of Judgment or Incogitancy deceive themſelves, they may have certain Evidence of the truth of Miracles, then there can be nothing wanting as to the eſtabliſhment of their Minds in the truth of that Doctrine which is confirm'd by them. There hath been nothing which hath made Men of better Affections than Underſtandings, ſo ready to ſuſpect the ſtrength of the Evidence from Miracles concerning Divine Teſtimony, as the multitude of Impoſtures in the World under the name of Miracles, and that the Scripture it ſelf tells us we muſt not hearken to ſuch as come with lying wonders. But may we not therefore ſafely rely on ſuch Miracles which we have certain Evidence cou'd not be wrought but by Divine Power, becauſe forſooth the Devil may ſometimes abuſe the ignorance and credulity of unwary Men? or is it becauſe the Scripture forbids us to believe ſuch as ſhou'd come with a pretence of Miracles, therefore we cannot rely on the Miracles of Chriſt himſelf? Which is as much as to ſay, becauſe the Scripture tells us that we muſt not believe every Spirit, therefore we muſt believe none at all; or becauſe we muſt not entertain any other Doctrine beſide the Goſpel, therefore we have no reaſon to believe that. For the ground whereby we are aſſur'd by the Scriptures, that the Teſtimony of Chriſt was Divine, and therefore his Doctrine true, is becauſe it was confirm'd by ſuch Miracles as he did; now if that Argument were inſufficient which the Scriptures tell us was the great Evidence of Chriſt's being ſent from God, we cannot give our ſelves a ſufficient account in point of Evidence, on which we believe the Doctrine of the Goſpel to be true and Divine. But the only rational pretence of any ſcruple in this caſe muſt be ſuppos'd uncertainty in our Rules of judging concerning the nature of Miracles; for there be no certain κριτήρια, or notes of difference, whereby to know Divine Miracles from Deluſions of Senſes and the Impoſtures of the Devil. I muſt confeſs that there is an apparent inſufficiency in the Evidence from Miracles; but if there be any certain Rules of proceeding in this caſe, we are to blame nothing but our Incredulity, if we be not ſatisfy'd by them. For the full clearing of this, I ſhall firſt *make it appear that there may be certain Evidence found out, whereby we may know true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical.* And, Secondly, *Inquire into thoſe things which are the main notes of difference between them.* Firſt, *That there may be certain Evidence whereby to know the truth of Miracles.* I ſpeak not of the difference *ex parte rei* between Miracles, and thoſe called Wonders, as that the one exceeds the power of created Agents, and the other doth not; for this leaves the Inquirer as far to ſeek for ſatisfaction as ever; for granting that by a Divine Power is ſeen in one, and not in the other, he muſt needs be ſtill diſſatisfy'd, unleſs it can be made evident to him that ſuch things are from Divine Power and others cannot be. Now the main diſtinction being placed here in the natures of the things abſtractly conſider'd, and not as they bear any Evidence to our Underſtandings, inſtead of reſolving doubts it increaſeth more; for, as for inſtance, in the caſe of the *Magicians* Rods turning into Serpents, as well as *Moſes*'s; what ſatisfaction cou'd this yield to any Spectator, to tell him, that in the one there was a Divine Power, and not in the other, unleſs it were made appear by ſome Evidence from the thing, that the one was a mere Impoſture, and the other a real Alteration in the thing it ſelf? I take it then for granted, that no general diſcourſes concerning the formal difference of Miracles and Wonders conſider'd in themſelves

ſelves, can afford any rational ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind; that which alone is able to give it, muſt be ſomething which may be diſcern'd by any judicious and conſiderative Perſon. And that God never gives to any a power of Miracles, but he gives ſome ſuch ground of ſatisfaction concerning them, will appear upon theſe two conſiderations.

1. *From God's intention in giving to any this power of doing Miracles.* We have largely made it manifeſt that the end of true Miracles is to be a confirmation to the World of the Divine Commiſſion of the Perſons who have it, and that the Teſtimony is Divine which is confirm'd by it. Now if there be no way to know when Miracles are true or falſe, this power is to no purpoſe at all; for Men are as much to ſeek for Satisfaction, as if there had been no ſuch things at all. Therefore if Men are bound to believe a Divine Teſtimony, and to rely on the Miracles wrought by the Perſons bringing it, as an Evidence of it, they muſt have ſome aſſurance that theſe Miracles cou'd not come from any but a Divine Power.

2. *From the Providence of God in the World*; which if we own, we cannot imagine that God wou'd permit the Devil, whoſe only deſign is to ruin Mankind, to abuſe the credulity of the World ſo far, as to have his lying Wonders paſs uncontroul'd; which they muſt do, if nothing can be found out as a certain difference between ſuch things as are only of Diabolical, and ſuch as are of Divine Power. If then it may be diſcover'd that there is a malignant Spirit which acts in the World and doth produce ſtrange things, either we muſt impute all ſtrange things to him, which muſt be to attribute to him an infinite Power, or elſe that there is a Being infinitely perfect which croſſeth this malignant Spirit in his Deſigns; and if ſo, we cannot imagine he ſhou'd ſuffer him to uſurp ſo much Tyranny over the minds of Men, as to make thoſe things paſs in the more ſober and inquiſitive part of the World for Divine Miracles, which were only Counterfeits and impoſtures. If then the Providence of God be ſo deeply engaged in the diſcovering the deſigns of Satan, there muſt be ſome means of this diſcovery, and that means can be ſuppos'd to be no other in this caſe, but ſome rational and ſatisfactory Evidence, whereby we may know when ſtrange and miraculous things are done by Satan to deceive Men, and when by a Divine Power to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.

II. But how is it poſſible, ſay ſome, that Miracles ſhou'd be any ground on which to believe a Teſtimony Divine when Chriſt himſelf hath told us, *That there ſhall ariſe falſe Chriſts, and falſe Prophets, and ſhall ſhew great ſigns and wonders; inſomuch that if it were poſſible they ſhould deceive the very elect?* and the Apoſtle tells us *that the coming of Antichriſt will be with all power and ſigns, and lying wonders.* How then can we fix on Miracles as an Evidence of Divine Teſtimony, when we ſee they are common to good and bad Men, and may ſeal indifferently either Truth or Falſhood? To this I reply;

Mat. 24. 24.

2 Theſ. 2. 9.

1. Men are guilty of doing no ſmall diſſervice to the Doctrine of Chriſt, when upon ſuch weak and frivolous pretences they give ſo great an advantage to Infidelity, as to call in queſtion the validity of that which yielded ſo ample a Teſtimony to the truth of Chriſtian Religion. For if once the rational grounds on which we believe the Doctrine of Chriſt to be true and Divine, be taken away, and the whole evidence of the Truth of it be laid on things not only derided by Men of Atheiſti-

cal

cal Spirits, but in themſelves ſuch as cannot be diſcern'd or judg'd of by any but themſelves; upon what grounds can we proceed to convince an Unbeliever that the Doctrine which we believe is true? If they tell him, *That as light and fire manifeſt themſelves, ſo doth the Doctrine of the Scripture* to thoſe who believe it; it will be ſoon reply'd, that Self-evidence in a matter of Faith can imply nothing but either a firm perſuaſion of the Mind concerning the thing propounded; or elſe that there are ſuch clear Evidences in the thing its ſelf, that none who freely uſe their Reaſon can deny it. The firſt can be no Argument to any other perſon any further than the authority of the perſon who declares it to have ſuch Self-evidence to him, doth extend it ſelf over the mind of the other; and to ones ſelf it ſeems a ſtrange way of arguing, *I believe the Scripturers becauſe they are true, and they are true becauſe I believe them*; for Self-evidence implies ſo much, if by it be meant the perſuaſion of the Mind, that the thing is true: But if by ſelf-evidence be further meant ſuch clear Evidence in the matter propounded, that all who do conſider it, muſt believe it; I then further inquire whether this Evidence doth lie in the naked propoſal of the things to the Underſtanding; and if ſo, then every one who aſſents to this Propoſition, that the whole is greater than the part, muſt likewiſe aſſent to this, that the Scripture is the Word of God; or whether doth the Evidence lie, not in the naked Propoſal, but in the efficacy of the Spirit of God, on the minds of thoſe to whom it is propounded. Then, 1. The Self-evidence is taken off from the written Word which was the object, and remov'd to a quite different thing which is the efficient cauſe. 2. Whether then any Perſons who want this efficacious operation of the Spirit of God, are or can be bound to believe the Scriptures to be God's Word? If they are bound, the duty muſt be propounded in ſuch a way as may be ſufficient to convince them that it is their duty; but if all the Evidence of the Truth of the Scripture lie on this Teſtimony of the Spirit, then ſuch as want this, can have none at all. But if, laſtly, by this Self-evidence be meant ſuch an impreſs of God's authority on the Scriptures, that any who conſider them as they ought, cannot but diſcern; I ſtill further inquire, whether this impreſs lies in the poſitive aſſertions in Scripture that they are from God, and that cannot be unleſs it be made appear to be impoſſible that any Writing ſhou'd pretend to be from God when it is not; or elſe in the written Books of Scripture, and then let it be made appear that any one merely by the evidence of the Writings themſelves without any further Arguments can pronounce the *Proverbs* to be the word of God, and not the Book of *Wiſdom*; and *Eccleſiaſtes* to be Divinely inſpir'd, and not *Eccleſiaſticus*: or elſe the Self-evidence muſt be in the excellency of the Matters which are reveal'd in Scripture; but this ſtill falls very ſhort of reſolving wholly the queſtion, whether *the Scripture be the Word of God?* For the utmoſt that this can reach to is, that the things contain'd in Scripture are of ſo high and excellent a nature, that we cannot conceive that any other ſhou'd be the Author of them but God himſelf; all which being granted, I am as far to ſeek as ever what grounds I have to believe that thoſe particular Writings which we call the Scripture are the Word of God, or that God did immediately imploy ſuch and ſuch Perſons to write ſuch and ſuch Books: for I may believe the ſubſtance of the Doctrine to be of God, and yet not believe the Books wherein it is contain'd, to be a divine and infallible Teſtimony; as is evident in the many excellent Devotional Books which are in the World.

But yet further, if the only ground on which we are to believe a Doctrine Divine be the Self-evidencing Light, and power of it, then I suppose there was the same ground of believing a Divine Testimony when the Doctrine was declar'd without Writing, by the first Preachers of it. So that by this method of proceeding, the ground of believing Christ to be sent as the *Messias* sent from God, must be wholly and solely resolv'd into this, that there was so much Self-evidence in this proposition utter'd by Christ, *I am the light of the World*, that all the *Jews* had been bound to have believ'd him sent from God, (for light manifests its self,) altho' our Saviour had never done any one Miracle, to make it appear that he came from God. And we cannot but charge our Saviour on this account with being at a very unnecessary expence upon the World in doing so many Miracles, when the bare naked affirmation that he was the *Messias*, had been sufficient to have convinced the whole World. But is it conceivable then upon what account our Saviour shou'd lay so much force on the Miracles done by himself in order to the proving his Testimony to be Divine, that he saith himself, *That he had a greater witness than that of* John, (who yet doubtless had Self-evidencing light going along with his Doctrine too,) *for the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me?* Can any thing be more plain, or have greater Self-evidence in it, than that our Saviour in these words doth lay the evidence of his Divine Testimony upon the Miracles which he wrought, which on that account he so often appeals to, on this very Reason, *because they bear witness of him; and if they would not believe him on his own Testimony, yet they ought to believe him for his works sake?* Doth all this now amount only to a removing of Prejudices from the Person of Christ? which yet according to the tenor of the Objection we are considering of, it is impossible the power of Miracles shou'd do, if these Miracles may be so far done or counterfeited by false Christs, that we can have no certain evidence to distinguish the one from the other.

Joh. 5. 36.

Joh. 19 25, 38. 14. 11. 15. 24.

III. Which the objection pretends; and was the great thing wherein *Celsus* the *Epicurean* triumph'd so much, that *Christ should foretell that others should come and do Miracles which they must not hearken to*, and thence wou'd infer as from Christ's own confession that Miracles have in them οὐδὲν θεῖον, *nothing divine but what may be done by wicked Men:* πῶς ἂν ἐ σχέτλιον δοκεῖ τῷ αὐτῷ ἔργῳ τ μὲν θεὸν, τὸς δὲ γόητας ἡγεῖσθ; *Is it not a wretched thing*, saith he, *that from the same works one should be accounted a God, and others Deceivers?* Whereby those who wou'd invalidate the Argument from Miracles, may take notice how finely they fall in with one of the most bitter Enemies of Christian Religion, and make use of the same Arguments which he did; and therefore *Origen*'s reply to him, will reach them too. *For*, saith he, *our Saviour in those words of his doth not bid Men beware in general of such as did Miracles,* ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ τοὶς ἀναγορεύουσιν ἑαυτὸς εἶναι τ χρισὸν τ θεῦ, καὶ πειρωμένοις διὰ τινῶν φαντασιῶν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπισρέφειν τὸς Ἰησου μαθητάς· *but bids them beware of that when Men gave themselves out to be the true Christ the Son of God, and endeavour'd to draw Christ's Disciples from him, by some mere Appearances instead of Miracles.* Therefore Christ being evidently made appear to be the Son of God, by the powerful and uncontroul'd Miracles which he wrought, what pretence of Reason cou'd there be to hearken to any one who gave themselves out to be Christs, merely from some strange Wonders which they wrought? And from hence, as he further observes

Orig. lib. 2. c. Cels.

may

may be justly inferr'd contrary to what *Celsus* imagin'd, that there was certainly an evidence of Divine Power in Miracles, when these false Christs gave themselves out to be Christs merely from the supposal that they had this power of doing Miracles. And so it is evident in all the false Christs which have appear'd, they have made this their great pretence that they did many Signs and Wonders; which God might justly permit them to do, to punish the great Infidelity of the *Jews*, who wou'd not believe in Christ notwithstanding those frequent and apparent Miracles which he did, which did infinitely transcend those of any such Pretenders. Such among the *Jews* were *Jonathas*, who after the destruction of *Jerusalem*, as *Josephus* tells us, drew many of the People into the Wilderness of *Cyrene*, σημεῖα καὶ φάσματα δείξειν προσχνέμενος, *promising to shew them many Prodigies and strange Appearances.* Not long after in the times of *Adrian* appear'd that famous Blazing-star *Barchochebas*, who not only portended but brought so much mischief upon the *Jews*; his pretence was that he vomited Flames; and so he did, such as consum'd himself and his Followers: after him many other Impostors arose in *Ægypt*, *Cyprus* and *Crete*, who all went upon the same pretence of doing Miracles. In latter times the famous Impostor was *David el-David*, whose story is thus briefly reported by *David Ganz*. *David el-David pretended to be the true Messias and rebelled against the King of* Persia, *and did many Signs and Prodigies before the* Jews *and the King of* Persia: *at last his head was cut off, and the* Jews *fined an hundred Talents of Gold.* In the Epistle of *Rambam* or *R Moses Maimon.* it is said, *That the King of* Persia *desired of him a Sign, and he told him that he should cut off his Head and he would rise again*; (which he cunningly desir'd to avoid being tormented,) *which the King was resolv'd to try, and accordingly executed him*; but I suppose his Resurrection and *Mahomet's* will be both in one day, altho' *Maimonides* tells us, *some of the* Jews *are yet such Fools as to expect his Resurrection.* Several other Impostors *Maimonides* mentions in his Epistle *de Australi regione.* One who pretended to be the *Messias* because he cur'd himself of the *Leprosy* in a night; several others he mentions in *Spain*, *France*, and other Parts, and the issue of them all was only a further aggravation of the Miseries and Captivities of the poor *Jews*, who were so credulous in following Impostors, and yet such strange Infidels where there were plain and undoubted Miracles to persuade them to believe in our blessed Saviour as the true *Messias.* We freely grant then that many pretended Miracles may be done in the World, to deceive Men with; but doth it hence follow that either there are no true Miracles done in the World, or that there are no certain Rules to distingish the one from the other? But as *Origen* yet further replies to *Celsus*, as a Wolf doth very much resemble a Dog, yet they are not of the same kind; nor a Turtle-Dove and a Pigeon; so that which is produced by a Divine Power is not of the same nature with that which is produced by *Magic*; but as he argues, *Is it possible that there should be only deceits in the World and Magical operations? and can there be no true Miracles at all wrought? Is Humane nature only capable of Impostures, or can none work Miracles but Devils? Where there is a worse, there may be a better*; *and so from the Impostures and Counterfeits, we may infer that there are true Miracles, wrought by a Divine Power*; *otherwise it were all one as to say, there are Counterfeits but no Jewels*; *or there are Sophisms and Paralogisms, but no legitimate Demonstrations: if then there be such deceits, there are true Miracles too*; *all the business is*

Tzemach David n. 895.

V. ep. Maimon. in not. Vorstii and Tzem. Dav.

βέβαια-

βεβασανισμένως τὰς ἐπαγγελλομένους τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξετάζειν, *ſtrictly and ſeverely to examine the pretenders to them, and that from the Life and Manners of thoſe that do them, and from the effects and conſequents of them, whether they do good or hurt in the world, whether they correct Mens manners, or bring Men to goodneſs, holineſs, and truth; and on this account we are neither to reject all Miracles, nor embrace all pretences, but carefully and prudently examine the rational evidences whereby thoſe which are true and Divine, may be known from ſuch as are Counterfeit and Diabolical.*

IV. And this now leads us to the main ſubject of this Chapter, *viz. What Rules we have to proceed by, in judging Miracles to be true or falſe* which may be theſe following.

1. *True divine Miracles are wrought in confirmation of ſome Divine Teſtimony.* Becauſe we have manifeſted by all the precedent diſcourſe, that the intention of Miracles is to ſeal ſome Divine Revelation. Therefore if God ſhou'd work Miracles when no Divine Teſtimony is to be confirm'd, God would ſet the Broad-Seal of Heaven to a Blank. If it be ſaid no, *becauſe it will witneſs to us now the truth of that Teſtimony which was deliver'd ſo many Ages ſince*; I anſwer, 1. The truth of that Teſtimony was ſufficiently ſeal'd at the time of the delivery of it, and is conveyed down in a certain way to us. Is it not ſufficient that the Charter of a Corporation had the Prince's Broad-Seal in the time of the giving of it, but that every ſucceſſion of Men in that Corporation muſt have a new Broad-Seal, or elſe they ought to queſtion their Patent? What ground can there be for that, when the original Seal and Patent is preſerv'd, and is certainly convey'd down from Age to Age? So I ſay it is as to us, God's Grand Charter of Grace and Mercy to the World thro' Jeſus Chriſt, was Seal'd by Divine Miracles, at the delivery of it to the World; the original Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures wherein the Charter is contain'd, is convey'd in a moſt certain manner to us; to this Patent the Seal is annex'd, and in it are contain'd thoſe undoubted Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of it; ſo that a new ſealing of this Patent is wholly needleſs, unleſs we have ſome cauſe of ſuſpicion, that the original Patent it ſelf were loſt, or the firſt ſealing was not true. If the latter, then Chriſtian Religion is not true, if the Miracles wrought for confirmation of it were falſe, becauſe the truth of it depends ſo much on the Verity and Divinity of the Miracles which were then wrought. If the firſt be ſuſpected, *viz.* the certain conveyance of the Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures, ſome certain grounds of ſuch a ſuſpicion muſt be diſcover'd in a matter of ſo great moment, eſpecially when the great and many Societies of the Chriſtian World do all conſent unanimouſly in the contrary. Nay it is impoſſible that any rational Man can conceive that the Patent which we now rely upon, is ſuppoſititious or corrupted in any of thoſe things which are of concernment to the Chriſtian World; and that on theſe accounts.

1. *From the watchfulneſs of Divine Providence for the good of Mankind.* Can we conceive that there is a God who rules and takes care of the World, and who to manifeſt his ſignal love to Mankind, ſhou'd not only grant a Patent of Mercy to the World, by his Son Chriſt, and then ſeal'd it by Divine Miracles, and in order to the certain conveyance of it to the World, caus'd it by Perſons imploy'd by himſelf, to be recorded in a Language fitteſt for its diſperſing up and down the World, (all which I here ſuppoſe:) Can we I ſay conceive that this God ſhou'd ſo far have caſt off his care of the World and the good of Mankind, which

was

was the original ground of the Grant it ſelf, as to ſuffer any wicked Men or malignant Spirits to corrupt or alter any of thoſe Terms in it, on which Mens eternal Salvation depends; much leſs wholly to ſuppreſs and deſtroy it, and to ſend forth one that is counterfeit and ſuppoſititious inſtead of it, and which ſhou'd not be diſcover'd by the Chriſtians of that Age wherein that corrupt Copy was ſet forth, nor by any of the moſt learned and inquiſitive Chriſtians ever ſince? They who can give any the leaſt entertainment to ſo wild, abſurd and irrational an Imagination, are ſo far from Reaſon, that they are in good diſpoſition to *Atheiſm*; and next to the ſuſpecting the Scriptures to be corrupted, they may rationally ſuſpect there is no ſuch thing as a God and Providence in the World; or that the World is govern'd by a Spirit moſt malignant and envious of the good of Mankind. Which is a ſuſpicion only becoming thoſe Heathens (among whom it was very frequent) who worſhipped the Devils inſtead of God.

2. *Becauſe of the general diſperſion of Copies in the World upon the firſt publiſhing of them.* We cannot otherwiſe conceive, but that Records containing ſo weighty and important things wou d be tranſcrib'd by all thoſe Churches which believe the truth of the things contain'd in them. We ſee how far curioſity will carry Men as to the care of tranſcribing ancient *MSS.* of old Authors, which contain only ſome Hiſtory of things paſt that are of no great concernment to us: Can we then imagine thoſe who ventur'd Eſtates and Lives upon the truth of the things reveal'd in Scripture, wou'd not be very careful to preſerve the authentic Inſtrument whereby they are reveal'd in a certain way to the whole World? And beſides this, for a long time the Originals themſelves of the Apoſtolical Writings were preſerv'd in the Church; which makes *Tertullian* in his time appeal to them. *Age jam qui voles curioſitatem melius exercere in negotio ſalutis tuæ; percurre Eccleſias Apoſtolicas, apud quas ipſæ adhuc cathedræ Apoſtolorum ſuis locis præſidentur, apud quas ipſæ authenticæ eorum literæ recitantur, ſonantes vocem, & repræſentantes faciem uniuſcujuſque.* Now how was it poſſible that in that time the Scriptures could be corrupted, when in ſome of the Churches the original Writings of the Apoſtles were preſerv'd in a continual ſucceſſion of Perſons from the Apoſtles themſelves, and from theſe Originals ſo many Copies were tranſcrib'd, as were convey'd almoſt all the World over, thro' the large ſpread of the Chriſtian Churches at that time? And therefore it is impoſſible to conceive that a Copy ſhould be corrupted in one Church, when it wou'd ſo ſpeedily be diſcovered by another; eſpecially conſidering theſe three circumſtances. 1. The innumerable multitude of Copies which wou'd ſpeedily be taken, both conſidering the moment of the thing, and the eaſineſs of doing it; God, probably for that very end, not loading the World with *Pandects* and *Codes* of his Laws, but contriving the whole Inſtruments of Man's Salvation in ſo narrow a compaſs, that it might be eaſily preſerv'd and tranſcrib'd by ſuch who were paſſionate admirers of the Scriptures. 2. The great numbers of learned and inquiſitive Men who ſoon ſprung up in the Chriſtian Church; whoſe great care was to explain and vindicate the ſacred Scriptures; can we then think that all theſe Watchmen ſhould be aſleep together when the Evil one came to ſow his Tares, which it is moſt unreaſonable to imagine, when in the Writings of all theſe learned Men, which were very many and voluminous, ſo much of the Scripture was inſerted, that had there been corruptions in the Copies themſelves, yet comparing them

De præſcript. adv. hæret. c. 36.

them with those Writings, the corruptions wou'd be soon discover'd? 3. The great veneration which all Christians had of the Scripture, that they placed the hopes of their eternal Happiness, upon the truth of the things contain'd in the Scriptures: Can we then think these would suffer any material Alteration to creep into these Records without their observing and discovering it? Can we now think when all persons are so exceeding careful of their Deeds, and the Records whereon their Estates depend, that the Christians who valu'd not this World in comparison of that to come, should suffer the *Magna Charta* of that to be lost, corrupted, or imbezzelled away? Especially considering what care and industry was us'd by many Primitive Christians to compare Copies together, as is evident in *Pantænus*, who brought the *Hebrew* Copy of *Matthew* out of the *Indies* to *Alexandria*, as *Eusebius* tells us in *Pamphilus* and the Library he erected at *Cæsarea*, but especially in *Origen*'s admirable *Hexapla*, which were mainly intended for this end.

3. It is impossible to conceive a corruption of the Copy of the Scriptures, because of the great differences which were all along the several ages of the Church, between those who acknowledg'd the Scriptures to be Divine. So that if one party of them had foisted in, or taken out any thing, another party was ready to take notice of it, and wou'd be sure to tell the World of it. And this might be one great reason, why God in his wise Providence might permit such an encrease of *Heresies* in the Infancy of the Church, *viz.* that thereby Christians might be forced to stand upon their guard, and to have a special Eye to the Scriptures, which were always the great Eye-sores of *Heretics*. And from this great wariness of the Church it was that some of the Epistles were so long abroad before they found general entertainment in all the Churches of Christ, because in those Epistles which were doubted for some time, there were some passages which seemed to favour some of the Heresies then abroad; but when upon severe enquiry they are found to be what they pretended, they were receiv'd in all the Christian Churches.

4. Because of the agreement between the Old Testament and the New: the Prophecies of the Old Testament appear with their full accomplishment in the New which we have; so that it is impossible to think the New should be corrupted unless the Old were too, which is most unreasonable to imagine, when the *Jews*, who had been the great Conservators of the Old Testament, have been all along the most inveterate Enemies of the Christians: So that we cannot at all conceive it possible that any material Corruptions or Alterations shou'd creep into the Scriptures, much less that the true Copy shou'd be lost, and a new one forged.

V. Supposing then that we have the same Authentic Records preserv'd and handed down to us by the care of all Christian Churches, which were written in the first Ages of the Church of Christ: what necessity can we imagine that God shou'd work new Miracles to confirm that Doctrine which is convey'd down in a certain uninterrupted way to us, as being seal'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine in the first Promulgation and Penning of it? And this is the first Reason why the truth of the Scriptures need not now be seal'd by new Miracles. 2. Another may be, because God in the Scripture hath appointed other things to continue in his Church, to be as Seals to his People of the truth of the things contain'd in Scriptures. Such are outwardly, the Sacraments of the Gospel,

ſpel, Baptiſm, and the Lord's Supper, which are ſet apart as Seals to confirm the truth of the Covenant on God's part towards us in reference to the great Promiſes contain'd in it, in reference to pardon of Sin, and the ground of our Acceptance with God by Jeſus Chriſt: and inwardly God hath promis'd his Spirit to be as a Witneſs within them, that by its working and ſtrengthning Grace in the hearts of Believers, it may confirm to them the truth of the Records of Scripture, when they find the Counter-part of them written in their Hearts by the finger of the Spirit of God. It cannot then be with any reaſon at all ſuppos'd, that when a Divine Teſtimony is already confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine, that new Miracles ſhou'd be wrought in the Church to aſſure us of the truth of it. So *Chryſoſtom* fully expreſſeth himſelf concerning Miracles, ſpeaking of the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church: καὶ γὰρ ἡ τότε χρησίμως ἐγίνετο, ἡ νῦν χρησίμως ἃ γίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων γραφῶν ἡ τῶν τότε σημείων τὴν πίστιν ὧν λέγομεν παρεχόμεθα. *Miracles were very uſeful then, and not at all now; for now we manifeſt the truth of what we ſpeak from the ſacred Scriptures, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of them.* Which that excellent Author there fully manifeſts in a Diſcourſe on this ſubject, *Why Miracles were neceſſary in the beginning of the Chriſtian Church, and are not now.* To the ſame purpoſe St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks, where he diſcourſeth of the truth of Religion: *Accepimus majores noſtros viſibilia miracula ſecutos eſſe: per quos id actum eſt ut neceſſaria non eſſent poſteris*; becauſe the World believed by the Miracles which were wrought at the firſt preaching of the Goſpel, therefore Miracles are no longer neceſſary. For we cannot conceive how the World ſhou'd be at firſt induced to believe without manifeſt and uncontrouled Miracles. For as *Chryſoſtom* ſpeaks, εἰ σημείων χωρὶς ἔπεισαν, πολλῷ μεῖζον τὸ θαῦμα φαίνεται. *It was the greateſt Miracle of all, if the World ſhou'd believe without Miracles.* Which the Poet *Dantes* hath well expreſs'd in the Twenty fourth *Canto* of *Paradiſe*. For when the *Apoſtle* is there brought in, asking the Poet upon what account he took the Scriptures of the *Old and New Teſtament to be the Word of* God; his Anſwer is,

Chryſoſt. in 1 Cor. 2. Hom. 6. p. 266. To. 3. ed. Æton.

De ver. Relig. cap. 25.

> *Probatio quæ verum hoc mihi recludit,*
> *Sunt opera, quæ ſecuta ſunt, ad quæ Natura*
> *Non candefecit ferrum unquam aut percuſſit incudem.*

i. e. *The evidence of that is the Divine Power of Miracles which was in thoſe who deliver'd thoſe things to the World.* And when the *Apoſtle* catechiſeth him further, *how he knew thoſe Miracles were ſuch as they pretended to be,* viz *that they were true and Divine*; his Anſwer is,

> *Si orbis terræ ſeſe convertit ad* Chriſtianiſmum,
> *Inquiebam ego, ſine miraculis: hoc unum*
> *Eſt tale, ut reliqua non ſint ejus centeſima pars.*

i. e. *If the World ſhou'd be converted to the* Chriſtian Faith *without Miracles, this wou'd be ſo great a Miracle, that others were not to be compar'd with it.* I conclude this then with that known ſaying of St. *Auſtin*: *Quiſquis adhuc prodigia, ut credat, inquiret, magnum eſt ipſe prodigium qui mundo credente non credit. He that ſeeks for Miracles ſtill to induce him to Faith, when the World is converted to the* Chriſtian Faith, *he needs not*

De Civit. Dei, l. 22. cap. 8.

ſeek for prodigies abroad; he wants only a looking-glaſs to diſcover one. For as he goes on, *Unde temporibus eruditis, & omne quod fieri non poteſt reſpuentibus, ſine ullis miraculis nimium mirabiliter incredibilia credidit mundus? Whence came it to paſs that in ſo learned and wary an Age as that was which the Apoſtles preach'd in, the World without Miracles ſhou'd be brought to believe things ſo ſtrangely incredible as thoſe were which* Chriſt *and his Apoſtles preached?* So that by this it appears that the intention of Miracles was to confirm a Divine Teſtimony to the World, and to make that appear credible which otherwiſe wou'd have ſeemed incredible; but to what end now, when this Divine Teſtimony is believ'd in the World, ſhou'd Miracles be continu'd among thoſe who believe the Doctrine to be Divine, the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it to have been true, and the Scriptures which contain both, to be the undoubted Word of God? To what purpoſe then the huge out-cry of Miracles in the *Roman* Church is, is hard to conceive, unleſs it be to make it appear how ambitious that Church is of being called by the name of him, *whoſe coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and ſigns, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableneſs of unrighteouſneſs in them that periſh, becauſe they receiv'd not the love of the Truth that they might be ſav'd.* For had they not receiv'd the Love of the Truth of the Goſpel, they wou'd have believ'd it on the account of thoſe Miracles, and Signs, and wonders which were wrought for the confirmation of it, by Chriſt and his *Apoſtles*; and not have gone about by their Juglings and Impoſtures, inſtead of bringing Men to believe the Goſpel, to make them queſtion the truth of the firſt Miracles when they ſee ſo many Counterfeits; had we not great aſſurance the *Apoſtles* were Men of other deſigns and Intereſts than *Popiſh* Prieſts are, and that there is not now any ſuch neceſſity of Miracles, as there was then when a Divine Teſtimony revealing the truth of *Chriſtian Religion* was confirm'd by them.

2 Theſ. 2. 9. 10.

VI. 2. *Thoſe Miracles cannot be Divine, which are done now for the confirmation of any thing contrary to that Divine Teſtimony, which is confirm'd by uncontrouled Divine Miracles.* The caſe is not the ſame now, which was before the coming of Chriſt; for then tho' the Law of *Moſes* was confirm'd by Miracles; yet tho' the Doctrine of Chriſt did null the obligation of that Law, the Miracles of Chriſt were to be look'd on as Divine, becauſe God did not intend the Ceremonial Law to be perpetual; and there were many Prophecies which cou'd not have their accompliſhment but under a new State: But now under the Goſpel, God hath declar'd this to be the laſt Revelation of his Mind and Will to the World by his Son, that now the Prophecies of the Old Teſtament are accompliſh'd, and the Prophecies of the New reſpect only the various conditions of the *Chriſtian Church*, without any the leaſt intimation of any further Revelation of God's Mind and Will to the World: So that now the Scriptures are our adequate Rule of Faith, and that according to which we are to judge all pretenders to Inſpiration or Miracles. And according to this Rule we are to proceed in any thing which is propounded to us to believe by any Perſons, upon any pretences whatſoever. Under the Law after the eſtabliſhment of the Law its ſelf by the Miracles of *Moſes*, the Rule of judging all pretenders to Miracles, was by the worſhip of the true God. *If there ariſe among you a Prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a ſign, or a wonder, and the ſign or the wonder come to paſs, whereof he ſpake to thee, ſaying, Let us go after other*

Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3.

Gods

Gods (which thou haſt not known) and let us ſerve them; thou ſhalt not hearken unto the words of that Prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your ſoul. Whereby it is plain, that after the true Doctrine is confirm'd by Divine Miracles, God may give the Devil or falſe Prophets power to work, if not real Miracles, yet ſuch as Men cannot judge by the things themſelves whether they be real or no; and this God may do for the tryal of Mens Faith, whether they will forſake the true Doctrine confirm'd by greater Miracles for the ſake of ſuch Doctrines which are contrary thereto, and are confirm'd by falſe Prophets, by Signs and Wonders. Now in this caſe our Rule of tryal muſt not be ſo much the Wonders conſider'd in themſelves whether real or no, as the comparing them with the Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of that Doctrine, which is contrary to this, which theſe Wonders tend to the proving of. Therefore God's People under the Law were to examine the ſcope and drift of the Miracles; if they were intended to bring them to Idolatry, whatever they were, they were not to hearken to thoſe who did them. So now under the Goſpel, as the worſhip of the true God was then the Standard whereby to judge of Miracles by the Law of *Moſes*, ſo the worſhip of the true God thro' Jeſus Chriſt, and by the Doctrine reveal'd by him, is the Standard whereby we ought to judge of all pretenders to work Miracles. So that let the Miracles be what they will, if they contradict that Doctrine which Chriſt reveal'd to the World, we are to look upon them as only tryals of our Faith in Chriſt, to ſee whether we *love him with our whole hearts* or no. And therefore I think it needleſs to examine all the particulars of *Lipſius* his Relations of Miracles wrought by his *Diva Virgo Hallenſis* and *Aſprecollis*; for if I ſee that their intention and ſcope is to ſet up the worſhip of *Dæmons*, or a middle ſort of *Deities* between God and us, which the Scripture is ignorant of, on that very account I am bound to reject them all. Altho' I think it very poſſible to find out the difference between true Miracles and them, in the manner and circumſtances of their operation; but this, as it is of more curioſity, ſo of leſs neceſſity; for if the Doctrine of the Scriptures was confirm'd by Miracles infinitely above theſe, I am bound to adhere to that, and not to believe any other Doctrine, *though an Angel from Heaven ſhould preach it*, much leſs, altho' ſome *Popiſh* Prieſts may boaſt much of Miracles to confirm a Doctrine oppoſite to the Goſpel: which I know not how far God may in judgment give thoſe Images Power to work, or others Faith to believe, becauſe they wou'd not receive the truth in the love of it: and theſe are now thoſe τέρατα ψεύδους, *lying wonders*, which the Scripture forewarns us that we ſhould not believe, *viz.* ſuch as lead men to the belief of Lyes, or of Doctrines, contrary to that of the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt. 2 Theſ. 2. 9.

VII. 3. *Where Miracles are true and divine, there the effects which follow them upon the Minds of thoſe who believe them, are true and divine, i. e.* the effect of believing of them, is the drawing of men from ſin unto God. This the Primitive *Chriſtians* inſiſted much upon, as an undoubted Evidence that the Miracles of Chriſt were wrought by a Divine power, becauſe the effect which follow'd them, *was the work of converſion of Souls from ſin and Idols to God and Chriſt, and all true piety and vertue.* As the effect of the Miracles of *Moſes* was the drawing a People off from Superſtition and Idolatry to the worſhip of the true God; ſo the effect

which follow'd the Belief of the Miracles of Christ in the World was the purging Mens Souls from all sin and wickedness to make them New Creatures, and to live in all exactness and holiness of conversation. And thereby *Origen* discovers the great difference between the Miracles of Christ and *Antichrist*, that the intent of all *Antichrist*'s Wonders was *to bring men* εἰς ἀπάτην τῆς ἀδικίας, *to the deceivableness of unrighteousness, whereby to destroy them*; *but the intent of the Miracles of Christ was* οὐκ ἀπάτη ἀλλὰ σωτηρία ψυχῶν, *not the deceiving but the saving of Souls*; τίς γὰρ τὴν κρείττονα βίου καὶ συμπεφωνημένην τῇ καινότητι ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάττον, εὐλόγως φησὶν ἀπὸ ἀπάτης γένεσιν; *who can with any probability say that reformation of life and daily progress from evil to good should be the effect of mere deceit?* And therefore he saith, *Christ told his Disciples, that they shou'd do greater works than he had done; because by their Preaching and Miracles the eyes of blind Souls are opened, and the ears of such as were deaf to all goodness are opened so far as to hearken to the Precepts and Promises of the Gospel: and the feet of those who were lame in their inward man, are so healed as to delight to run in the ways of God's Commandments.* Now is it possible that these shou'd be the effects of any evil Spirit? But on the contrary we see the effects of all Impostures, and pretended Miracles wrought by Diabolical power, was to bring men off from God to sin, and to dissolve that strict obligation to duty which was laid upon Men by the Gospel of *Christ*. Thus it was in that early Ape of the *Apostles*, *Simon Magus*, who far out-went *Apollonius Tyanæus* or any other Heathen in his pretended Miracles, according to the report which is given of him by the Primitive Christians; but we see the intent of his Miracles, was to raise an admiration of himself, and to bring men off from all holiness of conversation, by asserting among other damnable Heresies, that God did not at all regard *what Men did, but only what they believed*: wherein the *Gnostics* where his followers. Now when Miracles are wrought to be Patrons of sin, we may easily know from whom they come.

Lib. 2. cont. Cels.

V. Grot. in 2 Thes. 2. 9. *in opusc.*

VIII. 4. *Those Miracles are wrought by a Divine Power, which tend to the overthrow of the Kingdom of Satan in the World.* This is evident from hence, because all such things as are out of Man's power to effect, must either be done by a Power *Divine* or *Diabolical*: For as our Saviour argues, *Every Kingdom divided against its self is brought to desolation, and every City or House divided against its self cannot stand; and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself, how shall then his Kingdom stand?* Now *Christ* by his Miracles did not dispossess Satan out of Mens Bodies, but out of his Temples too, as hath been shewn already. And besides, the Doctrine of Christ which was confirm'd by those Miracles, was in every thing directly contrary to the Devils design in the World. For, as The Devil's design was to conceal himself among those who worshipp'd him; the design of the Gospel was to discover him whom the *Gentiles* worshipped, to be an evil and malignant Spirit, that design'd nothing but their ruin. Now it appears in the whole History of *Gentilism*, the grand Mystery of Satan which the Devil us'd among the *Heathens* was to make himself to be taken and worshipp'd for God, and to make them believe that their *Dæmons* were very good and benign Spirits; which made the *Platonists* and other Philosophers so much incensed against the Primitive *Christians*, when they declar'd their *Dæmons* to be nothing else but infernal and wicked Spirits which sought the destruction of Souls.

Matth. 12. 25, 26.

2. *The*

2. *The Devil's great design was to draw men to the practice of the greatest wickedness under a pretence of Religion*; as is very observable in all the *Heathen* Mysteries, which the more *recondite* and hidden they were, the greater wickedness lay at the bottom of them, and so were to purpose *Mysteries of Iniquity*: But now the design of the Gospel was to promote the greatest purity both of Heart and Life; there being in no other Religion in the World either such incomparable Precepts of Holiness, or such incouraging Promises to the practice of it (from eternal Life hereafter as the Reward, and the assistance of God's Spirit to help Men here) or such prevailing motives to persuade men to it, from the *love of God in Christ to the World*, the *Undertakings of Christ for us* in his Death and Sufferings, the excellent Pattern we have to follow in our Saviour's own example: now these things make it plain that the design of *Christ* and the *Devil* are diametrically opposite to each other. 3. The design of the *Devil* is to set God and Mankind at the greatest distance from each other; the design of *Christ* in the Gospel is to bring them nearer together. The *Devil* first tempts to sin, and then from sin he makes Men presume to sin, and to despair because they have sinned. *Christ* first keeps Men from sin, by his Precepts and Threatnings; and then supposing sin, incourageth them to repent with hopes of pardon procur'd by himself for all truly penitent and believing Sinners. Thus in every thing the design of *Christ* and the *Devil* are contrary, which makes it evident that the Miracles wrought in confirmation of the Doctrine of *Christ* cou'd be from no evil Spirit, and therefore must be from a truly Divine Power.

IX. 5. *True and Divine Miracles may be known and distinguished from false and diabolical, from the circumstances, or the manner of their operation.* There were some peculiar Signatures on the Miracles of *Christ* which are not to be found in any wrought by a power less than Divine. Which *Arnobius* well expresseth in these words to the *Heathens*. *Potestis aliquem nobis designare, monstrare ex omnibus illis Magis qui unquam fuere per secula, consimile aliquid Christo millesima ex parte qui fecerit? qui sine ulla vi carminum, sine herbarum aut graminum succis, sine ulla aliqua observatione sollicita sacrorum, libaminum, temporum? ——Atqui constitit Christum sine ullis adminiculis rerum, sine ullius ritus observatione, vel lege, omnia illa quæ fecit, nominis sui possibilitate fecisse, & quod proprium, consentaneum, Deo dignum fuerat, vero nihil nocens aut noxium, sed opiferum, sed salutare, sed auxiliaribus plenum bonis potestatis munificâ liberalitate donasse?* He challengeth the *Heathens* to produce any one of all their *Magicians* who did the thousandth part of what our Saviour did: who made use of none of their *Magical* Rites and Observations in whatever he did; and whatever he did was merely by his own power, and was withal most becoming God, and most beneficial to the World. And thence he proceeds to answer the *Heathens* about the Miracles wrought by their Gods, which fell short of those of Christ in three main particulars, the *Manner* of their working, the *Number* of them, and the *Quality* of the things done. *Arnob. c. gentes, l. 1. pag. 25, 26, &c.*

1. *The manner of their working.* What they did was with a great deal of pomp and ceremony; what Christ did was with a word speaking, and sometimes without it by the touch of his Garment: *Non inquiro, non exigo*, saith he, *quis Deus, aut quo tempore, cui fuerit auxiliatus, aut quem fractum restituerit sanitati; illud solum audire desidero, an sine ullius adjunctione materiæ*, i. e. *medicaminis alicujus ad tactum morbos*

bos jusserit ab hominibus evolare, imperaverit, fecerit, & emori valetudinum causam, & debilium corpora ad suas remeare naturas. Omitting all other circumstances, name me, saith he, *but which of your Gods ever cured a Disease without any adjoined matter, some prescriptions or other; or which of them ever commanded Diseases out of Bodies by their mere touch, and quite remov'd the cause of the Distempers.* *Æsculapius*, he says, cured Diseases, but in the way that ordinary *Physicians* do, by prescribing some thing or other to be done by the Patients. *Nulla autem virtus est medicaminibus amovere quæ noceant; beneficia ista rerum, non sunt curantium potestates. To cure Diseases by Prescriptions argues no power at all in the prescriber, but virtue in the Medicine.*

2. *In the number of the Persons cured.* They were very few which were cured in the *Heathen* Temples; Christ cured whole multitudes, and that not in the Revestries of the Temples where fraud and imposture might be easily suspected, but in the presence of the People who brought to him all manner of Persons sick of all sorts of Diseases, which were cured by him; and these so numerous, that the *Evangelist* who records many of Christ's Miracles which had been omitted by the other, yet tells us at last, the Miracles of Christ were so many, *that the whole World would not contain them.* But now *Arnobius* tells the *Heathens*, *Quid prodest ostendere unum aut alterum fortasse curatos, cum tot millibus subvenerit nemo, & plena sint omnia miserorum infeliciumque delubra? What matter is it to shew one or two cured, when thousands lie continually perishing for want of cure?* yea such as did *Æsculapium ipsum precibus fatigare, & invitare miserrimis votis*, that cou'd not beg a cure of *Æsculapius* with all their earnestness and importunity.

Joh. 21. 25.

3. *In the quality of the Diseases cured.* The cures among the *Heathens* were some slight things in comparison of those performed by Christ; the most Acute, the most Chronical, the most Malignant of Diseases, cur'd by a Touch; a Word, a Thought. A Learned *Physician* hath undertaken to make it evident from the circumstances of the History, and from the received Principles among the most Authentic *Physicians*, that the Diseases cured by our Saviour, were all incurable by the Rules of *Physic*; if so, the greater the power of our Saviour, who cured them with so much facility as he did. And he not only cured all Diseases himself, but gave a power to others, who were not at all versed in matters of Art and Subtilty, that they shou'd do Miracles likewise *sine fucis & adminiculis, without any fraud or assistance: quid dicitis O mentes incredulæ, difficiles, duræ! alicuine mortalium Jupiter ille Capitolinus hujusmodi potestatem dedit?* When did ever the great *Jupiter Capitolinus give a power of working Miracles to any? I do not say,* saith he, *of raising the dead, or curing the blind, or healing the lame; sed ut pustulam, reduviam, populam, aut vocis imperio aut manus contrectatione comprimeret: but to cure a wart, a pimple, any the most trivial thing, with a word speaking, or the touch of the hand.* Upon this *Arnobius* challengeth the most famous of all the *Heathen Magicians*, *Zoroastres*, *Armenius*, *Pamphilus*, *Apollonius*, *Damigero*, *Dardanus*, *Velus*, *Julianus*, and *Bæbulus*, or any other renowned *Magician* to give power to any one to make the dumb to speak, the deaf to hear, the blind to see, or bring life into a dead Body. Or if this be too hard, with all their *Magic* Rites and *Incantations*, but to do that *quod à rusticis Christianis jussionibus facilitatum est nudis, which ordinary* Christians *do by their mere words:* So great a difference was there between the highest that cou'd be done by

Gul. Ader. de morbis Evangel.

Magic,

Magic, and the leaſt that was done by the Name and Power of Chriſt.

X. 6. *Where Miracles are truly Divine, God makes it evident to all impartial judgments that the things done exceed all created power.* For which purpoſe we are to obſerve that tho' Impoſtures and Deluſions may go far, the power of *Magicians* further when God permits them; yet when God works Miracles to confirm a Divine Teſtimony, he makes it evident that His power doth infinitely exceed them all. This is moſt conſpicuous, in the caſe of *Moſes* and our Bleſſed Saviour. Firſt *Moſes*, he began to do ſome Miracles in the preſence of *Pharaoh* and the *Ægyptians*, *turning his Rod into a Serpent*; but we do not find *Pharaoh* at all amaz'd at it, but ſends preſently for the *Magicians* to do the ſame, who did it (whether really or only in appearance, is not material to our purpoſe,) but Aaron's *Rod ſwallowed up theirs*. The next time *the waters are turned into blood* by *Moſes*. The *Magicians they do ſo too*. After this, *Moſes brings up Frogs upon the land, ſo do the Magicians*. So that here now is a plain and open conteſt in the preſence of *Pharaoh* and his People, between *Moſes* and the *Magicians*, and they try for Victory over each other; ſo that if *Moſes* do no more than they, they wou'd look upon him but as a *Magician*; but if *Moſes* do that which by the acknowledgment of theſe *Magicians* themſelves cou'd be only by Divine Power, then it is demonſtrably evident that his power was as far above the power of *Magic*, as God is above the *Devil*. Accordingly we find it in the very next Miracle in *turning the duſt into Ciniphes* (which we render) *lice*, the *Magicians* are *non-pluſt*, and give out, ſaying in plain terms, *This is the finger of God*. And what greater acknowledgment can there be of Divine Power than the confeſſion of thoſe who ſeem'd to conteſt with it, and to imitate it as much as poſſible? After this we find not the *Magicians* offering to conteſt with *Moſes*, and in the plague of *Boils*, we particularly read *that they could not ſtand* before *Moſes*. Thus we ſee in the caſe of *Moſes* how evident it was that there was a power above all power of *Magic* which did appear in *Moſes*. And ſo likewiſe in the caſe of our Bleſſed Saviour; for altho' *Simon Magus*, *Apollonius*, or others might do ſome ſmall things, or make ſome great ſhew and noiſe by what they did; yet none of them ever came near the doing things of the ſame kind which our Saviour did, curing *the born-blind*, *reſtoring the dead to life after four days*, and ſo as to live a conſiderable time after; or in the manner he did them, with a Word, a Touch, with that frequency and openneſs before his greateſt Enemies as well as Followers, and in ſuch an uncontroul'd manner, that neither *Jews* nor *Heathens* ever queſtion'd the truth of them. And after all theſe, when he was laid in the grave after his *Crucifixion*, exactly according to his own prediction, he aroſe again the third day, and appear'd frequently among his Diſciples for forty days together. After which in their preſence, he *aſcended up to Heaven*, and ſoon after, made good his promiſe to them, *by ſending his Holy Spirit upon them*, by which they ſpake with Tongues, wrought Miracles, went up and down preaching the Goſpel of Chriſt with great boldneſs, cheerfulneſs and conſtancy, and after undergoing a great deal of hardſhip in it, they ſeal'd the truth of all they ſpake with their Blood, laying down their Lives to give witneſs to it. Thus abundantly to the ſatisfaction of the minds of all good Men hath God given the higheſt Rational Evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he hath reveal'd to the World. And thus I have finiſhed the Second

8. 10, 12.

Exod. 7. 19, 22.

8. 6, 7.

8. 19.

2. 11.

Part

Part of my Task, which concern'd the *Rational Evidence* of the truth of *Divine Revelation* from the Perſons who were imploy'd to deliver God's mind to the World: And therein have, I hope, made it evident that both *Moſes* and the *Prophets*, our *Saviour* and his *Apoſtles*, did come with ſufficient *Rational Evidence* to convince the World that they were Perſons immediately ſent from God.

ORIGINES SACRÆ.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Being of God.

I. *The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul: from them the neceſſity of a particular Divine Revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine Authority of the Scriptures.* II. *Why* Moſes *doth not prove the Being of God, but ſuppoſe it.* III. *The notion of a Deity very conſonant to Reaſon. Of the nature of* Idea's, *and particularly of the* Idea *of God.* IV. *How we can form an* Idea *of an infinite Being.* V, VI. *How far ſuch an* Idea *argues exiſtence.* VII, VIII. *The great unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm demonſtrated. Of the Hypotheſes of the* Ariſtotelian *and* Epicurean *Atheiſts.* IX. *The Atheiſts pretences examin'd and refuted.* X, XI, XII, XIII. *Of the nature of the Arguments whereby we prove there is a God. Of univerſal conſent and the Evidence of that to prove a Deity and Immortality of Souls.* XIV, XV. *Of neceſſity of Exiſtence imply'd in the notion of God, and how far that proves the Being of God.* XVI. *The order of the World and uſefulneſs of the parts of it, and eſpecially of Man's body an argument of a Deity.* XVII. *Some higher Principle prov'd to be in the World than Matter and Motion.* XVIII. *The nature of the Soul, and poſſibility of its ſubſiſting after Death.* XIX. *Strange appearances in Nature not ſolvable by the power of Imagination.*

HAving in the precedent Book largely given a rational account of the grounds of our Faith, as to the Perſons whom God imploys to reveal his Mind to the World; if we can now make it appear that thoſe ſacred Records which we embrace as Divinely inſpir'd, contain in them nothing unworthy of ſo great a name, or unbecoming Perſons ſent from God to deliver; there will be nothing wanting to juſtify our Religion in point of Reaſon to be True, and of Revelation to be Divine. For the Scriptures themſelves coming to us in the name of God, we are bound to believe them to be ſuch as they pretend to be, unleſs we have ground to queſtion the general Foundations of all Religion as uncertain, or this particular way of Religion as not ſutable to thoſe general foundations. The foundations of all Religion lie in two things; *That there is a God* who rules the World, I.

Heb. 11. 6. and that the *Souls of Men are capable of ſubſiſting after Death*; *for he that comes unto God, muſt believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that ſeek him*; ſo that if theſe things be not ſuppos'd as moſt agreeable to Humane Reaſon, we cannot imagine upon what grounds Mankind ſhou'd embrace any way of Religion at all. For if there be not a God whom I am to ſerve and obey, and if I have not a Soul of an immortal nature, there can be no ſufficient obligation to Religion, nor motive inducing to it: For all obligation to Obedience muſt ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of ſuch a Being which hath power to command me; and by reaſon of the promiſcuous ſcatterings of good and evil in this Life, the Motives engaging Men to the practice of Religion, muſt ſuppoſe the certainty of a future State. If theſe things be ſure, and the foundations of Religion in general thereby firmly eſtabliſh'd, it will preſently follow as a matter moſt agreeable to reaſon, that the God whom we are to ſerve ſhou'd himſelf preſcribe the way of his own worſhip; and if the right of Donation of that happineſs which Mens Souls are capable of be alone in himſelf, that he alone ſhou'd declare the Terms on which it may be expected: For Man being a Creature endu'd with a free Principle of acting, which he is conſcious to himſelf of, and therefore not being carry'd to his end by neceſſity of Nature or external Violence, without the concurrence of his own Reaſon and Choice, we muſt ſuppoſe this Happineſs to depend upon the performance of ſome Conditions on Man's part, whereby he may demonſtrate that it is the matter of his free choice, and that he freely quits all other Intereſts that he might obtain the enjoyment of it. Which Conditions to be perform'd, being Expreſſions of Man's obedience towards God as his Creatour and Governour, and of his gratitude for the Tenders of ſo great a Happineſs which is the free gift of his Maker, we cannot ſuppoſe any one to have power to preſcribe theſe Conditions, but he that hath power likewiſe to deprive the Soul of her Happineſs upon non-performance, and that muſt be God himſelf. But in order to Man's underſtanding his Duty, and his obligation to Obedience, it is neceſſary that theſe Conditions muſt not be lock'd up in the Cabinet Council of Heaven, but muſt be ſo far declar'd and reveal'd, that he may be fully acquainted with thoſe Terms which his Happineſs depends upon; elſe his neglect of them wou'd be excuſable, and his miſery unavoidable. Had Man indeed remain'd without offending his Maker, he might ſtill have ſtood in his favour upon the general terms of Obedience due from the Creature to his Creator, and to all ſuch particular Precepts which ſhou'd bear the impreſs of his Maker's will upon them; beſide which, the whole Volume of the Creation, without, and his own Reaſon within wou'd have been ſufficient Directors to him in the performance of his duty. But he abuſing his liberty, and being thereby guilty of *Apoſtaſy* from God (as is evident by a continu'd propenſity to Sin, and the ſtrangeneſs between God and the Souls of Men) a particular Revelation is now become neceſſary, that Mankind may thereby underſtand on what terms God will be pleas'd again, and by what means they may be reſtored into his favour. And laſtly, it not agreeing with the free and communicative nature of Divine Goodneſs (which was the firſt Original of the World's creation) to ſuffer all Mankind to periſh in their own folly, we muſt ſuppoſe this way for Man's recovery to be ſomewhere preſcrib'd, and the Revelation of it to be ſomewhere extant in the World. So that from the general Principles of the exiſtence of God, and immortality of the Soul,

Soul, we have deduced by clear and evident Reaſon the neceſſity of ſome particular Divine Revelation, as the Standard and Meaſure of Religion. And according to theſe Principles we muſt examine whatever pretends to be of Divine Revelation; for it muſt be ſutable to that Divine nature from whom it is ſuppos'd to come, and it muſt be agreeable to the conditions of the Souls of Men; and therefore that which carries with it the greateſt evidence of Divine Revelation, is, a faithful repreſentation of the ſtate of the caſe between God and the Souls of Men, and a Divine diſcovery of thoſe ways whereby Mens Souls may be fitted for eternal Happineſs. A Divine Revelation then muſt be faithful and true in all its Narrations; it muſt be excellent and becoming God in all its Diſcoveries. And therefore all that can with any reaſon be deſir'd for proof of the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, will lie in theſe three things. Firſt, *That the foundations of Religion are of undoubted certainty, or that there is a God, and that Mens Souls are Immortal.* Secondly, *That the Scriptures do moſt faithfully relate the matters of greateſt Antiquity therein contain'd* (which do moſt concern the Hiſtory of the Breach between God and Man.) Thirdly, *that the Scriptures are the only Authentic Records of thoſe terms on which happineſs may be expected in another World.*

II. I begin with the firſt of them, which concerns the Exiſtence of God, and Immortality of the Soul; both which ſeem to be ſuppos'd as general *Prolepſes* in the Writings of *Moſes*, and as things ſo conſonant to Humane nature, that none to whom his Writings ſhou'd come cou'd be ſuppos'd to queſtion them. And therefore he ſpends no time in the operoſe proving of either of theſe, knowing to how little purpoſe his Writings wou'd be to ſuch who deny'd theſe firſt Principles of all Religion. But beſide this, there may be theſe accounts given, why theſe main foundations of all Religion are no more inſiſted on in the firſt Books of the Scripture, which contain the Originals of the World. Firſt, *Becauſe theſe were in the time of the writing of them, believed with an univerſal conſent of Mankind.* In thoſe more early days of the World, when the Tradition of the firſt Ages of it was more freſh and intire, it is ſcarce imaginable that Men ſhou'd queſtion the Being of a God, when the Hiſtory of the Flood, and the Propagation of the World after it by the Sons of *Noah*, and the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah* were ſo freſh in their memories, as having been done ſo few Generations before them. And by what remains of any Hiſtory of other Nations in thoſe elder times, Men were ſo far from *Atheiſm*, that *Polytheiſm* and *Idolatry* were the common practice of the World, as is moſt evident in all Relations of the ancient *Chaldeans*, *Ægyptians*, *Phœnicians*, and other Nations, who all ſuppos'd theſe two Principles, as well as thoſe who ſerv'd the true God. And in all probability, as Men are apt to run from one extreme to another, *Polytheiſm* was the firſt occaſion of *Atheiſm*, and *Idolatry* of *Irreligion*. And thence we find the firſt appearance of *Atheiſts* to be in the moſt blind and ſuperſtitious Age of *Greece*, when the obſcene Poets had ſo debauch'd the common underſtandings of the People, as to make them believe ſuch things concerning their Gods, which were ſo incongruous to Humane Nature, that all who had any ſenſe of goodneſs left, cou'd not but loath and abhor ſuch Deities. And therefore we find all the flouts and jeers of the reputed *Atheiſts* among them, ſuch as *Dionyſius*, *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Euhemerus*, *Meſſenius* and others, were caſt upon their venerable *Deities*, which they ſo ſolemnly wor-

ſhipped, who had been before, as *Euhemerus* plainly told them, poor mortal Men, and thoſe not of the beſt reputation neither: and therefore as the *Epicurean* in *Tully* well ſays, *omnis eorum cultus eſſet in luctu*, the moſt ſutable Devotion for them had been lamenting their Death. Now when theſe common *Deities* were ſo much derided by intelligent Men, and yet the order of the World ſeem'd to tell them there was really a God, tho' thoſe were none; thoſe who had Philoſophical wits, ſuch as *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, ſet themſelves to work to ſee if they cou'd ſolve the *Phænomena* of Nature without a *Deity*; and therefore aſſerted the Origin of the Univerſe to be only by a fortuitous Concourſe of infinite little Particles: but herein they befool'd themſelves and their greedy Followers, who were glad to be rid of thoſe Anxieties of mind which the thought of a *Deity* and an immortal Soul did cauſe within them. And altho' *Lucretius* in a bravado tells us of his Maſter, *that when Mens minds were ſunk under the burden of Religion*,

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 38.

Lucret. l. 1.

Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret
In terris oppreſſa gravi ſub relligione:
Primum Graius homo mortales tollere contra
Eſt oculos auſus, primuſque obſiſtere contra.

That Epicurus *was the firſt true Gyant who durſt encounter the Gods*, and if we believe him, *overthrew them in open field*;

Quare relligio pedibus ſubjecta viciſſim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

Yet *Cotta* in *Tully* reports the iſſue of this Battle quite otherwiſe; for altho' the greateſt triumph in this Victory had been only to become like the Beaſts that periſh; yet if we believe *Cotta*, *Epicurus* was ſo far from gaining any of his belov'd Eaſe and Pleaſure by his Sentiments, that never was School-boy more afraid of a Rod, nor did any Enemy more dread a Conquerour, than *Epicurus* did the thoughts of a God and Death. *Nec quenquam vidi qui magis ea quæ timenda eſſe negaret, timeret; mortem dico & Deos.* So hard it is for an *Epicurean* even after he hath Proſtituted his Conſcience, to ſilence it; but (whatever there be in the Air) there is an Elaſtical power in Conſcience that will bear its ſelf up notwithſtanding the weight that is laid upon it. And yet after all the labours of *Epicurus*, he knew it was to no purpoſe to endeavour to root out wholly the belief of a Deity out of the World, becauſe of the unanimous conſent of the World in it; and therefore he admits of it as a neceſſary *Prolepſis* or Anticipation of Humane Nature, *quod in omnium animis Deorum notionem impreſſiſſet ipſa natura, that nature its ſelf had ſtamp'd an Idea of God upon the minds of Men; cum enim non inſtituto aliquo aut more aut lege ſit opinio conſtituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma conſenſio, intelligi neceſſe eſt Deos eſſe, quoniam inſitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura conſentit, id verum eſſe neceſſe eſt*, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* argues. Since the belief of a Deity, neither riſes from Cuſtom nor was enacted by Law, yet is unanimouſly aſſented to by all Mankind; it neceſſarily follows that there muſt be a Deity, becauſe the Idea of it is ſo natural to us. If it were thus acknowledg'd in the Philoſophical Age of *Greece*, when Men bent their wits to unſettle the Belief of ſuch things as tended to Religion;

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 86.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 44.

gion; how much more might it be esteem'd a general Principle of Humane Nature in those elder times, when not so much as one Dissenter appear'd that we read of among the more ancient Nations? But *Secondly*, it was less needful for *Moses* to insist much on the proof of a Deity in his Writings, when his very imployment, and the History he wrote, was the greatest Evidence that there was one. Cou'd any of them question, whether there were a God, or no, who had heard his voice at Mount *Sinai*, and had receiv'd a Law from him, who had been present at so many Miracles which were done by *Moses* in *Ægypt* and the Wilderness? What more evident demonstration of God cou'd be desir'd, than those many unparallell'd Miracles, which were wrought among them? And those who wou'd not be convinced by them that there was a God, wou'd certainly be convinced by nothing. *Thirdly*, It was unsutable to the purpose of *Moses* to go about to prove any thing he deliver'd by the mere force of Humane Reason, because he writ as a person imploy'd by God; and therefore by the Arguments on which they were to believe his Testimony in whatever he writ, they cou'd not but believe there was a God that imploy'd him. And from hence it is that *Moses* with so much Majesty and Authority begins the History of the Creation, with, *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth.* There cou'd be no greater Evidence that there was an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God, than that the Universe was produced out of nothing by him; and what reason cou'd there be to distrust his Testimony who relates it, who manifested not only that there was a God, but that he was imploy'd by him, by the Miracles which he wrought? So that all our former discourse concerning the Evidences of Divine Revelation, are a most palpable demonstration of a Deity; for if there be such a power which can alter the course of Nature when he pleases, the Being wherein it is, must needs be infinite; which is the same which we mean by God.

But yet for those whose minds are so coy and squeamish as to any thing of Divine Revelation, we want not sufficient Evidence in point of Reason to prove to them the Existence of a Deity. In order to which, I shall clear these following Propositions. III.

1. *That the true notion of a Deity is most agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and most consonant to Reason and the Light of Nature.*

2. *That those who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far less Reason, and must by their own Principles deny some things which are apparently true.*

3. *That we have a certain Evidence that there is a God, as it is possible for us to have, considering his nature.*

That the true notion of God is most agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and most consonant to Reason and the Light of Nature: i. e. that the Idea of God (or that which we conceive in our minds when we think of God) is so far from being any ways repugnant to any Principle of Reason within us, that it is hard to pitch on any other Notion which hath fewer entanglements in it, to a mind so far *Metaphysical* as to abstract from Sence and Prejudice. I grant it very difficult, nay impossible, for those to have any true settl'd notion of a God, who search for an Idea of him in their Fancies, and were never conscious to themselves of any higher faculty in their Souls than mere Imagination. Such may have *imaginem Jovis*, or *galeatæ Minervæ*, as he in *Tully* speaks, some Idea of an Idol in their minds, but none of a true God. For we Prop. 1.

may

may as ſoon come by the ſight of colours to underſtand the nature of Sounds, as by any corporal Phantaſms come to have a true Idea of God. And altho' ſometimes an Idea be taken for that impreſſion of things which is lodg'd in the Phantaſy, yet here we take it in a more general ſence, as it contains the repreſentation of any thing in the Mind; as it is commonly ſaid in the Schools that the Divine Intellect doth underſtand things by their Ideas, which are nothing elſe but the things themſelves as they are objectively repreſented to the Underſtanding. So that an Idea in its general ſence in which we take it, is nothing elſe but the objective Being of a thing as it terminates the Underſtanding, and is the form of the act of Intellection: that which is then immediately repreſented to the mind in its perception of things, is the Idea or Notion of it. Now ſuch an Idea as this is, may be either true or falſe. For better underſtanding of which we muſt conſider that an Idea in the Soul may be conſider'd two ways. 1. As it is a mode of Cogitation, or the act of the Soul apprehending an Object; now this way no Idea can be falſe; for as it is an act of the Mind, every Idea hath its truth: for whether I imagine a Golden Mountain, or another, it matters not here; for the one Idea is as true as the other, conſidering it merely as an act of the Mind. For the mind is as really imploy'd about the one as the other; as the Will is about an Object whether it be feaſible or no. 2. The Idea may be conſider'd in regard of its Objective Reality, or as it repreſents ſome outward object; now the truth or falſhood of the Idea lies in the Underſtanding paſſing judgment concerning the outward Object, as exiſtent, which doth correſpond to the Idea which is in the Mind. And the proneneſs of the Underſtanding's error in this caſe ariſeth from the different nature of thoſe things which are repreſented to the Mind; for ſome of them are general and abſtracted things, and do not at all ſuppoſe exiſtence, as the nature of Truth, of a Being, of Cogitation; other Ideas depend upon Exiſtence ſuppos'd, as the Idea of the Sun, which I apprehend in my Mind becauſe I have ſeen it; but beſides theſe, there are other Ideas in the Mind, which the Underſtanding forms within its ſelf by its own power, as it is a Principle of Cogitation; ſuch are thoſe which are called *entia rationis*, and have no other Exiſtence at all but only in the Underſtanding, as *Chimæra's*, *Centaures*, &c. Now as to theſe, we are to obſerve, that altho' the compoſition of theſe things together by the Underſtanding, be that which makes theſe Ideas to be only fictitious, yet the Underſtanding would not be able to compound ſuch things, were they not ſeverally repreſented to the Mind; as unleſs we had known what a Horſe and a Man had been, our minds cou'd not have conjoyn'd them together in its apprehenſion. So that in theſe which are the moſt fictitious Ideas we ſee, that altho' the Idea its ſelf be a mere creature of the Underſtanding, yet the Mind cou'd not form ſuch an Idea but upon Pre-exiſtent matter, and ſome objective reality muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the intellectual Conception of theſe Anomalous Entities. By which we ſee that that ſtrange kind of Omnipotency which ſome have attributed to Underſtanding, lies not in a Power of conceiving things wholly impoſſible, or fanſying Ideas of abſolute Non-entities, but in a kind of *African* Copulation of ſuch Species of things together, which in Nature ſeem wholly incompoſſible, (as the Schools ſpeak) or have no congruity at all in the order of the Univerſe. So that had there never been any ſuch things in the World as *matter* and *motion*, it is very hard to conceive, how the Underſtanding

ing cou'd have form'd within its ſelf the variety of the Species of ſuch things, which are the reſults of thoſe two grand Principles of the Univerſe. But becauſe it is ſo impoſſible for minds not very Contemplative and Metaphyſical to abſtract from matter, thence it is we are apt to imagine ſuch a Power in the Underſtanding, whereby it may form Ideas of ſuch things which have no objective reality at all. I grant thoſe we call *entia rationis* have no external reality as they are ſuch; but yet I ſay, the exiſtence of matter in the World, and the corporeal Phantaſms of outward Beings, are the foundation of the Soul's conception of thoſe Entities, which have no exiſtence beyond the Humane Intellect.

IV. The great inquiry then is, how far this Plaſtic Power of the Underſtanding, may extend its ſelf in its forming an Idea of God. That there is ſuch a one in the minds of Men, is evident to every one that conſults his own Faculties, and enquires of them, whether they cannot apprehend a ſettl'd and conſiſtent Notion of a Being which is abſolutely Perfect. For that is all we underſtand by the Idea of God; not that there is any ſuch connate Idea in the Soul, in the Senſe which connate Ideas are commonly underſtood; but that there is a Faculty in the Soul, whereby upon the free uſe of Reaſon, it can form within its ſelf a ſettl'd Notion of ſuch a Being, which is as perfect as it is poſſible for us to conceive a Being to be. If any difficulty be made concerning the forming ſuch a Notion in ones mind, let the Perſon who ſcruples it, only inquire of himſelf whether he judges all Beings in the World equal; whether a *Muſhroom* hath in it all the perfections which Man hath? which I ſuppoſe none, who have a Mind within them can queſtion. If then it be granted that Man hath ſome Perfection in him above inferior Creatures, it will be no matter of difficulty to ſhew wherein Man exceeds other inferior Beings. For is not Life a greater Perfection than the want of it? Is not Reaſon and Knowledge, a Perfection above Senſe? and ſo let us proceed to thoſe things, wherein one Man differs from another; for it is evident, that all Men are not of equal Accompliſhments; is not then Forecaſt and Prudence above Incogitancy and Folly? Is not the knowledge of Cauſes of things better than Stupidity and Ignorance? Is not Beneficence and Liberality more noble than Parſimony and Narrowneſs of Spirit? Is not true Goodneſs far above Debauchery and Intemperance? And are not all theſe far better, when they are joyn'd with ſuch a power as hath no limits or bounds at all? Now then is it not poſſible for a Man's mind, proceeding in its ordinary way of Intellection, to form a notion of ſuch a Being, which hath Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power in it, without any limits and bounds at all, or any of thoſe Abatements which any of theſe Perfections are found with in Man? For it is unconceivable, that the mind of Man can attribute to its ſelf abſolute Perfection, when it cannot but ſee its own defects in thoſe things it excells other Creatures in; and ſuppoſing it had Power, Goodneſs and Knowledge far above what it hath; yet it cannot but ſay, that theſe Perfections wou'd be greater if it were always poſſeſs'd of them, and it were impoſſible that it ſhould ever ceaſe to be, or not have been. So that now joyning infinite Goodneſs, Wiſdom and Power, with Eternity and neceſſity of Exiſtence, the reſult is the notion of a Being abſolutely perfect. So that now whoever queſtions the ſutableneſs of ſuch a Notion or Idea to the faculties of Mens Souls, muſt queſtion the truth of his own Faculties, and the method they proceed in, in their cleareſt Conceptions and Ratiocinations. And the Mind of Man may as well queſtion

queſtion the truth of any Idea it hath within its ſelf, as of this we now diſcourſe of. Nay, it may be far ſooner puzl'd in any of thoſe Ideas, which are tranſmitted into the Phantaſy by the Impreſſions of Corporeal Beings upon the Organs of Senſe, than in this more intellectual and abſtracted Idea, which depends wholly upon the Mind.

V. All the difficulty now is, whether this Idea of ſuch an abſolutely perfect Being, be any thing elſe but the Underſtanding's Plaſtic power, whereby it can unite all theſe Perfections together in one Conception; or doth it neceſſarily imply, that there muſt be ſuch a Being really exiſtent, or elſe I cou'd never have form'd ſuch a ſettl'd Notion of him in my mind? To this I anſwer, 1. It is as much as I deſire at preſent, that the forming of ſuch an Idea in the Mind, is as ſutable and agreeable to our Faculties as the forming the Conception of any other Being in the World. For hereby it is moſt evident that the notion of a God imports nothing incongruous to Reaſon, or repugnant to the Faculties of our Souls; but that the Mind will form as ſettl'd and clear a notion of God, as of any thing which in the judgment of *Epicurus*, his infallible Senſes did the moſt aſſure him of. So that there can be no ſhadow of a pretence, why any ſhou'd reject the Being of a God becauſe of the impoſſibility to conceive any ſuch Being as God is. If to this it be objected, *that ſuch things are imply'd in this Idea, which make it unconceivable, in that all the Perfections in this Being are ſuppos'd to be infinite, and Infinity tranſcends our capacity of apprehenſion.* To this I anſwer, 1. That thoſe who deny Infinity in God, muſt neceſſarily attribute it to ſomething elſe, as to infinite Space, infinity of ſucceſſion of Ages and Perſons, if the World were Eternal; and therefore it is moſt unreaſonable to reject any Notion for that which it is impoſſible, but if I deny that, I muſt attribute it to ſomething elſe, to whoſe Idea it is far leſs proper than it is to God's. 2. Leſt I ſhou'd rather ſeek to avoid the Argument than to ſatisfy it, I ſay, that tho' infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet we may clearly and diſtinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature, that no limits can be aſſign d to it, as to its Power or Preſence; which is as much as to underſtand it to be infinite. The *ratio formalis* of Infinity may not be underſtood clearly and diſtinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity its ſelf cannot be on this account, becauſe however Poſitive we apprehend it, yet we always apprehend it in a Negative way, becauſe we conceive it by denying all limitations and bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a Poſitive Manner, altho' not adequately, becauſe we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and diſtinctly ſee the Sea, tho' we cannot diſcover the bounds of it; ſo may we clearly and diſtinctly apprehend ſome Perfections of God when we fix our Minds on them, altho' we are not able to graſp them altogether in our narrow and confin'd Intellects, becauſe they are infinite. Thus we ſee that God's Infinity doth not at all abate the clearneſs and diſtinctneſs of the Notion which we have of God; ſo that tho' the Perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnancy at all to Mens natural Faculties, to have a ſettl'd Idea of a Being infinitely perfect in their Minds.

VI. To the Queſtion, I anſwer, It ſeems highly probable and far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary, that this Idea of God upon the mind of Man, is no merely fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whoſe Idea it is, and therefore doth ſuppoſe a reality in

in the Thing correſpondent to that objective reality which is in the Underſtanding. For altho' I am not ſo well ſatisfy'd that the mere objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly conſider'd in it ſelf, becauſe of the unlimited power of the Underſtanding in conception: Yet I ſay, conſidering that Idea in all the circumſtances of it, it ſeems highly probable that it is no mere *ens rationis*, or figment of the underſtanding; and that will appear on theſe conſiderations. 1. This Idea is of ſuch a Nature as cou'd not be fram'd from the Underſtanding's conſideration of any corporeal Phantaſms. Becauſe whatever hath any thing of Matter in it, involves of neceſſity many imperfections along with it; for every part of Matter is diviſible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to Natural Light, that it is a greater Perfection not to be diviſible than to be ſo. Beſides, corporeal Phantaſms are ſo far from helping us in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a diſtinct Conception of it, while we attend to them; becauſe theſe bear no proportion at all to ſuch a Being. So that this Idea however muſt be a pure act of Intellection, and therefore ſuppoſing there were no other faculty in Man but Imagination, it wou'd bear the greateſt repugnancy to our Conceptions, and it wou'd be according to the Principles of *Epicurus* and ſome modern Philoſophers, a thing wholly impoſſible to form an Idea of God, unleſs with *Epicurus* we imagine him to be Corporeal, which is to ſay, he is no God. Which was the reaſon that *Tully* ſaid, *Epicurus* did only, *nomine ponere, re tollere Deos*, becauſe ſuch a Notion of God is repugnant to Natural Light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abſtract from corporeal Phantaſms; it thereby appears that there is a higher faculty in Man's Soul than mere Imagination, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends it to an infinite object, ſhou'd come, but from an infinite Being: eſpecially if we conſider, Secondly, That the Underſtanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by diſtinct acts firſt collect one Perfection, and then another, and at laſt unite theſe together, but the ſimplicity and unity of all theſe Perfections is as neceſſarily conceiv'd as any of them. Granting then that the Underſtanding by the obſerving of ſeveral Perfections in the World, might be able to abſtract theſe ſeverally from each Being wherein they were, yet whence ſhou'd the Idea of the Unity and Inſeparability of all theſe Perfections come? The Mind may, it is true, knit ſome things together in fictitious Ideas, but then thoſe are ſo far from unity with each other, that in themſelves they ſpeak mutual Repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper *entia rationis*; but theſe ſeveral Perfections are ſo far from ſpeaking repugnancy to each other, that the Unity and Inſeparability of them is as neceſſary to the forming of this Idea, as any other Perfection whatſoever. So that from hence it appears that the conſideration of the Perfections which are in the Creatures, is only an occaſion given to the Mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea it ſelf depends upon thoſe Perfections as the cauſes of it: as in the cleareſt *Mathematical* truths the Manner of demonſtration may be neceſſary to help the Underſtanding to its clearer aſſent, tho' the things in themſelves be undoubtedly true. For all minds are not equally capable of the ſame truths; ſome are of quicker apprehenſion than others are; now altho' to ſlower apprehenſions a more particular way of demonſtrating things be neceſſary, yet the truths in themſelves are equal, tho' they have not equal Evidence to ſeveral Perſons.

3. It appears that this is no mere fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all persons who have freed themselves from the Entanglements of corporeal phantasms. Those we call *entia rationis*, we find by experience in our Minds that they are form'd *ad placitum*; we may imagine them as many ways as we please; but we see it is quite otherwise in this Idea of God; for in those Attributes or Perfections which by the light of Nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform consent in all those who have divested their Minds of corporeal phantasms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a Being absolutely perfect, there hath been no dissent in the Perfections which have been attributed to it; none have question'd but infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, joyn'd with necessity of Existence, have been all imply'd in this Idea. So that it is scarce possible to instance in any one Idea, no not of those which are most obvious to our Senses, wherein there hath been so great an uniformity of Mens conceptions as in this Idea of God. And the most gross corporeal Idea of the most sensible matter hath been more liable to heats and disputes among *Philosophers*, than this Idea of a Being infinite and purely spiritual. Which strongly proves my present Proposition, That this Idea of God is very consonant to Natural light; for it is hardly conceivable that there shou'd be so universal a Consent of minds in this Idea, were it not a Natural result from the free use of our Reason and Faculties. And that which adds further weight to this Argument is, that altho' Infinity be so necessarily imply'd in this Idea of God, yet Men do not attribute all kind of infinite Things to God; for there being conceivable infinite Number, infinite Longitude, as well as infinite power and knowledge, our minds readily attribute the latter to God, and as readily abstract the other from his Nature, which is an Argument this Idea is not fictitious, but argues Reality in the thing correspondent to our conception of it. So much may suffice to clear the first Proposition, *viz. That the notion of a God is very sutable to the Faculties of Mens Souls, and to that light of Nature which they proceed by in forming the conceptions of things.*

VII. Prop. 2. *Those who deny that there is a God, do assert other things on far less evidence of Reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true.* One wou'd expect that such persons who are apt to condemn the whole World of folly in believing the truth of Religion, and wou'd fain be admir'd as Men of a deeper reach, and greater wit and sagacity than others, wou'd, when they have exploded a *Deity*, at least give us some more rational and consistent account of things, than we can give that there is a God. But on the contrary we find the reasons on which they reject a *Deity* so lamentably weak, and so easily retorted upon themselves, and the *Hypotheses* they substitute instead of a *Deity* so precarious, obscure and uncertain, that we need no other Argument to evince the reasonableness of Religion, than from the manifest folly as well as impiety of those who oppose it. Which we shall make evident by these two things: 1. *That while they deny a Deity, they assert other things on far less reason.* 2. *That by those principles on which they deny a Deity, they must deny some things which are apparently true.*

1. 1. *That they assert some things on far less reason than we do that there is a God.* For if there be not an infinitely powerful God who produced the World out of nothing, it must necessarily follow according to the different Principles of the *Aristotelian* and *Epicurean Atheists*, that either the World was as it is from all eternity, or else that it was first made

made by the fortuitous concourſe of Atoms. Now I appeal to the Reaſon of any Perſon, who hath the free uſe of it, Whether either of theſe two *Hypotheſes* urged with the ſame or greater difficulties, *&c.* be not far more weakly prov'd than the exiſtence of a *Deity* is, or the production of the World by Him.

1. *They run themſelves into the ſame difficulties which they won'd avoid in the belief of a* Deity; and nothing can be a greater evidence of an entangled Mind than this is: To deny a thing becauſe of ſome difficulty in it, and inſtead of it to aſſert another thing which is chargeable with the very ſame difficulty in a higher degree. Thus when they reject a *Deity*, becauſe they cannot underſtand what Infinity means; both theſe *Hypotheſes* are liable to the ſame intricacy in apprehending the nature of ſomething infinite. For according to the *Epicureans*, there muſt be an infinite Space, and what greater eaſe to the Mind is there in conceiving an Idea of that than of an infinite Being? And if the World be eternal, there muſt have been paſt an infinite ſucceſſion of Ages, and is not the Underſtanding as eaſily loſt in this, as in an eternal Being which created the World? For if the courſe of Generations in the World had no beginning at all, (which neceſſarily follows upon the eternity of the World) then an infinite number of ſucceſſions are already paſt, and if paſt, then at an end, and ſo we find an infinite which hath had an end, which is a conſequence becoming one who avoids the belief of a *Deity*, becauſe Infinity is an unconceivable thing. Beſides, if the number of Generations hath been infinite, theſe two Conſequences will unavoidably follow, which the reaſon of any one but an *Atheiſt* wou'd ſtartle at, That one infinite may be greater than another, and that the part is equal to the whole. For let him fix where he pleaſe, in the courſe of Generations, I demand whether in the Great-grand-father's time the ſucceſſion of Generations was finite or infinite; if finite, then it had a beginning; and ſo the World not eternal; if infinite, then I ask, whether there were not a longer ſucceſſion of Generations in the time of his Great-grand-children, and ſo there muſt be a number greater than that which was infinite; for the former ſucceſſion was infinite, and this hath more Generations in it than that had: but if it be ſaid that they were equal, becauſe both infinite, then the ſucceſſions of Generations to the Grand-father, being but a part of that which extends to his Grand-children and poſterity, the part is equal to the whole. And is not the notion of an infinite Being enough to ſtumble an *Atheiſt*'s Reaſon, when he can ſo nimbly leap over ſo apparent contradictions? I inſiſt not on this as an evident Demonſtration to prove a *Deity*, which poſſibly it may not amount to, becauſe it may only demonſtrate the impoſſibility of our Underſtandings comprehending the nature of Infinity. But however it doth moſt evidently demonſtrate the folly and unreaſonableneſs of the *Atheiſt*, who rejects the Being of God on the account of his infinity, when his Underſtanding is more loſt in apprehending an infinite ſucceſſion of Generations which follows from his ſuppoſition of the eternity of the World. If then it be impoſſible, as it is, upon any Principles whatſoever, to avoid the conception of ſomewhat infinite and eternal, either Matter or Space, or ſome Being, let any one appeal to his own Reaſon, whether it be not more agreeable to that, to attribute theſe Perfections to ſuch a Being, to whoſe Idea they neceſſarily belong, than to attribute them to this World, in whoſe conception they are not at all imply'd; but on the contrary they do far more puz-

zle our Understandings than when we conceive them to be in God. If somewhat must have continued duration and be of an unbounded nature, how much more rational is it to conceive Wisdom, Power, and Goodness to be conjoyn'd with Eternity and Infinity, than to bestow these Attributes upon an empty Space, or upon dull and unactive Matter? It cannot be Reason then, but some more base and unworthy Principle which makes the *Atheist* question the Being of God, because his Perfections are unconceivable, when according to his own Principles the most puzzling Attributes of God return upon him with more force and violence, and that in a more inexplicable manner.

VIII. 2. As the *Atheist* must admit those things himself which he rejects the Being of God for; so he admits them upon far weaker grounds than we do attribute them to God. If any thing may be made evident to Man's natural Reason concerning the existence of a Being so infinite as God is, we doubt not but to make it appear that we have great assurance of the Being of God; but how far must the *Atheist* go, how heartily must he beg before his *Hypothesis* either of the fortuitous Concourse of *Atoms*, or Eternity of the World will be granted to him? For if we stay till he proves either of these by evident and demonstrative Reasons, the World may have an end before he proves his *Atoms* cou'd give it a beginning, and we may find it Eternal, *à parte post*, before he can prove it was so *a parte ante*. For the proof of a Deity we appeal to his own Faculties, Reason and Conscience; we make use of Arguments before his Eyes; we bring the universal Sense of Mankind along with us: But for his Principle, we must wholly alter the present Stage of the World, and crumble the whole Universe into little Particles; we must grind the Sun to Powder, and by a new way of Interment turn the Earth into Dust and Ashes, before we can so much as imagine how the World cou'd be fram'd. And when we have thus far begg'd leave to imagine things to be what they never were, we must then stand by in some infinite Space to behold the friskings and Dancings about of these little Particles of Matter, till by their frequent Rencounters and Justlings one upon another, they at last link themselves together, and run so long in a round till they make Whirl-pools enough for Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Bodies of the Universe to emerge out of. But what was it which at first set these little Particles of Matter in motion? Whence came so great variety in them to produce such wonderful diversities in Bodies as there are in the World? How came these casual Motions to hit so luckily into such admirable Contrivances as are in the Universe? When I once see a thousand blind Men run the point of a Sword in at a Key-hole without once missing; when I find them all frisking together in a spacious Field, and exactly meeting all at last in the very middle of it; when I once find, as *Tully* speaks, the *Annals* of *Ennius* fairly written in a heap of Sand, and as *Kepler*'s Wife told him, a Room full of Herbs, moving up and down fall down into the exact order of Sallets, I may then think the *Atomical Hypothesis* probable, and not before. But what Evidence of Reason or Demonstration have we, that the great Bodies of the World did result from such a Motion of these small Particles? *It is possible to be so*, saith *Epicurus*. What if we grant it possible? Can no things in the World be, which it is possible might have been otherwise? What else thinks *Epicurus* of the Generations of things now? They are such certainly as the World now is, and yet he believes it was once otherwise: Must therefore a bare possibility of the contrary make

us

us deny our Reason, silence Conscience, contradict the universal Sense of Mankind by excluding a Deity out of the World? But whence doth it appear possible? Did we ever find any thing of the same nature with the World produced in such a manner by such a concourse of *Atoms?* Or is it because we find in natural Beings, how much these Particles of Matter serve to solve the *Phænomena* of Nature? But doth it at all follow, because now under Divine Providence which wisely orders the World, and things in it, that these Particles, with their several Affections and Motion, may give us a tolerable account of many Appearances as to Bodies, that therefore the Universe had its Original merely by a Concretion of these, without any Divine Hand to order and direct their Motion? But of this more when we come to the Creation of the World; our design now is only to compare the Notion of a Deity, and of the *Atheist*'s *Hypothesis* in point of Perspicuity and Evidence of Reason: of which let any one who hath Reason judge. Thus we see how the *Atheist* in denying a Deity, must assert something else instead of it, which is press'd with the same, if not greater difficulties, and prov'd by far less Reason.

The Atheist by the same principles on which he denies a God, must deny some things which are apparently true. Which will be evident by our running over the most plausible pretences which he insists upon. IX. 2.

1. Because the Being of a God cannot be demonstrated. But how doth the *Atheist* mean it? Is it because God cannot be demonstrated to Sense, that we cannot [*digito monstrari & dicier hic est*] point at him with our Fingers? It is a sign there is little of Reason left, where Sense is made the only Umpire of all kinds of Beings. Must all intellectual Beings be proscrib'd out of the order of Nature, because they cannot pass the scrutiny of Sense? And by the same reason all Colours shall be dash'd out because they cannot be heard; all Noises silenced, because they cannot be seen; for why may not one Sense be set to judge of all objects of Sense with far more Reason, than Sense it self be set as Judge over Intellectual Beings? But yet it is wisely done of the *Atheist* to make Sense his Judge; for if we once appeal to this, he knows our Cause is lost; for as he said of a Physician, when one ask'd him whether he had any experience of him? No, said he, *Si periculum feciſſem, non viverem*; *If I had try'd him, I had been dead e'er now*; so here, If God were to be try'd by the judgment of Sense, he must cease to be God; for how can an infinite and spiritual Being be discern'd by the judgment of Sense? and if he be not an infinite and spiritual Being, he is not God. But it may be the *Atheist*'s meaning is not so gross, but he intends such a *demonstration to reason as That two and two make four, or That the whole is greater than the parts*; with such a demonstration he wou'd sit down contented. But will no less than this serve him? What becomes then of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms? Is this as evident as that two and two make four? And will the Philosophical *Atheist* really believe nothing in Nature, but what is as evident to him in material Beings, as *that the whole is greater than the parts?* By any means let *Atheists* then write Philosophy, that at the last the Clocks in *London* may strike together, and the Philosophers agree; for I suppose none of them question that. But yet it is possible the *Atheist* may in a good humour abate something of this, and mean by demonstration such a proof as takes away all difficulties. If he means as to the Ground of Assent, we undertake it; if as to the Object apprehended, we reject

reject it as unreasonable, because it is impossible a Being Infinite shou'd be comprehended by us; for if it cou'd, it were no longer Infinite. But let us try this Principle by other things, and how evident is it, that on this account some things must be deny'd which himself will confess to be true? For instance, that *opprobrium Philosophorum*, the divisibility of Quantity, or extended matter into finite or infinite parts; let him take which side he please, and see whether by the force of these Arguments on either side, if he hold to this principle, he must not be forced to deny that there is any such thing as matter in the World: and then we may well have an infinite empty space, when by force of this one Principle, both God and Matter are banish'd quite out of the World. But if the *Atheist* will but come one step lower, and by his demonstration intend nothing else but such a sufficient proof of it as the nature of the thing is capable of, he will not only speak most consonant to Reason, but may be in some hopes of gaining satisfaction. For it is most evident, that all things are not capable of the like way of proof; and that in some cases the possibility of the contrary must be no hindrance to an undoubted assent. What these proofs are, will appear afterwards. I come to the next ground of the *Atheist*'s opinion which is,

2. *The weakness of some Arguments brought to prove a Deity.* But let us grant that some Arguments will not do it, doth it therefore follow that none can do it? What if some have prov'd the Sun to be the Center of the World; and the motion of the Earth, by very weak Arguments, will the Atheist therefore question it? What if *Epicurus* hath prov'd his *Atomical Hypothesis* by some silly *Sophisms*, will the *Atheist* therefore rather believe the Creation of the World than it? What if the *Atheist* may make himself sport at some Stories of Apparitions insisted on to prove a Deity, doth it therefore follow there is no God, because some Persons have been over-credulous? What if some having more Zeal than Knowledge, may attribute such things to God's immediate hand, which may be produced by natural Causes, doth it thence follow that God hath no hand in governing the World at all? What if Fears, and Hopes, and Persuasions, may depend much on Principles of Education, must Conscience then be resolv'd wholly into these? What if some devout *Melancholist* may embrace the issues of his own Imagination for the impressions of the Divine Spirit, doth it therefore follow, that Religion is nothing but strength of Fancy improv'd by principles of Education? What if some of the numerous proofs of a Deity were cut off, and only those made use of, which are of the greatest force, wou'd the Truth suffer at all by that? I grant, advantage is often taken against a thing more by one weak Argument brought for it, than for it by the strongest Proofs: but I say, it is unreasonable it shou'd be so; and were Men Rational and Ingenuous it wou'd not be so. Many times Arguments may be good in their order, but they are mis-placed; some may prove the thing rational, which may not prove it true; some may shew the Absurdities of the Adversaries, rejecting the thing, which may not be sufficient to prove it; now when Men number and not weigh their Arguments, but give them in the lump to the main question, without fitting them to their several places, they do more disservice to the main of the Battle by the disorder of their Forces, than they can advantage it by the number of them.

3. Another great pretence the *Atheist* hath, is, that Religion is only an invention of Politicians, which they awe People with as they please, and

and therefore tell them of a God, and another World, as Mothers ſend young Children to School to keep them in better order, that they may govern them with the greater eaſe. To this I anſwer, 1. Religion I grant, hath a great influence upon the well-governing the World, nay ſo great, that were the *Atheiſts* opinion true, and the World perſuaded of it, it were impoſſible the World cou'd be well govern'd. For the Government of the World in civil Societies, depends not ſo much on Force, as the ſacred Bonds of Duty and Allegiance, which hold a Nation that owns Religion as true, in far ſurer Obligations to endeavour the peace and welfare of a Nation than ever Violence can do. For in this caſe only an opportunity is watch'd for to ſhake off that which they account a Yoke upon their Necks; whereas when Mens minds are poſſeſs'd with a ſenſe of duty and obligation to Obedience out of Conſcience, the Reins may be held with greater eaſe; and yet the People be better manag'd by them, than by ſuch as only gall and inrage them. So that I grant true Religion to be the moſt ſerviceable Principle for the governing of civil Societies; but withal, I ſay, 2. It were impoſſible Religion ſhou'd be ſo much made uſe of for the governing of People, were there not a real propenſity and inclination to Religion imprinted on the Minds of Men. For as, did not Men love themſelves, and their Children, their Eſtates and Intereſts, it were impoſſible to keep them in Obedience to Laws; but doth it follow, becauſe Magiſtrates perſuade People to Obedience by ſuting Laws to the general intereſt of Men, that therefore the Magiſtrates firſt made them love themſelves and their own concerns? So it is in Religion, the Magiſtrate may make uſe of this propenſity to Religion in Men for civil ends, but his making uſe of it doth ſuppoſe it and not inſtill it. For were Religion nothing elſe in the World but a deſign only of Politicians, it wou'd be impoſſible to keep that deſign from being diſcover'd at one time or other; and when once it came to be known, it wou'd hurry the whole World into confuſion; and the People wou'd make no ſcruple of all Oaths and Obligations, but every one wou'd ſeek to do others what miſchief he cou'd if he had opportunity, and obey no further than Fear and Force conſtrain'd him. Therefore no Principle can be ſo dangerous to a State as *Atheiſm*, nor any thing more promote its Peace than true Religion; and the more Men are perſuaded of the truth of Religion, they will be the better Subjects, and the more uſeful in civil Societies. As well then may an *Atheiſt* ſay there is no ſuch thing as Good Nature in the World, becauſe that is apt to be abus'd, nor any ſuch thing as Love, becauſe that may be cheated, as that Religion is nothing but a deſign, becauſe Men may make it ſtalk to their private ends. Thus we ſee how the *Atheiſt* by the force of thoſe Principles on which he denies a God, muſt be forced to deny other things, which yet by his own confeſſion are apparently true.

So I come to the third *Propoſition*, which is, *That we have as certain Evidence that there is a God, as we can have, conſidering his Nature.* X. Prop. 3. When we demand the proof of a thing, our firſt eye muſt be to the nature of the thing which we deſire may be prov'd; for things equally true, are not capable of equal evidence, nor have like manners of probation. There is no demonſtration in *Euclide* will ſerve to prove that there are ſuch places as the *Indies*: we cannot prove the Earth is round by the judgment of ſenſe; nor that the Soul is immortal by corporeal Phantaſms. Every diſtinct kind of Being hath its peculiar way of probation;

bation; and therefore it ought not to be at all wondred at, if the ſupreme and infinite Being have his peculiar way of demonſtrating himſelf to the minds of Men. If then we have as evident proofs of the Exiſtence of God, as we can have, conſidering the infinity of his Nature, it is all which in reaſon we can deſire; and of that kind of proofs we have theſe following. For, 1. *If God hath ſtamped an univerſal Character of himſelf upon the minds of Men.* 2. *If the things in the World are the manifeſt effects of infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power.* 3. *If there be ſuch things in the World which are unaccountable without a Deity,* then we may with ſafety and aſſurance conclude *that there is a God.*

1. *That God hath imprinted an univerſal Character of himſelf on the minds of Men*; and that may be known by two things, 1. *If it be ſuch as bears the ſame importance among all Perſons.* 2. *If it be ſuch as cannot be miſtaken for the Character of any thing elſe.*

1. I begin with the firſt, whereby I ſhall prove this Character to be univerſal, becauſe the whole World hath conſented in it. This Argument we may rely on with the greater ſecurity, becauſe it was the only Argument which retain'd the Deity in the ancient School of *Epicurus*; which cou'd he have thought of as eaſy a way of evading, as he thought he had found out as to the Origin of the Univerſe, he was no ſuch great Friend to the very name of a God, as to have retain'd it as an Anticipation or Prolepſis of Humane Nature. And this Argument from the univerſal conſent of the World, was that which bore the greateſt ſway among the Philoſophers, who went by nothing but Dictates of natural Light, which they cou'd not ſo clearly diſcover in any things, as in thoſe which all Mankind did unanimouſly conſent in. Two things I ſhall make this out by. 1. *That no ſufficient account can be given of ſo univerſal a conſent, unleſs it be ſuppos'd to be the voice of Nature.* 2. *That the diſſent of any particular Perſons is not ſufficient to controul ſo univerſal an Argument.*

1. *That no ſufficient account of it can be given, but only by aſſerting it to be a Dictate of Nature.* In ſo ſtrange a diſſent as there hath been in the World concerning moſt of thoſe things which relate to Mankind in common, as the Models of Government, the Laws they are rul'd by, the particular Rites and Cuſtoms of Worſhip; we have the greateſt reaſon to judge that thoſe common Principles which were the Foundations on which all theſe ſeveral different Cuſtoms were built, were not the effect of any poſitive Laws, nor the mere force of principles of Education, but ſomething which had a deeper root and foundation in the Principles of Nature it ſelf. A common and univerſal Effect muſt flow from ſome common and univerſal Cauſe. So the *Stoic* argues in *Tully*, If there were no God, *non tam ſtabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum ſeculis ætatibuſque hominum inveterare potuiſſet.* It is ſtrange to think that Mankind in ſo many Ages of the World ſhou'd not grow wiſe enough to rid it ſelf of ſo troubleſome an Opinion as that was, of the Being of God, had it not been true.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

We ſee in all the alterations of the World, other vain Opinions have been detected, refuted and ſhaken off; if this had been ſuch, how comes it to remain the ſame in all Ages, and Nations of the World? *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.* It is a great diſcredit to Time to make it like a River in that ſenſe, that it bears up only lighter things, when matters of greateſt weight are ſunk to the bottom and paſt recovery. This may paſs for a handſome Alluſion, as to the

Opinions

Opinions and Writings of particular Persons, but cannot be understood of such things which are founded on the universal consent of the World; for these common Notions of Humane Nature are so suted to the temper of the World, that they pass down the strong current of Time with the same facility that a well built Ship, tho' of good burden, doth furrow the Ocean. So that if we must adhere to the Allegory, it is easily reply'd, that it is not the weight of things which makes them sink, but the unsutableness of their Superficies to that of the water; so we see a small piece of Wood will sink, when a stately Ship is born up; so such things which have not that agreeableness in them to the Dictates of Nature may soon be lost, but such as lie so even upon the superficies of the Soul, will still float above the Water, and never be lost in the swiftest current of Time. Thus we assert this universal consent of Mankind, as to the existence of a Deity, to be a thing so consonant to our Natural reason, that as long as there are Men in the World it will continue.

XI

But now it is hardly conceivable, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, how Mankind shou'd universally agree in some common Sentiments; much less how it shou'd have such an Anticipation as himself grants of the Being of God. For if the Soul be nothing else but some more active and vigorous Particles of Matter (as *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, that his Opinion was, that the Soul was nothing else but a *System* ἐξ ἀτόμων λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων, *of the most smooth and round Atoms*) if so, it is very hard apprehending how any such things as Anticipations or common Notions can be lodg'd in the Soul; for if our Souls be nothing else but some small Sphærical Corpuscles which move up and down the Body, as the *Epicurean* Philosophy supposeth, then all our Knowledge and Perception must depend on Motion, which Motion must be by the impression of external Objects: which *Lucretius* acknowledgeth and contends for.

Laertius l. 10. in v. Epic. v. Gassend. To. 2d. l. 3. sect. 3.

Invenies primis à sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri. *Lucret. l. 4.*

If then our knowledge of Truth comes in by our Senses, and Sensation doth wholly depend upon the impression of outward Objects, what becomes of all common Notions and of the *Prolepsis* of a Deity? unless we suppose the knowledge of a Deity came in by Sense, which *Epicurus* himself denies when he attributes to the Deity not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus*, as *Tully* tells us, and therefore he is not a proper object of Sense. So that it is impossible there shou'd be any such thing as a natural Notion which may be the ground of universal consent among Men, according to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*. And therefore it stands to all reason in the World, that if our Senses be the only competent Judges of Truth, Men shou'd differ about nothing more than such things which cannot be try'd by the judgment of Sense; such as the notion of a God is; (for where shou'd Men be more uncertain in their judgments, than in such things which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of?) but we are so far from finding it so, that Men are nothing so much agreed about the objects of Sense, as they are about the existence of a Deity; and therefore we see this universal consent of Mankind concerning a God, cannot be salv'd by the Principles of those who deny it; according to which no account at all can be given of any such things as universal or common Notions.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

XII. Neither can this universal consent of Mankind be enervated with any greater probability by those *Atheists* who assert the Eternity of the World, and resolve this consent wholly into mere Tradition, such as the Fables of Poets were convey'd in from one to another. For I demand concerning this Tradition, whether ever it had any beginning or no? If it had no beginning, it cou'd be no Tradition; for that must run up to some Persons from whom it first came; again, if it had no beginning, it was necessary that it shou'd always be, on the same accounts on which they make the World eternal. And if it be necessary, it must be antecedent to any free Act of Man's Will which Tradition supposeth; and so some false Opinion wou'd be found to be as necessary as the World's being eternal, (and by consequence the World's being eternal may be a necessary false Opinion) but if any false Opinion be once granted necessary, it then follows that our Faculties are not true, and that Nature is a necessary cause of some notorious Falsity, which is the highest Impeachment the *Atheist* cou'd have laid upon his only ador'd Nature; which must then have done that, (which *Aristotle* was asham'd to think ever Nature shou'd be guilty of) which is, something in vain; for to what purpose shou'd Man have rational Faculties, if he be under an unavoidable necessity of being deceiv'd? If then it be granted that this Tradition had once a beginning, either it began with Humane Nature, or Humane Nature did exist long before it: if it began with Mankind, then Mankind had a beginning, and so the World was not eternal; if Mankind did exist before this Tradition, I then inquire in what time, and by what means, came this Tradition first to be embraced, if it doth not suppose the existence of a Deity? Can any Age be mention'd in History, wherein this Tradition was not universally receiv'd? and which is most to our purpose, the further we go back in History, the fuller the World was of Deities, if we believe the Heathen Histories; but however no Age can be instanc'd in, wherein this Tradition began first to be believ'd in the World; we can trace the Poetic Fables to their true Original, by the Testimonies of those who believ'd them; we know the particular Authors of them, and what course they took in divulging of them; we find great diversities among themselves in the meaning of them, and many Nations that never heard of them. But all things are quite otherwise in this Tradition; we have none to fix on as the first Authors of it; if the World were eternal, and the belief of a Deity fabulous, we cannot understand by what Artifice a fabulous Tradition cou'd come to be so universally receiv'd in the World, that no Nation of old cou'd be instanced in by the inquisitive Philosophers, but however rude and barbarous it was, yet it own'd a Deity. How cou'd such a Tradition be spread so far, but either by Force or Fraud? It cou'd not be by force, because embraced by an unanimous consent where no force at all hath been us'd, and hath been so rooted in the very Natures of those People who have been most tender of their Liberties, that they have resented no Indignity so highly, as any Affronts they conceiv'd to be offer'd to their Gods. Nay, and where any Persons seem to quit the belief of a Deity, we find what Force and Violence they have us'd to their own Reason and Conscience to bring themselves to *Atheism*, which they cou'd not subdue their Minds to any longer than the Will cou'd command the Understanding; which when it gained but a little liberty to examine it self, or view the World, or was alarmed with Thunder, Earth-quakes or violent Sickness, did bring back again the

the ſenſe of a Deity with greater force and power than they had endeavour'd to ſhake it off with. Now had this tradition come by force into the World, there would have been a ſecret exultation of Mind to be freed from it, as we ſee Nature rejoyceth to ſhake off every thing which is violent, and to ſettle every thing according to its due order. It is only Fraud then which can be with any Reaſon imagin'd in this caſe; and how unreaſonable it is to imagine it here, will appear to any one who doth conſider how extremely jealous the World is of being impoſed upon by the Subtilty of ſuch who are thought to be the greateſt Politicians. For the very Opinion of their Subtilty makes them apt to ſuſpect a Deſign in every thing they ſpeak or do, ſo that nothing doth more generally hinder the entertaining of any motion ſo much among vulgar People, as that it comes from a Perſon reputed very Politic. So that the moſt politic way of gaining upon the Apprehenſions of the Vulgar, is by taking upon one the greateſt appearance of Simplicity and Integrity; and this now cou'd not be done by ſuch Politicians which we now ſpeak of, but by accommodating themſelves to ſuch things in the People which were ſo conſonant to their Natures, that they cou'd ſuſpect no deſign at all in the matters propounded to them. And thus I aſſert it to have been in the preſent caſe, in all thoſe Politic Governours who at firſt brought the World into both Civil and Religious Societies, after they were grown Rude and Barbarous; for as it had been impoſſible to have brought them into Civil Societies, unleſs there had been ſuppos'd an inclination to Society in them, ſo it had been equally impoſſible to have brought them to embrace any particular way of Religion, unleſs there had been a natural propenſity to Religion implanted in them, and founded in the general belief of the exiſtence of a Deity. And therefore we never find any of the ancient Founders of Common-wealths go about to perſuade the People that there was a God, but this they ſuppos'd and made their advantage of it, the better to draw the People on to embrace that way of Worſhip, which they deliver'd to them, as moſt ſutable to their own deſign. And this is plainly evident in the vaſt difference of Deſigns and Intereſts which were carry'd on in the Heathen World upon this general apprehenſion of a Deity. How came the World to be ſo eaſily abus'd into Religions of all ſhapes and faſhions had not there been a natural inclination in Mens Souls to Religion, and an indelible Idea of a Deity on the Minds of Men? Were then this propenſity groundleſs, and this Idea fictitious, it were the greateſt ſlur imaginable, which cou'd be caſt upon Nature, that when the Inſtincts of irrational Agents argue ſomething real in them; only Man the moſt noble Being of the viſible World, muſt be fatally carry'd to the belief of that which never was. Which yet hath ſo great a force and awe upon Man, that nothing creates ſo great Anxieties in his life as this doth; nothing lays him more open to the deſigns of any who have an intent to abuſe him. But yet further, theſe Politicians who firſt abus'd the world, in telling them there was a God, did they themſelves believe there was a God or no? If they did, then they had no ſuch end as abuſing the world into ſuch a belief. If they did not, upon what accounts did they believe there was none, when the People were ſo ready to believe there was one? Was that as certain a Tradition before that there was no God, as afterwards they made it to be that there was? If ſo, then all thoſe People whom they perſuaded to believe there was a God, did before, all believe there was none; and how can it poſſibly

enter into the Reaſon of any Man to think, that People who had been brought up in the belief that there was no God at all, nor any State after this Life, ſhou'd all unanimouſly quit the Principles of Education which tended ſo much to their Eaſe and Pleaſure here, to believe there was a God and another Life, and thereby to fill themſelves full of Fears and Diſquietments, merely becauſe their Rulers told them ſo? Again, if theſe Rulers themſelves were ſo wiſe as not to believe a Deity, can we imagine there ever was ſuch an Age of the World wherein it fell out ſo happily, that only the Rulers were Wiſe, and all the Subjects Fools? But it may be, it will be ſaid, *That all who were wiſe themſelves did not believe a Deity, but yet conſented to the practice of Religion, becauſe it was ſo uſeful for the Government of Mankind*; but can it be thought that all theſe wiſe Men, which we muſt ſuppoſe of ſeveral Ranks and Degrees, (for Philoſophers are not always States-men, nor States-men Philoſophers) ſhou'd ſo readily concur in ſuch things which tended moſt to the intereſt of the Prince, and to the abuſe of the World? Wou'd none of them be ready to aſſert the Truth, tho' it were but to make a Party of their own, and diſcover to the People, that it was only the Ambition and Deſign of their Governours which ſought to bring the People to Slavery by the belief of ſuch things, which were contrary to the Tradition of their Fore-fathers, and wou'd make their Lives, if they believ'd them, continually troubleſome and unquiet? Or if we cou'd ſuppoſe things ſhou'd hit thus in one Nation, what is this to the whole World which the *Atheiſt* here ſuppoſeth eternal? What, did all the Rulers of the World exactly agree in one moment of time; or at leaſt in one Age thus to abuſe the World? Did the deſigns of Governours and the credulity of all People fall out to be ſo ſutable together? But on the contrary, we do not find that Governours can have the Judgments of People ſo at their command, that they can make them to believe what they pleaſe; if it were ſo, we may well ſay with that *Atheiſtical* Pope, *Heu quam minimo regitur Mundus*; *What a twine thread will Rule the World!* But granting theſe things, (which any but an *Atheiſt* will ſay are impoſſible) yet whence ſhou'd it come to paſs that the World, which is generally led more by the Opinions of their Fore-fathers, than by Reaſon, ſhou'd ſo cancel that former Tradition that there was no God, that no remaining foot-ſteps of it can be traced in any Hiſtory of thoſe times? Or did the Governours at all conſent to aboliſh all Records of it? Public and Written I grant they might, but not thoſe out of Mens Minds and Memories; which wou'd have been for the eaſe of the Minds of their Poſterity conveyed in ſome ſecret *Cabala* from Fathers to their Children. It may be it will be ſaid, *ſo it was, but Men durſt not profeſs it for fear of the Laws:* but, it is not evident that the Laws of all ancient Common-wealths were ſo ſevere againſt *Atheiſm*; and withal how came ſome of the wiſeſt and moſt philoſophical Men of *Greece* and *Rome* to embrace the exiſtence of a Deity, as a thing far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary Opinion, and eſtabliſh'd their belief on ſuch Evidences from Nature it ſelf, that none of their *Antagoniſts* were able to anſwer them? It was not certainly the fear of Laws which made Men rational and inquiſitive into the Natures and Cauſes of things; and yet thoſe who were ſuch amidſt the great Idolatries of the Heathen, and being deſtitute of Divine Revelation, yet freely and firmly aſſented to the exiſtence of a Deity. Had it been only Fraud and Impoſture which brought Men to believe a God, whence came it to paſs that this Fraud

was

was not discover'd by these Philosophers, who were far better able by their nearness to those eldest times and much converse abroad in other Nations (for some Travell'd into *Ægypt*, *Chaldea*, *Persia*, *India*, merely to gain Knowledge) to have found out such an Imposture, had it been such, than any of our modern *Atheists?* Whence come these now in this almost decrepit Age of the World to be the first smellers out of so great a Design? By what Means, what tokens and Evidences came such an Imposture to their knowledge? Because, forsooth, the World is still apt to be abus'd by a pretence of Religion; but he that doth not see how silly and ridiculous a Sophism that is, either by his own Reason, or by what hath gone before; hath Wit and Reason little enough to be an *Atheist*. Some therefore who wou'd seem a little wiser than the vulgar sort of *Atheists* (for it seems there is a *Vulgus* among them too, I wish it be more for their Meanness than Multitude) are so far convinced of the unreasonableness of judging that the belief of a Deity came in by Fraud, that finding it so general and universal, they attribute it to as general and universal a Cause, which is the influence of the Stars. So true still is that of the Poet, *Cœlum ipsum petimus stultitia*; for by what imaginable influence come the Stars to plant Opinions in Mens Minds so deeply and universally? But yet further, is this Opinion which is thus caus'd by the Stars, true or false? If the Opinion be true, we have what we desire; if false, what malignant Influence is this of the Stars, so powerfully to sway Men to the belief of a Falsity? How far are the Stars then from doing good to Mankind, when they are so influential to deceive the World; but then, by what peculiar Influence come some Men to be freed from this general Imposture? If the Cause be so universal, the Effect must be universal too. But if only the nativity and continuance of some particular Religions may be calculated by the Stars, (as *Cardan* and *Vaninus*, Atheistically suppose) whence then comes the general propensity and inclination to Religion in all Ages and Nations of the World? If it be then caus'd by the Heavens in general, it must be produced necessarily and universally, and so to be an *Atheist*, were impossible; if it be caus'd by the influence of some particular Stars, then when that influence ceaseth, the World wou'd universally relapse into *Atheism*. So that there is no possible way of avoiding this universal consent of Mankind, as an Argument that there is a God, when all the Pretences of the *Atheist* against it are so weak, ridiculous and impertinent.

VIII. The only thing then left for him, is, to deny the truth of the thing, *viz.* that there is such an universal consent; because some Persons have been found in the World who have not agreed with the rest of Mankind in this Opinion. To this I answer, (which was the second Particular for clearing this Argument) that the dissent of these Persons is not sufficient to manifest the consent not to be universal, and to arise from a Dictate of Nature: For I demand of the greatest *Atheist*, whether it be sufficient to say, that it is not natural for Men to have two Legs, because some have been born with one, or that it is not natural for Men to desire Life (which the *Atheist* loves so dearly) because there have been so many who have taken away their own Lives? If it be said that these are Monsters and *Anomalies* in Nature, and therefore not to be reckon'd in the regular Account of things, the same I may with as great reason say of *Atheists*, that they are to be dispung'd out of the *Census* of such who act upon free Principles of Reason; because there

may

may be ſome peculiar Reaſons given of their Diſſent from the reſt of Mankind in the denial of a Deity. We ſee by the old Philoſophers how far the Affectation of Novelty, and Ambition, of being cry'd up for no vulgar Wits, may carry Men to deny ſuch things, which are moſt common and obvious in the World. Is there any thing more plain and evident to Reaſon, than that it implies a contradiction for the ſame thing to be and not to be at the ſame time? and yet if we believe *Ariſtotle*, who largely diſputes againſt them, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχεσθαι φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. *There were ſome who affirm'd that a thing might be and not be at the ſame time.* What ſo evident in Nature as Motion? yet the Philoſopher is well known who diſputed againſt it, and thought himſelf ſubtile in doing ſo too. What are Men more aſſur'd of, than that they live, and yet (if it be not too Dogmatical, even in that to believe the *Sceptics*) it was a thing none cou'd be aſſur'd of? What are our Senſes more aſſur'd of than that the Snow is white, yet all the Philoſophers were not of that Opinion? Is this then ſufficient Reaſon on which to deny an univerſal conſent, becauſe ſome Philoſophers oppos'd it, when it is moſt undoubtedly true, which *Tully* ſharply ſpeaks of the ancient Philoſophers, *Nihil tam abſurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philoſophorum*; *There was no abſurdity ſo great, but it found a Philoſopher to vouch it?* But in this caſe thoſe Philoſophers who queſtion'd the exiſtence of a Deity, tho' they were not for number to be compar'd with thoſe who aſſerted it, yet were not ſo inexcuſable therein as our modern *Atheiſts*; becauſe they then knew no other way of Religion, but that which was joyn'd with horrible Superſtition, and ridiculous Rites of Worſhip; they were Strangers to any thing of Divine Revelation, or to any real Miracles wrought to confirm it, and to ſuch a way of ſerving God which is moſt agreeable to the Divine Nature, moſt ſutable to our Reaſon, moſt effectual for advancing true Godlineſs in the World. And altho' this moſt excellent Religion, *viz.* the Chriſtian, be ſubject to many Scandals by reaſon of the Corruptions which have been mix'd with it by thoſe who have profeſs'd it, yet the Religion it ſelf is clear and untainted, being with great Integrity preſerved in the ſacred Records of it. So that now *Atheiſm* hath far leſs to plead for its ſelf than it had in the midſt of the Ignorance and Superſtition of the Heathen Idolatries. But if we ſhou'd grant the *Atheiſt* more than he can prove, that the number of ſuch who deny'd a Deity hath been great in all Ages of the World; is it probable they ſhou'd ſpeak the Sence of Nature, whoſe Opinion, if it were embraced, wou'd diſſolve all Ties and Obligations whatſoever; wou'd let the World looſe to the higheſt Licentiouſneſs, without check or controul, and wou'd in time overturn all Civil Societies? For as *Tully* hath largely ſhewn, *Take away the Being and Providence of God out of the World, and there follows nothing but Perturbation and Confuſion in it, not only all Sanctity, Piety and Devotion is deſtroy'd, but all Faith, Vertue and Humane Societies too*; which are impoſſible to be upheld without Religion, as not only he, but *Plato*, *Ariſtotle* and *Plutarch*, have fully demonſtrated. Shall ſuch Perſons then who hold an Opinion ſo contrary to all other Dictates of Nature, rather ſpeak the Senſe of Nature, than they who have aſſerted the belief of a Deity, which tends ſo much to advance Nature, to regulate the World, and to reform the Lives of Men? Certainly if it were not a dictate of Nature that there was a God, it is impoſſible to conceive the World ſhou'd be ſo conſtant in the belief of him, when the thoughts of him

Ariſt. Metaphyſ. l. 4. c. 4.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. & de Legib. l. 2.

him breed so many Anxieties in Mens Minds, and withal, since God is neither obvious to Sense, nor his nature comprehensible by Humane Reason. Which is a stronger Evidence it is a Character of himself which God hath imprinted on the Minds of Men, which makes them so unanimously agree that he is, when they can neither see him, nor yet fully comprehend him. For any whole Nation, which have consented in the denial of a *Deity*, we have no evidence at all; some suspicions it is true there were at first concerning some very barbarous People in *America*, but it is since evident, tho' they are grosly mistaken as to the Nature of God, yet they worship something instead of him, such as the *Tupinamboults*, *Caribes*, *Patagons*, *Tapuiæ*, and others; of the last of which *Vossius* from one *Christophorus Arcissewski*, a *Polonian* Gentelman, who was among them, hath given a large account of their Religion, and the manner of their Worshipping of their Gods, both good and bad. And that which among these *Indians* much confirms our present Argument, is, That only those who have been the most barbarous and salvage Nations, have been suspected of Irreligion, but the more civiliz'd they have been, the more evident their sense of Religion. The *Peruvians* worship one chief God, whom they call *Virachocha*, and *Pachacamak*, which is as much as *The Creator of Heaven and Earth*. And of the Religion of the *Mexicans*, *Lipsius* and others speak. So that the nearer any have approach'd to Civility and Knowledge, the more ready they have been to own a Deity, and none have had so little sense of it, as they who are almost degenerated to Brutes; and whether of these two now comes nearer to Reason, let any one who hath it judge.

Vossius Addend. ad l. 1. de Idol. p. 2.

Vid. Acostam, l. 5. c. 3.

Lipsi. Mon. & Exempl. Politic.

XIV. 2. Another great Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character or Idea of himself on the Minds of Men, is, *because such things are contain'd in this Idea of God, which do necessarily imply his existence.* The main force of this Argument lies in this, *That which we do clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirmed of the thing*; not that it may be affirm'd with truth to belong to the nature of the thing, for that were an empty *Tautology*, but it may be affirm'd with truth of the thing its self; as if I clearly perceive upon exact enquiry, that to be an Animal doth belong to the nature of Man, I may with truth affirm that Man is a living Creature; if I find it demonstrably true that a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones, then I may truly affirm it of any Triangle: But now we assume, That upon the most exact search and inquiry, I clearly perceive that necessary existence doth immutably belong to the nature of God; therefore, I may with as much truth affirm, that God exists, as that Man is a living Creature; or, a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones. But because many are so apt to suspect some kind of *Sophism* in this Argument, when it is managed from the Idea in Mens Minds, because that seems to imply only an objective reality in the Mind, and that nothing can be thence inferr'd as to the existence of the thing whose Idea it is, I therefore shall endeavour to manifest more clearly the force of this Argument, by proving severally the suppositions which it stands upon, which are these three: 1. *That clear and distinct perception of the Mind is the greatest Evidence we can have of the truth of any thing.* 2. *That we have this clear perception that necessary existence doth belong to the nature of God.* 3. *That if necessary existence doth belong to God's nature, it unavoidably follows, that he doth exist.* Nothing can be desir'd more plain or full, to demonstrate the force of this Argument, than by proving every one of these.

1. *That*

1. *That the greateſt Evidence we can have of the truth of a thing, is a clear and diſtinct perception of it in our Minds.* For otherwiſe the rational Faculties of Man's Soul wou'd be wholly uſeleſs, as being not fitted for any end at all, if upon a right uſe of them, Men were ſtill liable to be deceiv'd. I grant the imperfection of our Minds in this preſent ſtate is very great, which makes us ſo obnoxious to error and miſtake; but then that imperfection lies in the proneneſs in Man's Mind to be led by intereſt and prejudice in the judgment of things; but in ſuch things as are purely ſpeculative and rational, if the Mind cannot be certain it is not deceiv'd in them, it can have no certainty at all of any *Mathematical* Demonſtrations. Now we find in our own Minds a clear and convincing Evidence in ſome things, as ſoon as they are propounded to our Underſtandings, as that a *thing cannot be and not be at the ſame time*; that a *non-entity can have no proper Attributes*; that *while I reaſon and diſcourſe, I am*; theſe are ſo clear, that no Man doth ſuſpect himſelf deceiv'd at all in them. Beſides, if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things, to what purpoſe is there an Idea of true and falſe in our Minds, if it be impoſſible to know the one from the other? But I ſay not, that in all Perceptions of the Mind we have certain Evidence of truth, but only in ſuch as are clear and diſtinct; that is, when upon the greateſt conſideration of the nature of a thing, there appears no ground or reaſon at all to doubt concerning it; and this muſt ſuppoſe the Mind's abſtraction wholly from the Senſes; for we plainly find that while we attend to them, we may judge our ſelves very certain and yet be deceiv'd, as thoſe who have an *Iderism* in their Eyes, may judge with much confidence that they ſee things as clearly and diſtinctly as any other doth. Beſides, there are many things taken for granted by Men, which have no Evidence of Reaſon at all in them: Now if Men will judge of the truth of things by ſuch Principles, no wonder if they be deceiv'd. But when we ſpeak of clear and diſtinct Perception, we ſuppoſe the Mind to proceed upon evident Principles of Reaſon, or to have ſuch Notions of things, which as far as we can perceive by the light of Reaſon, do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend; if in ſuch things then there be no ground of certainty, it is as much as to ſay, our Faculties are to no purpoſe; which highly reflects either upon God or Nature. It is a noble Queſtion as any is in *Philoſophy*, What is the certain, κριτήριον of the truth of things, or what ground of certainty the Mind hath to proceed upon in its judgment of the truth of ſuch objects as are repreſented to it? Nothing can render the *Philoſophy* of *Epicurus* more juſtly ſuſpected to any rational and inquiſitive Mind, than his making the Senſes the only conveyers of the truth of things to the Mind. The Senſes I grant do not in themſelves deceive any; but if I make the impreſſions of Senſe to be the only rule for the Mind to judge by of the truth of things, I make way for the greateſt impoſtures, and the moſt erring judgments. For if my Mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature according to that Idea which the Imagination hath receiv'd from the impreſſions upon the organs of Senſe, it will be impoſſible for me ever to underſtand the right natures of things. Becauſe the natures of things may remain the ſame, when all thoſe things in them which affect the organs of Senſe may be alter'd, and becauſe the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter may make ſuch an impreſſion upon the Senſes, which may cauſe an Idea in us of that in the things themſelves, which yet may

be

be only in the manner of Senſation; as ſome Philoſophers ſuppoſe it to be in Heat and Cold. Now if the Mind judgeth of the nature of things according to thoſe Ideas which come from the impreſſions made upon the organs of Senſe; how is it poſſible it ſhou'd ever come to a right judgment of the natures of things? So that in reference even to the groſſeſt material Beings, it muſt be the Perception only of the Mind, which can truly inform us of their proper Nature and Eſſence. Beſides, there are many Ideas of things in the Mind of Man which are capable to have Properties demonſtrated of them, which never ow'd their original to our Senſes; and were never imported to the Mind at the Keys of the Senſes. Such are moſt *Mathematical* Figures, which have their peculiar Properties and Demonſtrations; ſuch are all the mutual reſpects of things to each other, which may be as certain and evident to the Mind as its ſelf is: now it is plain by this, that all certainty of Knowledge is not convey'd by the Senſes; but our trueſt way of certain underſtanding the Nature of any thing, is by the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Mind, which is founded on the truth of our Faculties; and that however we may be deceiv'd when we do not make a right uſe of our Reaſon, becauſe of the imperfection of our preſent ſtate; yet if we ſay our Minds may be deceiv'd when things are evident and clear to them upon plain Principles of Reaſon, it is highly to reflect upon that God who gave Men rational Faculties, and made them capable of diſcerning Truth from Falſhood.

2. *That we have clear and diſtinct Perception that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth belong to the Nature of God.* For which we are to conſider the vaſt difference which there is in our Notion of the Nature of God, and of the Nature of any other Being. In all other Beings, I grant we may abſtract eſſence and Exiſtence from each other; now if I can make it appear, that there is evident Reaſon, *ex parte rei*, why I cannot do it in the Notion of God, then it will be more plain that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to his Nature. It is manifeſt to our Reaſon, that in all other Beings, which we apprehend the Natures of, nothing elſe can be imply'd in the Natures of them beyond bare poſſibility of Exiſtence; no, altho' the things which we do apprehend, do really exiſt; becauſe in forming an Idea of a thing, we abſtract from every thing which is not imply'd in the very Nature of the thing: now Exiſtence being contingent and poſſible, as to any other Being, it cannot be any ingredient of its Idea, becauſe it doth not belong to its Eſſence; for we may fully apprehend the Nature of the thing, without attributing Exiſtence to it. But now in our Conception of a Being, abſolutely perfect, bare poſſibility or contingency of Exiſtence ſpeaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of him; for how can we conceive that Being abſolutely perfect, which may want that which gives life to all other Perfections, which is *Exiſtence?* The only ſcruple which Mens Minds are ſubject to in apprehending the force of this Argument lies in this, *Whether this neceſſary Exiſtence doth really belong to the Nature of that Being whoſe Idea it is; or elſe it be only a Mode of our Conception in apprehending God?* For clearing of this, we muſt conſider by what certain Rules we can know when the compoſition of things together in the Underſtanding doth depend upon

the mere Operation of the Mind, and when they do belong to the things themſelves and their immutable Nature. For which we have no Rule ſo certain and evident as this is, that in thoſe things which depend merely on the Act of the Mind joyning together, the Underſtanding cannot only abſtract one thing from another, but may really divide them in its Conceptions from each other: but in ſuch things which cannot be divided from each other, but the Eſſence of the thing is quite alter'd, it is a certain evidence that thoſe things were not conjoyn'd by the mere Act of the Mind, but do immutably belong to the Natures of the things themſelves. As for inſtance, when I conceive a Triangle inſcrib'd in a Square, a Man walking, a Horſe with wings, it is evident I may underſtand the Natures of all theſe things without theſe Affections of them, becauſe I can fully apprehend the Nature of a Triangle, without imagining a Square, a Man without walking, a Horſe without wings; thence it neceſſarily follows, that the joyning of theſe things together, was merely an Act of the Mind: But now I cannot conceive a Triangle not to have three Angles equal to two right ones, nor a Man that hath not Rationality belonging to him; for if I divide theſe Attributes from them, I deſtroy their Natures; and therefore the joyning of theſe together is not any mere Act of the Mind; but theſe are ſuch things as are imply'd in the very notion of them, and therefore immutably belongs to them. So now, when I conceive the notion of a Body, I can imagine all Perfections belonging to it, without conceiving it neceſſarily to exiſt; for it may be a Body ſtill, tho' it hath not its Being from it ſelf; but when I conceive a Being abſolutely perfect, it is impoſſible to imagine it ſhou'd have its Being from any other; and if it be from it ſelf, it muſt of neceſſity exiſt. For tho' the Mind ſtill be apt to doubt, whether Exiſtence in this Idea be only a Mode of Cogitation; yet that doubt may be eaſily remov'd, if the Mind doth but attend to this, that at leaſt Poſſibility of Exiſtence doth belong to all thoſe Beings which we have a clear Idea of in our Minds; and the reaſon why we attribute bare poſſibility to them, is becauſe we apprehend ſome Reaſon in our Minds which keeps us from attributing neceſſity of Exiſtence to them, as that it is not imply'd in its Nature, or that it doth depend on ſome other Being, or that it wants infinite Power, &c. Now all theſe Reaſons which make us attribute bare poſſibility of Exiſtence to any Being, are taken away when we conceive a Being abſolutely perfect; for then Exiſtence is imply'd among the number of Perfections; and this Being is independant upon all others, and infinitely powerful; ſo that nothing can hinder its Exiſtence; and therefore we muſt conclude that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to the Nature of God, and is not any Mode only of our Conception; becauſe if we take away neceſſity of Exiſtence from God, we loſe the notion of a Being abſolutely perfect.

The third thing, *That if neceſſary Exiſtence belongs to the Nature of God, he doth exiſt*, not only follows as a neceſſary Concluſion from the other two, as the Premiſſes, but is in its ſelf evident to any one's Reaſon; for it implies no leſs than a Contradiction for a Being to exiſt neceſſarily, and yet it be queſtionable, Whether it doth exiſt or no? Thus much I ſuppoſe may ſuffice here

here to explain and enforce this Argument; if any are yet unſatiſfy'd, I refer them to thoſe judicious Authors, who have made it their peculiar buſineſs to manage it, and vindicate it from all objections: which falls in only here as an Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character of himſelf on the Minds of Men, ſeeing we have ſo clear and diſtinct an Idea of ſuch a Being, from whom, if we take away neceſſity of Exiſtence, we deſtroy that Notion which our Minds have of an abſolutely perfect Being. This is the firſt way whereby we can conceive an infinite Being may make himſelf known to Mankind, by imprinting an indelible Character of himſelf upon the Soul, which can be attributed to none beſides himſelf without doing manifeſt violence to our own Faculties, and ſuſpecting our ſelves deceiv'd in things which are moſt clear and evident to us.

Vid. Des Cartes Metaphyſ. Medit. & Reſp. ad Object. D H. *More* Antidote againſt Atheiſm, *l.* 1. *ch.* 8. *Append. ch.* 5, 6, 7.

XV. I come to the ſecond Evidence which God hath given us of his own Exiſtence, which is the mark, and *impreſſion which he hath left of an infinite Wiſdom and Counſel, in the appearances which are in Nature.* There needs no great Criticiſm to find out the true Author of all the Works of Nature; the Works themſelves ſhew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curioſity and contrivance of any artificial Engine ſpeak the excellency of the Mechanical Wit of the Framer of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare Mechaniſm of the Works of Nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of ſome Particles of Matter? Suppoſe a multitude of Letters caſually thrown together, ſhou'd fall ſo handſomely in order, that we might read in them the Names of *Troja*, *Juno*, *Æneas*, *Dido*, *Turnus*, *Aſcanius* or the like; is it poſſible for any to imagine that ever they ſhou'd reach the Grandeur, Stile, Matter and Accuracy of the whole Books of the *Æneids?* So granting, that now Matter being ſet in Motion by a Divine Power, may by its continual agitation, at laſt produce ſome of the appearances of Nature; yet what is this to the whole Univerſe, or the admirable Contrivance of any one part in it? If theſe things had been the reſult of mere Matter and Motion, when once the Particles of Matter had been ſo united and ſettled together, as to produce any one ſpecies of Animals in the World (which it is almoſt unconceivable they ſhou'd) yet we cannot think that if there had been but Symmetry of Parts enough for it merely to ſubſiſt it ſelf, and propagate more, there cou'd have been any further Attempt made by thoſe *Atoms*, which had been once ſettl'd in a determinate figure. How came it then to paſs that there is not any one ſpecies of Animals in the World, but what hath ſuch an Order, Symmetry and Contrivance of parts, which ſpeaks more than mere neceſſity of Subſiſtence, and therefore ſpeaks them to be the Effect of a Supreme Governour of the World, and not the Products of mere Matter? Is it poſſible, that any who is not before-hand reſolv'd to exclude a *Deity*, ſhou'd imagine that any Particles of Matter ſhou'd fall into the exact Form, Order, Motion, and ſerviceableneſs to the World which the Heavenly Bodies are in, without Divine Counſel and Wiſdom diſpoſing of them? *Tully* tells us of a Speech of *Ariſtotle* to this purpoſe; *If we cou'd ſuppoſe Perſons to have liv'd in ſome caverns of the earth, and to have enjoy'd every thing there of pleaſure, and*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2. *c.* 95.

riches, or whatever it is which we think makes Mens Lives happy, and had never been abroad upon the ſurface of the earth, but had only had ſome obſcure report of an infinite Power and Being; and that afterwards theſe Perſons ſhou'd by an opening of the caverns wherein they were, come abroad into theſe parts of the World, and ſhou'd ſuddenly behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, and obſerve the vaſtneſs of the Clouds, and violence of Winds, and behold the bigneſs, beauty and influence of the Sun, and how the Day depended upon his preſence, and upon his withdrawing ſhou'd view the face of the Heavens again (as it were the *ſecond courſe* of Nature,) *the order and ornament of the Stars, the varieties of the light of the Moon, their riſing and ſetting, and their fixed and immoveable courſes; they cou'd not hold from believing there was a* Deity, *and that theſe were the effects of his Power.* So vaſtly different are the free and natural emanations of our Souls, from that which we force and ſtrain out of our ſelves by diſtorting and wringing thoſe free Principles of Reaſon which God hath given us. When a few ſorry Experiments and ſome arbitrary *Hypotheſes*, muſt make us form other Conceptions of things, than the Majeſty, Order and Beauty of them do naturally ſuggeſt to us: We ſee, when once we can but abſtract our Minds from thoſe prejudices which continual converſation with the World brings upon us, by that Speech of *Ariſtotle*, how readily our Minds will frame an excellent Commentary upon thoſe words of the Royal *Pſalmiſt*, *The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament ſhews his handy-work.* To which purpoſe likewiſe thoſe words of the excellent *Orator* himſelf in another place, are very obſervable; *Quid eſt enim verius quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe mentem & rationem putet ineſſe, in cælo mundoque non putet? aut ea quæ vix ſumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putat? Quem vero aſtrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque viciſſitudines, quem menſium temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum eſſe cogant, hunc hominem omnino numerare qui dicet? What monſtrous arrogancy wou'd it be in any Man to think there is a Mind and Reaſon in himſelf, and that there is none in the World? Or to think thoſe things are mov'd without Reaſon and Underſtanding, which all that he hath is ſcarce able to comprehend? Neither can he deſerve the name of a Man, from whom the obſervation of the courſes of the Stars, the ſucceſſion and order of Seaſons, and the innumerable benefits which he enjoys in the World, doth not extort gratitude towards that Being which order'd all theſe things.* What a low opinion then had thoſe more refin'd and generous Spirits, who went only upon Principles of pure and undiſtorted Reaſon, of thoſe mean and ignoble Souls, which were inclin'd to *Atheiſm*; eſpecially then, when Religion was ſo abus'd, that it was true of the wiſeſt of them, what one ſaid of *Eraſmus*, *Magis habuit quid fugeret quam quid ſequeretur*, they knew what to avoid, but not what they ſhou'd embrace: And yet when they ſaw ſo much into the Folly and Superſtition of Heathen Worſhip, they ſaw the greateſt reaſon ſtill to adhere to the belief of a Deity, as may be clearly ſeen, eſpecially in the ſecond of thoſe excellent Dialogues of *Tully*, *De Natura Deorum:* Where this particular Argument to prove a Deity from the admirable

Cicero de Legibus, l. 2.

admirable contrivance of the Works of Nature, is manag'd with a great deal of Eloquence and Reaſon, and by particular enumeration of moſt conſiderable parts of the Univerſe. So unbecoming a late Philoſopher was that Reaſon of his, why he wav'd the Argument from the conſideration of the World, to infer a Deity, becauſe the ends of God are unſearchable, as flowing from his Infinite Wiſdom. For what tho' God may conceal ſome things from Men, which he intends, and are of no concernment for Men to know, muſt therefore of neceſſity thoſe ends of his be unſearchable in his works of Creation, which refer ſo immediately to the advantage of Life, and tend ſo much to the veneration of the Deity?

XVI. Nay, the peculiar uſe and ſerviceableneſs of many parts of the Univerſe, eſpecially of Animals, and chiefly of Man, is ſo evident, that this hath been the main Argument which hath induced ſome, otherwiſe *Atheiſtical* enough to acknowledge and adore a Deity. And altho' the *Epicureans* be lamentably puzled to give any tolerable account of many other appearances in Nature, yet they no where diſcover ſo much Weakneſs and Ignorance, as when they come to diſcourſe *De uſu partium*, about the contrivance of the parts of Man's Body. Whoſe Opinion is thus briefly delivered by *Lucretius*;

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti
Poſſemus; ſed quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum *Lucret. l. 4.*

i. e. *that no parts of Man's body were deſign'd for that uſe which they are imploy'd for, but the parts by chance fell into that form they are in, and Men by degrees brought them to their preſent uſe and ſerviceableneſs.* An Opinion at firſt view ſo ſtrangely unreaſonable, that we cannot think *Epicurus* ſhou'd have ever embraced it, had it not unavoidably follow'd upon his *Hypotheſis* of all things in the Univerſe reſulting only from a fortuitous Concourſe of Atoms: According to which he ſuppos'd in Man a different configuration of Parts wou'd happen from the various Agitation and Concretion of thoſe little Particles which at firſt run together in the faſhion of a Man; and becauſe that Man had in him a more florid and vivacious Spirit, made up of the moſt ſubtle and movable Atoms, thence Motion came into the ſeveral parts ſutable to the different Conformation of them. And becauſe thoſe Atoms of which the Soul is compos'd, are capable of Senſation, thence it comes to paſs, that it ſees in the Eye, hears in the Ear, and ſmells in the Noſtrils. This is the moſt which is made of the Opinion of *Epicurus* by the late ſedulous Vindicator of him, which yet himſelf calls *intoleranda opinio*; and it will appear to be ſo, not only as contradicting, what God himſelf hath deliver'd concerning Man, but what Reaſon it ſelf will eaſily ſuggeſt from the conſideration of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body. It muſt be confeſs'd there were ſome Philoſophers elder than *Epicurus*, who were much inclin'd to this Opinion, as *Democritus*, *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*, and others; yet we find thoſe who more narrowly ſearch'd into the Natures of living Creatures, were thereby brought to acknowledge a Divine Providence, which with a great deal

deal of Wiſdom did order the ſeveral parts of Animals, and adapted them to their peculiar uſes. And altho' *Ariſtotle* in his Book *de partibus Animalium*, hath ſaid enough to refute the fond Opinion of thoſe Philoſophers; yet none hath handled this Argument with more exactneſs and accuracy, and with a more peculiar reflection on *Epicurus*, than *Galen* hath done in his excellent piece *De uſu partium.* Which *Gaſſendus* thinks *Galen* writ with a kind of *Enthuſiaſm* upon him (*adeo totum opus videre conſcriptum* ἐνθουσιαστικῶς) and ſo all thoſe ſeventeen Books of his on that ſubject, are a kind of 119th *Pſalm* in Philoſophy, or a perpetual *Hymn* upon the praiſe of the great Creator, a juſt Commentary on thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt*, Pſal. 139. 14. *I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my Soul knoweth right well.* In the entrance of thoſe Books, *Galen* firſt ſhews the great variety of parts which is in ſeveral Animals ſutable to their ſeveral Natures; the Horſe becauſe of his Swiftneſs and Pride, hath the ſtrongeſt Hoofs and moſt curl'd Main; the Lion becauſe of his Fierceneſs and Courage hath his Strength lying in his Teeth and Paws; the Bull in his Horns; the Boar in his Tuſks; the Hart and Hare being timorous Creatures, their parts are made fitteſt for flight: but Man becauſe he hath a principle of Reaſon in him, hath no defenſive or offenſive Weapons in his Body, but he hath Hands to make uſe of both; which being joyn'd with, and imploy'd by his Reaſon, far exceed all thoſe advantages which any other Creatures have, being imploy'd not only to defend himſelf, but to build Houſes, make Cloaths, Arms and Nets, whatever is uſeful for himſelf, or hurtful to thoſe Creatures which he hath command over; but becauſe Man was made for Society and civil Converſe, therefore his hands were not only imploy'd to defend himſelf or hurt other Creatures, but for the mutual benefit and advantage of Mankind; for by theſe were Laws written, Temples built, all Inſtruments of Arts fram'd; by them we enjoy the benefit of others Wits, we can diſcourſe with *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hippocrates*, and other Ancients, tho' at ſuch a diſtance from us. Now that the Configuration of Parts is not the cauſe of the uſe of them afterwards; as the Lion's paw of his Courage, the Bull's horns of his Fierceneſs, or the ſlenderneſs of the Hart of its Fearfulneſs; appears by this, becauſe the young Ones of the ſeveral kinds of Animals, before their parts are grown up, ſtrive to make the ſame uſe of them which the others do. As *Galen* ſaith, he had often ſeen a Bull-calf puſhing with his Head before any Horns were grown out, and a Colt kicking when his Hoofs were yet tender, and a young Boar defending himſelf with his Jaws before he had any Tuſks, which is an evident Argument that the parts were deſigned for the uſe, and not the uſe to follow the parts. *So*, ſaith he, *take three Eggs, one of an Eagle, another of a Duck, and a third of a Serpent, and after they are hatch'd thro' a moderate heat, we ſhall find when they are but newly hatch'd, the two firſt will be ſtriving to fly before they have Wings, and the third endeavouring to creep away on its Belly; and if you breed them up to greater Perfection, and bring them into the open Air, you will preſently ſee the young Eagle mounting into the Air, the Duck quoddling in a Pool, and the Serpent creep under Ground.*

Gaſſend. Tom. 2. l. 2. §. 3.

After-

Afterwards he comes particularly to handle the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and firſt begins with the Hand, and ſhews in each part that it were impoſſible to have fram'd them with greater conveniency for their ſeveral uſes than they have. The uſe of the Hand is to take hold of any thing which Man can uſe; now there being things of ſuch different ſizes which Men may uſe, it had been impoſſible for the Hand, if it had been one intire thing, and undivided, that it cou'd have held things greater or leſſer than its ſelf, but it muſt have been equal to it. But now as the Fingers are placed and divided, they are equally fit for laying hold of Objects of any ſize or quantity; for the leaſt things, as a Barley Corn, are taken up with the Fore-finger and the Thumb, things ſomewhat bigger are taken up by the ſame, but not by the extremities of them as before; things ſomewhat bigger than theſe, with the Thumb, Fore-finger and Middle-finger, and ſo on by degrees, till at laſt the whole Hand is us'd: ſo that the diviſion of the Hand into Fingers is neceſſary. Neither were this enough, but the very poſition of the Fingers as they are, is neceſſary too; for they had been uſeleſs if they had been all divided in a right line; for the firmeſt hold is either circular, or at leaſt in two oppoſite points; but now this is provided for, by the poſition of the Thumb, which may equally joyn with any of the Fingers in taking hold of any thing. After this, he largely ſhews the particular neceſſity of the ſoftneſs, roundneſs of the Fleſh, and Nails on the tops of the Fingers; and the ſpecial uſefulneſs of theſe; and then comes to the Bones of the Fingers, how neceſſary they are for firm-hold, and if there had been but one Bone in each Finger, they wou'd have ſerv'd only for thoſe things which we take up when they are extended; but now ſeeing they have three ſeveral joynts, they are fitted for all kinds of things; for when we bow our Fingers, we uſe them as tho' they had no bones at all, and when we ſtretch them out, as tho' they were all but one intire Bone; and the ſeveral inflections of the Joynts ſerve for all kind of Figures: and then he ſhews the neceſſity of the Fleſh within the Fingers, and on either ſide of them, and upon them; and ſo with wonderful accuracy handles the magnitude, number, figure of the Bones, and nature of the Joynts of the Fingers, and then the Tendons and Muſcles belonging to the ſeveral Fingers, which after he hath diſcours'd on thro' his firſt Book he concludes it with the manifeſt inconveniency which wou'd follow in the hand, were not every thing in it in that exact magnitude, poſition, and figure in which it is. With the ſame exactneſs he goes thro' all the parts of the Body, handling in the ſecond Book all that belongs to the Arm, in the third the Legs, in the fourth and fifth the Organs of Nutrition, in the ſixth and ſeventh the Lungs, in the eighth and ninth the Head, in the tenth the peculiar and admirable Fabrick of the Eyes, in the eleventh the other parts of the Face, in the twelfth the parts of the Back, and ſo in the thirteenth, in the fourteenth and fifteenth the Genitals, in the ſixteenth the Arteries, Veins, and Nerves, and in the laſt the peculiar Diſpoſition and Figure of all theſe Parts, and the uſefulneſs of the whole Deſign: Which is as great as can be in any Work whatſoever, which is for us to take notice of the admirable Wiſdom of God in contriving the ſeveral

parts

pa[illegible] of the Body of Man: So that, that whole Book contains in it a moſt full and pregnant demonſtration of a Deity, which every Man carries about with him in the Structure of his Body, on which account Men need not go out of themſelves to find proof of a Deity, whether they conſider their Minds or their Bodies, of which it may be more truly ſaid than *Heraclitus* of old did of his Stove, *Etiam hic Dii ſunt.* So that of all Perſons, I ſhou d moſt wonder at thoſe whoſe Imployment particularly leads them to the Underſtanding the parts and nature of Man's Body, if the Proverb be not a great injury to them, ſince they have fuller inſight into this demonſtration of a Deity in the Fabric of Man's Body, than many others who converſe only with ſome jejune and ſapleſs Writings. And certainly, whatever is imagin'd to the contrary by Men of weak Underſtandings, the beſt way to cure the World of *Atheiſm*, is true Philoſophy, or a ſearch into the Natures of things; which the more deep and profound it is, the more impoſſible will it be found to explicate all the *Phænomena* of Nature by mere Matter and Motion. It was wiſely obſerv'd of a great Perſon and Philoſopher, that a narrow and ſlight Inſpection into Nature, inclin'd Men of weak Heads to *Atheiſm*; but a more thorow-inſight into the cauſes of things, made them more evidently ſee the neceſſary dependance of things on the great and wiſe Creator of them. A little knowledge of Philoſophy is apt to make Mens heads dizzy, and then in danger of falling into the Gulf of *Atheiſm*, but a more careful and diligent view of it, brings them into Sobriety and their right Wits again. Such a ſlight Inſpection had the Followers of *Epicurus* into the Nature of things; for when they found how in the preſent State of the World the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter wou'd handſomely ſalve many appearances of Nature, they, drunk with the ſucceſs, reel preſently into an Infinite Space, and there imagine they behold Infinite Worlds made of the concretion of Atoms, and ever ſince their Eyes have been ſo duſted with theſe little Atoms, that they cou'd ſee nothing elſe in the World but them. Which how groſs and unreaſonable it is, will appear from our preſent ſubject; for who but *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* cou'd ever think that our Noſtrils were at firſt faſhion'd as they are merely by the violent impulſe of the Air within, which wou'd force it ſelf a paſſage out? But how came the Air into the Body before it was forced out? Did it break open the Lips, make all that round cavity in the Mouth, for a paſſage thro' the *aſpera Arteria?* But if when it was in, it wou'd come out again, was not the Mouth wide enough to let it go? Or did the firſt Man ſhut his Mouth on purpoſe to find another vent for the Air? If ſo, how chance the force of the Air did not carry away the *Epiglottis?* Or if it got ſafely up to the Noſe, how came it not to force a paſſage out about the Eyes rather than to go down ſo low firſt? But if we believe theſe rare Contrivers of Man's Body, all the inward Veſſels of the Body were made by the courſe of Water, as Channels are; but how is it poſſible, to imagine, that the *Oeſophagus* and the Stomach ſhou'd be ſo curiouſly contriv'd by the mere force of Water? and that all the *Inteſtines* ſhou'd be made only as Channels, to let it out again when it was once in? but how comes then ſuch a kind of Reciprocation and

Ariſtot. de part. Anim. l. 1.

Peri-

Periſtaltic Motion in thoſe Veſſels? how comes the ſeveral Coats of them to be ſo firm? if it had been only a forced paſſage, it wou'd have been direct and thro' the ſubſtance of the parts, as we find it to be in all forced paſſages in the Body of the Earth. Beſides, if the Water receiv'd into the Stomach forced the paſſage thro' the Guts, how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for it ſelf? or did it not like that paſſage when other things came into it, and therefore found out a more ſecret one into the Bladder? but if that were made by the Water, how came it to be ſo full of Membranes, and ſo ſubject to dilatation? Thus ridiculous will Men make themſelves, rather than ſhew themſelves Men in owning and adoring that infinitely wiſe and powerful God, who *orders all things in the World, according to the counſel of his Will.* What can be more plain and evident than the peculiar uſefulneſs of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body is? What other intent can be imagin'd that Man is form'd with a Mouth, but only for taking in of Nouriſhment, and for receiving and letting forth of Air? or that an Infant is ſo ready to open his Mouth, but that there are Breaſts and Milk for him to ſuck in order to his Nouriſhment? Why ſhou'd the *Oeſophagus* be ſo hollow and the Stomach ſo wide, but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the Meat down, and the other for the Fermentation of it? Whence come all the other Veſſels to be ſo conveniently plac'd, were it not for the diſtribution of Nouriſhment into the ſeveral parts, or for conveying away the Excrements of it? Can any one think that the ſeveral Muſcles and Tendons ſhou'd be plac'd in the more ſolid parts for any other end than for the better Motion of them? or that the Nerves ſhou'd be deriv'd from the Brain into the ſeveral parts of the Body for any other deſign than to be the inſtruments of Senſe and Motion? or that the continual motion of the Heart ſhou'd be for any other purpoſe, than for receiving and diſtributing of the Blood thro' the Arteries into the parts of the Body? or that the Eye with all its curious Fabric ſhou'd be only accidentally imploy'd in ſeeing? Theſe things are ſo plain, that however the *Epicureans* may more eaſily loſe themſelves, and deceive others in explaining the appearances of Nature in ſome inanimate Beings, yet when they come with their blind concourſe of *Atoms* to give an account of the parts of Animals, they miſerably befool themſelves, and expoſe themſelves only to contempt and pity. It were eaſy to multiply examples in this kind, but I ſhall only mention one thing more, which is, If all the parts of Man's Body have no higher original than the concourſe of *Atoms* in the firſt Man and Woman, by what were the Umbilical Veſſels form'd whereby the Child in the Womb receives its Nouriſhment? by what *Atoms* was the paſſage of the *Succus nutritius* fram'd from the Mother to the Child? how come thoſe Veſſels to cloſe up ſo naturally upon the birth of the Child, and it to ſeek its Nouriſhment in quite another way? Will the Particles of Matter which by their concretion form'd the Firſt Pair, ſalve this too? Thus ſtill we ſee how impoſſible it is (to go no further than our ſelves) to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite Power and Being which produc'd all theſe things, and hath left ſo plain an inſcription of Himſelf upon the

works of Nature, that none but thoſe who ſhut their Eyes can abſtain from ſeeing it.

XVII. 3. I come now to the third Evidence of a *Deity*, which is, *That there are ſome Beings in the World, which cannot depend upon Matter or Motion, i. e.* that there are ſome Spiritual and Immaterial Subſtances or Beings, (for if the thing be acknowledg'd, it is unbecoming a Man to contend about words) the conſequence of this for the proving a *Deity*, neither hath been, nor I ſuppoſe will be deny'd, by ſuch who queſtion an infinite Being; the ſame Principles leading to the denying and the Proof of both, and immaterial Beings being the ſtrongeſt proof that there is ſomething above Matter in the World. If there be then ſuch things in the World, which Matter and Motion cannot be the cauſes of, then there are certainly ſpiritual and immaterial Beings, and that I ſhall make appear both as to the Minds of Men, and ſome extraordinary effects which are produc'd in the World.

1. I begin with the nature of the Soul of Man. And herein I muſt confine my ſelf to thoſe Arguments which directly prove my preſent purpoſe, and on that account muſt quit all thoſe common Arguments to prove the Soul's immortality from the Attributes of God; for all theſe do ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a *Deity* as already evident; neither can I rely with ſafety on the way which ſome have taken to prove the immortality of the Soul merely from the *Phænomena* of Senſation, which they endeavour to prove, cannot be perform'd by mere Matter and Motion; for granting all this, yet the utmoſt that can be prov'd by it is no greater immortality in our Souls than in the Souls of Brutes; and in the ſenſe in which that is admitted, I ſuppoſe an *Epicurean* will not deny the Soul of Man to be immortal, as *Demonax* in *Lucian* ſaid, when he was ask'd whether the Soul were immortal or no, *It is* (ſaid he) *but as all things elſe are*; for thoſe who make the Soul to be nothing but ſome more ſubtile and active Particles of matter, do not think that upon death they are annihilated, but that only they are diſpers'd and diſſipated; or in the *Platoniſts* Phraſe, may *return to the Soul of the World*. Theſe ways I cannot think to be ſufficient probations of ſuch a ſpiritual and immaterial Being in Man, which we now inquire for, much leſs can I make uſe of ſo precarious and infirm an *Hypotheſis* as *Præ-exiſtence*, which makes Men apt to ſuſpect the cogency of ſuch Reaſons which tend to prove the immortality of the Soul, which are link'd with a ſuppoſition, not only inevident either to Senſe or Reaſon, but likewiſe needleſs and impertinent. For I know no one Argument which doth directly prove the immateriality of the Soul, that doth in the leaſt infer any neceſſity of *Præ-exiſtence*, but on the ſame accounts it will prove the Soul's eternity. Being therefore thus at liberty to inquire into the Nature of the Soul conſider'd in her ſelf, our only way muſt be to find out ſuch peculiar properties in the Soul of Man, which cannot be ſalv'd on ſuppoſition, there were nothing elſe but Matter and Motion in the World. Suppoſing then that all Senſation in Man doth ariſe from corporeal Motion which is ſo ſtrongly aſſerted by the modern Philoſophers, and that the higheſt Conceptions which depend on Senſe, can amount no higher than Imagination,

gination, which is evident; if it can then be prov'd that there is a Principle of Action in Man, which proceeds in a different way of operation than Senſation doth, and that there are ſuch operations of the Soul which are not Imaginations, it will be then clear that there is a Principle in Man higher than Matter and Motion. Now altho' it be a task ſufficiently difficult to explain the manner of Senſation it ſelf in a mere mechanical way, ſuppoſing no higher Principle than mere Matter, yet it will appear far more difficult, nay impoſſible without a ſpiritual or immaterial Being to ſalve ſuch appearances in Man which tranſcend the power of Imagination; which will appear by theſe following Operations of the Mind, which every one who hath it, may find within himſelf.

1. *Correcting the errors of Imagination.* For if all our Perceptions were nothing elſe but the Images of corporeal things left in the Brain, the judgment of the Mind muſt of neceſſity be according to the impreſſions, which are made upon the Organs of Senſe. But now if our Minds can and do form apprehenſions of things quite different from thoſe which are convey'd by Senſe, there muſt be a higher Principle of knowledge in Man than Imagination is. For which the common inſtance of the juſt magnitude of the Sun is very plain; If we judge according to the image which is convey'd to the Brain by our Eyes, we can never imagine the Sun to be bigger than he ſeems to us to be; nay tho the ſight be advantaged by the help of *Teleſcopes*, it cannot receive ſuch an Image or Idea of the Sun which anſwers to its juſt magnitude, *viz.* that it is 160 times bigger than the Earth. From whence now comes this apprehenſion of the bigneſs of the Sun above that proportion which can poſſibly come in at our Senſes? If it be ſaid, *That by the obſervation of the leſſening of objects according to the proportion of diſtance, the Mind may come to underſtand how much bigger the Sun may be than he ſeems*; I grant it, but withal inquire how the Imagination comes to have Proportions and Diſtances which are mere reſpects, and can have no corporeal phantaſms whereby to be repreſented to it; ſo that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident, that there is ſome principle in Man beyond Imagination. Again, when the Mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far, and finds the Sun to be ſo great, what Idea is there of this magnitude in the Mind? the Mind cannot fix it ſelf on any thing but it muſt have an Idea of it; from whence comes this Idea? not from corporeal phantaſms; for none of them cou'd ever convey the due magnitude of the Sun to the Mind, and therefore the forming of this Idea muſt be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of Imagination, and is a Principle above it. So in the ſight of a ſtick, when under water, the repreſentation of it by the Senſe to Imagination is as crooked; for corporeal Motion carries things to the Eye, without any judgment upon them; the Eye conveys the Imagination to the Brain; and according to the rules of corporeal Perception muſt preſently take every thing for true which is convey'd thither; now from what Principle is it that this error of our Senſes is corrected? So in many other things wherein our Imaginations are quite puzl'd, and when we go according to them, it is impoſſible to apprehend things as our

Reaſon tells us they are; thus as to the *Antipodes* our Imaginations are wholly of the Mind of the Ancients, that the *Antipodes* to us muſt needs be in danger of knocking their heads againſt the Stars, and if they go upon any thing, it muſt be their Heads, and that that part of the Heavens which is in the other *Hemiſphere* is below us; theſe are pertinacious errors of Imagination while we adhere to that, and are only corrigible by our Reaſon, which makes it evident to be otherwiſe. Beſides, there are many things our Reaſon and Underſtanding inform us that they may be, and yet our Imaginations can form no Idea of them; let an *Epicurean* Philoſopher try the power of his Imagination in his *Inane* or *Infinite empty Space*, and he will ſoon find, that as ſtrong as his Phancy is, it will ſoon tire and retreat, as not being able to courſe thro' ſo unimaginable a Space. So for Eternal Duration our Reaſon tells us the thing is poſſible, but when our Imaginations begin to fardle up ſome Conceptions of it, they are preſently tying both ends together; which will make a ſtrange Idea of Eternity; the caſe is the ſame in the infinite Diviſibility of Quantity, which *Epicurus* was ſomewhat aware of when he deny'd the thing. But how many *Mathematical Problems* are there which will jade our Imaginations preſently, and yet our Reaſon ſtands ſtill and aſſures us of the poſſibility of the things, as in *two lines coming nearer ſtill to each other, and yet never meeting*, and in many other things, which moſt clearly evince that there is a higher Faculty in Man which exceeds Matter and Motion, when it is able thus to correct the faults and to ſupply the defects of Imagination.

XVIII. 2. *Reflex acts of the Mind upon it ſelf, argue a higher Principle than Imagination.* That there are ſuch things is evident to any one who hath any uſe of Cogitation; and if any one doubt of it, his very doubting argues he hath reflex Acts; for he cou'd not doubt whether he had or no, but by Reflection upon himſelf. Now that reflex Acts ſhou'd be caus'd thro' Matter and Motion, or thro' mere Imagination is unconceivable. For we ſee no Matter can act upon it ſelf: indeed one part of extended Matter may act upon another, but not purely upon it ſelf; the extremities of the Fingers can never feel themſelves, tho' they can touch each other; neither can Imagination reflect on it ſelf; for that proceeding upon Corporeal Images, muſt have ſuch a repreſentation from the Senſes of what it acts upon; now what image of it ſelf can be convey'd to the Imagination thro' the external Organs of Senſe? The Eye may ſee thro' the motion of the objects of Sight preſſing upon it; but how can it ſee that it ſees? ſo the Imagination receives the images convey'd to the Brain; but what ſhop hath it to make new ones in of it ſelf, and ſo to be guilty of the greateſt Idolatry or worſhipping its own Image? But tho' the Imagination cannot thus reflect, yet we find ſuch a Principle within us that is very apt to retire into it ſelf, and recollect things which cou'd never have been conſerv'd ſo long in that ſhop of ſhadows, the Imagination. For if Imagination be nothing elſe, but, as a modern * Philoſopher defines it, *Conception remaining, and a little and little decaying from and after the act of Senſe, like the Motion of Water after a ſtone is thrown into it*; how is it poſſible that at ſo great a diſtance of Years, as we commonly find, the image of a thing

* Hobbs's *Humane Nature, ch. 3. ſect. 2.*

a thing may be retriev'd with as much facility and freſhneſs as to circumſtances, as if it were but new done? And that account which he gives of Remembrance is very weak and inſufficient, when he tells us, that *Remembrance is nothing elſe but the miſſing of parts, which every Man expecteth ſhould ſucceed after they have a conception of the whole.* For according to this, it is impoſſible for the Mind to retrieve any object without mutilation of it; and ſo there cannot poſſibly be a recollecting of all circumſtances, when an object is once paſs'd, and the Motion begins to decay. But all this while, we underſtand nothing by what means this decaying Motion ſhou'd continue ſo long as our Memory can fetch things back, or by what means an object when once paſs'd, can be recover'd again, if Memory be nothing elſe but decaying Motion. Such perplexities muſt needs ariſe, when Men will undertake to ſalve the inward operations of the Soul by mere Motion; but is it not evident that many times when the Mind is imploy'd about other things, ſome Phantaſms of things long ago paſt will come and preſent themſelves to the Mind with as much clearneſs as if new done? whereas if Memory were decaying Motion, the longer paſt, the more impoſſible wou'd it be to recover any thing; but, do we not find that many old Men will better remember the circumſtances of many things they did in their Childhood, than a year or two before? Beſides we ſee what quickneſs and vivacity there is in our Intellectual Faculties above Corporeal Motion, with what facility the Mind turns it ſelf from one object to another, how ſuddenly it rangeth the whole World, how it trips over Mountains, croſſeth the Ocean, mounts to the Skies, and at laſt quarries upon it ſelf, and all in the twinkling of an intellectual Eye. As quick as the Eye of the Body is, the Mind far exceeds it, and can withdraw the Imagination from attending the Organs of Senſe; thus do Men who have their Minds much fix'd, fix their Eyes too; and yet afterwards can ſcarce tell themſelves what they have look'd on all that while. Sometimes the Mind fits and compares Phantaſms together, and ſports it ſelf in ſorting them into ſeveral ranks and orders, and making matches between ſuch things which are ſure to have no affinity with each other, which are thence called *entia rationis*, or the Creatures of the Mind. And can all theſe and many other ſuch operations which Men are conſcious to themſelves of, be nothing elſe but the Motion of ſome flegmatic Matter, the Reaction of the Brain, and the mere effects of Imagination?

3. *The profound ſpeculations of the Mind argue a power far above Imagination and Corporeal Motion.* I wonder how *Epicurus* his Soul, when, if we believe him, it was made up of *Atoms*, cou'd ever imagine an *Infinite Vacuity?* Cou'd mere *Atoms* ever diſpute whether they were *Atoms* or no? For I doubt not but *Epicurus* was fain to argue much againſt himſelf, before he cou'd perſuade himſelf to ſo ſtupendious a piece of folly. Were there nothing in Man but mere Corporeal Motion, whence came the diſpute, whether the Soul were Corporeal or no? Can *Atoms* frame *Syllogiſms* in *Mood* and *Figure?* and mere Matter argue *pro* and *con*, whether it be Matter or ſomething elſe? What kind of Aereal Particles were their Souls compounded of, who firſt fanſy'd themſelves to be immaterial? What ſtrange agitations of Matter were thoſe which

which first made Men think of an Eternal state? which thoughts have ever since so stuck upon these little Spherical Bodies, that they cou'd never yet disburthen themselves of them? Whence come such amazing fears, such dreadful apprehensions, such sinking thoughts of their future condition in Minds that wou'd fain ease themselves by believing, that death wou'd put a period both to Soul and Body? Whence on the other side come such incouraging hopes, such confident expectations, such comfortable prepossessions of their future state, in the Souls of good Men, when their Bodies are neareſt to the grave? *Seneca*, who was somewhat dubious sometimes as to the future condition of the Soul, yet cou'd tell his dear *Lucilius* with what pleasure he cou'd think of it; and cou'd elsewhere say of the Soul, *Et hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suæ quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis interest sed ut suis: The Soul had that mark of Divinity in it, that it was most pleas'd with Divine Speculations, and convers'd with them as with matters which nearly concern'd it.* And when it hath once view'd the dimensions of the Heavens, *contemnit domicilii prioris angustias*, it was asham'd of the Cottage it dwelt in; nay, were it not for these Speculations, *non fuerat operæ pretium nasci*, it had not been worth while for the Soul to have been in the Body; and as he goes on, *detrahe hoc inestimabile bonum, non est vita tanti ut sudem, ut æstuem.* Cou'd there be now so great an *Epicurism* in Contemplation, were the Soul of Man of *Epicurus* his mould, a mere complexion of *Atoms?* wou'd dull and heavy Matter ever have delighted to have search'd so much into the causes of things, to have gone over the World in its Speculations, and found more sweetness in Knowledge, than the little *Epicure*, the Bee, tasts in his choicest Flowers? *Epicurus* his own Philosophy is a demonstration against himself; if his Soul had not been of a purer Nature than he fansy'd, when his Brain had been well heated at his Study, those more vivid and spirituous Particles, like the spirits of Wine, had been in danger of evaporation, and leaving the more lumpish matter to complete his work. Of all Persons, I most admire that Philosophers, who make so much use of their Understandings, shou'd so ungratefully requite them, and serve them like old Horses, when they have made them do all the service they cou'd, turn them into the high-ways, and let them die in a ditch. But yet all Philosophers have not been so unthankful, some have understood the worth of their Souls, and asserted it, if they have not us'd too high, i. e *Platonical* expressions of it, making it a Particle, not of Matter, but of the Divine Nature it self, a little Deity in a Cottage, that stays here a-while, and returns to that upper Region from whence it came. As *Manilius* speaks,

Senec. præf. ad Quæst. Natur.

Manil. l. 4.

An dubium est habitare Deum sub pectore nostro,
In cœlumque redire animas, cœloque venire?

And while the Soul is here in its Cage, it is continually fluttering up and down, and delighteth to look out now at this part, and then at another, to take a view by degrees of the whole Universe, as the same Poet goes on,

Quid

Quid mirum noſcere mundum
Si poſſunt homines, quibus eſt & mundus in ipſis :
Exemplumque Dei quiſque eſt in imagine parva?

The Soul hath nothing more delightful to it than Knowledge, and no Knowledge ſo pleaſing and ſatisfactory as of him whoſe Image and Superſcription it bears, who makes Himſelf moſt known to ſuch as enquire after him;

Seque ipſum inculcat & offert
Ut bene cognoſci poſſit.

I conclude this with that of *Seneca*, in that excellent Preface to his *Natural Queſtions*, *O quam contempta res eſt homo niſi ſupra humana ſe erexerit! What a pitiful thing is Man, were it not that his Soul was apt to ſoar above theſe earthly things?* And by this Aptneſs to ſoar ſo high above theſe Terrene Objects, and to converſe with ſo much freedom with ſpiritual Beings, as well as abſtracted Notions we may certainly infer that our Rational Souls are of a far more noble and refin'd Nature than that more feculent Principle of Imagination, which always converſes in *fæce Romuli*, and can go no further than our Senſes carry it. And thus I have made good the firſt proof, that there is ſomething above Matter and Motion in the World, which is from that immaterial Being which is in Man.

XIX. 2. The next Evidence which we have of a Being above Matter and Motion, is, from *the extraordinary effects which have been in Nature.* I ſpeak not now merely of ſuch things which by their Natures and Effects are manifeſted to proceed from ſome Beings which bear ill-will to Mankind, multitudes of which are related by Men philoſophical and inquiſitive, with ſuch enumerations of circumſtances, and particular Evidences, that they are not mere impoſtures, that one may on the ſame grounds queſtion any Matter of fact which himſelf did not ſee, as ſuch relations which are deliver'd by Perſons without intereſt or deſign, and ſuch as were able to judge of the truth of circumſtances; ſuch are both ancient and modern Philoſophers, Phyſicians, States-men, and others. Neither ſhall I inſiſt on ſuch Prodigies, which oft-times preſage revolutions in States, if we believe *Machiavel* himſelf, who in a whole Chapter deſignedly proves it; and profeſſeth himſelf utterly to ſeek for the cauſes of them, unleſs they may be attributed to ſome Spirits and Intelligences in the Air, which give the World notice of ſuch things to come. But thoſe things which I ſuppoſe have the moſt clear and undoubted Evidence of true and undoubted Miracles (the Matters of fact being affirm'd by Eye-witneſſes, who ſeal'd the truth of them with their Lives) are thoſe recorded in the Holy Scriptures; which there are only two ways to evade, either by queſtioning the truth of the things, which I ſuppoſe in the precedent Book we have prov'd with as much rational Evidence as any thing of that nature is capable of, or elſe that the things therein recorded might be ſalv'd without a *Deity*. For which only two ways have been excogitated by *Atheiſtical* Spirits, either attributing

Machiav. diſput. l. 1. c. 56.

buting them to the power and influence of the Stars, the foundations of which fond and absurd Opinion have been taken away by those many Writers, who have rationally confuted the whole Art of *Judicial Astrology*, or else that they are done by mere power of Imagination, which is the way of *Avicenna* and some other *Arabic* Writers, which is so wild an effect of the power of Imagination, that nothing doth so much demonstrate the irregular Motions of it, as such an Opinion doth; and is sufficiently derided and refuted by *Pomponatius* himself. Now then, it being an acknowledg'd Principle in Nature, *That every thing continues in the course it is in, till something more powerful put it out*, if then such things have been in the World, which have been real alterations of the course of Nature, as the *Sun's standing still in the time of* Joshua, then there must be something above Matter and Motion, and consequently that there is a God.

Vid. D. H. *More's* Mystery of Godliness, *l.* 7. *c.* 14, 15, 16, 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Origin of the Univerſe.

I. *The neceſſity of the belief of the Creation of the World, in order to the truth of Religion. Of the ſeveral Hypotheſes of the Philoſophers who contradict* Moſes: *With a particular examination of them.* II. *The ancient Tradition of the World conſonant to* Moſes; *prov'd from the Ionic Philoſophy of* Thales, *and the Italic of* Pythagoras. III. *The Pythagoric Cabala rather Ægyptian than Moſaic. Of the fluid Matter, which was the material Principle of the Univerſe.* IV. *Of the Hypotheſis of the Eternity of the World aſſerted by* Ocellus Lucanus *and* Ariſtotle. V. *The weakneſs of the Foundations on which that Opinion is built. Of the manner of forming principles of Philoſophy.* VI. *The poſſibility of Creation prov'd.* [*No arguing from the preſent ſtate of the World againſt its beginning, ſhew'd from* Maimonides.] VII. *The Platoniſts arguments from the goodneſs of God for the Eternity of the World, anſwer'd.* VIII. *Of the Stoical Hypotheſis of the Eternity of Matter; whether reconcileable with the Text of* Moſes. IX. *Of the Opinions of* Plato *and* Pythagoras *concerning the præ-exiſtence of Matter to the formation of the World.* X. *The contradiction of the Eternity of Matter to the Nature and Attributes of God.* XI, XII, XIII, *Of the Atomical Hypotheſis of the Origin of the Univerſe.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. *The World cou'd not be produced by a caſual concourſe of Atoms prov'd from the nature and motion of* Epicurus's *Atoms, and the Phænomena of the Univerſe, eſpecially the Production and Nature of Animals.* XVIII. *Of the* Carteſian *Hypotheſis, that it cannot ſalve the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity giving Motion to Matter.*

THE Foundations of Religion being thus eſtabliſh'd in the Being of GOD, and the Immortality of the Soul, we now come to erect our Superſtructure upon them, by aſſerting the undoubted Truth and Certainty of that account of the World which is given us in the Writings of *Moſes*. Which beginning with the World it ſelf, leads us to a particular conſideration of the Origin of the Univerſe, the right underſtanding of which hath great influence upon our Belief of all that follows in the Word of GOD. For altho' we ſhou'd aſſert with *Epicurus* the Being of a Deity, if yet with him we add, that the World was made by a caſual concourſe of Atoms, all that part of Religion which lies in obedience to the Will of GOD is unavoidably deſtroy'd. All that is left, I.

is only a kind of Veneration of a Being more excellent than our own, which reacheth not to the government of Mens Lives, and ſo will have no force at all upon the generality of the World, who are only allur'd by Hopes or aw'd by Fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Beſides, what expreſſions of Gratitude can be left to GOD for his Goodneſs, if he interpoſe not in the Affairs of the World? What dependence can there be on Divine Goodneſs, if it be not at all manifeſted in the World? What apprehenſions can we have of GOD's Infinite Wiſdom and Power, if neither of them are diſcernible in the Being of the World? And as the Opinion of *Epicurus* deſtroys Religion, ſo doth that of *Ariſtotle*, which attributes Eternity to the Univerſe, and a neceſſary Emanation of it from the firſt Cauſe, as Light comes from the Sun; for if ſo, as *Maimonides* well obſerves, *The whole Religion of* Moſes *is overthrown, all his Miracles are but Impoſtures, all the Hopes which are grounded on the Promiſes of God, are vain and fruitleſs.* For if the World did of neceſſity exiſt, then GOD is no free Agent; and if ſo, then all inſtituted Religion, is to no purpoſe; nor can there be any expectation of Reward, or fear of Puniſhment from him who hath nothing elſe to do in the World, but to ſet the great Wheel of the Heavens going. So much is it our concernment to inquire into the true Original of the World, and on what Evidence of Reaſon thoſe Opinions are built, which are ſo contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the Books of *Moſes*. Wherein we read the true Origin of the World to have been by a Production of it by the Omnipotent Will and Word of GOD. This being then the plain Aſſertion of *Moſes*, we come to compare it, in point of Reaſon, with all thoſe ſeveral *Hypotheſes* which are repugnant to it, which have been embrac'd in ſeveral Ages by the Philoſophers of greateſt eſteem in the World. Which may be reduc'd to theſe four: 1. *Such as ſuppoſe the World to have exiſted as it is from all Eternity.* 2. *Such as attribute the Formation of the World as it is to God; but withal aſſert the præ-exiſtence and eternity of Matter.* 3. *Such as deny any eternity to the World, but aſſert the Origin of it to have been by a caſual concourſe of Atoms.* 4. *Such as endeavour to explain the Origin of the Univerſe, and all appearances of Nature, merely by the Mechanical Laws of the motions of Matter.*

Maimon. More Nevoch. p. 2. c. 25.

II. I begin with thoſe who aſſert the eternity of the World as it is, among whom *Ariſtotle* hath born the greateſt name; who ſeems to have arrogated this Opinion to himſelf; for when he inquires into the judgment of Philoſophers, who had writ before him, he ſays of them, γγυόμγυον ϖ̃ ἓν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, *all the Philoſophers aſſerted that the World was made*, tho' ſome one way, ſome another. And were this true which *Ariſtotle* ſaith, it wou'd be the ſtrongeſt Prejudice againſt his Opinion; for if the World had been eternal, how ſhou'd it come to paſs, that the eldeſt Philoſophers ſhou'd ſo readily and unanimouſly embrace that Opinion, which aſſerted the Production of the World? Was it not a ſtrong preſumption of the novity of the Univerſe, that all Nations, to whom the Philoſophers reſorted, had Memorials left among them of the firſt Origin of Things? And from hence it is obſervable, that when the humour of philoſophizing began to take the *Greeks* (about the XL *Olympiad*, when we may ſuppoſe *Thales* to flouriſh) the beginning of the World was no matter of Diſpute, but, taking that for granted, the inquiry was, out of what material Principle the Univerſe was form'd; of which *Thales* thus delivers his Opinion in *Tully*;

Ariſtot. de cœlo, l. 1. c. 10.

aquam

aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret; wherein he plainly distinguisheth the efficient from the material Cause of the World. The prime efficient was GOD, the material principle, Water. It is a matter of some inquiry, Whether the first principles of Philosophy among the *Greeks*, were not rather some Traditional Things conveyed to them from others, than any certain Theories which they had form'd from their own Experiments and Observations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this, that the first Principles of the two Founders of the chief Sects of Philosophers, *viz.* the *Ionic* and *Italic* (for all the other were but the various issues of these two) did come so near to that which we have the greatest Reason to believe to have been the most certain account of the Origin of the World. For this Opinion of *Thales* seems to have been part of that Universal Tradition which was continu'd in the World, concerning the first Principles of Things: For I do not see any Reason to aver with so much confidence, as some do, that those Philosophers who spake any thing consonantly to *Moses*, must presently converse with the *Jews*, transcribe their Opinions out of the Scriptures, or have them convey'd to them in some secret *Cabala* of the Creation; as it is affirm'd of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, and may with no less reason of *Thales*. But this, I suppose, may be made evident to any considerative Person, that those Philosophers of *Greece*, who convers'd most abroad in the World, did speak far more agreeably to the true Account of Things, than such who only endeavour'd by their own Wits to improve or correct those Principles which were deliver'd by the other Philosophers. Which I impute not so much to their converse with the *Mosaic* Writings, as to that Universal Tradition of the first Ages of the World, which was preserv'd far better among the *Phœnicians*, *Ægyptians*, *Chaldeans*, and others, than among the *Greeks*. For which we have this evident Reason, that *Greece* was far more barbarous and rude in its elder Times, than those other Nations were, which had means of preserving some Monuments and general Reports of the first Ages of the World, when the *Græcians* wanted them. And therefore we find that *Greece* from its beginning shin'd with a borrow'd Light; and saw not by an extramission of Rays of Knowledg from its self, but by an intromission of those representations of things which were receiv'd from other Nations. Those who form'd *Greece* first into civil Societies, and lick'd it into the shape of well order'd Commonwealths, were such who had been Traders for knowledg into foreign Parts. To which purpose *Diodorus Siculus* informs us, *That* Lycurgus *and* Solon, *as well as the Poets*, Orpheus, Musæus, Melampus *and* Homer, *and the Philosophers afterwards*, Pythagoras, Plato, *and others, had gain'd most of their Knowledg and Wisdom out of* Ægypt; nay, he saith in general, ὅσοι ποτὲ παρ' Ἕλλησι δεδοξασμένων ἐπὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ παιδείᾳ, παρέβαλον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, ἵνα καὶ ἐκεῖθεν νομίμων καὶ παιδείας μεταλάχωσιν. *All those who were renown'd among the* Greeks *for Wisdom and Learning, did in ancient time resort to* Ægypt, *to be acquainted with their Laws and Knowledg.* On this account therefore we are not to seek for the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World from the native and home-bred *Greeks*, such as *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*, but from those who took the Pains themselves to search into those Records which were preserv'd among the elder and more knowing Nations: And altho' the Nations they resorted to, sought to advance their own Reputation in the Histories of their ancient Times, of which we

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 25.

Diodorus, l. 1. V. Euseb. Præp. Evangel. l. 10.

have already given a large Account, yet they were more faithful in the account they gave of the Origin of the whole Universe. For it appears from *Diogenes Laertius*, that the *Ægyptians* did constantly believe, *That the World had a beginning, and was corruptible*; *that it was Spherical, and the Stars were of the nature of Fire*; *that the Soul was of an Immortal nature, and did pass up and down the World.* Which *Laertius* cites from *Hecatæus* and *Aristagoras.* So that we need not make *Pythagoras* acquainted with such a *Cabala* of the Creation, which in all probability neither the *Jews* nor he ever dreamt of; we find a fair account may be given of most of the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, and whence he deriv'd them, without forcing the words of *Moses* into such a sense, which the plainness and perspicuity of the Writings of *Moses*, argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny from those concurrent Testimonies of *Hermippus* and *Aristobulus*, besides *Origen*, *Porphyry*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and others, that *Pythagoras* might have had an opportunity of conversing with the *Jews*, (which it is most probable was in *Chaldæa*, after the Captivity, at which time *Pythagoras* was there among them) but that *Pythagoras* shou'd converse with the Successors of *Elisha* on Mount *Carmel*, as *Vossius* thinks; or that *Moschus* the *Sidonian* Philosopher, in *Iamblichus*, shou'd be *Moses*, as others fancy; or that præ-existence of Souls shou'd be part of the *Mosaic Cabala*; or that the *Pythageric* numbers, as they are explain'd by *Nichomachus Gerasenus* in *Photius*, should be adæquate to the Creation Cabalistically understood, are fancies too extravagant and *Pythagorean*, to be easily embraced. If *Pythagoras* was circumcis'd, it was more for love of the *Egyptians* than the *Jews*, among whom he spent twenty two Years; if præ-existence of Souls be a rational *Hypothesis*, we may thank the *Ægyptians* for it, and not *Moses*; if numbers be so expressive of the Work of Creation, we are beholding to the Arithmetical Hieroglyphics of *Ægypt* for them. But altho' *Pythagoras* might not be acquainted with such a philosophic *Cabala* of the Creation, which none of the *Jews*, as far as we can find, understood, till one more vers'd in *Plato* and *Pythagoras* than in the Learning of his own Nation, *viz. Philo* of *Alexandria*, began first to exercise his Wit on the Text of *Moses*, with *Platonic* Notions; yet I shall easily grant, that *Pythagoras*, by means of his great Industry and Converse with the learned Nations, might attain to far greater knowledg of many mysterious things in Natural Philosophy; and as to the Origin of the Universe, than any of the home-bred Philosophers of *Greece*, or it may be, than any one of the Nations he resorted to, because he had the advantage of comparing the several accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judg'd the best of them. And hence *Plutarch* tells us, that the first Principles of the World, according to *Pythagoras*, were these two, the one was τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδητικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νῶς ὁ θεὸς) *an active and forming Principle*, and that was God whom he call'd Mind, (as *Anaxagoras* likewise did) the other τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος) *passive and material*, which is, *the visible World.*

Diog. Laert. proœm. p. 7.

V. Selden. de jure Nat. & Gen. apud Ebræos. l. 1. c. 2.

Voss. de Sectis Philosoph. c. 6. sect. 5.

V. Mathem. Hierogl. Kircheri. Tom. 3. Oedip. Ægypt.

Plutarch. de Plat. Philos. l. 1. cap. 3.

III. And thus we see these two renowned Founders of the *Ionic* and *Italic* Societies of Philosophers, both giving their concurrent Testimony with *Moses* as to the true Origin of the World, and not at all differing from each other; for thus *Thales* speaks in *Diogenes Laertius*, πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων, θεὸς· ἀγένητον γὰρ κόσμος· ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ, *God is the eldest Being, because unbegotten*; *the World the most beautiful, because it is God's workmanship.*

Diog. Laer. V. Thalet.

ſhip. To which thoſe expreſſions of *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, come very near (whoſe Philoſophy was for ſubſtance the ſame with the *Pythagorean*) when he had before aſcrib'd the Production of the World to the goodneſs of GOD, which goodneſs of his did incline him to make all other things like himſelf. Θέμις ἔτ' ἦν ἔτ' ἔστι τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον. *For the moſt excellent Being cannot but produce the moſt excellent Effects.* And as to the material Principle out of which the World was made, there appears no great difference between the ὕδωρ of *Thales*, and the ὕλη of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, for *Plato*, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material Principle was, he deſcribes it thus, ἐκ ἠσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς κ) ἀτάκτως, which as *Calcidius* renders it, is *motu importuno fluctuans neque unquam quieſcens*, it was a *viſible corporeal thing* (πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν·) *which was never at reſt, but in continual diſorderly Motion and Agitation:* which is a full Explication, I ſuppoſe, of what *Thales* meant by his Water, which is the ſame with that ἰλὺς or mixture of Mud and Water together which others ſpeak of as the Principle of the Univerſe; as *Orpheus*, in *Athenagoras*, and the Scholiaſt on *Apollonius* cited by *Grotius* and others. Which we have the more reaſon to believe, becauſe the Succeſſors of *Thales*, *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*, expreſs themſelves to that purpoſe. *Anaximander* call'd the Sea, τὸ πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, *the remainder of the primitive moiſture:* and *Anaxagoras* ſays, before the Νοῦς, or GOD, ſet things in their order, πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ πεφυρμένα, *all things were at firſt confus'd together:* which muſt needs make that which *Chalcidius* tells us *Numenius* attributes to *Pythagoras*, which his Tranſlator calls *Sylvam fluidam*, or *fluid Matter.* Which is the ſame likewiſe with the *Phœnicians* Μωτ, which as appears by *Euſebius*, ſome call ἴλυν, others ὑλαιώδεις μίξεως σῆψιν, ſome, *Mud* or *Slime*, others, the *putrefaction of watery Mixtures*, which they ſay was, ἀρχὰ κτίσεως κ) γένεσις ὅλων, *the Seed-plot of the Creation and the Generation of things.* Thus we ſee how *Thales* with the *Phœnicians* from whom he was deriv'd, as *Laertius* tells us and *Pythagoras*, with the *Ægyptians* and others, concur with *Moſes*, not only in the production of the World, but in the manner of it, wherein is expreſs'd a fluid Matter which was the material Principle out of which the World was form'd, when we are told that *The Earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters*, *i. e.* that all at firſt was but fluid Matter; for *P. Fagius*, from *R. Kimchi*, renders רוח by ὕλη, which fluid Matter was agitated and mov'd by the Divine Spirit, or the *vis plaſtica mundi*, ſo *Chryſoſtom* calls it, ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ. And ſo *Druſius* and *P. Fagius* explain רחף by Motion or Agitation. And herein we have likewiſe the conſent of thoſe forenamed excellent Philoſophers, who attribute the Origin of particular things in the World to this Agitation or Motion of the fluid Matter. For *Chalcidius* ſpeaking not only of *Thales*, *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, but of *Anaximenes*, *Heraclitus*, and others, ſays thus of them, *omnes igitur hi---in motu poſitam rerum originem cenſuerunt: they all agreed in this, that the Origin of things was to be aſcrib'd to the motion of the parts of Matter.* So the *Phœnicians* call'd this Motion of the Particles of Matter ἀέρα ζοφώδη κ) πνευματώδη *a dark and bluſtering Wind.* And how ſutable this Explication of the Origin of things from the motion of fluid Matter is to the Hiſtory of Nature, appears by thoſe many Experiments by which mixt Bodies are ſhew'd to ſpring from no other material Principle than the Particles of fluid Matter. Of which you may read a Diſcourſe of that ingenious

Plato in Tim. p. 1047. ed. Ficini.

Chalcid. Tim. p. 25. ed. Meurſ.

Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Ver. Chriſt. Rel.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.

Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Gen. 1. 2.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 378

and

*

Boyle's Sceptical Chymiſt, p. 115. &c.

and learned Gentleman Mr. *Boyle* in his *Sceptical Chymiſt*. Only thus much may here ſuffice to have made it appear, that all thoſe Philoſophers, who were moſt inquiſitive after the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World concerning the firſt beginning of things, did not only concur with *Moſes* in the main thing, that its beginning was from GOD, but in the particular Circumſtances of it, as to the fluid Matter and motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add, if it be material, the Teſtimony of *Homer* in *Plutarch*.

Homer. Iliad. ξ.

Ωκεανὸς, ὅπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

Odyſſ. έ. Chalcid. p. 178. V. Meurſ. in Chal. p. 37. Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3.

And in *Chalcidius*: *Inque eadem ſententia Homerus eſſe invenitur, cum Oceanum & Thetin dicat parentes eſſe genituræ; cumque jusjurandum Deorum conſtituat aquam, quam quidem ipſe appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, & jurejurando nihil conſtituens reverentius.* To which purpoſe likewiſe *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks in his Metaphyſics, that the reaſon why *Styx* was made the Oath of the Gods, was becauſe Water was ſuppos'd to be the material Principle of things, which he ſaith was ἀρχαία τις ἂν τη καὶ παλαιὰ περὶ τὴ φύσεως δόξα, *a moſt ancient Tradition concerning the Origin of the Univerſe.* And tells us before, that ſome were of opinion, τὲς παμπαλαιὲς καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τὴ νυῦ γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας, *that the moſt ancient and remote Perſons and firſt Writers of Theology held this Opinion of Water being the firſt material Principle of things.*

Having thus made it appear what a conſent there was between the ancient Tradition of the World, and the Writings of *Moſes* concerning the Origin of the World; I now come to conſider upon what pretenſe of Reaſon this Tradition came to be contradicted, and the Eternity of the World aſſerted. For which we are to conſider, that the difference of the former Philoſophers of the *Ionic* Sect, after the time of *Thales*, as to the material Principle of the World, one ſubſtituting Air, another Fire inſtead of Water, rendred the Tradition it ſelf ſuſpected among other Philoſophers, eſpecially when the humor of innovating in Philoſophy was got among them, and they thought they did nothing unleſs they contradicted their Maſters; thence came that multiplicity of Sects preſently among them, and that Philoſophy which at firſt went much on the original Tradition of the World, was turn'd into Diſputes and Altercations, which help'd as much to the finding out of Truth, as the fighting of two Cocks on a Dung-hill doth to the finding out the Jewel that lies there. For which, ſcraping and ſearching into the Natures of things had been far more proper, than contentions and wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humor, Philoſophy from being a Deſign, grew to be a mere Art, and he was accounted the beſt Philoſopher, not that ſearch'd farther into the Bowels of Nature, but that dreſs'd and trick'd up the Notions he had, in the beſt poſture of defence againſt all who came to oppoſe him. From hence thoſe Opinions were moſt plauſible, not which were moſt true, but which were moſt defenſible, and which like *Des-Cartes* his ſecond Element, had all the Angles cut off, on which their Adverſaries might have an advantage of juſtling upon them, and then their Opinions were accounted moſt pure when they were ſo Sphærical, as to paſs up and down without interruption. From ſuch a degeneracy of Philoſophy as this we have now mention'd, aroſe the Opinion of the Eternity of the World; for the certain Tradition of the World being now loſt

in a crowd of Philoſophers, whoſe main aim was to ſet up for themſelves, and not to Trade with the Common-bank, ſo that there cou'd be no certain and convictive Evidence given to a ſhuffling Philoſopher that things were ever otherwiſe than they are; they found it moſt defenſible to aſſert that the World never had a beginning, nor wou'd have an end, but always did, and wou'd continue in the ſtate they were in. This Opinion, tho' *Ariſtotle* ſeems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatched, as far as we can find, at firſt, under *Pythagoras* his Succeſſors by *Ocellus Lucanus*, as appears by his Book ſtill extant, περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, *of the nature of the Univerſe*; to whom *Ariſtotle* hath not been a little beholding, as *Ludov. Nogarola* hath in part manifeſted in his Notes on *Ocellus*, altho' *Ariſtotle* had not the Ingenuity of *Pliny*, *agnoſcere per quos profecerit*. From *Ariſtotle* this Opinion together with his Name, ſpread it ſelf much farther, and became the Opinion moſt in vogue among the Heathen Philoſophers, eſpecially after the riſe of Chriſtianity; for then not only the *Peripatetics*, but the modern *Platoniſts*, *Plotinus*, *Apuleius*, *Taurus*, *Iamblichus*, *Alcinous*, *Proclus*, and others, were all engaged in the defence of the Eternity of the World, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Chriſtianity. Hence came the hot and eager Conteſts between *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, and *Philoponus*, who undertook to anſwer *Proclus* his eighteen Arguments for the Eternity of the World, and to charge *Ariſtotle* with ſelf-contradiction in reference to it. But nothing were they more troubl'd about, than to reconcile the *Timæus* of *Plato* with the Eternity of the World, which they made to be a mere *Hypotheſis*, and a kind of *Diagramme* to ſalve Providence withal; altho' the plain words of *Plato* not only there, but elſewhere do expreſs, as far as we can judge by his way of writing, his real Judgment to have been for the production of the World by GOD. For which purpoſe we have this obſervable Teſtimony in his *Sophiſta*, where he divides all manner of Productions of things into *Divine* and *Human*, and oppoſes the Opinion that conceiv'd all things to be produc'd by an eternal Power, to the Opinion of the vulgar, which, ſaith he, was τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀπό τινος αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ φυούσης, *that all things were produc'd by a blind force of Nature, without any Reaſon or Counſel*, to which he oppoſeth the other Opinion, that they are made μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης, *by a Divine Power with Infinite Reaſon and Wiſdom*; and when *Theætetus* expreſſeth himſelf in an Academical way as to either of theſe Opinions, the *Hoſpes Eleatenſis*, who there acts the part of the Philoſopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other Opinion, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν. *He wou'd undertake to make him confeſs the contrary by the Evidence of Reaſon which he wou'd bring.* And we ſhall ſee what great reaſon there is for this Opinion, when we conſider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the Arguments which either *Ocellus*, or *Ariſtotle*, or the modern *Platoniſts* make uſe of, are built on theſe following Suppoſitions which are all falſe. 1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been in any other ſtate than they are.* 2. *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* 3. *That* GOD *is no free Agent, but produced the World by neceſſity of Nature.*

Plato Sophiſt. p. 185. ed. Fic.

1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been any otherwiſe than they are.* The Reaſon of which ſuppoſition was this, That the general Concluſions of Reaſon, which they proceed upon in *Philoſophy*, were

were taken up from the Obſervation of things as they are at preſent in the World. Which is evident from the ground of *Ariſtotle*'s condemning the Opinion of *Empedocles*, who aſſerted the Production of the World, and yet the Incorruptibility of it, τὸ μὲν ἓν γρύαξ μὲ ἀΐδιον δ' ὅμως εἶ φάναι ἀδύνατον, which he acounts impoſſible, and gives this as his Reaſon, μόνα γὰρ ταῦτα θέλιον ἐυλόγως, ὅσα ἐπὶ πόλλων ἢ πάντων ὁρῶμεν ὑπάρχοντα. *For*, ſaith he, *nothing elſe can be rationally aſſerted, but what we find to be in all things or at leaſt in moſt*; now becauſe there cou'd nothing be found in the World which was produc'd (*i. e.* by Generation) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impoſſible it ſhou'd be ſo with the Univerſe. By which we evidently ſee what the grand Principles of Reaſon among the Philoſophers were: *viz.* ſuch Obſervations as they had made from the preſent courſe of Nature in the order of the Univerſe. From hence aroſe that ſtrong preſumption among them, which hath been ſo taken for granted, that it hath been look'd on as a common Notion of Human Nature, *viz. Ex nihilo nihil fit*, which was the main Argument us'd by them to prove the Eternity of the World: and by others to prove the *Præ-exiſtence of Matter*. So *Ocellus* argues againſt both the Diſſolution and Production of the World from this Principle; *If the World be diſſolv'd*, ſaith he, *it muſt either be* ἤτοι εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, *either into that which is, or into that which is not*: It cannot *be diſſolv'd into that which is, becauſe then the Univerſe cannot be deſtroy'd*; *for that which is, is either the Univerſe, or a part of it: neither can it be diſſolv'd into that which is not*, ἀμήχανον γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἀπόλλεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναλυθῆναι. *For it is impoſſible that a thing ſhou'd be made out of that is not, or be diſſolv'd into nothing*. And *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere tells us, that it is a Principle which all the Writers of *Natural Philoſophy* are agreed in, (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ τὴν φύσεως) which is ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, *that it's impoſſible for any thing to come out of nothing*. But now when we obſerve upon what grounds this Principle was took up by theſe Philoſophers, we have no reaſon to admit of it as an univerſal ſtandard of Nature. For we find theſe Naturaliſts, who thus aſſerted this Principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the courſe of Generations in the World, or from the works of *Art*, both which ſuppoſe *Matter Præ-exiſtent*, and from theſe ſhort collections they form this univerſal Maxim. And from hence when they diſcours'd of the manner whereby GOD did produce the World, their Imaginations ran preſently upon that which the *Epicurean* in *Tully* inquires after, *Quæ molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? quæ machinæ? qui miniſtri tanti operis fuerunt?* they apprehend GOD only as an Artificer that contrives the World firſt into a Platform, and then uſeth inſtruments to erect it, and conſequently ſtill ſuppoſe the Matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of *Balbus* in *Tully*, when he comes to diſcourſe of the Nature of GOD; *In quo nihil eſt difficilius quam a conſuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere*; *nothing is more difficult than to abſtract our Minds from the obſervations of this viſible World when we ſeek to apprehend the Nature of the Deity*. Thus we ſee upon what general grounds the Philoſophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how inſufficient any collections from the preſent order of the Univerſe are to determine any thing concerning its Production by. For ſuppoſing a Production of the World, ſeveral things muſt of neceſſity be ſuppos'd in it, different from what the preſent order of the World is; and it is an unreaſonable thing to argue from

Ariſt. de cælo, l. 1. cap. 10.

Vid. Laert. in vit. Democriti.

Ocellus Lucanus, p. 16. ed. Comm.

Ariſtot. Phyſic. l. 4.

Cicero de Nat. l. 1.

Ibid. l. 2.

from a thing when it is in its greateſt perfection, to what muſt always have been in the ſame thing; for by this means we muſt condemn many things for falſities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently falſe. For which *Maimonides* uſeth an excellent ſimilitude. *Suppoſe*, ſaith he, *one of exquiſite Natural parts, whoſe Mother dies aſſoon as he is born, and his Father brings him up in an Iſland, where he may have no ſociety with Mankind till he be grown up to years of underſtanding, and that he never ſaw any Female of either Man or Beaſt: Suppoſe now this Perſon to enquire of the firſt Man he ſpeaks with, how Men are born, and how they come into the World. The other tells him, that every Man is bred in the Womb of one of the ſame kind with our ſelves, thus and thus form'd; and that while we are in the Womb we have a very little Body, and there move and are nouriſhed, and we grow up by little and little till we come to ſuch a bigneſs, and then we come forth into the World, and yet grow ſtill till we come to ſuch a proportion as we are of. Here preſently this young Man ſtops him and inquires, when we were thus little in the Womb and did live, move and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breath at our Mouth and Noſtrils as we do now? did we not eaſe Nature as we do now? If it be anſwer'd him, No; then he preſently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring demonſtrations that it was utterly impoſſible that it ſhou'd ſo be: For, ſaith he, if either of us ceaſe breathing, but for an hour, our Motion and Life is gone; how is it then poſſible for one of us tho' never ſo little, to live and move in the Womb for ſo many Months, when it is ſo cloſe, and ſhut up, and in the middle of the Body? If one of us*, ſaith he, *ſhou'd ſwallow a little Bird, it wou'd preſently die as ſoon as it came into the Stomach, how much more if it were in the Belly? If we ſhou'd be but for few days without eating and drinking, we cou'd not live; how can a Child then continue ſo many Months without it? Again, if one doth eat and not void the excrement of what he eats, he will be kill'd with it in few days; how can it poſſibly be otherwiſe with a Child? If it be reply'd that there is a paſſage open in the Belly at which the Child receives his nouriſhment, he will preſently ſay that it is as impoſſible as the other; for if our Bellies were ſo open, we ſhou'd be quickly deſtroy'd. And again, if the Child hath all its Limbs perfect and ſound, how comes it not to open its Eyes, uſe the Feet, Mouth and hands, as we do? And ſo concludes it impoſſible that Man ſhou'd ever be born after this manner.* Much after this way, ſaith that excellent Author, do *Ariſtotle* and others argue againſt the Production of the World; for if the World were produc'd, ſay they, it muſt have been thus, and thus; and it is impoſſible that it ſhou'd have been ſo: Why? Becauſe we ſee things are otherwiſe now in the World. Which how infirm a way of arguing, it appears from the conſideration of the former ſimilitude, in which the Arguments are as ſtrong to prove the impoſſibility of that which we know to be true, as in the caſe about which we diſpute.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 17.

VI. 2. And this now leads us to the ſecond falſe *Hypotheſis* which the Opinion of the World's Eternity was founded on, which is, *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* Moſt of the Arguments which are us'd by *Ocellus* and *Ariſtotle*, againſt the Production of the World, run upon this ſuppoſition, That it muſt be generated as we ſee things are in the World. So *Ocellus* argues, Πᾶν τε τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀρχὴν εἴληφος, καὶ ἀγένητον ὄφελον κοινωνῆσαι, οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται μεταβολάς· μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀφ' ὅπερ

Ocell. Luc. 8.

ὅπερ ἂν ἄρξηται μεταβάλλειν γένεσις· τὸ μὲν εἰς ὃ ἀφικνεῖται ἀκμὴ· τέλειον μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τῆς μεταβολῆς ταύτης ὀνομάζεται φθορὰ καὶ ἄλυσις. *Every thing that comes into Being, and is ſubject to diſſolution, hath two obſervable mutations in it; the one is, whereby it grows from leſs to greater, and from worſe to better; and this is called Generation, and the height of this Mutation, Perfection: The other begins from better to worſe, and from bigger to leſs; and the concluſion of this is Corruption, and Diſſolution. But now,* ſaith he, *if the World had a beginning, there wou'd be ſuch a mutation in it, and it wou'd have grown by degrees greater, till it had come to its Perfection, and from thence it wou'd ſenſibly decay till it came to Diſſolution: But no body hath ever obſerv'd ſuch a mutation in the World, neither is there any appearance of it;* ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, *but the World is ſemper idem, it varies not, nor alters any thing from it ſelf.* For which he particularly inſtanceth in the Courſes, Symmetries, Figures, Poſitions, Intervals, Proportions of Motion which are in the World, which things all are capable of ſuch a Mutation, yet we ſee no ſuch thing in the Univerſe; from whence he infers, that the Univerſe was always and will be as it is. Upon the ſame Principle doth *Ariſtotle* diſpute for the Eternity of the World, from the Nature of his *materia prima*; becauſe if the Firſt Matter were generated, it muſt be generated of other Matter, and ſo *in infinitum*; and ſo argues from the Nature of the Heavens, that they are not capable of Generation and Corruption as other Bodies are. All which Arguments ſignify no more than this, that the World was not generated as Plants or Animals are; and whoever right in his Wits aſſerted that it was? But do any of theſe Arguments prove it impoſſible, that GOD having infinite Power, ſhou'd produce the Univerſe after another way, than any of thoſe things are produc'd in, which we obſerve in the World? For we aſſert an Infinite and Eternal Being, which was the Efficient Cauſe of the World, who by his Omnipotent Power produc'd it out of nothing, and continues it in its Being; which is well expreſs'd by the Author of the Refutation of *Ariſtotle* in *Juſtin Martyr*'s Works. *We aſſert,* ſaith he, *one* GOD *who is eternal himſelf, that hath nothing elſe co-equal with himſelf, neither by way of ſubjection or oppoſition, whoſe Power is ſo great that nothing can hinder it; by which Power he produc'd the World,* ἀρχὴ ἔχοντι τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ τί εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ὡς διαμένειν, ἢ ἐκείνου θέλησιν. *which hath no other Cauſe, either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his Will.* Who fully anſwers in a Philoſophical manner, the particular Allegations out of *Ariſtotle*, concerning the *Eternity of the World*; his deſign being, as he ſaith, to ſhew μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἀπριβῆ, καθ' ἣν ἐπαγγέλλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κτίσεων τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηκότας, ἀλλ' εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκεῖν διορισαμένους. *That the Greek Philoſophers in their Diſcourſes concerning* GOD *and the Creation, were very far from being as good as their word, to obſerve the Laws of Demonſtration, but inſtead of them proceeded only upon Opinions and Conjectures.* And to this particular, of the Poſſibility of another way of Production, beſides that of Generation, he proves it from *Ariſtotle*'s own Opinion, from the equal neceſſity of the Exiſtence of Matter, as of GOD. *For,* ſaith he, *if* GOD *can produce any thing out of Matter, which is as neceſſarily exiſtent as himſelf, he may produce ſomething out of nothing. For the ſame repugnancy that there is in that which is abſolutely nothing, to be produc'd, the ſame muſt there be in that which*

Ariſtot. dogmat. verſ. p. 111.

Juſt. Mar. ep. p. 113.

is neceſſarily exiſtent. How then can God produce ſomething out of Matter which neceſſarily exiſts, and not be able to produce ſomething out of nothing? For if Matter have its Original from it ſelf, how can it be ſubject to the Power of another? And beſides, if we acknowledge God to have his Being from himſelf, and on that account attribute infinite Power to him, by the ſame Reaſon we muſt attribute it to Matter. But whatever hath infinite Power in it ſelf, hath a Power upon ſomething beyond it ſelf; but if God and Matter have it both, they can never have Power upon each other, or without themſelves. Which is a far greater Abſurdity than the mere aſſerting a Power to produce ſomething out of nothing, which is imply'd in the very Notion of infinite Power; for if it be confin'd to any Matter, the Power is not infinite, becauſe we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than Matter doth. So that a Power of Creation is imply'd in the very Notion of a *Deity*; and therefore it is a mere *Sophiſm* to argue, becauſe the World cou'd not be generated, therefore it cou'd not be produc'd, unleſs any other way of Production but by Generation, be prov'd impoſſible.

A third falſe *Hypotheſis* they proceeded on was this, *That the Being of the World was no effect of* God's *Will, but of the neceſſity of Nature.* For altho' the Philoſophers we now ſpeak of, did aſſert a *Deity*, which in ſome ſenſe might be call'd the Cauſe of the World, yet they withal aſſerted that the World was co-equal with God himſelf; and ſo tho' there might be ſome priority in order of Cauſes between them, yet there was none in order of Time, or Duration; as we ſee the Light, tho' it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without Light. This *Ariſtotle* proves from the neceſſity of Motion and Time: *For*, ſaith he, *whatever is mov'd, muſt be mov'd by ſomething elſe, and conſequently there muſt be a running, in infinitum:* But this runs on a falſe Suppoſition of the neceſſity of a continual *Phyſical* Motion in Things, which we deny, ſince God by his infinite Power may give Motion to that which had it not before; and ſo all that can be prov'd, is the neceſſity of ſome firſt Cauſe, which we aſſert, but no neceſſity at all of his continual Acting, ſince he may cauſe Motion when he pleaſe. And for Time continually exiſting, it denotes nothing real in it ſelf exiſting, but only our manner of Conception, of the Duration of Things, as it is conceiv'd to belong to Motion; and ſo can argue nothing as to the real Exiſtence of Things from all Eternity. But the latter *Platoniſts* look upon theſe as inſufficient ways of Probation, and therefore argue from thoſe Attributes of God, which they conceive moſt neceſſary and agreeable to God's Nature; and by which the World was produc'd if at all: So that by the ſame Arguments whereby we prove that the World was made by God, they prove it to have been from all Eternity. It was well and truly ſaid in *Plato*, in his *Timæus, That the Goodneſs of* God *was the Cauſe of the Production of the World:* From which Speech the more modern *Platoniſts* gather a neceſſity of the World's Eternity; for from hence they infer, That ſince God was always Good, he muſt always have an Object to exerciſe his Goodneſs upon; as the *Sun diſperſeth his light as ſoon as he is himſelf.* True, were God of the Nature of the Sun, it wou'd be ſo with him; or were the Sun of the Nature of God, it wou'd not be ſo with it. But there is this vaſt difference between them, that tho' God be eſſentially and neceſſarily Good, yet the communications of his Goodneſs are the effects of his Will, and not

VII. 3.

merely of his Nature: For, were not the Acts of Beneficence and Goodneſs in GOD the free acts of his Will, Man muſt be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his firſt Exiſtence in the World, but as long as it ſhou'd continue, by mere neceſſity of Nature, without any intervention of the Will or Actions of Men. And ſo there cou'd be no ſuch difference as that of good and bad Men in the World; For, if the lettings forth of GOD's Goodneſs to the World be ſo neceſſary, all Men muſt become neceſſarily Good, if GOD's Goodneſs be ſo great as to be able to make Men ſo; which I ſuppoſe will not be queſtion'd. By this then, when we ſee that the communications of GOD's Goodneſs to the World are free, and depend upon the eternal Counſels of his Will, which is a depth too great for us to approach, or look into: By what neceſſity then, if GOD be a free Agent, and of infinite Wiſdom, as well as Goodneſs, muſt we either aſſert the Eternity of the World, or fear to deprive GOD of his eſſential Goodneſs? Whereas to make the communications of GOD's Goodneſs *ad extra* neceſſary, and therefore to make the World from Eternity, that he might have an Object to exerciſe his Goodneſs on, is, to take as much off from the infinite Perfection and Self-ſufficiency of the Divine Nature, as it wou'd ſeem to flatter his Goodneſs. For GOD cannot be himſelf without his Goodneſs; and if his Goodneſs cannot be without ſome Creature to ſhew or diſplay it upon, GOD cannot be perfect nor happy, without his Creatures, becauſe theſe are neceſſary iſſues of his Goodneſs; and conſequently we make the Being of the Creatures neceſſary to his being GOD. Which is the higheſt derogation from the abſolute Perfection of the Divine Nature. We aſſert then ſo much Goodneſs in GOD, as none can be imagin'd greater; we aſſert, that it was from the communication of this Divine Goodneſs which gave Being to the World; but withal we acknowledg GOD to be an Agent infinitely wiſe and free, who diſpenſeth this Goodneſs of his in ſuch a way and manner as is beſt pleaſing to himſelf, tho' ever agreeable to his Nature. As GOD is infinitely good in himſelf, ſo whatever he doth is ſutable to this Nature of his; but the particular determinations of the Acts of GOD's Beneficence belong to the Will of GOD, as he is a moſt free and independent Agent; ſo that Goodneſs, as it imports the neceſſary rectitude of the Divine Nature, implies a Perfection inſeparable from the true Idea of GOD; but as it is taken for the expreſſions of Divine Bounty to ſomewhat without, as the Object of it, it is not imply'd in our conception of GOD, as to his Nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his Will. We cannot then, neither ought we to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of GOD's Bounty towards the whole Univerſe, or any part of it, any farther than GOD himſelf hath declar'd it to us. Now we ſee the World exiſts, we have cauſe to adore that Goodneſs of GOD, which not only gave a Being to the Univerſe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for the Creatures which he hath made in it. Which the *Heathen* was ſo ſenſible of, that the *Stoic* in *Tully* taking notice of the abundant proviſion which is made in the World, not only for Man's neceſſity, but for delight and ornament, cries out, *Ut interdum Pronœa noſtra Epicurea eſſe videatur: God's Providence doth abundantly exceed Man's Neceſſity.* We ſee then from this Diſcourſe, how unſafe and unſatisfactory (that I may not ſay bold and preſumptuous) thoſe Arguments are, which are drawn from a general Conſideration of the Divine Nature and Goodneſs, without regard had to the determinations of his Will,

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

Will, as to the exiſtence of things in the World. It cannot certainly then be an Argument of any great force with any candid Inquirers after Truth and Reaſon, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf of that *Pythagorean Hypotheſis*, of the *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls, *viz. That if it be good for Men's Souls to be at all, the ſooner they are, the better; but we are moſt certain that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God will do that which is beſt; and therefore if they can enjoy themſelves before they come into theſe terreſtrial Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themſelves than not) they muſt be before they come into theſe Bodies. Wherefore the Præ-exiſtence of Souls is a neceſſary reſult of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, who can no more fail to do that which is beſt, than he can to underſtand it.* I now ſeriouſly inquire of ſuch who love Reaſon above *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, whether if the Eternity of the World were put into the Argument inſtead of the *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls, this Argument wou'd not hold as ſtrongly for that, as it doth for *Præ-exiſtence*; and if I am bound to believe *Præ-exiſtence* on this ground, I be not likewiſe bound to believe at leaſt the Souls of Men eternal, if not the Univerſe? But how reconcilable the Eternity of the World is to the *Pythagoric Cabala* of the Creation, I am yet to underſtand. But if this Argument doth not at all infer the Eternity of the World, as we have ſhew'd it doth not, much leſs doth it *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls.

VIII. We have thus far conſider'd the firſt *Hypotheſis*, which is repugnant to *Moſes*, concerning the Origin of the Univerſe, which is that which aſſerts the *Eternity of the World as it is*; we come now to the ſecond, which attributes the Formation of the World as it is, to GOD, as the efficient Cauſe; but attributes Eternity to the Matter out of which the World was fram'd. I am not ignorant that ſome who wou'd be taken for the Maſters of Reaſon, are ſo far from conceiving this *Hypotheſis* to be repugnant to the Text of *Moſes*, that they conceive it to be the genuine ſenſe of it, *viz.* That there was a *præ-exiſtent Matter*, out of which GOD form'd the World. But I wou'd willingly underſtand how *Moſes* wou'd have expreſs'd that Matter it ſelf was created, ſuppoſing it had been his intention to have ſpoken it; for altho' the word ברא may not of it ſelf imply neceſſarily the Production of things out of nothing, *i. e.* out of no *præ-exiſtent Matter*; yet it is acknowledg'd by all, that no word us'd by the *Jews* is more proper to that than ברא is; and *P. Fagius* cites it from *R. Nachmani*, *That the Hebrew Language hath no other word to ſignify ſuch a Production out of nothing but* ברא. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, That becauſe ברא is ſometimes us'd for no more than עשׂה, therefore the World was created out of *præ-exiſtent* Matter; all that can rationally be inferr'd, is, that from the mere force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collected: But if other places of Scripture compar'd, and the evidence of Reaſon, do make it clear, that there could be no *præ-exiſtent* Matter which was uncreated, then it will neceſſarily follow, that Creation muſt be taken in its proper Senſe. And in this Senſe it is evident, that not only *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, but even the *Heathens* themſelves underſtood *Moſes*, as is plain by *Galen*, where he compares the Opinion of *Moſes* with that of *Epicurus*, and ingenuouſly confeſſeth that of *Moſes*, which attributed the Production of Things to GOD, to be far more rational and probable than that of *Epicurus*, which aſſign'd the Origin of Things to a mere caſual concourſe of *Atoms*: But withal adds, that he muſt diſſent from both; and ſides with *Moſes* as to the Origin of

Volkelius de vera rel. l. 2. c. 4.

Galen. de uſu part. l. 11.

ſuch

ſuch Things as depend on Generation, but aſſerts the *præ-exiſtence* of Matter, and withal, that *God's power could not extend it ſelf beyond the capacity of the Matter which it wrought upon. Atque id eſt*, ſaith he, *in quo ratio noſtra ac* Platonis, *tum aliorum qui apud Græcos de rerum natura recte conſtripſerunt, a* Moſe *diſſidet.* How true theſe words are, will appear afterwards. *Chalcidius* in his Commentaries on *Plato's Timæus*, where he ſpeaks of the Origin of ὕλη, which in him is ſtill tranſlated *Sylva*, and inquires into the different Opinions of all Philoſophers about it, takes it for granted, that according to *Moſes*, this ὕλη had its Production from God. *Hebræi Sylvam generatam eſſe confitentur; quorum ſapientiſſimus* Moyſes *non humana facundia, ſed Divina, ut ferunt, inſpiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi cenſetur, ab exordio ſic eſt profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; Initio Deus fecit cœlum & terram. Terra autem erat inviſibilis & incompta. Ut vero ait Aquila; Caput rerum condidit Deus cœlum & terram; terra porro inanis erat & nihil; velut Symmachus; Ab exordio condidit Deus cœlum & terram. Terra porro fuit otioſum quid, confuſumque & inordinatum. Sed* Origenes *aſſeverat ita ſibi ab Hebræis eſſe perſuaſum, quod in aliquantum ſit a vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuiſſe enim in exemplari, Terra autem ſtupidâ quadam erat admiratione. Omnia tamen hæc in unum aiunt concurrere, ut & generata, ſic ea quæ ſubjecta eſt univerſo corpori, ſylva, ſermoneſque ipſos ſic interpretantur.* Where we find by the Teſtimony of *Chalcidius*, an univerſal conſent as to the Production of the Univerſal Corporeal Matter by God; for that is all which is underſtood by his term of *generata eſt.* But this ſame Author afterwards tells us, that by *Heavens* and *Earth* in the firſt Verſe of *Geneſis*, we are not to underſtand the viſible Heavens and Earth: *For*, ſaith he, *the Heavens, which are called the Firmament, were created after, and on the third Day, when the Waters were ſeparated, the dry Land appeared, which was called Earth. Qui tumultuario contenti ſunt intellectu, cœlum hoc quod videmus, & terram qua ſubvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant hoc cœlum ab initio factum, ſed ſecundo die.* And therefore by the *Heavens* he underſtands *Incorpoream Naturam*, and by *Earth*, ὕλη, or the *Primogenial Matter. And this*, ſaith he, *appears by the following words, The Earth was inviſible and without form*; i. e. this Corporeal Matter, before it was brought into order by the Power and Wiſdom of God, remain'd a rude and indigeſted Lump; and that which is ſo, might well be call'd Inviſible and without Form. And therefore it is called *inanis* and *nihil*, becauſe of its capacity of receiving all Forms, and having none of its own. *Symmachus* calls it *otioſa & indigeſta*; the former, becauſe of its inability to produce any thing of its ſelf; the latter, becauſe it wanted a Divine Power to bring it into due order. The ſtupidity and admiration which *Origen* attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the Majeſty of God, who was the Orderer and Contriver of it, *ſiquidem Opificis & Auctoris ſui Majeſtate capta ſtupuerit.* Thus we ſee, that according to *Moſes*, the firſt Matter of the World was produced by God, which is largely manifeſted by *Origen* againſt the *Marcioniſts*, a fragment of which is extant in his *Philocalia*; and by *Tertullian* againſt *Hermogenes*, and others, who from the Opinion of the præ-exiſtence of Matter, are call'd *Materiarii.*

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 372.

Origen. Philoc. c. 24. Tertull. ad Hermog. per tot.

IX. Having thus clear'd the Senſe of *Moſes*, it is far more difficult to find out the true Opinions of the ancient Philoſophers, concerning the production or eternity of Corporeal Matter, there having been ſo great diſſentions,

diſſentions, not only about the thing it ſelf, but about the Opinions of ſome about it. For it is plain by *Plutarch* his ψυχογονία, as well as the Diſcourſes of the later *Platoniſts*, how eager ſome have been to interpret *Plato*'s *Timæus* in favour of the Eternity, at leaſt of Matter, if not of the World. But altho' *Plato* doth aſſert therein a præ-exiſtence of rude Matter, before the formation of the World, yet I ſee no reaſon why he ſhould be otherwiſe underſtood than in the ſame Senſe that we believe a *Chaos*, to have gone before the bringing the World into the order it is now in. And in that Senſe may thoſe places in *Plutarch* be interpreted, ἐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος and ſo likewiſe thoſe following words, ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν· for the meaning may be no more, than that *Plato* conceiv'd that all the Productions of the kinds of Things which are in the World, was out of a præ-exiſtent Hyle, the one Spiritual and Intelligible, out of which he ſuppos'd Souls to be form'd, the other Senſible and Corporeal, out of which other Beings which were more groſs and material, were produced. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* look'd upon *conſtitutionem Sylvæ* to be *opus Providentiæ*; which I ſuppoſe relates not only to the bringing of Matter into Form, but to the production of Matter it ſelf. But after this he takes a great deal of Pains to ſearch out the true meaning of *Plato*, concerning the Origin of Hyle; and mentions the great diſſentions among the *Platoniſts* about it, and the obſcurity of the *Timæus* in it. To him therefore I refer the Reader: Who likewiſe brings in *Numenius* largely diſcourſing concerning the Opinion of *Pythagoras* about it, who condemns all thoſe, as not underſtanding *Pythagoras*, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate Hyle. Theſe are his words, *Numenius ex Pythagoræ Magiſterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, Pythagoræ dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram, Deum quidem ſingularitatis nominâſſe (nomine appellâſſe) ſylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam eſſe dicere. Hoc eſt, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque & ordinem nanciſceretur, ſine ortu & generatione; exornatam vero atque illuſtratam, a Digeſtore Deo eſſe generatam. Atque ita quia generationis ſit fortuna poſterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, æquævum Deo, a quo eſt ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim ſententiæ non recte aſſecutos, putâſſe, dici etiam illam indeterminatam & immenſam duitatem, ab una ſingularitate inſtitutam, recedente a natura ſua ſingularitate, & in duitatis habitum migrante.* But however theſe *Pythagoreans* might be deceiv'd, who thought the Unity it ſelf became the Deity; yet it is evident by *Numenius*, that he look'd on the undetermin'd and confus'd Matter to have been *co-æval* with GOD himſelf, and not produced by him. And if *Numenius* be as much to be credited in this as when he calls *Plato*, *Moſes Atticus*, then the Creation of Univerſal Matter can be no part of *Pythagoras* his philoſophic *Cabala*. But whatever were the Opinions of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, concerning the firſt Origin of Matter, we are certain that the *Stoics* generally aſſerted the improduction of Matter, and make that to be as neceſſary a paſſive Principle for the Being of the World, as GOD is the active and efficient Cauſe. So *Diogenes Laertius* reports of the *Stoical* Principles concerning the Origin of the Univerſe: Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τὰ ὅλων δύο· τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὰ ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν· *They make two principles of the Univerſe, one*

Plutarch. de Animæ procreat. è Tim.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 377.

Pag. 401.

Pag. 393.

Laer. V. Zenon. V. Lipſium in Phyſiol. Sto. l. 1. c. 4.

one active, and the other passive; the passive, an Essence without quality, called Hyle or confused Matter; the active, the Reason which acts on the other, which is GOD. These two Principles *Seneca* calls *Causa & materia; esse vero debet*, saith he, *aliquid unde fiat; deinde, a quo fiat; hoc causa est, illud materia.* Altho' *Seneca* seems to make a Query of it elsewhere; *quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an dată utatur?* But *Zeno* is expres's in *Stobæus*, Οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσι ἀίδιον, ὅτε πλείων γινομένην ὅτε ἐλάττω. *The first Essence of all is Matter, which is eternal, and not capable of accession or diminution.* To the same purpose *Chalcidius* speaks, *Stoici ortum sylvæ rejiciunt, quin potius ipsam & Deum, duo totius rei sumunt initia; Deum, ut opificem; Sylvam, ut quæ operationi subjiciatur. Una quidem essentiâ præditos facientem, & quod fit ac patitur, id corpus esse; diversa vero virtute; quia faciat Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam esse.*

Senec. Epist. 65.

Idem Præfat. ad Nat. Quæst.

Stob. Eclog. Physic.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 388.

X. Having now found out the certain Assertors among the Heathen Philosophers of the eternity and improduction of Matter as the passive Principle of things, we come to examin the reason of this *Hypothesis*, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to subsist upon to all Eternity? It might be sufficient prejudice against this Opinion, that it was built on the same infirm Conclusions which that of the Eternity of the whole World was, *viz.* that Maxim which *Lipsius* attributes to *Democritus*, but was embraced by all those Philosophers who deny'd production of Matter, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι, *that nothing cou'd be produced out of nothing, nor could return into nothing*; which as we have already said, was only taken up from the establish'd order of the Universe, and the manner of production of material Beings. But this is not all we have to charge this *Hypothesis* with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural Notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an Omnipotent Power; For otherwise we degrade him to the imbecillity of finite Creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that GOD shou'd give a Being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by Creation, *viz.* the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was produc'd. Now what repugnancy is there to any free Principle of Reason, that a Power infinite shou'd raise an Insect into Being without any passive Principle out of which it was caus'd; and if an Infinite Power can do that, it may as well produce the World out of nothing, else the Power wou'd not be Infinite; for it wou'd have its bounds set, that thus far it cou'd go and no farther. Now if such a Power in GOD implies no contradiction in it self, I say, the asserting the necessary existence of Matter implies a contradiction to this Power. For, 1. a Power to produce something out of nothing wou'd be to no purpose, if a passive Principle or præ-existent Matter be necessary to the Production of any thing; and so that Being which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something, which is a plain contradiction. 2. If GOD hath a power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth extend to the production of this Matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not Infinite, and so the same power is Infinite and not Infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to

the Notion of a God, to assert the necessary and eternal existence of Matter.

2. If Matter be unproduced, then necessary Existence must belong to it as well as to God; and if necessary Existence belongs to Matter, Infinite Power must belong to it too; for whatever necessarily exists is Self-originated; whatever is Self-originated, cou'd not by any Cause whatsoever be hinder'd from Being; what cannot by any Cause be hinder'd from Being, hath Infinite Power; what hath Infinite Power, may produce any thing, and is God, and so Matter cannot be a mere passive Principle, but must be an active, and must be God himself, or else there must be more Gods than one. To an Argument something of this nature *Hermogenes* in *Tertullian* replies, that Matter wou'd not lose the Name or Nature of Matter, because of its Co-eternity with God, neither cou'd it be God merely on that account, unless it had other things that were agreeable to the Nature of God as well as that. But I have already shew'd that necessary Existence implies other Perfections going along with it: which is likewise thus prov'd by *Tertullian* in answer to *Hermogenes*; The reason of the Imperfections which are to be seen in any Creatures, is from hence, that they derive their Beings from a higher Cause, who creates them in what order he pleases; but that which hath its original from it self, must on that account want those Imperfections which other Creatures in the World have; and therefore if necessary Existence be of the Nature of Matter, all other Perfections must belong to it too: and so there can be no superiority and inferiority between God and Matter, because on both sides there will be necessary Existence. *Divinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica:* and so the eternal existence of Matter, is repugnant to the Unity of God. *Tertull. adverſ. Hermog. c. 4.* *Tertul. c. 7.*

3. It is repugnant to the Independency of God: for it makes God subject to Matter, and not Matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without præ-existent Matter, the Matter is necessary to his Action, and so God must depend on that which he can do nothing without; and so God's using Matter, is as *Tertullian* speaks, *ex neceſſitate mediocritatis ſuæ*, to help him in the production of things. *Nemo non ſubjicitur ei cujus eget ut poſſit uti*, as he goes on. Thus Matter at last is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and so as *Tertullian* sharply says, *God is beholding to Matter for every Being known to the World*; *grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognoſceretur, & omnipotens vocaretur, niſi quod jam non omnipotens, ſi non & hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre.* Thus we see how irreconcilable this *Hypotheſis* is with these Attributes of God. *Ibid. c. 8.*

4. It is repugnant to the Immensity of God. For either God did exist separate from this Eternal Matter, or was conjoyn'd with it: if conjoyn'd with it, then both made but one Being, as *Maximus*, or *Origen* argues; if separate from it, then there must be something between them, and so there will be three real improduced things. If it be answer'd that they are neither conjoyn'd nor separate, but God is in Matter as in his proper place, as the *Stoics* asserted, it is easily reply'd, that either then he is in a part of Matter, or the whole Matter; if in a part only, he cannot be immense; if in the whole as his adequate place, how cou'd he then ever frame the World? For either he must then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himself into a narrower compass, that he might fashion that part of the World which he *Orig. Philoc. c. 24.*

was about, or else he might likewise frame part of himself with that part of the World which he was then framing of, which consequence is unavoidable on the *Stoical Hypothesis* of God's being Corporeal and confin'd to the World as his proper place. And so much for this second *Hypothesis* concerning the Origin of the Universe, which supposeth the eternity of Matter as co-existing with God.

XI. I come now to that which makes most noise in the World, which is the *Atomical or Epicurean Hypothesis*; but will appear to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origin of the Universe. For otherwise supposing a Deity which produc'd the World and put it into the order it is now in, and supremely governs all things in the World, that many of the *Phænomena* of the Universe, are far more intelligibly explain'd by Matter and Motion than by substantial Forms, and real Qualities, few free and unprejudic'd Minds do now scruple. But because these little Particles of Matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of Nature, that therefore there shou'd be nothing else but Matter and Motion in the World, and that the Origin of the Universe shou'd be from no wiser Principle than the casual concourse of these *Atoms*, is one of the Evidences of the proneness of Mens minds to be intoxicated with those Opinions they are once in love with. When they are not content to allow an *Hypothesis* its due place and subserviency to God, and Providence, but think these *Atoms* have no force at all in them unless they can extrude a Deity quite out of the World. For it is most evident that it was not so much the truth as the serviceableness of this *Hypothesis*, which hath given it entertainment among Men of *Atheistical* Spirits. *Epicurus* himself in his Epistle to *Pythocles* urgeth that as a considerable circumstance in his Opinion that he brought no God down upon the Stage to put things in order, ἡ ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμὴ προσαγέσθω, which his Paraphrast *Lucretius* hath thus rendred.

Diog. Laert. l. 10. Lucret. de Nat. l. 5.

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum.

If this Opinion then be true, the History of the Creation quite falls to the ground; on which account we are oblig'd more particularly to consider the reason of it. The *Hypothesis* then of *Epicurus* is, *that before the World was brought into that Form and Order it is now in, there was an infinite empty Space, in which were an innumerable company of solid Particles or Atoms of different sizes and shapes, which by their weight were in continual motion, and that by the various occursions of these, all the Bodies of the Universe were fram'd into that order they now are in.* Which is fully expres'd by *Dionysius* in *Eusebius*, and very agreeably to the Sence of *Epicurus* in his Epistles to *Herodotus* and *Pythocles*, and to what *Plutarch* reports of the Sence of *Epicurus*, tho' he names him not (if at least that Book be his, which *Muretus* denies) the words of *Dionysius* are these concerning the *Epicureans*, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀτόμους προσεικόνιες ἀφθαρτά τινα καὶ σμικρότατα σώματα, πλῆθος ἀνάριθμα, καὶ τι χωρίον κενὸν, μέγεθος ἀπεριόριστον προσαλλόμβοι, ταύτας δὴ φασι τὰς ἀτόμους ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν τῷ κενῷ φερομένας, αὐτομάτως τι συμπεπλέσας ἀλλήλαις ἀφ' ῥύμιω ἄτακτον καὶ συμπλοκομένας ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν πολύσχημον ἀλλήλων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ ἕτω τόνδε κόσμον, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ κόσμους ἀπείρους ἀποτελεῖν. So that according to this Opinion, all the account we have of the Origin of the World, is from this general Rendezvous of Atoms in this infinite Space, in which after many encounters and

Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. 14. c. 22. p. 421. R. St. Plutarch. de Placitis Phil. l. 1. c. 4. Muret. Annot. in Senec. de provid.

and facings about, they fell into their ſeveral Troops, and made up that order'd Battalia which now the World is the Scheme of. It was not imprudently done of *Epicurus* to make the Worlds infinite, as well as his Space and Atoms; for by the ſame reaſon that his Atoms wou'd make one World, they might make a thouſand; and who wou'd ſpare for Worlds, when he might make them ſo eaſily? *Lucretius* gives us in ſo exact an account of the ſeveral courſes the Atoms took up in diſpoſing themſelves into Bodies, as tho' he had been Muſter-Maſter General at the Rendezouz; for thus he ſpeaks of his Atoms.

Quæ quia multa modis multis mutata per omne *Lucret. l. 1.*
Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus & cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in taleis diſpoſituras,
Qualibus hæc rerum conſiſtit ſumma creata.

And more particularly afterwards,

Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum *Lucret. l. 5.*
Ex Infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibuſque ſuis conſuêrunt concita ferri,
Omnimodiſque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter ſe poſſunt congreſſa creare;
Ut non ſit mirum, ſi in taleis diſpoſituras
Deciderunt quoque, & in taleis venêre meatus,
Qualibus hæc rerum genitur nunc ſumma novando.

Thus we ſee the ſubſtance of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, that there was an infinite number of Atoms, which by their frequent occurſions did at laſt meet with thoſe of the ſame nature with them, and theſe being conjoyn'd together made up thoſe Bodies which we ſee; ſo that all the account we are able to give according to this *Hypotheſis* of all the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, is from the fortuitous concourſe of the Atoms in the firſt forming of the World, and the different contexture of them in Bodies. And this was deliver'd by the ancient *Epicureans* not with any Doubt or Heſitation, but with the greateſt Confidence imaginable. So *Tully* obſerves of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, beginning his Diſcourſe, *fidenter ſane ut ſolent iſti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, & ex Epicuri intermundiis deſcendiſſet:* Confidence was the peculiar Genius of that Sect, which we ſhall ſee in them to be accompany'd with very little reaſon.

XII. For thoſe two things which make any principles in Philoſophy to be rejected, this Atomical *Hypotheſis* is unavoidably charg'd with; and thoſe are, *If the principles be taken up without ſufficient ground in reaſon for them; and if they cannot give any ſufficient account of the* Phænomena *of the World.* I ſhall therefore make it appear, *That this Hypotheſis*, as to the Origin of the Univerſe, is *firſt, merely precarious, and built on no ſufficient grounds of Reaſon. Secondly, That it cannot give any ſatisfactory account of the Origin of things.*

1. That it is a precarious *Hypotheſis*, and hath no evidence of Reaſon on which it ſhou'd be taken up; and that will be prov'd by two things. 1. *It is ſuch an Hypotheſis as the* Epicureans *themſelves cou'd have no certainty of according to their own principles.* 2. *That the main*

principles of the Hypotheſis its ſelf are repugnant to thoſe Catholic Laws of Nature which are obſerv'd in the Univerſe.

1. *The* Epicureans *according to their own Principles, cou'd have no certainty of the truth of this Hypotheſis.* And that, 1. *Becauſe they cou'd have no certain Evidence of its Truth.* 2. *Becauſe their way of proving it was inſufficient.*

1. *That they cou'd have no certain evidence of the truth of it,* I prove from thoſe *Criteria,* which *Epicurus* lays down as the only certain Rules of judging the truth of things by; and thoſe were *Senſe, Anticipation* and *Paſſion.* Let Senſe be never ſo infallible a Rule of Judgment, yet it is impoſſible there ſhou'd be any Evidence to Senſe of the truth of this *Hypotheſis*; and let him extend his τὸ προσμένμον as long as he pleaſe, which was his great help for correcting the errors of Senſe, *viz.* as it was in the *Roman* Court when the Caſe was not clear, *ampliandum eſt:* So *Epicurus* wou'd have the Object repreſented every way it cou'd be before he paſt his Judgment; yet this prudent Caution wou'd do him no good for this *Hypotheſis,* unleſs he were ſo wiſe as to ſtay till this World were crumbl'd into Atoms again, that by That he might judg of the Origin of it. There is but one way left to find out the truth of Things inevident to Senſe, (as by *Epicurus*'s own Confeſſion all theſe Atoms are, which are now the component Particles of Bodies; much more thoſe which by their fortuitous concourſe gave Being to the World) and that is, if ſomething evident to Senſe doth apparently prove it, which is his way of proving a Vacuity in Nature and Motion: But tho' that be eaſily anſwer'd by Principles different from thoſe of *Epicurus,* and more rational; yet that very way of Probation fails him in this preſent *Hypotheſis.* For what is there evident to Senſe which proves a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms for the production of Things? Nay, if we grant him, that the compoſition of Bodies is nothing elſe but the Contexture of theſe inſenſible Particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to Senſe, that theſe Particles without any wiſe and directing Providence ſhou'd make up ſuch Bodies as we ſee in the World. And here, when we ſpeak of the evidence of Senſe, we may well aſk, as the *Stoic* in *Tully* doth, whether ever *Epicurus* found a Poem made by the caſual throwing of Letters together; and if a concourſe of Atoms did produce the World, *cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non poteſt? Why did it never produce a Cloyſter, a Temple, a Houſe, a City,* which are far eaſier things than the World? I know *Epicurus* will ſoon reply, *That things are otherwiſe in the World now than when it was produc'd*; I grant it, and from thence prove, that becauſe no ſuch thing ever happens in the World now, as a merely caſual concourſe of Atoms to produce any things, *Epicurus* could have no Evidence from Senſe at all to find out the truth of his *Hypotheſis* by. And as little relief can he find from his ſecond *Criterium,* viz. *Anticipation*; for by his own acknowledgment, all Anticipation depends on the Senſes, and Men have it only one of theſe four ways, 1. By Incurſion, as the Species of a Man is preſerv'd by the ſight of him. 2. By Proportion, as we can enlarge or contract that Species of a Man either into a Gyant or Pigmy. 3. By Similitude, as we may fancy the image of a City by reſemblance to one which we have ſeen. 4. By Compoſition, whereby we may joyn different Images together, as of a Horſe and a Man to make a Centaur. Now tho' it be very queſtionable how ſome of theſe ways belong to a *Criterium* of Truth, yet none of them reach our caſe; for there can be no

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

V. Gaſſend. de Logica Epicuri, Op. To. 1. c. 7. Can. 7.

Incurſion of inſenſible Particles as ſuch upon our Senſes; we may indeed by proportion imagine the parvitude of them: But what is this to the proving the truth of the *Hypotheſis?* Similitude can do no good, unleſs *Epicurus* had ever ſeen a World made ſo: The only relief muſt be from Compoſition, and that will prove the Origin of the World by Atoms to be as true as that there are Centaurs in the World, which we verily believe. Theſe are the only *Criteria* which *Epicurus* wou'd judg of the truth of natural Things by (for the third, Paſſion, relates wholly to things Moral and not Phyſical) and now let any one judg, whether the *Hypotheſis* of the Origin of the Univerſe by Atoms can ever be prov'd true, either by the judgment of Senſe, or by Anticipation.

XIII. 2. The way they had to prove this *Hypotheſis* was inſufficient; and that was by proving that the Bodies of the World are compounded of ſuch inſenſible Particles; now, granting the thing, I deny the conſequence; for what tho' the compoſition of Bodies be from the contexture of Atoms, doth it therefore follow, that theſe Particles did caſually produce theſe Bodies? Nay, doth it at all follow, that becauſe Bodies upon their reſolution do fall into inſenſible Particles of different ſize, figure and motion, therefore theſe Particles muſt be præ-exiſtent to all Bodies in the World? For it is plain, that there is now an univerſal Lump of Matter out of which theſe inſenſible Particles ariſe, and whither they return on the diſſolution of Bodies; and all theſe various Corpuſcles may be of the ſame uniform Subſtance only with the alteration of ſize, ſhape and motion; but what then? Doth this prove, that becauſe particular Bodies do now emerge out of the various Configuration and Motion of inſenſible Particles of that Matter which exiſts in the World, that therefore this whole Matter was produc'd by the caſual occurſions of theſe Atoms? It will aſk more Time and Pains than is uſually taken by the Philoſophers either ancient or modern, to prove that thoſe things whatſoever they are, whether Elements or Particles, out of which Bodies are ſuppos'd to be compounded, do exiſt ſeparately from ſuch compounded Bodies, and antecedently to them. We find no *Ariſtotelian* Elements pure in the World, nor any Particles of Matter deſtitute of ſuch a ſize, figure and motion, as doth make ſome Body or other. From whence then can we infer, either the exiſtence of *Ariſtotle*'s *materia prima*, without quiddity, quantity, or quality; or the *Epicurean* Atoms without ſuch a contexture as makes up ſome Bodies in the World? Our profound Naturaliſt, Dr. *Harvey*, after his moſt accurate ſearch into the Natures and Generation of Things, delivers this as his Experience and Judgment concerning the commonly reputed Elements, or Principles of Bodies. For ſpeaking of the different Opinions of *Empedocles*, and *Hippocrates*, and *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, concerning the compoſition of Bodies, he adds, *Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla corporum ſimilarium generatione, (ſive ea partium animalium, ſive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium, &c. fuerit) vel congregationem ejuſmodi, vel miſcibilia diverſa in generationis opere unienda præ-exiſtere, obſervare unquam potui.* And after explaining the way which he conceiv'd moſt rational and conſonant to Experience in the generation of Things, he concludes his Diſcourſe with theſe words; *Idemque in omni generatione fieri crediderim; adeo ut corpora ſimilaria miſta, elementa ſua tempore priora non habeant, ſed illa potius elementis ſuis prius exiſtant (nempe Empedoclis atque Ariſtotelis igne, aqua, aere, terra, vel Chymicorum ſale, ſulphure, & mercurio, aut Democriti atomis) utpote natura quoque ipſis perfectiora.* *Harvey, de Generat. Anim.*

Sunt,

Sunt, inquam, mista, & compoſita, etiam tempore priora elementis quibuſlibet ſic dictis, in quæ illa corrumpuntur & deſinunt; diſſolvuntur ſcilicet, in iſta ratione potius quam re ipſa & actu. Elementa itaque quæ dicuntur, non ſunt priora iſtis rebus quæ generantur aut oriuntur; ſed poſteriora potius, & reliquiæ magis quam principia. Neque Ariſtoteles ipſemet aut alius quiſpiam unquam demonſtravit, elementa in rerum natura ſeparatim exiſtere, aut principia eſſe corporum ſimilarium. If then none of theſe things which Bodies are reſolv'd into, and are ſuppos'd to be compounded of, either have been, or can be prov'd to exiſt ſeparate from and antecedent to thoſe Bodies which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of Atoms, which are ſuppos'd by their concourſe in an infinite Space to be the Origin of the World? I know not where to find them, unleſs dancing with the School-men's *Chimera*'s in a *vacuum*, or in a Space as empty as the infinite one, *viz.* ſome *Epicurean*'s Brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great Maſter *Epicurus*, if we believe the Character which the *Stoic* in *Tully* gives of him, who ſaith he was *homo ſine arte, ſine literis, inſultans in omnes, ſine acumine ullo, ſine auctoritate, ſine lepore.* But allowing the *Stoic* ſome of that Paſſion, (which he diſclaim'd ſo much) in theſe words; yet we may rather believe what *Tully* himſelf elſewhere ſpeaks of *Epicurus*'s Sentiments, that they were none of them handſom or becoming a Man. *At ille quid ſentit?* ſaith he of *Epicurus*; and ſoon replies, *ſentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum:* And in another place ſpeaking of his Morals, he ſaith, *nihil generoſum ſapit atque magnificum, there was nothing Noble and Generous in him.* Which cenſure of *Epicurus*, all the pains that *P. Gaſſendus* hath taken in the vindication of the Life and Opinions of *Epicurus*, hath not been able to wipe off. For altho' we ſhou'd yield what that Learned Man ſo much contends for, that all the Calumnies which were caſt on *Epicurus* ariſe from the antipathy between *Zeno* and the following *Stoics*, and the School of *Epicurus*; yet all this will not make *Epicurus* to have been comparable with ſome other Philoſophers for Parts and Judgment, whoſe Principles have ſomewhat more generous and venerable in them, than the Morals of *Epicurus* had, taking them in their more refin'd Senſe.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

Idem de Divinat. l. 1.

Idem de Finibus, l. 1.

XIV. But it is not the Morality of *Epicurus* which we now inquire after; our buſineſs is to ſee how well he acquits himſelf in rendring an account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity. And ſo we come to conſider the *Hypotheſis* it ſelf, whether it be rational or no, or conſiſtent with the Catholic Laws of Nature which appear in the World. Two things I ſhall here inquire into, which are the main Principles of *Epicurus*, *viz.* the Motion of theſe Atoms in the infinite Space, and the manner of the concretion of Bodies by the concourſe of theſe Atoms.

1. I begin with their Motion; which *Epicurus* attributes to his Atoms without any heſitation, and yet never undertakes to give an account of the Origin of that Motion; which argues his whole *Hypotheſis* to be extremely precarious. The thing then, (which he muſt aſſume as his main Principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, That Motion doth inſeparably belong to the leaſt Atom or inſenſible Particle; for without this there cannot be imagin'd any concourſe of Atoms at all, much leſs any ſuch contexture of Bodies out of them. But for one to ſay that Atoms move, becauſe it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is ſo precarious, that it will never give the

leaſt ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind. And it will be the leaſt of all pardonable in the exploders of ſubſtantial Forms and occult Qualities, when the Origin of the whole World is reſolv'd into an occult Quality, which gives Motion to Atoms. And herein the *Atomiſts* out-do the moſt credulous *Peripatetics*, ſeeing they lay the prime Foundation of the World and of their own Philoſophy together, in a thing they can give no rational account of at all; which is, the Motion of Atoms in an infinite Vacuity. If it be reply'd, which is all *Epicurus* hath to ſay, *That the Motion of Atoms depends upon their Gravity*; the queſtion returns upon him with the ſame violence, How comes this Gravity to belong to theſe Atoms in ſuch an empty Space, where there can be no impulſion from other Bodies, no attraction from any magnetic Particles which are ſuppos'd to be the Cauſes of the deſcent of heavy Bodies; Nay, *Epicurus* himſelf takes away any center of that Motion of Atoms, and yet attributes a neceſſary deſcent to his Atoms by virtue of their Gravity; and if a Philoſopher may beg ſuch things as theſe are, ſo repugnant to the *Phænomena* of Nature, without aſſigning any other Reaſon for them, but that it is their Nature, let us never venture Philoſophizing more, but ſit down in that contented piece of Ignorance, which attributes the Cauſes of every thing unto ſpecific Forms and occult Qualities. For this is ſo ſhameful a piece of Beggery, that *P. Gaſſendus* doth more than once diſclaim it, and in his Diſcourſe of Motion, doth prove an impoſſibility of Motion in an infinite empty Space. Might not *Epicurus* then have ſav'd his Credit better, by fitting down with the Opinions of his Forefathers, than thus to go a begging for ſuch *Hypotheſes*, which none, who are not reſolv'd to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him?

Gaſſendus Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 3. c. 7. De apparent. magnitud. Solis humilis & ſublimis, ep. 4. ſ. 3. De motu Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 5. c. 2. V. ep. de motu impreſſo a motore tranſlato. To. 3. op.

But yet this is not all, but according to this fundamental Principle of *Epicurus*, *viz.* That there is a principle of Motion in every inſenſible Particle of Matter, he plainly overthrows another Principle of his, which is, the ſolidity and different Magnitude of theſe Atoms. Theſe Particles are ſuppos'd ſo ſolid, that *Dionyſius* in *Euſebius* tells us the Account given, why they are call'd ἄτομοι was, διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερρότητα, becauſe of their indiſſoluble firmneſs; and the different ſizes of theſe Atoms is ſo neceſſary a Principle, that from thence they undertake to reſolve many *Phænomena* of the Univerſe; let us now ſee how conſiſtent theſe things are with the inſeparable property of Motion belonging to Atoms: For if there be Particles of ſuch different ſizes, then it is plain, that there are ſome Particles which may not only be conceiv'd to be bigger than others, but are really ſo; and ſo there muſt be more parts of Matter imagin'd in this bigger Particle than in another leſs; and if there be more Parts, theſe Parts may be conceiv'd ſeparate from each other, that this Particle may be equal to the other: Now then, I demand, if Motion doth inſeparably belong to the leaſt Particle of Matter, how comes one to be bigger than the other? For herein we ſee, that every Particle is not in diſtinct Motion; for there cannot but be more imaginable Particles in an Atom of a bigger ſize than in a leſs; and if ſo, there muſt be ſome union of thoſe imaginable Particles in that bigger Atom; and how cou'd ſuch an union be without Reſt? And what Reſt cou'd there be if Motion doth inſeparably belong to every Particle of Matter? And ſo it muſt be in all thoſe Atoms which are ſuppos'd to have Angles and Hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other, for the compoſition of Bodies; how come theſe Hooks and Angles to be annex'd to this Atom? For an Atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if ſuch a

Euſeb. præp. Evang. l. 14. c. 22.

XV.

principle of motion be in each Particle? If it be anſwer'd, *That Motion did belong to all theſe Particles, but by degrees the leſſer Particles hitting together made up theſe angled and hooked Particles*; I ſoon reply, that the difficulty returns more ſtrongly; for if theſe angled and hooked Particles be ſuppos'd neceſſary to the contexture and union of Bodies; how came thoſe leaſt imaginable Particles ever to unite without ſuch Hooks and Angles? And ſo the Queſtion will return *in infinitum.* If then the ſolidity and indiviſibility of theſe angled Atoms, doth depend on the union and reſt of thoſe leſſer imaginable particles joyn'd together, then it is evident that Motion is no inſeparable property of all theſe Particles, but ſome are capable of union, in order to the making of ſuch Hooks and Angles, which are neceſſary for the contexture of Bodies; and where there is union and ſolidity, there is reſt, which is at leaſt accompany'd with it, if it be not one of the great Cauſes of it. And without which the *Atomiſts*, of all other Philoſophers, will be leaſt able to give an account of firmneſs in Bodies, when they make Bodies to conſiſt of an aggregation of Particles, by which it will be very hard finding a ſufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm Bodies, unleſs it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid Bodies, and the reſt of the ſmall and contiguous parts that make up the firm Body, according to that Catholic Law of Nature, whereby things continue in the ſtate they are in till ſome ſtronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the *Epicurean Atomiſts* have left to give any account of the ſolidity of Particles of ſuch different ſizes, is, the want of Vacuity; for ſay they, *The ground of diviſibility of Bodies is the interſperſion of a diſſeminated Vacuum; now where there is no Vacuity, tho' the particles be of different ſize, yet they may be ſolid and indiviſible.* But this is taken off by the inſtance produced againſt other perſons by that Ingenious and Honorable Perſon Mr. *Boyle* in his *Phyſiological Eſſays*, which is to this purpoſe, *Suppoſe two of theſe preſum'd indiviſible particles, both ſmooth and of a cubical figure, ſhould happen to lie upon one another, and a third ſhould chance to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two; what ſhould hinder but that this Aggregate may by the violent knock of ſome other Corpuſcles be broken in the midſt of the whole Concretion, and conſequently in the middlemoſt Body?* For ſuppoſe them as ſolid as may be, yet ſince Corpuſcles as hard as they, can be made very violently to knock againſt them, why may not thoſe grate or break the middlemoſt Corpuſcle, or any of the others? And if there be a poſſibility of breaking off theſe cubical particles in the middle, then mere want of Vacuity is no ſufficient account of their being indiviſible. By this we ſee how far the *Atomiſts* are from giving any rational account of the Origin of the motion of the Atoms themſelves without a Deity.

V. Deſcartes, princip. p. 2. art. 54, 55, 56.

Hiſtory of Fluid. and Firm. p. 202.

XVI. 2. Suppoſing this Motion to be granted them, yet they *cannot give any ſatisfactory account of the manner of concretion of Bodies by the caſual occurſions of theſe Atoms moving in an infinite empty ſpace.* Which appears from thoſe groſs and extravagant ſuppoſitions of *Epicurus*, in order to the making theſe *Atoms* of his ſo hit together that they make up any Bodies by their Contexture.

1. He ſuppoſeth as it were two Regions, a Superior and Inferior in an infinite empty Space, which hath no center at all in it, nor any Body, from which to meaſure thoſe reſpects of above and below, as appears by his Epiſtle to *Herodotus*, wherein he ſaith, *Theſe terms of* ἄνω

and

and κάτω, *or upwards and downwards, muſt be conceiv'd without any bounds or limits at all. So that tho' we conceive ſomething ſuperior, we muſt imagin nothing ſupreme, and ſo on the contrary.* Whereby it is evident, as *Gaſſendus* confeſſeth, that *Epicurus* thought the ſurface of the Earth to be a plain, and this plain to be continued up in a level ſuperficies to the Heavens, and ſo to all that immenſe ſpace of the Univerſe. So that all thoſe heavy Bodies which ſhould fall downwards in any parts of the wideſt diſtance on the Earth, as in *Europe*, *Aſia*, and *Africa*, would never meet (if they continued their Motion) in the center of the Earth, but would continue their Motion ſtill in a parallel line; and ſo he imagin'd that which is ſaid to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the World, and ſo the deſcent of his *Atoms*, muſt neceſſarily be downwards towards the Earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy *Mathematical* Suppoſition, for one who would undertake to give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a *Deity?* *Gaſſend. Phyſic. ſ. 1. l. 3. c. 7.*

This Motion of deſcent by reaſon of the gravity of *Atoms* would not ſerve his turn; for if the *Atoms* mov'd downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it poſſible for them ever to meet for the contextures of Bodies? Now for this purpoſe he invented a *Motion of declination*; for finding the Motion *ad lineam*, or *ad perpendiculum* as ſome call it, could not poſſibly produce thoſe varieties of Bodies which are in the Univerſe, he ſuppos'd therefore the Deſcent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that ſo ſeveral Particles in their deſcent might make ſome occurſions one upon another. And this *Epicurus* added to *Democritus*; but therein, as *Tully* obſerves, was very unhappy, that where he adds to *Democritus*, *ea quæ corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur*; that he marr'd what *Democritus* had ſaid, by mending of it. The reaſon of which Motion of Declination is thus given by *Lucretius*; *Cicero de Fin. l. 1.*

Quod niſi declinare ſolerent, omnia deorſum *Lucret. l. 2.*
Imbris uti guttæ caderent per Inane profundum;
Nec foret offenſus natus, neque plaga creata
Principiis, ita nil unquam natura creâſſet,

It was obvious to object, That, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, there could have been no concourſe at all of *Atoms* in an infinite ſpace, on the two grounds he went on, which were the Natural Deſcent of *Atoms*, and the *æqui-velocity* of the Motion of all *Atoms* of what ſize ſoever, which he likewiſe aſſerted (altho' one would think, if Gravity were the cauſe of Motion, then the more Gravity, the ſwifter the Motion would be) from hence, I ſay, it were not eaſie to conceive how the *Atoms* ſhould embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down, as *Lucretius* expreſſeth it, *like drops of rain*; and therefore they ſaw a neceſſity to make their Motion decline a little, that ſo they might juſtle and hit one upon another. But this oblique Motion of the *Atoms*, tho' it be the only refuge left to ſalve the origin of things by a concourſe of *Atoms*, is yet as precarious and without reaſon as any other Suppoſition of theirs whatſoever. *Tully* chargeth this Motion of Declination with two great faults, *Futility*, and *Inefficacy*, *quæ cum res tota ficta ſit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem quod vult.* It is a childiſh Fancy, and to no purpoſe: For, *firſt*, It is aſſerted without any reaſon at all given *Cicero de Fin. bon. & mal. lib. 1.*

for it, which is unworthy a *Philoſopher*; neither is to any purpoſe; for if all *Atoms*, ſaith he, decline in their Motion, then none of them will ſtick together; if ſome decline, and others do not, this is as precarious as any thing can be imagin'd, to aſſign a diverſity of Motion in indiviſible Particles, which yet have all the ſame velocity of Motion; and, as *Tully* ſaith, *Hoc erit quaſi provincias Atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur*; as tho' *Epicurus* were the General at this *Rendezvous* of *Atoms*, who ſtands ready to appoint every one his Task and Motion. This *Plutarch* tells us was the great charge againſt *Epicurus*, ὡς ἀναίτιον εἰσαγόντι κλίσιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, *becauſe he introduced ſuch a Motion of Declination out of nothing, upon no pretence of reaſon.* And *Turnebus* tells us that the ground why they deſir'd ſo ſmall a Declination, was, becauſe they were conſcious to themſelues, that it was founded upon no ground of Reaſon; *Et Epicurei ſibi concii culpæ, timide eam ponebant, & minimam ſibi poſtulabant.* To which purpoſe *Turnebus* cites thoſe Verſes of *Lucretius*,

Plutarch. de Anim. procreat. è Timæo.

Turnebus in Ciceron. de Fato.

Lucret. l. 2.

Quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare neceſſe eſt
Corpora, nec pluſquam minimum, ne fingere motus
Obliquos videamur, & id res vera refutet.
Nam hoc in promptu manifeſtumque eſſe videmus,
Pondera quantum in ſe eſt, non poſſe obliqua meare
E ſupero cum precipitant, quod cernere poſſis.
Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai
Declinare quis eſt qui poſſit cernere ſeſe?

But this Argument of *Lucretius* will hold, if at all, farther than this little Declination (for it is no more they deſire than as little as may be imagin'd, *quo nihil poſſit fieri minus*, as *Tully* expreſſeth it) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? nay, it is impoſſible to conceive, but a little oblique Motion at firſt will in an infinite Space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the Motion which way it bends: now if there be never ſo little Motion of Declination, the *Atom* will be inclin'd that way; and what then ſhould hinder, but that the obliquity in a Motion thro' a great Space ſhould at laſt come to be very great; there being no center at all to guide the Motion towards, and the gravity not hindring this little Declination? Therefore *Tully* asks that Queſtion, *Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus? Why only it declines one minim, and not two or three? For*, ſaith he, *it is no impulſion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minim; neither is there any impediment in the Space to hinder it from declining more; ſo that*, as he well ſaith, *optare hoc quidem eſt, non diſputare*, this is to beg *Hypotheſes*, and not to prove them, which is the thing we have prov'd *Epicurus* to do. Which was the firſt thing premis'd, *viz.* that this *Hypotheſis* of *Epicurus* was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of Reaſon.

Cicero de Fato.

XVII. 2. *It is unſatisfactory and inſufficient, as well as precarious*; for ſhould we grant his two main Principles, *Atoms*, and his *Infinite empty Space*; yet we deny that ever his *Atoms* with all their occurſions would ever produce thoſe things which are in the Univerſe. To run thro' the noted *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, and to ſhew how inſufficient an account the *Epicureans* are able to give of them, from a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I ſhall rather ſuggeſt than inſiſt upon, to ſee what miſe-

rable

rable ſhifts the *Epicureans* are driven to for the ſalving of them, and ſhall then leave it with the *Reader* to judg, what unmeaſurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the ſake of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the World ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*.

1. *The great variety of appearances in Nature*, which are attributed to Particles of the ſame Nature, only with the alteration of Size, Shape and Motion. That ſome things in the World ſhould have no other Reaſon given of them, may not only be tolerable, but rational, as in the Objects and Operations on the Organs of Senſe, thoſe Affections which are miſtaken for real Qualities, *&c.* But that all thoſe Effects which are ſeen in Nature ſhould have no other Cauſe but the different Configuration and Motion of *Atoms*, is the height of Folly as well as impiety. To imagine that the Particles of Matter, as they are in Men, ſhould be capable of Senſation, Memory, Intellection, Volition, *&c.* merely becauſe of a different Shape, Size and Motion from what they have in a piece of Wood, is a Riddle that requires a new Configuration of *Atoms* in us to make us underſtand. May it not be hoped, that at leaſt one time or other by this caſual concourſe of *Atoms*, the Particles may light to be of ſuch a Nature in Stones, as to make them fly; in Plants, to make them all Senſitive; and in Beaſts to make them Reaſon and Diſcourſe? What may hinder ſuch a Configuration or Motion of Particles, if all theſe effects are to be imputed to no higher Principles? We ſee in other Bodies, what different appearances are caus'd by a ſudden alteration of the Particles of the Matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out ſo in the things mention'd? Neither can this be unreaſonable to demand. 1. Becauſe the Motion of theſe Particles of Matter is caſual ſtill, according to them; and who knows what Chance may do? For the ſeminal Principles themſelves are, I ſuppoſe, according to them, of the ſame uniform Matter with the reſt of the World, and ſo are liable to different Motion and Configuration. 2. Becauſe all Particles of Matter are ſuppos'd to be in continual Motion, becauſe of that diſſeminated Vacuity which is preſum'd to be in the World, and becauſe a *Coacervate Vacuity* is not only aſſerted as poſſible, but as probably exiſtent: I aſſume only then (that which is inſiſted on as probable) *viz.* That that Space which lies between our *Atmoſphere* and the *Stars*, is empty of any other thing, but only the Rays of the *Stars* which paſs thro' it; I then ſuppoſing it a Vacuity, whether would not the Particles of thoſe Bodies which lie contiguous to that Space, preſently diſlodge from the Bodies wherein they are, and begin a new *Rendezvous* of *Atoms* there? For all *Atoms* are ſuppos'd to be in perpetual Motion; and the Cauſe aſſign'd, why in ſolid Bodies they do not fly away, is becauſe of the repercuſſion of other *Atoms*, that when they once begin to ſtir, they receive ſuch knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the Bodies contiguous to this Space; for both thoſe Bodies are more fluid, and ſo there is no ſuch knocking of Particles to keep them at reſt; but which is more, thoſe which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from Motion, and ſo thoſe Particles will neceſſarily remove into that empty Space, where there is no impediment of their Motion, and ſo the next *Atoms* to thoſe muſt remove, becauſe that Space wherein the other were, is made empty by their removal; and ſo the next, and ſo on, till not only the Air, but the whole Maſs of the

Earth will, on ſuppoſition of ſuch a Vacuity, be diſſolv'd into its firſt Particles, which will all mutiny in the ſeveral Bodies wherein they are, and never reſt till they come to that empty Space, where they may again *Rendezvous* together. So dangerous is the news of Liberty, or of an empty Space to theſe *Democratical* Particles of the Univerſe. Neither can I ſee how a diſſeminated Vacuity can ſalve the difficulty; for thoſe Particles of the moſt ſolid Bodies being in continual Motion, and the ground of their union being repercuſſion, it thence follows, that towards that part where the diſſeminated *vacuum* is, the Particles meeting with no ſuch ſtrokes may fairly take their leaves of the Bodies they are in, and ſo one ſucceed in the place of another, till the Configuration of the whole be alter'd, and conſequently different appearances and effects may be caus'd in the ſame Bodies, tho' it reſults from ſeminal Principles: So that according to the *Atomical* Principles, no rational Account can be given of thoſe Effects which are ſeen in Nature. This *Dionyſius*, in *Euſebius*, urgeth againſt the *Atomiſts*, that from the ſame Principles, without evident reaſon given for it, they make of the ſame uniform Matter ſome things conſpicuous to Senſe, others not, ſome ſhort-liv'd, others extremely long-liv'd. Τίνα ὁ τρόπον μιᾶς ὕσι κ᾽ τ̃ αὐτ̃ης ἁπασῶν ὑσίας, κ᾽ τ̃ αὐτ̃ης ἀφθάρτ̃ φύσεως, πλὴ τ̃ μεγεθῶν, ὡς φασι, κ᾽ τ̃ σχημάτων, τὰ μ̀ ὄντ̃ θεῖα κ᾽ ἀκήρατα κ᾽ αἰώνια, ὡς αὐτοὶ φήσαιεν ἂν, τ̃ύμαλα, ἢ μακροβίωνά γε κ᾽ τ̃ ὕτως ὀνομάσαντα, φανόμενά τε κ᾽ ἀφανῆ; *What ground can there be aſſign'd of ſo vaſt a difference between things, if they all be of the ſame Nature, and differ only in Size and Shape?* ſaith that excellent Perſon, who there, with a great deal of Eloquence, lays open the Folly of the *Atomical* Philoſophy, Θαυμασή γε τ̃ ἀτόμων, ἡ δημοκρατία δεξιωμένων τε ἀλλήλας τ̃ φίλων κ᾽ περιπλεκομένων εἰς μίαν τε καλασκλωῆν συνοικίαν ἐπειγομένων. *It is a rare Democracy of Atoms*, ſaith he, *where the friendly Atoms meet and embrace each other, and from thence forward live in the cloſeſt Society together.*

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 24.

2. Not only the variety, but the *exact Order and Beauty of the World* is a thing unaccountable by the *Atomical Hypotheſis*. Were the whole World ſtill a *Heſiod*'s *Chaos* (from the conſideration of which *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, *Epicurus* began to philoſophize) we might probably believe an Agitation of Particles (ſuppoſing Matter created) might ſettle it in ſuch a confus'd manner; but that there ſhould be nothing elſe but a blind *impetus* of *Atoms* to produce thoſe vaſt and moſt regular Motions of the heavenly Bodies, to order the paſſage of the *Sun* for ſo great conveniency of Nature, and for the alternate ſucceſſion of the Seaſons of the Year, which ſhould cut ſuch Channels for the *Ocean*, and keep that vaſt Body of the Water (whoſe Surface is higher than the Earth) from overflowing it, which ſhould furniſh the Earth with ſuch ſeminal and prolific Principles, as to provide Food and Nouriſhment for thoſe Animals which live upon it, and furniſh out every thing neceſſary for the Comfort and Delight of Man's Life; to believe, I ſay, that all theſe things came only from a blind and fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is the moſt prodigious piece of Credulity and Folly that human Nature is ſubject to. But this part which concerns the Order and Beauty of the parts of the Univerſe, and the Argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous Principle, but an infinitely wiſe God, hath been ſo fully and judiciouſly handled by a Learned Perſon already, that I ſhall rather chooſe to refer the Reader to his Diſcourſe, than inſiſt any more upon it.

Laer. l. 10.

D. H. More's Antidote againſt Atheiſm. part 2.

† 3. *The*

3. *The Production of Mankind* is a thing which the *Atomiſts* are moſt ſhamefully puzzled with, as well as the Formation of the internal parts of Man's Body, of which I have already ſpoken in the precedent Chapter. It would pity one to ſee what lamentable ſhifts the *Atomiſts* are put to, to find out a way for the Production of Mankind, *viz. That our teeming Mother the Earth at laſt caſt forth ſome kind of Bags like Wombs upon the Surface of the Earth, and theſe by degrees breaking, at laſt came out Children, which were nouriſh'd by a kind of Juice of the Earth like Milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be Men.* Oh what will not *Atheiſts* believe, rather than a DEITY and *Providence!* But leſt we ſhould ſeem to wrong the *Atomiſts*, hear what *Cenſorinus* ſaith of *Epicurus*; *Is enim credidit limo calefactos uteros neſcio quos radicibus terræ cohærentes, primum increviſſe, & infantibus, ex ſe editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura miniſtrante præbuiſſe; quos ita educatos & adultos, genus humanum propagâſſe.* But becauſe *Lucretius* may be thought to ſpeak more impartially in the caſe, how rarely doth he deſcribe it? *Cenſor. de die Nat. c. 2.*

Creſcebant uteri terræ radicibus apti,
Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit ætas
Infantum, fugiens humorem, auraſque petiſſens,
Convertebat ibi natura foramina terræ,
Et ſuccum venis cogebat fundere apertis
Conſimilem lactis; ſicut nunc fœmina quæque
Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis
Impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti:
Terra cibum pueris, veſtem vapor, herba cubile
Præbebat, multa & molli lanugine abundans.

Had *Lucretius* been only a Poet, this might have paſs'd for a handſomely deſcrib'd Fable; but to deliver it for a piece of Philoſophy, makes it the greater Mythology: That Man's Body was form'd out of the Earth we believe, becauſe we have reaſon ſo to do; but that the Earth ſhould caſt forth ſuch *folliculi*, as he expreſſeth it, and then Men ſhould be brought up in ſuch a way as he deſcribes, deſerves a place among the moſt incredible and Poetic Fables. But if Poets muſt be credited, how much more like a Man did he ſpeak, who told us,

Natus homo eſt; ſive hunc divino ſemine fecit
Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris origo;
Sive recens tellus, ſeductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat ſemina cœli;
Quam ſatus Iapeto miſtam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Thus have we conſider'd the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, both as to the Principles on which it ſtands, and the ſutableneſs of it to the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe; and I ſuppoſe now there cannot be the leaſt ſhadow of Reaſon found from the *Atomical Philoſophy*, to make us at all queſtion that Account of the Origin of the Univerſe, which aſcribes it not to the fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, but to the infinite Wiſdom of a DEITY. I conclude then this Diſcourſe of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, with the words of *Automedon*, in the *Greek Epigram.*

Ταῦτ'

Anthолog. l. 1. c. 15.

Ταῦτ' εἰδὼς σοφός ἴσθι, μάτην δ' Ἐπίκυρον ἔασον
Πεῖν τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν, καὶ τίνες αἱ μονάδες.

Learn to be wiſe; let Epicurus *chaſe*
To find his Atoms, *and his empty Space.*

XVIII. I come now to the laſt *Hypotheſis* mention'd, which undertakes to give an account of the Origin of the Univerſe, *from the mere Mechanical Laws of Motion and Matter.* Which is the *Hypotheſis* of the late Famous *French* Philoſopher Mr. *Des-Cartes.* For altho' there be as much Reaſon as Charity to believe that he never intended his *Hypotheſis* as a foundation of *Atheiſm*, having made it ſo much his buſineſs to aſſert the Exiſtence of a DEITY, and Immateriality of the Soul: yet becauſe it is apt to be abus'd to that end by Perſons *Atheiſtically* diſpos'd, becauſe of his aſcribing ſo much to the power of Matter; we ſhall therefore ſo far conſider it, as it undertakes to give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a DEITY. His *Hypotheſis* therefore is briefly this. He takes it for granted, that all the Matter of the World was at firſt of one Uniform Nature, diviſible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in Motion: from hence he ſuppoſeth, 1. *That all the Matter of which the Univerſe is compoſed, was at firſt divided into equal particles of an indifferent ſize, and that they had all ſuch a Motion as is now found in the World.* 2. *That all thoſe particles were not at firſt Sphærical, becauſe many ſuch little Globes joyn'd together will not fill up a continued Space, but that of whatever figure they were at firſt, they would by continual Motion become Sphærical, becauſe they would have various circular Motions; for ſeeing that at firſt they were mov'd with ſo great force that one particle would be disjoyn'd from the other, the ſame force continuing would ſerve to cut off all angles which are ſuppos'd in them, by their frequent occurſions againſt each other; and ſo when the angles were cut off, they would become Sphærical.* 3. *He ſuppoſeth that no Space is left empty, but when thoſe round particles being joyn'd, leave ſome intervals between them, there are ſome more ſubtile particles of Matter, which are ready to fill up thoſe void Spaces, which ariſe from thoſe angles which were cut off from the other particles to make them Sphærical; which fragments of particles are ſo little, and acquire thereby ſuch a celerity of Motion, that by the force of that, they will be divided into innumerable little fragments, and ſo will fill up all thoſe Spaces which other particles could not enter in at.* 4. *That thoſe particles which fill up the intervals between the Sphærical ones, have not all of them the ſame celerity of Motion, becauſe ſome of them are more undivided than others are, which fill'd up the ſpace between three globular particles when their angles were cut off, and therefore thoſe particles muſt neceſſarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for Motion, and thence it comes to paſs that ſuch particles eaſily ſtick together, and transfer the greateſt part of their Motion upon thoſe other particles which are leſs, and therefore have a ſwifter motion; and becauſe theſe particles are to paſs thro' ſuch triangular ſpaces which lie in the midſt of three globular particles touching each other, therefore he ſuppoſeth them as to their breadth and depth to be of a triangular figure; but becauſe theſe particles are ſomewhat long, and the globular particles thro' which they paſs with ſo ſwift motion have their rotation about the poles of the Heavens, thence he ſuppoſes that thoſe triangular particles come*

Carteſii Princip. p. 3. Art. 46, &c.

to be wreathed. Now from these things being thus suppos'd, *Des Cartes* hath ingenuously and consonantly to his Principles undertaken to give an Account of the most noted *Phænomena* of the World, and those three sorts of particles mention'd, he makes to be his three Elements. The *first* is that subtile Matter which was suppos'd to arise from the cutting off the angles of the greater particles; and of this he tells us the *Sun* and Fix'd *Stars* consist, as those particles of that subtile Matter being in continual motion have made those several *vortices* or *Æthereal Whirlpools.* The *second* Element consists of the *Sphærical* particles themselves, which make up the *Heavens*; out of the *third* Element, which are those *Wreathed Particles*, he gives an Account of the Formation of the *Earth*, and *Planets*, and *Comets*; and from all of them, by the help of those common Affections of Matter, Size, Figure, Motion, *&c.* he undertakes to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the World. How far his Principles do conduce to the giving Mens Minds satisfaction, as to the particular *Phænomena* of *Nature*, is not here our business to inquire, but only how far these Principles can give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a DEITY? And that it cannot give a satisfactory account how the World was fram'd without a *Deity*, appears by the two grand Suppositions on which all his Elements depend, both which cannot be from any other Principle but GOD. Those are, 1. *The Existence of Matter in the World*, which we have already prov'd cannot be independent on GOD, and necessarily existent; and therefore supposing that Matter existent and put into Motion, would grind it self into those several particles by him suppos'd, yet this cannot give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a *Deity.* 2. *The motion of the particles of Matter supposeth a* Deity; for Matter is no self-moving Principle, as hath been fully demonstrated in several places by that judicious Philosopher Dr. *H. More*, who plainly manifests that if Motion did necessarily belong to Matter, it were impossible there should be *Sun*, or *Stars*, or *Earth*, or *Man* in the World; for the Matter being uniform, it must have equal Motion in all its particles, if Motion doth belong to it. For Motion being suppos'd to be natural and essential to Matter, must be alike every where in it, and therefore every particle must be suppos'd in motion to its utmost capacity, and so every particle is alike and mov'd alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in Bigness or Motion, it is manifest that this *Universal Matter*, to whom Motion is so essential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in Nature; for nothing could be caus'd by this thin and subtile Matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our Senses: and what a strange kind of visible World would this be? From hence then it appears that there must be an infinitely powerful and wise GOD, who must both put Matter into Motion, and regulate the Motion of it, in order to the producing all those varieties which appear in the World. And this necessity of the Motion of Matter by a power given it from GOD is freely acknowledg'd by Mr. *Des Cartes* himself in these words; *Considero materiam sibi libere permissam, & nullum aliunde impulsum suscipientem, ut plane quiescentem; illa autem impellitur a Deo, tantundem motus sive translationis in ea conservante quantum ab initio posuit.* So that this great improver and discoverer of the Mechanical power of Matter, doth freely confess the necessity not only of GOD's giving Motion in order to the Origin of the Universe, but of his conserving

Dr. *More Antidote b.* 2. *ch.* 1. Immortality of the Soul, *b.* 1. *c.* 11. *s.* 3. &c. *Ep.* 3. *ad Cartes. p.* 88.

Cartes. resp. ad ep. 3. *H. Mori, p.* 104.

ving Motion in it for the upholding it: So that we need not fear from this *Hypotheſis* the excluding of a *Deity* from being the prime efficient cauſe of the World. All the Queſtion then is concerning the particular manner, which was us'd by GOD as the efficient cauſe in giving Being to the World. As to which I ſhall only in general ſuggeſt what *Maimonides* ſays of it. *Omnia ſimul creata erant, & poſtea ſucceſſive ab invicem ſeparata*; altho' I am ſomewhat inclinable to that of *Gaſſendus*, *Majus eſt mundus opus, quam ut aſſequi mens humana illius molitionem poſſit*: To which I think may be well apply'd that Speech of *Solomon*; *Then I beheld all the work of* GOD, *that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the Sun: becauſe tho' a man labour to ſeek it out, yea farther, tho' a wiſe man think to know it, yet ſhall he not be able to find it.*

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 30. Gaſſendi Phyſic. ſ. 1. l. 7. c. 6. Eccl. 8. 17.

CHAP. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. Epicurus *his Arguments againſt it refuted. The neceſſity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence prov'd from a conſideration of the nature of* GOD, *and the things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great objections againſt Providence propounded. The firſt concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. GOD *cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of Man, doth not charge* GOD *with Man's fault.* GOD's *power to govern Man by Laws, tho' he gives no particular reaſon of every poſitive Precept.* VI. *The reaſon of* GOD's *creating Man with freedom of Will, largely ſhew'd from* Simplicius; *and the true account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. GOD's *permitting the Fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil compar'd with that of Heathen Philoſophers.* IX. *The antiquity of the opinion of aſcribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the judgment of the* Perſians, Ægyptians, *and others about it.* X. *Of Manichæiſm.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV. *The opinion of the ancient Greek Philoſophers; of* Pythagoras, Plato, *the* Stoics; *the Origin of Evil not from the neceſſity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The remainders of the Hiſtory of the Fall among the Heathens.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the malignity of* Dæmons. XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the ſufferings of the good and impunity of bad Men. An account of both from Natural Light, manifeſted by* Seneca, Plutarch, *and others.*

I. IT being now manifeſted not only that there is a GOD, but that the World had its Being from Him; it thence follows by an eaſy and rational Deduction, that there is a particular Hand of Divine Providence, which upholds the World in its Being, and wiſely diſpoſeth all Events in it. For it is a moſt irrational and abſurd Opinion to aſſert a *Deity*, and deny *Providence:* and in nothing did *Epicurus* more diſcover the weakneſs and puerility of his judgment than in this. Indeed, if *Epicurus* had no other deſign in aſſerting a *Deity*, than (as many ancient Philoſophers imagin'd) to avoid the imputation of direct *Atheiſm*, and yet to take away all foundations of Religion; he muſt needs be ſaid to ſerve his *Hypotheſis* well, tho' he did aſſert the Being of an *Excellent Nature*, which he call'd GOD; while yet he made Him ſit as it were with his Elbows folded up in the Heavens, and taking no cognizance of Human actions. For he well knew, that if the belief of Divine Providence were once rooted out of Mens Minds, the thoughts of an *Excellent Being* above the Heavens, would have no more awe or power upon the Hearts and Lives of Men, than the telling Men that there are Jewels of ineſtimable value in the *Indies*, makes them more ready to pay Taxes to their Princes. For that Philoſopher could not be ignorant, that it is not Worth but Power, nor Speculation but Intereſt that rules the World. The poor Tenant more regards his petty Landlord, than the greateſt Prince in the World that hath nothing to do with him: and he thinks he hath great reaſon for it; for he neither fears puniſhment, nor hopes for reward from him; whereas his Landlord may diſpoſſeſs him of all he hath upon diſpleaſure, and may advantage him the moſt if he gains his favour: Suppoſing then that there were ſuch an *Excellent Being* in the World which was compleatly happy in Himſelf, and thought it an impairing of his happineſs to trouble Himſelf with an inſpection of the World; Religion might then be indeed deriv'd *à relegendo*, but not *à religando*; there might be ſome pleaſure in contemplating his Nature, but there could be no obligation to Obedience. So that *Epicurus* was the firſt founder of a kind of *Philoſophical Antinomianiſm*, placing all Religion in a Veneration of *the Deity*, purely for its own Excellency, without any ſuch mercenary Eye (as thoſe who ſerve GOD for their own ends, as they ſay are apt to have) to reward and puniſhment. And I much doubt that Good-woman whom the Story goes of, who in an *Enthuſiaſtic* poſture ran up and down the Streets with Emblems in her Hands, *Fire* in the one, as ſhe ſaid, to burn up *Heaven*, and *Water* in the other, to quench *Hell*, that Men might ſerve GOD purely for Himſelf, would, if ſhe had compaſs'd her deſign, ſoon have brought *Proſelytes* enough to *Epicurus*, and by burning *Heaven* would have burnt up the Cords of *Religion*, and in quenching *Hell* would have extinguiſh'd the Awe and Fear of a *Deity* in the World. Indeed the incomparable Excellency and Perfection which is in the *Divine Nature*, to Spirits advanc'd to a Noble and Generous height in Religion, makes them exceedingly value their Choice; while they diſregard whatever rivals with GOD for it; but were it not for thoſe Magnetical hooks of Obedience and Eternal Intereſt, there are few would be drawn to a due Conſideration of, much leſs a Delight in ſo Amiable and Excellent a Nature. And it is impoſſible to conceive, why GOD in the Revelation of his Will ſhould ever ſo much as mention a future puniſhment, or promiſe an eternal Reward, were not the Conſideration of theſe things the Sinews of

II. Which they whoſe deſign was to undermine the very Foundations on which all Religion was built, underſtood far better, than thoſe weak pretended advancers of Religion, who while in ſuch a way they pretend to advance it, do only blow it up. For if Men ought not to have an Eye and reſpect to their own future Condition, nor ſerve GOD on the account of his Power to make our Souls miſerable or happy, much leſs ought Men to ſerve GOD with any regard to his Providence, ſince the Matters which Providence is employ'd about in this World, are of infinitely leſs moment, than thoſe which concern our Future State. And if we have no Eye on Divine Providence in the exerciſe of Religion, we ſhall ſcarce be able to underſtand for what end GOD ſhould take ſo much care of Mankind, and manifeſt ſo much of his Goodneſs to them, were it not to quicken them in their ſearch after him, and excite them to the more cheerful Obedience to him. And when once we queſtion to what end GOD troubles himſelf with the World, we are come next Door to *Epicurus*, and may in few ſteps more delight in the Flowers of his Garden. For this was his ſtrongeſt Plea againſt Providence, that it was beneath the Majeſty and Excellency of the Divine Nature to ſtoop ſo low, and trouble himſelf ſo far, as to regard what was done on Earth. This being one of his *Ratæ Sententiæ*, or undoubted Maxims, τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, *The bleſſed and immortal Being, neither hath any Imployment himſelf, nor troubles himſelf with others.* Which as *Maximus Tyrius* well obſerves, is rather a deſcription of a *Sardanapalus*, than a DEITY; nay, of a worſe than a *Sardanapalus*; for he in the midſt of all his Softneſs and Effeminacy wou'd yet entertain ſome Counſels for the ſafety and good of his Empire: But *Epicurus* his Deity is of ſo tender a nature, that the leaſt thought of Buſineſs wou'd quite ſpoil his Happineſs. This Opinion of *Epicurus* made the more raiſed-ſpirited Moraliſts ſo far contemn the unworthy Apprehenſions which he entertain'd of the Divine Nature, that they degraded him from the very title of a Philoſopher in it, and rank'd him beneath the moſt fabulous *Poets*, who had writ ſuch unworthy things of their Gods, as is evident by the Cenſures which *Tully*, *Plutarch*, and others, paſs upon him for this very Opinion. And they tell him, that ſome of their own Men were of a more noble and excellent Spirit than *Epicurus* his Deity, who abhorr'd Softneſs and Idleneſs, and made it their greateſt delight to do good to their Countries. But *Epicurus* muſt needs make his God of his own humour (the uſual flattery which Men bear to themſelves, to think that moſt excellent which they delight in moſt) as *Xenophanes* was wont to ſay, That if his Horſe were to deſcribe a GOD, it would be with a curl'd Main, a broad Cheſt, *&c.* and in every thing like himſelf. Had *Epicurus* himſelf ſo little of an *Athenian* in him, as not to make it ſome part of his delight to underſtand the Affairs of the World? Or at leaſt, did he take no pleaſure in the Walks of his famous Garden, nor to order his Trees, and ſet his Flowers, and contrive every thing for his own delight? Wou'd *Epicurus* then count this a part of his Happineſs? And is it inconſiſtent with the Happineſs of a Deity, to take notice of the World, and order all things in it for his own Glory? Muſt ſo excellent a Nature as GOD's was, by his own acknowledgment, be preſently tired with Buſineſs; when the more excellent any Nature is, the more active and vigorous it is, the more able to comprehend and diſpatch Matters of Moment with the leaſt diſturbance to it ſelf? Is it a pleaſure to a Nurſe to fill the Child with her Milk? Doth

Diog. Laert. l. 10.

Max. Tyr. Diſſert. 29.

Cicero de Finib. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. l. 2. Plutarch. adverſ. Colot.

the Sun rejoice to help the World with his conſtant Light? And doth a Fountain murmur till it be deliver'd of its Streams, which may refreſh the Ground? And is it no delight to the Divine Nature to behold the effects of his Goodneſs upon the World? We ſee here then the Foundation on which *Epicurus* went, *viz.* that his God muſt be like himſelf, or there muſt be none; and truly he might more ſutably to his Principles, queſtion his Exiſtence, than ſuppoſing his Exiſtence, deny his Providence on ſuch miſerable Accounts as theſe are, which yet are the chief which either *Epicurus* or *Lucretius* cou'd bring againſt it, from the conſideration of the Divine Nature.

III. The which to any one who conſiders it, doth neceſſarily infer a peculiar Eye and Hand of Providence in the World. For can we imagine, that a Being of Infinite Knowledg ſhou'd be ignorant of what is done in the World? And of Infinite Power, ſhou'd ſtand by and leave things to Chance and Fortune? Which were at firſt contriv'd and brought into Being by the contrivance of his Wiſdom, and exerciſe of his Power. And where the foundation of Exiſtence lies wholly and ſolely in the power of an infinite Being producing, the ground of continuance of that Exiſtence muſt lie in the ſame Power conſerving. When Men indeed effect any thing, the work may continue, whatever become of him that did it; but the reaſon of that is, becauſe what Man doth, is out of Matter already exiſtent, and his work is only ſetting Materials together: But now what God effects, he abſolutely gives a Being to, and therefore its duration depends on his Conſervation. What is once in its Being, I grant, will continue till ſome greater force than it ſelf put it out of Being; but withal I add, that God's withdrawing his Conſervation is ſo great a force, as muſt needs put that Being which had its Exiſtence from his Power, out of the condition it was in by it. The light of the Sun continues in the Air; and as long as the Sun communicates it, nothing can extinguiſh the Light, but what will put out the Sun: But cou'd we ſuppoſe the Sun to withdraw his Beams, what becomes of the Light then? This is the caſe of all Beings, which come from an infinite Power; their Subſiſtence depends on a continual Emanation of the ſame Power which gave them Being; and when once this is withdrawn, all thoſe Beings which were produced by this Power muſt needs relapſe into nothing. Beſides, what dependence is there upon each other, in the moments of Duration of any created Being? The Mode of Exiſtence in a Creature is but contingent and poſſible, and nothing is imply'd in the Notion of an exiſtent Creature, beyond mere poſſibility of Exiſtence; what is it then which gives actual Exiſtence to it? That cannot be it ſelf, for it wou'd be neceſſarily exiſtent: If another then gives Exiſtence, this Exiſtence muſt wholly depend upon him who gave it; for nothing can continue Exiſtence to it ſelf, but what may give it to it ſelf, (for it gives it for the Moment it continues it) and what gives Exiſtence to it ſelf, muſt neceſſarily exiſt, which is repugnant to the very Notion of a created Being: So that either we muſt deny a poſſibility of Non-exiſtence, or Annihilation in a Creature, which follows upon neceſſity of Exiſtence; or elſe we muſt aſſert, that the duration or continuance of a Creature in its Being, doth immediately depend on Divine Providence and Conſervation, which is with as much reaſon as frequency ſaid to be a continu'd Creation. But yet farther: Was an infinite Wiſdom and Power neceſſary to put things into that Order they are in: And is not the ſame neceſſary for the governing of them? I

cannot ſee any reaſon to think, that the Power of Matter when ſet in Motion, ſhou'd either bring things into that exquiſite order and dependence which the parts of the World have upon each other; much leſs that by the mere force of that firſt Motion, all things ſhou'd continue in the ſtate they are in. Perpetual Motion is yet one of the *deſiderata* of the World; the moſt exquiſite *Mechaniſm* cannot put an Engine beyond the neceſſity of being look'd after: Can we then think this dull, unactive Matter, merely by the force of its firſt Motion, ſhou'd be able ſtill to produce the effects which are ſeen in the World, and to keep it from tumbling, at leaſt by degrees, into its priſtine *Chaos?* It was an infinite Power, I grant, which gave that firſt Motion; but that it gave Power to continue that Motion till the Conflagration of the World, remains yet to be prov'd. Some therefore, finding that in the preſent ſtate of the World, Matter will not ſerve for all the noted and common *Phænomena* of the World, have call'd in the help of a Spirit of Nature, which may ſerve inſtead of a Man-midwife to Matter, to help her in her Production of Things. Or, as tho' GOD had a plurality of Worlds to look after, they have taken care to ſubſtitute him a Vicar in this, which is the Spirit of Nature. But we had rather believe GOD himſelf to be perpetually reſident in the World, and that the Power which gives Life, and Being, and Motion to every thing in the World, is nothing elſe but his own Providence; eſpecially ſince we have learnt from himſelf, that it is *in him we live, and move, and have our being.*

Acts xvii. 28.

IV. Thus then we ſee a neceſſity of aſſerting Divine Providence, whether we conſider the Divine Nature, or the *Phænomena* of the World; but yet the caſe is not ſo clear but that there are two grand Objections behind, which have been the continual exerciſe of the Wits of inquiſitive Men almoſt in all Ages of the World. The one concerns the firſt Origin of Evil; the other concerns the Diſpenſations of Providence, whence it comes to paſs, that good Men fare ſo hard in the World, when the bad triumph and flouriſh. If theſe two can be clear'd with any ſatisfaction to Reaſon, it will be the higheſt vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures, which give us ſuch clear light and direction in theſe profound Speculations, which the dim Reaſon of Man was ſo much to ſeek in.

I begin with the Origin of Evil; for, if there be a Hand of Providence which orders all things in the World, how comes Evil then into it, without GOD's being the Author of it? Which is a Speculation of as great depth as Neceſſity, it highly concerning us to entertain the higheſt apprehenſions of GOD's Holineſs, and how far he is from being the Author of Sin: And it is likewiſe a Matter of ſome difficulty ſo to explain the Origin of Evil, as to make it appear that GOD is not the Author of it. I eaſily then aſſent to what *Origen* ſaith on this ſubject, when *Celſus*, upon ſome miſtaken places of Scripture, had charg'd the Scripture with laying the Origin of Evil upon GOD; ἅπερ ἐν ἄλλῳ τις τόπῳ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀξιολόγων ἀπορήσειεν, ὁποσηοῦν ἀναδεέστερός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρώτων ταραχθεὶν ἂν γένοιτο. *If any thing which calls for our inquiry be of difficult inveſtigation, that which concerns the Origin of Evils is ſuch a thing*; and as *Simplicius* well begins his Diſcourſe on this Subject; περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῶν κακῶν ὁ λόγος μὴ καλῶς διορθωθεὶς καὶ τῷ περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβείας αἴτιος γέγονε, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν διαφθορὰν τοῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσφέρουσι, καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀλύτοις ἀπορίαις ἐνέβαλε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αἰτιολογοῦντας αὐτόν. *The diſpute concerning the Nature and Origin of Evil, not being well ſtated, is the cauſe of great Impiety towards*

Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. p. 207.

Simplic. in Epictet. c. 34.

wards God, and perverts the principles of good Life, and involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational account of it. So much then is it our great concernment to fix on ſure grounds in the reſolution of this important queſtion; in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intricacies of it, as it relates to any internal purpoſes of GOD's Will, (which is beyond our preſent ſcope) but I ſhall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the firſt Man. For the clearing of which I ſhall proceed in this method:

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.*

2. *That the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of Evil, doth not charge it upon God.*

3. *That no account given by Philoſophers of the origin of Evil, is ſo clear and rational as this is.*

4. *That the moſt material circumſtances of this account are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves.*

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.* For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without Heſitation to yield our aſſent to them in their plain and direct affirmations; and there can be no ground of ſuſpending aſſent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth, but the want of certain Evidence, whether it be of Divine Revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the moſt effectual ways to put an end to the numerous controverſies of the Chriſtian World (eſpecially to thoſe bold diſputes concerning the method and order of GOD's Decrees) if the plain and undoubted aſſertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard, whereby we ought to judg of ſuch things as are more obſcure and ambiguous. And cou'd Men but reſt contented with thoſe things which concern their eternal Happineſs, and the means in order to it (which on that account are written with all imaginable perſpicuity in Scripture) and the moment of all other Controverſies be judg'd by their reference to theſe, there wou'd be fewer Controverſies and more Chriſtians in the World. Now there are two grand Principles which concern Mens eternal Condition, of which we have the greateſt certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with ſafety rely, without perplexing our Minds about thoſe more nice and ſubtile Speculations (which it may be are uncapable of all full and particular reſolution) and thoſe are, *That the ruin and deſtruction of Man is wholly from himſelf*; and, *That his ſalvation is from God alone.* If then Man's ruin and miſery be from himſelf; which the Scripture doth ſo much inculcate on all occaſions; then without controverſy that which is the cauſe of all the miſery of Human Nature, is wholly from himſelf too, which is, Sin. So that if the main ſcope and deſign of the Scripture be true, GOD cannot be the Author of that, by which (without the intervention of the Mercy of GOD) Man's miſery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what Authority and Majeſty doth GOD in the Scripture forbid all manner of Sin? With what earneſtneſs and importunity doth he wooe the Sinner to forſake his ſin? With what loathing and deteſtation doth he mention Sin? With what juſtice and ſeverity doth he puniſh Sin? With what wrath and indignation doth he threaten Contumacious Sinners? And is it poſſible, (after all this and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to expreſs the Holineſs of GOD's Nature, his hatred of Sin, and his appointing a day of Judgment for the ſolemn puniſhment of Sinners) to imagin that the Scriptures do in the leaſt aſcribe

the

the Origin of Evil to God, or make him the Author of Sin? *Shall not the Judg of all the world do right?* will a God of infinite Juſtice, Purity, and Holineſs, puniſh the Sinner for that which himſelf was the cauſe of? Far be ſuch unworthy thoughts from our Apprehenſions of a *Deity*, much more of that God whom we believe to have declar'd his Mind ſo much to the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together.

Taking it then for granted in the general, that God cannot be the Author of Sin, we come to inquire, *Whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil, doth any way charge it upon God?* There are only two ways, according to the Hiſtory of the fall of Man recorded in Scripture, whereby Men may have any ground to queſtion whether God were the cauſe of Man's fall; either *firſt*, by the giving him that poſitive Law, which was the occaſion of his fall; or *ſecondly*, by leaving him to the liberty of his own Will. *Firſt*, The giving of that poſitive Law cannot be the leaſt ground of laying Man's fault on God; becauſe, 1. It was moſt ſuitable to the nature of a rational Creature to be govern'd by Laws, or declarations of the Will of his Maker: for conſidering Man as a free Agent, there can be no way imagin'd ſo conſonant to the nature of Man as this was, becauſe thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of Reward and Puniſhment, and acting in the conſideration of them, there muſt be a declaration of the Will of the Law-giver, according to which Man may expect either his Reward or Puniſhment. If it were ſuitable to God's nature to promiſe Life to Man upon Obedience, it was not unſutable to it to expect Obedience to every declaration of his Will; conſidering the abſolute Sovereignty and Dominion which God had over Man as being his Creature, and the indiſpenſable Obligation which was in the nature of Man to obey whatever his Maker did command him. So that God had full and abſolute Right to require from Man, what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive, how there ſhou'd be a Teſtimony of Man's Obedience towards his Creator, without ſome declaration of his Creator's Will. *Secondly*, God had full Power and Authority, not only to govern Man by Laws, but to determin Man's general obligation to Obedience to that particular poſitive Precept by the breach of which Man fell. If God's power over Man was univerſal and unlimited, what reaſon can there be to imagin it ſhou'd not extend to ſuch a poſitive Law? Was it, becauſe the matter of this Law ſeem'd too low for God to command his Creature? But whatever the matter of the Law was, Obedience to God was the great end of it, which Man had teſtify'd as much in that Inſtance of it as in any other whatſoever; and in the violation of it were imply'd the higheſt aggravations of Diſobedience; for God's Power and Authority were as much contemned, his Goodneſs ſlighted, his Truth and Faithfulneſs queſtion'd, his Name diſhonour'd, his Majeſty affronted in the breach of that, as of any other Law whatſoever it had been. If the Law were eaſie to be obſerv'd, the greater was the Sin of Diſobedience; if the weight of the matter was not ſo great in it ſelf, yet God's Authority added the greateſt weight to it; and the ground of Obedience is not to be fetch'd from the nature of the thing required, but from the Authority of the Legiſlator. Or was it then becauſe God conceal'd from Man his Counſel in giving of that poſitive Precept? Hath not then a Legiſlator power to require

any thing, but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it? If so, what becomes of Obedience and Subjection? It will be impossible to make any probative Precepts on this account; and the Legislator must be charg'd with the Disobedience of his Subjects, where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires: which as it concerns Human Legislators (who have not that absolute Power and Authority which God hath) is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general Sense of the World. This *Plutarch* gives a good account of, when he discourseth so rationally of the Sobriety which Men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of God's Actions; *For*, saith he, *Physicians will give prescriptions without giving the Patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them:* ὅσ' γὰρ ὅς ἄνθρωποι νόμους τίθενται, τὸ εὔλογον ἁπλῶς ἔχουσι καὶ φανόμενον, ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ δοκεῖ κομιδῇ γελοῖα τῶν προσταγμάτων. *Neither have Human Laws always apparent reason for them, nay some of them, are to appearance ridiculous*; for which he instanceth in that Law of the *Lacedæmonian Ephori*, μὴ τρέφειν μύσακα, to which no other reason was annex'd but this, καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ὡς μὴ χαλεποὶ ὄντες αὐτοῖς: *They commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his Office to shave himself, and gave this reason for it, that they might learn to obey Laws themselves.* He farther instanceth, in the *Roman* Custom of *Manumission*, their Laws about Testaments, *Solon*'s Law against Neutrality in Seditions, and concludes thence, καὶ ὅλως πολλὰς ἂν τις εὕροι νόμων ἀτοπίας, μήτε τὸν λόγον ἔχων τοῦ νομοθέτου, μήτε τὴν αἰτίαν σωσεὶς ἑκάστου τῶν γραφομένων. *Any one would easily find many Absurdities in Laws, who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator, or the ground of what he requires.* Τί δὴ θαυμαστὸν, saith he, εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄντως ἡμῖν ὄντων συνθετωρήτων, οὐκ εὔπορόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τῶν θεῶν εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τινι λόγῳ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρων, τὰς δὲ πρώτερον τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων κολάζουσιν· *What wonder is it, if we are so puzzled to give an account of the Actions of Men, that we shou'd be to seek as to those of the Deity?* This cannot be then any ground on the account of mere reason, to lay the charge of Man's Disobedience upon God, because he requir'd from him the observance of that positive command of not eating of the *forbidden Fruit.*

Plutarch. de his qui sero puniuntur a numine.

VI. The only thing then left, is, *whether God be not liable to this charge as he left Man to the liberty of his Will:* And that may be grounded on two things; *either that God did not create Man in such a condition, in which it had been impossible for him to have sinned*; *or that knowing his temptation he did not give him power to resist it.* If neither of these will lay any imputation of the Origin of Evil upon God, then God will appear to be wholly free from it. *First, concerning Man's being created a free Agent*; if the determination of the Schools be good, that possibility of Sinning is imply'd in the very notion of a Creature; and consequently that impeccability is repugnant to the nature of a created Being; then we see a necessary reason, why Man was created in a state of Liberty: but endeavouring to shew that the grounds of our Religion are not repugnant to natural Reason, I shall rather make use of the Testimony of such who profess'd to be Followers of nothing else but Reason and Philosophy. Among whom I shall make choice of *Simplicius* both for the Reason he produceth, and because he is farthest from any suspicion of partiality, by reason of his known opposition to the *Mosaic* History of the Creation. He then in his *Commentaries* on *Epictetus* professedly disputes this very subject of the Origin of Evil, and after having rejected that fond Opinion of two Principles, one of Good, and the

Vid. Thom. 1. p. q. 63. art. 1. Estium in sentent. l. 2. dist. 7. sect. 9.

Simplic. Com. in Epict. c. 34. p. 175.

the other of Evil, undertakes to give an account whence Evil came into the World; which becauſe it tends ſo much to the illuſtrating our preſent ſubject, I ſhall give an account of. GOD, ſaith he, *who is the fountain and principle of all Good, not only produced things which were in themſelves good, nor only thoſe things which were of a middle nature, but the extremes too, which were ſuch things which were apt to be perverted from that which is according to nature, to that which we call Evil. And that after thoſe Bodies which were* (as he ſuppoſeth) *incorruptible, others were produced which are ſubject to Mutation and Corruption; and ſo after thoſe Souls which were immutably fixed in Good, others were produced which were liable to be perverted from it; that ſo the riches of* GOD's *goodneſs might be diſplay'd in making to exiſt all Beings which are capable of it; and that the Univerſe might be perfect in having all ſorts of Beings in it. Now,* he ſuppoſeth *that all thoſe Beings which are above this ſublunary World are ſuch as are immutably good, and that the loweſt ſort of Beings which are liable to be perverted to Evil, are ſuch which are here below. Therefore,* ſaith he, *the Soul being of a more noble and immutable Nature, while it is by it ſelf, doth not partake of Evil; but it being of a nature apt to be joined with theſe Terreſtrial Bodies (by the Providence of the Author of the Univerſe, who produced ſuch ſouls, that ſo both extremes might be joyned by the Bonds of vital Union) thereby it becomes ſenſible of thoſe Evils and Pains which the Body is ſubject to; but theſe things are not properly Evils but rather Good, conſidering our Terreſtrial Bodies as parts of the Univerſe which is upheld by the changes and viciſſitudes which are in this lower World:* Which he largely diſcourſes on to ſhew that thoſe particular alterations which are in Bodies, do conduce rather to the perfection and beauty of the Univerſe, than are any real Evils in it. *But now,* ſaith he, *for the Origin of thoſe things which are properly Evils,* viz. *Moral Evils, which are* τὰ τ ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς πλαίσματα, *the lapſes and errors of the Human ſoul, we are to conſider, that there are ſouls of a more excellent nature than ours are, which are immutably good; and the ſouls of Brutes are of a lower kind than ours are, and yet are middle between the rational and vegetative, having ſomething in them parallel both to the Appetites and Evils which are in Men, which will therefore be underſtood by an account of the other.* Ἡ δ' ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, μέση προελθοῦσα τ τε ἀεὶ ἄνω μενουσῶν ψυχῶν, ἀφ' τε τ ἐν τῇ ψυχικῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀκρότητα, καὶ ἀφ' τ τῷ νῷ μίθεξιν, καὶ τ ἀεὶ κάτω ἀφ' τ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συγκρᾶσιν τ ἀλόγε ζωῆς, καὶ συνδεσμῷ ζωϊκὸς γινομένη τ τε ἄνω καὶ τ κάτω, ἀφ' τ αὐτεξουσίε ὀχέσεως, ποτὲ μὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοιοῦ). *The Soul of Man is nexus utriuſque mundi, in the middle between thoſe more excellent Beings which perpetually remain above, with which it partakes in the ſublimity of its Nature and Underſtanding, and thoſe inferior Terreſtrial Beings with which it communicates thro' the vital Union which it hath with the Body, and by reaſon of that freedom and indifferency which it hath, it ſometimes is aſſimilated to the one, ſometimes to the other of theſe extremes. So that while it aproacheth to the nature of the ſuperior Beings, it keeps it ſelf free from Evil, but becauſe of its freedom it may ſometimes ſink down into theſe lower things,* and ſo he calls *the cauſe of all evil in the Soul* ἡ αὐτοθελὴ κάθοδον εἰς τόνδε θνητὸν τόπον, *its voluntary deſcent into this lower World,* and immerſing it ſelf in the *feculency of Terreſtrial Matter,* Καὶ Φύσιν δὲ ἀμφίβολον ἔλαχεν, οὐκ ἀναγκαζομένη κάτεισιν ἢ ἄνεισιν ἀλλ' ὅτως ἔτυχεν, ὡς ὅταν αὐτὴ θέλῃ κατίναι τε καὶ ἀνίναι. *For tho' the Soul be of a kind of Amphibious Nature, yet it is not forced either upwards or downwards, but acts either way according*

Ibid. p. 108. ed. Salmaſ.

cording

cording to its internal liberty. But, saith he, *while the rational ſoul keeps that power which it hath in its hands over the Body, and makes uſe of it only as an inſtrument for its own good, ſo long it keeps pure and free from any ſtain of evil; but when it once forgets the ſimilitude it hath with the more excellent Being, and throws away the Scepter of its power, and drowns it ſelf in the Body and Brutiſh Affections (preferring the pleaſure of Senſe above that of Reaſon) when it ſo far degenerates below the principles of Reaſon, that inſtead of commanding the Brutiſh Faculties it becomes a ſlave to them, then it conceives and brings forth evil; but this it doth not thro' any coaction or neceſſity, but thro' the abuſe of that power and liberty which it hath: For the choice is a proper action of the Soul it ſelf: which he proves from hence, becauſe* God, *and the Laws, and all good Men, do not meaſure the good and evil of Actions ſo much by the event, as by the will and intention of the Perſon; and that Puniſhment and Reward have chiefly a reſpect to thoſe. And therefore Men are pardoned for what they do out of conſtraint and force, and the fault is aſcribed,* ὁ τῷ πράττοντι ἀλλὰ βιαζομένῳ, *not to him that did it, but to him that forced him to the doing of it.* And ſo from hence he concludes, *That becauſe of the freedom of the Will of Man, nothing elſe can be ſaid to be the Author of Evil properly, but the Soul of Man;* and concludes that Diſcourſe with this excellent Speech, Ἔχοντες ἓν ᾧ αἰτίαν τῷ κακῷ, λαμπρᾷ τῇ φωνῇ βοῶμεν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς κακίας ἀναίτιος, διότι τὸ κακὸν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνεργεῖ αὐτεξουσίως, καὶ ἐκ ὁ Θεός· εἰ μὲν γὰρ βίᾳ τὸ κακὸν ἔπραττεν ἡ ψυχή. τάχα ἄν τις τὸν Θεὸν ἐγκαλοῖ τὸν ἀναιτίως αὐτῷ συγκωρήσαντα βιασθῆναι, καὶ τοι οὐδὲ κακὸν ἦν τὸ βίᾳ πραττόμενον· καὶ οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν αὐτὸ αἱρεμένη αὐτὴ ἂν αἰτία λέγοιτο δικαίως. *Having thus found out the true origin of Evil, let us cry out with a loud voice, that* God *is not the Author of Sin, becauſe the Soul freely doth that which is evil, and not* God; *for if the Soul were forced to do what it doth, one might juſtly lay the blame on* God, *who permits ſuch a force to be offer'd it, neither could it be properly evil which the Soul was conſtrained to; but ſince it acted freely, out of choice, the Soul muſt alone be accounted the Author and Cauſe of Evil.* Thus we ſee that God cannot with any ſhadow of Reaſon be accounted the Author of Evil, becauſe he gave the Soul of Man a principle of internal freedom, when the very freedom of acting which the Soul had, put it into a capacity of ſtanding as well as falling. And certainly, he can never be ſaid to be the cauſe of the breaking of a Perſon, who gave him a ſtock to ſet up with, and ſuppos'd him able to manage it when he gave it him. Indeed had not Man had this freedom of Will, he could not have fallen; but then neither had he been a rational Agent, which ſuppoſing no corruption, doth ſpeak freedom of Action. So that while we enquire after the origin of Evil we have no other cauſe to aſſign it to, but Man's abuſe of that free power of acting which he had: but if we will be ſo curious as to inquire farther, why God did create Man with a freedom of Will, and not rather fix his Soul immutably on Good; if the order of Beings be no ſatisfactory Reaſon for it, we can give no other than that why he made Man, or the World at all, which was the good pleaſure of his Will.

But ſecondly, *Suppoſing* God's *giving Man this freedom of Will, doth not entitle him to be the Author of Evil;* doth not his leaving Man to this liberty of his in the Temptation, make him the cauſe of Sin? I anſwer no, and that on theſe accounts. VII.

1. *Becauſe Man ſtood then upon ſuch terms, that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary Act:* He had a power to ſtand, in that there

was no principle of Corruption at all in his Faculties, but he had a pure and undefil'd Soul, which could not be polluted without its own consent: Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which Man ſtood (which were the tryal of his Obedience to his Creator) had he been irreſiſtibly determin'd any way. *Simplicius* puts this queſtion after the former diſcourſe, *Whether* GOD *may be called the Author of ſin, becauſe he permits the Soul to uſe her liberty? But,* ſaith he, *he that ſays* GOD *ſhould not have permitted this uſe of its freedom to the Soul, muſt ſay one of theſe two things; either that the Soul being of ſuch a Nature as is indifferent to Good or Evil, it ſhould have been wholly kept from the chooſing Evil, or elſe that it ſhould have been made of ſuch a Nature that it ſhould not have had a power of chooſing Evil. The firſt is irrational and abſurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been, where there was no choice? And what choice could there have been, where the Mind was neceſſitated only to one part? For the ſecond we are to conſider,* ſaith he, *that no Evil is in it ſelf deſirable, or to be choſen; but withal, if this power of determining it ſelf either way muſt be taken away, it muſt be either as ſomething not Good, or as ſome great Evil; and whoever ſaith ſo, doth not conſider, how many things in the World there are, which are accounted good and deſirable Things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will. For it excels all ſublunary Beings; and there is none would rather deſire to be a Brute or Plant than Man; if* GOD *then ſhew'd his goodneſs in giving to inferior Beings ſuch Perfections which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to* GOD's *Nature and Goodneſs, to give Man the freedom of his Actions, and a ſelf-determining power, tho' he permitted him the free uſe of it? Beſides,* as that Author reaſons, *had* GOD, *to prevent Man's ſin, taken away the liberty of his Will, he had likewiſe deſtroyed the Foundation of all Vertue, and the very Nature of Man; for Vertue would not have been ſuch, had there been no poſſibility of acting contrary; and Man's Nature would have been Divine, becauſe impeccable. Therefore,* ſaith he, *tho' we attribute this ſelf-determining Power to* GOD *as the Author of it, which was ſo neceſſary in the order of the Univerſe, we have no reaſon to attribute the Origin of that Evil to* GOD, *which comes by the abuſe of that Liberty. For,* as he farther adds, GOD *doth not at all cauſe that Averſion from Good, which is in the Soul when it ſins, but only gave ſuch a Power to the Soul, whereby it might turn it ſelf to Evil, out of which* GOD *might afterwards produce ſo much Good, which could not otherwiſe have been without it.* So conſonantly to the Scripture doth that Philoſopher ſpeak on this ſubject.

Simplic. in Epictet. p. 186, 187.

2. GOD *cannot be ſaid to be the Author of Sin, tho' he did not prevent the Fall of Man, becauſe he did not withdraw before his Fall, any Grace or Aſſiſtance, which was neceſſary for his ſtanding.* Had there been indeed a neceſſity of ſupernatural Grace, to be communicated to Man for every Moment, to continue him in his Innocency; and had GOD before Man's Fall, withdrawn ſuch Aſſiſtance from him, without which it were impoſſible for him to have ſtood, it would be very difficult freeing GOD from being the Cauſe of the Fall of Man. But we are not put to ſuch difficulties for acquitting GOD from being the Author of Sin; for there appears no neceſſity at all for aſſerting any diſtinction of ſufficient and efficacious Grace in Man before his Fall; that the one ſhould belong only to a radical Power of ſtanding, the other to every Act of good which *Adam* did: For if GOD *made Man upright,* he certainly gave him ſuch a Power as might be brought into Act without the neceſ-

ſity of any ſupervenient Act of Grace, to elicite that habitual Power into particular Actions. If the other were ſufficient, it was ſufficient for its end; and how could it be ſufficient for its end, if notwithſtanding that, there were no poſſibility of ſtanding, unleſs efficacious help were ſuperadded to it? God would not certainly require any thing from the Creature in his Integrity, but what he had a Power to obey; and if there were neceſſary farther Grace to bring the Power into Act, the ſubtracting of this Grace muſt be by way of Puniſhment to Man, which it is hard to conceive for what it ſhould be, before Man had ſinned, or elſe God muſt ſubtract this Grace on purpoſe that Man might fall; which would neceſſarily follow on this Suppoſition, in which caſe Man would be neceſſitated to fall, *Veluti cum ſubductis columnis domus neceſſario corruit*, as one expreſſeth it, *As a Houſe muſt needs fall, when the Pillars on which it ſtood are taken away from it.* But now if God withdrew not any effectual Grace from Man, whereby he muſt neceſſarily fall, then tho' God permit Man to uſe his Liberty, yet he cannot be ſaid to be any ways the Author of Evil, becauſe Man had ſtill a *poſſe ſi vellet*, a Power of ſtanding, if he had made right uſe of his Liberty: And God never took from Man his *Adjutorium quo potuit ſtare, & ſine quo non potuit*, as *Divines* call it, Man enjoying ſtill his Power, tho' by the abuſe of his Liberty he fell into Sin: So that granting God to leave Man to the uſe of his Liberty, yet we ſee God cannot in the leaſt be charg'd with being the Author of Sin, or the Origin of Evil, by the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man in Scripture: Which was the thing to be clear'd.

VIII. We come now in the third place, to compare that account given of the Origin of Evil in Scripture, with that which was embrac'd by Heathen Philoſophers, in point of Reaſon and Evidence. There was no one inquiry whatſoever, in which thoſe who had nothing but natural Light to guide them, were more to ſeek for ſatisfaction in, than this concerning the Origin of Evil. They ſaw by continual Experience, how great a Torrent of both ſorts of Evils, of Sin and Puniſhment, did overflow the World; but they were like the *Egyptians*, who had ſufficient evidence of the overflowing their Banks by the River *Nile*, but could not find out the Spring or the Head of it. The reaſon was, as Corruption increas'd in the World, ſo the means of Inſtruction and Knowledg decay'd; and ſo as the *Phænomena* grew greater, the reaſon of them was leſs underſtood; the knowledg of the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, thro' which they could alone come to the full underſtanding of the true cauſe of Evil, inſenſibly decaying in the ſeveral Nations: Inſomuch, that thoſe who are not at all acquainted with that Hiſtory of the World, which was preſerv'd in Sacred Records among the *Jews*, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and ſome kind of obſcure Traditions which were preſerv'd among them; which while they ſought to rectify by their Interpretations, they made them more obſcure and falſe than they found them. They were certain of nothing, but that Mankind was in a low and degenerate Condition, and ſubject to continual Miſeries and Calamities; they who cry'd up the moſt the αὐτεξούσιον, or the Self-determining Power of the Soul, could not certainly but ſtrangely wonder, that a Principle indifferent to be carry'd either way, ſhould be ſo almoſt fatally inclin'd to the worſt of them. It was very ſtrange, that ſince Reaſon ought to have the command of Paſſions, by their own acknowledgment, the Brutiſh part

of the Soul ſhould ſo maſter and enſlave the Rational, and the Beaſt ſhould ſtill caſt the Rider in Man, the ſenſitive Appetite ſhould throw off the Power of the τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, of that Faculty of the Soul which was deſign'd for the Government of all the reſt. The Philoſophers could not be ignorant, what Slaves they were themſelves to this *Terreſtrial Hyle*, how eaſily their moſt mettleſome Souls were mir'd in the Dirt, how deep they were ſunk into corporeal Pleaſures, that it was paſt the power of their Reaſon to help them out. Nay, when the Soul begins to be fledg'd again, after her πτεροῤῥύησις, or moulting, at her entrance into the Body, which *Plato* ſpeaks of, and ſtrives to raiſe her ſelf above this lower World, ſhe then feels the weight of ſuch Plummets hanging at her Feet, that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of Earth. So *Hierocles* complains, That when Reaſon begins to carry the Soul to the perception of the moſt noble Objects, the Soul with a generous flight would ſoar above this World, ὅταν μὴ ἕ παθητικαῖς ὁλκαῖς ὥσπερ τισι μολύβδοισιν, ὑποφέρῃ πρὸς κακίαν; *Were it not born down to that which is Evil by the force of Paſſions, which hang like Leads upon the Soul's Feet.* What a ſtrange unaccountable thing muſt this needs be to thoſe who beheld the conſtancy of the Effect, but were to ſeek for the Cauſe of it? It could not but be clear to them that the αὐτεξούσιον they were wont to extol ſo high, was (in the ſtate Man was now in) but a more noble name for Slavery; when themſelves could not but confeſs the ῥοπὴ, or inclination in the Soul was ſo ſtrong to the Evil; and could that be an even Ballance, where there was ſo much down-weight in one of the Scales? unleſs they made, as ſome of them did, the voluntary Inclinations of the Soul to evil, an evidence of her Liberty in this moſt degenerate Condition, as tho' it were any Argument that the Priſoner was the freer, becauſe he delighted himſelf in the noiſe of his Shackles. Neither was this diſorder alone at home in the Soul, where there was ſtill a *Xantippe* ſcolding with *Socrates*, *Paſſion* ſtriving with *Reaſon*; but when they look'd abroad in the World, they could not but obſerve ſome ſtrange Irregularities in the converſe among Men. What debaucheries, contentions, rapines, fightings and deſtroying each other, and that with the greateſt Cruelty, and that frequently among Country-men, Friends, nay, Relations and Kindred! And could this Hoſtility between thoſe of the ſame Nature, and under the moſt ſacred Bonds of Union, be the reſult of Nature, when even Beaſts of Prey are not ſuch to thoſe of their own kind? Beſides all this, when they ſummed up the Life of Man together, and took an account of the Weakneſſes and Follies of Childhood, the Heats and Extravagancies of Youth, the Paſſions, Diſquietments and Diſappointments of Men in their ſtrength and height of Buſineſs, the Inquietude, Aches, and Infirmities of old Age, beſides the Miſeries, which thro' every one of theſe, all Men are ſubject to, and few eſcape; into how ſmall a Sum will the ſolid Pleaſure and Contentment of the Life of Man be reduc'd? Nay, if we take thoſe things in the World which Men pleaſe themſelves the moſt in enjoyment of, and conſider but with what Care they are got, with what Fear they are kept, and with what Certainty they muſt be loſt; and how much the Poſſeſſion of any thing fails of the expectation of it, and how near Men are upon the top of *Tenariff* to fall into the depth of the Sea; how often they are precipitated from the height of Proſperity, into the depthof Adverſity; we ſhall find yet much leſs, that by the greateſt *Chymiſtry* can be extracted of real ſatisfaction out of

Hieroc. in aurea carmina, p. 17.

† theſe

theſe things. Whence then ſhould it come, that Mens Souls ſhould ſo delight to feed on theſe Huſks, and to embrace theſe Clouds and Shadows, inſtead of that real Good, which is the true Object of the Soul's deſire? They could eaſily ſee there was no pure, unmix'd Good in the World, but there was a Contemperation of both together, according to that of *Euripides:*

Οὐκ ἂν γλώσσο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ κ᾽ κακά,
Ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τις σύγκρασις.

There is a kind of continual mixture of Good and Evil in the World; which *Socrates* obſerv'd upon the rubbing of his Thigh, where the Fetters made it itch, ὡς ἄτοπον, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ; ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν ἐν ἀντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν; *What a ſtrange thing is that which Men are wont to call Pleaſure? How near a kin is it to that which ſeems ſo contrary to it, Pain?* *Plat. in Phæd.*

Now the obſerving the ſtrange and ſudden viciſſitudes of theſe things, and what near neighbours Pain and Pleaſure were to each other, (ſo that there is frequently a paſſage out of one into the other) did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origin of both theſe. Thoſe who believe there was a GOD who produc'd the World, and order'd all things in it, did eaſily attribute whatever was good in the World to the Fountain of all Goodneſs; but that any Evil ſhould come from him, they thought it repugnant to the very Notion of a DEITY; which they were ſo far right in, as it concern'd the Evil of Sin; which we have already ſhew'd GOD could not be the Author of: But therein they ſhew'd their Ignorance of the true cauſe of *Evil*, that they did not look upon the Miſeries of Life as the Effects of GOD's Juſtice upon the World, for the evil of Sin. And therefore that they might ſet the Origin of Evil far enough off from GOD, they made two different Principles of things, the one of Good, and the other of Evil: This *Plutarch* tells us, was the moſt ancient and univerſal account which he could meet with, of the Origin of *Good* and *Evil.* To which purpoſe we have this ample Teſtimony of his, in his learned Diſcourſe, *De Iſide & Oſiride*, Διὸ κ᾽ παμπάλαιόν αὖτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων κ᾽ νομοθετῶν, εἰς τε ποιητὰς κ᾽ φιλοσόφους δόξα, δύο ἀρχὰς ἀνάπαλον ἔχουσα, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθοῦ δύναμιν, τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν ἐπιτροπεύουσαν καὶ ἀνάγουσαν· οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν φήμαις, κ᾽ ἐν τε τελεταῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις, κ᾽ βαρβάροις κ᾽ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ διαφερομένη, ὡς ἔτ᾽ ἄνευ κ᾽ ἄλογον κ᾽ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τὸ πᾶν, ἔστε εἰς ὃν ὁ κρατῶν κ᾽ καθυθυίων, ὥσπερ οἰάξιν ἥτισι πειθηνοῖς χαλινοῖς λόγου· ἀλλὰ πολλὰ κ᾽ μεμιγμένα κακοῖς κ᾽ ἀγαθοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄκρατον ἐνίεται τῇ φύσεως φερούσης· ὃ θύειν πίθων εἰς ταμίας, ὥσπερ νάματα τὰ προῤῥήματα καπηλικῶς ἀλλήλοις ἀναπερώντυσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ θύειν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν, κ᾽ θυεῖν ἀναλιπαλῶν θωμένων, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ κ᾽ καθ᾽ εὐθείαν ὑφηγεμονίης, τὴν δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἀναστροφὴν κ᾽ ἀνακλώσης, ὅ τε βίος μικτὸς, ὅ τε κόσμος εἰ κ᾽ μὴ πᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ περίγειος ἅπας κ᾽ μὴ σελήνης, ἀνώμαλος κ᾽ ποικίλος γέγονε, κ᾽ μεταβολὰς πάσας διὰ χόμβου, εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀναλύσεως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὴ κακὸν τἀγαθὸν ἐκ ἂν φθάσαι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν κ᾽ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ, κ᾽ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. *Plutarch. de Iſide & Oſir. p. 369. ed. Fr.*

Which words I have the more largely cited, becauſe they give us the moſt full account of the Antiquity, Univerſality, and Reaſon of that Opinion, which aſſerts two different Principles of Good and Evil. *It is a Tradition* (ſaith he) *of great Antiquity, deriv'd down from the ancient Maſters of Divine Knowledg, and Formers of Commonwealths, to the Poets and*

and Philoſophers, whoſe firſt Author cannot be found, and yet hath met with firm and unſhaken Belief, not only in ordinary Diſcourſes and Reports, but was ſpread into the Myſteries and Sacrifices both of Greeks *and others, that the Univerſe did not depend on chance; and was deſtitute of Mind and Reaſon to govern it; neither was there one only Reaſon which ſat at the Stern, or held the Reins, whereby he did order and govern the World: But ſince there is ſo much confuſion and mixture of Good and Evil in the World, that Nature doth not produce any pure untainted Good; there is not any one, who like a Drawer, takes the Liquor out of two ſeveral Veſſels, and mixeth them together, and after diſtributes them; but there are two Principles and Powers contrary to each other, whereof one draws us to the right Hand, and directs us ſtraight forward, the other pulls us back, and turns us the other way; ſince we ſee the Life of Man ſo mixed as it is; and not only that, but the World too, at leaſt ſo much as is ſublunary and terreſtrial, which is ſubject to many Varieties, Irregularities, and Changes. For if nothing be without a Cauſe, and Good cannot be the cauſe of Evil, it neceſſarily follows, that as there is a peculiar Nature and Principle which is the cauſe of Good, ſo there muſt be another, which is the cauſe of Evil.*

But leſt we ſhould think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen *Manichees* which held this Opinion, he tells us, to prevent that, ᾗ δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ζοφωδέστοις, *It was the Opinion of the moſt, and wiſeſt of the Heathen.* Now theſe two Principles ſome (ſaith he) call *Two oppoſite Gods*, whereof the one is the cauſe of *Good*, and the other of *Evil*; him they call Θεὸς, this Δαίμων. By this one would imagine, that this very ancient Tradition was nothing elſe but the true account of the Origin of Evil, a little diſguis'd. For the Scripture making the *Devil* the firſt Author of *Evil* himſelf, and the firſt ſollicitor and tempter of Man to it; who when God directed him ſtraight forward, pull'd Man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the Miſeries of the World came into it: For while Man kept cloſe to his Maker, his Integrity and Obedience were to him what the *vaſa umbilicalia* are to the Child in the Womb; by them he receiv'd whatever tended to his Subſiſtence and Comfort: But Sin cut thoſe Veſſels aſunder, and prov'd the *Midwife* of Miſery, bringing Man forth into a World of Sorrow and Sufferings. Now, I ſay, the Scripture taking ſuch eſpecial notice of one, as the chief of *Devils*, thro' whoſe means Evil came into the World, this gave occaſion to the Heathens, when length of Time had made the Original Tradition more obſcure, to make theſe two, *God* and the *Dæmon*, as two *Anti-gods*, and ſo to be the Cauſes, the one of all *Good*, and the other of all *Evil*. Which at laſt came to that (which was the *Devil*'s great deſign in thus corrupting the Tradition) that both theſe *Anti-gods* ſhould have ſolemn Worſhip by Sacrifices; the one by way of Impetration, for beſtowing of Good; the other by way of Deprecation, for averting of Evil. Such *Plutarch* there tells us, were the *Oromaſdes* and *Arimanius* of *Zoroaſtres*, which were worſhipped by the *Perſians*; the one for doing Good, and the other for avoiding Evil; the one they reſembled to Light (or Fire) the other to Darkneſs and Ignorance: What Animals were good and uſeful they aſcribed to *Oromaſdes*, and all venomous and noxious ones to *Arimanius*; whom *Plutarch* elſewhere calls τὸν πονηρὸν Δαίμονα Περσῶν, *The evil Dæmon of the Perſians.* The ſame *Diogenes Laertius* relates of the *Magi*, the Philoſophers of *Perſia*, that they made two diſtinct Principles, Ἀγαθὸν Δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν, *a good and bad*

Plut. in Alex.

Diog. Laertius in Proxm.

bad Dæmon; for which he quotes *Dinon*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus*, and others. The ſame *Plutarch* makes to be the Opinion of the ancient *Greeks*, who attribute the good to *Jupiter Olympius*, the bad to *Hades:* The *Chaldeans*, ſaith he, *make the Planets their Gods*, of which, two they ſuppoſe the cauſe of Good; two more of only a malignant Influence; and other three to be indifferent to either. The ſame he affirms of the *Ægyptians*, That whatever was evil and irregular, they aſcrib'd to *Typho*; what was good, comely, and uſeful, they attributed to *Iſis* and *Oſiris*; to *Iſis* as the paſſive, *Oſiris* as the active Principle.

X. Thus we ſee how large a ſpread this Opinion of the Origin of Evil had in the *Gentile* World; neither did it expire with *Heatheniſm:* But *Manes* retain'd ſo much of the Religion of his Country, being a *Perſian*, that he made a ſtrange medly of the *Perſian* and *Chriſtian* Doctrine together. For that was his famous Opinion, of which St. *Auſtin* tells us; *Iſte duo principia inter ſe diverſa atque adverſa, eademque æterna, & coæterna, hoc eſt, ſemper fuiſſe, compoſuit; duaſque naturas atque ſubſtantias, boni, ſcilicet, & mali, ſequens alios antiquos hæreticos, opinatus eſt.* St. *Auſtin* thinks that *Manes* had his Opinion, concerning two Principles, from the ancient Hereticks, by whom I ſuppoſe he means the *Marcioniſts* and *Valentinians:* But it ſeems more probable that *Manes* had his Doctrine immediately from his Country-men, tho' it be generally thought that *Scythianus* and *Buddas* were his Maſters in it. But from whomſoever it came, the Opinion was merely *Heathen*, and not more contrary to Scripture than it is to Reaſon; the former I meddle not with, that Opinion being now extinct in the *Chriſtian* World: I only briefly conſider the Unreaſonableneſs of it, to ſhew what a far better account of the *Origin of Evil* the Scriptures give us, than was diſcover'd by the *Heathen* Philoſophers: For on both ſides, that Opinion is repugnant to the Notion of a *Deity*, ſo that while they would make two ſuch *Gods*, they make none at all. For how can the Principle of Good be GOD, if he hath not infinite Power as well as Goodneſs? And how can he have infinite Power, if he hath not the Management of things in the World, And how can he have the Management of things, if they be liable to Evil; which the other GOD, which is the Principle of Evil, may lay upon it; from which, according to this ſuppoſition, the Principle of Good cannot reſcue it? So that they who hold this Opinion cannot, as *Simplicius* tells us, *Give* GOD τὸ ἥμισυ τῆ ὅλης δυνάμεως, *the half of that infinite Power* which belongs to him: For neither can he keep the good Creatures which he makes, from the power of the evil *Dæmon*; and therefore if he loves them, muſt be in continual fears of the Power of the contrary Principle: Neither can he free them from the Evil which the other lays upon them; for then GOD's Power would be far greater than the evil *Dæmon*, and ſo he could be no *Anti-god.* And on the other ſide, the Notion or Idea of an *infinite evil Being*, is in it ſelf an inconſiſtent Idea; for it is an *infinite Non-entity*, if we ſuppoſe his very Being to lie in *being Evil*, which is only a privation of Goodneſs: And beſides, if he be infinitely Evil, he muſt be infinitely contrary to the good Principle; and how can he be infinitely contrary, which enjoys ſeveral of the ſame Perfections which the other hath, which are *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence?* Now if this Principle of *Evil* be abſolutely contrary to the other, it muſt be contrary in all his Perfections; for whatever is a Perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now

Auguſt. de Hæreſ. c. 46.

if

if it be contrary in every Perfection, *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence*, being two, it muſt be as contrary as is imaginable to them, by which this evil Principle muſt be infinitely defective in Being and Exiſtence, and ſo it will be an *Infinite Non-entity* which yet exiſts, which is the height of contradiction. Again, if there be ſuch a contrary Principle, which is the cauſe of all Evil, then all Evil falls out unavoidably, and by the power of this *Infinitely evil Principle*, by which means not only all *Religion*, but all *Vertue* and *Goodneſs* will be taken out of the World, if this evil Principle be infinite; and if not infinite, no *Anti-god:* and not only ſo, but all difference of *Good* and *Evil* will be taken away (and then what need making two ſuch contrary Principles to give an account of the Origin of Evil?) for when once Evil becomes thus neceſſary, it loſeth its Nature as a Moral Evil; for a Moral Evil implies in it a voluntary breach of ſome known Law; but how can that breach be voluntary, which was caus'd by an Infinite Power in the moſt proper way of Efficiency? And thus if all freedom of Will be deſtroy'd (as it is neceſſarily by this Suppoſition) then no Government of the World by Laws can be ſuppos'd, and conſequently no Reward or Puniſhment, which ſuppoſe liberty of Action, and by this means all Religion, Law, and Providence are baniſh'd out of the World, and ſo this evil *Dæmon* will get all into his own hands, and inſtead of two contrary Principles, there will be but one *Infinitely evil Dæmon.* Which that there is not, appears by this, that notwithſtanding all the Evil in the World, there is ſo much Good left in it, of which there would be none, if this evil *Dæmon* had Infinite Power. By this we ſee there cannot be a Principle infinitely evil; for while they go about to make two ſuch contrary Principles infinite, they make neither of them ſo, and ſo while they make two *Gods*, they take away any at all. So that this Opinion of the *Origin of Evil*, is manifeſtly abſurd, irrational, and contradictious.

XI. But all the *Heathen* Philoſophers were not ſo groſs as to imagin two ſuch *Anti-gods* with infinitely active Power; but yet thoſe who would not in terms aſſert it, might be driven to it by the conſequence of their Opinion concering the *Origin of Evil*, which did ſuppoſe a neceſſity of it in Nature, as flowing from that paſſive Principle out of which the World was produc'd. Hence it was that *Heraclitus*, as *Plutarch* tells us, attributed the Origin of all things to *Diſcord* and *Antipathy*, and was wont to ſay, that when *Homer* wiſh'd

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride.

Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι.

That all contention were baniſh'd out of the World, that he did ſecretly curſe the Origin of things, and wiſh'd the ruin of the World. So *Empedocles* call'd the active Principle which did good, Harmony and Friendſhip, but the other

Νεῖκος ἐλόμενον ἠδ' ὀπίσω αἱμαλέον τι.

by which he makes it to be a quarelſom, pernicious, and bloody Principle. The ſame *Plutarch* tells us of theſe two renowned Philoſophers, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. Thence he tells us the *Pythagoreans* call'd the Principle of Good, τὸ ἓν, πεπερασμένον, τὸ μόνιμον, τὸ εὐθύ, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ τελεσγώνιον, τὸ ὀρθόν, τὸ λαμπρόν. *Unity, finite, quieſcent, ſtraight, uneven number, ſquare, right,*

right and ſplendid; the Principle of Evil, they call'd τὴν δυάδα, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερὸν, τὸ σκολιόν. *The Binary, Infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one ſide, unequal, left, obſcure.* The Opinion of *Plato*, he tells us is very obſcure, it being his purpoſe to conceal it; but he ſaith in his old Age, in his Book *de Legibus*, ὃ δὴ αἰνιγμῷ, δὴ συμβολικῶς, *without any ifs or ands*, he aſſerts the World to be mov'd by more than one Principle, by two at the leaſt, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν ἕξιν, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ, καὶ τὴν ἐναντίων δημιουργόν. *The one of a good and benign Nature, the other contrary to it both in its Nature and Operations.* *Numenius* in * *Chalcidius* thus delivers the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato de originibus*, as he ſpeaks; *Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam & ſine qualitate ſylvam eſſe cenſet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturæ mediæ, interque malorum, bonorumque viciniam, ſed plane noxiam; Deum quippe eſſe (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium & cauſam bonorum, ſylvam malorum:* So that according to *Numenius*, both *Plato* and *Pythagoras* attributed the Origin of Evil to the Malignity of Matter, and ſo they make Evils to be neceſſarily conſequent upon the Being of Things. For thus he delivers expreſly the Opinion of *Pythagoras*; *qui ait, Exiſtente providentia, mala quoque neceſſaria ſubſtitiſſe, propterea quod ſylva ſit, & eadem ſit malitiâ prædita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet; Unam beneficentiſſimam; malignam alteram*, ſc. *Sylvam. Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona ſua Dei, tanquam patris liberalitate collata ſunt; mala vero, matris ſylvæ vitio cohæſerunt.* But *Plutarch* will by no means admit, that *Plato* attributes the Origin of Evil merely to Matter, but he makes the Principle of Evil to be ſomething diſtinct from Matter, which he calls τὸ ἄτακτον, καὶ ἄορισον, αὐτοκίνητον δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἀρχὴν, *A confuſed, infinite, ſelf-moving, ſtirring Principle*; which (ſaith he) he elſewhere calls *Neceſſity*, and in his *de Legibus*, plainly, ψυχὴν ἄτακτον καὶ κακοπρεπῆ, *a diſorderly and malignant Soul*, which cannot be underſtood of mere Matter, when he makes his *Hyle* ἄμορφον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυνάμεως οἰκείας ἔρημον, *Without form or figure, and deſtitute of all qualities and power of operation: and it is impoſſible* (ſaith he) *that that which is of it ſelf ſuch an inert principle as Matter is, ſhould by* Plato *be ſuppos'd to be the cauſe and principle of Evil*, which he elſewhere calls ἀνάγκην πολλὰ τῷ Θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσαν καὶ ἀφυπάζουσαν, *Neceſſity which often reſiſted* GOD, *and caſt off his reins.* So that according to *Plutarch*, *Plato* acquits both *God* and *Hyle* from being the Origin of Evil, τὴν γε ὕλην ἀφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τὸν Θεὸν τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀποδιδοὺς τοῦ πεθήνοντος, and therefore attributes it to that malignant Spirit which moves the Matter, and is the cauſe of all the diſorderly Motions in the World. But what this Spirit ſhould be, neither he or any one elſe could ever underſtand: what darkneſs and ignorance then was there among the wiſeſt of Philoſophers concerning the Origin of Evil, when they were ſo confus'd and obſcure in the account which they gave of it, that their greateſt admirers could not underſtand them!

* *Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.*

Plutarch. de Animâ procreat. è Tim.

XII. But tho' *Plato* ſeem'd ſo ambiguous in his judgment of the Origin of Evil, whether he ſhould attribute it to the *Hyle*, or ſome malignant Spirit in it, the *Stoics* were dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cauſe of Evil to the perverſity of Matter. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that the *Stoics* made Matter not to be evil in it ſelf as *Pythagoras*, but that it was indifferent to either; *perrogati igitur unde mala? perverſitatem ſeminarium malorum cauſati ſunt:* they made the perverſity of Matter the Origin of Evil; but as he well obſerves, *nec expediunt adhuc unde ipſa perverſitas, cum juxta ipſos duo ſint initia*

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 395.

tia rerum, Deus & ſylva. Deus ſummum & præcellens bonum; ſylva, ut cenſent, nec bonum nec malum. They give no rational account whence this perverſity of Matter ſhould ariſe, when according to the *Stoics*, there are but two Principles of Things, *God* and *Matter*, whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perverſity they tell us is ſomething neceſſarily conſequent upon the Generation of Things. Ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι πάθη τὰ τῇ γενέσει περιπόμπα, ὥσπερ ἴῳ τῷ χαλκῷ, καὶ ὁ ῥυπὸς τῷ σώματι, *theſe are affections*, (*viz.* the Diſorders in the World) which *follow the Generation of things, as ruſt comes upon braſs, and filth upon the body*, as the counterfeit *Triſmegiſtus* ſpeaks; ſo *Maximus Tyrius* ſaith that Evils in the World are οὐ τέχνης ἔργα, ἀλλ' ὕλης πάθη, *not any works of art, but the affections of Matter. Non poteſt artifex mutare materiam*, ſaith *Seneca*, when he is giving an account *Why God ſuffers Evils in the World:* and elſewhere gives this account why Evils came into the World, *non quia ceſſat ars, ſed quia id in quo exercetur inobſequens arti eſt.* So that the Origin of Evil by this account of it lies wholly upon the perverſity of Matter, which it ſeems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produc'd the World out of that Matter which the *Stoics* ſuppos'd to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cauſe of Evil to God, ſeems to have been the great Reaſon, why they rather choſe to make it matter neceſſary and co-exiſtent with God, and this was the only plauſible pretence which *Hermogenes* had for following the *Platoniſts* and *Stoics* in this Opinion, that he might ſet God far enough off from being the Author of Sin; but I cannot ſee what advantage comes at all by this *Hypotheſis*, but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other. For, 1. *It either deſtroys* God's *Omnipotency, or elſe makes him the approver of Evil*; ſo that if he be not *Auctor*, he muſt be *Aſſentator mali*, as *Tertullian* ſpeaks againſt *Hermogenes*, becauſe he ſuffer'd Evil to be in Matter; for, as he argues, *Aut enim potuit emendere ſed noluit; aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus: ſi potuit & noluit, malus & ipſe, quia malo favit; & ſic jam habetur ejus licet non inſtituerit: quia tamen ſi noluiſſet illud eſſe, non eſſet; ipſe jam fecit eſſe, quod noluit non eſſe: quo quid eſt turpius? ſi voluit eſſe quod ipſe noluit feciſſe, adverſum ſemetipſum egit, cum & voluit eſſe quod noluit feciſſe, & noluit feciſſe quod voluit eſſe.* So that little advantage is gain'd for the clearing the true Origin of Evil by this Opinion; for either God could have taken away Evil out of Matter but would not, or elſe would but could not; this laſt deſtroys God's Omnipotency, the former his Goodneſs; for by that means Evil is in the World by his conſent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the Being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindred it, it would not have been, and ſo God by not rooting out of Evil, will be found an Aſſertor of it; *Male ſi per voluntatem, turpiter ſi per neceſſitatem: aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus:* if God's Will were the cauſe why Sin was, it reflects on his Goodneſs; if God's Power could not hinder it, it deſtroys his Omnipotency. So that by this Opinion God muſt either be a ſlave or a friend to Evil. 2. *This Principle overturns the foundations of Religion, and all tranſactions between* God *and Mens Souls in order to their welfare*, becauſe it makes Evil to be neceſſarily exiſtent in the World; which appears from hence, in that Evil doth reſult from the Being of Matter, and ſo it muſt neceſſarily be as Matter is ſuppos'd to be; for whatever reſults from the Being of a thing, muſt be coexiſtent with it; and ſo what flows from what doth neceſſarily

Maxim. Tyr. Serm. 25.

Seneca de Provid. c. 5.

Idem præf. ad natur. quæſt.

1.

Tertull. adverſ. Hermogen. c. 10.

2.

rily

rily exiſt, muſt have the ſame Mode of Exiſtence which the Being it ſelf hath; as is evident in all the Attributes of GOD, which have the ſame immutability with his Nature. Now then, if Evil did exiſt from Eternity together with Matter, it muſt neceſſarily exiſt as Matter doth, and ſo Evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the World; which if once granted, renders Religion uſeleſs, make's GOD's Commands unrighteous, and deſtroys the Foundation of God's Proceedings in the Day of Judgment. 3. *This Opinion makes* GOD *not to be the Author of Good,* 3. while it denies him to be the Author of Evil. For either there was nothing elſe but Evil in this eternal Matter, or there was a mixture of Good and Evil; if nothing elſe but Evil which did neceſſarily exiſt, it were as impoſſible for GOD to produce Good out of it, as to annihilate the neceſſarily exiſtent Matter. If there were a mixture of Good and Evil, they were both there, either neceſſarily or contingently: How could either of them be contingently in that which is ſuppos'd to be neceſſarily exiſtent, and no free Agent? If they be both there neceſſarily, 1. It is hard conceiving how two ſuch contrary things as Good and Evil, ſhould neceſſarily be in the ſame uniform Matter. 2. Then GOD is no more the Author of Good than of Evil in the World; for he is ſaid not to be the Author of Evil, becauſe it comes from Matter; and ſo it appears Good doth too, and ſo GOD according to this Opinion, is no more the Author of Good, than he is of Evil. But if it be ſaid *that Good is not in Matter, but* GOD *produc'd that out of nothing:* Then I reply, 1. If GOD did produce Good out of nothing, why did he not produce Matter out of nothing too? If he were ſo powerful as to do the one, there could be no defect of Power as to the other. What inſufficiency is there in GOD's Nature, for producing all Things out of nothing, if he can produce any thing out of nothing? 2. If GOD did produce Good out of Evil, why could he not have remov'd all Evil out of Matter? For Good could not but be produc'd by the removing of ſome Evil which was before that Good, and ſo GOD might have remov'd all Evil out of Matter. And ſo by not doing it when he might, this Opinion gives not the leaſt Satisfaction in point of Reaſon, for acquitting GOD from being the Author of Sin, nor for clearing the true Origin of Evil.

Thus we have now compar'd the account given of it in Scripture, XIII. with that given by the Heathen Philoſophers, and find it in every thing more clear, rational and ſatisfactory than theirs is: Which doubtleſs is the reaſon, why the more modern Philoſophers, ſuch as *Hierocles*, *Porphyry*, *Simplicius*, and others, tho' otherwiſe great oppoſers of Chriſtianity, did yet in this ſide with the Scriptures, and attribute the original of Evil not to Matter, but to the Will of Man. And whoever is ſeriouſly converſant with the writings of thoſe Philoſophers, who were ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς γραμμᾶς of the ſacred ſucceſſion out of the School of *Ammonius* at *Alexandria*, ſuch as *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus* and *Hierocles*, will find them write in a higher ſtrain concerning many weighty and important Truths; as of the degeneracy of Mens Souls from GOD, and the way of the Souls returning to Him, than the moſt ſublime of the ancient Philoſophers had done. Which ſpeculations of theirs no doubt, aroſe not ſo much from the School of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, as of that great reſtorer of Philoſophy *Ammonius* of *Alexandria*, whoſe Scholars *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus* were. Who living and dying a Chriſtian, as *Euſebius* and *Hierom* aſſure us, whatever *Porphyrius* ſuggeſts to the contrary,

Euſeb. Hereſ. Hiſt. l. 6. c. 19. Hierom. de Script. Eccl.

trary, did communicate to his Scholars the ſublimer Myſteries of Divine Revelation, together with the Speculations of the ancient Philoſophers; which *Holſtenius* conceives he did with an adjuration of Secrecy, which he tells us *Porphyrius* himſelf acknowledgeth, that thoſe three Scholars of *Ammonius*, *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus*, were under an Obligation to each other, not to reveal and diſcover, tho' it were after violated by them. It is an eaſy matter to conceive, what an excellent improvement might be made of the ancient *Platonic* Philoſophy, by the advantage of the Scriptures, by one who was ſo well vers'd in both of them, as *Ammonius* is ſuppos'd to have been; and how agreeable and becoming would that Philoſophy ſeem, which had only its riſe from *Plato*, but its height and improvement from thoſe rich and truly Divine Truths which were inlaid with them? The want of obſerving this, *viz.* whence it was that thoſe excellent Diſcourſes in the latter *Platoniſts* had their true Original, hath given occaſion to ſeveral miſtakes among Learned Men: As firſt, the over-valuing of the *Platonic* Philoſophy, as tho' in many of the Diſcourſes and Notions of it, it ſeem'd to ſome (who were more in love with Philoſophy than the Scriptures) to out-go what is diſcover'd therein concerning the ſame things. A moſt groundleſs and unworthy Cenſure! when it is more than probable (and might be largely manifeſted, were it here a fit Opportunity) that whatever is truly generous and noble in the ſublimeſt Diſcourſes of the *Platoniſts*, had not only its primitive Riſe, but its acceſſion and improvement from the Scriptures, wherein it is ſtill contain'd in its native Luſtre and Beauty, without thoſe paintings and impure mixtures which the ſublimeſt Truths are corrupted with in the *Platonic* Writings. The reaſon of which is, tho' theſe Philoſophers grew ſuddenly Rich, thro' the Spoils they had taken out of the Scriptures, yet they were loth to be known from whence they had them, and would ſeem to have had that out of their own Gardens, which was only tranſplanted from the Sacred Writings. Therefore we find them not mentioning the Scriptures, and the Chriſtian Doctrine, without ſome Contempt of its meanneſs and ſimplicity; and whatever improvement they had gain'd by them, they would have it leſs taken notice of, by profeſſing their oppoſition to the Chriſtians, as is notorious in thoſe great Philoſophers, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus*, *Hierocles*, *Simplicius*, and others. It being their deſign to take ſo much, and no more, out of the Chriſtian Doctrine as they could well ſuit with their *Platonic* Notions; by which means they ſo diſguis'd the Faces of the Truths they ſtole, that it were hard for the right Owners of them to know them again. Which was the grand Artifice of their great Maſter *Plato*, who doubtleſs by means of his Abode and Acquaintance in *Ægypt*, about the time when the *Jews* began to flock thither, had more certain knowledge of many Truths of grand Importance, concerning the DEITY, the Nature of the Soul, the Origin of the World, than many other *Greek* Philoſophers had; but yet therein lay his great fault, that he wrapt up and diſguis'd his Notions in ſuch a fabulous and ambiguous manner, that partly he might be leſs known from whence he had them, and that they might find better entertainment among the *Greeks*, than they were ever like to do in their plain and native dreſs. Which *Plato* himſelf ſeems ſomewhere to intimate, when he ſaith, That what the *Greeks* receiv'd from the *Barbarians* κάλλιον τῦτο εἰς τέλ@ ἀπεργάζονῦ, *they put it in a better faſhion, i.e.* they diſguiſe it, alter and change it as they pleaſe, and put it into a *Greek* Habit, that it might never be

Holſten. de vit. & Script. Porphyr. c. 6.

Plato in Epinom.

ſuſpected

ſuſpected to have been a Foreigner. Thence *Tertullian* ſpeaks with a great deal of Truth and Freedom of ſuch Philoſophers, who did *ingenii ſitim de prophetarum fonte irrigare* (as he expreſſeth it) that quench'd their Thirſt after Knowledge with the Waters of *Jordan* (tho' they did not, like *Naaman*, cure the Leproſie of the Head, by waſhing in them) for as *Tertullian* ſaith, they came only *ex negotio curioſitatis*, more to pleaſe the itch of their Curioſity, than to cure it. *Tertul. Apol. c. 47.*

And wherein they ſeem'd moſt to agree with the Scriptures, their difference was beyond their agreement. *Siquidem vera quæque & conſonantia Prophetis aut aliunde commendant aut aliorſum ſubornant, cum maxima injuria veritatis, quam efficiunt aut adjuvari falſis aut patrocinari. Whatever the Philoſophers ſpeak agreeable to the Scriptures, either they do not own whence they had it, or turn it quite another way, whereby they have done the Truth a great deal of injury, by mixing it with their corruptions of it, and making that little Truth a plea for the reſt of their Errors.* Neither was this only among the ancient Philoſophers, but the Primitive Chriſtians began to diſcern the underhand workings of ſuch, who ſought to blend Philoſophy and Chriſtianity together; for *Tertullian* himſelf takes great notice of ſuch, who did, *Veritatis dogmata ad Philoſophicas ſententias adulterare*, ſuborn Chriſtianity to maintain Philoſophy; which makes him cry out, *Viderint qui Stoicum, & Platonicum, & Dialecticum Chriſtianiſmum protulerunt*; by which we ſee what tampering there was betimes, rather to bring Chriſtianity down to Philoſophy, than to make Philoſophy truckle under the truth and ſimplicity of the Scriptures. Whether *Ammonius* himſelf, and ſome others of the School of *Alexandria*, might be guilty in this kind, is not here a place to inquire, tho' it be too evident in the Writings of ſome, that they rather ſeek to accommodate the Scriptures to the Sentiments of the School of *Plato*, than to reform that by the Scriptures: But I ſay, however it were with thoſe who were Chriſtians, yet thoſe who were not, but only Philoſophers, made their great advantage by it. For when they found what was reconcileable with the Doctrine of *Plato* in the Scriptures, done already to their hands, by the endeavours chiefly of *Ammonius* and *Origen*, they greedily embrace thoſe improvements of their Philoſophy, which would tend ſo much to the Credit of it, and as contemptuouſly reject what they found irreconcilable with the Dictates of their Philoſophy. Now what an unreaſonable thing is it, when whatever was noble and excellent in the Heathen Philoſophy was derivative from the Scriptures, as the ſacred Fountain of it; that the meeting with ſuch things ſhould in the leaſt redound to the prejudice of the Scriptures, from whence it was originally deriv'd? When on the other ſide, it ſhould be a great confirmation to our Faith, as to the Scriptures, that they who were profeſs'd Philoſophers, and admirers only of Reaſon, did ſo readily embrace ſome of thoſe grand Truths which are contain'd in the Word of GOD. *Tertul. de Anima, c. 2.* *Tertul. de Præſcrip. adverſ. hæret. c. 7.*

XIV. For which we need no other inſtance than that before us, concerning the Origin of Evil, the making out of which will tend to the clearing the laſt thing mention'd concerning it; which was, *That the moſt material things in it are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves.* And this Honey which is gain'd out of the Lion's Mouth, muſt needs taſte ſweeter than any other doth. For it is a weak and groundleſs miſtake on the other ſide, which is the ſecond (which ariſeth from meeting things conſonant to the Scriptures, in the Writings of Philoſophers) preſently

to conclude from ſuch things, that they were Chriſtians (as it is ſaid ſome have lately done in the behalf of *Hierocles*.) For there being ſuch clear accounts given in Scripture, of the grand Difficulties and Perplexities which the Minds of Men were troubled with, when theſe came to the knowledge of ſuch who were of Philoſophic and inquiſitive Heads, we cannot but think they would meet with acceptation among them; eſpecially if they might be made conſiſtent with their former Speculations. Thus it was in our preſent Caſe, concerning the Origin of Evil; we have already beheld the lamentable perplexities the ancient Philoſophers were in about it; what *Meanders* they were loſt in, for want of a Clue to guide them thro' them: Now it pleas'd God, after the coming of Christ in the Fleſh, to declare to the World the only way for the recovery of Souls and their eternal Salvation; the News of which being ſpread ſo far, that it ſoon got among the Philoſophers, could not but make them more inquiſitive concerning the State and Condition of their Souls: And when they had ſearch'd what the Philoſophers had formerly diſcover'd of it, their Curioſity would preſently prompt them to ſee what account of Things, concerning the Souls of Men, was deliver'd by the Preachers of this new Doctrine. By this they could not but preſently underſtand, that they declar'd all Mens Souls to be in a moſt degenerate and low Condition, by being ſo continually under the power of the moſt unreaſonable and unruly Paſſions, that they were eſtranged from God, and prone to fix on things very unſutable to their Nature; as to all which, their own inward Senſe and Experience could not but tell them that theſe things were notoriouſly true: And therefore they inquire farther how theſe things came to be ſo; which they receive a full account of in Scripture, that Man's Soul was at firſt created Pure and Holy, and in perfect Friendſhip with God; that God dealt bountifully and favourably with Man; only expected Obedience to his Laws; that Man being a free Agent, did abuſe his Liberty, and diſobey'd his Maker; and thence came the true πτεροῤῥύησις, the Feathers of the Soul, whereby it ſoared up to Heaven, moulted away, and the Soul ſunk below it ſelf, into a degenerate and apoſtate Condition, out of which it is impoſſible to be recover'd without ſome extraordinary Expreſſion of Divine Favour. Now what is there in all this Account, but what is hugely ſutable to Principles of Reaſon, and to the general Experience of the World, as to thoſe things which were capable of being try'd by it? And thoſe Philoſophers who were any thing ingenuous, and Lovers of Truth, could not but confeſs the Truth of thoſe things which we are now ſpeaking of, *viz. That Mens Souls are in a very degenerate Condition; That the moſt rational account of it is, that Man by the act of his own Will, brought himſelf into it; and that in order to the Happineſs of Mens Souls, there was a neceſſity of recovery out of this Condition.*

XV. 1. *As to the degeneracy of the Souls of Men*; this was the common complaint of thoſe Philoſophers, who minded the government of themſelves, and the practice of Virtue, eſpecially of the *Platoniſts* and *Stoics*. *Seneca* in all his Moral Diſcourſes, eſpecially in his Epiſtles, may ſpeak ſufficiently in behalf of the *Stoics*, how much they lamented the degeneracy of the World. And the *Platoniſts* all complain of the ſlavery of the Soul in the Body, and that it is here by way Puniſhment, for ſomething which was done before; and which makes me ſomewhat inclinable to think, that *Plato* knew more of the lapſe of Mankind, than he would openly diſcover; and for that end diſguis'd it after his uſual

manner in that *Hypotheſis* of Præ-exiſtence, which taking it Cabaliſtically (for I rather think the Opinion of Præ-exiſtence is ſo to be taken, than the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man) may import only this, *That Mens Souls might be juſtly ſuppos'd to be created happy, but by reaſon of the Apoſtacy of Man's Soul from* GOD, *all Souls come now into their Bodies as into a kind of Priſon, they being enſlav'd to the brutiſh part within them, there having been ſuch a true* περιῤῥύησις, *the Soul being now depriv'd of her chiefeſt Perfections in this her low and degenerate Condition.* And it ſeems far more rational to me, to interpret thoſe Perſons Opinions to a Cabaliſtical, or an Allegorical Senſe, who are known to have writ deſignedly in a way obſcure and ambiguous, than to force thoſe Mens expreſſings to *Cabala*'s, who profeſs to write a plain Hiſtory, and that with the greateſt ſimplicity and perſpicuity. But it cannot but ſeem very ſtrange, that an *Hypotheſis* capable of being reconcil'd to the plain literal Senſe of the Scriptures (deliver'd by a Perſon who uſeth great artifice and cunning to diſguiſe his Opinions, and ſuch a Perſon withal, who (by ſuch Perſons themſelves who make uſe of this Opinion to that end) is ſuppos'd to have been very converſant with the Writings of *Moſes*) ſhould be taken in its literal Senſe, as it really imports Præ-exiſtence of each particular Soul in the groſſeſt manner: And this ſhould be made to be a part of the Philoſophic Cabala of the Writings of ſuch a Perſon, who uſeth not the leaſt Artifice to diſguiſe his Senſe, nor gives us any where the leaſt intimation, that he left behind him ſuch plaited Pictures in his Hiſtory of the beginning of the World, that if you look ſtraight forward, you may ſee a literal Cabala, on the one ſide a Philoſophical, and on the other a Moral. But now if we remove the Cabala from *Moſes* to *Plato*, we may find no incongruity or repugnancy at all either as to *Plato*'s way of Writing, or the conſonancy of the Opinion ſo interpreted to the plain genuine Senſe of *Moſes*, if by *Plato*'s Opinion of the præ-exiſtence and deſcent of Souls, be underſtood by the former, the happy ſtate of the Soul of Man in conjunction with GOD; and by the latter, the low and degenerate Condition which the Soul is in, after Apoſtacy from him: Which the latter *Platoniſts* are ſo large and eloquent in expreſſing. *Porphyry*, where he ſpeaks of ſome things he counſels Men to do, hath theſe words, *But if we cannot do them, let us at leaſt do that which was ſo much lamented of old,* τὸ θρηνούμενον πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν, which is, ὡς τοίων ἐχόντων ἐρίσδων, ἔχειν νεικέων ἡμόμβα, ὅτι τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀκήρατον, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀβλαβὲς σώζειν ὐ δυνάμβα. *Let us at the leaſt join with our Fore-fathers in lamenting this, that we are compounded of ſuch diſagreeing and contrary Principles, that we are not able to preſerve divine, pure and unſpotted Innocency.* And *Hierocles* fully expreſſeth his ſenſe of the Degeneracy of Mankind in theſe words; Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ κακοὶ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει ἥττους καὶ πρενσέλα θεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς γῆν νεύσεως ἡμόμβοι, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακὸν ἔχειν, ὀχὶ τὸ βελτιώσαι φυγεῖν ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἀπομείρασι αὐτὸς τῆς τοῦ ὁμιλίας, ἧς ἐνῆν ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ λαγχάνειν· τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ θεοῦ χωρισμὸν βλάπτουσα τὰς φρένας ἡ πρὸς γῆν νεῦσις δηλοῖ. *The moſt of Men in the World are bad, and under the command of their Paſſions, and grown impotent thro' their propenſity to Earth; which great Evil they have brought upon themſelves, by their wilful Apoſtacy from* GOD, *and withdrawing themſelves from that Society with him, which they once enjoy'd in pure light: Which departure of Mens Souls from* GOD, *which is ſo hurtful to the Minds of Men, is evident by their ſtrong inclination to the things of this World.* The ſame Author mentions, with much approbation, that Speech of *Heraclitus*, ſpeaking of thoſe Souls which

Porphyr. de Abſtinent. l. 3. ſ. 2.

Hieroc. in Pythag. Carm. p. 261.

which are ἄπλωτοι εἰς κακίαν, which I cannot better render than *undeclinably good*, he ſaith, ὅτι ζῶμεν τὸ ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸ ἐκείνων βίον. *We live their Death, and die their Life:* κάτεισι γὰρ καὶ ἐποπτεύει τὸ ευδαίμονα χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος. *For Man is now fallen down from that bleſſed Region*; and as *Empedocles* the *Pythagorean* ſpeaks,

Φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης
Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.

Which words cannot be better rendred, than in the words the Scripture uſeth concerning *Cain*, *And he went from the Preſence of the Lord, and was a fugitive in the Earth*, and under continual perplexities. For the Soul of Man having left τὸ λειμῶνα τὸ ἀληθείας (it is *Hierocles*'s own expreſſion) *the pleaſant meadow of Truth* (a fit deſcription of Paradiſe) τῇ ὁρμῇ τὸ πτεροῤῥυήσεως εἰς γήϊνον ἔρχεται σῶμα ὀλβίᾳ αἰῶνος ἀμοιβῆς, *through the violence of her moulting, or deplumation, ſhe comes into this earthly Body, deprived of that bleſſed Life, which ſhe before enjoy'd.* Which he tells us is very conſonant to *Plato*'s ſenſe of the κάθοδος, or deſcent of Souls, that when by reaſon of their impotency of fixing wholly on GOD they ſuffer συμφοράν καὶ πτεροῤῥύησιν, *ſome great loſs, and a depravation of former Perfections*, (which I ſuppoſe is meant by the πτεροῤῥύησις, the Souls impotency of flying up above this earthly World) then they lapſe into theſe Terreſtrial and Mortal Bodies. So *Hierocles* concludes with this excellent and divine Speech, ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ θεόθεν φυγὴ, καὶ ἡ πτεροῤῥύησις τὸ κυφιζόντων ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ ἄνω εἰς τὸ τῆς θνητῆς ἤνεγκε τόπον, οἷς τὰ κακὰ συμέρχεται· οὕτως οὖν ἡ τῆς θνητῆς προσταθείας ἀποβολὴ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἷς πτερῶν τινῶν ἔκφυσις πρὸς τὸ τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὴν θείαν ευζωίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *As therefore by apoſtacy from* GOD, *and the moulting of thoſe Feathers of our Souls, whereby we may be rais'd up above this World, we have fallen into this place of Mortals which is compaſſed about with Evils*; *ſo by caſting off carnal Affections, and by the growth of Virtues like new Feathers to the Soul, we ſhall aſcend to the Place of pure and perfect Good, and to the enjoyment of a Divine Life.* So much more becoming Chriſtians do theſe excellent Philoſophers ſpeak of the degeneracy of Mens Souls, and the conſequents of it, than ſome who would be accounted the followers of Reaſon, as well as of CHRIST, who make it ſo much of their buſineſs to extenuate the Fall of Man. Which we find thoſe who were mere Philoſophers, far more rational and ingenuous in, than thoſe who pretend ſo highly to Reaſon; but I think with as little of it as any, ſuppoſing the Scriptures to be of Divine Authority. But it is not here our buſineſs to conſider the Opinions of thoſe who pretend to Chriſtianity, but only of ſuch who pretending only to Reaſon, have yet conſented with the Doctrine of the Scriptures as to the Degeneracy of the Souls of Men, that it lies in an Apoſtaſie from GOD, and having loſt thoſe Perfections which they had before.

Hierocl. in Pythag. p. 254.

XVI. 2. *That Man's Fall is the cauſe of his Apoſtaſie*; this we have already manifeſted at large, from the Teſtimony and Reaſon of *Simplicius*; and *Hierocles* is as large and clear in it as the other, with Expreſſions much of the ſame nature. Μέση γὰρ ἔσα ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐυία τὸ τε ἀεὶ νοούντων τὸ θεὸν, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε νοεῖν πεφυκότων, ἄνεισι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ κάτεισι πρὸς ταῦτα, νῦν κλήσει καὶ ἀποβολῇ, πρὸς τὴν θείαν ὁμοίωσιν καὶ τὴν θήρειον, ἀφ᾽ ὧν τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀμφίβιον ἀναμέμεικεν. *Man's Nature lying between thoſe Beings which perpetually contemplate* GOD, *and thoſe which are uncapable of it, it ſometimes aſcends*

Hierocl. in aur. Carm. p. 258.

to those, and sometimes descends to these, according as it observes or rejects the Dictates of Reason, and so by reason of the indifferency of the Will is liable to take upon it the similitude of God *or a Beast.* Τῶντ' ἔν ὁ περὶ τ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐγνωκὼς ὐσίας, οἷός τ' ἐστὶ καὶ αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πῶς τλήμονες καὶ τάλανες τ ἑαυτῶν αἱρέσεσι γίνονται. *And whoever thoroughly considers this will easily understand, how Men are the causes of their own Evils, and become unhappy and miserable thro' their own choice and self-wills.* Which he brings in by way of explication of that truly golden *Pythagorean* Verse,

Γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχοντας
Τλήμονας.

Men are grown miserable thro' their own fault. And afterwards *Hierocles* excellently describes the nature of Evil in these words, ὧν δὴ συμφυὲς ἅμα καὶ ἐπίκτητον ἡμῖν κακὸν, ἡ τῦ αὐτεξουσίου παρὰ Φύσιν κίνησις. *Both our natural and contracted pravity, is nothing else but the unnatural motion of our free Wills:* According to which, saith he, ἐναντιοῦμεν τοῖς θείοις νόμοις πειρώμενα, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθανόμενοι ὅσον ἑαυτοὺς βλάπτομεν, μόνον τ ἔχειν ἀνιέναι θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μόνον τῦτο τυφλῶς ὁρῶντες, ὅτι δυνησόμεθα ἀφωπλισάμενοι τ ἐκείνου δεσμῶν. *We dare to contradict the Laws of* God, *not being sensible how much we injure our selves when we do it; and only look at this, that we are able to cast off the reins of* God's *Laws from our necks.* And he truly saith, *That it is the greatest abuse of liberty to offend* God, *when we either do what he forbids, or neglect what he requires.* Ἵνα ἑκατέρωθεν τ ἀθλιότητι ἑαυτοὺς πληρώσωσιν οἱ τ θεῖον νόμον ἐκβαίνοντες, τῷ τε μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ προσταττόμενα καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀπηγορευμένα. *So that on both sides Men bring misery upon themselves, by transgressing the Divine Law, both by not doing what they are commanded, and by doing what they are forbidden.* So that he fully ascribes the origin of Evil to the τὸ αὐτεξούσιον κίνημα παρὰ Φύσιν ἁμαρτεῖν, as he calls it, *the irregular motion of the Will of Man,* which we have already shew'd to be the Doctrine of the Scriptures.

As to the necessity of the Soul's recovery from this condition, in order to her felicity, we have these Philosophers expressing their consent with the Scriptures. *Porphyrius,* as St. *Augustine* tells us in the end of his first Book, *De regressu animæ,* doth acknowledge the necessity of a way of recovering Souls, which should be universal. *Cum autem dicit Porphyrius, Nondum receptam unam quandam sectam, quæ universalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ, ——— nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali cognitione perlatam, proculdubio confitetur esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam.* But the necessity of the purgation of the Soul in order for the Felicity, is so largely and fully discours'd of by all the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans,* that it will be needless to insist upon it. Thus far then we find the account given of the origin of Evil in Scripture to be embrac'd by the sublimest of the Heathen Philosophers, as most rational and satisfactory; which was the thing to be prov'd. 3. *August. de Civit. Dei, l.* 10. *c.* 32.

XVII. Neither do we find only the main of this account acknowledged as rational, but we may trace some not obscure foot-steps of the truth of particular Circumstances which concern the fall of Man, among the Heathens: such as the *Devil's envying of Man's happiness, his disguising himself under the form of a Serpent, and Man's being thrown out of Paradise upon his fall.*

D. Caſaub. Original of temporal Evils.

1. *The Devil's envying the happineſs of Man.* It hath been truly obſerv'd by a learned Man, that the original of that very ancient Opinion among the Heathen, *de invidia Dæmonis*, had its riſe from the Hiſtory of the fall of Man, which he hath made out ſo fully, that I ſhall the leſs need to prove it. And that there was an undoubted Tradition of ſome malignant Spirits, which envy'd the welfare of Mankind, appears by that ample Teſtimony of *Plutarch*, in his *Dio*, mention'd by the ſame Author; Οὐκ οἶδα, μὴ τ πάνυ παλαιῶν τ ἀποπώταλον ἀναλκαδῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον, ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, προσφθονοῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν πράξεσιν ἐνιστάμενα, ταραχὰς καὶ φόβους ἐπάγειν, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὸ ἀρετῶν ὡς μὴ βεβαίους ἀπλῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκεραίοις, βέλτιον ἐκείνων μοίρας μετὰ τελευτῶν τύχωσιν. *Plutarch* was much troubl'd to give an account of the Apparitions which *Brutus* and *Dio*, who were learned and philoſophical Men, were haunted withal; and doubts he can give no juſt account of it, unleſs he embrac'd that very ancient Tradition (which yet ſeem'd abſurd and incredible,) viz. *That there are certain wicked and malignant Dæmons, which envy good Men, and withſtand their Enterprizes, by raiſing Fears and Troubles to them, that ſo they might hinder them in their purſuit of Vertue; leſt, if they continue ſtedfaſt and unmoveable in Good, they ſhould be at laſt partakers of greater Felicity than they enjoy.* There being ſo ancient a Tradition of ſuch ὑβρεισταὶ δαίμονες, (as the learned Man mention'd hath more fully ſhew'd in his Notes on this place of *Plutarch*,) gives a great confirmation to the truth of what the Scripture reports concerning the Devil's being ſo great an Inſtrument in procuring the fall of Man. To him therefore I refer the inquiſitive Reader, and ſhall not add to the Teſtimonies of him cited, that of *Xenocrates* in *Plutarch, de Iſide & Oſiride*, where he ſaith that the calamities of Life and Misfortunes Men meet with, do not agree with that veneration which we have for the Deity and good Spirits, Ἀλλ' εἴ) φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυρὰς, δυσεργεῖς δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπὰς, αἳ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. *But that there are in the Air ſome great and potent Beings, which are of a ſurly and malignant nature, and rejoyce to do Men all the miſchief they can.* *Iamblichus*, in his anſwer to *Porphyrius* concerning the *Ægyptian* Myſteries, undertakes to give an account of theſe evil Spirits or Dæmons, and that from them the origin of Evil in the World is; for thus he ſpeaks (as he is tranſlated by *Ficinus*) *Si verum eſt quod de Idolis dicebamus, improbiſque Dæmonibus, hinc ſane exoritur multiplex origo malorum. Simulant enim Deorum præſentiam, Dæmonumque bonorum, ideoque cultorem ſuum jubent eſſe juſtum, ut ipſi videantur boni, ſicut & Dii; quoniam vero natura ſunt mali, rogati mala inferre, libenter inferunt, atque nobis ad injuſta conducunt. Hi ſunt omnino qui & in oraculis mentiuntur & fallunt, & turpia conſulunt atque peragunt.* By which we ſee he acknowledgeth ſome Spirits whoſe natures are wicked, and help Men to do evil; and that theſe very Spirits may ſometimes command that which is good, leſt they ſhould be ſuſpected to be what they are, of a wicked and malignant Nature, which only deſign the ruin of Men. By which we have a good account of whatever was commendable deliver'd by the Heathen Oracles, which yet might come from the Devil ſtill, by this confeſſion of *Iamblicus* himſelf.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 361.

Iamblich. de myſter. p. 105.

XVIII. 2. *For the Devil's appearing under the form of a Serpent*, It is very probably conjectur'd, that from hence it was that the Prince of thoſe who contended with *Saturn*, was by that Ænigmatical writer *Pherecydes Syrius* call'd Ὀφιονεύς. *Celſus* who had ſo little skill in Antiquity as to

think that the History of *Moses* was as to many passages of it taken out of Heathen Fables, insists on this very story of *Ophioneus* as the groundwork of that relation in *Genesis* concering the Fall. But *Origen* well answers him, ὅρα δὲν, εἰ ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν ὡς σφᾶς μυθολογοῦσι ἀσεβέσι, καὶ ἀποπεπλανημένοις, θείων ἀνεγμάτων, αὐτὸς σαφῶς σφάλλεται· μὴ καταγνοήσας ὅτι τὰ πολλῷ ἐστὶ μόνον Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Φερεκύδου ἀρχαιότερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁμήρου, Μωϋσέως γεγράμματα εἰσήγαγε τὰ περὶ πονηροῦ τέτου καὶ ἐκπεσόντος τοῦ οὐρανίου λόγου. *See therefore if this rare Antiquary who chargeth us with Impiety in corrupting and altering the Heathen Fables, be not himself more justly chargeable with the same fault, not understanding the far greater Antiquity of the Writings of* Moses, *than either of* Heraclitus, *or* Pherecydes, *or* Homer *himself, which reports the story of that evil one which fell from Heaven.* ὁ γὰρ ὄφις (παρ' ὃν ἀπὸ τοῦ Φερεκύδη γέγονεν Ὀφιονεύς) αἴτιος γεγόμενος τῆς ἐκβληθῆναι τῆς θείας ἀξιώσεως τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοιαῦτά τινα αἰνίσσεται, ἐπαγγελίᾳ θεότητος καὶ μείζονων ἀπατήσας τὸ θηλύτερον γένος· ὡς συναπολωθηκέναι λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ. *For the Serpent (from which* Ophioneus *in* Pherycides *deriv'd his name) which was the cause why Man was cast forth of Paradise, doth intimate some such thing, while under a pretence of Divinity, and of a better condition, he first deceiv'd the Woman, and by her means the Man.* *Cælius Rhodiginus* calls this *Ophioneus Dæmonicum Serpentem, qui antesignanus fuerit agminis a Divinæ mentis placito deficientis.* This *Pherecydes*, as appears by *Eusebius*, had much converse with the *Phœnicians*; where he purposely speaks concerning this *Ophioneus*. Now the *Phœnicians*, as *Eusebius* likewise tells us, worshipped their God under the form of a Serpent; which probably might be occasion'd by the Devil's ambition and tyranny over Men, that would be worshipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done so much mischief to the World. It was very early in the World, when the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians* did begin to adore their Gods under the form of Serpents, for the beginning of it is attributed to *Taautus* by *Eusebius*, ἢ μὲν ἐν τῇ Δρακοντίνῳ Φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὄφεων αὐτὸς ἐζεθιάσεν ὁ Ταάυτος, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν αὖθις Φοίνικές τε καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι. Neither was this only among the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians*, but where-ever the Devil reign'd, the Serpent was had in some peculiar veneration: thence *Justin Martyr* saith, παρὰ πᾶσι νομιζομένων παρ' ὑμῖν θεῶν ὄφις σύμβολον μέγα καὶ μυστήριον ἀναγράφεται· *The Serpent was the Symbol of Adoration among them*; and was the proper *Indicium*, or note of a Consecrated Place, as is evident by that of *Persius*.

Cæl. Rhodig. Antiq. lect. l. 2. c. 7.

Euseb. de Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Just. Mart. Apolog. 2.

Pinge duos angues: pueri, sacer est locus. *Pers. Satyr. 1.*

Thence the Scholiast on *Aristophanes* on that place in *Plutus*, ἐξηξάτλων ἓν δύο δράκοντ' ἐκ τοῦ νεώ, observes κοινῶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἥρωσι δράκοντες παρετίθεντο, so that where-ever any God or Hero was to be worshipped, there were Serpents painted to denote so much. So *Orus Apollo* saith of the *Ægyptians*, ἔθος ὁ ὄφιν ἑλληνιστὶ βασιλίσκον χρυσῦν προτίθεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, *they were wont to put the form of a golden Basilisk to their Gods.* *Heinsius* conceives that the first worship of *Apollo* at *Delphi* was under the form of a Serpent, whither *Nonnus* tells us that *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* went upon his first coming into *Bœotia*, and from hence he derives the name *Pytho* from the Hebrew פתן which signifies a Serpent. *Ut non dubitandum sit*, saith he, *quin Pythius Apollo, hoc est, Spurcus ille spiritus, quem Hebræi Ob & Abaddon, Hellenistæ ad verbum* Ἀπολλύωνα, *cæteri* Ἀπόλλονα *sub hac forma qua miseriam humano generi invexit, primo cultus sit in Græcia.* And which is farther observable, the Devil was always ambitious to have the

Orig. c. Celsum, l. 6.

Heins. Aristarch. p. 18. ed. 1627.

World think that the knowledg of Good and Evil was to come by the Serpent ſtill; thence the famous Oracle of *Apollo* here at *Delphi*; thence came the uſe of Serpents ſo much in Divination, thence נחש ſignifies to divine, from נחש a Serpent; and ſo among the *Greeks* οἰωνίζεσθαι, is taken in the ſame Senſe, from οἰωνὸς a Serpent. So that excellent Gloſſographer *Heſychius*; οἰωνὸς, ὄφις· ὑπεικῶς λέγουσι εἰς τὰς μαντείας τὰς ὄφεις ἔχειν διὸ καὶ οἰωνοὺς εἴλεγον. The Serpent was reckoned among the *pedeſtria auſpicia* by the *Romans*; and *Homer* tells in that ſolemn Divination, concerning the *Greeks* ſucceſs at *Troy* there appears,

Iliad. β'. Δράκων ἐπὶ νῶτα δάφοινος.

Which, ſaith *Heinſius*, is an exact deſcription of the *Nachas*; whom they would have ſo call'd from the marks on his Back, which they accurately obſerv'd in Divination. Thus we ſee how careful the Devil was to advance his honour in the World under that form, wherein he had deceiv'd Mankind into ſo much Folly and Miſery.

3. We meet with ſome remainders of Man's being caſt out of Paradiſe, upon his Fall among the *Heathens*. *Origen* thinks that *Plato*, by his converſe with the *Jews* in *Egypt*, did underſtand the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man, which he after his way enigmatically deſcribes in his *Sympoſiacs*. Where he brings in *Porus*, *the God of Plenty*, *feaſting with the reſt of the Gods*; *after Supper* Penia *comes a begging to the Door*; Porus *being drunk with Nectar*, *goes into* Jupiter's *Garden*, *and there falls aſleep*; Penia *obſerving it*, *ſteals to him*, *and by this deceit conceiv'd by him.* In this Fable of *Plato*, *Origen* takes notice what a near reſemblance the Garden of *Jupiter* hath to *Paradiſe*, *Penia* to the *Serpent* which circumvented *Adam*, and *Porus* to *Man*, who was deceiv'd by the *Serpent*. Which he conceives more probable becauſe of *Plato*'s Cuſtom, τὰ μεγάλα ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενα δόγματα κρύψαι μὴ διὰ τὸν πολλὸν ἐν τῷ τοῦ μύθου σχήματι, *to wrap up thoſe excellent things he knew under ſome Fables*, *becauſe of the Vulgar*; for which he after ſpeaks of his Cuſtom, in altering and diſguiſing what he had from the *Jews*, leſt he ſhould too much diſpleaſe the fabulous *Greeks*, if he ſhould adhere too cloſe to the *Jews*, who were ſo infamous among them. Some have thought the ſtory of Paradiſe was preſerv'd among the *Heathens* in the Fable of the Gardens of *Adonis*, which comes near that of *Eden*; but what foot-ſteps may be gather'd of the truth of Scripture Hiſtory in the *Heathen* Mythology, will appear afterwards. Thus much here then may ſerve to have manifeſted the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil by the Fall of Man to be in it ſelf rational, and atteſted by the conſent of ſuch Perſons who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality to the Scriptures.

Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. *p.* 189.

XX. We come now to conſider the other grand Difficulty which concerns the Origin of Evil, and the Truth of Divine Providence together. Which is, that if Sin be the cauſe of Miſery, and there be a God which Governs the World; *Whence comes it to paſs*, *that the worſt of Men do ſo frequently eſcape ſufferings*, *and the beſt do commonly undergo them?* This hath been in all Ages of the World, where Men have been philoſophical and inquiſitive, one of the great Inquiries which the Minds of Men have been perplex'd about. The true and full Reſolution of which Queſtion, depends much upon thoſe Grounds and Principles which are diſcover'd to us by Divine Revelation in the Scriptures, concerning the grounds of God's Patience towards wicked Men, the nature

and end of Sufferings which good Men are exercis'd with. And certainly this ſhould very much commend the Scriptures to all ſober and inquiſitive Perſons, that they contain in them the moſt clear and certain grounds of Satisfaction to the Minds of Men, in ſuch things wherein they are otherwiſe ſo irreſolv'd. But of that afterwards. Our preſent buſineſs is to give an account of this difficulty from Natural Reaſon, which will be moſt ſatisfactorily done by the producing thoſe grounds from which they have reſolv'd this Queſtion, *Cur malis bene, & bonis male*, who either have not had, or at leaſt own'd any thing of Divine Revelation. I begin with that which doth concern the Proſperity and Impunity of wicked Men, which Men have with more confidence inſiſted on on this account, becauſe all Men could not but underſtand a general reaſon of Sufferings, by reaſon there were none whoſe Conſciences could wholly acquit them of evil Actions; but why Perſons notoriouſly Wicked ſhould live in Impunity, when others ſuffer, that they were unable to give an account of. And this was the common pretence of *Atheiſm*: And *Simplicius* tells us, Συμβαίνει δέ τινας καὶ ἀφ' τὸ ἀναποδείκτως τιθέναι, καὶ ἀφ' τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς μὴ ἀγαθοὺς δυσυχοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς ἐν εὐτοῖς εὐτυχοῦντας, ὀλιγωρεῖν ὧν ἔχουσι προλήψεων, καὶ χώραν δέδοναι τῇ τραγωδίᾳ λέγειν; *Simplic. Comment. in Epictet. c.38.p.223.*

Τολμῶ καλεῖπεῖν μήποτ' ὢν εἰσὶν Θεοὶ,
Κακοὶ γὰ εὐτυχοῦντες ὠπλήτηκέ με.

It comes to paſs, that ſuch who have no grounded belief of a DEITY, *when they obſerve the Miſeries of good Men, and the tranquillity and felicity of bad Men, they regard not the common Notions they have of a* DEITY, *and are ready to cry out with the Tragœdian,*

Shall I not dare to ſay there are no Gods,
When thoſe do proſper who have injur'd me?

And it is obſervable, that the moſt of thoſe who have taken occaſion amongſt the *Heathens* to queſtion Providence, have done it upon ſome remarkable injury which they have conceiv'd to be done to themſelves, and ſo we have ground to think that it was more Paſſion and Intereſt, than any clear Reaſon which was the inducement to it. So *Diagoras* reſolves to ſet up for an *Atheiſt*, becauſe the perjur'd Perſon was not ſtruck down in the place.

And *Jaſon* in *Seneca*, when he ſees *Medea* fly away after killing his Children, cries out,

Teſtare nullos eſſe qua veheris Deos.

Thou tell'ſt the World there are no Gods that way
Where thou doſt fly.

And ſo *Claudian*, who largely reaſons the caſe on both ſides, for Providence and againſt it, at laſt tells us what it was which was the main cauſe of his doubts, *viz.* the long impunity of *Rufinus*.

Abſtulit hunc tandem Rufini pœna tumultum
Abſolvitque Deos.

Rufinus's

Rufinus's *death doth clear the Gods, and ſet My Mind at eaſe.*

Cicero. l. 3. de Nat. Deor.

But becauſe ſome carry it higher, as *Cotta* in *Tully*, who reaſons the moſt (as became a Stateſman) in reference to ſuch Perſons who had been uſeful or hurtful to the Commonwealths, we may ſuppoſe there might be ſomewhat more of Reaſon than Intereſt in ſuch Argumentations; and yet even in thoſe Diſcourſes we may ſtill find that the main original of this quarrel againſt Providence, was an over-high eſteem of themſelves, that they thought they deſerv'd better from the Gods, than to receive ſuch Injuries, or undergo ſuch Calamities. Therefore *Cotta* cries out on Providence, becauſe ſuch Perſons who were uſeful to the *Roman* Commonwealth, were deſtroy'd, when the enemies to it eſcap'd, as tho' Providence had been only a *Tutelar Deity* of *Rome*, and had nothing to do elſewhere. Thence he cries out, If there be Providence, why were the two *Scipio*'s deſtroy'd in *Spain* by the *Carthaginians?* Why was *Maximus* killed by *Hannibal?* Why were the *Romans* with *Paulus* ruined at *Cannæ?* Why did *Regulus* undergo ſo much cruelty by the *Carthaginians?* Why did not *Africanus* die in his own Bed? Nay, ſaith he, to come nearer home, why is my Uncle *Rutilius* in baniſhment? Why was my friend *Druſus* killed in his own Houſe? On the other ſide, why did *Marius* die in peace, and the moſt cruel *Cinna* enjoy ſo long tranquillity? With many other inſtances of both ſorts. But this is it which I take notice of theſe for, becauſe we hereby ſee how common it is for Men to queſtion Providence, more out of Paſſion and Intereſt, than out of any ſolid grounds of Reaſon.

XXI. Let us therefore appeal from Perſons who were particularly engaged by ſome private intereſt in thoſe Paſſages, from whence they would infer that there was no Providence, to ſuch who ſtood by unconcern'd, and made uſe of the free dictates of their Reaſon in theſe caſes. And ſuch Perſons when they come to reaſon the caſe like Philoſophers, and Men out of paſſion, have given ſatisfactory and rational accounts why God in his wiſe Providence may ſometimes ſuffer the worſt of Men to go on in Impunity, when good Men may go thro' the troubles of this World. As,

1. God *forbears wicked Men, to propound the example of his Goodneſs to their imitation, to teach them not to revenge their Injuries too greedily on each other.* This *Plutarch*, in that admirable Diſcourſe of his on this ſubject, inſiſts on as his firſt reaſon, why God doth not preſently puniſh wicked Men. For, ſaith he out of *Plato*, God *hath ſet forth himſelf in the midſt of the World for our imitation; and true Virtue is nothing elſe but an imitation of the Divine Nature. And therefore* God, ſaith *Plato, gave Man the uſe of ſight, that by the ſight of the heavenly Bodies, and the exact Motions which are in them, Men ſhould learn* τὸ εὔχημον καὶ τελαυγὲς, *that which was comely and orderly, and hate all diſorderly and irregular Motions:* For as he excellently ſpeaks, Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅ, τι μεῖζον ἄνθρωπῳ ὄνησιν θεὸς παρέσχηκεν ἢ τὸ μιμήσει, καὶ διώξει τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι. *There is no greater benefit Man can receive from* God, *than to attain true Virtue by the imitation and purſuit of thoſe Perfections which are in him.* And thence, ſaith *Plutarch*, God forbears to puniſh wicked Men preſently, not leſt if he ſhould puniſh them he might do that he would repent of afterwards, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν τὸ περὶ τὰς

Plutarch. de his qui ſero puniuntur à numine, p. 550. ed Fr.

τὰς τιμωρίας θηρῶντες καὶ λάβρον ἀφαιροῦν, *but that he might take away the fury and violence of Men, in revenging their injuries on each other*, that they ſhould not do it in Wrath and Anger, with as much eagerneſs as they ſatisfy their Hunger and Thirſt, whereby they do, ἐπιπηδᾶν τοῖς λελυπηκόσιν, *leap upon them who have injur'd them*, with as much fury as a wild Beaſt upon his Prey: But Men ſhould learn to imitate τὴν ἐκείνου πραότητα καὶ μέλλησιν, GOD's *gentleneſs and patience*, whereby he gives the Offender time to conſider with himſelf what he hath done, before he doth ſeverely puniſh him. As *Plato* when his Boy had angred him, ſtood ſtill a while without ſtriking him, τὸν θυμὸν κολάζων, as he ſaid, *puniſhing himſelf firſt for his Anger*, before he would chaſtiſe the Boy for his fault: And *Archytas* when he ſaw how negligent his Workmen had been, and began to be very angry with them, told them, εὐτυχεῖτε ὅτι ὀργίζομαι ὑμῖν, *It is well for you that I am angry with you.* Now ſaith *Plutarch*, if the conſideration of this forbearance in Men ſhould tend to moderate Mens heat and violence, how much more ſhould the conſideration of the Lenity and Patience of GOD, do it! καὶ θεῖον ἡγεῖσθαι μόριον ἀρετῆς τὴν πραότητα καὶ τὴν μεγαλοπάθειαν, *and to account gentleneſs and forbeaance to be an imitation of Divine Perfections.* Now what can be more rational and agreeable to our Apprehenſions of a Divine Nature than this is, that he ſhould ſhew his Goodneſs to all, and by his Forbearance of ſo many, teach the World more Meekneſs and Gentleneſs towards each other? For if offences riſe by the quality of the Perſon againſt whom they are committed, no Injuries can be ſo great in one Man to another, as thoſe Affronts are which Men put upon GOD by their continual provocations of Him: And if GOD then be of ſo infinite patience to forbear ſuch who have offended him, what juſtice and reaſon is there, but that Men ſhould expreſs more Lenity and Patience towards each other? So *Hierocles* excellently ſpeaks, Μιμεῖται καὶ ὢν τοῖς φιλίας μέτροις τὸν Θεὸν, ὃς μισεῖ μὲν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, τὸ δὲ φιλανθρωπίας ἀγαθὸν κοινῷ πᾶσι γένει πρατείνων. *A good Man imitates* GOD *in the meaſures of friendſhip, who hates no Man, and extends his loving-kindneſs to all Mankind.* Of which *Seneca* likewiſe ſomewhere ſpeaks: *Ne Deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effuſa benignitate ſacrilegi negligenteſque eorum deterrent; utuntur natura ſua, & cuncta, interque illa ipſos munerum ſuorum malos interpretes, juvant. The Divine Benignity extends it ſelf to all, even to ſuch as affront and diſhonour them, and abuſe the Gifts they beſtow upon them.* And ſince there is ſo much truth and reaſon in that of *Plato*, τέλος δὲ ἀγαθῶν τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι Θεῷ, *It is the height of goodneſs to be like to* GOD; we ſee what excellent reaſon there is for that Command of our Saviour, *Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward ſhall be great, and ye ſhall be the Children of the Higheſt; for he is kind unto the unthankful, and to the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful.* Luke vi. 35, 36.

2. GOD *forbears preſently to puniſh wicked Men, to give them time to become better.* This the ſame excellent Moraliſt gives as another account of GOD's patience, that thereby he gives them χρόνον πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, *a ſpace to repent in*, as the Scripture calls it. *For Men*, ſaith *Plutarch*, *in their puniſhments look at nothing farther than mere ſatisfying their revenge and malice, and that makes them purſue thoſe that have offended them with ſo much rage and eagerneſs; but* GOD, ſaith he, *aims at the cure of thoſe who are not utterly incurable*, to ſuch he gives, μεταβολῆς χρόνον, *a time to reform in.* Here he brings in the examples of ſuch who were *Plutarch.* p. 551. Rev. ii. 21.

bad

bad at first, and came afterwards to be chang'd from what they were; for which he instances in *Cecrops*, who was thence call'd Διφυὴς, because from a cruel severe Prince, he became gentle and mild; and so *Gelon* and *Hieron* of *Sicily*, and *Pisistratus* the Son of *Hippocrates*, who, from being Usurpers became excellent Princes. If *Miltiades*, saith he, had been cut off while he acted the part of a Tyrant, and *Cimon* in his Incest, or *Themistocles* in his Debaucheries, what had become of *Marathon*, *Eurymedon*, *Dianium*, by which the *Athenians* got so great Glory and Liberty? and as he well observes, Οὐθὲν γὰρ αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις μικρὸν ἐνφέρουσιν, *Great Spirits do nothing mean*; Οὐδ' ἀρρεῖ δι' ὀξύτητα τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐν αὐλαῖς καὶ ἀθερμήτου, ἀλλ' ἐν σάλῳ διαφέρον πρὸς εἰς τὸ μόνιμον καὶ καθεστηκὸς ἦθος ἐλθεῖν. *That sharp and active Spirit that is in them can never lie at rest by reason of its vigor, but they are toss'd up and down, as it were in a tempest, till they come to a settled compos'd life.* But as the multitude of weeds argues the richness and softness of the ground, tho' for the sake of those weeds one not skill'd in Husbandry would not account such ground worth looking after; so, saith he, ἄδηλα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα προεξανθοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις· *Great Spirits usually bring forth no commendable fruits at first; which we considering the danger and hurtfulness of, are presently for cutting them down: but one that more wisely considers the generous nature which may lie under this ill fruit, waits time and leisure, till Reason and Age begin to master these head-strong passions.* And therefore according to the prudent Law of the *Ægyptians*, *The Woman with Child must be repriev'd till the time of her delivery.*

3. God *spares some wicked Men from punishment to make them instruments of his justice in punishing others.* Ἐνίοις γὰρ ἀμέλει καὶ κολασεῖς ἑτέρων πονηρῶν, ἅτε δημοκοίνοις, ἀπεχρήσατο τὸ δαιμόνιον, as *Plutarch* goes on, God *spares some from punishment, that by them he might punish others.* Which he supposeth to be the case of all Tyrants; and thereby *Cotta*'s difficulty concerning *Marius*, *Cinna*, *Sylla*, and those other cruel and tyrannical persons, who usurp'd Authority among them, is clearly taken off: For Divine Providence might let those Trees grow from whence he intended to take his Rods to scourge others withal. God makes the same use of Tyrants (saith *Plutarch*) to Common-wealths, that Physicians do of the Gall of a *Hyæna* and other hurtful Creatures; which may be good for curing some dangerous Diseases; so may the tyrannical severity and sharpness of such persons be continued ἢ τὸ νοσοῦν ἀπαλλάξαι καὶ καθάραι, *till the diseases of the political Body be cur'd by these sharp Medicines.* Such a one was *Phalaris* to the *Agrigentines*, and *Marius* to the *Romans*: and the Oracle told the *Sicyonians* in express terms, μαστιγούμων δεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν. *The City wanted some severe discipline.* Thence *Totilas*, when he found what strange success he had in his enterprizes, call'd himself *Flagellum Dei*, and thought God rais'd him up on purpose to be a Scourge for the sins of the World. And no doubt those strange passages of the *Roman* Common-wealth (which made *Cato* at least dispute Providence, and say, *Res divinas multum habere caliginis*, when he saw *Pompey* successful as long as he serv'd his Ambition, but presently overthrown when he stood for the Common-wealth) these things, I say, had a higher end than they look'd at, which was to make both *Pompey* and *Cæsar* the Instruments of Divine Justice to punish the *Romans* for their Lusts, Ambition and Cruelty, which were never greater than in that Age. Now then, if God must justly punish Offenders, why may he not spare some to make them his Instruments in the punishing of others, especi-

cially since after he hath us'd his Rods, he may cast them into the fire too? as was evident in the instance of *Cæsar*, who, after all his slaughters and triumphs, was murthered in the *Senate*, and that by some who had been as active as any for him. And herein Divine Justice, both as to the punishment of the persons, and the means of it, hath been very remarkable in multitude of Instances, which every one's reading may afford him.

4. Therefore, another account why GOD may spare wicked Men a while, is, *That Divine Providence might more remarkably be observ'd in the manner of their punishment afterwards.* *Plutarch* tells us of *Callippus*, who was stabb'd by his Enemies with the same Dagger with which he had kill'd *Dion* under a pretence of friendship. And when *Mitius* the *Argive* was kill'd in a tumult, afterwards, upon the day of a solemn Shew, a brass Statue in the Market place fell upon his Murtherer, and kill'd him there. But most remarkable is the Story of *Belsus* recorded by the same Author, who having kill'd his Father, and a long time conceal'd it, goes one night to Supper to some Friends, and while he was there, thrusts up his Spear into a Swallow's Nest, and pulls it down, and kills the young ones; his Friends asking him the reason of so strange an action: Οὐ γὰρ (ἔφη) μᾶ τὰλα κελαμῦρίζουσιν αἱ ψῶσῶς κ' κελαδοῦσιν, ὡς ἀπεκτονότ@ τ τὰλέρα· *Do not you hear*, saith he, *how they falsly accuse me, and cry out, that I have killed my Father?* Which being by the persons present carry'd to the King, and the truth of it found out, he was executed for it. Such strange ways doth Providence sometimes use to shew how vigilant it is, even when we think it sleeps the most.

5. *Tho' God spares the persons of wicked Men, he doth not defer their punishment*, when the thoughts of their evil actions is the greatest torment to them; *Maxima peccati pœna est, peccasse*, as *Seneca* speaks. Sin bears its own punishment along with it. Wickedness is δεινή τις βίᾳ δημιουργὸς εὕρεσις, *the most exquisite contriver of misery*, which fills the Minds of those who commit it with continual consternations, anxieties and perplexities of Mind. But as that often and deservedly cited Author on this subject, *Plutarch* tells us, most Men are in this like Children, who when they behold Malefactors in the Theatres in their Cloth of Gold, and Purple Robes, with their Crowns on their Heads dancing about, they admire them, and imagin them to be most happy Men, till they see them lash'd and beaten, and fire come out from their brave Apparel; so, saith he, as long as Men see others in their Pomp and Grandeur, they think them very far from punishment, till they behold their execution; which, saith he, is not so much the entrance of their punishment, as the perfection of it. So that the longer the time of their Lives is, the longer is the time of their punishment here; Οὐδ' γηράσαντες ἐκολάσθησ, ἀλλ' ἐγήρᾳ κολαζόμῳοι· *They are not punished when they grow old, but are grown old in punishments.* Cannot we say a person is punished while he is in Prison and hath his fetters upon him, till his execution comes? nor that one that hath drunk Poison, is a dying while he walks about till the cold comes to his Heart, and kills him? *If we deny*, saith he, *that all the inquietudes, horrors and anxieties of Mind which wicked Men have, are no part of their punishment, we may as well say that a Fish which hath swallow'd the hook is not taken, because he is not fry'd, or cut in pieces.* So it is with every wicked Man, he hath swallow'd the hook when he hath committed an evil action (τὸ γλυκὺ τ̃ ἀδικίας

ἀδικίας ὥσπερ πέλαγος ἑαυτὸν ἐξεμέσαντος) and this Conſcience within him, as he expreſſeth it,

Θυμῷ βολαῖσι πέλαγος ὡς διαστρέφει.

Iſa. 57. 21. Which in the Prophet's expreſſion is, *The wicked are like a troubled ſea, which caſts forth nothing but mire and dirt.* As *Apollodorus* dreamt, that he was flea'd and boyl'd by the *Scythians*, and that his Heart ſpake to him out of the Cauldron, Ἐγώ σοι τούτων αἰτία, *I am the cauſe of all this.* God deals by wicked Men, as *Caligula* was wont to ſay of thoſe he commanded to be executed, *Ferit ut ſentiant ſe mori*, he ſo puniſhes them, as to make them ſenſible of their puniſhments. And as *Tacitus* ſpeaks of cruel and wicked perſons, *quorum mentes ſi recludantur, poſſint aſpici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita ſævitia, libidine, malis conſultis animus dilaceretur.* Wickedneſs is the only Fury which continually haunts and laſhes thoſe who delight in it, and leaves ſtill behind it ἀσχέτους καὶ φοβερὰ πάθη, *loathſome and terrible perturbations*, ſecret gripings of Conſcience and ſelf-condemning thoughts for their folly and wickedneſs; like *Lyſimachus*, who for extreme thirſt offer'd his Kingdom to the *Getæ* to quench it, which when he had done, φεῦ τῆς ἐμῆς κακίας, ὃς δι' ἡδονὴν ὕδατος βραχείαν ἐξέρημαι βασιλείας τηλικαύτης. *What a wretch was I* (ſaith he) *to loſe ſuch a Kingdom for ſo ſhort a pleaſure!* And tho' wicked Men be not ſenſible of the loſs of a far more glorious Kingdom than this of *Lyſimachus*, viz. *that of Heaven*, yet they cannot but be ſenſible how much they have loſt that Kingdom which every good Man hath in the tranquillity of his Spirit, and the command of his paſſions.

6. *The time that* God *ſpares wicked Men, is not ſo long as we think for.* It is all one, as *Plutarch* ſaith, as if we ſhould complain, that the Malefactor was puniſhed in the evening, and not in the morning; God's forbearance is but for a very little time, compar'd with his own duration. We meaſure God by the ſhort hour-glaſs of our time, when we are ſo ready to confine him to our meaſures. The time ſeems long to us, but it is as nothing in it ſelf: ἐπεὶ τοῖς γε θεοῖς πᾶν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου διάστημα, τὸ μηδὲν ἔστι. *The whole life of Man compared with eternity is nothing.* Beſides, all this time God ſuffers wicked Men to live here, he hath them under ſafe cuſtody; he doth but let them take the air within the Priſon-wall, or it may be they may play and ſport themſelves there, but there is no poſſibility of eſcaping out of the hands of Divine Juſtice.

7. God *forbears wicked Men here, becauſe the time is to come wherein* God *intends to puniſh them.* This is the higheſt vindication of Divine Providence, as to the preſent impunity of wicked Men in the world, becauſe this is not the proper ſeaſon for the open Execution of Juſtice. There are but few in compariſon whom Juſtice cauſeth to be executed in the Priſon, of what are reſerv'd for the General Aſſizes; God reſerves them for a fair and open Trial, for the greater vindication of his honour, and manifeſtation of his Juſtice to the World. And altho' God's Judgments even in this World be ſometimes ſo remarkable, that we cannot but ſee a hand of Providence in them, yet they are but few whom God doth ſo remarkably puniſh here, to make us more firmly believe a day of Judgment to come. Which tho' it be moſt clearly and fully reveal'd in Scripture, yet the *Heathens* themſelves from mere Reaſon have had ſuch a perſuaſion of it, that they have given this as another great reaſon,

reaſon, why God did forbear to puniſh wicked Men here, becauſe he did reſerve them for future puniſhment. For, as the ſame Moraliſt ſpeaks in the ſame Diſcourſe concerning the Soul, Ἀγωνίζεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς τὴν ζωὴν τὸν βίον, ὅταν ὁ ἀγωνίζεται τότε τυγχάνῃ τῶν προσηκόντων, *This preſent life is the place of the Soul's combat, which when it hath finiſh'd, it then receives according to its performance of it.* And as he before ſpeaks, Ἐπεὶ ὅτι λόγῳ ὁ τῶν Θεὸν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ ἀθανασίαν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον ἂν ἔτι ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀναιρεῖσθαι θάτερον. *The ſame reaſon which confirms Providence, doth likewiſe confirm the Immortality of the Soul; and if one be taken away, the other follows.* Οὔσης δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν τελευτὴν, μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἔστι καὶ τιμὰς ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ τιμωρίας· *And if the Soul doth ſubſiſt after death, it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that it ſhould there receive either reward or puniſhment.* Thus we ſee how far Natural Light, and Moral Reaſon will carry Men in the vindicating of Divine Providence, as to the preſent impunity of wicked Men. *Plutarch.* p. 561.

XXII. The other part which concerns the *ſufferings of good Men*, is not of ſo great difficulty, becauſe there are none ſo good as not to have a mixture of evil in them, and as they have a mixture of evil, ſo they have but a mixture of puniſhment; none lying under ſo great miſeries here, but withal they have ſome ſhare in the comforts of this Life. And therefore it is leſs wonder, that this part of Divine Providence which concerns the ſufferings of Men, hath not wanted ſome among the Heathen Moraliſts, who have made it their deſign to vindicate it; which ſetting aſide what *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, and many others have done, is fully performed by *Seneca* in his Tract on this ſubject, *Cur bonis male ſit, cum ſit Providentia* (as *Muretus* reſtores the title of that Book) wherein theſe following accounts are given of it.

1. God *brings them up as his Children under ſharp diſcipline for their future benefit.* A good Man in *Seneca*'s language is, *Diſcipulus Dei, æmulatorque, & vera progenies:* which in the language of the Scriptures is, *one taught of* God, *and a follower of* God, *and one born of him.* Now, ſaith he, *Parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis exactor, ſicut ſeveri patres, durius educat.* God, *who is the great Father of good Men, keeps them under diſcipline while under age, and by hardſhip fits them for the practice of Vertue.* Thence he bids us take notice of the different indulgence of Fathers and Mothers to their Children; the Father he haſtens them to School, ſuffers them not to be idle on their play-days, makes them toil, and ſometimes cry; the Mother ſhe is all for holding them in her lap, keeping them out of the Sun, and from catching cold, would not willingly have them either cry or take pains. *Patrium habet Deus adverſus bonos animum, & illos fortius amat.* God *bears the indulgence of a Father towards his Children, and loves them with greater ſeverity.* *Seneca de Provid. c. 1.*

2. *Good Men receive benefit by their ſufferings*; *Quicquid evenit in ſuum colorem trahit*, ſaith *Seneca* of a good Man, which in the language of the Apoſtle is, *Every thing works together for his good. The ſea loſeth nothing*, ſaith he, *of its ſaltneſs by the rivers running into it, neither doth a good Man by the current of his ſufferings.* And of all benefits which he receives, that of the exerciſe and trial of his Vertue and Patience is moſt diſcernable. *Marcet ſine adverſario virtus*, as ſoon as *Carthage* was deſtroy'd, *Rome* fell to Luxury: *True Wreſtlers deſire to have ſome to try their ſtrength upon them*; *Cui non induſtrio otium pœna eſt?* An active ſpirit hates idleneſs and cowardiſe; For, *etiamſi ceciderit, de genu pugnat, tho' his legs he cut off, he will fight on his knees.*

3. *It redounds to* GOD's *honor, when good Men bear up under ſufferings. Ecce par Deo dignum, virtus fortis cum mala fortuna compoſitus.* It is a ſpectacle GOD delights to ſee, a good Man combat with calamities. GOD doth in *Seneca*'s phraſe *quoſdam faſtidio tranſire*, paſſeth them by in a ſlight; *An old wreſtler ſcorns to contend with a Coward*, one who is *vinci paratus*, ready to yield up preſently. *Calamitates ſub jugum mittere proprium magni viri eſt*, It argues a noble ſpirit to be able to ſubdue miſeries.

4. *It tends to the trial and increaſe of their ſtrength. Seneca* highly extols that ſpeech of the Philoſopher *Demetrius, Nihil infelicius eo cui nihil unquam evenit adverſi; non licuit enim illi ſe experiri.* He is the moſt unhappy Man who never knew what miſery meant; for he could never know what he was able to bear. And, as he ſaith, to paſs one's Life away *ſine morſu animi*, without any trouble, it is *ignorare rerum naturæ alteram partem*, not to know what is upon the reverſe of Nature. *Idem licet fecerint qui integri revertuntur ex acie, magis ſpectatur qui ſaucius redit.* Tho' he that comes home ſound, might fight as well as he that is wounded; yet the wounded perſon hath the more pity, and is moſt cry'd up for his valour. The Pilot is ſeen in a Tempeſt, a Soldier in the Battel, and a good Man in Sufferings. GOD doth by ſuch as Maſters do by Scholars, *qui plus laboris ab his exigunt, quibus certior ſpes eſt*; who ſet the beſt Wits the hardeſt taſks.

5. GOD *exerciſeth good Men with ſufferings, to diſcover the indifferency of thoſe things which Men value ſo much in the World, when he denies them to good Men.* Blindneſs would be hateful, if none were blind but ſuch whoſe Eyes were put out; and therefore *Appius* and *Metellus* were blind. Riches are no good things, therefore the worſt as well as the beſt have them. *Nullo modo magis poteſt Deus concupita traducere, quam ſi illa ad turpiſſimos defert, ab optimis abigit.* GOD could not traduce or defame thoſe things more which Men deſire ſo much, than by taking them away from the beſt of Men, and giving them to the worſt.

6. *That they might be examples to others of patience and conſtancy:* For, as *Seneca* concludes, *Nati ſunt in exemplar*, they are born to be patterns to others. If to theſe things we add what the Word of GOD diſcovers concerning the nature, grounds, and ends of afflictions, and that Glory which ſhall be reveal'd, in compariſon with *which exceeding weight of Glory, theſe light and momentany afflictions are not at all to be valu'd*; then we have a clear and full vindication of Divine Providence, as to the ſufferings of good Men, as well as to the impunity of ſuch as are wicked. But however, from hence we ſee how far the mere light of Reaſon hath carried Men in reſolving theſe difficulties concerning GOD's Providence in the World, and what a rational account may be given of them, ſuppoſing evil of puniſhment to ariſe from ſin, and that there is a GOD in the World, who is ready to puniſh the wicked, and to reward the good: Which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Origin of Nations.

I. *All Mankind deriv'd from* Adam, *if the Scriptures be true.* II. *The contrary ſuppoſition an introduction to Atheiſm.* III. *The truth of the Hiſtory of the Flood. The poſſibility of an univerſal Deluge prov'd.* IV. *The Flood univerſal as to Mankind, whether univerſal as to the Earth and Animals; no neceſſity of aſſerting either.* V. *Yet ſuppoſing the poſſibility of it demonſtrated without creation of new Waters.* VI. *Of the Fountains of the Deep. The proportion which the height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth. No Mountains much above three Mile perpendicular. Of the Origin of Fountains. The opinion of* Ariſtotle *and others concerning it diſcus'd. The true account of them from the Vapours ariſing from the maſs of ſubterraneous Waters.* VII. *Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from* Buteo *and others.* VIII. *The truth of the Deluge from the Teſtimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from* Noah's *Poſterity.* IX. *Of the beginning of the* Aſſyrian *Empire. The multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the LXX. Of the time between the Flood and* Abraham, *and the advantages of it.* X. *Of the pretence of ſuch Nations, who call'd themſelves* Aborigines. XI. *A diſcourſe concerning the firſt Planters of* Greece: *The common Opinion propounded and rejected. The* Hellens *were not the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece, *but the* Pelaſgi. *The large ſpread of them over the parts of* Greece. XII. *Of their Language different from the* Greeks. XIII. *Whence theſe* Pelaſgi *came; that* Phaleg *was the* Pelaſgus *of* Greece, *and the Leader of that Colony, prov'd from* Epiphanius. XIV. *The Language of the* Pelaſgi *in* Greece *Oriental: Thence an account given of the many Hebrew words in the Greek Language, and the remainders of the Eaſtern Languages in the Iſlands of* Greece, *both which not from the* Phœnicians, *as* Bochartus *thinks, but from the old* Pelaſgi. XV. *Of the ground of the Affinity between the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians. *Of the Peopling of* America.

THE next thing we proceed to give a rational account of, in the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World contain'd in Scripture, is the peopling the World from *Adam*. Which is of great conſequence for

us

us to understand, not only for the satisfaction of our curiosity as to the true Origin of Nations, but also in order to our believing the truth of the Scriptures, and the universal effects of the Fall of Man. Neither of which can be sufficiently clear'd without this. For as it is hard to conceive how the effects of Man's Fall should extend to all Mankind, unless all Mankind were propagated from *Adam*; so it is unconceivable how the account of things given in Scripture should be true, if there were Persons existent in the World long before *Adam* was. Since the Scripture doth so plainly affirm, *That* GOD *hath made of one Blood all Nations of Men, for to dwell on the face of the Earth*; some Greek Copies read it ἐξ ἑνὸς, leaving out αἵματος which the vulgar Latin follows: The *Arabic* Version to explain both, reads it *ex homine*, or as *de Dieu* renders it *ex Adamo uno*, there being but the difference of one Letter in the Eastern Languages between דם and אדם, the one denoting Blood, and the other Man. But if we take it as our more ordinary Copies read it ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, yet thereby it is plain, that the meaning is not, that all Mankind was made of the same uniform Matter, as the Author of the *Præ-Adamites* weakly imagin'd (for by that reason, not only Mankind, but the whole World might be said to be ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, of the same Blood, since all things in the World were at first form'd out of the same Matter) but αἷμα is taken there in the sense in which it occurs in the best *Greek* Authors for the stock out of which Men come: So *Homer*,

Acts xvii. 26.

Hom. Odyss. ω.

Εἰ ἐτεόν γ' ἐμὸς ἐσσὶ καὶ αἵματος ἠμετέροιο.

Thence those who are near Relations, are call'd in *Sophocles*, οἱ πρὸς αἵματος, thence the name of Consanguinity for nearness of Relation: and *Virgil* useth *sanguis* in the same sense,

Trojano a sanguine duci.

So that the Apostle's meaning is, that however Men now are so dispers'd in their Habitations, and differ so much in Language and Customs from each other, yet they were all originally of the same stock, and did derive their succession from that first Man whom GOD created. Neither can it be conceiv'd on what account *Adam* in the Scripture is call'd the first Man, and that *he was made a living Soul, and of the Earth, earthy*; unless it were to denote that he was absolutely the first of his kind, and so was to be the Standard and Measure of all that follows. And when our Saviour would reduce all things to the beginning, he instanceth in those words which were pronounc'd after *Eve* was form'd. *But from the beginning of the Creation* GOD *made them Male and Female*; *for this cause shall a Man leave Father and Mother, and cleave unto his Wife.* Now nothing can be more plain and easie than from hence to argue thus; those of whom these words were spoken, were the first Male or Female which were made in the beginning of the Creation; but it is evident these words were spoken of *Adam* and *Eve*: *And* Adam *said, this is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: Therefore shall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and shall cleave unto his Wife.* If the Scriptures then of the *New Testament* be true, it is most plain and evident that all Mankind is descended from *Adam*; and no less conspicuous is it from the History of the Creation as deliver'd by *Moses*.

1 Cor. xv. 45, 47.

Mark x. 6, 7.

Gen. ii. 23, 24.

For how neceſſary had it been for *Moſes*, when he was giving an account of the Origin of Things, to have diſcover'd by whom the World was firſt planted, if there had been any ſuch Plantation before *Adam*: but to ſay that all the deſign of *Moſes* was only to give an account of the Origin and Hiſtory of the *Jewiſh* Nation, and that *Adam* was only the firſt of that Stock, is manifeſtly ridiculous, it being ſo clear, that not only from *Adam* and *Noah*, but from *Sem*, *Abraham*, and *Iſaac*, came other Nations beſides that of *Jews*. And by the ſame reaſon that it is ſaid, that *Moſes* only ſpeaks of the Origin of the *Jewiſh* Nation in the Hiſtory of *Adam*, it may as well be ſaid that *Moſes* ſpeaks only of the making of *Canaan*, and that part of the Heavens which are over it, when he deſcribes the Creation of the World in the ſix Days work. For why may not the Earth, in the ſecond Verſe of *Geneſis*, be as well underſtood of the Land of *Judæa*, and the Light and Production of Animals and Vegetables refer only to that, as to underſtand it ſo in reference to the Flood, and in many other paſſages relating to thoſe eldeſt times? But the Author of that *Hypotheſis* anſwers, *That the firſt Chapter of* Geneſis *may relate to the true Origin of the World and the firſt Peopling of it, but in the ſecond* Moſes *begins to give an account of the firſt Man and Woman of the Jewiſh Nation.* Very probable! but if this be not a putting aſunder thoſe which GOD hath joyn'd together, nothing is. For doth not *Moſes* plainly at firſt give an account of the Formation of things in the firſt ſix Days, and of his Reſt on the Seventh? But how could he be ſaid to have reſted then from the Works of Creation, if after this follow'd the Formation of *Adam* and *Eve* in the ſecond Chapter? Beſides, if the forming of Man mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 7. be diſtinct from that mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 27. then by all parity of Reaſon, תולדות השמים והארץ the *Generations* of *Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 4. muſt be diſtinct from the *Creation of the Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 1. And ſo if there were another Creation of Heaven and Earth belonging to the *Jews* in *Gen.* 2. we may likewiſe believe that there was a new Creation of Man and Woman in that Chapter diſtinct from that mention'd in the former. Again farther, if there had been any ſuch Perſons in the World before *Adam*, no doubt *Adam* himſelf was ignorant of them; or elſe it had been a falſe and ridiculous account which he gives of the name of his Wife חוה *becauſe ſhe was* אסכלחי *the Mother of all living.* Gen. iii. 20. Not of all living Things, for that had been a more proper deſcription of a *Ceres*, or *Magna Mater*, or *Diana multimammia*, of our Grandmother the Earth, but certainly it extends to all of the kind, that all living Creatures that are of Human Nature came from her. So the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt underſtands it, ſhe was call'd *Hava*, becauſe ſhe was אמא רכל בני אנשא *the Mother of all the Sons of Men.* And ſo the *Arabic* Verſion, *Quia ipſa fuit mater omnis viventis rationalis.* To which purpoſe our Learned *Selden* cites the Verſion of the *Mauritanian Jews*, and the *Perſic* of *Tawaſius.* *Selden. de jure natur. & gent. l.* 1. *c.* 3. *p.* 65.

II.

But whatever the Credit or Authority of theſe Verſions be, this is moſt certain, that *Adam* had no reaſon at all to have given this name to his Wife, as being *the Mother of all living*, if there had been any of Mankind exiſting in the World from other Mothers, which had been long before *Eve* was form'd. So that we find it plain and clear, that if the report given of things in Scripture be true, the *Hypotheſis* of *Præ-Adamites* is undoubtedly falſe. And certainly who ever ſeriouſly conſiders the frequent Reflections on the Authority of the Scriptures, which

were

were caſt by the Author of that Fiction, and his endeavouring on all occaſions to derogate from the Miracles recorded in it, may eaſily ſuſpect the deſign of that Author was not to gain any credit to his Opinion from thoſe Arguments from Scripture, which he makes ſhew of (which are pitifully weak and ridiculous) but having by the help of ſuch Arguments made his Opinion more plauſible, his hope was, that his Opinion would in time undermine the Scriptures themſelves; when he had made it appear that the account given in the Scriptures of the plantation of the World was unſatisfactory, ſince there were Men before *Adam*, which the Scriptures, to pleaſe the *Jewiſh* Nation, take no notice of. So that after he had attempted to proſtitute the Scriptures to his Opinion, his next work had been to have turn'd them out of Doors, as not of credit to be rely'd on by any, when they were ſo common to every Opinion. But how impious, abſurd, and rude that attempt was upon the ſacred and inviolable Authority of the Scriptures, hath been ſo fully diſcover'd by his very many not unlearned Adverſaries, that it might ſeem needleſs ſo much as to have taken notice of ſo weakly grounded, and infirmly prov'd an Opinion, had it not thus far lain in my way in order to the clearing the true Origin of Nations according to the Scriptures. The main foundations of which fabulous Opinion lying chiefly in the pretended Antiquities of the *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and others, have been fully taken away in our firſt Book, where our whole deſign was to manifeſt the want of credibility in thoſe accounts of ancient Times, which are deliver'd by Heathen Nations in oppoſition to the Scriptures. There is nothing at all in Scripture from the Creation of *Adam* to the Flood, which ſeems to give any countenance to that Figment, but only what may be eaſily reſolv'd from the conſideration of the great conciſeneſs of the *Moſaic* Hiſtory, in reporting that long interval of time which was between the Fall of *Adam*, and the Flood; by means of which conciſeneſs ſuch things are reported as ſpeedily done, becauſe immediately ſucceeding in the Story, which aſked a very conſiderable time before they could be effected; and beſides all things which were done before the Flood, being all quite obliterated by it, and all the numerous Poſterity of *Adam* being then deſtroy'd (only *Noah* and his Family excepted) to what purpoſe had it been any farther to have reported the paſſages before the Flood, otherwiſe than thereby to let us underſtand the certainty of the ſucceſſion of Perſons from *Adam*, and ſuch Actions in thoſe times which might be remarkable diſcoveries of God's Providence and Man's Wickedneſs in it; which being moſt apparent at firſt in *Cain* and his Poſterity, did by degrees ſo ſpread it ſelf over the face of the then inhabited World, that the juſt God was thereby provok'd to ſend a Deluge among them, to ſweep away the preſent Inhabitants, to make room for another Generation to ſucceed them.

III. This therefore we now come to conſider, *viz. The Hiſtory of the Flood*, and the certainty of the Propagation of the World, from the Poſterity of *Noah* after the Flood. I begin with the Hiſtory of the Flood it ſelf, as to which two things will be ſufficient to demonſtrate the truth of it. 1. *If there be nothing in it repugnant to Reaſon.* 2. *If we have ſufficient evidence of the truth of it, from ſuch who yet have not believ'd the Scriptures.* There are only two things which ſeem queſtionable to Reaſon concerning the Flood: The *firſt*, is, *concerning the poſſibility of the Flood it ſelf:* The other is, *concerning the capacity of the Ark for preſerving all kinds of Animals.* The only ground of queſtioning the poſſibility

poſſibility of ſuch a Flood, as that is related in Scripture, hath been from hence, that ſome have ſuppos'd it impoſſible, that all the Water which is contain'd in the Air, ſuppoſing it to fall down, ſhould raiſe the ſurface of Water upon the Earth a Foot and a half in height; ſo ſo that either new Waters muſt be created to overflow the Earth, or elſe there muſt be ſuppos'd a Rarefaction of the Water contain'd in the Sea and all Rivers, ſo that it muſt take up at leaſt fifteen times the ſpace that now it doth: But then, they ſay, if the Water had been thus rarefy'd, could neither have deſtroy'd Man nor Beaſt, neither could *Noah*'s Ark have been born up by it any more than by liquid Air. To this therefore I anſwer.

Firſt, I cannot ſee any urgent neceſſity from the Scripture to aſſert, that the Flood did ſpread it ſelf over all the ſurface of the Earth. That all Mankind (thoſe in the Ark excepted) were deſtroy'd by it, is moſt certain according to the Scriptures. When the occaſion of the Flood is thus expreſs'd, *And* GOD *ſaw that the wickedneſs of Man was great upon Earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his Heart was only evil continually. And the Lord ſaid, I will deſtroy Man whom I have created from the face of the Earth.* It could not be then any particular Deluge of ſo ſmall a Country as *Paleſtine*, which is here expreſs'd, as ſome have ridiculouſly imagin'd; for we find an univerſal corruption in the Earth mention'd as the cauſe; an univerſal threatning upon all Men for this cauſe; and afterwards an univerſal deſtruction expreſſed, as the effect of this Flood. *And all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth, and every Man. And every living ſubſtance was deſtroyed which was upon the face of the Ground, both Man and Cattle, and the creeping things, and the Fowl of the Heaven, and they were deſtroyed from the Earth, and* Noah *only remained alive, and they that were with him in the Ark.* So then it is evident, that the Flood was univerſal as to Mankind; but from thence follows no neceſſity at all of aſſerting the univerſality of it, as to the Globe of the Earth, unleſs it be ſufficiently prov'd that the whole Earth was Peopled before the Flood: Which I deſpair of ever ſeeing prov'd. And what Reaſon can there be to extend the Flood beyond the occaſion of it, which was the corruption of Mankind? And it ſeems very ſtrange, that in ſo ſhort an interval in compariſon, as that was from *Adam* to the Flood, according to the ordinary computation, *viz.* 1656 Years, and not much above two thouſand, according to the largeſt, the World ſhould then be fully Peopled, when in ſo much longer a ſpace of time ſince the Flood to this Day, the Earth is capable of receiving far more Inhabitants than now it hath. The only probability then left for aſſerting the univerſality of the Flood, as to the Globe of the Earth, is from the Deſtruction of all living Creatures together with Man; now tho' Men might not have ſpread themſelves over the whole ſurface of the Earth, yet Beaſts and creeping Things might, which were all deſtroy'd with the Flood: For it is ſaid, *That all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth, both of Fowl and of Cattle, and of Beaſt, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth, and every Man.* To what end ſhould there be not only a note of univerſality added, but ſuch a particular enumeration of the ſeveral kinds of Beaſts, creeping Things, and Fowls, if they were not all deſtroy'd? To this I anſwer. I grant as far as the Flood extended all theſe were deſtroy'd; but I ſee no reaſon to extend the deſtruction of theſe beyond that compaſs and ſpace of the Earth where Men inhabited: Becauſe the puniſhment upon

Gen. 6. 5, 7.

Gen. 7. 21.

Ver. 23.

the Beaſts was occaſion'd by, and could not but be concomitant with the deſtruction of Mankind, but (the occaſion of the Deluge being the Sin of Man, who was puniſh'd in the Beaſts, that were deſtroy'd for his ſake, as well as in himſelf) where the occaſion was not, as where there were Animals, and no Men, there ſeems no neceſſity of extending the Flood thither. But to what end then, it will be replyed, *Did* GOD *command* Noah *with ſo much care to take of all kinds of Beaſts, and Birds, and creeping Things into the Ark with him, if all theſe living Creatures were not deſtroy'd by the Flood?* I anſwer, becauſe all thoſe things were deſtroy'd where ever the Flood was. Suppoſe then the whole Continent of *Aſia* was Peopled before the Flood, which is as much as we may in reaſon ſuppoſe, I ſay, all the living Creatures in that Continent were all deſtroy'd; or if we may ſuppoſe it to have extended over our whole Continent of the anciently known World; what reaſon would there be that in the oppoſite part of the Globe, *viz. America*, which we ſuppoſe to be unpeopled then, all the living Creatures ſhould there be deſtroy'd, becauſe Men had ſinned in this? And would there not on this ſuppoſition have been a ſufficient reaſon to preſerve living Creatures in the Ark for future propagation, when all other living Creatures extant had been in ſuch remote places as would not have been acceſſible by them in many Generations, and thoſe Beaſts growing wild for want of Inhabitants, would not have prov'd preſently ſerviceable for the uſe of Men after the Flood? Which was certainly the main thing look'd at in the preſervation of them in the Ark, that Men might have all of them ready for their uſe after the Flood, which could not have been, had not the ſeveral kinds been preſerv'd in the Ark, altho' we ſuppoſe them not deſtroy'd in all parts of the World.

IV. All this proceeds on ſuppoſition that Animals were propagated much farther in the World than Men were, before the Flood. Which I confeſs ſeems very probable to me on this account, becauſe the production of Animals is parallel in *Geneſis* with that of Fiſhes, and both of them different from Man; *For* GOD *ſaith, Let the waters bring forth every moving Creature that hath life*; viz. *Fiſh, and Fowl*; and accordingly it is ſaid, *that the waters brought forth abundantly every living Creature after their kind, and every Fowl after his kind.* Accordingly in the production of Beaſts, we read, *Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind, Cattle, and creeping thing, and Beaſt of the Earth after his kind, and it was ſo:* But in the production of Man, it is ſaid, *Let us make Man in our own likeneſs.* From hence I obſerve this difference between the production of Animals, and of Man, that in the one GOD gave a prolific Power to the Earth and Waters for production of the ſeveral living Creatures which came from them; ſo that the ſeminal principles of them were contain'd in the Matter out of which they were produc'd; which was otherwiſe in Man, who was made by a peculiar Hand of the great Creator himſelf, who thence is ſaid to have *formed Man of the duſt of the ground.* Now therefore altho' there were but one Male and Female of Mankind at firſt, which had a ſpecial formation by GOD himſelf; yet there is no reaſon we ſhould conceive it to be ſo as to the Production of other living Creatures, whether Fiſh, or Fowl, or Beaſts; but the prolific Virtue being by GOD's power given to that material principle out of which they were form'd, it may very well be ſuppos'd that many of the ſame kind were at firſt produc'd. For it ſeems very ſtrange to imagin that in the whole Ocean there ſhould be only two of a kind produc'd; but Fiſh and Fowl both ariſing from the Water, we

Gen. 1. 20, 21.

Ver. 24.

Ver. 26.

Gen. 2. 6.

may

may have juſt reaſon to think, that the Waters being ſeparated before this prolific Virtue was communicated to the whole maſs of Waters, might in the ſeveral parts of the Globe of the Earth, bring forth both Fiſh and Fowl after their kinds. The ſame I ſay of the production of Animals in the ſixth days work, which are rank'd into three ſorts, Cattle, creeping Things, and Beaſts of the Earth after their kinds; now GOD ſaying, *Let the Earth bring forth her living Creatures*, (and that after the Waters had divided ſome parts of the Earth from other, ſo that there could be no paſſage for the Cattle, creeping Things, and Beaſts out of one part into another, without the help of Man,) it ſeems very probable that at leaſt thoſe parts of the Earth which were thus divided from each other, did bring forth theſe ſeveral living Creatures after their kinds, which did after propagate in thoſe parts without being brought thither by the help of Man. If now this ſuppoſition be embrac'd, by it we preſently clear our ſelves of many difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals in the World, and their converſation in the Ark, which many have been ſo much to ſeek for ſatisfaction in. As how the unknown kind of Serpents in *Braſil*, the ſlow-belly'd Creature of the *Indies*, and all thoſe ſtrange ſpecies of Animals ſeen in the *Weſt-Indies* ſhould either come into the Ark of *Noah*, or be convey'd out of it into thoſe Countries which are divided from that Continent where the Flood was by ſo vaſt an Ocean on the one ſide, and at leaſt ſo large a tract of Land on the other (ſuppoſing any paſſage out of one Continent into another, which yet hath not been diſcover'd.) Beſides, ſome kind of Animals cannot live out of that particular Clime wherein they are; and there are many ſorts of Animals diſcover'd in *America*, and the adjoining Iſland, which have left no remainders of themſelves in theſe parts of the World. And it ſeems very ſtrange that theſe ſhould propagate into thoſe remote parts of the World from the place of the Flood, and leave none at all of their number behind them in thoſe parts from whence they were propagated. Theſe things at leaſt make that Opinion very probable which extends the production of Animals beyond that of Mankind in the old World, and that the Flood tho' it deſtroy'd all Mankind, and every living Creature within that compaſs wherein Mankind inhabited, yet might not extend it ſelf to thoſe parts, and the Animals therein, in which Men had never inhabited. And by this means we need not make ſo many Miracles as ſome are fain to do about the Flood; and all thoſe difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals do of themſelves vaniſh and fall to the ground. This is the firſt way of reſolving the difficulty concerning the poſſibility of the Flood, by aſſerting it not to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, but only over thoſe parts where Mankind inhabited.

V. *Secondly*, Suppoſe the Flood to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, yet there might have been Water enough to have over-whelm'd it to the height mention'd in Scripture. For which we are to conſider that many cauſes concurr'd to the making of this Deluge; *firſt*, the Air was condens'd into Clouds, and thoſe fell down with continu'd force and violence, not breaking into drops, but all in a body (which Sir *Walter Rawleigh* parallels with the ſpouts of the *Weſt Indies*) which are thence call'd the Cataracts or Flood-gates of Heaven, GOD looſening (as he expreſſeth it) the power retentive which was in the Clouds, and ſo the Waters muſt needs fall in abundance, according to the expreſſion of *Job*, *Behold he with-holdeth the waters, and they dry up, alſo he ſendeth* Job. 12. 15. *them*

Sir Walter Rawleigh's Hiſtory.

them out, and they overturn the Earth. Now I ſay, altho' theſe Waters falling down with ſo much fury and violence, as well as in ſo great abundance might quickly deſtroy all living Creatures; yet this was not all; for GOD who held in the Ocean within its bounds, whereby he ſaith to it, *Thus far it ſhall go, and no farther*, might then give it commiſſion to execute his Juſtice upon the ſinful World: and to all this, we have another cauſe of the Deluge, which was, *That the Fountains*
Gen. 7. 11. *of the great Deep were broken up.* By which *Vatablus*, moſt probably underſtands, *Immenſam illam & profundam aquarum copiam quæ eſt ſubter terram*, that vaſt body of Water which lies in the bowels of the Earth; now when all theſe Fountains were broken up, and the Waters within the Earth ruſh out with violence and impetuoſity upon it, it muſt needs cauſe an Inundation ſo great as that is mention'd in the Scripture. For
Sir Walter Rawleigh *Ibid.* as that judicious Hiſtorian Sir *W. Rawleigh* obſerves, Let us conſider that the Earth had above 21000 Miles compaſs, the Diameter of the Earth according to that Circle 7000 Miles, and then from the Superficies to the Center 3500 Miles; take then the higheſt Mountain of the World, *Caucaſus*, *Taurus*, *Teneriff*, or any other, and I do not find, ſaith he, that the higheſt exceeds thirty Miles in height: It is not then impoſſible, anſwering Reaſon with Reaſon, that all thoſe Waters mixed within the Earth, 3500 Miles deep, ſhould be able to cover the ſpace of 30 Miles in height, which 30 Miles upright being found in the depths of the Earth 116 times; for the Fountains of the great Deep were broken and the Waters drawn out of the Bowels of the Earth. But then withal, ſaith he, if we conſider the proportion which the Earth bears to the Air about it, we may eaſily underſtand the poſſibility of the Flood, without any new creation of Waters; for ſuppoſing ſo much Air to be condens'd, and ſo turn'd into Water which doth encompaſs the Earth, it will not ſeem ſtrange to Men of Judgment, yea but of ordinary Underſtanding, that the Earth (GOD ſo pleaſing) was cover'd over with Waters, without any new Creation. But this will yet appear more probable, if the height of the higheſt Mountains doth bear no greater proportion to the Diameter of the Earth, than of the 1670 part to the whole, ſuppoſing the Diameter of the Earth to be 8355 Miles, as
Gaſſend. Tom. 2. op. Phyſ. ſ. 3. l. 1. *P. Gaſſendus* computes both. And it is more than probable, that Men have exceedingly miſtaken, as to the height of Mountains, which comes ſo ſhort of what Sir *Walter Rawleigh* allows to them, that the higheſt Mountain in the World will not be found to be five direct Miles in height, taking the altitude of them from the Plain they ſtand upon. *Olympus*, whoſe height is ſo extoll'd by the Poets and ancient *Greeks*, that it is ſaid
Plut. in Æmilian. Plin. l. 2. c. 65. to exceed the Clouds; yet *Plutarch* tells us that *Xenagoras* meaſur'd it, and found it not to exceed a Mile and half perpendicular and about 70 Paces. Much about the ſame height *Pliny* ſaith that *Dicæarchus* found the Mountain *Pelion* to be. The Mount *Athos* is ſuppos'd of extraordinary height, becauſe it caſts its ſhadow into the Iſle of *Lemnos*, which according to *Pliny* was 87 Miles, yet *Gaſſendus* allows it but two Miles
Voſſ. in Pomp. Melam, l. 5. c. 2. p. 115. &c. in height; but *Iſaac Voſſius* in a learned diſcourſe concerning the height of Mountains in his Notes on *Pomponius Mela*, doth not allow above 10 or 11 Furlongs at moſt to the height of Mount *Athos*. *Caucaſus* by *Ricciolus* is ſaid to be 51 Miles in height: *Gaſſendus* allowing it to be higher than *Athos* or *Olympus*, yet conceives it not above three or four Miles at moſt; but yet *Voſſius* will not yield it above two Miles perpendicular, for which he gives this very good reaſon; *Polybius* affirms,

there

there is no Mountain in *Greece* which may not be aſcended in a days time, and makes the higheſt Mountain there not to exceed 10 Furlongs; which, ſaith *Voſſius*, it is ſcarce poſſible for any one to reach, unleſs he be a Mountainer born; any other will ſcarce be able to aſcend above ſix Furlongs perpendicular; for in the aſcent of a Mountain every Pace doth reach but to an hand breadth perpendicular; but if we do allow eight Furlongs to a Days aſcent, yet thereby it will appear that the higheſt Mountains in the World are not above twenty four Furlongs in height, ſince they may be aſcended in three Days time. And it is affirm'd of the top of Mount *Caucaſus*, that it may be aſcended in leſs than the compaſs of three Days, and therefore cannot be much above two Miles in height. Which may be the eaſier believ'd of any other Mountain, when that which is reputed the higheſt of the World, *viz.* the *Pike* of *Teneriff*, which the Inhabitants call *Pica de Terraria*, may be aſcended in that compaſs of time, *viz.* three Days: For in the Months of *July* and *Auguſt* (which are the only Months in which Men can aſcend it, becauſe all other times of the Year Snow lies upon it, altho' neither in the Iſle of *Teneriff* nor any other of the *Canary-Iſlands*, there be Snow ever ſeen) the Inhabitants then aſcend to the top of it in three Days time; which top of it is not Pyramidal but plain, from whence they gather ſome Sulphurous Stones, which are carry'd in great Quantities into *Spain*. So that according to the proportion of eight Furlongs to a days Journey, this *Pike* of *Teneriff* will not exceed the height of a *German* Mile perpendicular, as *Varenius* confeſſeth, than which he thinks likewiſe that no Mountain in the World is higher. For what *Pliny* ſpeaks of the *Alps* being fifty Miles in height, muſt be underſtood not perpendicular, but in regard of the obliquity of the aſcent of it; ſo that he might account ſo much from the foot of the *Alps* to the top of them, and yet the *Alps* in a perpendicular Line not come near the height of a *German* Mile. If then the higheſt Mountains do not exceed much above three Miles in height, (for the *Spaniards* themſelves affirm, that thoſe lofty Mountains of *Peru*, in compariſon of which, they ſay, the *Alps* are but like Cottages, may be aſcended in four Days compaſs,) we ſee from hence then far greater probability, how the Waters in the time of the general Flood might overtop the higheſt Mountains.

V. Varenium Geogr. General. l. 1. c. 10. prop. 3.

VI. Eſpecially if it be made evident that there is ſo great an Abyſs of ſubterraneous Waters, that the breaking open of the Fountains of it may ſo much increaſe the Inundation ariſing from the Clouds, and from the breaking in of the Ocean upon the main Land. And that there is ſuch a maſs of Waters in the body of the Earth, is evident from the Origin of Fountains; for the Opinion of *Ariſtotle* imputing them to the condenſation of Air in the Caverns of the Earth, and that of other Philoſophers aſcribing them to the fall of Rain-water receiv'd into ſuch Ciſterns in the Earth which are capable of receiving it, are both equally unſatisfactory, unleſs we ſuppoſe a maſs of Waters in the Bowels of the Earth, which may be as the common ſtock to ſupply thoſe Fountains with. For it is very hard conceiving, how mere Air ſhould be ſo far condens'd, as to cauſe not only ſuch a number of Fountains, but ſo great a quantity of Water as runs into the Sea by thoſe Rivers which come from them, (as the River *Volga* is ſuppos'd to empty ſo much Water in a Years time into the *Caſpian* Sea, as might ſuffice to cover the whole Earth,) by which likewiſe it is moſt evident that there muſt be ſome ſubterranean paſſages into the Sea, or elſe of neceſſity, by that abundance of

Water

Water which continually runs into it from the Rivers, it would overflow and drown the World. And from this multitude of Waters which comes from Fountains, it is likewiſe evident, that the Origin of Fountains cannot be merely from ſuch Water which falls from the Clouds, which would never ſuffice to maintain ſo full and uninterrupted a Stream as many Fountains have: Eſpecially if that be true which ſome aſſert, that Rain-water doth never moiſten the Earth above ten Foot deep, for of far greater profundity many Fountains are. And beſides, the Rain-water runs moſt upon the ſurface of the Earth, and ſo doth rather ſwell the Rivers, which thereby run with greater force in their paſſage to the Ocean, and doth not lodg it ſelf preſently in the Earth, eſpecially if it deſcends in a greater quantity, which alone is able to fill ſuch Ciſterns ſuppos'd to be in the Earth, eſpecially in Mountains, which may keep a Stream continually running. Altho' therefore we may acknowledg that the fall of Rain may much conduce to the over-flowing and continuance of Fountains, as is evident by the greater force of Springs after continu'd Rains, and by the decay of many of them in hot and dry Weather, (which yet I had rather impute to the Sun's exhaling by his continu'd heat thoſe moiſt Vapours in the Earth, which ſhould continually ſupply the Springs, than merely to the want of Rain,) and by the riſe of moſt great Rivers from ſuch Fountains which came from the foot of Mountains; where the Ground is ſuppos'd to be of ſo hard and conſiſtent a ſubſtance, as Stone or Chalk, or ſomething of like nature, which might help to the conſervation of Water there, from whence it after ran in Streams to the Ocean, (which was the great Argument of the famous *Peireſkius* for his Opinion,) altho' I ſay, theſe things may argue thus far, that Rain-water doth much conduce to the preſervation of Springs, yet it cannot give a ſufficient account of the origin of them: Which with the greateſt reaſon and probability is imputed to thoſe ſubterraneous Waters which paſs up and down thro' the Bowels of the Earth. Some have fancy'd the Earth to be as one great Animal, whoſe ſubterraneous paſſages were like Veins in the Body, which receiv'd Water out of the Sea, as the Veins do Blood out of the Liver; and that there are ſome kind of Vapours in the Earth which ſupply the place of vital Spirits, which are diffus'd up and down the Body thro' the Arteries. And that as in an Animal, there are ſome parts which upon the leaſt prick do ſend forth Blood, and others are more callous where the inciſion muſt be deeper before any Blood appears; ſo it is in the Earth: When it is open'd in a right Vein we find preſently a Spring of Water; but if we chance to hit on a wrong place, we go deep and may find none; not that Water is wanting, but we have not hit on the Veins thro' which it runs. And thence the Blood with equal freedom and velocity aſcends into the Head as it runs into the Legs, becauſe it is equally diſpers'd into all the parts from the Center of it; ſo in the body of the Earth it is as natural for the Water to aſcend into the tops of Mountains, as it is to fall down into the Center of the Earth. And that it is no more wonder to ſee Springs iſſue out of Mountains, than it is to ſee a Man bleed in the Veins of his Fore-head when he is let Blood there. So in all places of the Earth the parts of it are not diſpoſed for apertion; for ſome of them are ſo hard and compact, that there ſeems to be no paſſage thro' them, (which is the moſt probable reaſon, why there is no Rain neither in thoſe places, becauſe there is no ſuch exſudation of thoſe moiſt Vapours thro' the ſurface of

V. Gaſſend. vit. Peireſkii, l. 3. p. 292.

the

the Earth, which may yield Matter for Rain, as it is in many of the ſandy places of *Africa*;) but uſually Mountainous Countries have more large, and as it were Temple-veins thro' which the moiſt Vapours have a free and open paſſage, and thence there are not only more frequent Springs there, but Clouds and Rains too. Now if this account of the Origin of Springs in the Earth be as rational as it is ingenious and handſome, (and there is not much can be ſaid againſt it, but only that then all Fountains ſhould be ſalt as the Water is from whence they come) then we eaſily underſtand how the Earth might be overflow'd in the univerſal Deluge; for then the Fountains of the Deep were broken up, or there was an univerſal opening of the Veins of the Earth, whereby all the Water contain'd in them would preſently run upon the ſurface of the Earth, and muſt needs according to its proportion, advance it ſelf to a conſiderable height. But becauſe the ſalving the difference of the Water in Springs from what it is in the Sea, is ſo conſiderable a *Phænomenon* in our preſent caſe, I therefore rather take this following as the moſt rational account of the Origin of Fountains, *viz.* That there are great Cavities in the Earth, which are capable of receiving a conſiderable quantity of Water, which continually runs into them from the Sea, (which as it continually receives freſh ſupplies from the Rivers which empty themſelves into it, ſo it diſpatcheth away a like quantity thro' thoſe ſpungy parts of the Earth under the Ocean, which are moſt apt to ſuck in and convey away the ſurpluſage of Water,) ſo that by this means the Sea never ſwells by the Water convey'd into it by the Rivers, there being as continual a circulation in the body of the Earth, of the Water which paſſeth out of the Ocean into the ſubterraneous Caverns, and from thence to the Mountains, and thence into the Sea again, as there is a circulation of Blood in Man's Body from the Heart by the Arteries into the exterior parts, and returning back again by the Veins into the Heart. According to which we may imagine ſuch a place in the Heart of the Earth like *Plato*'s *Baratrum*,

Τήλε μάλ' ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον.

As *Plato* in his *Phædrus* deſcribes it out of *Homer*, *A long and deep ſubterraneous Cavity.* εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα ῥυῤῥέουσί τε πάντες οἱ πολλαμοὶ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν πάντες ἐκρέουσι. *Into which Cavity all the Rivers at laſt flow, and from which they again diſperſe themſelves abroad.* Now this Cavity of the Earth thus fill'd with Water, ſupplies the place of the Heart in the body of the Earth, from which all thoſe ſeveral *Aqueducts* which are in the Earth have their continual ſupply; but that which makes thoſe paſſages of Water which we call Springs and Fountains properly, I ſuppoſe, is thus generated; from thoſe Cavities fill'd with Water in the Earth, by reaſon of the hot ſteams which are in the body of the Earth, there are continually riſing ſome Vapours or little Particles of Water, which are disjoyn'd from each other by the heat, by reaſon of which they attain a greater celerity of Motion, and ſo paſs thro' the inner Pores of the Earth till they come near the ſuperficies of it. Which when they have approach'd to, they are beat back again by the cold, which environs the ſurface of the Earth, or at leaſt are ſo arreſted by the cold and condens'd by it, that they loſe the form of Vapours, and become perfect Water again. Which Water being now more groſs, than while it was a mere Vapour, cannot deſcend again thro' the ſame Pores thro' which it aſ-

cended before, becauſe theſe are not now capable of receiving it: And therefore it ſeeks out ſome wider paſſages near the ſurface of the Earth, by which means it moves in an oblique manner, and is ready to embrace any other Vapours which are arreſted in the ſame manner: Now when theſe are grown to a conſiderable body in the ſurface of a Mountain, or a Plain, and find a vent fit for them, there appears a proper Fountain, whoſe ſtreams are ſtill maintain'd by the ſame condenſation of Vapours, which when they are once come abroad, are in continual Motion, whereby Rivers are made, which are ſtill finding a paſſage thro' the declivity of the ſurface of the Earth, whereby they may return to the Ocean again. Now according to this account, that grand *Phænomenon* of the freſhneſs of Fountain-water, when the Water of the Sea is ſalt, whence it originally comes, is ſufficiently reſolv'd. For mere tranſcolation may by degrees take away that which the *Chymiſts* call the fixed Salt; and for the Volatile Salt of it (which being a more ſpiritous thing, is not removable by Diſtillation, and ſo neither can it be by Tranſcolation,) yet ſuch an evaporation as that mention'd, may ſerve to do it, becauſe it is evident that freſh Water will fall from the Clouds, which hath riſen from thoſe Vapours which have come out of the Sea: And beſides theſe Vapours or ſmall Particles of Water in their paſſage through the Earth (eſpecially when they come near the ſurface of it) do incorporate with other ſweet Vapours; as thoſe which come from Rain, and others, by which means they inſenſibly loſe their former acidity and ſharpneſs. But thoſe Fountains which do retain their former ſaltneſs, as there are many ſuch in the World, may very probably be ſuppos'd not to have come from thoſe Vapours condens'd, but to be a kind of breaking of a Vein, in which the Salt Water was convey'd up and down the body of the Earth. Now then, conſidering that maſs of Waters, and multitude of Vapours ariſing thence which are in the Earth, how eaſie is it for us to underſtand what the breaking open the Fountains of the Deep means in Scripture, and how by that means, together with the falling down of the Cataracts of the Clouds, and the letting looſe of the Ocean, the whole Earth might be overſpread with an univerſal Deluge? The poſſibility of which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

VII. The next thing we come to concerning the Flood, is, the capacity of the Ark for receiving the ſeveral Animals which were to propagate the World afterwards. Concerning which, two things are neceſſary to be underſtood; what the meaſure of the Ark was, and what the number of Animals contain'd in it. The meaſure of the Ark muſt be determin'd by the proportion of the Cubit, which there is no reaſon at all to ſuppoſe either with *Origen* and others, to have been the Geometrical Cubit, which contains ſix ordinary Cubits or nine Feet; both becauſe we find no mention at all of any ſuch Cubit in Scripture, and becauſe the Fabric of the Ark would have been of too vaſt a proportion. Neither yet is it probable, what Sir *W. Rawleigh* ſuppoſeth, that this Cubit muſt be of a proportion as much exceeding ours, as the ſtature of a Giant doth ours, both becauſe there is no certain evidence, either from Scripture or Reaſon, that the proportion Men then did generally exceed what is now. And beſides, this tends not in the leaſt to make the thing more plain; for according to that proportion, we muſt then have imagin'd Beaſts to have been as well as Men; for the Horſe muſt have been proportionably as great to have been ſerviceable to Men of that ſtature, and ſo the Animals would have taken up as much more room in the Ark

as

as the Cubit is ſuppos'd to be bigger. I ſuppoſe then that *Moſes* ſpeaks of the Cubit moſt in uſe in his own time (for he writ ſo that they for whoſe uſe he writ, might be eaſily able to underſtand him,) now this Cubit by the conſent of Writers contain'd a Foot and a half in length; according to which proportion, ſuppoſing the Ark by *Moſes*'s deſcription Gen. 6. 15. to have 300 Cubits in length, 50 in breadth, and 30 in height, the whole capacity of the Ark, according to the computation of *Joh. Buteo* comes to 450000 ſolid Cubits. For the length of 300 Cubits being multiply'd into the breadth of 50 Cubits, and the product by the height of 30 Cubits, makes the whole Concavity 450000. Which *Matheus Hoſtus* reducing to the *German* meaſure, makes the Longitude of the Ark to be 31 Perches, 4 Cubits, 5 Fingers; the Latitude 5 Perches, 2 Cubits and 11 Fingers; the Altitude 3 Perches 1 Cubit, 9 Fingers; allowing to every Perch 15 *Roman* feet. So that if we take a Perch to contain 10 *Hebrew* Cubits, which exceeds the former 11 Fingers, the whole capacity of the Ark will be 450 cubical Perches. And as he ſaith, *Hujuſmodi ſane ædificii amplitudo capaciſſima eſt, & quamlibet magno animantium numero haud dubie ſufficere potuit*; the Ark of ſo large a capacity might eaſily contain the ſeveral kinds of Animals in it. Which will be eaſily underſtood, if according to our former ſuppoſition, only the Animals of the inhabited part of the World were preſerv'd in the Ark; But admitting that all kinds of Animals were there, there would be room enough for them, and for Proviſion for them. For which Sir *W. Rawleigh* gives a prudent caution, that Men ought not to take Animals of a mixt Nature, as *Mules* and *Hyæna*'s, nor ſuch as differ in ſize and ſhape from each other, as the *Cat* of *Europe*, and *Ownce* of *India*, into the ſeveral ſpecies of Animals. Sir *W. Rawleigh* following *Buteo* reckons 89, or leſt any be omitted, 100 ſeveral kinds of Beaſts; and undertakes to demonſtrate from a triple proportion of all Beaſts, to the Ox, Wolf, and Sheep, that there was ſufficient capacity for them in the Ark. *Hoſtus* allows 150 ſeveral kinds of Animals, yet queſtions not the capacity of the Ark. But theſe things are ſo particularly made out by thoſe Learned Authors, eſpecially by *Buteo*, that I ſhall rather refer the Reader for farther ſatisfaction to the Authors themſelves, than take the pains to tranſcribe them.

Buteo de arca Noe. p. 93.

Hoſius de fabrica Arcæ Noah. th. 66.

I come now therefore to the evidence of the truth and certainty of VIII. this univerſal Deluge, of which we have moſt clear and concurring Teſtimonies of moſt ancient Nations of the World. For which purpoſe *Grotius* and others, have at large produc'd the Teſtimony of *Beroſus* the *Chaldean* out of *Joſephus*, concerning the Flood and the Ark, in which *Noah* was preſerv'd; of *Abydenus* out of *Cyril* and *Euſebius* concerning *Xiſuthrus*, or *Noah*'s ſending out of the Birds to ſee if the Flood were aſſwag'd; and of *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, concerning the preſervation of Animals in the Ark; of *Plutarch* concerning the ſending out of the Dove; of *Lucian de Dea Syria* concerning the whole ſtory, and ſo of *Molon* and *Nicolaus Damaſcenus*. Beſides, it is manifeſted by others, how among the *Chaldeans* the memory of *Noah* was preſerv'd under the Fable of *Oannes*, which had part of a Fiſh, and part of a Man, as is evident from the fragments of *Apollodorus*, *Abydenus*, and *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, preſerv'd in *Euſebius*'s Greek Chronica; among the *Chineſes*, under the name of *Puoncuus*, who by them is ſaid to have eſcap'd alone with his Family out of the univerſal Deluge, ſaith *Iſaac Voſſius*, who ſuppoſeth *Pu* or *Pi* to be only a prefix to the name, and ſo that *Puon-*

V. Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Verit. relig. Chriſt. Voſſ. Iſagog. Chron. diſſert. 4. c. 2. & 3. Bochar. Geogr. ſacr. l. 1. c. 4. Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 18. c. 12. & ibid. Lud. Viv. Euſeb. Chr. p. 5. ed. 2. Scaliger. Iſ. Voſſ. epiſt. ad Colvium, p. 409.

cius,

Martin. hiſt. Sinic. l. 1. p. 12. *cuus*, is the ſame with ὁ Νῶχος. *Martinius* tells us, *de diluvio multa eſt apud Sinicas Scriptores mentio*, that the ancient Writers of the *Sinic* Hiſtory ſpeak much of the Flood. *Johannes de Laet* tells out of *Leſcharbotus*, how conſtant the Tradition of the Flood is among the *Indians*, both in *New-France*, *Peru*, and other parts. This being therefore ſo fully atteſted by the evident and apparent conſent of ſo many Writers and Hiſtorians, which did not own the Authority of the Scriptures, I ſhall ſuppoſe this ſufficiently prov'd, and proceed to the main thing which concerns the Origin of Nations, which is, *The certainty of the propagation of Mankind from the Poſterity of* Noah. Of which there is this ſtrong and convincing evidence, that in all that account which the Scripture gives of the propagation of Nations from the Sons of *Noah*, there is ſome remainder in the Hiſtory of that Nation, to juſtifie the reaſon of the impoſition of the name from the names of the Nations themſelves, which have preſerv'd the original name of their Founder in their own; as the *Medes* from *Madai*; the *Thracians* from *Thiras*; the *Ionians* from *Javan*; the *Sidonians* from *Sidon*; the *Philiſtins* from *Poleſthim*; the *Arcæans*, *Arcadians*, *Elymæans*, *Aſſyrians*, *Lydians*, from *Arki*, *Arrad*, *Elam*, *Aſſur* and *Lud*, and many others produc'd by *Grotius*, *Montanus*, *Junius*, and eſpecially *Bochartus*, who with admirable Induſtry and Learning hath clear'd all this part of ſacred Hiſtory, which concerns the reaſon of the impoſition of the names of the People which were propagated from the Poſterity of *Noah*, and given a full and ſatisfactory account of the ſeveral places where the Poſterity of *Noah* ſeated themſelves after the Deluge. Inſtead of that therefore, I ſhall conſider the pretences which can be brought againſt it, which are chiefly theſe three. 1. That the *Chaldean* Empire ſeems to have greater Antiquity than can be attributed to it by the Hiſtory of *Moſes*. 2. That the moſt learned Heathen Nations pretend to be ſelf-originated, and that they came not from any other Country. 3. That no certain account is given from whence *America* ſhould be Peopled.

Joh. de Laet. de orig. gent. American. l. 1. p. 115.

Grot. Annot. ad l. 1. de Verit. *Ari. Montan. Phaleg.* *Junius in Gen. 10.* *Bochart. Geogr. ſacr. p. 1.*

IX. 1. The Hiſtory of the *Aſſyrian* Empire ſeems inconſiſtent with the propagation of the World from the Sons of *Noah*; for the Reign of *Ninus* and *Semiramis* is plac'd by many *Chronologers* within the firſt Century after the Flood, which ſeems a manifeſt inconſiſtency with the propagation of Mankind from the Sons of *Noah*; for it ſeems utterly impoſſible that the foundations of ſo great an Empire ſhould be laid in ſo ſmall a compaſs of time by the Poſterity of three Perſons: And beſides, *Ninus* and *Semiramis* were not the firſt who began the *Aſſyrian* Empire; for *Belus* not only reign'd fifty five Years before *Ninus*, but according to the *Chaldean* Antiquities from *Evechous*, who they ſay firſt reign'd among them, are reckon'd 495 Years. But admit that the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire be plac'd ſo low as *Petavius* and other Chronologers would have it, *viz.* in the Year after the Flood, 153, yet the difficulty is only ſomewhat abated, but not remov'd; for it ſeems yet unconceivable, that from three Perſons in 150 Years, ſuch multitudes ſhould ſpring, as to make ſo large an Empire as that of *Ninus*, and that within an hundred Years after the Flood there ſhould be ſuch vaſt multitudes for the building the Tower of *Babel*, and diſperſion up and down the World; ſo that according to the *Hebrew* computation in the compaſs of 300 Years, *viz.* about *Abraham*'s time, the World was ſo fully peopl'd, that we read of ſeveral Kings encountring one another: By which it is evident the World had been peopl'd ſome time before, or elſe there could not

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. c. 14. Tom. 2.

not have been ſuch potent Kings as ſome of them were at that time. This being the grand Difficulty, to it I anſwer theſe things.

1. There is no ſuch certainty of the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, as for the ſake of that, to queſtion the truth of the Propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*. I have already largely manifeſted the want of credibility in the Chronology of the ancient *Chaldeans*, and that we have no certain grounds to rely upon in reference to it. Eſpecially as to theſe ſeven firſt *Babylonian* Kings, which are cited out of *Africanus*, by *Euſebius*, and *Georgius Syncellus*, viz. *Evechous*, *Chomaſbolus*, *Porus*, *Nechubes*, *Abius*, *Oniballus*, *Chinzirus*, who are ſaid to reign 225 years two Months; and alike fabulous, I ſuppoſe, is the other *Dynaſty* of ſix *Arabian* Kings, whoſe Empire is ſaid to have ſtood 215 years to the time of *Belus*, who expell'd the *Arabians*, and took the power to himſelf: And it is much more agreeable to Reaſon to reject theſe two *Dynaſties*, which had no record of them left in any Hiſtory of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, but only in *Beroſus*, whoſe authority in this caſe hath been diſcuſs'd already; than to follow our late excellent Primate of *Armach*, who punctually ſets down the Reign of the Kings of theſe two *Dynaſties*, but cuts off at leaſt eight Ages in the time of the *Aſſyrian* Empire from *Ninus* to *Sardanapalus*, which times he confines to 496 years, and placeth *Ninus* in the 2737 year of the World, according to the *Hebrew* Computation, and ſo to live in the time of the *Judges*, and be contemporary with *Deborah*: Which he builds only on a place in *Herodotus*, which relates not to the time between *Ninias* and *Sardinapalus*, but to the time of the defection of the *Medes* from the *Aſſyrian* Empire, as *Iſaac Voſſius* hath already ſhew'd. We cannot then find any certainty in the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, which may give us cauſe to queſtion the Propagation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah*.

Uſſer. Ann. vet. Teſt. A. M. 2737.

Caſtigat. adv. Horn. c. 10.

Gen. 9. 1.

2. We have reaſon to think that there was a more than ordinary multiplication of the World from the Sons of *Noah* after the Flood. For as GOD had before puniſh'd the World by deſtroying Mankind in it by an extrordinary manner; ſo after the Flood, he doth in a particular manner bleſs *Noah* and his Sons, and ſaid unto them, *Be fruitful and multiply, and repleniſh the Earth*, which may well be thought to have then had an extraordinary effect. Several ways have been attempted by Learned Men to make appear, to what a vaſt number the Poſterity of *Noah* would increaſe in the ſpace of two or three hundred years after the Flood. *Petavius* ſuppoſeth that the Poſterity of *Noah* might beget Children at ſeventeen, and that each of *Noah*'s Sons might have eight Children in the eighth year after the Flood, and that every one of theſe eight might beget eight more; by this means in only one Family, as of *Japhet* in the year after the Flood 238, he makes a *Diagram* conſiſting of almoſt an innumerable company of Men. *Johannes Temporarius*, as our moſt Learned *Primate* tells us, takes this way, that all of the Poſterity of *Noah*, when they attain'd twenty years of Age, had every year twins, on which ſuppoſition by *Arithmetical* progreſſion he undertakes to make it appear, that in the 102 year after the Flood, there would be of Males and Females 1554420; but taking away the one half, becauſe of the groundleſs ſuppoſition of twins, yet then in that time there would be 388605 Males beſides Females. Others ſuppoſe that each of the Sons of *Noah* had ten Sons, and by that proportion, in few Generations it would amount to many thouſands within a Century. Others inſiſt on the parallel between the multiplication

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. *c.* 14.

Uſſ. Chron. ſacr. c. 5.

of the Children of *Iſrael* in *Ægypt*; that if from 72 Men in the ſpace of 215 years there are procreated 600000, how many will be born of three Men in the ſpace of an hundred years? ſome have ſaid above 23000, but with what ſucceſs in their *Arithmetic*, I ſhall not determin. But whether all or any of theſe ways be ſufficient, and ſatisfactory, we have yet cauſe to believe that there was a more than ordinary multiplication in the Poſterity of *Noah* after the Flood.

Horn. def. diſſert. de ætat. mundi, c. 26.

3. If we embrace the account of thoſe Copies, which the *Septuagint* follow'd in their Verſion, all this difficulty is then ceas'd. For that account doth very much enlarge the times, and makes almoſt a thouſand years between the Flood and *Abraham*, by which means there will be ſufficient ſpace given for the propagation of Mankind, the building the Tower of *Babel*, the diſperſion of Nations, the founding the *Aſſyrian* Empire, the plantation of *Ægypt*, *China*, and other places, all which ſeem to have been in that time, and to concur with that computation, as well as *Joſephus* doth, and the whole Primitive Church before *Hierom*, which certainly ought in no caſe to be diſregarded.

The whole controverſy concerning this part of the Chronology of the World comes at laſt to this; Whether it be more probable that the *Jews* who lived under the ſecond Temple (who then were the Truſtees to whom were committed *the Oracles of* GOD) whom the LXX. follow'd in their Verſion, had the true reading, or the *Talmudic Jews* after their diſperſion and baniſhment from their Countrey, when they were diſcarded by GOD himſelf from being his People, when he broke up houſe among them at the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem* and the Temple. But if the Reader deſire farther ſatisfaction concerning this difference of this Chronology of the LXX. from that of the preſent *Hebrew* Copies, he may conſult the learned diſſertation of the late learned Biſhop of *Cheſter* upon the LXX. and the later Diſcourſes of *Iſaac Voſſius* on this ſubject. Setting aſide then the controverſy between the preſent *Hebrew* Copies and the LXX. in point of integrity and incorruption, which I meddle not with, I cannot but ſubſcribe to the judgment of our judicious Hiſtorian, * Sir *W. Rawleigh*: *That if we look over all, and do not haſtily ſatisfy our Underſtanding with the firſt things offer'd, and thereby being ſatiated do ſlothfully and drowſily ſit down, we ſhall find it more agreeable rather to follow the reckoning of the LXX. who according to ſome Editions make it above* 1072 *years between the Flood and* Abraham's *Birth, than to take away any part of thoſe* 352 *years given. For if we adviſedly conſider the ſtate and countenance of the World, ſuch as it was in* Abraham's *time, yea before* Abraham *was born, we ſhall find that it were very ill done of us by following opinion without the guide of Reaſon, to pare the time over deeply between* Abraham *and the Flood; becauſe in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole ſtory might perchance bleed thereby, were not the teſtimony of the Scriptures ſupream, ſo as no objection can approach it; And that we did not follow withal this precept of St.* Auſtin, *that whereſoever any one place in the Scriptures may be conceiv'd diſagreeing to the whole, the ſame is by ignorance of miſ-interpretation underſtood. For in* Abraham's *time all the then known parts of the World were peopled: all Regions and Countries had their Kings.* Ægypt *had many magnificent Cities, and ſo had* Paleſtine *and all bordering Countries; yea all that part of the World beſides as far as* India: *and thoſe not built with ſticks, but of hewn ſtones, and defended with Walls and Rampiers, which magnificence needed a Parent of more antiquity than thoſe*

Walton: Proleg. ad Bibl. Polyg. c. 9. §. 58, 63, &c. Iſaac Voſſius de LXX. Interpr. & ætat. Mundi.

* Sir *Walt. Rawleigh Hiſt. p. 1. b. 2. c. 1. ſect. 7.*

other Men have ſuppos'd. And therefore where the Scriptures are plaineſt and beſt agreeing with Reaſon and Nature, to what end ſhould we labour to beget doubts and ſcruples, or draw all things into wonders and marvels? giving alſo ſtrength thereby to common cavillers, and to thoſe Mens apiſh brains, who only bend their Wits to find impoſſibilities and monſters in the Story of the World and Mankind. Thus far that excellent Hiſtorian, whoſe words deſerve conſideration. Thus much for the firſt Objection.

X. 2. The ſecond is, *From the great pretence of ſeveral Nations that they were ſelf-originated*, or came not from any other place. This was the pretence of the *Ægyptians*, *Græcians*, ancient Inhabitants of *Italy*, and others. But how little reaſon we have to give credit to theſe pretences, will appear on theſe accounts. 1. The Impoſſibility in Nature that Mankind ſhould be produc'd in ſuch a way as they imagin'd, which we have manifeſted already in our Diſcourſe of the Origin of the Univerſe. 2. That the Nations which pretended this, were never able to give ſufficient Evidence of it to any other Nation which demanded it; which is manifeſt by their want of any certain Records of their ancient times, which is fully prov'd in our Diſcourſe in the firſt Book of the want of credibility in the *Heathen* Hiſtory. 3. The only probable Reaſon which induc'd theſe Nations to make themſelves *Aborigines*, was, becauſe they ſuppos'd themſelves to be the firſt Inhabitants of the Countries they liv'd in: which altho' I may allow to the *Ægyptians*, and ſome other ancient Nations, yet I cannot do it to the *Hellens* or *Greeks*, who moſt vainly and arrogantly pretend to it. Which becauſe it may give more light into the greateſt Antiquities of *Greece*, and ſome other Nations than hath been yet diſcover'd or taken notice of, and becauſe it may farther tend to clear the truth of the Scriptures, as to the Origin of Nations, I ſhall more particularly inquire into the firſt Plantation of *Greece*. That it was firſt inhabited by ſome of *Noah*'s Poſterity, is out of queſtion with all thoſe who prefer the moſt ancient and undoubted Records of Scripture before the fabulous Impoſtures of Mens Brains. But by whoſe immediate Poſterity the Country of *Greece* was firſt inhabited, is not yet ſo clear as it hath been generally preſum'd to be, by moſt who had rather follow the dictates of others, than ſpend time in ſuch enquiries themſelves: Which yet certainly are ſo far from being unworthy Mens labour and induſtry, that nothing tends more clearly to advance the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, than the reconciling the Antiquities of the elder Nations to what we find deliver'd of the Plantation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah*. As to this particular therefore of the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, I ſhall firſt propound the opinion generally embraced among Learned Men, and then ſhew how far it is defective, and what other more true account may be given of it. It is evident from *Moſes*, Gen. 10. 5. that the Poſterity of *Japhet* took poſſeſſion of the Iſles of the *Gentiles*, i. e. according to the *Hebrew* Idiom, not only ſuch as are properly ſo call'd, but all thoſe Countries which lay much upon the Sea, being at any diſtance from *Palæſtine*, eſpecially ſuch as lay between the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean* Sea; and ſo both *Greece* and *Italy* come under the name of the *Iſles of the Gentiles*. Among the Sons of *Japhet* none is conceiv'd ſo probable to have firſt peopled *Greece*, as he whoſe name was preſerv'd among the Inhabitants of *Greece* with very little alteration. And ſo as the *Medes* from *Madai*, the *Aſſyrians* from *Aſſur*, the *Thracians* from *Thiras*, by the like Analogy the *Ionians* from

Javan.

Javan. From which it is obſervable, that altho' among the *Greeks* themſelves, the *Ionians* were but as one diviſion of that People which inhabited *Greece*, yet other Nations comprehended all under the name of *Ionians*. For which we have ſufficient evidence from *Heſychius*, and the Scholiaſt on *Ariſtophanes*. Οἱ βάρβαροι τὰς Ἕλλωτας Ἴωνας λέγουσιν, ſaith *Heſychius*; and more to this purpoſe the Scholiaſt ſpeaks. Πάντας τὰς Ἕλλωτας Ἰάονας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκάλουν. For Ἰάονες with the Inſertion of the *Æolic Digamma* (which is always done when two Vowels meet) is Ἰάϝονες i. e. *Javones*; and *Stephanus Byzantius* tells us, that from Ἰάων comes Ἰών, and ſo *Homer*,

Heſych. v. Ἴαννι. *Acharnen. Schol. in Ariſtoph.* *Stephanus de Urb.* v. Ἰών.

Hom. Il. v. Ἔνθα δ' Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Ἰάονες ἑλκεχίτωνες.

And *Dionyſius Periegetes* reckons up Ἰάων as one of the Rivers of *Arcadia*,

Dionyſ. v. 516. Ἔνθα μέλας ὄθι Κράθις ἵνα ῥέῃ ὑψόθεν Ἰάων.

And which much confirms this opinion, the *Hebrew* word for *Javan* before the points added by the *Maſorites*, *viz.* יון bears a perfect Analogy with the *Greek* Ἰών· and ארץ יון in Scripture is taken for *Greece*; and ſo *Dan.* 8. 21. *Alexander* is call'd מלך יון, which the LXX. render Βασιλεὺς ἑλλήνων· and *Joel* 3. 6. *You have ſold my Sons,* לבני היונים *to the Sons of Javan,* i. e. to the *Greeks*, as it is generally underſtood. But as *Javan* cannot be ſuppos'd to have come into theſe parts without his Family, ſo it is generally preſum'd that there are no obſcure foot-ſteps left of *Javan*'s eldeſt Son, *Eliſha*'s ſeating himſelf in *Greece*. For from him *Joſephus* derives the name Αἰωλεῖς, with whom the *Jeruſalem* Paraphraſt concurs. *Montanus* from thence derives the name *Elis*, from whence he ſuppoſeth the *Greeks* are call'd Ἕλλωνες. *Bochartus* finds the cleareſt remainders of *Eliſha* in *Elis*, the ſame with *Peloponneſus*, one part of which by *Homer* is call'd *Aliſium*; thence *Ezeck.* 27. 7. we read of the *purple and ſcarlet from the Iſles of* Eliſha, which makes it moſt probable to be that part of *Greece* which lay upon the *Ionian* Sea, where the beſt Purple next to the *Tyrian* was found, as the Learned *Bochartus* hath demonſtrated from ſeveral Authors. This is now the ſubſtance of the generally-receiv'd account concerning the plantation of *Greece* from the Poſterity of *Noah*. Which if it be taken as to that People which did at length poſſeſs *Greece*, I ſee no reaſon to diſapprove it; but if it be extended to the firſt plantation of *Greece*, I ſee as little to embrace it. That we may therefore judg more freely of the firſt Inhabitants of *Greece*, it is requiſite we take an account of it from thoſe who profeſs themſelves moſt vers'd in their own Antiquities, who may in a matter of this nature, which is atteſted by the common conſent of the moſt learned Antiquaries of *Greece*, be the more credited, in that what they thus deliver, may be ſuppos'd to come from an ancient and undoubted Tradition.

Ar. Mont. Phaleg. p. 24.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 3. cap. 10.

XI. It is evident therefore, from the judgment of the moſt learned and judicious, even of the *Greeks* themſelves, that *Greece* was firſt inhabited by a People by them call'd *Barbarous*, i. e. a People different from them in Language and Manners. So *Ephorus*, whom *Polybius* commends as the beſt Writer of the *Greek Antiquities*, ſaith that *Greece* was inhabited by a barbarous People before the *Hellens* came into it. And *Hecatæus Mileſius* cited by *Strabo* concerning *Peloponneſus*, ὅτι πρὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ᾠκησε

αὐτὴν

αὐτὼ βάρβαροι, which *Strabo* himself not only believes of *Peloponneſus*, but of all *Greece*, that it was καλοικία βαρβάρων τὸ πάλαιον, *anciently a Plantation of Barbarians*; the ſame is affirm'd by *Ariſtotle* writing of the Common-wealth of the *Tegeates* concerning *Arcadia*, that before its being poſſeſs'd by the *Arcadians*, it was inhabited by a barbarous People, who becauſe they were expulſed their Country before Moon-riſing, the *Arcadians* call'd themſelves προσέλληνοι. Whether that be the ground of that vain-glorious boaſt (of which many reaſons are given by learned Men) I here diſpute not; it is ſufficient that we find the *Grecians* were not the firſt who peopled any of theſe ſeveral places; which is likewiſe atteſted by *Herodotus*, *Thucydides*, and others, whoſe teſtimonies we ſhall afterwards produce. It being then evident that the *Grecians* were not the firſt who inhabited that Country after from them called *Greece*, it follows to be inquir'd what this barbarous People was, and from whence they came. *Strabo* hath given us in a large Catalogue of the names of many of them, as the *Dryopes*, *Caucones*, *Leleges*, beſides the *Aones*, *Tembices*, *Hyantes*, and many others; but theſe ſeem not to have been that ancient People, but rather ſome latter Caſtlings of the *Carians*, who, as *Thucydides* tells us, did very often make inroads upon the quarters of *Greece*. That People which had the largeſt ſpread, and greateſt Antiquity, was the *Pelaſgi*: thence *Peloponneſus* was anciently called Πελασγία. *Stephanus Byzantius* Πελοποννήσου τρεῖς ἐπωνυμίαι, Ἀπία Πελασγία and Ἀργος· and *Apollodorus* ſaith, that the *Peloponneſians* were anciently called *Pelaſgi*; and *Euripides*,

Strab. l. 7. V. Scholiaſt. in Appollon. l. 4. v. 262.

Πελασγιώτας ὠνομασμένους τὸ πρὶν
Δαναούς.

And elſewhere,

Πρῶτον Πελασγοὶ, Δαναΐδαι τὸ δεύτερον.

Theſe *Pelaſgi* were not only in *Peloponneſus*, but in *Attica* too, as appears by *Strabo*, where he ſaith the Nation of the *Pelaſgi* did inhabit, and by the *Athenians* (that is after their mixture) they were called πελαργοὶ, *Storks*, ἀπὸ τῆ πλάνω, for their frequent removals from place to place: And *Pauſanias* mentions their being under the *Acronoli* at *Athens*: that they were in *Theſſaly*, is evident from *Heſychius*. Πελασγοὶ οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ καὶ ἔνιον τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ γένος ἀπὸ Πελασγοῦ τοῦ Ἀρκάδος γεγονὸς πολυπλάνητον· *Arcadia* ſeems to have the firſt or chief place of their reſidence, for the *Arcadians* who were accounted παλαιότατα ἔθνη τῶν ἑλλήνων, do vindicate the Founder of this Nation, whom they call *Pelaſgus*, to themſelves, and ſay he was an αὐτόχθων among them, that is, the firſt who came into that Country; for all thoſe, whoſe Original they knew not, they called *Terræ filios*, and *Genuinos terræ*. *Pauſanias* rightly conjectures that he was the firſt Man among them, not as tho' he was alone, but becauſe the Chief Ruler and Commander among them, and that brought them into the Country; but tho' they might fix themſelves about *Arcadia*, it is evident they ſpread farther; for *Menecrates Eleates* in his Book of the Founders of Cities, affirms that all the Sea-coaſts of *Greece* called *Ionica*, beginning from *Mycale*, were firſt inhabited by the *Pelaſgi*; nay we find them yet much higher in *Epirus*, who were, as *Strabo* tells us, the firſt Founders of that famous Oracle of *Dodona*; for

Strabo, l. 9.

Pauſan. in Arcad.

Strab. l. 13.

Idem, l. 7.

ſo

ſo *Ephorus* in him ſaith it was Πελασγῶν ἴδρυμα, and that theſe were τὴν τῆς τ' ἑλλάδα ὁμωνύμους ἀρχαιοτάτους: Thence the Poet,

* Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε Πελασγικέ.

And *Heſiod*,

Δωδώνης φυλάσσε Πελασγῶν εὐρώεντα νέμος.

Strabo farther makes it evident, that they were a barbarous People which liv'd about *Dodona*, from the deſcription *Homer* gives of them,

Ἀμφὶ δ' Σελλοὶ
Σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται, ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεύναι.

Philoſtr. in Imag. Which *Philoſtratus* beſt interprets, when he ſaith they were αὐτοχθόνιοί τινες καὶ ὅτε καλλισκιασμένοι τὸν βίον, *ſuch that thought the Gods were beſt pleaſed with their ſimplicity and ſeverity of Life*, and therein far different from the *Grecian* humour. *Suidas* in *Theſſalicis* (cited likewiſe by *Strabo*) ſaith, that the Temple of *Dodona* was remov'd from *Scotuſa* in *Pelaſgia* to *Theſſala*, which is confirm'd by *Herodotus* in *Euterpe*, where he largely ſpeaks of the *Temple* and *Oracle* at *Dodona*. Theſe *Pelaſgi* confin'd not themſelves to *Greece* neither, but were diſpers'd into the neighbour Iſlands, as *Chios*, *Crete*, *Leſbos*, *Lemnos*, *Imbro*, *Samos*, as will appear afterwards; and at laſt came into *Italy*, as is well known, and are thought to be the ſame with the *Tyrrhenians*, and by ſome conceiv'd to be the firſt Founders of *Rome*. We ſee what a large ſpread the *Pelaſgi* had over *Greece*, which was divided after the *Hellens* began to appear, into τὸ πελασγικὸν and τὸ ἑλληνικὸν, as *Herodotus* witneſſeth; and ſo theſe two appear to be a very different People from one another, and not the ſame under different names, as is commonly thought.

XII. Which ſufficiently appears from their Language, which was quite different from one another. So *Herodotus*, Ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες, *they us'd a barbarous Language*; *i. e.* a Language not underſtood by the *Hellens*; who at firſt had their chief Reſidence in *Theſſaly*, from whence by degrees they came forwards into *Greece*, as *Thucydides* ſhews. For altho' the name of *Hellens* at laſt ſpread it ſelf over all the People of *Greece*, yet it was at firſt peculiar to that part of *Theſſaly* called *Pthiotis*, and thence *Homer* calls them properly *Hellens*, which followed *Achilles* from thence: And it appears by *Homer*, that there was a City there called Ἕλλας, which as *Stephanus de Urbibus* tells us, was there built by Ἕλλην, altho' he will not have him to be *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, but the Son of *Pthius*, wherein he is miſtaken: For *Thucydides* plainly ſhews, that it was from *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, that the name Ἕλληνες came, and this *Hellen* liv'd in *Pthiotis*. But altho' they were firſt in *Pthiotis*, yet they daily increaſing in numbers and power, by degrees they got all *Theſſaly* into their hands, of which one part was called Πελασγιῶτις; afterwards under *Dorus* the Son of *Hellen* they conquer'd *Heſtiæotis*, that part of *Theſſaly* which lies under the Mountains *Oſſa* and *Olympus*; from thence they were beaten back by the *Cadmeans* into *Pindus*, where the *Greeks* were firſt called Μακεδνοὶ, as *Herodotus* tells us; from hence they went into *Dryopis*, and thence into *Peloponneſus*, and there had the name *Dorians*: But before their coming hither, they

had first secured themselves of the *Hellens*, lying between *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*, and there they dispossest the *Pelasgi* in all the *Attic* Region; who were now forc'd to submit or to fly; they who submitted, as most of them did, were incorporated into the *Greeks*, and became one People with them, and so by degrees lost that former Language which was peculiar to themselves and wholly distinct from the *Greek* Tongue. That the *Hellens* did thus gradually come into *Peloponnesus*, is evident from the names of People and Places common to *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*; which came from hence, that tho' the *Greeks* left the Cities behind them, yet they carried most of the names along with them. Thus the *Achæi*, *Ionians*, and *Æolians*, and *Dorians* in *Peloponnesus* came from those of the same names in *Thessaly*; and so likewise the names of these following Regions and Cities were common to both, as *Ellopia*, *Estiæa*, *Eretria*, and *Oropos*, *Graia*, *Larissa*, *Psophis*, *Iton*, *Œchalia*, and very many others. *Salmasius* seems to be of opinion, that the *Pelasgi* never us'd any Language distinct from the *Hellens*; but besides that it is directly contrary to the Testimony of *Herodotus*, the Arguments he produceth for it are very weak. The first is, because the *Pelasgi* that went into *Italy*, did use the *Greek* Tongue, from their calling *Agylla Cære*, from χαῖρε, a word pronounc'd from one on the Walls: And because the *Arcades* us'd only the *Greek* Language in the *Æolian* Dialect, which *Evander* carried with him into *Italy*, and from which most of the old *Roman* Language was deriv'd. But doth not *Herodotus* expressly say, that after the mixture between the *Greeks* and *Pelasgi* these by degrees lost their own proper Language, and made use of the common *Greek* Tongue? Yet afterwards too, it is evident from *Herodotus* in some places, as at *Crotona*, they did use a Language different from the *Greek*. His other Argument is, *That the names of the eldest Persons mention'd were originally* Greek; but this is expressly deny'd by *Strabo*, who makes the contrary, one of his strongest Arguments, that the *Barbarians* did anciently inhabit *Greece*; and instanceth in *Cecrops*, *Codrus*, *Æolus*, *Cothus*, *Drymas*, *Crimanus*. Thus we have abundantly prov'd against the common opinion, that *Greece* was not first peopl'd by the *Hellens*, or the Posterity of *Elisa*, altho' these did afterwards come to the full possession of *Greece*. *Salmas. de Hellen. p. 315.*

XIII. It remains that we shew whence these *Pelasgi* came, and of whose Posterity they were, and what the Language was which was us'd by them. He that gave the name to this People according to the *Grecian* Fables, was one *Pelasgus*, which none will wonder at among them, whose constant custom it was, (partly by reason of their Ignorance of the true account of their Names, and partly by their Pride, that they might not seem ignorant of any thing) when they meet with any Names of People, to find out some Person near it who was the Founder of them. Thus *Attica* from *Actæus*, it being anciently called Ἀκτική, and *Cranae* from *Cranaus*, *Ægialea* from *Ægialeus*, *Mauritania* from *Maurus*, *Scythia* from one *Scythes*, *Galatæa* from *Galates*, and thus in multitudes of other Names. But from the name *Pelasgi*, we may probably find out the true Founder of the People, allowing that variation which is usually caus'd thro' the *Greeks* melting the harsher words of the *Eastern* Languages into a sound fit for their more delicate Palates; as is evident in the comparing the Names of the Prophets in *Hebrew*, with what they are in the *Greek* Version. Thus the *Pelasgi* may with great probability be deriv'd from פלג, *Phaleg*; for which we have the concurrent Testi-

Grot. not. in lib. 1. de jure bel. & c. 3. Sal. de Hellen.

mony of two Learned Perſons, *Grotius* and *Salmaſius*, who are contented to mention it, without bringing much evidence of Reaſon for it. What they only touch at, we ſhall endeavour to make out more at large; which we ſhall do by removing the great preſumptions againſt it, and laying down the probabilities for it. The great preſumptions lying againſt it are; for that the Iſles of the Nations fell to the Poſterity of *Jepheth*, and that *Phaleg* liv'd with *Eber* in *Chaldæa*. For the firſt, it muſt be acknowledg'd that the greateſt part of the Countries lying upon the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean*, were in the time when *Moſes* wrote ſo inhabited; not that the Habitations of the Sons of *Noah* had their bounds and limits ſet them either by GOD or *Noah*, but that the Poſterity of *Japhet* did chiefly addreſs themſelves to thoſe parts which lay towards *Europe*; but yet not ſo, as to exclude any of the Poſterity of *Sem*, if their neceſſities for farther room made it neceſſary for them to ſeek for Habitations farther abroad. For we can have no reaſon to think, that becauſe the chief of *Sem*'s Poſterity did live together, therefore none of them went farther off, which neceſſity would put them upon becauſe of their great increaſe; for we read of *Phaleg* and others, that beſides thoſe in direct Line to *Abraham*, (whoſe Genealogy it was *Moſes* his great deſign to recount) they begat many other Sons and Daughters, which would make it neceſſary for them, to ſeek their Habitations farther abroad. And that *Phaleg* and *Ragau* did ſo, we have the expreſs Teſtimony of *Epiphanius*, Φαλὲγ καὶ Ῥαγαῦ οἴτινες ἐπὶ τὸ τῆ Εὐρώπης κλίμα γλυδικότες πρὸς τῇ Σκυθίας μέρει καὶ τοῖς αὐτόθι ἔθνεσι προσκρίθησ, ἀπὸ τῆ τῦ Θήρας ἡλικίας καὶ ἐπέκεινα, ἐξ ὅπερ οἱ Θρᾷκες γεγόνασι. *That from the Age of* Therah *and thence forward*, Phaleg *and* Ragau *diverted towards the clime of* Europe, *to part of* Scythia, *and were joyn'd with thoſe Nations from which the* Thracians *aroſe*. Several things make this not ſo improbable as ſome have imagin'd it to be; for firſt, it is the conſtant acknowledgment of all ſober Inquirers into the Original of the *Greeks*, that *Greece* was firſt peopled from *Scythia*; and indeed almoſt all the Nations in *Europe* have come out of that Country: Beſides, there is evidence of it, even in the Grecian Fables; for *Prometheus* (from whom the *Greeks* deriv'd themſelves) is fancy'd by them to lie bound in Mount *Caucaſus*, which muſt be ſuppos'd to be the Country from whence he came. Again, it is evident already that the *Hellens* came not into *Greece* before it was peopled by the *Peleſgi*, and that theſe had different Language and Cuſtoms from one another; now then in all probability, altho' the Poſterity of *Eliſa* might come firſt down from *Scythia* into thoſe parts, and ſeat themſelves in *Macedonia* and *Theſſaly*, where they had in probability more than room enough at firſt, and a Country to their deſire; they might be willing to permit the Poſterity of *Phaleg* to paſs on farther; for in thoſe firſt Plantations we cannot otherwiſe conceive, but that the laſt comers muſt be the fartheſt goers; unleſs they had ſtrength enough to drive the former Inhabitants out of their Seats whereof they were already poſſeſs'd, as the *Scythians* did afterwards, and ſo the *Hellens*: So then the Poſterity of *Phaleg* being forced to quit their own Country, becauſe of the multitude of Inhabitants, muſt be ſuppoſed to take that courſe, where in probability they might find an empty Seat fit for them to dwell in; thence they come towards *Europe*; for they ſaw how the Poſterity of *Sem* did ſpread it ſelf Eaſtwards already, and *Cham* Southwards, and coming to part of that vaſt Country of *Scythia*, which was both already taken up, and not ſo convenient an Habitation for

Gen. 11. 19, 21.

Epiph. de Scythis l. ep. ad Acu. & Paulum.

them

them, they draw downwards towards *Thracia*; and there the Poſterity of *Thiras*, from whom the *Thracians* came, had already poſſeſſed themſelves: Paſſing farther into *Theſſaly*, they find that already planted by ſome of the Poſterity of *Eliſa*, but as yet but ſcant and thin of Inhabitants; therefore they diſperſe themſelves up and down through ſome part of *Epirus*, moſt part of *Ellas*, and ſome paſs into *Peloponneſus*, where they fix themſelves chiefly upon *Arcadia*, and thence ſpread up and down by degrees towards the Sea-ſide; for we cannot but think that the Maritime parts were the laſt peopled, partly for fear of another Deluge, partly for want of conveniency of Navigation, moſt of their Travels being by Land; and partly when Navigation grew more in uſe for fear of Pirates, who drove a great Trade upon the Coaſts of *Greece* in elder times, as is moſt evident from *Thucydides* in the beginning of his Hiſtory. Thus we have a reaſonable account given of the *Pelaſgi* their firſt coming into *Greece*, and how by degrees the *Hellens* came to poſſeſs their Country, and what a fair pretence the *Arcadians* had to boaſt of the greateſt Antiquity, their Country being probably firſt peopled by the *Pelaſgi* of any part of the whole *Cherſoneſe*, and the Seat of the Leader of the whole Company whom they call *Pelaſgus*, and the Scriptures *Phaleg*.

XIV. Having thus far clear'd the Antiquities of *Greece* as to the firſt Planters of it, whom we have evidenc'd to have been the *Pelaſgi*, and theſe deriv'd from *Peleg*, it will be no great difficulty to reſolve what Language they brought along with them, which muſt be ſuppos'd to be the ſame with that us'd in the Family from whence *Peleg* or *Phaleg* came, as to the ſubſtance of it, altho' it might admit as great variation of Dialect from it as the *Chaldee* or *Syriac* doth. But this I will not only ſuppoſe, but offer theſe probabilities for the proof of it: The firſt is, the agreement of the ancient *Greek* Language with the *Hebrew* in many of its primitive words; and here we have a moſt rational and probable account given of it; which is, the *Greeks* mixing with the *Pelaſgi*, and both coming to be one People, they muſt needs retain many of the old words us'd by the *Pelaſgi* in their *Greek* Language; which are evidently of an Eaſtern Extraction, the ground of which cannot with ſuch probability be fetch'd from *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians*, becauſe it is not ſo eaſy admiſſion of a foreign Language after the perfection of their own, unleſs by long tract of Time, or great numbers over-running the former People, neither of which can be ſo truly affirm'd of *Cadmus* and his Company; for they were ſoon driven out of *Greece*, he himſelf ending his days in *Illyricum*; neither was their Spread ſo large as that of the *Pelaſgi*, who were before poſſeſſors of the Country; and it is continually ſeen, how impoſſible it is for any Conquerors, as the *Greeks* were, to bring their own Language ſo into a place, where ſome of the former People are ſuffered to live, and not to retain many of their old words among them, and ſo make the Language mixt of both, as it is in all Nations conquer'd by the *Romans*; the *Roman* not being purely ſpoken by any, but corrupted with a mixture of the former Language in uſe among them. The ſecond Argument is, from the different Pronunciation and Dialects in uſe in the *Greek* Language; of which no account ſo likely can be given, as the mixture with different Languages. This is moſt evident in the *Doric* Dialect; for the *Dorians* inhabiting probably where moſt of the *Pelaſgi* had been, their Pronunciation and Dialect comes the neareſt to the Eaſtern of any of the *Greeks:* For in the *Doric* Dialect

the Πλατειασμὸς or *broad pronunciation*, is moſt taken notice of: So he in *Theocritus* upbraids the *Dorians*, ὅτι πλατειάσδυσιν ἄπαντα, they ſpeak every thing *very broad*; which anſwers to the pronunciation of the Eaſtern Languages; beſides, the *Doric* Dialect delights much in adding *a* to the end of words, which beſides that it is the Cuſtom of Eaſtern Tongues, eſpecially the *Syriac*, it doth much widen the Pronunciation. The third Argument is from the remainders of the Eaſtern Tongues in thoſe places, eſpecially where the *Pelaſgi* had been. The *Pelaſgi* are much taken notice of for their frequent removes and travelling from one place to another; which I ſuppoſe was chiefly after the *Hellens* had conquer'd the Country where they dwelt, then they were forc'd to go ſeek better Habitations abroad: Thence *Strabo* calls the Nations of the *Pelaſgi* πολύπλανον καὶ ταχὺ τὸ ἔθνος πρὸς ἐπανασάσεις· And elſewhere, that they were πολλαχοῦ τῆ Εὐρώπης τὸ παλαιὸν πλανώμενοι, they went up and down to a great part of *Europe*: But we may ſuppoſe them to have made their firſt and chief reſort to the neighbour Iſlands to *Greece*; where we ſhall ſee what evidence they left of their Language there. The firſt Iſland we meet with them in, is *Crete*: So *Strabo* ſpeaking of them, Καὶ γὰρ τὴν Κρήτης ἔποικοι γεγόνασιν, ὡς φησὶν Ὅμηρος; that a Colony of them liv'd in *Crete*, for which he voucheth *Homer*'s Authority:

Strabo. l. 5.

Id. lib. 12.

Id. lib. 5.

Hom. Odyſſ. τ. 175.

Ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμιγμένη, ἐν μὲν Ἀχαιοί,
Ἔν δ' Ἐτεόκρητες μεγαλήτορες, ἐν δὲ Κυδῶνες,
Δωριέες τε τριχάϊκες, δῖοί τε Πελασγοί.

It is evident then that the *Pelaſgi* were in *Crete*. Now moſt of the *Cretan* words are of an Eaſtern extraction, if we believe the Learned *Bochartus*, who hath promis'd a Diſcourſe on that ſubject: Beſides *Crete*, we find the *Pelaſgi* in *Chios*, καὶ Χῖοι δὲ οἰκισθὰς ἐαυτῶν Πελασγοὺς φασι τοὺς ἐκ Θετταλίας, ſaith *Strabo*, the Inhabitants of *Chios* ſay, that the *Pelaſgi* of *Theſſaly* were their firſt Inhabitants; and here the forenamed Learned Perſon hath deriv'd the name *Chios*, the Mountain *Pelinæus*, and the Wine *Arviſium*, all from the Eaſtern Languages. The next we find them in, is *Leſbos*, καὶ γὰρ τὴν Λεσβὸν Πελασγίαν εἰρήκασι, which from them was called *Pelaſgia*, ſaith *Strabo*, whoſe name is likewiſe fetched out of the Eaſt. By *Bochartus* farther, we find them in *Lemnos* and *Imbros*: So *Anticlides* in *Strabo*, περὶ τῶν Πελασγῶν τὰ περὶ Λῆμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον κτίσαι; concerning whoſe names, ſee *Bochartus* 82. I know that Learned Author makes the *Phœnicians* the Authors of all theſe Names, from no other ground generally, but becauſe they are of an Eaſtern derivation; but according to what we have laid down, we may yield to the thing it ſelf, and upon clearer grounds; for of ſome of theſe Iſlands he ingenuouſly confeſſeth he can find no evidence of the *Phœnicians* being in them. *Phœnices in his Inſulis habitaſſe nuſquam legimus*: But we find it very plain, that in thoſe very Iſlands the *Pelaſgi* inhabited; and whether account then be more probable, let the Reader judge. One thing more I ſhall inſiſt on, which is the Original of the *Samothracian Myſteries*: That theſe were as to their Names from the Eaſtern Languages, is now acknowledg'd by all Learned Men, the *Cabiri* being ſo evidently deriv'd from כביר, which ſignifies *ſtrength* and *power*, i. e. the *Dii potes*; ſo *Cabiri* is explain'd by *Varro* and *Tertullian*, and the particular Names of the ſeveral *Cabiri*, mention'd by the Scholiaſt on *Apollonius*, Ἀξιερὸς, Ἀξιόκερσα, Ἀξιόκερσος, and Κάδμιλος are very handſomly explain'd by

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. c. 15.

Strabo l. 1. c. 9.

Bochart. Geor. p. 2. l. 1. c. 12.

Id. lib. 1. c. 9.

Tertull. de ſpect. c. 8.

Bochart. ibid. l. 1. c. 12.

that

that Learned and Excellent *Bochartus* from the Eaſtern Languages; only he will needs have them deriv'd from the *Phœnicians*, whereas *Herodotus* expreſly tells us that they were from the *Pelaſgi*, whoſe words are theſe; ὅσις ὃ τὰ Καβείρων ἕρτια μεμύηϰε τὰ Σαμοθρήϊϰες ἐπιτελέουσι λαβόντες παρὰ Πελασγῶν· And again, τὸ γὰρ Σαμοθρηϊϰίων οἴϰεον πρότερον Πελασγοὶ ἔτοί τοι συνῴϰησαν τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι σὺν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἐγίνοντο, ϰὴ παρὰ τούτων Σαμοθρήϊϰες τὰ ἕρτια παρελάμβανον. *Herod. l. 2.* We ſee evidently by this, that the *Samothracians* deriv'd their Myſteries from the *Pelaſgi*; and without all queſtion they had their names from thence, whence they deriv'd their Myſteries: And to this purpoſe it is farther obſervable, that as the old *Hetrurians* were certainly a Colony of the *Pelaſgi*, upon their removal out of *Greece*; ſo *Voſſius* obſerves that the old *Hetruſcan* language *(fere a Syris habet cuncta ſacrorum nomina)* hath almoſt all the ſacred Appellations from the Eaſtern tongues. For which purpoſe it is farther obſervable, which *Grotius* takes notice of, that the *jus pontificum Romanorum* was taken a great part from the *Hetruſci*, and the *Hetrurians* had it *ab Hebræis* out of the Eaſtern parts. *Voſſius de Idol. l. 2. c. 57. Grot. Annot. in Mat. 12. 1.*

XV. By all which I cannot conceive but this opinion, notwithſtanding its novelty, is advanc'd to as high a degree of probability, as any that ſtands on the like foundations; and not only ſo, but it is an excellent clue to direct us to the Labyrinth of Antiquities, and give us a fair account whence the *Eaſtern* Tongues came to be ſo much us'd among both the ancient *Greeks* and *Hetrurians*. One thing more this will help us to underſtand far better than any *ſalvo* hath been yet us'd for it; which is the affinity ſpoken of by *Arius* King of *Lacedæmon* in his Letters to *Onias*, between the *Jews* and *Lacedæmonians:* εὑρέθη ἐν γραφῇ περί τε τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν ϰὴ Ἰουδαίων ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀδελφοὶ, ϰὴ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐϰ γένους Ἀβραάμ· which is explain'd by *Joſephus* thus: ἐντυχόντες γραφῇ τινι, εὕρομεν ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶεν γένους Ἰουδαῖοι ϰὴ Λαϰεδαιμόνιοι ἐϰ τοῦ περὶς Ἀβραάμ εἰϰειότητα· *They had found in a book that the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians *were of the ſame ſtock, from their mutual relation to* Abraham. *1 Maccab. 12. 21. Joſeph. Antiq. l. 13. c. 9.* *Voſſius* thinks the original of this was from thoſe of the poſterity of *Anak*, who came into *Greece*, and Peopled *Sparta*, and would ſeem to have been of the poſterity of *Abraham*; or that they were partly of the Poſterity of *Abraham* by *Agar* or *Ceturah*, and partly of the *Canaanites*, driven out by *Joſhua:* But how unlikely a thing is it (ſuppoſing *Sparta* Peopled by the *Canaanites*, which yet is not evident) that they ſhould give out themſelves to be of that ſtock which they had been expell'd their Country by? And for the true poſterity of *Abraham* coming thither, as we have no ground for it but the bare aſſertion, ſo we have this ſtrong evidence againſt it, that all that came from *Abraham* were Circumcis'd, as the *Iſhmaelites*, *Hagarens*, &c. which we never read of among the *Lacedæmonians*. *H. Grotius* differs not much from the opinion of *Voſſius* concerning the ground of this kindred between the *Jews* and *Spartans:* For in his Notes on that place in the *Maccabees*, where it is ſpoken of, he gives this account of it. The *Dorians*, of whom the *Spartans* were a part, came from the *Pelaſgi*; the language of the *Pelaſgi* was different from that of the *Greeks*, as appears by *Herodotus* in his *Clio:* ἦϚ οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶτταν ἔνιεσι. Now the *Pelaſgi* (ſaith he) are פלגי *diſperſi*, a *ſcatter'd Nation*; thence he ſuppoſeth theſe *Pelaſgi* or baniſh'd People, to have come from the Confines of *Arabia* and *Syria*, in which the poſterity of *Abraham* and *Ceturah* had plac'd themſelves. *Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.* But, 1. it is uncertain whether the poſterity of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* were plac'd ſo near *Canaan* or no. I know *Junius*

endeavours to find the ſeat of all the Sons of *Ceturah* in *Arabia*; but *Mercer* gives ſeveral not improbable reaſons why he conceives them plac'd not in the Eaſt of *Canaan*, but in the Eaſtern parts of the World. 2. We have no evidence at all of any remove of theſe Sons of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* out of the parts of *Arabia*, ſuppoſing them plac'd there; nor any reaſon why they ſhould be baniſh'd thence. 3. That which was the badg of *Abraham*'s poſterity, was never that we read of in uſe among the *Spartans*, which was Circumciſion. Indeed in much later Ages than this we ſpeak of, we read of a People among the *Thracians* who were circumcis'd, whom the *Greeks* themſelves judg'd to be *Jews*. So *Ariſtophanes* brings the *Odomantes* in. Τὶς ἦ Ὀδομάντων τὸ πρόσωπον ἀπολέθραξεν ἂν· ἀπολέθραξεν (ſaith the Scholiaſt) i. e. ἀνέτιλλον, ἐλεαίνουσιν ἢ ἀπελίλλουσιν οἱ Θρᾷκες τὰ αἰδοῖα ἢ ἀποσεσυρμένα εἶχον αὐτά. Whereby it is plain that Circumciſion was in uſe among the *Thracians*; for theſe *Odomantes* were (ſaith the Scholiaſt) a People of *Thrace*. Φασὶ δὲ αὐτὲς Ἰουδαίους εἶναι. It ſeems it was a Tradition among them that they were *Jews*. If ſo, it ſeems moſt probable that they were ſome of the ten Tribes, who were plac'd about *Colchis*, and the adjacent places: For *Herodotus* in *Euterpe* ſaith, that the *Syrians* that liv'd about the Rivers *Thermodoon* and *Parthenius*, learn'd Circumciſion from the *Colchi*, of whom he ſaith, Μοῦνοι πάντων Κόλχοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες περιτέμνουσι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὰ αἰδοῖα. *Only the* Colchi, *and* Ægyptians, *and* Ethiopians *had originally the cuſtom of Circumciſion.* Or elſe the *Odomantes* might be ſome of the diſpers'd *Jews* in *Armenia*, where *Strabo* mentions a Region call'd *Odomantis*, and ſo they retain'd the name of the place from whence they came, after their removal into *Thrace*. But whatever theſe *Odomantes* were, they were far enough from the *Spartans*, who never were thus ſuſpected of *Judaiſm*, nor laught at for Circumciſion. So that this opinion of *Grotius* on that account ſeems not very probable. *Bochartus*, who hath been ſo happy in many other Conjectures, yet here gives out, unleſs it may depend upon the Teſtimony of *Claudius Iolaus* in *Stephanus Bizantius*, who fabulouſly derives the *Jews* from one *Judæus Sparton*, who went from *Thebes* along with *Bacchus* into the Wars; which *Sparton* they might confound with another *Sparton*, the Son of *Phonoreus*, the Founder of *Sparta*; which yet is rejected as a Fable by *Pauſanias* in *Laconicis*. Surely the *Lacedæmonians* were very ambitious of Kindred with the *Jews*, that would claim it upon ſuch grounds as theſe, eſpecially at ſuch a time when the People of the *Jews* were under diſtreſs, and their Kindred might be like to coſt them ſo dear; and if they had never ſuch a mind to have claim'd Kindred with the *Jews*, they would certainly have done it upon a more plauſible Teſtimony than the Fable of one *Claudius Iolaus*, that had neither Senſe nor Reaſon in it; and yet ſuppoſing his Fable true, it had been nothing to the purpoſe, without the linking another Fable to it, which was ſo groſs, that even the *Greeks* themſelves were aſham'd of it, who were always the moſt daring Forgers of Fables in the World. But let us ſee farther what the Divine (as ſome have lov'd to call him) *Joſ. Scaliger* ſaith to it: All that he ſaith, is only a wonder or two at it: *Quid magis mirum quam Lacedæmonios ab Abraham prognatos eſſe*, &c. and a refutation of an abſurd opinion, that *Œbalus* the Father of *Tyndareus*, and Grandfather of *Caſtor*, *Pollux*, and *Helena*, was the ſame with *Ebal*, mention'd *Gen.* 10. 28. which there can be no reaſon for, ſince *Ebal* was the Son of *Joktan*, and ſo of another Race from *Abraham*; and *Joktan*'s Sons were plac'd Eaſtward,

Ariſtoph. Achar nen. Act. 1. *ſc.* 4.

Strabo l. 11.

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. *c.* 22.

Scalig. Canon. Iſag. p. 332.

but chiefly *Œbalus* was within an hundred years before the deſtruction of *Troy*; but *Phaleg* Unkle to *Ebal*, died 664 years before *Œbalus* in *A. M.* 1993. Thus far then we cannot find any plauſible account of this claim of Kindred: but tho' it be an endleſs taſk to make good all the claims of Kindred in the World, eſpecially to Perſons of Power and Authority, yet there being no viſible intereſt or deſign which the *Spartans* could have in ſuch a claim, eſpecially at that time with a Nation generally hated and maligned by Heathen Idolaters, we cannot ſuppoſe but there muſt be ſome at leaſt plauſible ground for ſuch a perſuaſion among them. What if we ſhould conjecture that the *Spartans* might find in the *Greek* Verſion of the *Pentateuch*, which was much ſpread abroad at that time among the Sons of *Iſhmael*, one whoſe name makes the neareſt approach to their *Cadmus*, from whom they ſuppoſe themſelves deriv'd; for the youngeſt of *Iſhmael*'s Sons was call'd *Kedemah*, Gen. 25. 15. which the *Syriac* renders *Kedem*, the very name of *Cadmus* in the Eaſtern Tongues. But this being a light conjecture, I paſs it by, and return to the ſubject of our diſcourſe, which gives a plauſible account of the ground of this Kindred. We have already ſhew'd that the *Pelaſgi* were the firſt who Peopled *Greece*, (ἀρχὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πᾶσ ἐπῴκησαν, is *Strabo*'s expreſſion of that Nation, that it ſpread over all *Greece*) and withal it appears that the chief Seat of the *Pelaſgi* was in *Arcadia*, to which next adjoyns *Laconia*; and therefore in all probability was Peopled by them; and beſides, the *Dorians* ſprang from the *Pelaſgi*, and the *Spartans* were a part of the *Dorians*, as appears already out of *Grotius*; ſo that what Kindred the *Pelaſgi* had, was deriv'd down to the *Spartans*; and we have manifeſted that theſe *Pelaſgi* were from *Phaleg*, and the Scripture tells us that *Phaleg* was the Son of *Eber*, from whom *Abraham* came in a direct and lineal ſucceſſion. And thus the *Jews* coming from *Abraham* and the *Spartans* by the *Pelaſgi* from *Phaleg*, they both came out of the ſame ſtock: For ſo *Joſephus* expreſſeth it, not that the *Lacedæmonians* came from *Abraham*, but that the *Jews* and they were both ἐξ ἑνὸς γένους, *out of the ſame ſtock, and both had relation to* Abraham; the *Jews* as coming in a direct line, the *Spartans* as deriving from *Phaleg*, from whom *Abraham* came. And thus much may now ſuffice to clear the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, and to ſhew how conſonant it is to ſacred Scripture; which I have taken the more pains in, becauſe of the ſerviceableneſs of this diſcourſe to that end, and to ſhew what uſe may be made of this kind of Learning, for vindicating the honor of the Sacred Scriptures. Gen. 11. 17, 28.

The only thing remaining as to the origin of Nations, is the Peopling of that vaſt Continent of *America*, which I cannot think we have yet ſufficient information, either concerning the paſſages thither, eſpecially Eaſt and North, or concerning any Records the *Indians* have among themſelves abſolutely to determin any thing in it. It ſeems moſt probable that the ſeveral parts of it were Peopled at ſeveral times, and from ſeveral parts, eſpecially North and Eaſt; but to go about abſolutely to determin from what Nation, in what Age, by what means they were firſt Peopled, were a piece of as great confidence as ignorance, till we have more certain diſcoveries of it. I chuſe therefore rather to refer the Reader to the bandyings of this Controverſy in the many Writers about it, than to undertake any thing as to the deciſion of it. Only in the general it appears from the remaining Tradition of the Flood, and many Rites and Cuſtoms us'd among them, that they had the ſame original

V. Grot. Joh. de Laet. Horn. de Orig. Gent. American.

V. Manaſſe Ben. Iſrael. ſpes Iſrael. Et Spizzel. de Iſrael. American.

original with us, and that there can be no Argument brought againſt it from themſelves, ſince ſome Authors tell us that the eldeſt Accounts and Memoirs they have, do not exceed 800 years backward; and therefore their Teſtimony can be of no validity in a matter of ſo great Antiquity, as the origin of Nations is.

CHAP. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

I. *That there were ſome remainders of the ancient Hiſtory of the World preſerv'd in the ſeveral Nations after the diſperſion.* II. *How it came to be corrupted: by decay of Knowledg, increaſe of Idolatry, confuſion of Languages.* III. *An inquiry into the cauſe of that. Difficulties againſt the common opinion that languages were confounded at* Babel. IV. *Thoſe difficulties clear'd.* V. *Of the fabulouſneſs of Poets. The particular ways whereby the Heathen Mythology aroſe. Attributing the general Hiſtory of the World to their own Nation. The corruption of* Hebraiſms. *Alteration of names. Ambiguity of Senſe in the Oriental languages.* VI. *Attributing the actions of many to one perſon, as in* Jupiter, Bacchus, *&c.* VII. *The remainders of Scripture-hiſtory among the Heathens. The names of* God, Chaos, *formation of Man among the* Phœnicians. *Of* Adam *among the* Germans, Ægyptians, Cilicians. Adam *under* Saturn. Cain *among the* Phœnicians. Tubal-Cain *and* Jubal *under* Vulcan *and* Apollo. Naamah *under* Minerva. VIII. Noah *under* Saturn, Janus, Prometheus *and* Bacchus. IX. Noah's *three Sons under* Jupiter, Neptune *and* Pluto. Canaan *under* Mercury, Nimrod *under* Bacchus, Magog *under* Prometheus. *Of* Abraham *and* Iſaac *among the* Phœnicians. X. Jacob's *ſervice under* Apollo's. *The* βαιτύλια *from* Bethel. Joſeph *under* Apis. Moſes *under* Bacchus. Joſhua *under* Hercules. Balaam *under the old* Silenus.

I. THE main particulars contain'd in the Scriptures concerning the Hiſtory of ancient Times being thus far clear'd, there remains only that Evidence which there is of the truth of the Hiſtorical part of thoſe eldeſt times, in thoſe foot-ſteps of it which are contain'd in the Heathen Mythology. For we cannot conceive, that ſince we have manifeſted that all Mankind did come from the Poſterity of *Noah*, that all thoſe paſſages which concern'd the Hiſtory of the World, ſhould be preſently obliterated and extinguiſhed among them, but ſome kind of

Tradition

Tradition would be preſerv'd, altho' by degrees it would be ſo much alter'd for want of certain Records to preſerve it in, that it would be a hard matter to diſcover its original, without an exact comparing it with the true Hiſtory it ſelf from whence it was firſt taken. For it far'd with this Tradition of the firſt Ages of the World, as with a Perſon who hath a long time travell'd in foreign Parts, who by the variety of Climes and Countries may be ſo far alter'd from what he was, that his own Relations may not know him upon his return, but only by ſome certain Marks which he hath in his Body, by which they are aſſur'd, that however his Complexion and Viſage may be alter'd, yet the Perſon is the ſame ſtill. Thus it was in this original Tradition of the World; thro' its continual paſſing from one Age to another, and the various humours, tempers, and deſigns of Men, it receiv'd ſtrange diſguiſes and alterations, as to its outward favour and complexion; but yet there are ſome ſuch certain Marks remaining on it, by which we find out its true original. Two things then will be the main ſubject of our inquiry here. 1. *By what means the original Tradition came to be alter'd and corrupted.* 2. *By what marks we may diſcern its true original,* or what Evidences we have of the remainders of Scripture-hiſtory in the Heathen Mythology.

II. 1. Concerning the means whereby the Tradition by degrees came to be corrupted. There may be ſome more general, and others more particular. The general cauſes of it were,

1. The gradual decay of Knowledg and increaſe of Barbariſm in the World, occaſion'd by the want of certain Records to preſerve the ancient Hiſtory of the World in: Which we at large diſcours'd of in our entrance on this ſubject. Now in the decay of Knowledg, there muſt needs follow a ſudden and ſtrange alteration of the Memory of former times, which hath then nothing to preſerve it, but the moſt uncertain report of Fame, which alters and diſguiſeth things according to the Humours, and Inclinations, and Judgments of thoſe whoſe hands it paſſeth thro'. *Book* 1. c. 1. *ſect.* 16.

2. The gradual increaſe of Idolatry in the World: Which began ſoon after the diſperſion of Nations, and in whoſe Age, we cannot at ſo great a diſtance, and in ſo great obſcurity, preciſely determine; but as ſoon as Idolatry came in, all the ancient Tradition was made ſubſervient in order to that end; and thoſe Perſons whoſe Memories were preſerv'd in ſeveral Nations, by degrees came to be worſhipped under diverſities of Names; and ſuch things were annexed to the former Traditions as would tend moſt to advance the greateſt Superſtition in the World.

3. The Confuſion of Languages at *Babel,* was one great reaſon of corrupting the ancient Tradition of the World. For in ſo great variety (as ſuddenly happen'd) of Languages in the World, it cannot be conceiv'd but ſuch things which might be preſerv'd in ſome uniform manner, had all Nations us'd the ſame Language, would through the diverſity of Idioms and Properties of ſeveral Tongues be ſtrangely alter'd and diſguis'd, as will appear afterwards. This alteration of Languages in the World upon the confuſion of Tongues at *Babel,* brought as great a confuſion into the original Tradition, as it did among thoſe who were the deſigners of that work.

III. And becauſe this ſubject of the original and cauſe of this diverſity of Languages among Men, doth both tend to explain the preſent ſubject,

and to clear the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, I ſhall a little farther inquire into it. Chiefly on this account, becauſe it is pretended that ſuch a confuſion is needleſs which is deliver'd in Scripture, for the producing ſuch diverſities of Languages, which would ariſe thro' mere length of time, and the varieties of Climes and Cuſtoms in the World. But if we only ſpeak concerning the ſenſe of *Moſes* about it, the inquiry is of greater difficulty than at firſt view it ſeems to be. For it is pretended, that *Moſes* no where ſpeaks of a diverſity of Languages, as we underſtand it, but only of a confuſion of their Speech who were at *Babel*, which might well be, altho' they all us'd the ſame Language; that is, there might be a confuſion rais'd in their Minds, that they could not underſtand one another; their Notions of things being diſturb'd, ſo that tho' they heard one word, they had different apprehenſions of it; ſome thinking it ſignify'd one thing, and ſome another. As *Julius Scaliger* tells us, that the *Jews* he had convers'd with, did not underſtand by it a multiplication of Tongues; but only by that confuſion their former Notions of things, by the ſame words, were alter'd. As if one call'd for אבן a Stone, one by that word underſtands Lime, another Water, another Sand, *&c.* this muſt needs produce a ſtrange confuſion among them, and enough to make them deſiſt from their work. But ſuppoſing no ſuch diviſion of Languages there, yet after their diſperſion, which might be caus'd by the former confuſion, by the different Laws, Rites, and Cuſtoms, Commerce, and Trading, and tract of Time, there would have riſen a diviſion of their ſeveral Tongues. But if there were ſuch a diviſion of Tongues miraculouſly caus'd there (that as it is commonly ſaid, all thoſe who were of the ſame Language, went together in their ſeveral Companies) whence comes it to paſs, that in their diſperſion we read of ſeveral Families diſperſed, which uſed the ſame Language after their diſperſion; as all the Sons of *Canaan*, mentioned *Gen.* 10. 15, 16, 17, 18. uſed the *Canaanitiſh* Tongue: In *Greece*, *Javan* and *Eliſa* had the ſame Language: In *Ægypt*, *Miſraim* and *Pathruſim*: In *Arabia* the Sons of *Joktan* and *Chus*: In *Chaldæa*, *Aram* and *Uz*, the Inhabitants of *Syria*, *Maſh* of *Meſopotamia*, *Nimrod* of *Babylon*, *Aſſur* of *Aſſyria*: Whence comes it to paſs if their ſeveral Tongues were the cauſe of their diſperſion, that theſe ſeveral Heads of Families ſhould uſe the ſame Tongue? Another reaſon againſt the common opinion, is this, which ſeems to have a great deal of force in it. If Tongues were divided at *Babel* as it is imagin'd; whence was it, that the nearer any Nation lay to thoſe who had the primitive Language the *Hebrew*, they did participate more of that Tongue than thoſe who were more remote, as is plain in the *Chaldeans*, *Canaanites*, *Greeks*, and others? Whereas if their Language were divided at *Babel*, they would have retain'd their own Languages as well as others. This very Argument prevail'd ſo far with the Learned *Iſ. Caſaubon*, as appears by his *Adverſaria* on this ſubject (publiſh'd by the Learned Doctor his Son) as to make him leave the common opinion, and to conclude the ſeveral Tongues to be only ſome variations from the *Hebrew*, but yet ſo as many new words were invented too. Hence he obſerves, that the *Aſiatic Greeks* came nearer to the *Hebrew* than the *European*. And if this opinion hold true, it is the beſt foundation for deriving other Languages from the *Hebrew*; a thing attempted by the ſame Learned Perſon, as you may ſee in the Book fore-cited, and endeavour'd by *Guichardus*, *Avenarius*, and others. Thus we ſee there is no agreement in Mens minds concerning the diviſion of Tongues at *Babel*.

V. Mer. Caſaub. de 4 linguis P. 3, &c.

Scal. Exercit. in Cardan. 259. ſect. 1.

Caſaub. Diatrib. de L. Heb. P. 17, 18.

P. 47.

But

But having ſet down this Opinion with its Reaſons, I ſhall not ſo leave the receiv'd Opinion, but ſhall firſt ſee what may be ſaid for that, and leave the judgment concerning the probability of either to the underſtanding Reader. And it ſeems to be grounded on theſe Reaſons. 1. That had it been left to Mens own choice, there cannot be a ſufficient reaſon aſſign'd of Languages in the World. For there being one Language originally in the World, whereby Men did repreſent their conceptions to one another; we cannot imagine that Men ſhould of themſelves introduce ſo great an alteration, as whereby to take off that neceſſary ſociety and converſe with each other, which even Nature it ſelf did put Men upon. Hence *Calvin*, and others conclude, That *prodigii loco habenda eſt linguarum diverſitas*; becauſe there having been that freedom of converſe among Men, it is not to be ſuppoſed they ſhould of themſelves cut it off to their mutual diſadvantage. But to this it is ſaid, *That the long tract of Time and diverſity of Cuſtoms might alter the Language.* I grant it much, but not wholly; and they would only therein differ in their Languages, wherein their Cuſtoms differ'd: So that there would remain ſtill ſuch an agreement as whereby they might underſtand each other; which it will be hard to find in many of the eldeſt Languages. As for the length of Time, tho' that doth alter much in reference to Words and Phraſes, in which that of *Horace* holds true, *Multa renaſcentur quæ jam cecidêre, &c.* yet it will be more difficult to find where mere length of Time hath brought a whole Language out of uſe, and another in the room of it. But that which I think deſerves well to be conſider'd, is this, that the greateſt alteration of Languages in the World hath riſen from Colonies of Nations that us'd another Language; and ſo by the mixture of both together the Language might be much alter'd: As the *Hebrew* by the *Chaldees* in *Babylon*; the *Spaniſh*, *Italian* and others by the *Latin*, as *Breerwood* ſhews, our own by the *Normans* and others. So that were there not a diverſity of Languages ſuppos'd, this interfering of People would bring no conſiderable alteration along with it, no more than a Colony from *New-England* would alter our Language here. And as for another cauſe aſſign'd of the change of Languages, the difference of Climates, which *Bodin* gives as the reaſon why the *Northern* People uſe Conſonants and Aſpirates ſo much, eſpecially the *Saxons*, and thoſe that live by the *Baltic* Sea who pronounce thus, *Per theum ferum pibimus penum finum.* And ſo *R. D. Kimchi* obſerves of the *Ephraimites*, Judg. 12. 6. that it was the Air that was the cauſe of their liſping, and calling it *Sibboleth*, as he there obſerves the Men of *Sarphath*, that is, the *French*, that they could not pronounce *Schin*, but pronounc'd it like *Thau Raphe*. But by theſe examples we ſee, that this would cauſe only an alteration as to ſome Letters and Syllables, and rather as to the Pronunciation, than any variety of the Language. So that we ſee that, ſetting aſide the confuſion of Languages at *Babel*, there can be no reaſon ſufficient aſſign'd for the variety of Languages in the World. 2. Tho' it be granted, that a confuſion in their Minds without diſtinct Languages, were enough to make them deſiſt from their work, yet the Context in that place, *Gen.* 11. doth infer a diverſity of Tongues, as will appear from the antecedents and conſequents; as from the firſt Verſe, where it is not conceivable why it ſhould be there taken notice of as ſuch a remarkable circumſtance, that then they had but one Language before they ſet upon this work, if there was not a diverſity of Tongues cauſed by the work they

IV.

Calvin. Annot. in Gen. 11. 1, 2.

Breerwood's Inquiries, c. 5, 6.

Bodin Method. Hiſt. c. 9.

Mayer. Prodr. Chaldaiſm c. 1.

went about; but especially *ver.* 6. where God takes such notice of this very thing, that they had but one Language, wherein they were so confident to carry on their work: Therefore, *ver.* 7. when he would destroy their work by confounding their Language, it must be by multiplying that Language into many more; for it must be taken in opposition to what is said in the other Verse. And what is there added, *their not understanding one anothers speech*, seems to refer not to their inward Conceptions, as tho' they did not understand one anothers Minds, but to the outward expressions, as שבח doth apparently relate to them: Farther in *ver.* 8. this is set down as the cause of their dispersion, which had the Tongue been the same afterwards as it was before, could have been no reason for it. Again, some argue from the name *Babel* given to the place, from בלל, which signifies to *confound* and mingle things of several kinds together. So us'd *Judg.* 19. 21. *Esay* 30. 24. *Job* 6. 5. &c. thence the name בבל for בלבל the middle ל left out, as in *Golgotha* for *Golgoltha*, *Kigultha* for *Kilkaltha*, and others of a like nature. Besides, there seems to be somewhat in what is said, *That the Families were divided according to their tongues*, Gen. 10. 5, 20, 31. which doth at least imply a diversity of Tongues among them, the cause of which must be assigned by them who will not allow of the confusion and division of Languages at *Babel*. Farther, this seems most agreeable to God's end in making of them thus leave off their work, that there might be not only a present judgment upon them, but that which might remain to Posterity as a note of the folly of their Ancestors. Those who recede from the common opinion, lest they should give advantage to Infidels by attributing that to a Miracle, which might be done without, seem to be more wary than wise in it. For besides that, it is certain that Miracles may be in those things which might be effected otherwise by natural Causes, when they are produced without the help of those Causes, and in a space of time impossible to nature; and that it hath not been as yet prov'd, how such diversity of Tongues as is in the World would have been effected without such a Miracle; it must be granted by them that there was a Miracle in it; and what greater difficulty there should be in the variety of Languages, than in the signification of the same words, I understand not. But I see no necessity of asserting, that every one of the Families had a distinct Language; and the common opinion of 70 or 72, as the Gr. Families and as many Languages, is now taken for a groundless fancy by Learned Men: As is easily prov'd from the dividing Father and Children, whose Families could not certainly be without them: and some suppos'd to be unborn then, as *Joktan*'s 13 Children; especially if we say, as many do, that the confusion was at the birth of *Phaleg*, and *Joktan* was his younger Brother, as the *Jews* generally do. To the last Objection it may be reply'd, That the Agreement of Languages in some radical words, doth not infer the derivation of the one from the other, as is plain in the *Persian* and *German*, in which Learned Men have observ'd so many words alike. And so by *Busbequius*, of the Inhabitants about *Tauric Chersonese*; and so in most of our modern Tongues there may be some words alike, without any such dependence or derivation. Again, tho' it be granted that the Languages of them who were at *Babel* were confounded, yet it is not necessary we should say that all *Noah*'s Posterity were there. It is thought by some, that they were chiefly *Cham* and his Company; if so, then *Sem* and his Posterity might retain the Lan-

Bochart. Geog. l. 1. c. 15.
Buxt. diatr. jeſt. 54.
Ibid. jeſt. 68.
Lipſ. cent. 3. ep. 44.
Busbeq. ep. 24.
Mayer. Philol. ſacr. p. 2. c. 6.

guage

guage they had before, only with ſome variations. But this is very uncertain, unleſs we take it for *Heber* and *Phaleg*, from whoſe vicinity other bordering Nations might make uſe of many of their primitive words: And for the *Greeks*, it will be granted, that many of their words, eſpecially the old *Bœotic*, had affinity with the *Hebrew*; but it was from the *Pelaſgi* at firſt, and *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* afterwards: The old *Canaanitiſh* Language being, if not the pure *Hebrew*, yet a dialect of that Tongue, as is prov'd by many Learned Men. But however theſe things be, it is not neceſſary to ſay that all Mother Tongues ſo call'd, were then exiſtent at that confuſion; but the preſent Curſe did divide their Languages who were there, and that all diviſion of Languages ſince, is to be look'd upon as the effect of that Curſe.

It being thus manifeſted what a ſtrange confuſion of Languages was caus'd in the World, we may thereby eaſily underſtand how the ancient Tradition came to be corrupted and alter'd in the World. V. 4.

Another reaſon of the alteration of the ancient Traditions, was the fabulouſneſs of the Poets; for theſe made it their deſign to diſguiſe all their ancient Stories under Fables, in which they were ſo loſt, that they could never recover them afterwards. For the elder Poets of *Greece* being Men of greater learning than generally the People were of, and being converſant in *Ægypt* and other parts, did bring in new reports of the ancient times which they receiv'd from the Nations they went to; and by mixing their own Traditions and others together, and by ſuiting what was remaining of the ancient Tradition to theſe, they muſt needs make a ſtrange confuſion of things together, and leave them much more obſcure and fabulous than they found them. And herein all their cunning and ſubtilty lay, in putting a new face on whatever they borrow'd from other Nations, and making them appear among themſelves in a *Greek* Habit, that the former owners of thoſe Traditions could ſcarce challenge them as theirs under ſo ſtrange a *Metamorphoſis*. For thoſe things which were moſt plain and hiſtorical in the Fountains whence they deriv'd them, they did ſo περιδύειν, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſpeaks, (or as *Origen*, σκιαζόντες ἀνέπλασε) wrapt them up under ſo great *Mythology*, that the original Truths can hardly be diſcerned, becauſe of that multitude of prodigious Fables, with which they have inlaid them. But as great as their Artifice was in the doing this, we may yet diſcern apparently many of thoſe particular courſes which were taken by them to diſguiſe and alter the primitive Tradition. *Clemens Strom. 6. c. Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 4.*

1. Attributing what was done by the great Anceſtors of Mankind to ſome Perſons of their own Nations. Thus the *Theſſalians* make *Deucalion* to be the Perſon who eſcap'd the Flood, and from whom the World was peopled after it. And whoever compares the relation of the Flood of *Deucalion* in *Apollodorus* with that in the Scripture, might eaſily render *Apollodorus* his *Greek* in the Language of the Scriptures, only changing *Greece* into the whole Earth, and *Deucalion* into *Noah*, *Parnaſſus* into *Ararat*, and *Jupiter* into *Jehovah*. On the ſame account the *Athenians* attribute the Flood to *Ogyges*, not that the Flood of *Ogyges* and *Deucalion* were particular and diſtinct Deluges, which many have taken a great deal of needleſs pains to place in their ſeveral Ages: But as *Deucalion* was of the eldeſt memory in *Theſſaly*, ſo was *Ogyges* at *Athens*, and ſo the Flood as being a matter of remoteſt Antiquity, was on the ſame account in both places attributed to both theſe. Becauſe as Mankind was ſuppos'd to begin again after the Flood, ſo they had among them *Apollod. biblioth. l. 1. p. 19.*

them no memory extant of any elder than these two, from whom on that account they suppos'd Mankind deriv'd. And on the same reason it may be suppos'd that the *Assyrians* attribute the Flood to *Xisuthrus*, whom they suppos'd to be a King of *Assyria*; but the circumstances of the Story as deliver'd by *Alexander Polyhistor*, and *Abydenus*, are such as make it clear to be only a remainder of the universal Flood which happened in the time of *Noah*. So the *Thessalians* make *Prometheus* to be the *Protoplast*; the *Peloponnesians Phoroneus*, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* tells us, whom *Phoronides* the Poet calls πατέρα τ ἀνθρώπων, *The Father of Mankind*. This may be now the first way of corrupting the ancient Tradition, by supposing all that was convey'd by it to have been acted among themselves; which may be imputed partly to their Ignorance of the state of their ancient times, and partly to their Pride, lest they should seem to be behind others in matters of Antiquity.

Apud Cyr. c. Julian. lib. 21.

Clemens Strom. l. 1.

2. Another fountain of *Heathen Mythology*, was the taking the *Idiom* of the Oriental Languages in a proper Sense. For whether we suppose the ancient Traditions were convey'd to them in the ancient *Hebrew* by the *Pelasgi*, or were deliver'd to them by the *Phœnicians*, or were fetch'd out of the Scriptures themselves (as some suppose, tho' improbably, of *Homer* and some ancient Poets) yet all these several ways agreeing in this, That the Traditions were Oriental, we thereby understand how much of their *Mythology* came by taking the *Hebrew* in a proper and literal sense without attending to the *Idiom* of the Tongue. From hence *Bochartus* hath ingeniously fetch'd many Heathen Fables. Thus when *Noah* is said to be איש האדמה *Gen.* 9. 20. which in the *Idiom* of the *Hebrew* only signifies a *husbandman*, they took it in a proper sense for ὁ ἀνὴρ τ γῆς, and thence *Saturn* who was the same with *Noah* (as will appear afterwards) is made by *Mythologists* the husband of *Rhea*, which was the same with the *Earth*. So the Gyants making war against Heaven, was only a Poetical adumbration of the design at the building of *Babel*, whose top in the Scripture is said to reach בשמים, which in the *Hebrew* signifies only a *great height*; but to aggrandize the Story, was taken in the literal Interpretation, that they attempted *Heaven*. So when they are said to fight against the Gods, *Bochartus* thinks it might be taken from that phrase of *Nimrod*, that he was a *mighty hunter*, לפני יהוה *before the Lord* we render it, but it sometimes signifies *against the Lord*. So what *Abydenus* saith of the Gyants, that they were ἐκ τ γῆς ἀνάσχοντες, *those that came out of the earth*, is suppos'd to be taken from that phrase, *Gen.* 10. 11. מן הארץ יצא, *è terra ipsa exiit*. But far more likely and probable is that which Learned Men are generally agreed in concerning *Bacchus* his being born of *Jupiter*'s *Thigh*, which is only an Expression of that *Hebraism* ירכו יצאי, wherein *coming out of the thigh* is a phrase for ordinary Procreation.

Gen. 11. 4.

Ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 9.

Gen. 46. 26.

3. A third way observable, is, the alteration of the Names in the ancient Tradition, and putting Names of like importance to them in their own Language. Thus *Jupiter* who was the same with *Cham*, was called Ζεὺς ἅμα τ ζέσιν, as חם, from חמם *fervere, incalescere*. Ἄμμωνα γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι καλέεσι τ Δία, saith *Herodotus*; him whom the *Greeks* call Ζεύς, the *Ægyptians* call *Cham*. So *Japheth*, whose memory was preserv'd under *Neptune*, to whose portion the Islands in the Sea fell, was called by the *Greeks* Ποσειδῶν, which comes saith *Bochartus*) from the *Punic* בשיטן, which signifies *large* and *broad*, which is the very importance of the *Hebrew* יפת; thence in allusion to the Name, it is said, *Gen.* 9. 27. יפת

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1.

אלהים ליפת יפת *God ſhall enlarge Japhet.* Thence the *Epithets* of *Neptune* are Εὐρύσερν@, Εὐρύοψ, Εὐρυχρείων, all equally alluding to the Name *Japhet.* So Ἀπόλλων, in the *Greek* is of the ſame importance with the *Heb.* שד, *Dæmon*, from שדד *to deſtroy.* Thence we read, *Deut.* 32. 17. *they ſacrificed* לשדים, *to Devils.* *Canaan* in the *Hebrew* ſignifies a Merchant; thence *Mercury*, under whom the memory of *Canaan* the Son of *Cham* was preſerv'd is deriv'd, by many from מכר, *to ſell.* *Ceres* which was the Inventreſs of *Agriculture*, from גרש which imports *Breadcorn.* Theſe and many others are produc'd by *Voſſius*, *Heinſius*, *Bochartus* and other Learned Men, which I inſiſt not on, becauſe my deſign is only *digitos ad fontes intendere*, and to make theſe handſom and probable conjectures, argumentative to our purpoſe, and to bind up thoſe looſe and ſcattering obſervations into ſome order and method, in which they have not yet appear'd, nor been improv'd to that end which I make uſe of them for.

When the Oriental phraſes were ambiguous and equivocal, they omitted that ſenſe which was plain and obvious, and took that which was more ſtrange and fabulous. From hence the Learned *Bochartus* hath fetch'd the Fable of the *Golden Fleece*, which was nothing elſe but robbing the Treaſury of the King of *Colchis*; but it was diſguis'd under the name of the *Golden Fleece*, becauſe the *Syriac* word גוא, ſignifies both a *Fleece* and a *Treaſury.* So the *Bulls* and *Dragons* that kept it, were nothing but the *Walls* and *Brazen-gates*; for שור, ſignifies both a *Bull* and a *Wall*, and נשח *Braſs*, and a *Dragon.* And ſo the Fable of the *Braſs-Bull* in the Mountain of *Tabyrus* which foretold Calamities, aroſe from the Equivocation of the *Phœnician* or *Hebrew* words אלוף מנחש, which ſignify either *Doctor*, *Augur*, or *Bos ex ære*, a *Foreteller* of *events* or a *Brazen-Bull.* From the like Ambiguity of the word אלסיא aroſe the Fable of *Jupiter* ſtealing *Europa* in the form of a *Bull*, becauſe the word either ſignifies a *Ship* in which he convey'd her away, or a *Bull*; or it may be the Ship had σφάγιμον *bovis*, as the Ship St. *Paul* ſailed in had *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, it being uſual to call their Ships by the names of the Signs they carry'd. From the like Equivocation in the *Phœnician* Language doth *Bochartus* fetch many other Heathen Fables, in his Excellent Piece *De Phœnicum Coloniis*, as particularly that of *Arethuſa* coming from *Alpheus*, which was from אלפי a *Ship*, becauſe it was not far from an *Excellent Haven.* And ſo he makes the *Chimæra* to be no more than a mere *ens rationis*; for he takes the *Chimæra* which *Bellerophon* conquered, to be only the People of *Solymi* under the three Generals, *Aryus*, *Troſibis*, and *Arſalus*; ארי that ſignifies a *Lion*; *Troſibis* was ראש וזוא *the head of a Serpent*: *Arſalus* was אור ויל a *young Kid*, and ſo the *Chimæra* conſiſted of *the form of a Lion, a Goat, and a Serpent.* Thus we ſee how eaſy a matter it was to advance the *Heathen Mythology* from the Equivocation of the Oriental Languages, in which their Traditions were convey'd to them. 4. *Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. cap. 28.* *Ibid. l. 1. c. 6.*

But yet a more prolific Principle of *Mythology* was by attributing the Actions of ſeveral Perſons to one who was the firſt or the chief of them. Thus it was in the Stories of *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, *Mars*, *Mercury*, *Minerva*, *Juno*, *Bacchus* and *Hercules*, which were a collection of the Actions done by a multitude of Perſons, which were all attributed to one Perſon. So *Voſſius* tells us before the time of the *Trojan* Wars, moſt of their Kings, who were renowned and powerful, were called *Joves.* VI. 5. *Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1.*

Now

Now when the Actions of all theſe were attributed to one *Jupiter* of *Creet*, they muſt needs ſwell his Story up with abundance of Fables. *Voſſius* hath taken a great deal of pains to digeſt in an Hiſtorical manner the Stories of the ſeveral *Jupiters*, whereof he reckons two *Argives*, a third the Father of *Hercules*, a fourth a King of *Phrygia*, and two more of *Creet*; to one of which, without any Diſtinction, the Actions of all the reſt were aſcribed, and who was worſhipped under the name of *Jupiter*. And ſo beſides the ancient *Neptune*, who was the ſame with *Japhet*, they ſometimes underſtood any Inſular Prince, or one that had great power at Sea; but beſides theſe, there were two Famous *Neptunes* among the *Greeks*, the one of *Athens*, the other the Builder of the Walls of *Troy*: Now the Stories of all theſe being mixed together, muſt needs make a ſtrange confuſion. So for *Mars*, beſides that ancient one they had by the Oriental Tradition, they had a *Spartan*, *Thracian*, and *Arcadian Mars*. What abundance of *Mercuries* are we told of by * *Tully*? and of no leſs than five *Minervas*? Every angry, ſcornful, jealous Queen would fill up the Fables of *Juno*, who was equally claim'd by the *Argives* and *Samians*. What conteſts were there between the *Greeks* and *Ægyptians*, concerning the Country of *Bacchus*, or *Liber Pater*, whoſe Story was made up of many patches of the Oriental Story, as will appear afterwards. The ſame may be ſaid of *Hercules*. Now what a ſtrange way was this to increaſe the number of Fables? when they had one whoſe memory was anciently preſerved among them, they attributed the Actions of all ſuch to him, who came near him in that which his Memory was moſt remarkable for: And in thoſe things which they did retain of the Eaſtern Tradition, it was an uſual thing to confound Perſons Places and Actions together. So the Story of *Enoch* and *Methuſelah* is joined together by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, under the Name of Ἄννακ, who is there ſaid to live above 300 years (which agrees with *Enoch* as the Name doth) and that at his death the World ſhould be deſtroy'd by a Flood; which agrees with *Methuſelah*. So *Abraham* by *Orpheus* is called Μονογλώσσος, which belongs to *Iſaac* his Son; ſo the Actions of *Nimrod*, *Ninus* and *Cham*, are confounded together in their *Mythology*. By theſe ſeveral ways now we underſtand how the Original Tradition was by degrees corrupted and altered in the Heathen *Mythology*.

* *Cicero l. 3. de Nat. Deor.*

Steph. V. Ἄννακ

I come now to the footſteps of Scripture-hiſtory, which notwithſtanding theſe corruptions, may be diſcern'd in the Heathen *Mythology*, which I ſhall methodically inquire after according to the ſeries of Scripture-hiſtory. That the Names given to God in Scripture were preſerv'd among the *Phœnicians*, appears ſufficiently by the remainders of the *Phœnician Theology*, tranſlated by *Philo Byblius* out of *Sanchoniathon*; wherein we read of the God Ἰάω, which hath the ſame Letters with יהוה, beſides which there we meet with Ἐλιοῦν, the ſame with עליון, *The moſt High*, and Ἰλ, which is אל *The ſtrong* God; *Beelſaman*, which is, שמין בעל *The God of Heaven*: and Ἐλωεὶμ, the very Name of God us'd in the beginning of *Geneſis* ſo often. Beſides in thoſe Fragments we have expreſs mention of the *Chaos*, and the *Evening* following it, or *the Darkneſs on the face of the Deep*; the *Creation of Angels* under the Ζοφασημὶν צופה שמים thoſe *Beings* which contemplate the Heavens: and the *Creation of Mankind*, Ἐκ τῆς κόλπου ἀνέμου, i. e. קול פי יה, ſaith *Bochartus*, *The voice of the mouth of* God, which is by God's Word and Inſpiration, when it is expreſs'd that God ſaid, *Let us make Man*, and

V. Scaliger. Not. in Frag. Græc. Selden. de Diis Syr. Bochart. Cana. l. 2. c. 2.

that he *breathed into him the breath of life.* After we read of γήϊνος and αὐτόχθων, which properly agree to *Adam*, who was made out of the *Earth.* *Voſſius* conceives that the memory of *Adam* was preſerv'd among the old *Germans*, of whom *Tacitus* ſpeaks, *Celebrant antiquis carminibus Tuiſtonem Deum terra editum, & filium Mannum, originem gentis, conditoreſque.* Either by *Tuiſto Adam* is underſtood, who was form'd of the Earth, and by *Mannus, Noah:* or by *Tuiſto* GOD may be underſtood, and by *Mannus*, *Adam*; to which conjecture may be added further that the ſame Author reports that ſome of the *Germans* ſacrificed to *Iſis*, which *Voſſius* likewiſe conceives to be a remainder of the *Hebrew Iſcha.* And ſo among the *Ægyptians* it is with like probability conceiv'd that *Adam* and *Iſcha* were preſerv'd under *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, as they were hiſtorically taken. In *Cilicia*, the City *Adana* is thought to have ſome remainder of the Name of *Adam*; for the *Greeks* had no termination in *M*, therefore for *Adam* they pronounced it *Adan*, and that from Ἀδανὸς, and ſo the City *Adana:* Now that Ἀδανὸς, by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, is ſaid to be the *Son of Heaven and Earth.* Ἔστι ὃ ὁ Ἀδανὸς γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ παῖς. This *Adanus*, he tells us, was otherwiſe called Κρόνος, or *Saturn*, under whom the *Greeks* preſerv'd the memory of *Adam*; for *Diodorus*, *Thallus*, *Caſſius*, *Severus*, and *Cornelius Nepos*, do all (as *Tertullian* ſaith) confeſs *Saturn* to have been a Man; and according to their Fables he muſt have been the firſt of Men. *Saturn* was the Son of *Heaven* and *Earth*, and ſo was *Adam:* he taught Men Huſbandry; and was not *Adam* the firſt that tilled the ground? Beſides, that Power which *Saturn* had, and was depoſed from, doth fitly ſet out the Dominion Man had in the *Golden Age* of Innocency, which he loſt by his own folly. And *Adam*'s hiding himſelf from the preſence of the LORD, gave occaſion to the Name of *Saturn*, from *Satar* to hide. We find ſomething of *Cain* preſerv'd in the *Phœnician* Antiquities, under the Name of Ἀγρόνης, or Ἀγρότης, the firſt Countryman or Huſbandman, who with his Brother Ἄγρος built Houſes, and the firſt foundation of a City is attributed to *Cain:* And on that account *Voſſius* conjectures that the memory of *Cain*'s Wife was preſerv'd under *Veſta*, both becauſe ſhe was the Daughter of *Saturn*, i. e. of *Adam*, and that ſhe is ſaid τὴ οἰκῶν καλιασκιὴν εὑρεῖν, *to find out firſt the way of building Houſes.* That *Tubal-Cain* gave firſt occaſion to the Name and Worſhip of *Vulcan*, hath been very probably conceiv'd, both from the very great affinity of the Names, and that *Tubal-Cain* is expreſly mention'd *to be an Inſtructer of every Artificer in braſs and iron*; and as near relation as *Apollo* had to *Vulcan*, *Jubal* had to *Tubal-Cain*, who was the *Inventer of Muſic, or the Father of all ſuch as handle the Harp and Organ*; which the *Greeks* attribute to *Apollo.* And if that be true which *Genebrard* and others aſcribe to *Naamah*, the Siſter of *Jubal* and *Tubal-Cain*, *viz.* that ſhe was the Inventer of Spinning and Weaving; then may ſhe come in for *Minerva.* Thus we ſee there were ſome, tho' but obſcure foot-ſteps preſerved, even of that part of Scripture-hiſtory which preceded the Flood.

Voſſ. de Idolat. l. 1. cap. 38.

Tacit. de moribus German.

Stephan. V. Ἄδανα.

Tertull. Apolog. c. 10.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 17.

Gen. 4. 22.

4. 21.

VIII. The memory of the Deluge it ſelf we have already found to be preſerved in the Heathen *Mythology*; we come therefore to *Noah* and his Poſterity. Many parcels of *Noah*'s memory were preſerved in the ſcattered fragments of many Fables, under *Saturn*, *Janus*, *Prometheus*, and *Bacchus.* *Bochartus* inſiſts on no fewer than 14 Parallels between *Noah* and the Heathen *Saturn*, which he ſaith are ſo plain, that there is no doubt but under *Saturn*, *Noah* was underſtood in the Heathen *Mythology.* *Saturn* was ſaid to be the common Parent of Mankind, ſo was *Noah*; *Saturn* was

Bochart. Phal. l. c. 1.

a juſt King, *Noah* not only righteous himſelf, but a preacher of Righteouſneſs; The Golden Age of *Saturn* was between *Noah* and the diſperſion of Nations. In *Noah*'s time all Mankind had but one Language, which the Heathens extend under *Saturn*, both to Men and Beaſts: The Plantation of Vines attributed to *Saturn* by the Heathens, as to *Noah* by the Scriptures: The Law of *Saturn* mentioned by the Poets, that none ſhould ſee the nakedneſs of the Gods without puniſhment, ſeems to reſpect the Fact and Curſe of *Cham*, in reference to *Noah*. *Saturn* and *Rhea*, and thoſe with them are ſaid to be born of *Thetis*, or the *Ocean*, which plainly alludes to *Noah* and his companies eſcaping the Flood; thence a Ship was the ſymbol of *Saturn*; and that *Saturn* devoured all his Children, ſeems to be nothing elſe but the Deſtruction of the old World by *Noah*'s Flood. And not only under *Saturn*, but under *Prometheus* too, was *Noah*'s memory preſerved. *Diodorus* ſpeaks of the great Flood under *Prometheus*; and *Prometheus* implies one that hath Forecaſt and Wiſdom, ſuch as *Noah* had, whereby he foretold the Flood, and was ſaved in it, when others were *Epimetheus*'s, that had not Wit to prevent their own deſtruction.

Diod. l. 1.

And no wonder if *Prometheus* were *Noah*, that the forming Mankind was attributed to him, when the World was peopled from him. *Herodotus* his ſaying, that *Aſia* was *Prometheus* his Wife, might relate to the Country *Noah* lived in, and our propagation from thence. Another part of *Noah*'s memory was preſerv'd under *Janus*; the Name of *Janus* is moſt probably derived from יין, becauſe of *Noah*'s planting a Vine, and *Janus* was called *Conſivius*, ſaith *Macrobius*, *à conſerendo, hoc eſt, à propagine generis humani, quæ Jano autore conſeritur*: Now to whom can this be ſo properly apply'd as to *Noah*, from whom Mankind was propagated? And *Janus* his being *biſrons*, or looking πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω, *forward and backward*, is not ſo fit an Emblem of any thing as of *Noah*'s ſeeing thoſe two Ages before and after the Flood. And it is farther obſervable, which *Plutarch* ſpeaks of in his *Roman Queſtions*, that the ancient Coins had on one ſide the Image of *Janus* with his two Faces, on the other πλοίου πρύμναν ἢ πρῷραν ἐγκεκαραγμένην, *the fore or hinder part of the Ship*, by which the memory of the *Ark* of *Noah* ſeems to have been preſerv'd. Thus we ſee what *Analogy* there is in the Story of *Janus* to that of *Noah*: Not that I give credit to thoſe fooleries which tell us of *Noah*'s coming from *Palæſtine* with his Son *Japhet* into *Italy*, and planting Colonies there, for which we are beholding to the ſpurious *Ethruſcan* Antiquities; but all that I aſſert is, that the Story of *Noah* might be preſerv'd in the eldeſt Colonies, tho' diſguiſed under other Names, as here in the caſe of *Janus*. And on the ſame account that the Name of *Janus* is attributed to *Noah*, ſome likewiſe believe him to have been the moſt ancient *Bacchus*, who was according to *Diodorus*, Εὑρετὴς τῆς ἀμπέλου, *the firſt planter of Vines and inſtructer of Men in making Wines*: And beſides *Bacchus* his being twice born, ſeems only an adumbration of *Noah*'s preſervation after the Flood, which might be accounted a ſecond Nativity, when the reſt of the World was deſtroy'd; and withal, *Philoſtratus* in the Life of *Apollonius* relates, that the ancient *Indian Bacchus* came thither out of *Aſſyria*, which yet more fully agrees with *Noah*. So that from theſe ſcatter'd Members of *Hippolytus*, theſe broken Fragments of Traditions, we may gather almoſt an intire Hiſtory of all the paſſages concerning *Noah*.

V. Mayer. Philol. ſacr. p. 2. c. 5.

Philoſtr. vit. Apoll. c. 4.

As the Story of *Saturn* and *Noah* do much agree, ſo the three Sons of *Noah* and thoſe of *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, have their peculiar reſemblances to each other. Of which *Voſſius* and *Bochartus* have largely ſpoken, and we have touched on already. Beſides which, this latter Author hath carry'd the Parallel lower, and finds *Canaan* the Son of *Cham*, the ſame with *Mercury* the Son of *Jupiter*; as it was the curſe of *Canaan* to be a Servant of Servants, ſo *Mercury* is always deſcribed under ſervile employments; his Wings ſeem to be the Ships of the *Phœnicians* who were derived from *Canaan*; and his being the God of Trade, noting the great Merchandize of the *Phœnicians*, and *Mercury*'s Thievery noting the Pyracies, or at leaſt the ſubtilty and craft of the *Phœnicians*; he was the Father of *Eloquence* and *Aſtronomy*, as *Letters* and *Aſtronomy* came from the *Phœnicians* into *Greece*. The ſame Author parallels *Nimrod* and *Bacchus*, and *Magog* and *Prometheus* together. The Name of *Bacchus* is but a light variation of ברכוש, *Bar-chus*, as *Nimrod* was the Son of *Chus*, and *Bacchus* is called *Nebrodes* by the *Greeks*, which is the very Name of *Nimrod* among them, and *Bacchus* is called Ζωγρεὺς, which excellently interprets *Nimrod*'s being a *mighty hunter*. *Bacchus* his Expeditions into *India* were the attempts of *Nimrod*, and the *Aſſyrian* Emperors. On which account *Voſſius* makes *Nimrod* or *Belus* the moſt antient *Mars*; for *Heſtiæus Mileſius* ſpeaks of *Enyalius*, which is *Mars*, his being in *Sennaar* of *Babylonia*. That the memory of *Magog* was preſerved under *Prometheus*, theſe things make it probable, that *Magog* was the Son of *Japhet*, as *Prometheus* of *Iapetus*, and that the Poſterity of *Magog* was placed about *Caucaſus*, where *Prometheus* is feigned to lie: and the eating of *Prometheus* his Heart, is only an Interpretation of מגג, which apply'd to the Heart ſignifies to *waſte away* and *be conſum'd*. Thus far *Bochartus*.

IX.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18. *Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1. cap. 2.*

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 16.

The *Phœnician* Antiquities ſeem to have preſerved the memory of *Abraham*'s ſacrificing his Son *Iſaac*, by that place which *Euſebius* produceth out of *Porphyry*'s Book concerning the *Jews*; where he relates, *How* Saturn *whom the* Phœnicians *call* Iſrael, *when he reigned in thoſe parts and had an only ſon called* Jeoud, *of a Nymph called* Anobret, *being under ſome great calamity, did ſacrifice that ſon of his, being clothed with a royal habit.* Here we have a Royal Perſon called *Iſrael*; and that *Abraham* ſhould be accounted a King in thoſe elder times, is nothing ſtrange conſidering his wealth, and what petty Royalties there were in thoſe times. But *Grotius*, and from him *Voſſius*, do not think that *Abraham* was here called *Iſrael*, but that the Tranſcriber of *Euſebius* meeting with ΙΛ, ſuppoſed it to be a contraction of Ἰσραὴλ, and ſo writ at length: it muſt be acknowledg'd that ΙΛ is uſed in the *Phœnician Theology* for *Saturn*, but yet the circumſtances of the Story make the ordinary reading not improbable; neither is it ſtrange, that *Abraham* ſhould be called by the name of the People which he was the Progenitor of. That *Iſaac* ſhould be meant by his only Son called *Jeoud* is moſt likely; for when God bids *Abraham* go ſacrifice him, he ſaith, *Take thy ſon*, יחיד, *thy only ſon*; *Jehid* is the ſame with the *Phœnician Jeoud*. That *Sara* is meant by *Anobret*, the original of the Name implies, which is as *Bochartus* derives it חן עוברת, *Annoberet*, that is, *ex gratia concipiens*, which the Apoſtle explains, *Through faith* Sara *her ſelf receiv'd ſtrength to conceive ſeed*. Now all the difference is, that which was only deſigned and intended by *Abraham*, was believ'd by the *Phœnicians* as really done, that it might be as a precedent to them for their Ἀνθρωποθυσίαι, *ſacrificing* of Men, a thing

V. Scaliger. ad Frag. Græc.

Grot. in Deut. c. 18. v. 10. *Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.*

Gen. 22. 1.

Bochart. de Phœnic. col. l. 2. c. 2. Heb. 11. 11.

ſo much in uſe among the *Phœnicians*, and all the Colonies derived from them, as many Learned Men have at large ſhew'd. But beſides this, there are particular teſtimonies concerning *Abraham*, his age, wiſdom and knowledg, his coming out of *Chaldæa*, and the Propagation of Knowledg from him among the *Chaldæans*, *Phœnicians*, and *Ægyptians*, are extant out of *Beroſus*, *Eupolemus*, and others in **Joſephus* and *Euſebius*, and from thence tranſcribed by many Learned Men, which on that account I forbear tranſcribing, as being common and obvious.

* *Joſeph. Antiq. l. 1. c. 7. Euſ. Præp. Evang. l. 9. c. 16.*

X. Some have not improbably conjectured, that the memory of *Jacob*'s long peregrination, and ſervice with his Uncle *Laban*, was preſerved under the Story of *Apollo* his baniſhment and being a Shepherd under *Admetus*. For *Callimachus* reports that *Love* was the cauſe of *Apollo*'s travels, as it was of *Jacob*'s; and withal mentions a ſtrange increaſe of Cattel under *Apollo*'s care, anſwerable to what the Scripture reports concerning *Jacob*. But it is more certain, that the memory of *Jacob*'s ſetting up the *Stone* he had reſted on for a Pillar, and pouring *Oyl* upon it, and calling the place *Bethel*, was preſerved under the Anointed Stones, which the *Phœnicians* from *Bethel* called Βαιτύλια, as hath been frequently obſerv'd by Learned Men, from whence came the cuſtom of *Anointing ſtones* among the Heathens, of which ſo very many have largely diſcourſed. Thence the Proverb of a ſuperſtitious Man, πάντα λίθου λιπαροῦ προσκυνεῖ, which *Arnobius* calls *lubricatum lapidem, & ex olivi unguine ſordidatum*. It ſeems the anointing the ſtones with oyl, was then the ſymbol of the conſecration of them. The Name Βαίτυλος for ſuch a ſtone occurs in *Heſychius*, the *Greek Etymologiſts*, *Damaſcius* in *Phocius*, and others. That the memory of *Joſeph* in *Ægypt* was preſerved under the *Ægyptian Apis*, hath been ſhew'd with a great deal of probability by the Learned *Voſſius*, in his often-cited piece of *Idolatry*, from the teſtimonies of *Julius Maternus*, *Rufinus*, and *Suidas*; and from theſe three Arguments: 1. The greatneſs of the Benefit which the *Ægyptians* received by *Joſeph*; which was of that nature that it could not eaſily be forgot, and that no ſymbol was ſo proper to ſet it out as the *Ægyptian Apis*; becauſe the famine was portended by lean Kine, and the plenty by fat; and *Minucius* at *Rome*, for relieving the people in a time of famine, had a Statue of a golden Bull erected to his memory. 2. The *Ægyptians* were not backward to teſtify their reſpect to *Joſeph*, as appears by *Pharaoh*'s rewarding him. Now it was the cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to preſerve the memories of their great Benefactors by ſome ſymbols to poſterity; which were at firſt intended only for a Civil uſe, altho' they were after abus'd to Superſtition and *Idolatry*. 3. From the Names of *Apis* and *Serapis*. *Apis* he conceives to be the ſacred Name of *Joſeph* among the *Ægyptians*, and is as much as אב, *Father*; ſo *Joſeph* himſelf ſaith, he was a *Father* to *Pharaoh*. And *Serapis*, as *Rufinus* and *Suidas* both tell us, had a *Buſhel* upon his *Head*, and *Serapis* is probably derived from שור, *Sor*, which ſignifies a *Bull*, and *Apis*. So that by this means the Story of *Joſeph* is atteſted by the *Ægyptian* ſuperſtitions, of which they can give no account ſo likely as this is.

Callimach. Hymn. in Apoll.

Gen. 28. 18.

Scalig. not. in Frag. Gr. Bochart. Can. l. 2. c. 2. Seld. de Diis Syris. V. Heinſ. in Clem. Al. Strom. 7. Caſaubon. ad Theoph. p. 295. Herald. ad Arnob. l. 1. Colvium ad Apul. Florid. Ouzel. & Elmenhorſt. ad Minuc. de Idol. l. 1. c. 29.

Gen. 45. 8.

XI. Many things concerning *Moſes* are preſerv'd in the Story of *Bacchus*; not that from thence we are to conclude that *Moſes* was the *Bacchus* of the *Greeks*, as *Voſſius* thinks, but they took ſeveral parts of the Eaſtern Traditions concerning him, which they might have from the *Phœnicians* who came with *Cadmus* into *Greece*, while the memory of *Moſes* was yet freſh among the *Canaanites*. In the Story of *Bacchus*, as *Voſſius* obſerves,

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 30.

ſerves, it is expreſly ſaid, that he was born in *Ægypt*, and that ſoon after his birth he was put in an Ark, and expos'd to the River; which Tradition was preſerv'd among the *Braſiatæ* of *Laconica*: and *Bacchus* in *Orpheus* is called Μίσης, and by *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, *Palæſtinus*: and he is called Βιμάτωρ, which agrees to *Moſes*, who, beſides his own Mother, was adopted by *Pharaoh*'s Daughter: *Bacchus* was likewiſe commended for his Beauty as *Moſes* was, and was ſaid to be educated in a Mount of *Arabia* called *Nyſa*, which agrees with *Moſes* his reſidence in *Arabia* forty years; ſo *Plutarch* mentions Φυγὰς Διονύσου, the *baniſhments* of *Bacchus*; and *Nonnus* mentions *Bacchus* his flight into the *Red-ſea*: who likewiſe mentions his Battles in *Arabia*, and with the neighbouring Princes there. *Diodorus* ſaith, that *Bacchus* his Army had not only Men but Women in it, which is moſt true of the company which *Moſes* led. *Orpheus* calls *Bacchus* Θεσμοφόρον, and attributes to him Δίπλακα Θεσμὸν, whereby we underſtand *Moſes* his being a *Legiſlator*, and that he deliver'd the *Laws* in two Tables. *Moſes* his fetching Water out of a Rock with his Rod, is preſerv'd in the *Orgia* of *Bacchus*, in which *Euripides* relates that *Agave* and the reſt of the *Bacchæ* celebrating the *Orgia*, one of them touched a Rock, and the Water came out; and in the ſame *Orgia Euripides* reports how they were wont to crown their Heads with Serpents, probably in memory of the cure of the fiery Serpents in the Wilderneſs. A Dog is made the companion of *Bacchus*; which is the ſignification of *Caleb*, who ſo faithfully adhered to *Moſes*. To theſe and ſome other circumſtances inſiſted on by *Voſſius*, *Bochartus* adds two more very conſiderable ones; which are, that *Nonnus* reports of *Bacchus* that he touched the two Rivers *Orontes* and *Hydaſpes* with his *Thyrſus*, or *Rod*, and that the Rivers dried, and he paſs'd thro' them: and that his *Ivy-ſtaff* being thrown upon the ground, crept up and down like a *Serpent*, and that the *Indians* were in darkneſs while the *Bacchæ* enjoy'd light; which circumſtances conſider'd will make every one that hath judgment ſay as *Bochartus* doth; *Ex mirabili illo conſenſu vel cæcis apparebit priſcos fabularum architectos à ſcriptoribus ſacris multa eſſe mutuatos.* From this wonderful agreement of *Heathen Mythology* with the Scriptures, it cannot but appear that one is a corruption of the other. That the memory of *Joſhua* and *Sampſon* was preſerved under *Hercules Tyrius*, is made likewiſe very probable from ſeveral circumſtances of the Stories. Others have deduced the many Rites of *Heathen Worſhip* from thoſe us'd in the *Tabernacle* among the *Jews*. Several other might be inſiſted on, as the Parallel between *Og* and *Typho*, and between the old *Silenus* and *Balaam*, both noted for their ſkill in *Divination*, both taken by *Water*, *Num.* 22. 5. both noted for *riding* on an *Aſs*: ἐπὶ ὄνου τὰ πολλὰ ὀχούμενος, ſaith *Lucian* of the old *Silenus*; and that which makes it more probable, is that of *Pauſanias*, Ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἐφεσίων χώρᾳ Σιλλοῦ μνῆμα, which ſome Learned Men have been much puzled to find out the truth of; and this conjecture which I here propound, may paſs at leaſt for a probable account of it. But I ſhall no longer inſiſt on theſe things, having, I ſuppoſe, done what is ſufficient to our purpoſe, which is, to make it appear what footſteps there are of the truth of Scripture-hiſtory amidſt all the corruptions of *Heathen Mythology*.

Nonn. Dion. l. 20.

Diod. l. 4.

Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. *c.* 18.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. *c.*26. *p.*118.

p. 169.

Lucian. de Deor. Con.

Pauſan. Eliacôn. 2. *p.* 203.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

I. *Concerning matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contain'd therein.* II. *The ground of the diſeſteem of the Scripture is tacite Unbelief.* III. *The Excellency of the Scriptures manifeſted as to the matters which* GOD *hath reveal'd therein.* IV. *The Excellency of the diſcoveries of* GOD*'s Nature which are in Scripture.* V. *Of the Goodneſs and Love of* GOD *in* CHRIST. *The ſutableneſs of thoſe diſcoveries of* GOD *to our Natural Notions of a* DEITY. *The neceſſity of* GOD*'s making known Himſelf to us in order to the regulating our Conceptions of him.* VI. *The Scriptures give the fulleſt account of the ſtate of Mens Souls, and the corruptions which are in them. The only way of pleaſing* GOD *diſcover'd in Scriptures.* VII. *The Scriptures contain matters of greateſt Myſteriouſneſs, and moſt univerſal ſatisfaction to Mens Minds.* VIII. *The Excellency of the manner wherein things are reveal'd in Scriptures, in regard of Clearneſs, Authority, Purity.* IX. *Uniformity, and Perſuaſiveneſs.* X. *The Excellency of the Scriptures as a Rule of life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion, and the Reaſonableneſs of them. The Greatneſs of the Encouragements to Religion contained in the Scriptures.* XI. *The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace in order to Man's Salvation.*

I. HAving thus largely prov'd the truth of all thoſe paſſages of ſacred Scripture which concern the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, by all thoſe Arguments which a ſubject of that nature is capable of, the only thing left in order to our full proving the Divinity of the Scriptures, is, the conſideration of thoſe matters contain'd in it, which are in an eſpecial manner ſaid to be of Divine Revelation. For thoſe hiſtorical paſſages, tho' we believe them as contain'd in the Scripture, to have been divinely inſpir'd as well as others: yet they are ſuch things as ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation, might have been known ſufficiently to the World, had not Men been wanting to themſelves as to the care and means of preſerving them; but thoſe matters which I now come to diſcourſe of, are of a more ſublime and tranſcendent nature, ſuch as it had been impoſſible for the Minds of Men to reach, had they not been immediately diſcover'd by GOD himſelf. And thoſe are the Terms and Conditions on which the Soul of Man may upon good grounds expect an eternal Happineſs, which we aſſert the Book of Scriptures to be the only authentic and infallible records of. Men might by the improvements of

Reaſon and the ſagacity of their Minds diſcover much, not only of the lapſed condition of their Souls, and the neceſſity of a purgation of them, in order to their Felicity; but might in the general know what things are pleaſing and acceptable to the Divine Nature, from thoſe differences of Good and Evil which are unalterably fix'd in the things themſelves: but which way to obtain any certainty of the Remiſſion of Sins, to recover the Grace and Favor of GOD, to enjoy perfect Tranquillity and Peace of Conſcience, to be able to pleaſe God in things agreeable to his Will, and by theſe to be aſſur'd of eternal Bliſs, had been impoſſible for Men to have ever found, had not GOD himſelf been graciouſly pleas'd to reveal them to us. Men might ſtill have bewildred themſelves in following the *Ignes fatui* of their own imaginations, and hunting up and down the World for a Path which leads to Heaven, but could have found none, unleſs God himſelf taking pity of the wandrings of Men had been pleas'd to hang out a Light from Heaven to direct them in their way thither, and by this *Pharos* of Divine Revelation to direct them ſo to ſteer their courſe, as to eſcape ſplitting themſelves on the Rocks of open Impieties, or being ſwallow'd up in the Quickſands of terrene delights. Neither doth he ſhew them only what Shelves and Rocks they muſt eſcape, but what particular courſe they muſt ſteer, what Star they muſt have in their Eye, what Compaſs they muſt obſerve, what Winds and Gales they muſt expect and pray for, if they would arrive at laſt at eternal Bliſs. Eternal Bliſs! What more could a GOD of infinite Goodneſs promiſe, or the Soul of Man wiſh for? A Reward to ſuch who are ſo far from deſerving, that they are ſtill provoking; Glory to ſuch who are more apt to be aſham'd of their Duties, than of their Offences; but that it ſhould not only be a Glorious Reward, but Eternal too, is that which tho' it infinitely tranſcend the Deſerts of the Receivers, yet it highly diſcovers the infinite Goodneſs of the Giver. But when we not only know that there is ſo rich a Mine of ineſtimable Treaſures, but if the Owner of it undertakes to ſhew us the way to it, and gives us certain and infallible directions how to come to the full poſſeſſion of it; how much are we in love with Miſery, and do we court our own Ruin, if we neglect to hearken to his Directions, and obſerve his Commands!

II. This is that we are now undertaking to make good concerning the *Scriptures*, that theſe alone contain thoſe ſacred diſcoveries, by which the Souls of Men may come at laſt to enjoy a compleat and eternal Happineſs. One would think there could be nothing more needleſs in the World than to bid Men regard their own welfare, and to ſeek to be happy; yet whoever caſts his Eye into the World, will find no counſel ſo little hearkened to as this, nor any thing which is more generally look'd on as a matter trivial and impertinent. Which cannot ariſe but from one of theſe two grounds, that either they think it no great wiſdom to let go their preſent hold as to the good things of this World, for that which they ſecretly queſtion whether they ſhall ever live to ſee or no; or elſe that their Minds are in ſuſpenſe, whether they be not ſent on a *Guiana Voyage* to *Heaven*, whether the certainty of it be yet fully diſcover'd, or the inſtructions which are given be ſuch as may infallibly conduct them thither. The firſt, tho' it hath the advantage of ſenſe, fruition, delight, and further expectation; yet to a rational Perſon who ſeriouſly reflects on himſelf, and ſums up what (after all his troubles and diſquietments in the procuring, his cares in keeping, his diſappointments in his expectations, his fears of loſing what he doth enjoy, and that vexation

vexation of Spirit which attends all these) he hath gain'd of true contentment to his Mind, can never certainly believe that ever these things were intended for his Happiness. For is it possible that the Soul of Man should ever enjoy its full and complete Happiness in this World, when nothing is able to make it happy, but what is most futable to its Nature, able to fill up its large Capacity, and commensurate with its Duration? but in this Life the matter of Mens greatest delight is strangely unsutable to the nature of our rational Beings, the measure of them too short for our vast Desires to stretch themselves upon, the Proportion too scant and narrow to run parallel with Immortality. It must be then only a Supreme, Infinite and Eternal Being, which by the free communications of his Bounty and Goodness can fix and satiate the Soul's Desires, and by the constant flowings forth of his own uninterrupted streams of Favor will always keep up Desire, and yet always satisfy it: One whose Goodness can only be felt by some transient touches here, whose Love can be seen but as thro' a lattice, whose constant presence may be rather wish'd for than enjoy'd, who hath reserv'd the full sight and fruition of himself to that future state, when all these dark veils shall be done away, and the Soul shall be continually sunning her self under immediate beams of Light and Love. But how or in what way the Soul of Man in this degenerate condition should come to be partaker of so great a Happiness, by the enjoyment of that God our Natures are now at such a distance from, is the greatest and most important inquiry of Human Nature; and we continually see how successless and unsatisfactory the endeavors of those have been to themselves at last, who have sought for this Happiness in a way of their own finding out: The large volume of the Creation, wherein God hath describ'd so much of his Wisdom and Power, is yet too dark and obscure, too short and imperfect to set forth to us the way which leads to eternal Happiness. Unless then the same God who made Mens Souls at first, do shew them the way for their recovery; as they are in a degenerate, so they will be in a desperate condition: but the same Bounty and Goodness of God, which did at first display it self in giving Being to Mens Souls, hath in a higher manner enlarged the Discovery of it self, by making known the way whereby we may be taken into his Grace and Favor again.

III. Which it now concerns us particularly to discover, thereby to make it appear that this way is of that peculiar excellency, that we may have from thence the greatest evidence, it could come from no other Author but God himself, and doth tend to no other end but our eternal Happiness. Now that incomparable excellency which is in the sacred Scriptures, will fully appear, if we consider the Matters contain'd in them under this threefold capacity. 1. As *Matters of Divine Revelation.* 2. As *a Rule of Life.* 3. As containing *that Covenant of Grace which relates to Man's eternal Happiness.*

1. Consider the Scripture generally, as containing in it Matters of Divine Revelation, and therein the excellency of the Scriptures appears in two things. 1. *The Matters which are revealed.* 2. *The Manner wherein they are revealed.*

1. *The matters which are revealed* in Scripture, may be consider'd these three ways. 1. *As they are matters of the greatest weight and moment.* 2. *As matters of the greatest depth and mysteriousness.* 3. *As matters of the most universal satisfaction to the Minds of Men.*

1. *They are matters of the greateſt moment and importance for Men to know.* The Wiſdom of Men is moſt known by the weight of the things they ſpeak; and therefore that wherein the Wiſdom of God is diſcover'd, cannot contain any thing that is mean and trivial; they muſt be matters of the higheſt importance, which the ſupreme Ruler of the World vouchſafes to ſpeak to Men concerning: And ſuch we ſhall find the matters which God hath revealed in his Word to be, which either concern the rectifying our apprehenſions of his Nature, or making known to Men their ſtate and condition, or diſcovering the way whereby to avoid eternal Miſery. Now which is there of theſe three, which ſuppoſing God to diſcover his Mind to the World, it doth not highly become him to ſpeak to Men of?

IV. 1. What is there which doth more highly concern Men to know than God himſelf? or what more glorious and excellent object could he diſcover than himſelf to the World? There is nothing certainly which ſhould more commend the Scriptures to us, than that thereby we may grow more acquainted with God; that we may know more of his Nature, and all his Perfections, and many of the great Reaſons of his actings in the World. We may by them underſtand with ſafety what the eternal purpoſes of God were as to the way of Man's Recovery by the death of his Son; we may there ſee and underſtand the great Wiſdom of God; not only in the contrivance of the World, and ordering of it, but in the gradual Revelations of himſelf to his People, by what ſteps he train'd up his Church till the *fulneſs of time was come*; what his Aim was in laying ſuch a load of Ceremonies on his People of the *Jews*; by what ſteps and degrees he made way for the full revelation of his Will to the World by ſpeaking in theſe laſt days by his Son, after he had ſpoke *at ſundry times and in divers manners by the Prophets*, &c. *unto the Fathers.* In the Scriptures we read the moſt rich and admirable diſcoveries of Divine Goodneſs, and all the ways and methods he uſeth in alluring Sinners to himſelf; with what Majeſty he commands, with what Condeſcention he intreats, with what importunity he wooes Mens Souls to be reconciled to him, with what Favour he imbraceth, with what Tenderneſs he chaſtiſeth, with what Bowels he pitieth thoſe who have choſen him to be their God! With what Power he ſupporteth, with what Wiſdom he directeth, with what Cordials he refreſheth the Souls of ſuch who are dejected under the ſenſe of his diſpleaſure, and yet their love is ſincere towards him! With what profound humility, what holy boldneſs, what becoming diſtance, and yet what reſtleſs importunity do we therein find the Souls of God's People addreſſing themſelves to him in Prayer! With what cheerfulneſs do they ſerve him, with what confidence do they truſt him, with what reſolution do they adhere to him in all ſtreights and difficulties, with what patience do they ſubmit to his Will in their greateſt Extremities! How fearful are they of ſinning againſt God, how careful to pleaſe him, how regardleſs of ſuffering, when they muſt chooſe either that or ſinning, how little apprehenſive of Mens diſpleaſure, while they enjoy the favor of God! Now all theſe things which are ſo fully and pathetically expreſs'd in Scripture, do abundantly ſet forth to us the exuberancy and *Pleonaſm* of God's Grace and Goodneſs towards his People, which makes them delight ſo much in him, and be ſo ſenſible of his diſpleaſure. But above all other diſcoveries of God's Goodneſs, his ſending his Son into the World to die for Sinners, is that which the Scripture ſets forth with the greateſt Life and

Eloquence. By Eloquence, I mean not an artificial compoſure of Words, but the gravity, weight, and perſuaſiveneſs of the matter contain'd in them. And what can tend more to melt our frozen Hearts into a current of thankful obedience to God, than the vigorous reflection of the beams of God's Love thro' *Jeſus Chriſt* upon us! Was there ever ſo great an expreſſion of love heard of! nay, was it poſſible to be imagin'd, that that God who perfectly hates ſin, ſhould himſelf offer the pardon of it, and ſend his Son into the World to ſecure it to the Sinner, who doth ſo heartily repent of his Sins, as to deny himſelf, and take up his Croſs and follow *Chriſt!* Well might the Apoſtle ſay, *This is a faithful ſaying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the world to ſave ſinners.* How dry and ſapleſs are all the voluminous diſcourſes of Philoſophers, compar'd with this Sentence! How jejune and unſatisfactory are all the Diſcoveries they had of God and his Goodneſs, in compariſon of what we have by the Goſpel of *Chriſt!* Well might St. *Paul* then ſay, *That he determined to know nothing but Chriſt, and him crucified. Chriſt crucified* is the Library which triumphant Souls will be ſtudying in to all eternity. This is the only Library which is the true Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς, that which cures the Soul of all its Maladies and Diſtempers: other Knowledg makes Mens Minds giddy and flatulent; this ſettles and compoſes them: other Knowledg is apt to ſwell Men into high Conceits and Opinions of themſelves; this brings them to the trueſt view of themſelves, and thereby to humility and ſobriety: other Knowledge leaves Mens Hearts as it found them; this alters them and makes them better. So tranſcendent an excellency is there in the Knowledg of *Chriſt crucified* above the ſublimeſt ſpeculations in the World.

1 Tim. 1. 15.

1 Cor. 2. 2.

V. And is not this an ineſtimable Benefit we enjoy by the Scripture, that therein we can read and converſe with all theſe expreſſions of God's Love and Goodneſs, and that in his own Language? Shall we admire and praiſe what we meet with in *Heathen Philoſophers*, which is generous and handſom; and ſhall we not adore the infinite fulneſs of the Scriptures, which run over with continued expreſſions of that and a higher nature? What folly is it to magnifie thoſe *Lean Kine*, the Notions of Philoſophers, and contemn the Fat, the Plenty and Fulneſs of the Scriptures? If there be not far more valuable and excellent diſcoveries of the Divine Nature and Perfections; if there be not far more excellent Directions and Rules of Practice in the ſacred Scriptures, than in the ſublimeſt of all the Philoſophers: then let us leave our *full ears*, and feed upon the *thin*. But certainly no ſober and rational Spirit that puts any value upon the Knowledg of God, but on the ſame account that he doth praiſe the Diſcourſes of any Philoſophers concerning God, he cannot but ſet a value of a far higher nature on the Word of God. And as the Goodneſs of God is thus diſcover'd in Scripture, ſo is his Juſtice and Holineſs: we have therein recorded the moſt remarkable judgments of God upon contumacious Sinners, the ſevereſt denunciations of a Judgment to come againſt all that live in Sin, the exacteſt Precepts of Holineſs in the World; and what can be deſir'd more to diſcover the Holineſs of God, than we find in Scripture concerning Him? If therefore acquaintance with the Nature, Perfections, Deſigns of ſo excellent a Being as God is, be a thing deſirable to Human Nature; we have the greateſt cauſe to admire the excellency, and adore the fulneſs of the Scriptures, which give us ſo large, rational and complete account of the Being and Attributes of God. And which tends yet more to commend the

the Scriptures to us, thoſe things which the Scripture doth moſt fully diſcover concerning GOD, do not at all contradict thoſe prime and common Notions which are in our Natures concerning him, but do exceedingly advance and improve them, and tend the moſt to regulate our Conceptions and Apprehenſions of GOD, that we may not miſcarry therein, as otherwiſe Men are apt to do. For it being natural to Men ſo far to love themſelves, as to ſet the greateſt value upon thoſe excellencies which they think themſelves moſt maſters of: thence Men came to be exceedingly miſtaken in their Apprehenſions of a *Deity*, ſome attributing one thing as a Perfection, another a different thing, according to their humors and inclinations. Thus imperious ſelf-willed Men are apt to cry up GOD's abſolute Power and Dominion as his greateſt Perfection; eaſy and ſoft-ſpirited Men his Patience and Goodneſs; ſevere and rigid Men his Juſtice and Severity: every one according to his humor and temper, making his GOD of his own Complection: and not only ſo, but in things remote enough from being Perfections at all; yet becauſe they are ſuch things as they prize and value, they ſuppoſe of neceſſity they muſt be in GOD, as is evident in the *Epicureans* Ἀπαθεία, by which they excluded *Providence*, as hath been already obſerv'd. And withal conſidering how very difficult it is for one who really believes that GOD is of a pure, juſt, and holy Nature, and that he hath grievouſly offended him by his ſins, to believe that this GOD will pardon him upon true repentance: It is thence neceſſary that GOD ſhould make known himſelf to the World, to prevent our miſ-conceptions of his Nature, and to aſſure a ſuſpicious, becauſe guilty Creature, how ready he is to pardon iniquity, tranſgreſſion, and ſin, to ſuch as unfeignedly repent of their follies, and return unto himſelf. Tho' the light of Nature may dictate much to us of the Benignity and Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, yet it is hard to conceive that that ſhould diſcover further than GOD's general Goodneſs to ſuch as pleaſe him: but no foundation can be gathered thence of his readineſs to pardon offenders, which being an act of Grace, muſt alone be diſcovered by his Will. I cannot think the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, are ſuch itinerant Preachers, as to unfold unto us the whole Counſel and Will of GOD in reference to Man's acceptance with GOD upon repentance. It is not every *Star* in the Firmament can do that which the *Star* once did to the *Wiſe-men*, lead them unto *Chriſt*. The *Sun* in the *Heavens* is no *Parelius* to the *Sun of Righteouſneſs*. The beſt *Aſtronomer* will never find the *Day-ſtar from on high* in the reſt of his number. What St. *Auſtin* ſaid of *Tully*'s Works, is true of the whole Volume of the Creation: There are admirable things to be found in them: but the Name of *Chriſt* is not legible there. The work of *Redemption* is not engraven on the works of *Providence*; if it had, a particular Divine Revelation had been unneceſſary, and the *Apoſtles* were ſent on a needleſs errand, which the World had underſtood without their Preaching, *viz. That God was in Chriſt reconciling the World unto himſelf, not imputing to Men their treſpaſſes, and hath committed to them the Miniſtry of Reconciliation.* How was the word of *Reconciliation* committed to them, if it were common to them with the whole frame of the World? and the *Apoſtle*'s *Quære* elſewhere might have been eaſily anſwer'd, *How can Men hear without a Preacher?* For then they might have known the way of *Salvation*, without any ſpecial Meſſengers ſent to deliver it unto them. I grant that *God's long-ſuffering* and *patience* is intended to lead Men to Repentance, and that ſome general collections might be made from *Providence* of the

2 Cor. 5. 18, 19.

Rom. 10. 14.

placability of God's Nature, and that *God never left himself without a witness of his Goodness* in the World, being *kind to the unthankful, and doing good, in giving rain and fruitful seasons.* But tho' these things might sufficiently discover to such who were apprehensive of the guilt of sin, that God did not act according to his greatest severity, and thereby did give Men encouragement to hearken out and inquire after the true way of being reconcil'd to God; yet all this amounts not to a firm Foundation for Faith, as to the remission of sin, which doth suppose God himself publishing an Act of Grace and Indemnity to the World, wherein he assures the Pardon of sin to such as truly repent and unfeignedly believe his holy Gospel. Now is not this an inestimable advantage we enjoy by the Scriptures, that therein we understand what God himself hath discover'd of his own Nature and Perfections, and of his readiness to pardon Sin upon those gracious terms of *Faith* and *Repentance*, and that which necessarily follows from these two, hearty and sincere Obedience?

Act. 14. 14. Luke 6. 35. 36.

VI. 2. *The Scripture gives the most faithful representation of the state and condition of the Soul of Man.* The World was almost lost in Disputes concerning the Nature, Condition, and Immortality of the Soul, before *Divine Revelation* was made known to Mankind by the *Gospel* of *Christ*; but *Life and Immortality* was *brought to light by the Gospel*, and the future state of the Soul of Man, not discover'd in an uncertain *Platonical* way, but with the greatest light and evidence from that God who hath the supreme disposal of Souls, and therefore best knows and understands them. The Scriptures plainly and fully reveal a Judgment to come, in which *God will judg the secrets of all Hearts*, when *every one must give an account of himself unto God*, and God will call Men to give *an account of their stewardship* here, of all the Receipts they have had from him, and the Expences they have been at, and the Improvements they have made of the Talents he put into their hands. So that the *Gospel* of *Christ* is the fullest Instrument of discovery of the certainty of the future state of the Soul, and the conditions which abide it, upon its being dislodg'd from the Body. But this is not all which the Scripture discovers as to the state of the Soul; for it is not only a Prospective-glass, reaching to its future state, but it is the most faithful Looking-glass, to discover all the spots and deformities of the Soul: And not only shews where they are, but whence they came, what their nature is, and whither they tend. The true Original of all that disorder and discomposure which is in the Soul of Man, is only fully and satisfactorily given us in the Word of God, as hath been already prov'd. The nature and working of this corruption in Man, had never been so clearly manifested, had not the Law and Will of God been discover'd to the World: that is the Glass whereby we see the secret workings of those Bees in our Hearts, the corruptions of our Natures; that sets forth the folly of our Imaginations, the unrulineſs of our Passions, the distempers of our Wills, and the abundant deceitfulness of our Hearts. And it is hard for the Elephantin sinner (one of the greatest magnitude) so to trouble these Waters, as not therein to discover the greatness of his own deformities. But that which tends most to awaken the drowsie, senseless Spirits of Men, the Scripture doth most fully describe the tendency of Corruption, that the wages of *sin* is *death*, and the issue of continuance in sin will be the everlasting misery of the Soul, in a perpetual separation from the presence of God, and undergoing the lashes and severities of Conscience to all eternity.

nity. What a great diſcovery is this of the faithfulneſs of God to the World, that he ſuffers not Men to undo themſelves without letting them know of it beforehand, that they might avoid it! God ſeeks not to entrap Mens Souls, nor doth he rejoice in the miſery and ruin of his Creatures; but fully declares to them what the conſequence and iſſue of their practices will be, aſſures them of a Judgment to come, declares his own future ſeverity againſt contumacious Sinners, that they might not think themſelves ſurpriz'd, and that if they had known there had been ſo great danger in ſin, they would never have been ſuch fools, as for the ſake of it to run into eternal miſery. Now God, to prevent this, with the greateſt plainneſs and faithfulneſs hath ſhew'd Men the nature and danger of all their ſins, and aſks them beforehand what they will do in the end thereof; whether they are able to bear his Wrath, and wreſtle with everlaſting burnings? if not, he bids them bethink themſelves of what they have done already, and repent, and amend their Lives, leſt *iniquity prove their ruin*, and *deſtruction overtake them, and that without remedy.* Now if Men have cauſe to prize and value a faithful Monitor, one that tenders their good, and would prevent their ruin; we have cauſe exceedingly to prize and value the Scriptures, which give us the trueſt repreſentation of the ſtate and condition of our Souls.

3. *The Scripture diſcovers to us the only way of pleaſing God, and enjoying his favor.* That clearly reveals the way (which Man might have ſought for to all eternity without particular Revelation) whereby Sins may be pardoned, and whatever we do may be acceptable unto God. It ſhews us that the ground of our acceptance with God, is thro' *Chriſt*, whom he hath made a *propitiation for the ſins of the World*, and who alone is the *true and living way*, whereby we may *draw near to God with a true heart, in full aſſurance of Faith, having our hearts ſprinkled from an evil conſcience.* Thro' *Chriſt* we underſtand the terms on which God will ſhew Favor and Grace to the World, and by him we have ground of a Παῤῥησία, *acceſs with freedom and holdneſs unto God.* On his account we may hope not only for Grace to ſubdue our ſins, reſiſt temptations, conquer the Devil and the World; but having *fought this good fight and finiſhed our courſe, by patient continuance in well-doing*, we may juſtly *look for glory, honor, and immortality*, and that *crown of righteouſneſs which is laid up for thoſe who wait* in faith, holineſs, and humility, *for the appearance of Chriſt from Heaven.* Now what things can there be of greater moment and importance for Men to know, or God to reveal, than the Nature of God, and our ſelves, the ſtate and condition of our Souls, the only way to avoid eternal Miſery, and enjoy everlaſting Bliſs?

VII. 2. The Scriptures diſcover not only matters of importance, but of the greateſt depth and myſteriouſneſs. There are many *wonderful things in the Law of God*, things we may admire, but are never able to comprehend. Such are the eternal Purpoſes and Decrees of God, the Doctrin of the *Trinity*, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the manner of the Operation of the Spirit of God on the Souls of Men, which are all things of great weight and moment for us to underſtand and believe that they are; and yet may be unſearchable to our Reaſon, as to the particular manner of them. What certain ground our Faith ſtands on as to theſe things hath been already ſhew'd, and therefore I forbear inſiſting on them. Book II. Ch. 8. Sect. 5, 6, 7.

3. The Scripture comprehends matters of the moſt univerſal ſatisfaction to the Minds of Men; tho' many things do much exceed our Apprehenſions, yet others are moſt ſutable to the Dictates of our Nature.

As

Orig. contra Celſ. l. 3. p. 135. As *Origen* bid *Celſus* ſee, Εἰ μὴ τὰ τῇ πίστεως ἡμῶν πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐρχῆθεν συναγορεύοντα, μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐυγνωμόνως ἀκροωμένοις καὶ λογιζομένοις, *Whether it was not the agreeableneſs of the Principles of Faith with the common Notions of Human Nature, which prevail'd moſt upon all candid and ingenuous auditors of them.* And therefore as *Socrates* ſaid of *Heraclitus* his Books, What he underſtood was excellent, and therefore he ſuppos'd that which he did not underſtand was ſo too: ſo ought we to ſay of the Scriptures, If thoſe things which are within our capacity be ſo ſutable to our Natures and Reaſons, thoſe cannot contradict our Reaſon which yet are above them. There are many things which the Minds of Men were ſufficiently aſſur'd that they were, yet were to ſeek for ſatisfaction concerning them, which they could never have had without Divine Revelation. As the Nature of true Happineſs, wherein it lay, and how to be obtain'd, which the Philoſophers were ſo puzl'd with, the Scripture gives us full ſatisfaction concerning it. True contentment under the troubles of Life, which the Scripture only acquaints us with the true grounds of; and all the preſcriptions of Heathen *Moraliſts* fall as much ſhort of, as the directions of an *Empyric* do of a wiſe and ſkilful *Phyſician*. *Avoiding the fears of Death*, which can alone be thro' a grounded Expectation of a ſtate of Happineſs which Death leads Men to, which cannot be had but thro' the right underſtanding of the Word of GOD. Thus we ſee the excellency of the matters themſelves contain'd in this Revelation of the Mind of GOD to the World.

VIII. As the Matters themſelves are of an excellent Nature, ſo is the manner wherein they are reveal'd in the Scriptures, and that,

2. 1. *In a clear and perſpicuous manner.* Not but there may be ſtill ſome paſſages which are hard to be underſtood, as being either prophetical, or conſiſting of ambiguous Phraſes, or containing matters above our comprehenſion; but all thoſe things which concern the terms of Man's Salvation are deliver'd with the greateſt evidence and perſpicuity. Who cannot underſtand what theſe things mean, *What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do juſtly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God*; that *without Faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God*; that *without Holineſs none ſhall ſee the Lord*; that *unleſs we be born again, we can never enter into the Kingdom of Heaven?* Theſe and ſuch like things are ſo plain and clear, that it is nothing but Mens ſhutting their Eyes againſt the Light can keep them from underſtanding them: GOD intended theſe things as Directions to Men; and is not he able to ſpeak intelligibly when he pleaſe? He that made the Tongue, ſhall he not ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood without an infallible Interpreter? eſpecially when it is his deſign to make known to Men the terms of their eternal Happineſs. Will GOD judg Men at the great day for not believing thoſe things which they could not underſtand? Strange! that ever Men ſhould judg the Scriptures obſcure in matters neceſſary, when the Scripture accounts it ſo great a judgment for Men not to underſtand them. *If our*
2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. *Goſpel be hid, it is hid to them that are loſt; in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, leſt the light of the glorious Goſpel of Chriſt ſhould ſhine unto them.* Sure *Lot*'s door was viſible enough, if it were a judgment for the Men of *Sodom* not to ſee it; and the Scriptures then are plain and intelligible enough, if it be ſo great a judgment not to underſtand them.

2. *In a powerful and authoritative manner*; as the things contain'd in Scripture do not ſo much beg acceptance as command it; in that the

 expreſ-

expreſſions wherein our duty is concern'd are ſuch as awe Mens Conſciences, and pierce to their Hearts and to their ſecret thoughts; *All things are open and naked before this Word of God; every ſecret of the mind and thought of the heart lies open to its ſtroke and force; it is quick and powerful, ſharper than a two-edged ſword, piercing to the dividing aſunder of ſoul and ſpirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a diſcerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.* The *Word* is a *Teleſcope* to diſcover the great Luminaries of the World, the Truths of higheſt concernment to the Souls of Men; and it is ſuch a *Microſcope* as diſcovers to us the ſmalleſt *Atom* of our Thoughts, and diſcerns the moſt ſecret intent of the Heart. And, as far as this Light reacheth, it comes with Power and Authority, as it comes arm'd with the Majeſty of that GOD who reveals it, whoſe Authority extends over the Soul and Conſcience of Man in its moſt ſecret and hidden receſſes. Heb. 4. 12, 13.

3. *In a pure and unmix'd manner.* In all other Writings how good ſoever, we ſee a great mixture of Droſs and Gold together: Here is nothing but pure Gold, Diamonds without flaws, Suns without ſpots. The moſt current Coins of the World have their Alloys of baſer Metals, there is no ſuch mixture in Divine Truths; as they all come from the ſame Author, ſo they all have the ſame purity. There is a *Urim* and *Thummim* upon the whole Scripture, Light and Perfection in every part of it. In the Philoſophers we may meet, it may be, with ſome ſcattered fragments of purer Metal, amidſt abundance of Droſs and impure Oar; here we have whole wedges of Gold, the ſame vein of purity and holineſs running thro' the whole Book of Scriptures. Hence it is call'd the *form of ſound words:* Here have been no Huckſters to corrupt and mix their own Inventions with Divine Truths. 2 Tim. 1. 13.

4. *In an uniform and agreeable manner.* This I grant is not ſufficient of it ſelf to prove the Scriptures to be Divine, becauſe all Men do not contradict themſelves in their Writings; but yet there are ſome peculiar circumſtances to be conſider'd in the agreeableneſs of the parts of Scripture to each other, which are not to be found in mere human Writings. IX.

1. That this *Doctrine was delivered by perſons who lived in different Ages and Times from each other.* Uſually one Age corrects another's faults, and we are apt to pity the Ignorance of our Predeceſſors, when it may be our Poſterity may think us as ignorant as we do them. But in the ſacred Scripture we read not one Age condemning another; we find Light ſtill increaſing in the ſeries of times in Scripture, but no reflexions in any time upon the Ignorance or Weakneſs of the precedent; the dimmeſt Light was ſufficient for its Age, and was a ſtep to further diſcovery. *Quintilian* gives it as the reaſon of the great uncertainty of *Grammar* Rules, *Quia non analogia dimiſſa cœlo formam loquendi dedit*; that which he wanted as to *Grammar*, we have as to Divine Truths; they are deliver'd from Heaven, and therefore are always uniform and agreeable to each other. *Quint. l. 1. cap. 6.*

2. *By Perſons of different intereſts in the World.* GOD made choice of Men of all ranks to be Inditers of his *Oracles*, to make it appear it was no matter of State-policy or particular intereſt which was contain'd in his Word, which Perſons of ſuch different intereſts could not have agreed in as they do. We have *Moſes*, *David*, *Solomon*, Perſons of Royal Rank and Quality; and can it be any mean thing, which theſe think it their glory to be Penners of? We have *Iſaiah*, *Daniel*, and other Perſons of the higheſt Education and Accompliſhments; and can it be

any

any trivial thing which these imploy themselves in? We have *Amos*, and other Prophets in the Old Testament, and the Apostles in the New, of the meaner sort of Men in the World, yet all these join in consort together; when God tunes the Spirits, all agree in the same strain of Divine Truths, and give light and harmony to each other.

3. *By persons in different places and conditions:* Some in prosperity in their own Country, some under banishment and adversity, yet all agreeing in the same substance of Doctrine; of which no alteration we see was made either for the flattery of those in power, or for avoiding miseries and calamities. And under all the different dispensations before, under and after the Law, tho' the management of things was different, yet the Doctrine and Design was for Substance the same in all. All the different Dispensations agree in the same common Principles of Religion; the same ground of acceptance with God, and obligation to duty, was common to all, tho' the peculiar instances wherein God was serv'd might be different, according to the Ages of growth in the Church of God. So that this great uniformity consider'd in these circumstances, is an Argument that these things came originally from the same Spirit, tho' convey'd thro' different Instruments to the knowledg of the World.

5. *In a persuasive and convincing manner:* and that these ways. 1. *Bringing Divine Truths down to our capacity*, clothing spiritual matter in familiar expressions and similitudes, that so they might have the easier admission into our Minds. 2. *Propounding things as our interest which are our duty.* Thence God so frequently in Scripture recommends our Duties to us under all those motives which are wont to have the greatest force on the Minds of Men; and annexeth gracious Promises to our Performance of them; and those of the most weighty and concerning things. Of *Grace*, *Favor*, *Protection*, *Deliverance*, *Audience of Prayers*, and *Eternal Happiness:* and if these will not prevail with Men, what Motives will? 3. *Courting us to Obedience, when he might not only command us to obey, but punish presently for disobedience.* Hence are all those most pathetical and affectionate strains we read in Scripture. *O that there was*
Deut. 5. 29. *such a heart within them, that they would fear me and keep all my commandments always, that it might go well with them, and with their chil-*
Jer. 13. 27. *dren after them. Wo unto thee, O Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made*
Ezek. 33. 11. *clean? when shall it once be? Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel? How shall I give thee up,*
Hos. 11. 8. *Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me,*
Matth. 23. 37. *my repentings are kindled together. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not.* What Majesty, and yet what sweetness and condescension is there in these expressions? What obstinacy and rebellion is it in Men for them to stand out against God, when he thus comes down from his Throne of Majesty, and wooes rebellious Sinners to return unto him that they may be pardoned? Such a matchless and unparallel'd strain of *Rhetoric* is there in the Scripture, far above the Art and Insinuations of the most admired *Orators.* Thus we see the peculiar excellency of the manner wherein the matters contain'd in Scripture are reveal'd to us. Thus we have consider'd the Excellency of the Scripture, as it is a Discovery of God's Mind to the World.

X. 2. The Scriptures may be considered as a *Rule of Life*, or as a *Law of God*, which is given for the Government of the Lives of Men, and

therein the Excellency of it lies in the Nature of the Duties, and the Encouragements to the Practice of them.

1. In the Nature of the Duties requir'd, which are *moſt becoming* GOD *to require*, moſt reaſonable for us to perform.

1. *Moſt becoming* GOD *to require*, as they are moſt ſutable and agreeable to the Divine Nature, the imitation of which in our Actions, is the ſubſtance of our Religion. Imitation of him in his Goodneſs and Holineſs, by our conſtant Endeavours of mortifying Sin, and growing in Grace and Piety. In his Grace and Mercy, by our kindneſs to all Men, forgiving the injuries Men do unto us, *doing good to our greateſt enemies.* In his Juſtice and Equity, by *doing as we would be done by, and keeping a conſcience void of offence towards* GOD *and towards Men.* The firſt takes in the Duties of the firſt, the other the Duties of the ſecond Table. *All acts of piety towards* GOD, are a part of Juſtice; for, as *Tully* ſaith, *Quid aliud eſt pietas, niſi juſtitia adverſus Deos?* and ſo *our loving* GOD *with our whole hearts, our intire and ſincere obedience to his Will*, is a part of Natural Juſtice; for thereby we do but render unto GOD that which is his due from us as we are his Creatures. We ſee then the whole Duty of Man, *the fearing* GOD *and keeping his Commandments*, is as neceſſary a part of Juſtice, as the rendring to every Man his own is.

2. They are moſt reaſonable for us to perform, in that, 1. *Religion* is not only a ſervice of the reaſonable Faculties which are imploy'd the moſt in it, the commands of the Scripture reaching the heart moſt in it, and the ſervice requir'd being a ſpiritual Service, not lying in Meats and Drinks, or any outward Obſervations, but in a ſanctify'd temper of Heart and Mind, which diſcovers it ſelf in the courſe of a *Chriſtian*'s Life: But, 2. The Service it ſelf of Religion is reaſonable; the Commands of the *Goſpel* are ſuch as no Man's Reaſon which conſiders them can doubt of the excellency of them. All Natural Worſhip is founded on the Dictates of Nature, all inſtituted Worſhip on God's revealed Will; and it is one of the prime Dictates of Nature, that God muſt be univerſally obey'd. Beſides, God requires nothing but what is apparently Man's intereſt to do; God prohibits nothing but what will deſtroy him if he doth it; ſo that the Commands of the Scriptures are very juſt and reaſonable.

2. The Encouragements are more than proportionable to the difficulty of Obedience. God's Commands are in themſelves eaſie, and moſt ſutable to our Natures. What more rational for a Creature than to obey his Maker? All the difficulty of Religion ariſeth from the corruption of Nature. Now God, to encourage Men to conquer the difficulties ariſing thence, hath propounded the ſtrongeſt Motives and moſt prevailing Arguments to Obedience. Such are the conſiderations of God's Love and Goodneſs manifeſted to the World, by ſending his Son into it, to die for Sinners, and to give them an example which they are to follow, and by his readineſs thro' him to pardon the ſins, and accept the Perſons of ſuch who *ſo receive him as to walk in him*, and by his Promiſes of Grace to aſſiſt them in the wreſtling with the enemies of their Salvation. And to all theſe add that glorious and unconceivable reward which God hath promis'd to all thoſe who ſincerely obey him; and by theſe things we ſee how much the encouragements over-weigh the difficulties, and that none can make the leaſt pretence that there is not motive ſufficient to down-weigh the troubles which attend the exerciſe of Obedience to the Will of God. Thus we ſee what a peculiar excellency there is in the

Scriptures as a Rule of Life, above all the Precepts of mere *Moraliſts*; the foundation of Obedience being laid deeper in Man's Obligation to ſerve his Maker, the practice of Obedience being carry'd higher in thoſe moſt holy Precepts which are in Scripture, the reward of Obedience being incomparably greater than what Men are able to conceive, much leſs to promiſe or beſtow.

3. The Excellency of the Scriptures appears, as they contain in them a Covenant of Grace, or the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs. The more memorable any Tranſactions are, the more valuable are any authentic Records of them. The Scriptures contain in them the *Magna Charta* of Heaven, an Act of Pardon with the Royal Aſſent of Heaven, a Proclamation of Good-will from God towards Men; and can we then ſet too great a value on that which contains all the remarkable paſſages between God and the Souls of Men, in order to their Felicity, from the beginning of the World? Can we think, ſince there is a God in the World of infinite Goodneſs, that he ſhould ſuffer all Mankind to periſh inevitably, without his propounding any means for eſcaping of eternal Miſery? Is God ſo good to Men as to this preſent Life; and can we think if Man's Soul be immortal, as we have prov'd it is, that he ſhould wholly neglect any offer of Good to Men as to their eternal Welfare? Or is it poſſible to imagine that Man ſhould be happy in another World without God's promiſing it, and preſcribing conditions in order to it? If ſo, then this Happineſs is no free gift of God, unleſs he hath the beſtowing and promiſing of it; and Man is no rational Agent, unleſs a Reward ſuppoſe conditions to be perform'd in order to the obtaining it; or Man may be bound to conditions which were never requir'd of him; or if they muſt be requir'd, then there muſt be a Revelation of God's Will, whereby he doth require them: And if ſo, then there are ſome Records extant of the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs: For what reaſon can we have to imagine that ſuch Records, if once extant, ſhould not continue ſtill, eſpecially ſince the ſame Goodneſs of God is engag'd to preſerve ſuch Records, which at firſt did cauſe them to be indited? Suppoſing then ſuch Records, extant ſomewhere in the World of theſe grand Tranſactions between God and Mens Souls, our buſineſs is brought to a Period; for what other Records are there in the World that can in the leaſt vye with the Scriptures, as to the giving ſo juſt an account of all the Tranſactions between God and Men from the foundation of the World, which gives us all the ſteps, methods and ways whereby God hath made known his Mind and Will to the World, in order to Man's eternal Salvation. It remains only then that we adore and magnifie the Goodneſs of God in making known his Will to us, and that we ſet a value and eſteem on the Scriptures, as on the only authentick Inſtruments of that *Grand Charter of Peace*, which God hath reveal'd in order to Man's eternal Happineſs.

FINIS.

ORIGINES SACRÆ.

BOOK I.

DISCOURSE I.

CHAP. I.

The General Prejudices againſt Religion in our Age examin'd; and the old Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *conſider'd.*

BEFORE I come to the particular Vindication of the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *Holy Scriptures*, which is my chief Deſign, it will be neceſſary to remove, if poſſible, the common and general Prejudices againſt Religion in this Age, as if it were only a cunning Artifice of ſome crafty Perſons to ſupport their own intereſt by deceiving the reſt of Mankind. If this were the truth of the caſe, none ought to be blam'd for their Contempt of Religion; nor for their endeavors to ſet the Minds of Men free from the uneaſineſs and ſlavery of a ſuperſtitious and groundleſs Fear. For this muſt be all that is imply'd in Religion, if it were at firſt begun, and is ſtill carry'd on by the Craft of ſome Men, and the Folly of the reſt. But ſuch an imputation as this ought to be very well grounded, becauſe it reflects on all Mankind (a very few excepted) and ought in common juſtice to be prov'd by the moſt clear and convincing Evidence; becauſe no Men have any reaſon to preſume ſo far upon their own Wit and Capacity above all others, as to take it for granted, that the reſt of Mankind are either *Fools* or *Knaves*. For this is the meaning of thoſe who go about to perſuade others, that Religion is nothing but *an Impoſture*, that hath appear'd under ſeveral ſhapes and diſguiſes; but ſtill the *Machine* is the ſame, and the ſame Deſign carry'd on by the different Actors, according to the Humor and Inclination of ſeveral Ages.

I could be glad, that all this might juſtly be look'd on as a feign'd caſe, only for a better Introduction to the following Diſcourſes; but none that live in our Age, and underſtand the too great prevalency of Scepticiſm and Infidelity in it, can apprehend it to be ſo. And therefore I ſhall lay down the true ſtate of the preſent Caſe, with reſpect to Religion in general. It cannot be deny'd by the greateſt Enemies to it, that there is ſtill a general Belief of the truth of it among Mankind, however they differ in their particular Notions about it. For this cannot be look'd on as a new Thing, or an Invention of the preſent Age, ſince it is manifeſt by the undoubted Hiſtory of former Times, that the ſame foundations of Religion have been generally receiv'd by Mankind; by which I underſtand the Being of GOD and Providence, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a future State; but yet not ſo, but that there have been

in ſeveral Ages ſuch as have gone about to unſettle Mens Minds about them, and to repreſent them as an invention of *Politicians* to keep the World in greater Awe. But they have not met with ſuch ſucceſs as they expected in their Diſcoveries; for they have been oppos'd by the wiſeſt and moſt thoughtful Men in the ſeveral Ages they appear'd in; and the generality of Mankind continu'd in the ſame Belief which they had before. And yet they had then the ſame inclinations to Eaſe and Pleaſure, as they now have, and would have been as willing to be rid of the terrible apprehenſions of God and another World; they had the ſame value and eſteem for themſelves and their own intereſts, and hated all ſuch as deſign'd to cheat them; they fell into warm Diſputes and violent Heats about ſome particular Parts and Modes of Religion, which are apt to make them call all the reſt into queſtion: Yet under all theſe diſadvantages, the Foundations of Religion have been preſerv'd among them; and Mankind cannot be brought to look on them as *an Impoſture*. But thoſe who think ſo, are forc'd in great meaſure to conceal their thoughts, and to put on diſguiſes to the World, that they may appear to be of another Mind than really they are.

Whence then comes it to paſs, that thoſe who are averſe to the Practice of Religion, yet cannot be brought to ſhake off the Principles of it? That thoſe who are otherwiſe ſo fond of their own eaſe and intereſt, ſhould abhor thoſe Atheiſtical Principles, which are ſaid to be very much for the advantage of both? That thoſe Nations which have had no communication with each other, and differ ſo much from one another in Languages, Cuſtoms, and Modes of Religion, yet agree in the ſame common ſenſe of God, and a future ſtate?

It is a ridiculous thing for any to pretend to make our Religion to be *an Impoſture*, unleſs they can firſt give a juſt and ſatisfactory account of theſe things.

All that I can meet with to that purpoſe may be reduc'd to theſe three Heads; which contain the great *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age.

I. That the Notions of Religion were firſt ſtarted among rude and barbarous People by *Politicians*, to keep the People in better awe; and that the *Prieſts* found it their intereſt to ſupport them, becauſe they were ſupported by them.

II. That there are ſome *Peculiar Qualities in Mankind*, which join'd with their *Ignorance* and *Fear*, tend to preſerve *that ſeed of Religion which is in Man, and no other living Creature.*

III. That the Conſent of Mankind is not ſo great, as is pretended, there being ſeveral Nations now known by the late diſcoveries, which have no ſenſe or notion of God, or a future ſtate.

Theſe are the things, which I ſhall now make it my buſineſs to inquire into; and thereby ſhew the vanity and folly of theſe general Prejudices againſt Religion.

I begin with the firſt, That Religion was firſt invented and carry'd on by *Politicians* and *Prieſts*, who aim'd only at keeping the World in better awe, and Themſelves in a better condition. This hath been ſuggeſted by Atheiſtical Perſons in all Ages, where they have dar'd to appear; and was thought the moſt plauſible Artifice to draw in the People to their party; for no Men love to be impos'd upon, eſpecially in what concerns their eaſe and intereſt: But they were not able to make out the Perſons, Times, or Places, when the Notions of Religion were firſt ſpread among Mankind. For they could never produce any inſtances of Perſons who

deſign'd

deſign'd to impoſe upon Mankind in matters of Religion, but they found the general Principles of Religion were entertain'd among them before; as will appear by the following Examples of the *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, which are moſt inſiſted upon.

The *Egyptians* are ſaid by *Lucian* to have been the firſt who ſet up *Religious Worſhip*; and *Herodotus* ſeems to be of the ſame opinion. *Plutarch* ſaith it was done by *Oſiris*, and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith *it was directed by* Hermes, *who was a great Politician*, and *chief Counſellor to* Oſiris. But all that *Diodorus* ſaith, is, *that he brought the Honors and Services of the Gods into Order*; which ſuppoſes that there was Religion among them before, but he methodiz'd it. And if we believe *Sanchoniathon*, who makes him firſt Counſellor to *Cronus* Father to *Miſor* or *Oſiris*, he began *the Symbolical Images of the Gods*, which caus'd ſuch confuſion in their Worſhip afterwards. *Diodorus* ſaith *that* Oſiris *built* Thebes *or* Dioſpolis, where there was a Temple to *the Immortal God that made the World*, as appears by the Teſtimonies both of *Plutarch* and *Porphyry*. And the former obſerves, *That the moſt ancient, and univerſal and moſt credible Tradition, both of Law-givers and others, Philoſophers, as well as Poets and Divines, was, that the World was not made by chance, without a Mind and Reaſon to order and govern it.* From whence it follows, That before ſuch *Politicians* took upon them to order matters of Religion, there was a generally receiv'd Tradition of a Divine Being, which made and govern'd the World, and was the true foundation on which religious Worſhip was built. And the ſame *Plutarch* in that Diſcourſe affirms it to be *an Impious and Atheiſtical Opinion to attribute the Name of* GOD *to inſenſible Matter*; and adds, *that there is one univerſal Reaſon which governs the World. Ammianus Marcellinus* ſaith, *that the firſt beginnings of Religion were in* Egypt *long before they were in other parts.* Here therefore we muſt ſearch out for the firſt laying this deſign by *Politicians*; and here we find it fix'd upon *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*, who by the accounts given of him, was a very great Man, and that in the beginning of the *Egyptian Monarchy. Philo Byblius* ſaith, he was call'd by the *Egyptians Thoth*, by the *Phœnicians Taautus*, by the *Greeks Hermes:* He flouriſh'd, he ſaith, *with great reputation for Wiſdom among the* Phœnicians; who it ſeems at that time were under the Government of *Cronus* Father to *Oſiris* (or *Miſor*, as they call'd him from *Miſraim*, the Son of *Ham*, who firſt peopled thoſe Countries.) And ſo far there is nothing improbable in the Story: For the ſame Perſon being of an extraordinary Capacity, might be in favor both with *Cronus* in *Phœnicia*, and with *Oſiris* afterwards in *Egypt*. But he goeth on, and ſaith, That *Taautus* was *the firſt who took the matters of religious Worſhip out of the hands of unſkilful Men, and brought them into due Method and Order.* So that we find plainly there was Religion among the People before: But this wiſe Politician thought he could manage it better, if he appointed the Rites of publick Worſhip, ſo as to be moſt ſerviceable to Government; and for that end he ſet up the worſhip of Princes after their Death (eſpecially of *Oſiris*, after his being cut in pieces by his Brother, and joyn'd their Names with thoſe of the Stars, as viſible Deities; and of ſome Animals, as ſo many living Images of their Gods. And herein, as far as we can find, lay the politick invention of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*; not in the firſt planting the principles of Religion, but in turning them that way, as he thought would ſerve beſt to the ends of Government, by raiſing a high veneration for deceas'd Monarchs, and deifying ſuch things as they thought moſt uſeful

Lucian. de Deâ Syriâ. Herodot. 2. 4. Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride. Diod. Sicul. l. 1. Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 10. Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſirid. Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 11. Plutarch. ib. p. 369. Ammian. Marc. l. 22. Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l. 1. c. 10. p. 40.

Πρῶτος τὰ περὶ τὴν θεοσέβειαν ἐκ τῶν ἀλόγων χυδαίων ἀπειρίας, εἰς ὀμοιότητα μονήρους ἐμπειρίαν διέταξεν.

to Mankind. This was indeed playing the *Politician* with Religion. But that there was a ſenſe of Religion before among the People, not only appears by the former Saying of *Philo Byblius*, but by another in his *Proem* to *Sanchoniathon*; where he ſaith, *That the* Phœnicians *and* Egyptians *agreed (from whom other Nations took it up) to worſhip thoſe as their chief Gods, which were moſt uſeful to Mankind; and to this purpoſe they turn'd the Temples already ſtanding, and erected Pillars and Statues to their Memories, and made Feſtivals to them.* From whence it appears that there were Rites of publick Worſhip among them before; but that *Hermes* caus'd them to be imploy'd this way, joining the Worſhip of the Stars and their Kings together.

Καὶ εἰς τὸ χρεὼν καταστάντας ναοὺς μεταskευάσαμένους.

But there are two very different accounts concerning that Religion which was firſt ſetled by *Hermes* in *Egypt*. The one is of thoſe who believe there are ſome remainders of the old *Egyptian* Doctrine in the *Triſmegiſtick Books*, tho' with many additions and interpolations. And their Opinion is, that under all the popular Diſguiſes and ſuperſtitious Ceremonies for amuſing the Common People, he did cover the true Principles of Natural Religion, aſſerting the Being and Providence of God, and the Immortality of Souls. And for this, they produce not only divers paſſages in thoſe Books of *Hermes*, which were known in the *Egyptian* times, while their Prieſts were yet in being to have contradicted them, if they had publiſh'd Falſhoods under ſo great a Name; but from the Teſtimonies of *Plutarch* and *Iamblicus*, which cannot be ſuſpected: To which the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who ſojourn'd ſo long among the *Egyptian* Prieſts to learn their Doctrine, may be added. But it is not pretended that in thoſe times this was the common and profeſs'd Religion among the People; but that it was kept up *as a Secret*, not to be communicated but only to ſuch who were prepar'd for it. According to this opinion, the deſign of *Hermes* was not to eſtabliſh any true Religion among the People, but to entertain them with Pomp, and Sacrifices, and Ceremonies; and (as ſome in *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* think) to keep up a difference among them about the ſacred Animals, to ſecure them from an univerſal Conſpiracy againſt the Monarchy. But if the true Notions of God, and Providence, and another World, were preſerv'd among the Prieſts, eſpecially at *Dioſpolis*, or the famous *Thebes*, where the chief of their reſidence was; then it appears, that theſe were not ſcatter'd among the Common People, by *Prieſts* and *Politicians*; but were kept ſecret, as not ſo fit for their capacities, which would go no further than viſible Deities, and a pompous Worſhip. So that the True Principles of Religion were not ſow'd by them to ſerve their ends, but the Corruptions of it, in order to the pleaſing and entertaining the ſenſes and devotions of the Common People, who they knew were moſt affected with what was moſt agreeable to their ſuperſtitious fancies. And there was much more of *Policy* than *Religion*, in keeping the Beſt parts of it from the knowledg of the People: but the *Politicians* knew very well, thoſe would not ſerve their turn ſo well as the fopperies of their Superſtition.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 380. Diod. Sic. l. 1.

But there is another opinion which depends moſt upon the credit of *Philo Byblius*, who liv'd about *Hadrian*'s time. This Man being learned, had a mind to make ſome noiſe in the World with the *Antiquities* of his own Country (for *Byblus* was a *Phœnician* Town.) He found the *Jewiſh* Antiquities aſſerted by *Joſephus* and others, and the *Egyptian* by *Apion*; and now he thought was a fit time to vie with them both. To that

end,

end, he produces Nine Books of the *Phœnician Antiquities*, written, as he pretended, long ſince by *Sanchoniathon*, and tranſlated by him into *Greek*; which he pretends *to have found after a moſt diligent ſearch into the* Phœnician *Monuments*. And to make it appear how credible this account of *Sanchoniathon* was, he ſaith, *He took it out of the Records of Cities, and the Monuments of Temples; which were kept up in the ſacred Ammonian Letters.* And this Man is very much commended by *Porphyry* writing againſt the *Chriſtians* for his *Antiquity* and *Veracity*. What ground there is for theſe Pretences may be examin'd afterwards; I am now only to conſider the Scheme of Religion, which is produc'd with ſo much pomp; and yet the Author of it, whoever he was, was neither Divine, Philoſopher, nor Politician, for it is one of the rankeſt and moſt inſipid pieces of Atheiſm that is to be found in Antiquity. And *Porphyry* could not but deteſt it, unleſs he had produc'd it in ſpite to the *Chriſtians*. For he doth on all occaſions declare not only his belief of GOD and Providence, but that he was the Maker of the World; as *Holſtenius* hath made it appear in his Life, *cap.* 9. and it is well known that he was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt*. But let us now ſee what an account we have from this *Phœnician Scheme*, about the making of the World. "At firſt there was a dark, "confus'd, reſtleſs Chaos, which was agitated for a long time, and no-"thing came of it. At length a mixture happened, and this was the "firſt principle of making the Univerſe: but it was ignorant of its own "making. From this Mixture came *Môt*, or a ſlimy kind of ſubſtance, "out of which iſſued the Generation of all things. There were ſome "Animals which had no Senſe, out of which came thoſe which had Un-"derſtanding, and were called *Zophaſemin*, i. e. Beholders of the Hea-"vens, and were made in the figure of an Egg: and the *Môt* ſhined "forth, and the Sun and Moon and great Stars appear'd. But it ſeems "thoſe living Creatures were faſt aſleep, till they were awaked by dread-"ful Thunders, and then they began to beſtir themſelves. This is the ſhort account of this matter, which depends not, we are told, on *Sanchoniathon*'s Authority; *but he took it out of the Records of* Taautus *himſelf*. And ſo we have the Original of the World according to this ancient *Hermes*. And if this were his true Doctrine, it is one of the moſt abſurd and ſenſleſs pieces of Atheiſm, and tends directly to overthrow all Religion in the World. For can any thing do it more effectually, than to ſuppoſe that there was nothing originally in the World but ſtupid Matter; which by its own motion, without a GOD to give and direct it, ſhould produce the Heavens and Earth, and all living Creatures; and that Senſleſs Creatures ſhould beget thoſe that had Underſtanding; and theſe not capable of acting, till they were thoroughly awaked by cracks of Thunder? Can we imagin this *Taautus* to have been any deep Philoſopher or Politician, by ſetting down ſuch extravagant and unreaſonable ſuppoſitions as theſe? But let us ſee how it was poſſible for him to advance any thing like Religion upon theſe grounds: He muſt be a Politician indeed that could do it. The firſt Men, he ſaith, conſecrated the Fruits of the Earth, by which they liv'd, and worſhip'd them, and made oblations to them. This was a very notable beginning of Religion, according to this admirable Politician, for Mankind to worſhip what they devour'd. But *Cotta* in *Cicero* thought **No Man could be ſo mad to worſhip what he did eat.* But he ſaith, *That theſe notions of Worſhip were ſuitable to their weakneſs and puſillanimity.* This doth not give any account how they came to have any notions of Divine Worſhip at all. What was there

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 9.

Euſeb. l. 10. c. 9.

* *Ecquem tam amentem eſſe putas, ut illud quo veſcatur credat Deum eſſe?* Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3. c. 16.

there in the Plants, which made them give ſuch Reverence and Devotion to them? They ſaw how they grew out of the Earth, and had no power to help themſelves, when they made uſe of them for food. And how was it poſſible then to give Divine Worſhip to them? which muſt ſuppoſe Power at leaſt in what is worſhip'd, or elſe it is a moſt ridiculous folly in Mankind to ſtoop to things ſo much below them. Now this original inclination to give Divine Worſhip to ſomething or other, is that which argues that there is that which ſome call a Natural Seed of Religion in Human Nature; and muſt come from ſome antecedent Cauſe, ſince there could be nothing in theſe Objects of Worſhip, which ſhould move them to it; if it had been ſo, as *Sanchoniathon* repreſents it from the ancient Records of *Taautus*.

The two firſt Mortals, he ſaith, *were* Æon *and* Protogonus; *and their Children were* Genus *and* Genea, *who inhabited* Phœnicia; *and when they were ſcorched with the heat, they lift up their hands to the Sun, whom they believ'd to be the Lord of Heaven, and called him* Beel-ſamen, *the ſame*, ſaith he, *whom the Greeks call* Ζεύς. But how came they to imagin any Lord of Heaven, if they knew that the Sun was made out of ſenſleſs Matter, as well as themſelves? It may be ſaid, *That they being weak and ignorant, did not know it.* But how then came their poſterity to know it, if the very firſt Race of Mankind were ignorant of it? By what means came *Taautus* to be ſo well inform'd? Revelation cannot be pretended, for that ſuppoſes what they deny, *viz.* a Supreme Being, above Matter, which hath Underſtanding, and gives it to Mankind. But here Mankind come to be underſtanding Creatures, by being born of Animals that had no Senſe: which is a moſt unreaſonable Suppoſition. They could not have it by original Tradition; for that fails in the Fountain-head, if the firſt pair of Mortals knew nothing of it. Then they muſt find it out by Reaſon: and how was that poſſible, if there was no Maker of the World, that there ſhould be *a Lord of Heaven?* It is a remarkable Saying of *Ariſtotle* obſerv'd by *Cicero*, (who ſaw ſeveral of his pieces which we have not, after they were brought to *Rome* by *Sylla*, and put into order by *Andronicus Rhodius*) That if there were Men bred under ground, and had there all conveniencies of Life, without coming upon the ſurface of the Earth; but ſhould only hear that there was a God and a Divine Power; and afterwards theſe Perſons ſhould come out of their Caves, and behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Clouds, the force of the Wind, the bulk, and beauty, and influence of the Sun, with the orderly motions and courſes of the heavenly Bodies: they could not but think, not only that there was a Divine Power, but that theſe things were the effects of it. And why ſhould there not have been the ſame thoughts in this firſt Race of Mankind, unleſs we can ſuppoſe that they had never heard of any ſuch thing as God, or a Divine Power in the World? But then I ask, How they ſhould come to think of worſhipping this *Beel-ſamen* or Lord of the Heavens? for ſo he confeſſes they did, and *lift up their hands to the Sun.* What could the lifting up their hands ſignify to a ſenſleſs maſs of Fire, which lately happened to be united together by chance in one body? If he had made Mankind wholly devoid of Religion, till they had been inſtructed in it by ſome crafty Politician, it had been much more agreeable to this *Hypotheſis*; but to ſuppoſe them to pray to the Heavenly Bodies ſo early, and without any Inſtructor, muſt imply ſome natural apprehenſion of a Deity, altho' they were ſo much miſtaken in the Object of

De Nat. Deor. l. 2. 37.

Divine Worſhip. But it is not reaſonable to believe this ſhould have been ſo early and ſo univerſal, but that they preſum'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars to have been the viſible Deities appointed to govern the viſible World; and that the Supreme Mind was to be worſhip'd in a way ſutable to his own Excellency, by acts of the Mind; which was the opinion of many Nations, and ſome of the greateſt Philoſophers.

Then he proceeds to relate, how after ſome of their poſterity had found out ſome uſeful Inventions as to the conveniences of Life; after their death their Children erected Statues and Pillars to their Memories, and worſhip'd and kept annual Feſtivals at them: and that after the death of *Uranus*, and *Cronus*, and *Dagon*, and the reſt, *Taautus* made Symbolical Images of them, being made King of *Egypt* by *Cronus*; and theſe things he ſaith, the *Cabiri*, by *Taautus* his own command, enter'd into Records, from whence we are to believe that *Sanchoniathon* took them, and *Philo Byblius* tranſlated them out of the *Phœnician* Language. And *Euſebius* ſeems not to queſtion the antiquity of them, but prefers this plain and ſimple Story far before the Inventions of Poets, or the Allegories of the Philoſophers. If theſe things were recorded by the *Cabiri*, the Sons of *Sydyc*, Brother to *Miſor*, the Father of *Taautus*, they do not ſeem to have conſulted the honour of *Taautus*; for they make him not barely to be chief Counſellor to *Cronus*, in the deſign againſt his Father *Uranus*, but that he made uſe of Magical Arts againſt him, (but they do not tell us who invented them, nor upon what principles they could be founded, if there were nothing but Matter in the World) and beſides this, he adviſ'd *Cronus*, having a ſuſpicion of his Brother, to bury him alive in the Earth. And one would think ſo great a Politician as *Hermes*, would never have commanded the *Cabiri* to have preſerv'd theſe Stories of himſelf and his Anceſtors.

However, this is the account given by *Philo Byblius*, out of *Sanchoniathon*, about the firſt planting Religion by *Hermes*, who was after worſhipped himſelf as a God by the *Egyptians*. And now let any one conſider, whether this be a reaſonable or tolerable account of the firſt *ſowing the ſeeds of Religion among Mankind*. And yet this was the foundation of that ſort of Religion which came out of *Phœnicia* and *Egypt* into *Greece*: For they pretend to give an account of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, or *Saturn* and his Sons, and of *Minerva* at *Athens*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* ſaith, *Saturn gave the dominion of it*; but the *Greeks*, as *Philo Byblius* complains, *confounded all with their Fables and Allegories*: but this, he ſaith, is the true foundation which they rais'd their *Mythology* upon.

It is evident by what is ſaid by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus Siculus* and others, that there were ſeveral Colonies that went out of *Egypt* into *Greece*, in the times of *Cecrops*, *Cadmus*, *Danaus*, and *Erectheus*; and it is very probable that they carry'd the *Egyptian* Superſtitions along with them: but the Perſon who is pretended to have ſetled Religion among the *Greeks*, was *Orpheus*, who is ſaid to have reduc'd them firſt from Barbariſm, and then to have model'd Religion among them, and to have brought out of *Egypt* the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a Future State.

This muſt therefore be more particularly inquired into. *Orpheus* is reported to have been a Man of Quality in his own Country of *Thrace*, his Father having a Command over a ſmall Territory there, called *Sithonia*, * ſaith *Pliny*, near the Mountain *Rhodope*, whence he had his Title *Rhodopeius Orpheus*. But † *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *That when he had accompliſhed*

* *Plin. l. 4. c. 11.*
† *Diod. Sic. l. 1. & 4.* *Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 1.*

compliſhed himſelf at home, he went into Egypt; *and from thence brought the greateſt part of the* Egyptian *Myſteries into* Greece, *only changing the Names from* Oſiris *and* Iſis, *to* Bacchus *and* Ceres; and ſo he did, *as to the ſtate of the Good and Bad after death.* For, ſaith he, *The* Elyſian *Fields for the Good, and the Torments of* Hades *for the Bad, were both of* Egyptian *original.* I do not queſtion but the *Egyptian* Superſtition was in great meaſure the foundation of the *Greek*; but it is hard to determin any thing concerning *Orpheus*, ſince *Ariſtotle*, who was born in *Macedonia*, *knew nothing of him*, as *Cicero* informs us, and *that the Verſes under his Name were written by a* Pythagorean. Which is not at all improbable. But not only *Diodorus* ſpeaks poſitively about him, but *Strabo* and *Pauſanias* ſeem not at all to queſtion him; and *Diogenes Laertius* mentions an Epitaph upon him at *Dios* in *Macedonia:* But I lay no weight on the Verſes under his Name; for *Suidas* mentions ſeveral antient Poets of that Name; and it is allow'd on all hands, that there have been at leaſt great Additions and Interpolations in the Verſes that bear the Name of *Orpheus.* The *Argonautics*, *Suidas* ſaith, were written by one *Orpheus* of *Crotone*, one well acquainted with *Piſiſtratus:* Others ſay, the true Author of the *Orphic Poems* was *Onomacritus*, who liv'd about that time; and the *Deſcent into Hades* was written by one *Orpheus* of *Camarine*, ſaith *Suidas.* The moſt probable Opinion is that of *Ariſtotle*, that his Sacred Poems were written by a *Pythagorean*; and therefore the *Platoniſts Syrianus* and *Proclus* might well boaſt of the agreement of the *Orphic* and *Pythagorean* Doctrines. It is no Objection, that there is no ſuch thing now to be found in *Ariſtotle*; for I think *Cicero* may be truſted, who ſaw more of *Ariſtotle* than we now have. But I confeſs if *Diodorus* were not deceiv'd by the *Egyptian* Prieſts, their mentioning him with *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Eudoxus*, and *Democritus*, who were certainly in *Egypt*, makes it very credible, that *Orpheus* had been there too, and carry'd many of the *Egyptian* ſuperſtitions with him: and he might the eaſier ſettle them in *Greece*, becauſe, as *Diodorus Siculus* obſerves, he had a particular intereſt in the Colony which *Cadmus* brought, and was much eſteem'd by them; and *Cadmus* himſelf was originally of *Thebes* or *Dioſpolis*; altho' *Cadmus* himſelf might call it after his own Name; or at leaſt the Caſtle, which long continued it, when the City was called *Thebes.*

L. 10. c. 8.

De Nat. Deor. l. 1.

But that *Orpheus* did not find thoſe parts ſo barbarous, as to be deſtitute of all Religion before, will appear from the account *Diodorus Siculus* himſelf gives of him, *viz. That he was very well inſtructed in the Theology of his Country before he went into* Egypt. How could this be, if they were a wild and barbarous People, without any ſenſe of GOD and Religion, till he return'd and planted it among them? It's true, he calls it a *Mythology*; and what elſe were the *Egyptian* Doctrines about *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, or about *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, as *Orpheus* chang'd them? But whether it were a *Mythology* or not, he calls it a *Theology*; ſuch as was then known and thought to be true Doctrine, and I am apt to think, more decent and agreeable to their natural notions of Religion, than the Myſteries which *Orpheus* brought among them from the *Egyptians.* Some have obſerv'd, that the very Name of Religion among the *Greeks* was deriv'd from the *Thracians* (Θρησκεία) and ſuch Religion they had among them, before *Orpheus* was born, as *Diodorus* himſelf confeſſes. Whether *Zamolxis* had inſtructed them in Religion before the time of *Orpheus*, we cannot determin, unleſs his time had been better fix'd: The *Greeks*, who write *Pythagoras* his Life in favor to themſelves, make *Zamolxis* his

Καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Θεολογίας μυθολογούμενα μαθὼν, ἀπεδήμησε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους. l. 4. p. 232.

Servant;

Servant; and that he went from them to inſtruct the *Getæ*, among whom he was honor'd as a God. But *Herodotus*, who extols them *as the moſt valiant and juſt of the* Thracians, after he had told the *Greek* Story about *Zamolxis* being *Servant to* Pythagoras, he concludes, *That he thought him long before* Pythagoras. And he ſaith, *that the* Thracians *had that opinion of his Doctrine, that they deſpis'd Death, ſaying, they only went to* Zamolxis. From whence it is plain, that the *Thracians* then believed the Immortality of the Soul: and *Pomponius Mela* ſaith, *that Belief continu'd among them to his time.* But whereas *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that Orpheus *brought all the Mythology about* Hades, *and the ſtate of the Dead, out of* Egypt, *and the cuſtoms of Burial there; for the Body was to be convey'd over the Lake* Acheron *by* Charon, *where on one ſide were pleaſant Fields, and not far off the Temple of* Hecate, *and* Cocytus, *and* Lethe: I do not deny that *Orpheus* might add particular circumſtances from what he had obſerv'd in *Egypt*; but that the whole Tradition concerning a Future State came from thence, is ſo ſo far from being true, that the *Thracians*, the *Getæ*, and *Hyperborei* had the like Tradition among them; as appears by the *Gothic Edda's*, where we read *of the Judgment* of another World, and that the Good ſhall dwell with *Odin* in a happy ſtate, and the Bad go to *Hellen* and *Thiſſulheim:* and a large account is given of the manner of Judicature in the other World, from the Braſs Tables of the *Hyperborei* in the Iſland of *Delos*, which are mention'd in the Dialogue *Axiochus* in *Plato's* Works. And however it be not genuine, it is ſufficient to our purpoſe that all this Tradition came not out of *Egypt*. One would think, by the account given by *Diodorus*, that neither *Orpheus*, nor the *Egyptians*, believ'd any thing at all concerning a Future State: but that only ſome Ceremonies were us'd about Burials, wherein the Lives of Men were enquir'd into, and Judgment paſs'd upon them; which the Hiſtorian thinks more effectual for reforming Mankind, than the *Greek* or Poetical Fables. But that the *Egyptians* had a real Belief of another State, appears from *Diodorus* himſelf. For if any Perſon were accus'd before the ſolemn Judicature, which ſat upon him; if the matter were not prov'd, the Accuſer was ſeverely puniſh'd; if it were, the Body was depriv'd of Burial: If there were no Accuſation, then the Perſon's Virtues were remembred, his Piety, Juſtice, Chaſtity, *&c.* and they concluded with a Prayer, that he might be admitted to the bleſſed Society of the Good; and the People applauded his Happineſs in that reſpect. But *Porphyry*, who cannot be ſuſpected of Forgery in this matter, gives a more particular account of this Prayer, which he ſaith *Euphantus* tranſlated out of the *Egyptian* Language; and the ſubſtance of it is this: They firſt take out the Bowels, and put them into a Cheſt on purpoſe, and then lift it up towards Heaven; and the Perſon to whom it belongs, makes a Prayer in the name of the Deceaſed, to the Sun and all the Gods, which give Life to Men, that they would receive him into the Society of the immortal Gods. For he had piouſly worſhip'd the Gods his Parents had taught him, as long as he liv'd; he had honor'd thoſe from whom he came into the World; he had not kill'd, nor injur'd or defrauded any one, nor had committed any horrible Wickedneſs; but if he had offended in eating and drinking, it was for the ſake of that which was in that Cheſt; and ſo they took that, and threw it into the River, and intombed the reſt of the Body. By this we ſee a diſtinction is to be made between the general ſenſe of another Life, and ſome particular Superſtitions, ſuch as thoſe

Herodot. l. 9. c. 95.

Mela l. 2. c. 2. *Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 58, 61.*

Edda Mythol. c. 3.

Porphyr. de Abſtin. l. 1. c. 10.

Orpheus

Orpheus carry'd into *Greece*, where they had a notion of another World before, as well as in *Egypt*. For it is not reasonable to presume that the *Greeks* should be worse in this respect than the most barbarous Northern People. For, besides those already mention'd, *Cæsar*, and *Strabo*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* say, *that the* Druids *asserted the Immortality of Souls*; and neither *Orpheus*, nor any out of *Egypt* ever convers'd among them.

Cæs. l. 6. *Strabo l. 4.* *Ammian. Marcellin. l. 15.*

But some in our Age are so fond of the *Egyptians*, that they will by all means make the Immortality of Souls to be *a Noble Invention of theirs*. What is the meaning of this *Noble Invention?* Is it that none ever thought of it before them, and all others deriv'd it from them? That appears already to be otherwise, and that very distant and remote Nations, who had no communication with these Noble Inventors, held the same Opinions; as might, if it were needful, be prov'd by undoubted Testimonies, both of the *East* and *West Indies*, where neither *Orpheus* nor the *Egyptian* Priests were ever heard of. And *Pausanias* long since observ'd, *That the* Chaldeans *and* Indians *held the same*, and before the *Egyptians*; for he *makes them the first*. But *Herodotus* saith, *That the* Egyptians *were the first who asserted the Immortality of Souls*. Not absolutely; *but so as to pass from one Body to another, till at last it came into a human Body.* And of this *Noble Invention* let the *Egyptians* have the due honor; and not those *Greeks*, who, as he saith, *would deprive them of it*. It is great pity they should lose it, since *Diodorus Siculus* saith, *The Soul of* Osiris *past into a Bull, and that is the reason why they give so much honor to it.* It cannot be deny'd, that some *Greek* Philosophers of great reputation did assert the *Transmigration of Souls*, if their Doctrine be not misrepresented: but neither *Pythagoreans* nor *Platonists* did hold it universally, nor in such a manner as is commonly understood. For, they held no Transmigration of the Souls of Good Men, which were fit for Happiness; but asserted that they went immediately to Heaven, or a state of Bliss, as may be prov'd by the testimonies of *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Plato*, and many others: but the difficulty lay about Impure Souls; the *Pythagoreans* utterly rejected the poetical Fables about the state of the Dead; and therefore they were forc'd to think of some way of purifying them after Death. They had no Light to direct them, but their own Imagination; and they thought it best for the same Soul to come into another Human Body, to try if it would behave it self better, that it might be happy: But for profligate and very wicked Persons, they told them of going into such Beasts, as were most remarkable for those Vices they were most addicted to; as the Cruel into Tygers and Beasts of Prey; the Voluptuous into Swine; the Proud and Vain into Birds; the Idle and Soft into Fishes. This is the account given, saith *Bessarion*, by *Timæus* in his Book *de Mundo & Animâ*. And when *Trapezuntius* charg'd *Plato* with asserting that *Brutes were informed by Human Souls*; Cardinal *Bessarion*, a very learned *Greek*, utterly denies it, and saith, *That* Plato *doth not make the Soul of a Man to become the Soul of a Brute; but only that it is confined to it as a Prison for a certain time, but it is not capable of acting there for want of proper Organs.* So that these Philosophers Opinion was very different from the *Egyptians*. But whence came the most antient Philosophers to hold the Immortality of Souls? Had they it from the *Egyptians?* *Plutarch* saith, That Thales *was the first*; not that held the Soul to be immortal; for so many did before him; but that maintained it as a Philosopher by Reason; that is, because it had the Principle

Epicharm. apud Grot. Excerpt. p. 481. *Element. Alex. Str. 5.* *Poësis Philos. p. 28.*

Bessar. cont. Calumn. l. 2. c. 7.

* Θαλῆς πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον καὶ ἀϊδιον, *Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 4. c. 2.*

Principle of Motion within it ſelf, and ſo could not be ſuppoſed to forſake it ſelf, or to ceaſe moving by the death of the Body. For, as *Cicero* obſerves, a Body is moved by impulſe from another Body; but the Soul finds it hath this power wholly within and from it ſelf, and therefore is immortal. *Cicero Tuſc.* 1. 23.

But *Pythagoras* is ſaid *to have learnt this Doctrine in* Egypt: He called the Soul *a ſelf-moving Number*, ſaith *Plutarch* in the ſame place, *i. e.* as he well explains it, he puts *Number* after his myſtical way for *a Mind*: and it ſeems very ſtrange to me that ſo great a Man as *Ariſtotle* ſhould think *Pythagoras* ſpake literally of *Numbers*, as tho' any Number could move it ſelf. But *Plutarch* rightly interpreted him, and the latter *Pythagoreans* from *Moderatus Gadetanus* made no ſcruple of ſaying that Pythagoras *expreſſed his ſenſe about immaterial Beings by Numbers and Figures, as having nothing of Matter in them.* And it is very probable, he learnt this way from the *Symbols* and *Hieroglyphicks* of the *Egyptians*. But *Cicero* ſaith, *That he had learnt the Immortality of the Soul from his Maſter* Pherecydes, *which he confirmed very much.* And it is obſervable, that he firſt ſuppoſes *a general conſent of Mankind as to the Immortality of Souls, from a very antient Tradition*; and then proceeds to the *Philoſophers*, who offer'd to give Reaſons for aſſerting it, of which he gives an account. And if there were ſuch a general conſent *from all Antiquity*, as he affirms, then this Doctrine could not originally come out of *Egypt* by *Orpheus* into *Greece*. *Porphyr. in vit. Pythag. Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 354. Cicero Tuſc.* 1. 16. *Cap.* 13. *Cap.* 12.

Let us now conſider the ſenſe of Religion or Divine Worſhip among the *Greeks* before *Orpheus* his time; whether they were ſuch Strangers to it, as they muſt be ſuppoſed, if he brought it firſt among them. *Plato* was a very competent Witneſs as to the *Old Greeks*; and he affirms *that the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece *ſeem'd to him to have worſhip'd no other Gods, but the Sun, Moon, and Earth, and Stars, and the Heavens, as moſt barbarous Nations ſtill do.* So that here we have the ſame *Religion* in *Greece*, that was then common to the reſt of the World; *i. e.* the Worſhip of *Viſible Deities*, and ſuch as they apprehended to have the greateſt influence upon their Affairs. The heavenly Bodies did ſtrike them with aſtoniſhment at their Vaſtneſs, and Beauty, and orderly Motion, and the Benefits they continually receiv'd from them; and theſe they were moſt ready to pay their Devotions to, as to thoſe which appear'd moſt to them; but that which did not appear, was to them, that were ſo much govern'd by Senſe, as if it were not. As if we ſuppoſe a Prince travelling with his Chariot in the Country, with the Curtains drawn up on all ſides, and a great Retinue about him; the People are much ſurprized with ſo great an Appearance, and flock about them to ſee to whom they muſt pay their Reſpects; and ſeeing no body in the Chariot, they turn their eyes to the Attendants, and eſpecially to him that ſits ſo high in the Coach-box and manages the Horſes; and immediately give him that profound Reverence which was only due to the Prince himſelf, if he had appear'd: Much after this manner it was with the Barbarous People, both in *Greece* and other parts of the World. There was ſomething ſo great, as to require Devotion from them; and they looked about them, and could ſee nothing which they thought could deſerve it better than the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which were placed very high, and were the great Movers which kept all things in their order, and made them ſo ſerviceable to them. But this is far from being an argument that they had no Religion; it being rather a ſign they had *Plato in Cratyl. p.* 397.

too much, but knew not how to govern it. But this was a far more reaſonable Worſhip than that which *Orpheus* or the *Old Poets* brought in among the *Greeks*, whoſe Stories and Ceremonies were ſo filthy and indecent, as were enough to have turn'd the ſtomachs of modeſt and virtuous Men from any kind of Worſhip, which had the tincture of ſo much Obſcenity going along with it. And it is really to be wonder'd at, that the *Orphick Myſteries* and *poetical Fables* receiv'd among the *Greeks*, did not quite overthrow all Religion among them. For, as *Plutarch* well ſaith, *Abſurd Notions of* GOD *have very bad conſequences both ways*; *for ſome are plung'd into the depth of Superſtition, and others, to avoid that, run themſelves into Atheiſm.* And if there had not been ſome very great reaſon in Nature, to have kept the Notion of a DEITY in Mens Minds; it is hardly conceivable, that under all the horrible Superſtitions of *Greece*, there ſhould be any ſuch thing as a ſenſe of Religion left among them. But the evidence of that was ſo great, as made all Men of Underſtanding to put any tolerable ſenſe upon thoſe *vile Superſtitions*, which were ſo prevailing in *Greece*, after the *Egyptian Fopperies* were brought in among them. The Rule they went by was this, That Religion muſt be preſerv'd in the World, not to ſerve Politick Ends, but to ſatisfy the Reaſon and common Senſe of Mankind; and that ſince ſuch a way of Worſhip was ſo generally receiv'd, they were willing to put the beſt conſtructions upon it, and to make it ſome way or other ſerve to keep up the ſenſe of a Divine Power in the management of the World. And of this we have a remarkable inſtance in *Plutarch*, with reſpect to the *Egyptian Myſteries*, in his Treatiſe of *Iſis* and *Oſiris*. He profeſſes at firſt *a great deſire to find out the truth of theſe things that concern the knowledg of* GOD, *it being the greateſt Bleſſing* GOD *can give, and Mankind can receive*; *and that without it Immortality is not Life, but Duration. And the end of all*, he ſaith, *is the knowledg of the firſt and principal and intellectual Being.* But he can make nothing at all of the *Matters of fact* with relation to *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, which he looks on as very abſurd, and ſo overthrows all the *Phœnician Scheme* of *Philo Byblius*, who lived much about the ſame time under *Trajan*: But *Plutarch* ſaith, *To underſtand thoſe things of a Divine Being literally, is ſo abſurd and impious, that they deſerve to be ſpit at who offer them.* And for thoſe, *who interpret theſe things of great Princes in former times, who had Divine Honor given them, this*, he ſaith, *is the way to overthrow the natural ſenſe of a Divine Being, and ſo open the way to Atheiſm, by confounding Gods and Men together*; as he ſaith, *Euhemerus Meſſenius* had done. And therefore he was fain to turn all into *Allegory*, to avoid the miſchief of abſurd and impious Opinions concerning that Divine Power, which he owned to be in the World; and not only ſo, but he adds (as is already obſerved) that *there was a very antient Tradition in the World, among all ſorts of Men*; *and which had obtained a firm and unſhaken Belief in the World, not only in common talk, but in their greateſt Myſteries, and that both among Greeks and Barbarians, that the Univerſe was not made by chance, or without reaſon, but that it was made and governed by it.* From whence it follows, that there was ſuch a Tradition among the *old Greeks*, which did not loſe its Authority, when thoſe Myſteries were brought in; and that made the moſt intelligent Perſons to apply them that way. For it ſeems, by the account he gives of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*, that Atheiſtical Perſons took great advantages

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.

Ων τέλος ἔξιν ἡ περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ νοητῶν γνῶσις. p. 352.

P. 358.

Διὰ τὴν παμπάλαιον αὐτὴν ἐν Θεολόγων τε νομοθετῶν καὶ ποιητὰς, καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξαν ἐγχώριον ἀδιάσειστον ἔχουσα, καὶ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἔν τε τελεταῖς, ἔν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένη, ὡς οὐτ' ἄνευ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ ἀκυβερνήτου αἰωτεῖν τὸ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ Πᾶν. P. 369.

from

from theſe Stories of their Gods, to prove that there were none at all; but only that Great Men in former Ages, that had found out ſome uſeful Inventions, were deify'd after their deaths. *Plutarch* makes that a fabulous Story, which he tells of his *Golden Inſcriptions* in *Panchæa*, to prove the truth of his aſſertion, *which none ever ſaw beſides himſelf*; and he affirms, That there were no ſuch Perſons as the *Panchæi*: but others have ſhew'd that there was ſuch a place as *Panchæa* about *Arabia Fœlix*. And *Diodorus Siculus* mentions it as a conſiderable Iſland in the *Arabian* Sea, and that the Inhabitants are called *Panchæi*; and that near the City *Panara* there is a Temple to *Jupiter Triphyllius*, which was in great veneration for its Antiquity and Magnificence, which he deſcribes at large; and upon the Mountain there it is ſaid that *Uranus* of old inhabited; and the People were called *Triphyllii*, from three different Tribes which join'd there, and were afterwards driven out by *Ammon*. And to make the Story of *Euhemerus* more probable, he ſaith, the Inhabitants came firſt out of *Crete* in *Jupiter*'s time. So that *Plutarch* was very much to ſeek, when he deny'd that there was any ſuch Place as *Panchæa*, or ſuch a Perſon as *Jupiter Triphyllius*. And *Diodorus* further ſaith, there was in it a golden Pillar in the old *Egyptian* Letters, wherein there were Inſcriptions containing the Acts of *Uranus* and *Jupiter*, and of *Diana* and *Apollo* written by *Hermes*. Which is a very different account of this matter, from what *Plutarch* gives. Some are willing to excuſe *Euhemerus*, as tho' he intended nothing more, but to let the *Greeks* know, that they worſhip'd ſuch for Gods which had been Men; which was true enough. But this did not reach his deſign, according to *Plutarch*; which was to prove, *that there were no other Gods but theſe:* ſo *Plutarch* ranks him with *Diagoras Melius* and *Theodorus*, who ſaid *there were no Gods*. And the *Epicurean* in *Tully* ſaid, *that* Euhemerus *deſtroy'd all Religion*; which could not be true, if he had left any Divinity to be worſhip'd. *Sextus Empiricus* reckons him among the *Atheiſts*, and ſaith, he was *a conceited Man*; but he charges him only with ſaying, *That ſome great Men in former Ages had been made Gods*. Which was ſo evident a thing, that one would think none could have been called an *Atheiſt* merely upon that account. But *Jupiter* of *Crete* had been advanc'd a long time to the higheſt Divine Honor; and conſequently thoſe who went about to diſprove his Worſhip, were thought to deſtroy the Worſhip which belongs to the Supreme God. But *Diodorus Siculus*, in a Fragment of his ſixth Book preſerv'd by *Euſebius*, gives a very different account of him; and that from *Euhemerus* his own words, *viz.* That the Antients had deliver'd to their Poſterity two different Notions of Gods; one of thoſe that were Eternal and Immortal, as the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and other parts of the Univerſe; but others were Terreſtrial Gods, that were ſo made, becauſe they were Benefactors to Mankind, as *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, and others. And as to *Euhemerus*, he ſaith, *that he was a Favorite of* Caſſander *King of* Macedonia, *by whoſe command he made a Voyage into thoſe parts*, where he found the things before mention'd. But ſome learned Men are ſtill of *Plutarch*'s opinion, that *Euhemerus* his *Panchæa* is a mere figment of his; for which I do not ſee any reaſon ſufficient; eſpecially when the ſame Perſons do allow *Sanchoniathon*'s *Phœnician* Antiquities; and methinks *Euhemerus* his account of the Inſcriptions on Pillars of the Acts of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, and *Jupiter* and *Ammon*, and *the Sacred Letters* by *Hermes*, comes ſo near to *Philo Byblius*, that one would think he had compar'd Notes with *Euhemerus* and *Diodorus Siculus*.

Diod. Sicul. l. 5. p. 220.

Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſ. l. 7. Cicer. de N. D. l. 1. Sext. Emp. ad Mathe. p. 317.

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 2.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 2. c. 8.

But their deſign was different in this reſpect, that *Sanchoniathon* juſtify'd the making Men to be Gods; but *Euhemerus* went about to prove they were *not Gods*, becauſe they had *been Men*. It is poſſible that the common People might account him an Atheiſt for denying *Jupiter* of *Crete* to be God, or for ſaying, that his Sepulchre was to be found. But why ſhould *Plutarch* charge him on this account, when he himſelf ſo much finds fault with theſe who made Men to be Gods? He endeavour'd, he ſaith, to avoid the extremes both of *Superſtition* and *Atheiſm*; but he could but *endeavour* it, when he allow'd the Practices of the *Greeks* and *Egyptians*, and only offer'd at ſome forced Interpretations of them, againſt the general ſenſe of the *Egyptian* Myſteries.

But however it appears from him, that the *old Greeks* did preſerve the antient Tradition of *the World not being made by chance*, which is the foundation of all Religion. And *Plato*, when he enters upon the Diſcourſe againſt *Atheiſm*, begins with two things, *viz. That the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and the order of Seaſons ſhew'd there was a* GOD *and Providence*; *and the conſent of all Mankind, Greeks and Barbarians.* Now, how could *Plato* have ſaid this of the *old Greeks*, if they had been without any Religion till *Orpheus* came out of *Egypt*? And we have an evident proof of the practice of Divine Worſhip among them, from the *Parian Chronicle*, where it is ſaid, *That* Deucalion *after he had eſcaped the Flood went to* Athens, *and there offered a ſolemn Sacrifice for his Deliverance*; and *Pauſanias* ſaith, *he there built a magnificent Temple.* Which are ſufficient Evidences of the Religion of the *old Greeks*, even before they had the Name of *Hellens* from the Son of *Deucalion.* But I have not yet done with *Diodorus Siculus*, who lets fall ſeveral Inſinuations, as tho' he were of the mind of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*; and that the old Religion, both in *Egypt* and elſewhere, was nothing but a *Politick Contrivance.* For in the beginning of his Hiſtory, he pretends to give an account of the beginning of all things: but it is ſuch a one as plainly ſhews he was no friend to Religion; for he takes away the very foundation of it, by ſuppoſing the World to be produc'd without any Intellectual Cauſe. He ſaith at firſt there were two Opinions among the Philoſophers and Hiſtorians: One was, that the World had been always juſt as it is; the other, that there was a beginning of Mankind, and of other things. But how? This he undertakes to explain after this manner. At firſt there was a Chaos, or a confus'd mixture of Heaven and Earth and all together; then follow'd a Separation of Bodies from each other, and thence came the preſent Frame of the World. The lighter Bodies mov'd forward, as the Air and Fire, by which Motion came the Sun, Moon and Stars: But the groſſer and more heavy parts ſubſided together; the moiſter made the Sea, and the dry the Earth, which was very moiſt; but being quicken'd by the heat of the Sun, ſwell'd up in ſeveral Tumors with thin Skins containing the Materials of living Creatures, which having ſtrength brake thro' thoſe Skins, and thence came all ſorts of Animals. But the heat of the Sun and the Winds hardening the Surface of the Earth, no more of ſuch Swellings appear'd; and ſo the Animals are ſince continued by Propagation. But the Men which were thus born were very wild at firſt, but by degrees they came to underſtand one another, and to find out the conveniencies of Living. This is the ſhort Abſtract of the Account he gives, which is juſt the *Epicurean Hypotheſis* in other Terms, which was much in vogue in the time of *Diodorus Siculus*, (which, ſaith *Suidas*, was that of *Auguſtus*) eſpecially after *Lucre-*

Plato de LL. l. 10.

Marmor. Arundell.

Pauſan. in Atticis.

Lucretius his Poem was in ſuch reputation: For, he ſaith, he very well underſtood the *Latin* Tongue, and had great helps to his Hiſtory from *Rome*; and whoſoever compares this with *Lucretius*, will ſcarce find any difference. And *Euſebius* obſerves, that he does not ſo much as once mention the Name of GOD in it, but leaves all to Chance and a fortuitous concourſe; and as it is expreſs'd in *Plutarch*, where the *Epicurean Opinion* is deliver'd much to the ſame purpoſe, the World is ſaid to have come together at firſt by a Motion of Atoms without Providence. Where there muſt be ſomething defective in the beginning, to ſhew this to have been the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; for as it ſtands, it ſeems to be *Plutarch*'s own opinion, which is directly contrary to what he had ſaid before in the foregoing Chapter, where he blames *Anaximander* for leaving out the efficient Cauſe; for, ſaith he, Matter alone can do nothing without it. And the ſame he repeats againſt *Anaximenes*, and ſaith plainly, *That it is impoſſible that Matter alone ſhould be the Cauſe of Things, as it is for Metals to form themſelves into Pots and Cups without an Artiſt. So that *Plutarch* muſt be clear'd from that Opinion, which he ſo juſtly oppoſes; and he commends *Anaxagoras* in a particular manner, for adding Mind as the Efficient Cauſe to Matter, which brought it out of confuſion into that order that appears in the World. *Pliny* ſaith of *Diodorus*, *Apud Græcos deſiit nugari*; but he only applies it to the Title of his Book, and it is not true of the Beginning of it. *Pliny* himſelf took the World to be an Eternal Being, which he calls *God*, and ſo was againſt *Diodorus* his Making of the World. But *Diodorus* quotes *Euripides* the Scholar of *Anaxagoras* for his Chaos: but that is not the point, whether there were ſuch Confuſion at firſt, but how the World came out of it. It's certain that *Anaxagoras* did not only hold a *Chaos* at firſt, but an *Eternal Mind*, which order'd the World, and brought things into that Beauty and Uſefulneſs which they have. *Diogenes Laertius* ſaith, that *Anaxagoras* follow'd *Linus*, and he was before *Orpheus*: If it were only in that of *the Chaos*, there was nothing extraordinary in that; for all that ſuppoſed the World to be made, aſſerted it; but if it were of the Mind as the Efficient Cauſe, that is a conſiderable teſtimony of the antiquity of that Opinion among the *old Greeks*. And *Orpheus*, as *Suidas* gives an account of his Doctrine, ſaith, *That he held a Chaos, and before that an Æther of* GOD*'s making, which was the great Inſtrument in framing the World.*

But *Euſebius* charges *the moſt part of the* Greek *Philoſophers with being of* Diodorus *his mind in this matter*: but I hope to make it appear otherwiſe in the progreſs of this Diſcourſe, being now only to conſider this Aſſertion as we find it in him. And I cannot but take notice of the unfairneſs of it; for he repreſents it, as if there had been but two Opinions among the Philoſophers, that *of the Eternity of the World*, and its *being made by Chance*; as if he had never heard of an *Eternal Mind* among them: which it is impoſſible ſo inquiſitive and learned a Man ſhould be ignorant of. But he offers no kind of proof of the truth of what he lays down; not ſo much as the Inſcriptions of *Hermes*, or the *Commentaries* of *Taautus*, which *Sanchoniathon* and *Philo Byblius* pretended to. He gave no manner of Reaſon how the confus'd Matter was put into motion, or how the ſeparation of the lighter and heavier Bodies was effected; how the heavenly Bodies came to have diſtinct *Vortices*, without interfering with each other; how the moiſter and heavier parts came to be divided, ſo as to make two ſuch great Bodies, as the Earth and

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 1. c. 7.

Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. 1. c. 4.

* Ἀδωία- λον δὲ ἀφ- χὴν μίαν ὕλην τ ὑλων, ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα γεγονέναι· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴ- τιον χρὴ προσλαβεῖν.

Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3.

Plin. N. H. l. 1. c. 1.

Lib. 2. c. 1.

Laert. in Proëm.

Euſeb. de Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 8.

and Sea to be ſo diſtinguiſh'd and parted from one another: which are conſiderable Difficulties, and ought to have been clear'd. It may be ſaid, *That he writes not like a Philoſopher, but as an Hiſtorian, and only in general lays down the Principles that had been receiv'd by Philoſophers.* But this doth not vindicate him: For then he ſhould have ſet down all their Opinions, which he doth not; but purpoſely avoids that which would have reſolv'd theſe Difficulties. For if an Eternal Mind be ſuppos'd to give and direct the Motion of Matter, then we may eaſily conceive, not only whence Motion it ſelf came; but whence Gravitation, or the tendency of Bodies towards their Center; whence the ſeveral great Bodies of the Heavens came to have their diſtinct circumvolations; and whence the Earth and Sea came to be ſo divided, and parted from one another.

But *Diodorus* was ſenſible that there would be great Objections made againſt *the production of Animals out of the Earth*, without any other Cauſe than *the heat of the Sun, and moiſture and putrefaction of the ſlimy ſubſtance of the Earth.* And therefore to anſwer them, *the* Egyptians, he ſaith, *produce this Experiment among them, that about* Thebes, *when the Earth is moiſtened by the* Nile, *by the intenſe Heat of the Sun falling upon it, an innumerable multitude of Mice do ſpring out; which being done after the Earth was ſo much hardened, and the firſt Influences abated, much more might all kind of Animals come out of the Earth at firſt.*

I. But in the firſt place, we have nothing but the teſtimony of theſe *Egyptians* for the original truth of this, who brought it as an Argument to juſtify their own *Hypotheſis.* And from them other Writers have taken it, without examining the truth of it, as *Ovid, Mela, Pliny,* &c. *Ælian* goes farther (who liv'd in *Hadrian*'s time) for he ſaith, *in his way between* Naples *and* Puteoli, *he ſaw ſuch imperfect Animals, half Mud, and half living Creatures*;

Ovid. Metamorph. l. 15.

Plin. l. 9. 58.

Altera pars vivit, rudis eſt pars altera tellus;

As *Ovid* deſcribes them. But this is very far from making any tolerable proof; for they might be perfect Animals, and only one part appear out of the Mud or Dirt, and the other be cover'd over with it. And this in all probability was the caſe in *Egypt.* For theſe were ſeen only *in the Mud*, after the *Nile* was return'd into its Channel, as *Mela* affirms, *Ubi ſedavit diluvia & ſe ſibi reddidit, per humentes campos quædam non perfecta animalia,* &c. Now this was a very ill time for any Perſons to go farther than as to what appear'd to them at a diſtance: and becauſe they ſaw but ſome Parts, they concluded the reſt to be nothing but Slime. But this is a very ſlight and imperfect way of making *Experiments.* Did any of the *Egyptians* take and diſſect any of theſe *Imperfect Animals*, and ſhew how it was poſſible in the formation of them, for one part of them to be nothing but Mud, when the reſt had all the proper Organs belonging to ſuch Animals? If the internal and vital parts be firſt form'd (as no doubt they are) and the Blood paſſing thro' the Heart into the outward Parts, be the great Inſtrument of perfecting the *Organs* of Senſe and Motion; how is it poſſible to conceive that where the inward Parts are perfect in their kind, one main part of an Animal ſhould have nothing like Organs, but merely be a Maſs of Dirt? And by what means could that afterwards be join'd with the other to make up one perfect Animal? It is agreed among the beſt Obſervers and moſt curious

Inqui-

Inquirers into theſe things, that the Heart is the firſt of the ſolid parts, and the Blood of the Fluid; but whether it be by a dilatation of the *Punctum ſaliens*, or red beating ſpeck into ſeveral parts, whereof one is for the upper, and the other for the lower and remoter parts; or it be by extention of the ſeveral parts in little, as an *Embryo*, (as it is in Plants) or by a fermentation raiſed in the fluid matter by an active fluid conveyed into it, upon the conjunction of male and female; (which are the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* of the moſt inquiſitive Perſons in this Philoſophical Age) which way ſoever we take it, this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* of *Imperfect Animals*, is repugnant to the moſt accurate Obſervations, which have been made about the Generations of Animals. And however ſuch things might then paſs among ſuch who take all upon truſt from the *Egyptians* or others who never examin'd them; yet it would be the only proof of *Imperfect Animals*, to find any in our Age to defend thoſe crude and abſurd Opinions. As tho' any thing were to be believed rather than the moſt reaſonable things in the World, *viz.* GOD and Providence; which appear moſt conſpicuouſly in the production of Animals. Inſomuch that our ſagacious Dr. * *Harvey* after all his diligent and exact Inquiries, confeſſes *that the power and preſence of the* DEITY *is no where more obſervable than in the formation of Animals.* And he could find no ſatisfaction in any *Hypotheſes* of the greateſt Naturaliſts, without taking in *the immediate Power and Providence of* GOD. And even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf, who was as unwilling to call in the help of Providence as another; yet is forc'd to give up the Cauſe in this matter; and freely confeſſes, † *That if Men examin the ſeveral Machines in order to Generation and Nutrition, and think they were not ordered by an intelligent Being to their ſeveral offices, muſt be ſaid to be without Underſtanding themſelves.* And yet he ſets down the words of *Diodorus Siculus* in the beginning of that Chapter; and thinks *that is as far as Men can go by Phyloſophy, without Revelation.* How can theſe things conſiſt? For Men *without Revelation* may find out all the *Machines in the Body*; and therefore may be convinc'd that there was an Eternal Mind which gave a Being to theſe things; which is more than *Diodorus Siculus* or *his Philoſophers* could find: For they affirm'd, *That Animals were form'd by Chance, out of Mud and Putrefaction without any Mind*; and therefore according to him they had none themſelves. And ſome of our moſt experienc'd and ſkilful *Anatomiſts*, after all their debates about the ſeveral *Mechanical Hypotheſes* concerning the Production of Animals, have concluded that || *it is impoſſible that mere Matter and Motion, of whatſoever figure the particles of Matter be, ſhould make up the Body of an Animal; but that we muſt have recourſe to a moſt Wiſe and Omnipotent Agent, which alone is able to do it.*

* Neq; fane uſpiam alibi, quam in Animalis fabrica, Omnipotens Creator in operibus ſuis aut manifeſtius conſpicitur, aut præſentius ejus Numen adeſt. *Exercitat.* 49. Quapropter rem recte pieq; (mea quidem ſententia) reputaverit, qui rerum omnium Generationes, ab eodem illo æterno atq; omnipotente Numine deduxerit, à cujus nutu rerum ipſarum Univerſitas dependet. *Exercitat.* 50.

Quod ubique præſens, ſingulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adſit, quam toti Univerſo, quod Numine ſuo ſive providentia, arte ac mente Divina cuncta animalia procreet. *ibid.*

† Qui ſi machinas omnes, tum Generationis tum Nutritionis ſatis perſpexerint, nec tamen eas a mente aliqua conditas ordinataſque ſua quaſque officia viderint, ipſi profecto ſine mente eſſe cenſendi ſunt. *Hobb. de Homine, l.* 1. *c.* 1. *ad fin.*

|| Interea ratum maneat juxta normam optimæ Philoſophiæ fieri non poſſe, ut Particulæ ſive Corpuſcula quomodocunque figurata ſolo motu fortuito in corpus humanum aut belluinum ſponte coaleſcant: Sed neceſſario ad hoc opus omnino ſapientiſſimum potentiſſimumque Architectam requiri, qui Animalium Machinas tam affabre & artificioſe componat. Adeoque Deum ſolum formare cuncta animalia, & fœcunditatem ovis addere. *Exercit. Anatomicæ & Medicæ Peieri & Hardeti, p.* 126.

And thoſe who plead moſt for the Motion of the Particles of Matter in forming the Body, yet confeſs, That it is hardly poſſible to con-

Etmulleri Inſtit. Medicæ, c. 23.

ceive how the kinds of Animals can be preſerv'd, unleſs there be ſomething beyond that, to regulate and determin that Motion; but what that is, they are not able to explain. Let now any Perſons that have the uſe of Underſtanding, conſider whether this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* have the leaſt credibility in it; ſince it is grounded on ſo little Authority.

II. But that is not all. For we ſhall prove it to be repugnant to the moſt certain accounts we have of the *Nature*, as well as the *Production of Animals*; both which are impoſſible to be conceiv'd to be the mere reſult of a fortuitous Motion of Matter, by the heat of the Sun upon the ſlime of the Earth. As will appear by conſidering the moſt neceſſary and vital parts of Animals themſelves, and what relates to the ſeveral kinds and the Preſervation of them: For the *Egyptians* argued from their Mice to all other Animals. The moſt neceſſary and vital parts of *Animals*, are ſuch as the *courſe of the Blood* and *Reſpiration* depend upon, without which it is impoſſible for them *to live*. The *Courſe of the Blood* ſuppoſes *the Heart*, as the great Machine in the Body; and the ſeveral Arteries are as ſo many veſſels to convey the Blood into the ſeveral parts. But here is ſo much wiſdom and contrivance in this, that unleſs the Heart had been fram'd in ſuch a manner, and the Blood put into ſuch a Motion as it is, the preſervation of Life had been impoſſible. And Life it ſelf is ſomething beyond the mere Coalition of the Particles of Matter: For if that were ſufficient, then there muſt be Life in all parts of Matter united together; (but neither Stones nor Plants are *Animals*) and they become *Animals* by that which makes the difference between them and inanimated things; which are the conſtant courſe of the Blood, and the diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the ſeveral parts of the Body in order to their ſupport; and when theſe are at an end, the Life of an Animal is gone. Now in order to this courſe of the Blood, the Heart hath its peculiar and wonderful frame and motion; for therein is the chief ſeat of that which is called *the Flame of Life*; which is nothing elſe but that briſk and vigorous motion of the Blood, which actuates and enlivens the whole Body. But both the natural heat and motion of the Blood are unaccountable in the Mechanical way. To ſay the natural heat is caus'd by Fermentation, can give no manner of ſatisfaction; for from whence comes this fermentation, but from heat? And ſo heat muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the producing heat; and there can be no end in ſuch kind of Suppoſitions. And if the particles did of themſelves give it, then it muſt be diſcern'd as much at firſt as afterwards; but the contrary is obſerv'd in Animals: For the Blood is more fixed at firſt, and its heat riſes by degrees, as the parts are forming. If it be ſaid, *There is a Spiritus Genitalis which cauſes all that heat and motion*; I aſk, Whence that ariſes? Not from mere matter and motion. But it muſt be ſomething of a higher nature, and from a ſuperior cauſe. But if Heat and Mud can produce Animals, there is no need of any ſuch *Spiritus Genitalis* in Nature, but all muſt ariſe from mere motion, and the continuation of Animals might as well have been without any diſtinction of ſexes. But how came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a diſtinction, with parts ſutable to ſuch a deſign? How come the Inſtincts of Nature in *Animals* to be ſo violent to ſuch an end; when if there be nothing but *Matter*, there can be no ſuch end deſign'd? How come ſome *Animals* (as *Mules*) not capable of propagating their kind, when upon

Unde autem aliter calor hic perennis enaſcatur, haud facilè dixerim, ſiquidem ad fermentationis operam recurrere inane auxilium eſt, quoniam ipſamet ſine calore nihil egerit. *Ent. Apologia, p.* 204.

upon Anatomical ſearches no kind of defect hath been found in them as ſome imagined? How come the *Species* of *Animals* to be ſo determined and limited, that in the revolution of ſo many Ages no new *Species* have appeared, altho' they are ſo different in ſome Countries from others? How comes the number of ſome *Animals* ſo very much to exceed others? i. e. How come the *Beaſts of Prey* to fall ſo much ſhort of the moſt tractable and *uſeful Animals* to Mankind, as *Sheep* and *Oxen?* And thoſe are obſerved to be moſt fruitful, which afford the beſt Food for them. Can we ſuppoſe *the heat of the Sun and ſlime of the Earth* ſhould regard ſo much the benefit of Mankind? How comes the difference of *Animals* as to the manner of their production? i. e. How come ſome to hatch their young ones within their own Bodies, and others to bring forth eggs, and ſo to bring them to maturity by incubation? And how comes this difference to have always continu'd without alteration? Whence comes that difference in Animals, that ſome do *Ruminate*, and others do not? Did mud quickened by the Sun deſign to ſupply the want of teeth for *Maſtication* by thoſe ſeveral ventricles, and the muſcles belonging to them? How come ſome Animals to have their ſenſes more exquiſite than others, according to the nature of their food; as ſight in ſome, and ſmelling in others? How come Birds and Fiſhes ſo very much to exceed Mankind in the frame of thoſe nerves, which ſerve for ſmelling? Whence comes that wonderful ſagacity in ſome Animals to purſue others meerly from the ſcent left upon the ground at ſome diſtance of time, and to diſtinguiſh it from all others of the ſame kind? Whence comes that wonderful care and tenderneſs of their young ones in the moſt cruel and fierceſt Animals? If heat and mud could produce the Beaſts themſelves, yet what influence could they have upon their Brood? How comes the change of the paſſage between the lungs and the heart, when a young Animal is come into the open Air, from what it had in the Womb? What particles of matter cloſe up the *Foramen Ovale*, and direct the paſſage of the Blood another way? What makes the milk to come into the proper Veſſels of the breeding Animal juſt at ſuch a time, and to decay when there is no farther Occaſion for it? Whence came the wonderful contrivance of Birds in making their neſts; and feeding and preſerving their young? What particles of Matter diſpos'd them to find out their proper food and Phyſick? How come the ſeaſons of bringing forth to be ſo ſetled, that there is a ſufficient proviſion to ſupport the young Animals when they come into the World, by the Milk ready prepar'd for them, and ſuch conveniences for the young to ſuck it? How come they to run ſo naturally to their dams without any director, and to avoid ſuch as would deſtroy them? What had the particles of Matter to do in all this? If we go to *Inſects*; How came the Silk-worms to hatch their eggs when the Mulberry-trees are ready for their food? The Bees to come forth in *May*, when there is moſt plenty of dew? The Waſps near Autumn, when the fruit is grown ripe to ſupport them? How come the ſeveral Inſects by that ſagacity to find out the moſt proper places to lay their eggs in? It being obſerv'd of them, by thoſe who have moſt curiouſly inquir'd about theſe matters, *That all the ſeveral ſorts of Inſects lay their eggs in places moſt ſafe and agreeable to them, where they are ſeldom loſt or miſcarry, and where they have a ſupply of nouriſhment for their young, ſo ſoon as they are hatched and need it.*

Cicer. de N. Deor. l. 2.

Neque alia parte ingenia avium magis admiranda ſunt. *Plin. N. H. l. 10. c. 33.*

Mr. Ray of the Creation, p. 115.

But there are ſome things yet further to be conſider'd in the neceſſary vital parts of Animals, which ſhew that they could not be the reſult of a fortuitous motion of Matter. The main vitals of Animals are the ſame; and where there is any obſervable difference, theſe two things are remarkable: 1. That they are alike in the ſame kind. 2. That it is for the greater conveniency of thoſe kinds. As the poſition of the heart is higher in Mankind, than in creatures that put their heads down to eat; becauſe if the Heart of Mankind were in the center of the Body, and not in the upper part, there could not be ſo eaſy a paſſage of the Blood from the heart to the head, which is ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of life; but in thoſe creatures which hold their heads downwards, altho' the paſſage may be longer in ſuch which have long necks, yet no inconvenience comes by it, becauſe of the eaſineſs of the deſcent in holding down their heads. But how comes a fortuitous production of Animals to cauſe ſuch an agreement in the ſeveral parts of living Creatures? That all have the ſame vitals, *Inſects* excepted (in which the heart is the whole Body) none wanting the heart with its arteries carrying out the Blood, and the veins returning it; nor the lungs for reſpiration, nor the brain for ſenſe and motion (to name no more;) How comes a blind motion of Matter to hit ſo exactly on all theſe, and to put them into ſuch a convenient ſituation for the preſervation of Life? How comes the heart to be endued with ſuch ſtrong fibres, unleſs it were intended not merely to receive the Blood in its paſſage, but to diſperſe it again by its contraction of it ſelf? How come the coats of the arteries about the Heart to be ſo much ſtronger than in the outward parts, but that there is the greateſt neceſſity of their being ſo, to receive the Blood in its firſt heat and quickeſt motion? How come the veins to be ſo diſpers'd in all parts of the Body, but to receive the Blood in its return; and ſo to keep up the life and warmth of all parts? What motion of Matter could frame the *Valves* in the *Veins*, ſo as to give free paſſage of the Blood towards the heart, but oppoſe the paſſage of the Venal-blood the other way? (which gave the firſt occaſion to the diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood, as Mr. *Boyle* tells us from Dr. *Harvey* himſelf.) What is it which keeps the Blood in its conſtant courſe for ſo many years, as ſome Animals live to? And what makes the very different periods of their lives, when we can ſee no reaſon from their mechanical frame, why one ſhould in an ordinary courſe ſurvive another, for ſo great a compaſs of years? What is there in the texture and coalition of the parts of a Stag, to make it outlive an Ox or a Horſe ſo many years; when *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *They ſeem to be leſs made for long life than other Animals, as far as he could judge by their bearing and growth:* but *Pliny* ſo long after him ſaith, *Vita Cervis in confeſſo longa eſt; it was a thing taken for granted that they lived long.* But I meddle not with any improbable Stories about it; for my argument depends not upon any thing but what all grant to be true, *viz.* That there is a great diverſity in the Lives of *Animals*; of which I ſay no account can be given from mere Matter and Motion.

Tota Cor ſunt. *Harv.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes*, p. 157.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. c. 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 8. c. 32.

III. There is no probability of any kind of *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, which the *Egyptians* and *Diodorus Siculus* make their foundation. *After the inundation of the* Nile, *a ſudden heat of the Sun falling on the ſlime, cauſes a putrefaction, and from thence an innumerable company of Mice came.* But *Theophraſtus*, a very great Philoſopher, in a Fragment

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 8.

Fragment preſerv'd in *Photius*, ſaith, *That the great number of Mice is to be found in dry Soils, and not in moiſt; for Water is a great Enemy to them, and they are certainly deſtroy'd by it.* How comes *Theophraſtus* to differ ſo much herein from *Diodorus Siculus* and the *Egyptians?* Or muſt we ſuppoſe that the Water of *Nile* was quite of a different nature from all other Waters to them? *Proventus eorum in ſiccitatibus*, ſaith *Pliny*; where he ſpeaks of the great Increaſe of them. How then came they to multiply in ſuch moiſt places, where the *Nile* hath overflow'd? *Rain-water kills them*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*; how then comes the *Nile* to produce them? If it be ſaid, *that* Ariſtotle *ſpeaks of great Showers which drown them*; it is eaſily anſwer'd, That at their going off, upon theſe Principles, they produce more, and ſo the greateſt numbers would be after great Rains. But what *Theophraſtus* ſaith before of *ſmall Frogs* will hold of theſe *Mice* too; *they do not come from the Water, but that diſcovers them, and brings them out of the places where they were before.* And *Pliny*'s words are remarkable, when he ſpeaks of this matter, *Detegente eo* (Nilo) *muſculi reperiuntur*, &c. And ſo the late Editor confeſſes it was in the beſt MSS. So that the going off of the *Nile* is that only which brings them to light. And before, *Pliny* ſaith, the *Gyrini* (the Name given to theſe ſmall Frogs) do come from other Frogs, and not from *Putrefaction: Pariunt minimas carnes nigras, quas Gyrinos vocant, oculis tantum & cauda inſignes; mox pedes figurantur*, &c. Theſe are called *Tadpoles*, and ſeem imperfect at firſt, but by degrees do come to all their Parts. But as to *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, learned and inquiſitive Perſons of our Age have taken great pains to diſcover the truth of it in ſeveral Countries, but with no ſucceſs. In *Italy*, *Franc. Redi* undertook the Diſcovery of this matter with incredible diligence, and great variety of Experiments; but after all, could not find *that any putrified Fleſh would produce Animals*, much leſs putrified Water or Slime; *but that leſſer Animals hide themſelves under Dirt and Slime, and therefore have been ſuſpected to have come out of it; and if thoſe who firſt broached this Opinion had examined this matter more ſtrictly, they would have found them only covered over, or at leaſt ſome part of them, with that Earth which they thought had brought them forth.* And *for the little Frogs*, he ſaith, *that they are ſo much of the colour of the Earth, that they might eaſily be miſtaken for parts of it; but upon opening of them, their Stomachs and Inteſtines are full of Food and Excrements.* Which is a plain demonſtration againſt their original from the Earth; and he concludes it a thing *impoſſible for any ſuch Creatures that are part Mud and part Animals, to be produced by the inundation of the* Nile. There is a remarkable Paſſage in *Olaus Wormius* concerning the *Norway* Mice, which ſeem to come out of the Clouds, *that aſſoon as they are fallen, they have found green Herbs in their Bowels*; (and I do not think any Graſs grows in the Clouds:) But he thinks *Scaliger*'s Opinion not improbable, *that they come from putrefied Water in the Clouds*; and he ſaith, *The Seamen have found them fallen into their Veſſels, and that the Clouds ſtink and hinder their breathing*; but at laſt he thinks *they may be only carried by ſome violent Storms from the Mountains and Iſlands where they breed in great abundance.* And *Etmullerus*, a *German* Phyſician, concludes all *Æquivocal Generation to be impoſſible.* Some of our own moſt diligent Inquirers, after all their Searches, declare that they can find no ſuch thing as a *Spontaneous Generation* of *Animals*; and I remember I have formerly read a Diſcourſe in MS. of Mr. *Boyle*'s to that purpoſe. Our ingenious and learned Mr. *Ray* poſi-

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 278.

Plin. N. H. l. 10. *c.* 65.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 9. *c.* 58.

Cap. 51.

Fr. Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 195, *&c.*

P. 208.

P. 209.

Muſeum Wormian. l. 3. *c.* 23. *p.* 326.

Exercit. 192. 3.

Etmuller. Inſtit. Med. c. 23.

Liſter in Goedart de Inſect. p. 47.

Ray of the Creation, part. 2. p. 71. tively affirms, *That there is no ſuch thing in nature, as Æquivocal or Spontaneous Generation, but that all Animals, as well ſmall as great, are generated by animal Parents of the ſame ſpecies with themſelves.* And becauſe ſome were offended at it, he goes about to juſtify his Aſſertion, not only *from Reaſon*, but from the *Authority* of *Malpighius*, as well as *Redi*, *Swammerdam*, and *Lewenhoek*, and many others, who have examin'd this matter *carefully and circumſpectly*; *and therefore their Authority ſways more with him than the concurrent ſuffrages of a thouſand others*, as he ſaith.

But there are ſome things not yet ſufficiently clear'd as to this matter, eſpecially as to Animals breeding in Human Bodies, of particular Times, and in ſome Diſeaſes: but as to Plants and ſome Inſects about them, in which *Redi* himſelf gives up the cauſe, *Malpighius* contradicts him, and

Micrograp. p. 189. ſo do *Swammerdam* and others; particularly Mr. *Hook* ſaith, *He obſerv'd little Eggs in the Protuberancies of Plants, which became Worms with Legs, which eat through the Womb which incloſ'd them: And in all Galls*, he ſaith, *there be either holes where the Worm hath eat out its paſſage, or a place where it had been.* All which he attributes to the particular deſign of Providence, in taking care for the conveniencies of the meaneſt Animals. But there ſeems to be more difficulty in the *Apiarium marinum* mention'd by *Piſo*; for it is hard to underſtand how *thoſe blue*

Piſo Hiſt. Nat. Braſil. l. 4. c. 2. *Worms* came to the bottom of the Sea, *which coming up with a ſpungy ſort of ſhrub growing upon the Rocks, and being expos'd to the heat, turn'd to little Animals like Bees.* But this matter is not deliver'd diſtinctly enough to form any Argument upon, as Mr. *Hook* hath well obſerv'd.

Micrograp. c. 43. I ſee no difficulty in the *Ephemeron* or *Hemerobion*, as it is deſcrib'd by the Authors at the end of *Goedart*, who give the beſt account of it; for it ſeems to be of the nature of other Inſects: and the only difficulty is, why ſo much pains for ſo ſhort a life? for it is produc'd by ſuch Changes as other Inſects are. But it cannot be deny'd, that there have been among us two very learned Men, who have aſſerted a kind of Spontaneous Generation of Animals; I mean Dr. *Harvey* and his *Apologiſt*.

Redi p. 19. For Dr. *Harvey*, *Redi* obſerves, *That altho' he aſſerts every Animal to come of an Egg proper to its kind, yet he was of opinion that theſe Eggs are not always contain'd in the Bodies of Animals, but are diſpers'd up and down by the Air, and after become Animals in an equivocal manner:* but he ſaith, *he hath not clear'd the grounds of his Opinion*, ſave only *that it comes from the Omnipotent Hand of God.* So that Dr. *Harvey* held a true Spontaneous Generation from mere Matter and Motion to have been impoſſible, as appears by what is ſaid of him before. And ſo his *Apologiſt*

Ent. Apol. c. 17. p. 379. ſuppoſes *a ſaline Spirit to be diſpers'd in Nature, which meeting with proper Matter and a moderate Heat, may produce Inſects, and ſuch kind of Animals:* but he was very far from thinking this could be done without a Power far above Matter and Motion, which at firſt order'd the World,

P. 245. and all things in it. But he thinks *ſuch Inſects come nearer to the nature of Plants than Animals, and live chiefly by the Heat of the Sun; and therefore in the Winter they are torpid and without Motion, and are reviv'd at Spring when the Heat increaſes.*

IV. Suppoſing it to be granted that there were ſuch an Æquivocal Generation of Mice and Frogs on the Bank of the *Nile*, how doth it from thence follow that Mankind had the ſame kind of Original? It is a ſay-

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 1. ing of *Pliny*, which hath been carry'd too far, *Quam Natura rerum nuſquam magis quam in minimis tota ſit*; where he compares Inſects with the

greater Animals, and ſeems to admire the Workmanſhip of one far beyond the other: His words are, *Nuſquam alibi ſpectatiore naturæ rerum Artificio.* And ſo he falls into admiration of the perfections of ſome Inſects, as to the quickneſs of Senſe and Motion, and of others as to their peculiar Properties. I think *Ariſtotle* was very much in the right when he held, *they were to be blam'd who deſpiſed the leaſt things in Nature; for in all of them* ἔνεσί τι θαυμαστὸν, *there is ſomething which deſerves admiration:* And particularly in *Inſects*, the Contexture of their Parts, the manner of their Transformations, the difference of their Kinds, the variety of their Food, and their time of taking it, have ſomething in them, which cannot be accounted for by mere Matter and Motion: But yet there is a great difference in the inward make of theſe Creatures from more perfect Animals. For *Redi* affirms, that *Steno* and he opening ſome Inſects together, they could find no other inward Parts, *but one long Channel thro' the whole Body, about which there were Filaments in a confus'd ſeries, which they thought might be inſtead of Veins and Arteries.* When all their inward Parts were taken out, and the Head taken off, *they ſtill lived and moved as other Inſects do, and laid their Eggs.* By which we ſee what a vaſt difference there is between the principles of Life in Mankind from thoſe in theſe admirable Inſects. *Jul. Scaliger* extremely deſpiſes *Cardan*'s way of reaſoning, *Mus è putredine poteſt naſci, ergo & homo poteſt:* and ſaith, *That the Woman in* Eſop's *Fables, who was aſked by her Huſband how the Child came without him, and ſhe anſwered, Out of the Snow; might have made a better anſwer from* Cardan's *Philoſophy*, viz. *out of the Mud.* And it is wittily ſaid by *Scaliger* of him in another place, *They who ſtick in the dirt, while they lift up one Foot to get out, ſet the other faſter, and therefore it is beſt to keep out of it altogether.* But *Cardan* ſeem'd to be ſo little concern'd to get out of it, that he aſſerts *that every Putrefaction produces ſome Animal or other; and that all Animals come out of it: which,* ſaith *Scaliger, is a wicked and profane Speech.* And yet *Andr. Cæſalpinus* undertakes to defend *Cardan*, chiefly from the Generation of Inſects; without regarding the difference between them and more perfect Animals, if his ſuppoſiton had been true. *Ariſtotle*, who had all poſſible advantages for writing his *Books of Animals*, by the bounty of *Philip* or *Alexander*, or both, coming to ſpeak of ſuch *as had no Blood*, (among which are all Inſects) he ſaith, *They have no Veins, nor Bladder, nor Reſpiration; but ſomething that ſerves inſtead of a Heart, without which they could have no Life; but they have the Parts which ſerve for Nutrition:* and therefore their Life differs little, according to *Pliny* himſelf, from that of *Plants* and *Fruits*; but he would have them *ſpirare ſine Viſceribus*, breathe without Lungs; and he grants they have neither them, *nor Heart, nor Liver.* And altho' there be ſome higher degree of Life in ſuch *Animals* as *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaks of, yet thoſe fall ſo far ſhort of Mankind, that it is a wonder Men of ſenſe could imagin the Production of one could be an Argument for the other. For, if we go no farther than *Nutrition, Mice* and *Frogs* are eaſily provided for; but how ſhould Mankind live that were produc'd out of Slime and Mud? But nothing can be more abſurd and ridiculous than the accounts given of the ſeveral ways of producing Mankind by a Spontaneous Generation, as will appear by a particular examination of them.

Franc. Redi hath reckon'd up the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* to our hands: The firſt is, that of *Democritus, That Mankind came into the World like Worms,*

Ariſt. de par. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 218. Nihil intus, niſi admodum paucis Inteſtinum implicatum. Plin. l. 11. c. 4. Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 4. c. 6. Scaliger. Exercit. 193.

Exercit. 180. 2.

Exercit. 190, 193.

Andr. Cæſalpin. Qu. Peripat. l. 5. c. 1.

De partib. Anim. l. 4. c. 5.

Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 14.

Worms, which by degrees grew up to the figure and ſhape of Men. I wiſh we had more of *Democritus* his own Writings left, that we might better judg what his true Opinion was; but by what remains it doth not appear that herein he differ'd from *Epicurus*. It's certain he did, as to the firſt Principles of all things being made of Atoms; but whether he did, as to the immediate Production of Animals, is not ſo clear. For they did not imagin that Animals were form'd immediately by Atoms, which was too general and indefinite a Principle; but that the Atoms firſt came together in one form, and then another, till they came to the perfection of Animals. And ſo 'tis ſaid, that *Democritus* held Mankind to have appear'd firſt in the faſhion of Worms. *Petronius Arbiter* ſaith, that *Democritus* ſpent his days in making Experiments, *Ætatem inter Experimenta conſumpſit*; and *Columella* particularly takes notice of his Experiments *about Inſects*; and it is not improbable that from his Obſervations about their Tranſformations he might form his *Hypotheſis* about Mankind. His original Notion was, as appears by *Plutarch*, *That there were infinite Atoms diſpers'd in a void ſpace, which had no kind of Qualities inherent in them; but as they caſually hit upon each other, they produc'd Water, and Fire, and Plants, and Men; which were nothing but a congeries of Atoms*; which, ſaith *Plutarch*, he calleth *Ideas*. And it appears by another place in him, that *Democritus* only held Bulk and Figure in his Atoms; but *Epicurus* added *Gravity*, without which he found *his Atoms could not move*. And altho' *Epicurus* deriv'd the main of his Principles from *Democritus*; yet it is plain by *Plutarch*, that his Followers ſet themſelves to leſſen the credit of *Democritus*, as one that overthrew the certainty of our Senſes, and reſolv'd all into Reaſon. To which purpoſe there are ſeveral Paſſages, in *Sextus Empiricus*, of *Democritus* himſelf. Wherein he affirms, *That the things we call Qualities, are only Names impos'd upon Opinions* (which he calls Law) *and ſo Bitter and Sweet, and Hot and Cold, are only Fancies and no Realities; and that there is nothing real but what is not ſeen but only apprehended by the Mind*, as *Atoms and Vacuity*; and in ſeveral other places, that there is no *Certain Knowledg*, but *only Opinion by our Senſes*. And he quotes *Democritus* his own words to prove, *that the Knowledg we have by our Senſes is dark and obſcure, but that which is genuine depends only upon Reaſon*. The *Epicureans*, who follow'd their Maſter, as to the certainty of Senſe, could by no means brook this Doctrine of *Democritus*, who ſaw far beyond *Epicurus*, and knew what Blunders he muſt fall into by the judgment of Senſe, as about the bigneſs of the Sun, which he poſitively ſaid, was *no greater than appear'd to our Senſes*, i. e. *two Foot over*, ſaith *Cicero*, or *a little more or leſs*; which was ſo notorious a Blunder, that *Democritus*, he ſaith, *could not fall into, being ſkill'd in Geometry*; *but* Epicurus *not only deſpis'd it, but perſuaded* Polyænus *it was falſe*. And his late great Defender hath little to ſay for him, but that *Socrates* underſtood as little *Geometry* as he; but *Socrates* was far enough from aſſerting ſuch ſtupid *Paradoxes*, and making *Geometry* nothing but a piece of *Sophiſtry*; as *Epicurus* did, and made a Mathematician think ſo too. Which ſhew'd his Authority ſway'd more than his Reaſon. But the *Epicurean* in *Plutarch* rejects *Democritus* his Doctrine, for that which *Plutarch* ſaith, *doth as well follow from that of* Epicurus; for if there be nothing but Atoms, then Qualities are only Appearances; and when we judg by our Senſes, we cannot judg truly of things, but of what they appear to us. But if nothing, ſaith he, can be produc'd out of nothing, and no Generation

Columel. l. 11. ult.

Plutarch. adv. Col.

De Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Sext. Emp. p. 163.

P. 164.

Cicero de Fin. l. 1. c. 6.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 33.

can be of that which already is; how can indiviſible Atoms, which cannot be chang'd, produce Plants or Animals? Either therefore *Democritus* ſhould not have aſſerted ſuch immutable Principles, or he ſhould not have overlook'd the Conſequence, *i. e.* that there can be no Generation. But *Epicurus* impudently holds the ſame Principles, and yet would deny the Conſequence, and aſſert true Generation; juſt as he deny'd Providence, and yet aſſerted Piety; held Friendſhip to be only for Pleaſure, and yet that a Man muſt undergo any hardſhip for his Friends; made an Infinite Space, and yet placed an upper and lower Region in it. But he declares he can by no means underſtand, how Bodies indu'd with Qualities, ſhould be produc'd by Atoms that have none. There can be no Generation without Heat; how comes there to be Heat, when the Atoms themſelves have no Heat in them, nor become hot when they are join'd together? for if they are capable of Heat, then they are not impaſſible, nor without Qualities. So that according to the general Principles of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, there can be no ſuch thing as a Generation of Animals.

But Democritus *obſerv'd ſtrange alterations in the Bodies of Inſects from Worms to flying Animals; and why might not Mankind have come into the World after the ſame manner?* If this were his Opinion, it is one of the wildeſt and moſt extravagant Opinions that could have enter'd into the head of ſuch a Man, and would make one think that the People of *Abdera* were not out in their judgment of him, if thoſe *Epiſtles* about him were genuine between *Hippocrates* and them.

There are wonderful alterations in the Bodies of *Inſects*, as appear beyond all contradiction by the many Experiments of thoſe who have apply'd themſelves for many years to obſerve them. But what then? Do not all theſe *Inſects* come out of Eggs, which have been laid by other *Inſects* before them? and therefore Mankind could not be *Worms* firſt, but there muſt have been Eggs before. And how ſhould theſe Eggs be tranſform'd into the Worms? What force was there in Nature to make ſo ſtrange a Tranſformation as is continually obſerv'd in them? And the very ſame Perſons, who have obſerv'd their *Tranſformations*, have as well obſerv'd the incredible number of Eggs that are laid by them, and the great and ſudden increaſe of them from thoſe Eggs. Even in the *Ephemeron*, which was ſo great a rarity taken notice of by *Ariſtotle* upon the River *Hypanon*, (but is ſo frequent upon ſome Rivers in *France* and the *Low Countries*, as is obſerv'd by *Scaliger*, *Auger. Clutius*, and others) it is agreed, *That they come out of ſuch a Tranſformation as other Inſects do, with four Wings and ſix Feet, and are very careful where they lay their Eggs, to keep them from the Water, in which they die, after they have ſpent their ſhort life in flying in great numbers together, at Sun-ſetting*, ſaith one from his own Obſervation. *Scaliger* ſaith, thoſe he obſerv'd *began to live at night, and dy'd by morning.*

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 5. c. 19. Scaliger. Exercit. 194. 5. Aug. Clut. de Hemerobio. Joh. de Mey Append. ad Goedart. Swammerdam Anatom. de Ephem. apud Thevenot. Amer. Sept.

But there are ſome things which deſerve a particular obſervation about Inſects, which plainly ſhew that they were not form'd by a caſual Coalition of Atoms, but by a wiſe Providence. As, that thoſe that have Wings have them ſtronger or weaker, more or leſs, according to their buſineſs and occaſion for uſing them; thoſe that have Feet, have an equal number on both ſides, altho' the numbers differ ſo much according to their kinds; thoſe which have neither Wings nor Feet, have Repoſitories made for them with proper Food in the Leaves of Trees or Plants. Concerning which there are ſeveral things very obſervable. (1.) Their great

great niceneſs as to their Food. *Goedart*, who made it his buſineſs to obſerve them 40 years, (as *Ariſtomachus Solenſis* did *Bees* for 58 years, ſaith *Pliny*) found it very difficult ſometimes to find the proper Food for them; for they would eat no other, and expreſs'd their joy when they had it. Dr. *Liſter* adds, *That Inſects would rather die than eat any thing elſe, not from want of Organs, but from a natural accuracy of Taſt.* And he ingeniouſly obſerves, that from hence may be found the beſt way of keeping Ships from Worms, by finding out that ſort of Wood which thoſe Worms will not touch. (2.) The different ſorts of Food in their different ſtates. While they are mere *Erucæ*, they eat a hard ſort of Food, as the Leaves of Plants; but when they come to have their Wings and to fly abroad, they live only on Honey and liquid things: which is very different from ſuch Animals as have Blood; for when they are *Embryo*'s they live on Liquids, but as they grow up they like harder Food. (3.) That thoſe which feed on Leaves of Plants growing, will not touch them when they are taken off or decaying: which *Goedart* ſaith he obſerv'd both as to Garden-herbs and Graſs. (4.) That thoſe flying Inſects which have very ſhort Feet, take their Food out of Flowers by the help of their Tongues as they fly. (5.) That thoſe which are moſt afraid of Birds, eat only in the night, when they are moſt ſecure from them; which argued a wonderful care of their own Safety. There are many other Obſervations to be made uſe of concerning the manner of their Transformations, the change made by them in the very Bodies of theſe Inſects, and the different times of continuance under them, and the ways to ſecure themſelves from Injuries of the Weather in cold Seaſons: but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, which was to ſhew that *Democritus* made a very ill choice of Worms, as the inſtance of a fortuitous Production. But if they had been ſo, it was a very extravagant Fancy to think that Mankind ſhould undergo ſuch Transformations as Worms do, before they come to their perfection. For theſe Changes are evident to Senſe to all that obſerve no more than Silk-worms; but Mankind continue in one uniform ſtate, from an Embryo to a perfect Man, and while he is an Embryo hath one ſort of nouriſhment from the Mother, which is wholly different from what all ſorts of Worms do live upon; and the parts of Mankind are extremely remote from the ſhape, number and uſe of all ſorts of Worms. Inſomuch that *Democritus* might much better have fanſy'd, that Mankind were at firſt a ſort of Trees ſet with their Roots upwards: for the Head to Man is what the Root is to the Tree; and Trees come from an Embryo in the Seed, and are preſerv'd in the Womb of the Earth, and are fed with a Dew from above, and have Paſſages like *Lymphæducts* in their ſeveral parts; only they happen to want the Inſtruments of Senſe and Motion, which are needleſs to them, ſince their Food is brought home to them, and they grow up in the ſame uniform manner without Transformations, as Mankind do.

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 9. *Goedart de Inſectis. N. 5.* *Ed. Liſter. p. 13. 33.* *N. 14.* *N. 14.* *N. 15.*

The next *Hypotheſis* was that of *Anaximander*; and he makes them *to be bred up as Embryo's in the Bowels of other Creatures.* Of which *Plutarch* gives the fulleſt account: In one place he only ſaith, *That the firſt Animals were produc'd in moiſture, cover'd over with a certain Bark*, like the rind of a Cheſnut, ſaith *Redi*; *and when it grew dry it crackt, and the Animals ſtarted out, but liv'd not long.* Was not this a hopeful Beginning in the early days of Philoſophy? For *Anaximander* ſucceeded *Thales*, who was the firſt Philoſopher of *Greece*, and a much wiſer Man than his Scholar, as will afterwards appear. But we muſt now purſue

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 5. c. 19.

Anaximander: and *Plutarch* in another place tells us, *That he was of opinion that Mankind were first bred in the Bellies of Fishes; and when they were strong enough to help themselves, they very fairly cast them upon dry ground and left them to shift for themselves.* Is not this a very good philosophical account of this matter? And he was in the right, when upon this ground *he dissuaded Men from eating of Fish*, lest they should be like *Cannibals.* It is a known saying, *That there is nothing so absurd, but it was said by one Philosopher or other.* I think *Anaximander* may put in for the first, who broach'd his own dreams and idle fancies under the name of Philosophy. And yet *Empedocles* in this matter, rather outwent him. For he saith, *Animals were not intire at first; but came into the world by pieces*; and so arms and legs, and all other parts happening to joyn together, made up one perfect Animal. *Hæc non sunt Philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia*, may be much better apply'd here, than it is by the *Epicurean* in *Cicero* to their opinions of the Gods. But I rather think *Empedocles* his opinion is mis-represented; since the Author of the Book *De Mundo* (which is very ancient, if not *Aristotle*'s) gives another account of him; and saith, *He deriv'd the forming of Animals from* GOD; and his *Verses*, as they are in *Simplicius*, do not deny it; but only shew, *that all things except* GOD, *came from different principles.*

Plutarch. Sympos. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutarch. de Placit. l. 5. c. 19.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

But we are not deceiv'd in the third *Hypothesis* of *Epicurus* and his followers; which as *Redi* represents it is, *That Mankind and other Animals were inclos'd in certain Coats and Membranes in the womb of the Earth, which being broken in due time, they were all expos'd naked, without any sense of heat or cold, and sucked the Earth for nourishment, but the Earth grew too old for such births; and therefore was contented ever since to bring forth nothing but Insects.* This is so well known to be the *Epicurean Hypothesis* from *Lucretius*, *Censorinus*, &c. that there needs no farther proof of it. But whether it can be thought reasonable, is the thing now to be consider'd. And herein these two things are suppos'd: (1.) That there was a fit disposition of the Earth to produce them; and a capacity in it to form Wombs and Bags to preserve them till they were able to take nourishment; and that the Earth did afford a sort of Milk to support them. (2.) That the use of all the parts of human Bodies came only by chance, and were not form'd with any design. Both which are very unreasonable suppositions.

How can they make it appear that there ever was any such disposition of the Heavens and Earth to produce Animals more than there is still? When they were told *that if the Earth could at first produce Animals, why not still?* Their answer was, *The Seasons are changed, the Heavens were more benign, and the Earth more fruitful than they have been since.* (1.)

At novitas Mundi nec frigora dura ciebat,
Nec nimios æstus, nec magnis viribus auras;
Omnia enim pariter crescunt & robora sumunt.

Lucret. l. 5.

And *Lactantius* sets down their opinion more distinctly, *That certain motions of the Heavens are necessary to this production of Animals, as well as the freshness of the Earth; and that then there was no Winter nor Summer, but a perpetual Spring.* But how came such a *Proper Season* for this purpose at that time; and never since? *Animals*, say they, *can never since propa-*

Lactant. l. 2. c. 12.

gate themſelves: But what is this to the *Seaſon?* Do the *Seaſons* alter, as there is occaſion? Then there is a Superior Mind to direct them. If there be a natural courſe of the Heavens, which caus'd the Earth to be then prolifical; that muſt return and put a new vigor into the Earth, and make it young again. And this our modern Atheiſtical Philoſophers in *Italy*, ſuch as *Cardan*, *Pomponatius* and others, ſaw very well; and therefore aſſerted *that upon certain Conjunctions of the Heavens, the ſame effects would follow.* So *Berigardus*; who ſaith, that *Cardan* and *Pomponatius* laid much weight on this Story in *Diodorus Siculus* about *Animals produc'd by the Nile*; and he adds another very ridiculous, as he pretends out of *Camerarius*, *of ſeveral parts of human Bodies, which are ſeen to appear every year riſing out of the Earth about* Grand Cairo: and he thinks *they were like the Egyptian Mice, part Earth and part Animals.* What will not ſuch Men be inclin'd to believe rather than the truth! As when he adds, *of the two Green Boys in* England, *which came out of a Wolf's den 500 years ſince; and the Blew and Red Men out of the Mountains of* Armenia. Which are ſuch incredible Fictions, that it is a wonder any one that pretends to common ſenſe could repeat them. But as to the Egyptian Story in *Camerarius*, it relates not at all to the firſt making of Bodies; but *to the Reſurrection from the dead.* *Camerarius* neither pretends to have ſeen it himſelf, nor that his Friend did; but that his Friend heard one that had been a great Traveller ſay, *That in a certain place not far from the Pyramids, at a certain time of the year, a great multitude met to ſee the Reſurrection of the Dead, as they call'd it; and then he ſaid ſome part of the Body ſeem'd to come out of the Earth, ſometimes the Head, ſometimes the Feet, and ſometime the greater part of the Body; which were afterwards hid under the Earth again.* And another Friend of his ſhew'd him an old *Itinerary* to the ſame purpoſe; *and that the place was two Miles from the* Nile, *in an old Burying place; and that it laſted three days, and then no more were ſeen that year.* But he added, That *they were not ſeen riſing up or walking*; and he ſaith, *That he ſaw it not himſelf.* But *Camerarius* himſelf cenſures it as a *ſuperſtitious folly.* *Martinus à Baumgarten*, ſaith, *That at* Cairo *it was believ'd in his time, that at a certain Moſque near the* Nile, *the Bodies of the dead do ariſe out of their Graves at the time of Prayers, and there ſtand, and diſappear when they are over*; which he calls a *Diabolical Illuſion.* But when our Ingenious Mr. *Sandys* was in *Egypt*, the ſtory was chang'd; for then it was affirm'd, *That not far from the* Nilus, *upon Good-Friday, the Arms and Legs of a Number of Men did appear ſtretch'd forth of the Earth, to the aſtoniſhment of the multitude.* Which he not improbably conjectures *to have been taken out of the Mummies not far off by the Watermen, (who gain very much by it) and plac'd conveniently in the Sand to be ſeen,* as they thought would raiſe the greateſt admiration. Since his time Monſ. *Thevenot*, who was upon the place ſaith, *That at* Grand Cairo *it is generally believ'd that on three days in Paſſion-week, ſome part of the dead Bodies lie out of the graves, and then return into the Earth. He had the curioſity to go and ſee, and there found ſome ſkulls and bones, which they ſay confidently came out of the Earth; but he looked on it as a contrivance of the Santons.* But if this prove any thing, it is not what *Berigardus* brings it for, that Mankind came firſt out of the Earth, but that there ſhall be a Reſurrection of the Dead: for he ſaith, *It was in a place where many dead Bodies did lie buried*; and not far from the *Mummies*; which was the moſt famous place for Burials in all *Egypt:* an account whereof is

Berigard. Circul. 10. *p.* 636. *part.* 5.

Camerar. Operæ ſubciſ. Cent. 1. *c.* 73.

Martin. à Baumgart. Peregrin. l. 1. *c.* 18.

Sandys's *Travels, p.* 99.

Thevenot Voyage de Levant, part 2. *ch.* 12.

Bellon. l. 2. *c.* 47.

Pietr. della Valle Vol. 1. *Lett.* 11. §. 8.

given by *Bellonius*, *Peter della Valle*, *Buratine* in *Thevenot's Collection*, Prince *Radzivil* and ſeveral others: Prince *Radzivil* obſerv'd, *That there were vaſt numbers of ſkulls and bones ſcatter'd up and down, where the fleſh had been taken off, and ſold away for Mummy.* But beſides theſe *Mummies* (as they are call'd) there was continu'd a place of ſolemn Burial near to *Grand Cairo* by the *Turks*; ſo that there were always Bodies ready that were not proper *Mummies*, to make this annual ſhew with, to deceive the ſimple. But *Berigardus* is aware of the difficulty *of aſſigning the manner how Animals come out of the Earth*; and therefore he thinks it ſufficient to ſhew that the Earth can produce them one way or other, and afford them *Nouriſhment* when they are produc'd; this he thinks *abſolutely neceſſary*, and he ſuſpects that *Lucretius* his *Folliculi* will not do the buſineſs; *becauſe it is impoſſible for Children to ſubſiſt, if they did break the bags they were inclos'd in, which were faſtened to the Earth:* But if there were ſuch a *Milky Subſtance* in the Earth for new born Children to ſuck, is that all that is neceſſary for their ſupport, when they are ſo unable to help themſelves? Of all things one would not expect to find Milk in the breaſts of the Earth; and it muſt be ſome very happy Conjunction of the Planets to make the Earth to give ſuck. How much would thoſe who are friends to Religion have been deſpis'd and laugh'd at, if they had made ſuch abſurd and ridiculous *Hypotheſis* as theſe? If ſuch a thing did ariſe from natural and neceſſary Cauſes, it muſt continue; and ſince we are certain it hath never been ſince, we have no reaſon to think it ever was. If it were by chance; what hinders the ſame effect, unleſs Chance were ty'd up to one certain time? and by what Laws can Chance be bounded? If it were by particular deſign at that time for the ſupport of new born Animals, then there muſt be a Providence owned; and yet all this was invented on purpoſe to exclude Providence: which ſhews how weak and inconſiſtent this *Hypotheſis* is.

Thevenot Relat. part. 1. ad fin. Peregrin. Principis Radzivil, p. 187.

We account it a wonderful work of Providence, that at the ſame time the Child is form'd in the womb of its Mother, there ſhould be ſo ample and ſutable proviſion made for its nouriſhment in the Mother's breaſts againſt its coming into the World. Whether it be by turning the Blood into Milk, as was generally thought, or by a paſſage of the Chyle from the Ventricle thither, as ſome of late think; it cannot but be look'd on as a work of Deſign, to turn the nouriſhment another way on purpoſe to ſerve the neceſſities of the new born Child. But this is not all; but continual care and watchfulneſs of the Nurſe is neceſſary to preſerve it, otherways, as well as by feeding it. But theſe unadvis'd and fanciful makers of Mankind think they have done their buſineſs, if they can but imagin the Earth to afford ſome *Milky Subſtance*, to ſupport the poor helpleſs Infants to a little ſuck from the Earth: why did they not as eaſily find out all other conveniencies for them? But there is ſo much abſurdity in the whole Suppoſition, that *Berigardus* concludes, *That Mankind muſt come full grown out of the Earth, and able to ſhift for themſelves; or elſe that ſome other Animals muſt come out before them to afford Milk for them, as the Wolf did to* Romulus *and* Remus. Such miſerable ſhifts muſt thoſe run into, who will not allow a wiſe Providence to have brought Mankind into the World.

But how came Mankind, if they came into the World ſo by chance, II.
to be ſo admirably provided in all parts of their Bodies of ſuch inſtruments of ſenſe and motion, that look as like a deſign as any thing can

poſſibly do? The Bodies of Men are not like meer lumps of dirt and water put together, for there is not the leaſt part about them, but is made up of ſuch a *Wonderful Mechaniſm*, that there cannot be a diſcompoſure in it without a diſorder in the whole. But, ſuppoſe the fleſhly and bony parts could be made by the mixing and tempering ſeveral particles of Matter together; yet what can be imagin'd as to the *Muſcles* and *Nerves* and *Fibres*, which are ſo conveniently diſpers'd over the Body? The Heart it ſelf is found to be a very ſtrong Muſcle, conſiſting of abundance of Nerves, and all kind of Fibres complicated within each other, and a ſtrong Tendon at the Baſis of it; by virtue whereof it is able to contract it ſelf, and ſo makes the Blood to paſs into the Arteries, which convey it to all parts of the Body. Now let any one think with himſelf how it is poſſible for a meer Lump of Earth made in ſuch a form as the Heart is, to have ſuch a force and power to contract it ſelf to ſuch a degree as to ſend out ſo much Blood continually, and to receive it in again by the relaxation of it ſelf. How comes this Motion to begin in ſuch a piece of Clay made with a Baſis and a Cone? How came the inward cavities to be form'd, and kept ſo diſtinct from each other? For, if there were any ſtop of the paſſage, Life is at an end. How comes ſuch a Motion to continue ſo long and ſo uniform? Thoſe who have moſt narrowly ſearch'd into it, have found that no other account can be given of it, but that the Wiſe Creator that form'd the Heart, doth both give and continue its motion. And as to all the other Muſcles of the Body, if we conſider their number, their poſition, the contexture of their parts, and their continual uſefulneſs; we can never imagin that all theſe things could be the reſult of Heat and Mud, or a caſual conflux of the dull particles of Matter. Every Muſcle hath its proper Fibres laid upon one another, and its oppoſite Tendons, with an inward cavity, and the Artery, Veins and Nerves belonging to it, and a Membrane to cover all; and all parts capable of motion have ſeveral Muſcles peculiar to themſelves, for diſtinct uſes and different ſort of motions; as may be ſeen at large in all that treat of theſe matters. Who tell us generally that the Eyes have ſix, the Noſe four pair, the Cheeks two pair, the Lips four Muſcles, the nether Mandible five, the Ears ſix, the Tongue ſeven, &c. I need go no farther: and altho' there be ſome difference in the way of numbring them, yet they all agree, there are ſo many as are impoſſible to be made out by heat and mud, or any force of the Sun or Earth. And what is it which makes all theſe Muſcles ſo ſerviceable to Mankind, that upon the leaſt command they move the parts they ſerve in what manner we direct them? The Reaſon of *Muſcular Motion* is a thing as much out of our reach as that of the *Heart:* Some talk of *Elaſtick Spirits*; others of *the weight of the Blood*; others of *a nervous liquor diſtending the carnous Fibres*; others of *a Succus nutritius from the Nerves meeting with the Animal Spirits, and fermenting together, which being thruſt into the carnous Fibres, ſwells and dilates them ſo as to make them contract themſelves*; *from whence*, they ſay, *Local Motion proceeds.* But all theſe are but mere conjectures, and hardly anſwer to the moſt common appearances of Muſcular motion. And the Mechaniſm of our own Bodies, both as to Senſe and Motion, baffles all the attempts of the moſt ingenious and ſubtle Philoſophers; who may eaſier teach us the ways to talk about it, than to underſtand it. But there is one thing yet farther fit to be obſerv'd in this place concerning the Muſcles; which is the different Figure of them, according to the uſe they ſerve for; as

Lower *de Corde. p.* 85.

the

the Muſcle called *Deltoides* on the Shoulder, the Circular Muſcles, where their uſe is to open and ſhut; if ſuch things do not argue contrivance and deſign, it is not eaſy to imagin what doth. What can thoſe who follow *Diodorus Siculus* make of the whole *Syſtem of Nerves*, which are in the Body of Man? Did theſe come out of ſlime with *the heat of the Sun?* How came the different Riſe of the *Nerves*, ſome within and others without the Brain? What reaſon is there in the bulk, and figure, and texture of that ſame Subſtance, that it comes to be ſo divided, ſo as part of it to continue within the Brain, and the other to be continued down to the loweſt part of the Back, by ſeveral diſtinct *Vertebræ?* How came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a paſſage down from the Brain, and to ſecure it in ſuch a manner; and to compact the ſeveral parts together, ſo firmly as if they were but one bone, and yet ſo flexibly as to ſerve beſt for motion? What made the *Perforation* for the *Spinal Marrow* to paſs in the middle and on the ſides, for the ſeveral *Nerves* to go from thence to the ſeveral parts of the Body? Whence came that *Ligament*, which joyns the *Vertebræ* of the Back together, and covers the other Membranes of the *Spina Dorſi?* There is a wonderful curioſity obſerved by our greateſt *Anatomiſts*, in the order and placing of the *Nerves*, the *Arteries*, *the Veins* and the *hollow places* belonging to it: which they found by opening the *Vertebræ* in *Embryos*, and taking out the ſpinal Marrow, and injecting liquors into the ſeveral veſſels. And ſtill the farther any have gone in theſe ſearches, the more reaſon they have ſeen to admire the wiſdom of Providence: and ſo it hath been in other parts. *Ariſtotle* mentions a ſtrange ſaying of *Empedocles*, *That the reaſon why the Back-bone appears as if it were made up of ſeveral pieces, was that it was at firſt broken, and then put together; and ever ſince it hath ſo continued.* But how came the *Vertebræ* then to be ſo well faſtened together, and to be ſo much more convenient for motion than an intire bone would have been? Beſides in an *Embryo* that which is properly the *Spina*, doth not then appear, as being inconvenient for its poſture in the womb; which ſhews both the intention of Nature, and the deſign of Providence. How came the *Vertebræ* to be in other Animals as well as Mankind? And even *Ariſtotle* himſelf was therein miſtaken, for he affirms, *That a Lion hath no* Vertebræ *in his Neck-bone, but that it is all one continued bone:* But *Borrichius* in his Anatomy of one, declares *that he found the ſeveral* Vertebræ *in the Neck plain and diſtinct.* And the ſame learned Perſon obſerves, *That in a Crocodile, which he diſſected, he found in four foot length of the Back ſixty* Vertebræ; *which were of a ſpongy nature, fit to receive nouriſhment*; and from *the different formation of ſome parts of them*, he concludes it moſt probable that they grow ſo much longer than other Animals. But *Ariſtotle*'s miſtakes, about *the Lion's having no* Vertebræ *in his Neck*, had been diſcover'd by *Scaliger*, and confirm'd by ſeveral Diſſections ſince: So that the *Vertebræ* are of the original deſign of Nature. But to proceed: What made the ſeveral paſſages out of the Skull, for the Nerves which ſerve for the ſeveral Senſes of *Smelling*, *Seeing*, *Hearing* and *Taſting?* How come the ſeveral branches of the *Par Vagum* to be ſo diſpers'd, and to make ſuch knots with the *Intercoſtal Nerves?* Theſe, and many more ſuch Queſtions might be aſked relating to the wonderful *Syſtem* of *Nerves*, but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, to ſhew that theſe wonderful contrivances for Senſe and Motion, could not come from meer fortuitous and unthinking Cauſes. But let us look now upon the moſt obvious parts of the Body, which lie to the

Willis de Cerebro, c. 29.

Ariſt. de Partib. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Hermet. Sapient. vindic. c. 10. p. 245. p. 272.

Exercit. 208.

view

view of all Men, the *Eye*, the *Ear*, the *Mouth*, and the *Hand*; one would think it hardly poſſible for any Men pretending to Reaſon, to think theſe to be the reſult of Chance. Let us well conſider the ſtructure of *the Eye*, and we may well think *Lucretius* had no lucid interval when he wrote,

Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer & iſtam
Effugere errorem, vitareque præmeditator,
Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Proſpicere ut poſſimus. Lucret. l. 4.

That we muſt have a great care to avoid the miſtake of thoſe that ſay, that Eyes were made for Seeing. For could any Man in his right Senſes think the Eye could be form'd for any other uſe but to ſee with? *But the uſe is after the thing is form'd.* What then? May it not be deſign'd for ſuch a uſe by him that form'd it? *But that which is form'd for a particular uſe, muſt be later than that for whoſe uſe it is form'd, as a Bed for a Man to ſleep on, a Cup to drink out of, Armour to defend himſelf; but a Man might ſleep, and drink, and defend himſelf, before thoſe things were found out.* What is the meaning of all this? No one is ſo ſenſleſs to queſtion, Whether Men be not before they find ſome conveniencies for their particular uſes; but the Queſtion here is, Whether when a thing is ſo form'd as to ſerve only for ſuch a uſe, it be not reaſonable to conclude that it was made on purpoſe for that uſe? But ſaith *Lucretius*,

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti
Poſſemus, ſed, quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.

Nothing is made in the Body that we might uſe it, but when it is made we find out the uſe of it. As tho' it had been poſſible for Mankind to have found ſuch an uſe of the Eye, unleſs it had been purpoſely made for it, The Act of Seeing is no doubt ſubſequent to the making of the Eye; for we cannot ſee without Eyes; but if we could make no other uſe of Eyes; but to ſee with, is not this a plain evidence they were made for us to that end? This is not like a uſe we make of things which we alter the faſhion of for our conveniences. For, we do not make our own Eyes; they are very early form'd in the Body, and therefore were within the primary intention of Nature; and aſſoon as we come into the World, we do not deliberate whether we ſhould uſe Eyes or not, for we preſently ſee with them. And how can the Eye being made teach us the uſe of it, when we preſently make uſe of our Eyes without any previous deliberation? We may hinder the uſe of them, if we pleaſe, by blinding our ſelves, but we cannot turn them to any other uſe. If *Lucretius* in the extravagancy of his imagination, might fancy the uſe was arbitrary, then Men might have heard with their Eyes or have ſeen with their Ears, or have taſted with their Noſes, or ſmelt with their Tongues: But this I ſuppoſe none can think that he meant. What was it then? that Men could not uſe them till they were made? We grant it. But doth it follow thence that they were not made deſignedly for ſuch a uſe? How can we judge of that, but by examining the ſeveral parts? and if they were fitted for ſuch a uſe and no other, we have reaſon to conclude they were ſo intended. Now

what could the *Muſcles* and *Tunicles*, and *ſeveral Humours* of the Eye be made for, but for Sight? How came that *Cavity* to be form'd in the Forehead in which the Eyes are plac'd? What motion of the particles of Matter made two ſuch hollow places in the Skull? How came one not to be ſufficient? How come the *Eye-lids* to be ſo plac'd? Could they be deſign'd for any other uſe? How come the *Glands* to be fix'd in the corners of the Eyes, and with the *Lymphatick Veſſels* belonging to them? Could they have ſerv'd for other uſes? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be continued to the three Tunicles of the Eyes? and that which partakes moſt of the ſubſtance of the Brain to be the chief organ of Sight, as fitteſt to tranſmit the images to the Brain? What was the *Chriſtallin Humour* deſign'd for, but to receive the impreſſions of outward objects? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be ſo inſerted into the Eye, not directly behind, but on one ſide, but only for the more intire tranſmitting the Images receiv'd by the Eye? Can now any one think that the Eye could be ever made for any other uſe, but for ſight? And we do not therefore uſe it, becauſe we find it ready prepar'd? but it was therefore ſo prepar'd, that we might uſe it to ſuch a purpoſe. And as to his general ſaying, *That nothing in the Body is made for uſe, but that the uſe follows the making of it*; let us apply it to other Animals, and it will appear ridiculous. What could any Man anſwer ſeriouſly to one that ſhould ſay, that four-footed Animals had not Feet given them to go with; but that finding ſo many Feet, they did go with them? And ſo for the Wings of Birds, and the Fins of Fiſhes; and the particular ſhapes of ſome Animals for their particular uſe: As, the long Neck of the Swan, for going deeper in the water for his food; will any one ſay, that the Swan finding his Neck ſo long, us'd it for that purpoſe? Or that *Shell-fiſh* finding their hard Shells ready made as a defence againſt the Rocks, crept into them for that end? Whereas all the Muſcles they move by, are cover'd over with a hard bony Subſtance; and ſo they are the neceſſary parts belonging to them. What can be ſaid to the thick horny ſubſtance of an Eagle's Eye, which makes it bear the ſtrongeſt beams of the Sun; was this only us'd for that purpoſe, but not intended by Nature? Whence came that outward covering of the Eye, not only in Eagles but in other greater Birds, which they can draw over it as they pleaſe, and is ſo ſtrong a defence againſt light, that Anatomiſts tell us, by the help of it put to their open Eyes, they could look on the Sun without trouble, as *Borrichius* informs us? *Steno*, upon the obſervation of the wonderful Mechaniſm of the Eye both in Mankind, and Beaſts, and Birds, ſaith, *That if a Man firſt underſtands Mechanicks, and then curiouſly examins the fabrick of Animals, he muſt either put off his Reaſon, or he muſt admire the wiſdom and contrivance of Providence.* And he underſtood the frame of theſe things far beyond what either *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* did.

Borrich. Hermet. ſap. p. 259. Act. Dan. l. 2. Obſ. 127.

And ſo for the Ear *that was made*, ſaith *Lucretius*, *long before any Sound was heard.*

Multoque creatæ ſunt prius Aures,
Quam ſonus eſt auditus.

No doubt of it. For how ſhould we hear without Ears? But can any Man imagin they could be made for any other uſe but to hear with? How came they to be plac'd in the Head and not in any other part of the

the Body? Were there any form'd before with Ears in other parts, which did not do so well? In other cases they say, *Nature was put to try divers Experiments, because the imperfect Animals could not subsist*; But this cannot hold here: For Mankind might have lived without Ears in other places, but the Head is certainly the best for Sounds, being received and transmitted to the Brain. How comes the outward part of the Ear to be so framed as it is, but for the better gathering and more distinct conveyance of the Sounds, as appears by the confus'd noise which those have who have lost that part? What made the inward passage so winding, and such an exquisite Membrane at the end of it, and a Cord behind it, but for the advantage of the Sound? How come the three cavities behind, the first with little Bones of an extraordinary figure, whereof one triangular, the better to give passage to the Air; the second called *the Labyrinth*, and the third with *Spiral Windings* and *an Internal Air*, and all particularly serving the purpose of Hearing, by the Sound passing from one to another? Whence came all these subtle and intricate passages, if our Bodies were made by chance? And yet, if any of them be not in their due order, our sense of Hearing is prejudiced; which shews that this contrivance was necessary in order to it. And which is again observable, the greater discoveries have been made in these matters, the more reason we have to admire the contrivance of them. As in this sense of Hearing, the latest discoveries about the small bones of the first cavity, call'd *the Hammer, the Anvil*, and *the Stirrup*, and another in the joyning the two last, acquaint us with more than what the Ancients knew; since there are two things remarkable about them. 1. *That they do move each other*; the Drum moves the Hammer, the Hammer the Anvil, that the Stirrup, which opens the passage into the second cavity. 2. *That these bones are as big in an Infant, as in grown Persons.* Now how comes this to pass in a way of *Mechanism*? How come these Bones not to increase as the other parts of the Body do; since the most solid of them, *the Hammer* and *Anvil*, as well as the *Stirrup*, have manifest Pores in them to receive nourishment? But not only these, but the other small bones in the inner cavities, the *Semicircular passages* and the *Cochlea* only receive a greater *firmness* and *hardness* by Age. These things I can only mention, and refer the Reader to Mr. *Du Verney* and others, who have treated most exactly of them.

The frame of the Mouth as it is, is necessary for *Respiration*, and *Nourishment*, and *Speech*. For *Respiration*, the Mouth opened affords a Passage to the Air, and there are inward Vessels fitted to convey it to the Lungs, and without breathing it is impossible to live. But how came the two different Passages for the *Air* and *Food*? How came the *Valve* to secure the Passage to the Lungs from such things which may prejudice it, and pass the other way? As to *Nourishment*, the Mouth not only takes in the Food, but the Teeth are conveniently plac'd for the preparing it for its farther passage and alteration in the Stomach, in order to Nutrition; for which end there are Vessels prepar'd with wonderful variety and contrivance. How come those *Channels* into those hard Bones in the Mouth, which we call *Teeth*, by which an Artery, a Vein and a Nerve spread themselves in branches to each particular Tooth? How come the figures of them to vary according to their use, and to have stronger Roots where the work is harder? And because *Speech* is one of the peculiar excellencies of Mankind, there is an Instrument fram'd on

purpoſe for it in the Mouth (which ſerves for *Taſting* likewiſe) and without this, all the communication of Mankind with each other by words had been loſt. And I cannot ſee how mere Matter and Motion could help Mankind either to frame words, or to utter them to others without a *Tongue*; nor, how it could be fram'd by it.

The *Hand* is ſo provided with *Joints*, *Muſcles*, and *Tendons*, for the great variety of neceſſary uſes it ſerves Mankind for, that he that can think it could be ſo contriv'd by chance, doth thereby ſhew that ſome can think only by Chance without any Reaſon; and it is a vain thing to hope to convince them. I ſhall not need to inſiſt on the curioſity of the contrivance of all the Muſcles of the Hand; but it is impoſſible for any Man to give an account of the *Perforation* of thoſe Muſcles, which ſerve for the uſe of ſome of the Fingers and Toes, from mere Matter and Motion; or the Ligaments about the Tendons of thoſe Muſcles, for the greater eaſineſs of their motion. *Ariſtotle* hath a Diſcourſe about the great uſe of a Hand to Mankind: *Anaxagoras*, he ſaith, *ſaid that Man was the wiſeſt Animal, becauſe he alone had Hands*; but, ſaith he, *therefore Man had Hands, becauſe he was the wiſeſt, being beſt able to make uſe of ſuch an excellent Inſtrument. For that is the Wiſdom of Nature to do as a wiſe Man would do*, i. e. *to give the beſt Inſtruments to the beſt Workman. Now*, ſaith he, *the Hand is the moſt uſeful Inſtrument to him that is capable of making a good uſe of it.* And therefore he blames thoſe that ſaid, *Man was the worſt provided for of any Animals; for they have but one help afforded them by Nature, but the Hand is inſtead of all, for it can make uſe of all.* And for that reaſon he ſhews how very convenient the make and faſhion of the Hand is, and the diviſion of it into five parts, on which he inſiſts at large. So that *Ariſtotle* was fully ſatisfy'd that the production of Mankind was no caſual or ſpontaneous thing, but the effect of Wiſdom and Underſtanding.

Riolan. Anatom. l. 5. c. 28.

Ariſtot. de Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Theſe things I have here laid together at firſt, becauſe this *Hypotheſis* of *Diodorus Siculus* hath been thought by ſome in our Age to be *the natural ſenſe of Mankind without Revelation*; whereas in truth it is the foundation of Irreligion, and the reproach of Mankind; but not the ſenſe of the wiſeſt part of them. And to make out this more effectually, I ſhall now proceed to conſider and compare the ſenſe of the moſt *antient Philoſophers* on both ſides as to this point, whether the World was the effect of Chance, or of a wiſe Providence. For if the World were made by a wiſe and intelligent Being, it can never be ſuſpected that Religion is an Impoſture, or a contrivance of Politicians; for then it will appear to be built upon the trueſt Reaſon. And I ſhall the more carefully inquire into the Opinions of the eldeſt Philoſophers, becauſe they were neither *Prieſts* nor *Politicians*, having no Intereſt to carry on by the practice of Religion. And ſome of them were born in a very good condition, and quitted their Eſtates, or neglected other buſineſs, the more freely to attend on their philoſophical Inquiries. And therefore we have the more reaſon to ſearch into their Opinions, ſo far as relates to theſe matters.

It cannot be deny'd that after Men began to be inquiſitive into the philoſophical Reaſons of Things, there were ſome who ſet up for material Cauſes only, without an Efficient. And there were two different ſorts of theſe, and the other Schemes may be well reduced to them.

The firſt was of thoſe who were the immediate Succeſſors of *Thales*. For I ſee no reaſon to put him in the head of them, if what *Cicero*, *Diogenes Laertius* and *Plutarch* report of him be true. For it is ſaid in

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. 25.

Cicero, *That* Thales *made* God *to be the Mind that form'd all things*. And to what purpose should *Velleius* say this, if this had not been then known to have been his Opinion? For it had been better for his design to have made so great a Man as *Thales* was esteem'd, to have excluded God and Providence. *Diogenes Laertius* saith, *That he not only made* God *an Eternal Being, but that the World was of his making*. And he was no more partial in this case, than the *Epicurean* in *Tully*. It is observable, that when *Plutarch* blames *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* for *leaving out the Efficient Cause*, he takes no notice of *Thales* on that account; which he ought to have done, as being the Head of that Sect of Philosophers called the *Ionick*, as himself acknowledges in that place. And *Stobæus* saith, *That* Thales *own'd a Divine Power, which pass'd thro' and gave motion to the fluid Matter, out of which he suppos'd all things to be made*. The great Objection against this, is, that several of the antient Writers say, *That* Anaxagoras *was the first Philosopher, who attributed the making of the World to an Infinite Mind*; and that *Plutarch* himself, in the Life of *Pericles*, saith the same. But the true answer to this, is, that *Anaxagoras* was the first who own'd this in writing, whose words are produc'd by so many; but *Thales* wrote nothing about it that appear'd, and therefore his Scholars going another way, there might be some presumption against him. For it is too evident that *Anaximander*, his Disciple, did never mention a God in the making of the World; *but he mentions several Gods made out of the World*, *Dii nativi*; a sort of *Phœnician Gods*, which rose out of Matter; and such as the *Poets* had possess'd the People with among the *Greeks*. I have already observ'd from *Plato*, *That the old* Greeks *worship'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars*, &c. *as other barbarous Nations did*. Now herein lay the artifice of *Anaximander*, that he took care to assert the *Popular Deities*, and so avoided the imputation of *Atheism* among the People, who look'd no farther, than whether Men own'd the Religion in vogue: But whether there were an Infinite Mind superior to those Gods they worship'd, they look'd on as a Speculation too deep for them; and therefore they let those alone, who spake nothing against the Gods they solemnly worship'd. And this was the true reason of the different usage of *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*. The former asserted the Beginning of all things to have been from Infinite Matter, without an Efficient Cause: The latter said this was impossible; but there must be an Eternal Mind to give motion to Matter, and to direct it. Now one would have thought that *Anaxagoras* should have been in favor with the People, who hated *Atheism*, and *Anaximander* punished: But on the contrary *Anaximander* kept up his Interest among the People where he liv'd, at *Miletus* in *Asia*, and at last carry'd a Colony along with him to *Apollonia*. The reason was, the People of *Miletus* had a wonderful veneration for the *Sun* and *Moon*, under the names of *Apollo* and *Diana*; and as long as *Anaximander* comply'd with them, as to these *Dii nativi*, they let him alone in his Philosophy. But *Anaxagoras* coming to *Athens*, and being there in favor with *Pericles*, a leading Man in the City, but oppos'd violently by a different Faction of *Thucydides Milesius*, who took all advantages they could against *Pericles* his Party: They finding that *Anaxagoras* had shew'd too much of his Philosophy, when he call'd the Sun a *Mass of Fire*; this set them all in a flame, and made such a disturbance about it, that *Anaxagoras* was accus'd of *Atheism*; and *Pericles* with all his Interest and Eloquence could not save him from Banishment, in which he died, as appears by Laertius and Ælian. *Ana-*

Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3. Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 1.

Ælian. l. 3. c. 17. Strab. l. 14.

xagoras

xagoras was very clear as to the main point of *Atheiſm*, for he aſſerted an Eternal Mind which made the World; this *Anaximander* deny'd, but he aſſerted the Common Deities: and altho' the *Epicurean* in *Tully* argues well againſt *Anaximander*'s Opinion, *Sed nos Deum niſi ſempiternum intelligere quî poſſumus?* We can have no true Notion of GOD not eternal; yet ſuch philoſophical Reaſons ſignified little; he allow'd the ſame Worſhip which they practis'd, and this was enough to ſatisfy them.

I am not ignorant, that ſome have gone about to excuſe *Anaximander*, as tho' he were ſo intent upon the Material Cauſes, that thro' *Incogitancy* only *he left out the Efficient.* A ſtrange piece of *Incogitancy* in a Philoſopher to leave out the main point. For the juſt fault which *Anaxagoras* found, was that he went about to make a World without an Eternal Mind before Matter; and he knew very well what the ſenſe of *Anaximander*, and his Scholar *Anaximenes* were, by whom he was inſtructed. And why ſhould *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Theophraſtus*, &c. look on it as ſo extraordinary a thing in *Anaxagoras* to aſſert an Eternal Mind, as the firſt Cauſe, if his Predeceſſors meant the ſame thing? But there is a paſſage in *Ariſtotle* which ſeems moſt to favour *Anaximander*, viz. *That he own'd an infinite firſt Principle, which did contain and govern all things, and was Immortal and Incorruptible.* And this *Aug. Steuchus Eugubinus* in his learned Book *De perenni Philoſophia*, inſiſts much upon. (A Book written with ſo good a deſign, and bating ſome ſuppoſititious Authorities, ſo well manag'd, that the Elder *Scaliger*, as his Son tells us, commended it particularly to a great Friend of his, too inclinable to *Atheiſm* (as was too much the faſhion then as well as ſince, among ſome who would ſeem to have more Wit than others) and it had ſo great ſucceſs therein, that he utterly renounc'd all Principles tending that way.) The Paſſage which he produces is certainly in *Ariſtotle*, and it ſeems ſo capable of a good meaning, that *Clemens Alexandrinus join'd him with* Anaxagoras *in ſuppoſing an Infinite Being above the Elements:* And it cannot be deny'd that the Author of the Book *de Mundo* (who, as I before obſerv'd, was very antient, if not *Ariſtotle*) doth uſe the ſame Expreſſion concerning GOD, *that he doth contain and govern all things:* but yet laying the Paſſages in *Ariſtotle* together, there is too great reaſon to ſuſpect that *Anaximander* did not aſſert an Eternal Mind, as *Anaxagoras* did. He is there giving an account of the different Notions Philoſophers had concerning *the firſt Principle: Some aſſerted it to be Infinite, as* Anaxagoras *and* Democritus; *the former held things to be made out of one another, and that there was one firſt Principle of all, which he called Mind; the latter held no Generation of things out of another, but that one Common Matter or Body was the only Principle of all things, and that the parts differ'd only by bulk and figure.* Thus far *Ariſtotle* is clear; then he goes on to ſhew, *that the firſt Principle muſt be Ingenite and Incorruptible*; and then it *muſt contain and govern all things*; *as all do hold, who do not aſſert* other Cauſes, *as Mind* (as *Anaxagoras*) *or Friendſhip* (as *Empedocles.*) *And this is the* Τὸ Θεῖον *the Divine Being, which is immortal and incorruptible,* as was aſſerted by *Anaximander* and *the moſt of thoſe* he calls *Phyſiologiſts, i. e.* who went no farther than the bare Nature of things. Now here it is plain, that he doth diſtinguiſh *Anaximander* and his Followers from *Anaxagoras*, who aſſerted an Eternal Mind: and he diſtinguiſhes his Opinion both from that of *Democritus* and *Anaximander.* It may be ſaid, *that it is plain from hence, that* Anaximander *did aſſert a Divine Being*; but at laſt it came to nothing but *Infinite Matter*, which was the Ori-

De Perenni Philoſ. l. 1. c. 5.

Joſ. Scalig. de vit. Julii Scaligeri p. 50.

Clem. Alexandr. Protrept. p. 43.

Nat. Auſ. l. 3. c. 4.

ginal and Mother-God to his *Dii Geniti*, as he called them. In another
Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3. place he ſpeaks yet more plainly, viz. *that thoſe Philoſophers before* Anaxagoras *went no farther than Matter, and made all things to come out of it, and to be diſſolv'd into it again, being it ſelf one and immutable under all the variety of changes.* He ſaith, *They differ'd about the firſt Material Principle: Thales*, and one *Hippon* called *the Atheiſt* (the firſt of that Order that we read of) *held it to be Water*; but *Ariſtotle* beſtows a very
Διὰ τ' ἀ-πέλειαν αὐ-τῶν τ' διανοίας. ſevere character upon him, viz. *that he did not deſerve to be mention'd for the meanneſs of his capacity.* (It ſeems Wit and Atheiſm did not begin together.) *Anaximander* would go no farther than Infinite Matter in general; but *Anaximenes* was for *Air*, and ſo was *Diogenes Apolloniates*, who liv'd in the time of *Anaxagoras*; but it ſeems by *Demetrius Phalereus* his Apology for *Socrates* (now loſt) *that he fell into ſome danger at* Athens (poſſibly for being againſt the Worſhip of Fire, as *Anaxagoras* was:) But upon the whole matter, I do not ſee how *Anaximander* can be excus'd, altho' he left the *Popular Gods*, and beſtow'd the name of *Divinity* upon his *Infinite Matter*.

But there was another *Succeſſion* of *Philoſophers* deriv'd from *Xenophanes*, who liv'd in *Sicily*, ſaith *Laertius*, and was Contemporary with *Anaximander*: and he was neither a Follower of *Thales* nor of *Pythagoras*; but from a Town near the Sea in *Italy*, whence his chief Followers came, it was called the *Eleatick Sect*. He was a great Enemy to *the poetical Fictions about the Gods*, as he had reaſon; for they ſtrangely corrupted the Minds of the People, and took away all inward Reverence towards the Deity. And altho' *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks with ſome contempt of him; yet
Beſſario c. Calumnia. Plat. lib. 2. c. 10, 11. others have ſhew'd that he miſunderſtood him, and that he aſſerted *One Infinite and Eternal Mind*; and the ſame *Simplicius* ſaith of *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*: But ſince the learned Author of the *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, hath very well clear'd that matter, I intend not to tranſcribe him, but to refer my Reader to him, and proceed to thoſe who changed the firſt Notions of the *Eleatick Sect*, and ſet up for the making a World without a Deity. And thoſe were *Lucippus* and *Democritus*;
Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 8. and yet *Stobæus* ſaith, *that* Leucippus *wrote a Book about Mind*, wherein he hath this Saying, *That nothing is done in vain, but all things are done from Reaſon and Neceſſity.* How theſe two things came to be ſo put together is hard for us now to conjecture, unleſs that Book of his had been
Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 7. preſerv'd. *Plutarch* ſaith, That *Democritus* held that God *was an Intellectual Fire, and the Soul of the World.* But it appears by *Cicero*, that *Democritus* did not ſtick at making ſome very ſubtle *Effluvia* of his Atoms
Cicero de N. Deor. l. 1. to be Gods, both thoſe without us, and thoſe within us, *viz.* thoſe which make up our intellectual Faculties. It is very hard to ſay what his true Notion of *Divinity* was, unleſs we could have ſeen his Books about *Mind* and *Providence*, which *Laertius* ſaith *that he wrote*. But whatever he might write for the amuſing the World, (as *Epicurus* did afterwards) if he made the Origin of all things to have been *without Mind or Providence*, no Titles of Books will be a ſufficient Excuſe for him.

And I confeſs it is all one to me, whether thoſe who fram'd the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* proceeded in the way of *Forms* and *Qualities*, or of *Atoms* and *Vacuity*; becauſe I think the one way as impoſſible as the other. For as *Ariſtotle* hath well obſerved, the great difficulties as to the firſt Principles lay in two things, *The beginning of Motion, and the Order of the World*: and in both theſe the different *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander*

and

and *Democritus* were equally defective. But whether the World were made by *the Circumvolution of Infinite Matter, endued with contrary Qualities*; or *by the motion of Atoms, which had nothing but Bulk and Figure*, ſignifies nothing as to the main point. I do not deny but one *Hypotheſis* may in ſome reſpects be more intelligible than the other, and tend more to explain the difference of Body and Mind. But there are ſtill difficulties on both ſides: Some things may be taken for *Real Qualities*, which are not; and the many Experiments of this Age have fully prov'd it: but then there are other things, eſpecially relating to *Animals*, which can never be explain'd in the Mechanical way, to the ſatisfaction of any reaſonable Man.

But altho' *Anaximander* and *Democritus* ſtarted theſe two different *Hypotheſes* about the Origin of the World; yet thoſe who aſſerted an Eternal Mind to be the firſt Cauſe, had in common Reaſon very much the advantage of either; ſince it was impoſſible for them to give an account how the motion of Matter began, or how it fell into that Order, and Beauty, and Uſefulneſs, which we find in thoſe parts which make up the viſible World. All that we can learn of *Anaximander*'s *Hypotheſis* is, *That the Heavens and Infinite Worlds* (for why ſhould they ſtop, when they could make Worlds ſo eaſily) *were produced by an infinite circumvolution of all things; that theſe had in them very different Qualities from each other, ſome hot ſome cold, ſome dry ſome moiſt, &c. that theſe being in continual motion, a mixture of them happened, and according to the different mixtures of Qualities, the ſeveral ſorts of things did ariſe.* This, as far as I can apprehend, was his Scheme of the Production of things. *Plutarch. apud Euſ. Præp. Evs. l. 1. 8.*

There is little difference between the two *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, but only in the point of Mixture, which one attributes to Qualities, and the other to the Bulk and Figure of Atoms. They both aſſert the Production of things by the circumvolution of the parts of Matter; both held infinite Worlds, and that the things of this World came together of themſelves, without any ſuperior Cauſe.

But were not all the Philoſophers of their Mind? No; ſo far from it, that the beſt and greateſt of them utterly rejected this Doctrine, as unſatisfactory to Human Reaſon. Of which we have an evident proof from *Ariſtotle*, who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality in this matter. In the beginning of his *Metaphyſicks* he gives an account of the Opinions of *Philoſophers before him about the firſt Principles of things.* I know that he is hardly thought of by many for miſrepreſenting the Opinions of thoſe before him, and that he endeavour'd to leſſen their Reputation to advance his own; but I can ſee no manner of reaſon for it in this caſe. 'Tis poſſible, as to the *Pythagorean* and *Eleatick Sect*, he might not repreſent their Opinions ſo fairly as they were capable of: but as to theſe *Phyſiologiſts*, as he calls them, he charges nothing upon them, but what they own'd; only he makes *Thales the Head of them*, for which I have offer'd Reaſons to the contrary. But in general he ſaith, *That thoſe who began firſt to philoſophize, look'd upon Matter as the only Principle, out of which all things came, and to which they did return; the Subſtance remaining the ſame, and the Affections only chang'd: As* Socrates *is the ſame Man, altho' his inward Habits were chang'd.* But what this Material Principle was, they were not agreed. Thales, *the firſt of them, thought it to be Water*; Anaximenes *and* Diogenes *Air*; Hippaſus *and* Heraclitus *Fire*; Empedocles *to them added Earth.* Hitherto, ſaith he, we find nothing but the Material Cauſe; but, ſaith he, when they had *Metaphyſ. l. 1. §. 3.*

Περιόντος δ' ἔτως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν.

gone ſo far, the very Nature of things carried them farther in their Inquiries. For whatever change he made in Generation and Corruption, there muſt be ſome Cauſe why it ſo happened. For mere Matter doth not change it ſelf. As Wood doth not make it ſelf into a Bed, nor Braſs into a Statue; but ſome Artificer doth it. *But the ſeeking this, is looking after another Principle*, which he calls *the Principle of Motion. Which thoſe who aſſerted from the beginning, ran themſelves into difficulties, altho' they aſſerted Matter to be one; but thoſe who went no farther than Matter, whether Water, or Fire, or Earth, were never able to clear the Production of things; and therefore were forc'd by Truth it ſelf,* (ὑπ' αὐτῆς τ ἀληθείας) *to ſeek for another Principle.* Where it is very conſiderable that *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That there were ſome from the beginning who aſſerted both Principles; and that thoſe who aſſerted only a Material Principle, ran themſelves into ſuch difficulties which they could never ſee their way through; but were forc'd at laſt by the mere power of Truth to ſeek for another Principle. Which not only ſhews his own Opinion, but that others, upon conſideration, were fain to ſet up a new *Hypotheſis* againſt theſe Materialiſts, not wholly new, as he ſhews, but new in oppoſition to them, who thought at firſt, by pretending to ſkill in Philoſophy, to have run down the antient Opinion of Mankind, founded on ſuch a Tradition, of which none could trace the Original. Of which I have already produc'd the teſtimonies of *Plato* and *Plutarch*. But now the humor of philoſophizing coming among the *Greeks*, the firſt ſetters up of this were very apt to contemn any thing that was built on Tradition; for that gave no Reaſon of things, which it was their buſineſs to do. In ſome things then unknown as to the natural Cauſes of them, they wonderfully ſurpriſed the common ſort, who thereupon admired them as Men that could do any thing. Being thus puffed up with a vain opinion of their own ſkill, they attempted to give an account of the very beginning of the World; and finding out what they thought the main Principle of which things were compoſed, they had no more to do, but to ſuppoſe them all reduced to a Maſs or Chaos; and then they fancied that by the motion of theſe ſeveral parts of Matter, things would fall into that ſtate we now ſee them in the World. But as much as they pleas'd themſelves with theſe Speculations, thoſe who came after them found them extremely defective, both in the beginning of this Motion, and the Order of it. For they found Matter to be a dull unactive thing of it ſelf, and that no Matter could form it ſelf without an Agent; and therefore they ſaw it neceſſary to add a Supreme Efficient Cauſe, which ſhould both put the parts of Matter, however qualified, into motion, and direct and regulate the courſe of it. For otherwiſe it was impoſſible to conceive, that there ſhould be ſuch diſtinct Syſtems or Bodies of Matter, as there are in the World. For how come the ſeveral *Vortices* not to interfere with each other? What made the Centers of them to be diſtinct from one another, ſo as that the Matter within ſuch circumference ſhould move about that alone? And without this it is impoſſible to conceive there ſhould be ſuch Bodies as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are; ſo great, and yet ſo diſtinct from each other. But what Cauſe then was found ſo neceſſary to be ſuperadded? *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That the Order and Fitneſs of things, which he calls Εὖ καὶ Καλῶς, muſt proceed from an Intelligent Cauſe; for theſe things could never come either from mere Material Cauſes, as Fire, Earth, *&c.* or only by Chance. And therefore he ſaith, *Anaxagoras* wrote like a Man in his ſenſes, in com-

pariſon of thoſe before him; which ſhews that he look'd on the others Speculations as Dreams and idle Fancies. And he will not allow *Anaxagoras* to have been the firſt that aſſerted this; but he did it φανερῶς, openly and plainly, in oppoſition to ſuch as had ſet up another *Hypotheſis*. For before him, he ſaith, *Hermotinus Clazomenius* had ſaid the ſame thing, as to a ſuperior Cauſe: And ſo no doubt had many others; but he mentions him as a Philoſopher of the ſame City from whence *Anaxagoras* came. But it ſeems the reputation of *Thales* and his Scholars had obtain'd ſo much in the *Greek* Colonies where they inhabited, that they buried the name of others, altho' *Clazomenæ* were a City of *Ionia* too.

But that *Anaxagoras* was a Perſon of a juſt eſteem, appears by the great value which *Pericles* ſet upon him; who not only had him for his Counſellor, but ventur'd his intereſt to preſerve him: and altho' he was over-rul'd by the contrary Faction, as to his Baniſhment; yet he took care of him in it. And as *Plutarch* ſaith, he obtain'd the name of Νοῦς; he cannot tell, whether it was for his Opinion, or the reputation of his Wiſdom. And after he was buried at *Lamſacus*, a City of *Aſia Minor* near the *Helleſpont*, there were two Inſcriptions on the Altar erected to his Memory, which teſtify'd the very great Eſteem of him in two words, the one was Νοῦς, and the other Ἀλήθεια. And what can be ſaid greater of a Philoſopher, than that *Underſtanding* and *Truth* belong'd to him? *Timon*, who was not very civil to the memories of moſt Philoſophers, gives him a high character in *Laertius*: who ſaith likewiſe, *That he was born to a conſiderable Eſtate; but he had a Mind above Riches.* And *Sextus Empiricus* ſaith, *he was the moſt ſkilful in Natural Philoſophy*; and he was blam'd both by *Socrates* and *Ariſtotle*, for running too far into Natural Cauſes, as tho' he made uſe of his Supreme Mind only to help him out, when nothing elſe would. But therein he ſhew'd that it was not for want of underſtanding Natural Cauſes, that he aſſerted *an Eternal Mind, pure and unmix'd*, which was the firſt Cauſe of things; but it was his true ſkill in Philoſophy, which brought him to it. For he fix'd on the Principle of *Gravitation*, as the main foundation of Union and Compoſition; but the other *Hypotheſes* of *Vortices*, or *Circumlations* without it, he look'd on as weak and inſufficient. So vain is that ſaying of *Lucretius* and a modern Philoſopher, that *Ignorance of Cauſes inclin'd Men to Religion*; eſpecially as to the Heavenly Bodies:

Τοῦτον θαυμάσας ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος Περικλῆς. *Plutarch. in Pericle.*

Ælian. l. 8. c. 19.

Sext. Empir. p. 153. Plato in Phædr. Ariſt. Metaph. l. 4. Plutarch. in Pericle.

Leviathan. ch. 12.

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti,
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoſcere cauſis;
Ergo perfugium ſibi habebant omnia Divis
Tradere, & illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Lucret. l. 5.

For the trueſt and exacteſt ſearcher into Natural Cauſes, we ſee, was the moſt firm and ſteddy aſſerter of a GOD. *Lucretius* magnifies his Heroe, *that neither the common Fame, nor the Thunder and Lightning had frighted him into any ſenſe of Religion; but that he had gone beyond the Clouds by the ſtrength of his Wit, and had ſetled all the bounds of Nature.*

Quem nec fama Deûm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compreſſit cœlum, &c.

Which was all becoming the more than Poetick fury of *Lucretius* to ſay. But *Plutarch* in the Life of *Pericles* ſaith, That *Anaxagoras* explain'd to him the Natural Cauſes of thoſe Meteors which are ſo apt to terrify Mankind, and thereby took away an ignorant Superſtition; but inſtead of that he ſettled in his Mind ἡ ἀσφαλῆ μετ' ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν δόξειαν, *a firm Devotion accompanied with good Hopes.* And is not this far beyond the utmoſt *Lucretius* attributes to his *Hero?* ſuppoſing he had ſuch ſucceſs, as he imagin'd; which we have only the Poet's word for.

Quare Relligio pedibus ſubjecto viciſſim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.

But we can find no ſuch victory that he ever obtain'd over Religion, by his fooliſh and precarious *Hypotheſis*, which the more learned pretenders to *Atheiſm* in our Age are aſham'd of, becauſe of its vanity and inconſiſtency; and therefore there is now leſs need of inſiſting upon it. But what reaſon had *Lucretius* to make ſuch extravagant boaſting of *Epicurus* his ſucceſs againſt the Principles of Religion; when *Cicero* of the ſame age and time, and a friend to *Lucretius*, had ſo very mean an opinion of it, and hath expos'd it ſo much to contempt in more places than one? But poſſibly he may mean, *it had ſo at Athens:* nothing like it. For it was obſerv'd, that none were more forward to comply with the *popular ſuperſtitions*, none more reſerv'd as to their real opinions about the *Deity* than *Epicurus* and his followers. What need all this mean complyance, this caution and reſerve, if they were ſuch Conquerors, as he repreſents them? They never oppos'd the common ſentiments, as *Anaxagoras* did, and ſuffer'd for it; but inſtead of it, they induſtriouſly labour'd to perſuade the People, that they were *for Piety and Veneration of the Gods*; *and Epicurus* wrote about it: whether in earneſt or not, I diſpute not; but he was in earneſt concern'd for his own ſecurity. Are theſe the marks of a *Conqueror?* And yet in his time the *fear of the Areopagus*, after the time of *Ephialtes* was in great meaſure remov'd. It is obſerved by *Joſephus, That by the Laws of* Athens, *it was death without mercy, to ſpeak againſt the eſtabliſhed Religion*; and we find with what difficulty *Anaxagoras* eſcaped: But in *Epicurus* his time the Government was ſunk, and the *Macedonian* Empire was continually growing upon them; and all People took greater liberty to ſpeak their Minds, and without any ſuch oppoſition as the Philoſophers before him met with, when their Laws were obſerved more ſtrictly; as when *Protagoras* and *Diagoras* were forced to abſcond for fear of their lives; and *Ariſtotle* upon a ſuſpicion of a profane *Hymn* to withdraw to *Calcis*. But in the time of *Epicurus*, the ſtate of the City was altered, and the Government was in the hands of *Alexander*'s Succeſſors; for *Epicurus* lived with his Scholars in *Athens*, when it was ſo cloſely beſieged by *Demetrius*, as *Plutarch* informs us, who ſoon after had the poſſeſſion of it delivered to him. Now in buſy and diſorder'd times, ſuch as *Epicurus* might be far more ſecure than at another time; and yet even then he was afraid of giving any diſtaſt, as to his opinions about Religion; and ſtill aſſerted his owning *the Anticipation of a Deity*, altho' not conſiſtent with his own grounds of certainty. But where was *the victory the mean while over Religion*, which *Lucretius* boaſts of? His Defenders ſay, *It was over the ill effects of Superſtition*; but we find nothing like that effected by him. The World was not made one jot

Plut. adv. Colot.

Joſ. contr. Apion. l. 2.

Plut. vit. Demetrii.

the better, but a great deal the worſe for his Principles; for the very name of a Philoſopher went a great way with Perſons of bad inclinations: and they do not govern themſelves by any Reaſon; but when they can bring an Authority of a Perſon of any reputation, they inquire no farther, but go on with greater confidence in their former practices; and then they charge *Ignorance* and *Superſtition* on thoſe that contradict them. I do not deny but ſome of the Defenders of *Epicurus* in our Age, have been Perſons of Wit and Learning, and they have utterly diſown'd his irreligious Principles: but yet the very undertaking to defend the Author of ſo much impiety, hath done unſpeakable miſchief to the Age we live in; and all the diſcoveries of Natural Philoſophy can never make amends for it. We are now comparing the Notions of *Epicurus* and *Anaxagoras* as to religion; and that method which *Plutarch* tells us *Anaxagoras* took, as to the freeing the Mind of *Pericles* from *Superſtition*, was far better than that of *Epicurus*. For *Anaxagoras* ſatisfy'd him, that there were natural cauſes of Thunder and Lightning, but theſe were the effects of a Divine Providence, which order'd the affairs of Mankind for the beſt, as well as the Meteors in the Air; and therefore there was no reaſon why any wiſe and good Man ſhould not entertain a comfortable Hope of Divine Protection: but in the way of *Epicurus* there is a bare account of Natural Cauſes, which whether true or falſe, can give no ſatisfaction to a thinking Man. For the utmoſt comes to this; Such and ſuch Effects do naturally follow ſuch Cauſes. And what then? *Then if ſuch things happen, we cannot help it.* And what follows? Nothing more. And is this all the comfort of *Epicurus* his Inquiry into Cauſes? To underſtand this better, I will put a Caſe, which lately happened in the place where I live at preſent, to a Man working in his Garden near a great River: while he was there buſy, a violent ſhower of Rain fell of a ſudden; and the Man thinking to divert it, the Rain beat down a great heap of earth above him, and carried it through his Garden, and took away the Man with its force into a precipice hard by, and with great violence hurried him down into the River, which made him ſtupid and ſenſleſs; but it pleas'd GOD he was taken up, and recover'd. Now let us conſider what would tend moſt to the ſatisfaction of this Man's Mind, when he was in that deplorable ſtate, if he had been then ſenſible of his caſe: What comfort would it have been to him to have been told, that as things were, the earth above him falling down, and there being ſuch a precipice below him, there was no help for him, and he muſt be contented to ſuffer? But would it not be far greater ſatisfaction to be told, there were thoſe above who ſaw him fall, and pitied his caſe, and would be ſure to help him out, and give him what was neceſſary for his relief and remedy? Now this is the caſe of *Neceſſity* and *Providence:* the one gives only that heavy comfort, *Things muſt be ſo, and we cannot help it*; the other ſtill keeps up reaſonable hope, and the expectation of ſomething better. So that no one can deny, that upon mere principles of Natural Reaſon, this is the more deſirable *Hypotheſis*; and nothing but invincible arguments ſhould remove Mankind from it: but neither *Democritus* nor *Epicurus* could offer any thing but a very precarious *Hypotheſis* againſt it.

From *Anaxagoras* I now come to *Socrates* (for *Acheloüs* purſued his Principles at *Athens*, where *Socrates* was his Diſciple.) He was a Perſon of great vogue at *Athens*, for the *Natural ſharpneſs of his Wit*, and

the freedom he us'd in converſation with all ſorts, without regard to his own intereſt. And for this he appealed to his Judges, and to the whole City, that he was far from any deſign to enrich himſelf, as they all knew: he did not deny but that he had great preſents offer'd him; but he took no more than to keep him from poverty, as in the caſes of the King of *Macedonia* and *Alcibiades*: and none could blame him for being refractory to their Laws about Religion; for he declar'd that to be his Principle, *That* GOD *ought to be worſhip'd according to the Laws of the City where a Man liv'd.* And for this, *Xenophon* ſaith, *he truſted to the* Pythian *Oracle*; which was thought of good Authority among them: however ſome in our time have repreſented it as *ſo groſs an Impoſture*, that it is hardly credible any Men of common ſenſe could be deceived by it, much leſs the *Athenians*; who for all that we can perceive had as good an opinion of it, as the *Bœotians* themſelves.

Plato in Apol. Socr.

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 3.

Van. Dalen Diſſert. de Orac. Ethn.

This was a very hard point at that time among Men of better underſtanding, and who had a true ſenſe of GOD and Providence, how they ſhould behave themſelves with reſpect to the Popular Superſtitions. There was no difficulty, as to ſuch as had no Religion at all; for their Principle was to keep fair and to ſecure themſelves; and they look'd on ſuch as *Protagoras* and *Diagoras*, as Perſons who deſerved to be puniſh'd for their folly. But for Men who truly believ'd a wiſe GOD to govern the World, as *Socrates* and his two excellent Scholars *Plato* and *Xenophon* did, the caſe was very difficult: For, if they did not comply, they were ſure to be proſecuted as guilty of impiety; if they did, this ſeem'd to juſtify all their Superſtition.

The way which *Socrates* took was this: He avoided giving any offence as to the contempt of their publick worſhip. Nay, *Xenophon* ſaith, he was ſo far from any Impiety that way, that he was rather more remarkable for his diligence therein; and that no Man ever heard him ſay or do any thing that tended to the diſhonor of Religion; ſo that from the whole courſe of his life, he might be well concluded to be Εὐσεβέστατον, *a very devout Man. Cicero* had a very particular eſteem of *Socrates* not only for *the greatneſs of his Wit, but for his Wiſdom and Goodneſs*; and from him we learn what the grounds were which ſuch Men went upon. They found the World horribly corrupted with Superſtition, which was to be remov'd in the beſt way they could; but there was great danger, leſt under that pretence, all Religion ſhould be deſtroy'd. And they ſaw an abſolute neceſſity of keeping up that, ſince *the Beauty and Order of the World, was ſufficient to convince Mankind that there was an Excellent amd Eternal Being, which was to be adored and worſhip'd by Mankind.* This was their fundamental Principle; and they rather choſe to comply with the follies of their Superſtitions, than not keep the ſolemn worſhip of the *Deity*. And to ſatisfy themſelves, they put ſuch interpretations upon the publick Rites, as made them ſerve to ſome part or other of natural worſhip, with reſpect to the benefits GOD beſtows on the World; and thus, even the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries were underſtood by them.

Propter ejus magnitudinem Ingenii. *De Orat.* 1. 54. Qui quum omnium ſapientiſſimus eſſet, ſanctiſſimeq; vixiſſet. *Ib.*

Eſſe præſtantem aliquam æternamque Naturam, & eam ſuſpiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo Mundi, ordoque rerum cœleſtium cogit confiteri. *Cic. de Div. l. 2. c. 72.*

But how then came *Socrates* to be ſo ſeverely proſecuted at *Athens*? 'Tis true, that his enemies charg'd him with *Impiety* and *Atheiſm*, as appears both by *Plato* and *Xenophon*. In *Plato's Apology* we find that *Melitus*

Melitus downright accus'd him *that he thought there were no Gods. Socrates* being much ſurpriz'd at this charge, aſk'd him what ground he had for it; and all the proof he offer'd was, that he was of *Anaxagoras*'s Opinion that the Sun and Moon were not Gods: which *Socrates* deny'd; and ſaid his charge was inconſiſtent, for he both accus'd him of bringing in new *Deities*, and aſſerting that there were none at all. But in the concluſion of his Apology, he fully own'd *a Divine Providence taking care of good Men living or dying; but whether of the two were better for a Man, he thought* GOD *alone knew.*

But to ſhew more plainly what *Socrates* his judgment was as to the Production of the World: *Xenophon* gives this account of it. *That he look'd on it as a great piece of folly in Mankind to attempt it from Material Cauſes; and he wonder'd that they did not find out, that theſe things were above their reach.* And he thinks thoſe * *Philoſophers argued like mad Men; neither agreeing with one another, nor with the nature of things: for ſome ſaid, that it conſiſted of One thing; others, of Infinite: ſome ſaid, all things were in motion; others ſaid, there was no motion at all: ſome ſaid, that all things were generated and corrupted; and others, that nothing at all was.* Plato in his *Phædo* lets us know how he came to be unſatisfy'd even with *Anaxagoras* himſelf, altho' he mightily approv'd his fundamental Notion of *all things being produc'd by an Eternal Mind.* When he was a young Man, he ſaith, he was a great admirer of Natural Philoſophy, and endeavoured to find out the Cauſes of things; but at laſt *he found they were too hard for him*, and ſo fell into a kind of *Scepticiſm:* but he had heard of a Book of *Anaxagoras*, wherein he aſſerted that *Mind* order'd all things; this pleas'd him well: but he expected that from hence he would have ſhew'd how that Eternal Mind did frame every thing for the beſt, τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον· but finding him to falter there, and to run to mere Natural Cauſes as others had done, he gave over his purſuit of Natural Philoſophy, and applied himſelf to matters of Morality; as more certainly known, and of greater uſe to Mankind.

Ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις διϊδεῖν. *Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 1.*

* Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ μέτρου φερόντων ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τέτον λέγειν ἃ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. *Ibid.*

Butas to Providence, *Xenophon* is very particular in it, *That it extended to all things ſaid or done, altho' in never ſo great ſilence; and that* GOD *was preſent in all places.* To the ſame purpoſe *Diogenes Laertius* mentions a ſaying of *Thales*; *Being aſked, whether a man could do an unjuſt action without* GOD*'s knowing it: No,* ſaith he, *not if he only thinks to do it.* Which ſaith *Valerius Maximus*, was intended to keep Mens Minds clean and pure, as well as their hands. But the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens* in *Socrates* his time turn'd this another way. For they ſaid, *This was only a contrivance of ſome cunning man, to keep Mankind more in awe.* And that this was their ſenſe, appears by the Verſes ſtill preſerv'd in *Sextus Empiricus*; and part in *Plutarch* and others; but by the former they are attributed to *Critias*, and by the latter to *Euripides*, both of *Socrates* his time. But there ſeems to be far greater probability as to the former, becauſe ſuch a ſaying was very agreeable to the Character of the Man. For *Critias* was one of the *thirty Tyrants* ſet up by *Lyſander* at *Athens*; a Man of Wit, and addicted to Poetry; as *Socrates* himſelf owns in *Plato*'s *Charmides*, that he deriv'd it from *Solon:* He and *Alcibiades* had been both under *Socrates* his care, as *Xenophon* tells us, but they both forſook him, and changed their Manners upon it. *Critias* went into *Theſſaly*, and there fell into lew'd

Xenoph. l. 1. c. 1. ad fin. & c. 4. ad fin.

Valer. Max. l. 7. 2. §. 8.

Sext. Emp. p. 310. Poeſis Phil. p. 75.

and debauch'd company; and from thence came to hate *Socrates*, whom he had admir'd before: and when he was one of the *thirty Tyrants*, he and *Charicles* ſhew'd a particular diſpleaſure againſt him; for *Socrates* had ſpoken too freely againſt their Government. He was the head of the number, as appeared by *Theramenes* drinking a health to *Critias*, when he took off his Poiſon; and when *Thraſybulus* came to deliver *Athens*, upon his being kill'd, the whole Faction ſunk. Nothing can be more agreeable to the Character of ſuch a Man, than to make him look on all Religion as an impoſture and contrivance of ſome crafty Politician. But nothing of it agrees with that of *Euripides*, who was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, a friend to *Socrates*; and on all occaſions wrote decently with reſpect to Piety and Vertue. But *Plutarch* ſaith, *he wrote the Verſes in the Name of* Siſyphus *for fear of the* Areopagus. It cannot be deny'd, that Author (whether *Plutarch* or not, for ſome queſtion it) doth ſay ſo. But if *Plutarch* had ſaid it on good ground, how came *Sextus* after him, ſo poſitively to give them to *Critias*? And which is more to the purpoſe, the ſame Author had but a little before quoted a paſſage of *Euripides* very agreeable to a Scholar of *Anaxagoras*, *That the Heavens were* Καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφοῦ, *The beautiful Workmanſhip of a wiſe Architect*; and from thence we come to the Notion of God. How different is this from the ſenſe of thoſe Atheiſtical Verſes! But it is no eaſy matter to judg what the true ſenſe of a Poet is, when it is his deſign to perſonate others. And ſo *Euripides* might introduce *Siſyphus* as ſpeaking agreeable to his own Character, who is repreſented as *an ill Man, and given to fraud*; and therefore it is no wonder ſuch a Man ſhould look on Religion as ſuch a contrivance. For either *Siſyphus* or *Critias* might be well ſuppos'd to utter ſuch things, but the queſtion is, how far *Euripides* is to be charg'd with them; and whether he ſpoke his own ſenſe under the name of *Siſyphus*, for fear of the *Areopagus*. This ought certainly to be prov'd ſome other way: and if not, it ſeems to be a very unjuſt imputation; eſpecially ſince *Socrates* expreſs'd ſuch an eſteem for *Euripides*; which he would never have done, if he had ſuſpected that under the Perſon of *Siſyphus* he had overthrown the foundations of Religion.

P. Petit. Miſcell. l. 1. c. 1.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 6.

Ælian. l. 2. c. 13.

But what the true ſenſe of *Socrates* was, may be ſeen by his Diſcourſe with *Ariſtodemus*, of which *Xenophon* hath preſerv'd the remembrance. This *Ariſtodemus* was one of thoſe that not only neglected Religion himſelf, but deſpiſed and laugh'd at thoſe that regarded it. *Socrates* finding what ſort of man he was, takes him to taſk after his dry manner. And are there no Perſons, *Ariſtodemus*, ſaid he, that you have any eſteem of for being wiſer than others? Yes, ſaid he briſkly and like a Man of Wit, *I admire* Homer *for an Epick Poem*, Melanippides *in Dithyrambics*, Sophocles *in Tragedy*, Polycletus *in the Art of making Statues, and* Phidias *in Painting*. The Man we ſee was a kind of *Virtuoſo* in other things, but without any ſenſe of God or Religion. Well! ſaid *Socrates, and would you not admire thoſe more who make living and moving Statues, than ſuch only as have neither ſenſe nor motion?* No doubt the former, *Ariſtodemus* reply'd, if they are made by Deſign, and not by Chance. Of that, ſaid *Socrates*, we may beſt judg by the uſe, they are intended for. For thoſe things which are for a manifeſt uſe are moſt agreeable to Deſign. As for inſtance, the Senſes of Men are ſo plainly given them for particular uſes, that we cannot reaſonably think, but that he that made Mankind at firſt, gave them them for that

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 4.

purpoſe; as he particularly inſtances in the Fabrick of the Eye, and the care of Nature to preſerve it, (which he calls a work of Providence) and ſo for the Ears, Noſe and Mouth, which are ſo fram'd, as to be προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα, done by a wiſe Deſign, and not by Chance. And I cannot, ſaith *Socrates*, look upon them otherwiſe than as the Workmanſhip Σοφῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου, of a wiſe contriver, and a lover of his own Workmanſhip. The ſame he ſhews in the propagation of Animals, and the love and care of their Young, *&c.* but as to Mankind, he ſaith, there is Φρόνιμόν τι, a reach beyond other Animals; and they have not only a Body made out of Earth, but a Mind which we perceive within our ſelves. And can theſe great and wonderful things come to paſs δι' ἀφρονος τινος, without Mind or Underſtanding? To which our *Virtuoſo* had nothing to ſay, *but that he could not ſee the Artificer here, as he did in other caſes.* Well! and do not you contrive and deſign things in your own Mind? And yet you can no more ſee that, than the wiſe contriver of theſe things. All that *Ariſtodemus* had to ſay, was, that he did not diſown or deſpiſe a Divine Being; but he thought it too great to regard his Service. Hold a little, ſaid *Socrates*; for the greater he is, the more he ought to be honor'd by Mankind. Then he queſtion'd, whether there were ſuch a thing as Providence, with reſpect to human affairs. For that, *Socrates* again bad him look to the frame of Human Nature, and the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and he could not but ſee a Providence in the contrivance of the ſeveral parts of the Body; but eſpecially the Mind, which he hath inſpir'd into Men. Τῷ ψυχῷ κραλίσῳ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε, Not *blowing ſome ſubtile Air into Man*, as ſome modern Philoſophers would tranſlate it; or giving *a mere Vital Motion.* But *Socrates* was far from thinking *an Incorporeal Subſtance* within us to be *a Contradiction*; nor that it was any abſurdity to take a Metaphor from *Air*, to expreſs the infuſion of an Immaterial Soul. And he ſhews the excellency of the human Soul above others, becauſe it alone apprehends the Being of GOD, who made and contriv'd the greateſt beſt things, and alone is capable of doing him ſervice. Beſides, that it hath Prudence and Memory above all others. So that Mankind are as ſo many Gods among inferior Creatures. If a Man had the Body of an Ox and the Mind of Man together, he could not do what he would; nor if Brutes had Hands and wanted Minds, could they do much with them. But you, ſaid he to *Ariſtodemus*, have both, and can you think there is no care of Providence about you? Can you think, ſaid he, that the Gods (as he ſpeaks) ſhould plant in Mens Minds an opinion that they are able both to reward and puniſh, if it were not ſo? And that Mankind ſhould be always deceiv'd in this matter, and not be ſenſible of it? *Do not you ſee*, ſaith *Socrates*, *that the moſt antient and wiſeſt Cities, and Nations, and Ages, have always ſhew'd the greateſt regard to Religion?* This is a very remarkable teſtimony of *Socrates* concerning the ſenſe of former Ages about the foundations of Religion; and that the Atheiſtical temper ſome were then fallen into, was a late Innovation, and in probability occaſion'd by that ſmattering in Philoſophy, which was crept in among the *Greeks* from the Principles of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*. But *Socrates* aſſures us *the beſt and wiſeſt Ages* had a very different ſenſe of theſe matters. And this *Xenophon* tells us he had from *Socrates his own Mouth, and that he heard this Diſcourſe between them.*

And what now is to be ſaid to ſuch a Teſtimony as this, concerning the ſenſe of Mankind about Religion? Have we any reaſon to miſtruſt

ſuch

ſuch a Teſtimony as that of *Socrates*, who was ſo much valu'd for his Integrity, and loſt his Life, becauſe he could not flatter nor diſſemble? For any one that will carefully examin the circumſtances of his Trial, will find the true reaſon of his proſecution was, that he had diſobliged ſo many ſorts of People by his Plain-dealing: For, as he told his Judges, his way was when he heard any Man had a great opinion for his own Wiſdom and Skill above other Men, to talk with him on purpoſe, to ſee whether there were any ſufficient ground for ſuch an Opinion: which was one of the moſt diſobliging courſes in the world; conſidering how fond Men are apt to be of themſelves, and to think themſelves wiſer than others; at leaſt in that which they moſt pretend to. By which means he diſobliged the *Politicians*, who hate any Man that would pretend to find them out; the Sophiſts, whom on all occaſions he expos'd, and in the moſt publick manner: and the Men of Wit and the Poets were enrag'd againſt him, becauſe he ſlighted their way, as tending only to entertain the Fancy, and not to make Men wiſer; and in their happieſt ſtrains, there was only a *Natural Enthuſiaſm*; and altho' they ſaid many fine things, yet they were not one jot the wiſer Men. The Artificers he found had many pretty knacks; but becauſe of their Skill in ſuch little things, they preſum'd wonderfully at *Athens* upon their Underſtandings, and would never bear long any Great Men among them, when things went by majority of Votes: As *Socrates* found, when Sentence came to be paſt; for altho' he had many good Friends, yet when it came to the numbring of Votes, he was caſt by a great Majority. But as the People of *Athens* were ſo opinionated of themſelves, that they could not bear any Man, whoſe Reputation leſſen'd theirs; ſo when they had done ſuch things which made them ill ſpoken of abroad, then they were for redeeming their own honor; either by recalling them from Baniſhment, if living; or if dead, by puniſhing the inſtruments made uſe of in the Proſecution. So it happened in the caſe of *Socrates:* when they found his Death brought an *Odium* upon the City, one of his Accuſers was *put to death*, another *baniſhed*; and *Plutarch* ſaith, *ſome of the reſt were ſo weary of their lives, that they put an end to them by hanging themſelves.* And to ſhew their great eſteem of him, they caus'd a Statue made by *Lyſippus*, to be ſet up in a publick place in the City, as a perpetual Monument of his Wiſdom, and their own Folly. And his carriage at his death was with ſo much courage, and conſtancy, and evenneſs of Mind, that they were all ſatisfy'd as to his integrity and freedom from any ill deſign. What reaſon can there be then to ſuſpect his Teſtimony in this point of Religion, when there was not the leaſt conſtraint or biaſs upon him, and this atteſted by ſo unexceptionable a witneſs as *Xenophon*; a Perſon of great honor and judgment, and whoſe Writings are ſuch, as could hardly be counterfeited by any ſince him, by reaſon of their *unaffected ſweetneſs*, for which the antient Criticks ſo much admired him; even *Cicero*, as well as *Dionyſius Halycarnaſſeus*, and *Quintilian?*

Platon. Apolog. Socr.

Plutarch. de Odio & Invid.

Cicero de Orat. l. 2. Dionyſ. Halycarn. ad Pomp. Quint. X. Cicero ad Quint. l. 1.

From *Socrates* I go on to *Plato*, who in *Cicero*'s opinion (and he was a very good judg) was *Princeps Ingenii & Doctrinæ*, the *Top of antient Wit and Learning*; and to the ſame purpoſe *Quintilian*, whom *Valla* eſteem'd above all other Criticks. But I need not go about to ſet up the Reputation of *Plato:* He was deſcended from *Solon* by his Mother, and by his Father from *Codrus*; he was nearly related to *Critias*, the firſt of the *thirty Tyrants*, and head of the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens*; and there-

fore it will be worth our while to find out his true ſenſe and opinion about theſe matters; to which I ſhall confine my Diſcourſe concerning him. And in his *tenth Book of Laws* he gives an account of three Opinions then in vogue among the looſer ſort of People at *Athens*. *One was, that there was no* GOD *at all: The 2d, that tho' there was a* GOD, *yet there was no Providence: The 3d, that if both were allow'd, yet that* GOD *would accept of Gifts and Sacrifices, as a compenſation for their faults.*

As to the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſis* it is obſervable, what character he gives of the Perſons who were for it, *that they were the looſer and more diſſolute ſort of Men among them; and eſpecially in the heat of their Youth. And that he never knew any Man who continued in it from his Youth to his Old Age*; and he calls it *the plague of young Men.* The *Hypotheſis*, as he lays it down, is much the ſame with *Anaximander*'s, viz. *That Nature and Chance produced all things out of a ſtrange Chaos, wherein were all ſorts of Qualities jumbled and confounded together, and at laſt by mixture came to that we call the World. But that Religion and the differences of juſt and unjuſt depended upon human Laws and Contrivances, for the better Government of Mankind.*

This is the ſubſtance of their *Hypotheſis*, which *Plato* in a long Diſcourſe ſets himſelf to refute, by ſhewing that theſe things could not come together by mere Nature and Chance; but were according to *right Reaſon, the product of a Superior Mind.* And whatever they pretended, as to ſkill in Natural Cauſes, this opinion did proceed from *great Ignorance about them*, and that their Reaſonings were both *Impious and Incoherent.* That their fundamental Miſtake lay in ſuppoſing ſuch Motion and Mixtures in Matter, before any Principle to begin or to direct it. For the firſt Motion muſt be from that which hath a power to move it ſelf, as well as other things; and therefore there muſt be a Mind antecedent to Matter, in order to the Production of things. This is the force of his Reaſoning. Then he ſhews how unreaſonable it is to ſuppoſe a GOD without Providence; becauſe it muſt argue either *Weakneſs* or *Neglect*, which were both inconſiſtent with *the Divine Perfections:* and ſo he proves was the laſt Opinion, and that it tended to overthrow *the practice of Virtue.*

In his *Epinomis* (which I ſee no reaſon to miſtruſt) he undertakes to prove *Religion to be the trueſt Wiſdom of Mankind*, the firſt Principle whereof is, *that there is an Eternal Mind before all Matter*; and then ſaith, *That there is no greater Virtue belonging to Mankind than Piety, or a due regard to the Divine Being.* So far was he from looking on Religion as an Impoſture, or Trick put upon Mankind in order to their better Government. *Epinom. p. 989.*

But *Ariſtotle* may be more ſuſpected for this, who wanted no Wit, but is generally thought to have been of no Religion; and he was by no means fond of *Plato*'s *Notions*, eſpecially thoſe he took from the *Pythagoric School:* but yet I hope to ſhew, that in the main foundation of all, as to the Being of GOD, and the Happineſs of Mankind, he agreed with him at laſt: I do not mean at his death, according to the ſtory in *Cælius Rhodiginus*, that then he ſaid, *Cauſa Cauſarum miſerere mei*; and which *Suarez* quotes *Laertius* for; but there is nothing like it in him, and *Cælius* had it out of a trifling Book *De Pomo:* But I go upon the Principles deliver'd by him in his beſt conſider'd Books. In his *Politicks* indeed he recommends Religion to a Prince, *in order to his eſteem among the People, that they may look on him as under the particular care of Providence.* *Cæl. Rhod. l. 17. c. 34.* *Ariſt. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.*

Now this *Ariſtotle* is charg'd to have utterly deny'd himſelf; and *Atticus* the *Platoniſt* in *Euſebius* makes him worſe than *Epicurus*, *becauſe he put his Gods quite out of the World*, *which* Ariſtotle *did not*; *but*, ſaid he, *he overthrew all Religion by denying Providence.* And *Lactantius* is very ſharp upon him, and makes him *a contemner of* GOD *and Religion:* but to do him right, he ſaith at other times, *That he plac'd one Mind over the World*; and *that* Ariſtotle *and his Followers were of the ſame mind with* Antiſthenes, *that there was but One* GOD *in Nature, and many popular Gods. But was not* Ariſtotle *charg'd with Impiety at* Athens, *and forc'd on that account to withdraw to* Chalcis, *where he died*; *or as ſome ſay, was poiſoned?* So *Eumelus*, and the anonymous Author of his Life, publiſh'd by *Menagius.* It cannot be deny'd that there was a proſecution againſt him by *Eurymedon* and *Demophylus*; but ſo there was againſt *Anaxagoras* and *Socrates:* but the pretence againſt *Ariſtotle* was not for *Impiety in his Doctrine*, but for a *profane Hymn* which he was ſaid to have made on his Friend *Hermias*, ſuch as were wont to be made to *Apollo.* This *Athenæus* denies, and *Ariſtotle* ſent an Apology for himſelf to *Athens*, but it was not receiv'd. The truth was, *Ariſtotle* found it was time for him to be gone; leſt, as he told his Friends, *that City ſhould offend twice againſt Philoſophy:* For, as he ſaid in his Letter to *Antipater*, *He found the City abounded with Sycophants*; and he was fallen under *Alexander*'s diſpleaſure, on the account of *Caliſthenes* his Kinſman; and in a Letter of his to *Antipater* he had ſaid, *he would be reveng'd on the Sophiſter*; and he publickly affronted him by the great Preſent he ſent to *Xenocrates*, and none to him: which was ſufficient intimation to his Enemies, which he never wanted, ſaith *Ariſtocles*, *becauſe of the intereſt he had in Princes.* And if *Pliny*'s Story be true, (which *Plutarch* and *Appian* intimate too) as to *Antipater*'s deſign, *Alexander* had cauſe for his diſpleaſure. But *Ariſtocles* ſaith, *That* Apellicon *(to whom his Books came) wrote ſo full a Vindication of him, that thoſe who read that need no more.* But they are his Principles which we enquire after, and not his Practices. *Alexander Aphrodiſienſis*, who is thought to have underſtood *Ariſtotle*'s Mind as well as any Commentator, owns *that* Ariſtotle *without doubt aſſerted, that there was one Eternal Mind, which gave the firſt motion to Matter, and that thereby things were put into ſuch an order, not by Chance, but from the firſt Mover, ſo as to produce the variety of Species in the World, and to make them uſeful to each other, and for the good of the whole*; *and ſuch an univerſal Providence*, he ſaith, Ariſtotle *did hold.* So much then is confeſs'd by one who was thought his moſt judicious Interpreter. But let us ſee, whether *Ariſtotle* may not be reaſonably preſum'd to go beyond this: For (1.) he blam'd *Anaxagoras* for making *no more uſe of his Eternal Mind, than merely to ſet things in order at firſt.* Then it follows, that according to him, GOD muſt be more than a mere *Firſt Mover.* (2.) He makes this famous concluſion of his *Metaphyſicks*, *That things are beſt govern'd by one Head*; which ſignified nothing, if there be no Providence. *Clauſulam hanc tam inſignem amplector & laudo*, ſaid one of his moſt bitter Enemies; and it cannot be denied, that he there compares *the Government of the World* with *that of an Army or Family, wherein are there ſeveral Ranks and Orders of Men for different purpoſes*; *which muſt ſuppoſe a particular inſpection and care.* (3.) He makes the complete Happineſs of Mankind to be Θεῖόν τι, *a Divine thing*; and muſt ſuppoſe *Providence*, as I ſhall now make it to appear. He affirms that a Man's complete Happineſs depends *upon ſomething Divine in him, in*

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 5. *Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. 19.* *De falſ. Rel. l. 5.* *De Ira Dei c. 11.* *Beſſario c. Calumn.* *Athen. l. 15.* *Suid. in Ariſt.* *Ælian. 3. 36.* *Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 2.* *Plin. N. H. l. 30. c. 16.* *Alexand. Aphrodiſ. in Ariſt. Phyſic. l. 2. c. 8.* *Met. 1. 4.* *Metaphyſ. l. 14. ult.* *P. Rami Schol. Metaphyſ. l. 12. c. 10.* *Eth. l. 1. c. 10.* *Eth. l. 10. c. 7.*

the exerciſe whereof his happineſs conſiſts. And therefore he adviſes thoſe that ſtudy to be happy Ἀναθανατίζειν, *to draw themſelves off from mortal things, and to live according to that which is the beſt thing in us,* viz. *our Minds; which altho' they do not ſo appear in bulk, yet in reality are far greater and of more value than other things.* By which he plainly owns ſuch a Principle in Mankind as is capable of a greater Happineſs than the things of this World can give him, becauſe his Mind is of a higher Nature than they. But then the Queſtion ariſes, whether Mankind can make themſelves happy by this Divine Principle within them? He grants in one place, *That if there be any gift from* GOD, *it is moſt reaſonable it ſhould be that which is beſt for them*; but he avoids *the diſpute there*, becauſe his buſineſs was to put Men upon uſing their own endeavors to be happy: But in his laſt Book, where he ſpeaks of this Divine Happineſs, he ſaith, *That he that acts according to his Mind, and is diſpos'd to do the beſt things, is the moſt likely to be beloved of* GOD: *for, if there be any care above of Human Affairs, as there ſeems to be, it is moſt reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the Gods love what is beſt and neareſt to them; which is our Mind.* But doth he not ſeem to ſpeak very doubtfully in this matter? It is obſerv'd by his Commentator, that his manner of expreſſion is ſuch as he uſes when there is no manner of doubt. But we muſt take *Ariſtotle* as a Philoſopher, and conſider on what grounds he went. He had no Revelation to direct him, and ſo was to judg according to what he thought *moſt reaſonable*; and this he declares he took to be ſo. And in his following words he ſaith, *That thoſe who did moſt eſteem and value their own Minds, the Gods did regard as their friends, and ſuch as did the beſt actions.* That word Ἀντευποιεῖν is very emphatical in this caſe; for it implies a *Retribution of a Reward* for doing good. So that here we have the complacency, which GOD takes in thoſe that are good, and do good; and the reaſonableneſs of expecting a Recompenſe for it. *Ariſtotle* was no Fool, but was eſpecially admired by very great Men, particularly by *Cicero*, and *Quintilian*, and *Pliny*, for *the greatneſs of his Wit and Subtilty:* and ſuch a Perſon would never have been guilty of ſo great impertinency to ſet down ſuch Expreſſions as theſe, if he had not thought them fit to be believ'd; but he would have ſet ſome mark upon them, that they were the Opinions of other Men, and not his own. And in this caſe he had more particular reaſon to have done it. For any one that compares theſe expreſſions with thoſe in *Plato*, 10 *de Rep.* would think that *Ariſtotle* had taken them from thence. For *Plato* there ſaith the ſame thing, *That a good Man is* Θεοφιλής, *one in favor with* GOD; *and whoſoever is ſo, ſhall receive the beſt things from him. And we cannot ſuppoſe, that he that deſigns to be good, and minds the practice of Virtue, will be neglected above, when he makes it his buſineſs to be as like* GOD *as he can.* And *Plato*, who was far from being uncertain as to Providence, makes uſe of the ſame kind of expreſſion. *It is not probable that he ſhould be neglected of one ſo like him.* And *Ariſtotle* in the foregoing Chapter ſaith, *The Gods are in a ſtate of perpetual Bliſs, and Mankind are capable of Happineſs, as they come nearer to reſemblance of them.* Can any Expreſſions come nearer than theſe do?

Eth. l. 10. *c.* 10.

Ὁ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐπορσῶν καὶ τῶν τὸν θεοφιλέστατον καὶ διακεινωθέντα ἄριστα, καὶ θεοφιλέστατ' ἔοικεν εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἶναι ἂν εἰκὸς καὶ συγχωρεῖσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν εἴη ὁ Νοῦς. *Eth. l.* 10. *c.* 9.

Καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀνταποιεῖν καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς περιτιθέντας.

Ariſtoteles vir ſummo ingenio, ſcientiæ copia. *Tuſc.* 1. 4. 10. *Acad.* 1. 4. Singulari vir ingenio Ariſtoteles, & pene Divino. *De Div.* 1. 25. *Quint. X.* 1. *Plin. N. H. l.* 8. 16, 18, 34.

Εἰκὸς γ' ἔρη τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

Ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει.

We find *Ariſtotle* on other occaſions not very ſhy of expreſſing his diſſent from *Plato*, even in theſe Books of Morals. How warmly doth he diſ-
Ethic. 1. 34. pute againſt *Plato*'s notion of *Ideas*? He ſaith, *there are three kinds of Men pretend to Happineſs*; *the ſenſual and voluptuous*, which he ſaith, *is the Happineſs of Slaves and Brutes: The buſy and active Men place it in Honor, which is not in their power.* But beſides theſe, *there are thoſe who place it in Contemplation, which is moſt agreeable to the moſt perfect faculty we have.* But then he ſaith, *Some Friends of his had introduced Ideas to this purpoſe*; *however he was reſolved to prefer truth before them.* Here we ſee he ſticks not at contradicting *Plato*, *as to his Ideas*; but is ſo far from doing it in the preſent caſe, that he takes his very Expreſſions as his own; which he would never have done, if he had not thought them agreeable to Truth and Reaſon. He did not like *Plato*'s *Ideas*, nor his *Poetical Fictions* about a Future State, which made him more reſerved in diſcourſing about it; but he was ſatisfy'd in theſe three things: 1. That the Mind of Man was capable of a real Happineſs diſtinct from the Body. 2. That this Happineſs lies in a ſimilitude to GOD, as the moſt perfect Being. 3. That it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe GOD ſhould make the beſt to be moſt happy.

Mag. Mor. 1. 5. In his *Great Morals*, he declares it *not to be Courage but Madneſs not to be afraid of the Gods.* And if there be no Providence, what reaſon can there be for Fear?

Eudem. l. 7. c. 15. In the concluſion of his *Eudemian Morals*, he makes it *the beſt end of a Man to contemplate* GOD, *and ſaid*; *that it argues a very ill mind to hinder his Worſhip and Service, and the beſt temper of mind to be little affected with ſenſual Inclinations*; *and this*, ſaith he, *is the great end of Virtue and Goodneſs.*

Theſe are not the Expreſſions of a Man that deſpis'd GOD and Providence; and we are certain theſe were his, as we are, that we have any Books of his. For even *Fr. Patritius* himſelf makes very ſlight Objections againſt them; and the Author of the antient *Paraphraſe* upon his *Ethicks*
Diſcuſſ. Peripatet. To. 1. *l.* 3. *ad Nichomachum* (ſuppos'd to be *Andronicus Rhodius*) is a far better evidence for them, who is ſaid to have *paraphraſed upon* Ariſtotle's *Writings*, and not upon any other Man's. And he puts this matter out of doubt;
Paraphr. Ethic. l. 10. *c.* 10. for he thus *paraphraſes* his words, *If* GOD *doth take care of Mankind*, καθάπερ πᾶσι δοκεῖ καὶ ἔστι γε, *as it ſeems to all and is true.* And not only *Plutarch* in the Life of *Sylla*, but *Porphyry* in that of *Plotinus*, ſay, *that* Andronicus Rhodius *took great care in digeſting and explaining* Ariſtotle's *Works.*

Let us now compare theſe Sayings with the Objections taken out of him againſt Providence. *Alex. Aphrodiſienſis* is of opinion that *Ariſtotle* meant no more by *Providence*, but *an univerſal care to preſerve the Species of things, and the Order of the World*; *but he doth not deny that ſo far it extends even to ſublunary things.* But if he did allow ſuch an univerſal Providence as to the good of the World; I ask then, Whether GOD did know and intend this Good and Order that is in the World? If he did, then his great Argument againſt particular Providence is taken off; which was, *That it was below the Divine Perfections to take notice of ſuch mean things.* For if it were not below it at firſt to appoint and order theſe things, then it cannot be below it to mind or regard them. And ſince they cannot deny ſuch an *Univerſal Providence*, they cannot for this reaſon reject a Particular; for it is no more unbecoming GOD to regard the good of his Creatures, than it was at firſt to make them. But *Ariſtotle* utterly rejects

rejects their Opinion, that attributed the making of things, or the order that appears in them, to blind Neceſſity or Chance; and then GOD muſt have a Power and Will to make and order theſe things as they are, and with a deſign for the good of the whole. Then it follows, that a Providence that regards the good of the whole, as agreeable to the Divine Nature; and why not then a Particular Providence for the ſame end? If the ſame Power and Wiſdom can manage the whole for that end, with regard to Particular Events, why ſhould that be rejected, and the other allowed?

All that is pleaded from *Ariſtotle* is this, *That the knowledg and care of particular things is troubleſom and uneaſy; that the Eternal Being is happy in it ſelf; and it's better not to ſee and know ſome things, than to ſee and know them.* But I urge from *Ariſtotle* himſelf, that he yields, that the Divine Happineſs doth not lie in *an Unactive ſtate*, or ſuch *a perpetual ſleep, as they fancied of* Endymion. And what can be more agreeable to infinite Goodneſs, than ſuch an Activity as imploys it ſelf in the care of his Creatures? *Metaphyſ. l. 14. c. 6.* *Moral. l. 10. c. 8.*

But, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *How can* GOD *underſtand any thing below himſelf? He is a perfect object, and fit for his own contemplation, and all other things are infinitely below him.* If any made the Divine Happineſs to conſiſt in the knowledg of his Creatures, they were extremely miſtaken; but I do not find that *Socrates* or *Plato*, who were hearty Aſſertors of Providence, ſay any thing like it; All that they ſay, is, That GOD being infinitely good and wiſe, takes care of the good of the whole, and eſpecially of thoſe that are good; and if he did not, it muſt be either from want of Power or Will, neither of which can be ſuppos'd in the Divine Nature. And if he wants neither of theſe, why is it not done? It cannot be ſaid, *That* Ariſtotle *abſolutely denied* GOD's *knowledg of all things*; for in one place he ſaith, *It is the Character of a bad man to ſuppoſe any thing hidden from* GOD; and in another, *That we attribute to* GOD *the knowledg of all things.* But 'tis poſſible he might be to ſeek as to the manner of GOD's knowing all things, as who is not? But if he could not comprehend it, it doth not therefore follow, that he denied it. *If* GOD, ſaith he, *underſtands nothing, then he is like one that ſleeps, which is not conſiſtent with that veneration which we owe to* GOD. *If he doth underſtand, and the principal object be without himſelf, then he is not the beſt Subſtance himſelf.* But none ever thought, that if there were a GOD, the principal object of his Underſtanding could be without himſelf. But what repugnancy is there for Infinite Knowledg to comprehend all things? And ſo if there be things without himſelf, he muſt know them, or his Knowledg cannot be infinite. Could *Ariſtotle* imagin that the World and the order of it were of his making and contriving; and yet he know nothing beyond himſelf? Are the ſeveral *ſpecies of things* of his ordering and appointing, and yet he not know them? This is impoſſible. But *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *That his Eſſence, as moſt perfect, is the moſt proper object of Divine Contemplation; and his Underſtanding is nothing but the underſtanding of himſelf:* and ſo, as he expreſſes it, *his Underſtanding is the underſtanding of his Underſtanding.* Wherein, as *Scaliger* ſaith, he did apprehend things *ſupra humanum captum*; and I am apt to think ſo too. But our buſineſs is not to unfold the Myſtery of Divine Knowledg with reſpect to it ſelf, but to conſider whether it be repugnant to it to know other things? *If ſo*, ſaith *Ariſtotle, there muſt be a change and motion, but the Divine Eſſence is always* *Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18.* *De Poet. c. 15.* *Scaliger. Exercit. 365. n. 5.*

the ſame. As tho' an Infinite Mind could not comprehend all things, without a change in it ſelf, or ſuch trouble as we find in our gradual perceptions of things, which ariſes from our Weakneſs and Imperfection. The Objection from *the meaneſs of things* is very inconſiderable. For, if they were fit to make up a part of the Order of the World, why are they below Divine Knowledg and Providence? If God thought fit to make them, why not to preſerve them?

Yes, ſay they, *as to the ſpecies he doth, but not as to all the little accidents about them*, The Schoolmen diſtinguiſh in Providence the *Ratio Ordinis* from the *Executio Ordinis*; the firſt they ſay, is wholly immediate, the other is by ſubordinate Cauſes, which we call the Courſe of Nature; which is no more than the common Order which God hath appointed in the World; which generally obtains, but yet ſo as that there muſt be a due ſubordination to the firſt Agent; if he ſees cauſe for particular ends to order things otherwiſe. And I cannot ſee any kind of incongruity or repugnancy in ſuch a Suppoſition, becauſe it anſwers the ſame ends, which the original intention and deſign of Univerſal Providence doth. As that in the ordinary courſe of Nature, Fire burns, *i. e.* diſſolves that contexture of Bodies which it meets with; and this it doth by virtue of that order of Cauſes and Effects, which is eſtabliſhed by Univerſal Providence: but ſuppoſe that there be a ſtop put to this method by an extraordinary act for great and wiſe ends becoming the ſupreme Governor of the World, why ſhould not this be as agreeable to the Deſign of Providence, as the firſt appointment of things in the common order was? Why not as well to work miraculous cures at ſome times, as to leave things to the ordinary methods at other times; But we muſt ſtill ſuppoſe the ends to be wiſe, and great, and good; for otherwiſe they do not reach the general deſign of Providence; and we mean no other particular Providence, but ſuch as anſwers the ſame general ends which an Univerſal Providence is deſigned for.

Magn. Moral. l. 2. c. 4. But, ſaith *Ariſtotle, If we ſuppoſe a particular Providence with reſpect to Mankind, then he muſt give to Men here according to their deſerts; which cannot be, ſince bad men often meet with good fortune; and therefore* God *being Lord over theſe things would deal unjuſtly as a Judg, which is not becoming him to do.* Here it cannot be deny'd that *Ariſtotle* doth exclude a *Judicial Diſpoſal* of theſe things; for if it were ſuch, his Argument muſt hold; but we diſtinguiſh between that and a *Providential management*, in order to the real good of Mankind. And I need no other than *Ariſtotle*'s own Arguments in this caſe: for if a Man's real happineſs lies in *a ſimilitude of the mind to* God, how can that be inconſiſtent with Divine Juſtice to exerciſe good Men here in ſuch a manner, as tends moſt to draw off their Minds from theſe tranſitory and decaying pleaſures? And if theſe things cannot make a Man really happy without virtue, which is the great deſign of his *Morals* to prove; how is it inconſiſtent with his Juſtice to let bad Men meet with good fortune? For theſe things can be no demonſtrations of the favor or diſpleaſure of God, which himſelf grants relates moſt to the inward temper of Mens Minds. But the real difficulty in this caſe, is a ſuppoſition that there is no future ſtate. I confeſs that *Plato* clears this matter

Plato de Rep. l. 10. eaſily and plainly; *A good man*, ſaith he, *if he be under poverty, diſeaſes, or other difficulties here, will find theſe things end in good to him, living or dying; and he makes no queſtion of ſuch a one's happineſs in another ſtate.* But *Ariſtotle* is upon a great reſerve, as to a future ſtate;

and altho' he asserts the possibility of it sufficiently, from what he saith of the Nature of the Mind of Man, as distinct from the principle of Life; yet I am afraid *Plato*'s giving too much way to such *Poetical Fictions*, as that of *Herus Pamphilius*, made *Aristotle* more cautious as to what he said concerning it, unless he could go upon surer grounds. He grants, That *the Mind is of a nature distinct from the Body, and separable from it*, that *it comes from without*; that *it is capable of pleasures more Divine* than the Body can enjoy or apprehend: But when he had gone thus far, the mere light of Reason would carry him no farther; and therefore he rather forbore to say any thing than affirm what he could not prove. As *Socrates* said in the case of Prayer, in the second *Alcibiades*, *they must stay till they were better inform'd.* Which is a mighty advantage in behalf of Divine Revelation. But of that afterwards.

Aristot. de. Anim. l. 1. c. 5. L. 3. c. 5. De Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1. De Gen. Anim. l. 2. c. 3. De Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10. Eth. l. 10. c. 7, 8, 9.

Thus far I have consider'd the Persons of greatest Reputation in *Greece*, and compar'd their Opinions and the grounds they went upon; and I shall proceed no farther there, because the following Sects were deriv'd from these, and they fell into quarrels and contentions with one another, which I have no occasion at present to consider. And therefore I shall now give an Account of another set of Philosophers, who settled in that part of *Italy*, which lay towards *Sicily*, and was call'd *Magna Græcia*; and this was called the *Pythagorean Sect:* which I shall inquire into, with respect to the present Subject. *Pythagoras* was a Man of wonderful esteem for his wisdom, not only in those parts, but at *Rome* too. For *Pliny* and *Plutarch* tell us, *That the Roman Senate erected a Statue to him, as to the wisest Man:* but *Pliny* wonders that *Socrates was not preferr'd before him.* But the *Romans* had a particular veneration for *Pythagoras*; from the Tradition that *Numa* the wisest of their Kings was instructed by him. It's true that this is contradicted by *Cicero* and *Livy*, (two great Men) but *Plutarch* thinks, *that they had no certain measure of times to direct them to judg by*; as he shews from *Clodius his Index.* And there are other odd circumstances, as to *Numa*, which favor the correspondence; as his Laws about *Worship* and *Sacrifices*, mention'd by *Plutarch*; and especially the *Greek Books* found in his Tomb, distinct from those of the *Pontifical Rites*; for which *Pliny* produces unexceptionable Authorities. Even *Livy* himself, who thought it a mistake about *Pythagoras*, yet confesses, *the Books contain'd the wisdom of the* Greeks *at that time.* If *Pythagoras* was contemporary with *Thales* (as we are told he took his advice about going into *Egypt*) what *Wisdom of the Greeks* was there before *Thales?* But *Varro*'s testimony is plain as well as the rest, *that these Books contain'd the Greek Philosophy.* And what *Greek Philosophy* could come to *Numa*, but that of *Pythagoras?* And therefore *Ovid* makes no scruple of saying, *That* Numa *did consult him.* But if *Pythagoras* was in such esteem at *Rome*, *how came these Books to be so solemnly burnt by the order of the Senate, after they were discover'd? Livy* saith, *because they tended to dissolve their Religion:* which *Lactantius* carries too far, when he saith, *That they tended to overthrow all Religion.* A most improbable story! That *Numa* should take such care that Posterity should believe him to have been a notorious Impostor. Do Men that deceive the World, write Books on purpose to let others see they have deceiv'd Mankind? No; they take all possible care to prevent any suspicion of that kind. But *Numa* could not think otherwise, but these Books would in time come to light? And it is a wonder

Plin. N. H. l. 34. c. 6. Plutarch. in Numâ. Tusc. l. 1. 16. IV. 1. Plut. Num. Plin. N. H. l. 13. c. 13. Liv. l. 40. Ovid. Met. l. 15. Lact. l. 2.

that

that they were ſo long concealed; and ſo *Pliny* ſaith; for they lay there 535 years: *Plutarch* ſaith, *but about* 400 years, which others ſay is a great miſtake. However, it was a long time before they were diſcover'd; *by a great ſhower*, ſaith *Plutarch*; by *plowing*, ſaith *Pliny* and others.

But ſtill, why were theſe Books burnt? The true account I take to be this. *Numa*'s Religion was very different from what then obtain'd among them. And *Q. Petilius* the *Prætor*, having got a ſight of them, ſaith *Livy*, *from his Kinſman* L. Petilius, in *whoſe Ground they were found*, very officiouſly inform'd the Senate that they were Books of dangerous conſequence to their Religion; and upon his Oath, they order'd the burning of them. Now *Numa*, as *Plutarch* ſaith, had expreſly forbidden any Images in Divine worſhip, which he ſaith continued for 160 years among the *Romans*; and the reaſon he gives was, *that the firſt or ſupreme Being according to* Numa, *was not ſenſible or viſible, but was inviſible, pure, and only to be apprehended by the Mind*; which ſaith he, was very agreeable to the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*: and the Sacrifices he appointed were unbloody, *of meal and wine, and other eaſy things*. But theſe things were ſoon chang'd; for *Plutarch* ſaith that *Tullus Hoſtilius*, his immediate Succeſſor, *chang'd the Devotion which* Numa *had ſet up into great Superſtition*; which daily increaſing, it was no wonder that they ſhould then order *Numa*'s *Books* to be burnt, which upbraided them with their ſuperſtitious folly. But by this we ſee what *Pythagoras* his notion of God and his worſhip was. *Ovid* admires him *for his ſkill in Divinity and Philoſophy*; *for his giving an account of the beginning and nature of things*.

——*Iſque licet cœli regione remotos*
Mente Deos adiit, & quæ natura negabat
Viſibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hauſit.

So that, if we may truſt a Poet (and ſurely his Authority is as good as that of *Lucretius*) *Pythagoras* aſſerted *the being of* God, *and the beginning of the World*.

——*Magni primordia Mundi,*
Et rerum cauſas, & quid natura docebat;
Quid Deus, unde Nives, quæ fulminis eſſet origo.

Cyrill. contra Jul. l. 1. There is a large deſcription of God extant in St. *Cyril* againſt *Julian*, according to *Pythagoras*; wherein God is ſaid to be *intimately preſent in the World, the beginning of all things, the mind aud ſoul, and motion of the Univerſe*. And ſo *Velleius* in *Cicero*, ſaith that according to *Pythagoras*, God *was a Mind diffus'd thro' the World*. Which is likewiſe expreſs'd by *Virgil* in his known Verſes, *Mens agitat molem*, &c. *Philoaus*, a noted Scholar of *Pythagoras*, (whoſe Books brought the *Pythagorean Learning* into eſteem in *Greece*) gives this deſcription of God, * *That he is the eternal Governor and Ruler over all, being one and the ſame always, and different from all others*. Which we find in *Philo*, and have no reaſon to miſtruſt his Teſtimony; conſidering what the other *Pythagoreans* ſaid concerning the Divine Nature. They made God to be *one Eternal, perfect Being, and that the happineſs of Mankind lay in a*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. *c.* 27.

* Ἐστὶ γὰρ φησὶν, Ἡγεμὼν καὶ Ἄρχων ἁπάντων θεὸς, εἷς ἐστὶν ὢν μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. *Philo de Mundi Opific. p.* 23.

ſimilitude to him; as appears by the *Pythagorean Fragments* in *Stobæus*, and elſewhere, which I need not repeat; but I ſhall only ſet down the paſſages of *Zaleucas* and *Charondas*, who were known *Pythagoreans* as appears by *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Laertius*, &c. in the excellent Prefaces to their Laws. *Zaleucus* ſaith, *That in the firſt place all perſons ought to own and acknowledge the Gods*; *which*, ſaith he, *is manifeſt by ſeeing the Heaven and the World, and the order that is therein*; *for theſe are not the work of Fortune, or of Mens hands*; *and they ought to be worſhip'd and honour'd as the Author of all good things to us. And to that end they ought to keep their Souls pure from evil*; *for* GOD *is not honour'd by bad men, nor by coſtly ſacrifices, but by virtue, and the choice of good and juſt actions. Charondas* ſaith, *That Men ought to begin their actions with piety. For* GOD *is the cauſe of all: and they muſt abſtain from evil actions, for the ſake of their reſpect to* GOD. *For* GOD *hath no regard to wicked perſons.* Theſe were Men of great and juſt eſteem in their Cities, and their memory is preſerv'd by all that ſpeak of them with great veneration. *Stob. Serm.* 42. p. 279. p. 289.

I might purſue this matter much farther; but if this be not ſufficient to my purpoſe, more will be leſs regarded: for Mankind are better pleas'd with *Choice* than *a Heap*; and I have only pitch'd upon Perſons of great eſteem in the World. Only *Pythagoras* did not go down well with ſome of the *Greeks*, becauſe of his *Myſtical* and *Symbolical ways* of Inſtruction; which the *Greeks* were by no means fond of; as appears by *Xenophon*'s Epiſtle to *Æſchines* (if it be genuine, and I ſee little reaſon to queſtion it) for he upbraids *Plato* with mixing *the Pythagorick Extravagancies* with the plain Doctrine of *Socrates*, which *Xenophon* kept ſtrictly to. But as to *Pythagoras* himſelf, *Cicero* extols him *for his wiſdom* and *Quality*; and he ſaith, *The Pythagoreans for a great while were accounted the only Learned men.* *Pliny* admires him for *his ſagacity*; *Apuleius* for *the greatneſs of his Wit*; and the People of *Crotone* aud *Metapontum, as more than a Man.* His greateſt fault was that he was too wiſe; for he lock'd up his Secrets ſo cloſe, that the greateſt part of Mankind were not much the better for them; only the Cities of *Magna Grecia* were wonderfully reform'd by his means (if the *Pythagoreans* may be believ'd) but at laſt the prevalent Faction of *Cylon* and his brutiſh Party at *Crotone* deſtroy'd many of the Diſciples of *Pythagoras*, and diſperſed the reſt. And *Pythagoras* himſelf ended his days either by violence, or the diſcontent he had to find his good deſigns diſappointed in ſuch a manner. The reputation of his School was for ſome time kept up by *Archytas* and *Philolaus*; and ſome that eſcaped the common danger, as *Lyſis* (who went to *Epaminondas* in *Greece*, and is ſuppos'd to have publiſhed the *Golden Verſes*) and ſeveral others are mention'd by *Porphyry* and *Iamblichus*. But *Porphyry* obſerves, That *they only preſerv'd ſome dark and obſcure notions of the* Pythagorick *Doctrine, and made wonderful ſecrets of them*; which he thinks did not contain the true Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; but only *ſome ſparks of it*, which were far from being clear. And the decay of the *Pythagorean Doctrine*, he doth not only impute to the violence of the Faction rais'd againſt the *Pythagorean Society* in thoſe Cities of *Italy* where they flouriſh'd; but to their *Enigmatical* way of expreſſing their minds by *Numbers* and *Figures*; and to the *Dorick Dialect*, which was almoſt ſacred among them: and after their Books were come into *Greece*, he ſaith, Plato *and others took out the beſt, and put it into ſmoother Language*, which made the reſt be *Tuſc.* 4. 1; *De Leg.* 2. 9. *Tuſc. I.* 16. *Plin. N. H.* 2. 21. *Apul. Flor. Iambl. vit. Pyth. c.* 6. 10.

ſlighted. And he thinks ſome *invented things on purpoſe in their names to expoſe them the more.* So that it is no eaſy matter to judg now what was the genuine *Pythagorean Doctrine*, except what we find mix'd with *Plato*; who had the beſt opportunities of underſtanding their Doctrine by going among them himſelf, and afterwards getting the Books of *Philolaus* into his hands. And *Porphyry* in the Life of *Plotinus* doth particularly commend him, for *joining the Doctrines of* Pythagoras *and* Plato *together, beyond any that had gone before him.* From whence it appears, that there was no difference between them, as to the firſt Cauſe and the Production of things.

But what ſhall we ſay to *Ocellus Lucanus*, who is mention'd as a Diſciple of *Pythagoras* by *Iamblichus*; and *Architas* in his Epiſtle to *Plato* mentions a Book of his of *the Generation of things*; which hath been often publiſh'd out of MSS. and doth plainly aſſert the *World's Eternity, and Being from it ſelf*; and ſo overthrows the *Pythagorean Doctrine* of God's being the Beginning of all;

In anſwer. That there is ſomething genuine of *Ocellus* extant, I do not queſtion. For *Stobæus* produces a Fragment out of his *Book of Law*, written in the *Dorick Dialect*, according to their cuſtom, and the precept of *Pythagoras*; wherein he doth poſitively aſſert, *That* God *was the cauſe of the World* αὐτὰς δὲ αὔτιος ὁ Θεός· but that is not all; for he ſaith, *The World conſiſts of two parts, of that which governs, and is the principle of motion; and that which is called paſſive, and is governed; the firſt* he ſaith, *is Active and Divine, having Reaſon and Underſtanding; the other is made, unreaſonable, and liable to changes.* How can this be reconciled to the Principles of the other Book? And yet *Vizzanius* who compared it with ſeveral MSS. and publiſhed it, hath printed this Fragment at the end of the other. As to *the different Dialect*, he ſuppoſes *it was firſt written in* Dorick, *but after turn'd into the* Attick: but of this he offers no proof; only he ſaith, *It was done as words are tranſlated out of* Portugueſe *into* Caſtilian; or which anſwers more to the *Doric*, out of *Scotch* into *Engliſh.* No one queſtions but ſuch things have been done, and may be ſo again. But how doth it appear that the whole Book was ſo? For there are ſome Fragments of this very piece in *Stobæus* in the *Dorick Dialect*, which is the concluſion of the firſt Chapter, and ſome parts of the ſecond and third; which I ſuppoſe to have been genuine, and the groundwork of the reſt; which ſome unknown Philoſopher built more upon, and turn'd theſe Fragments into the *Attick Greek*, to make them all of a piece. The *Pythagoreans* did aſſert, that the World was incorruptible, as appears by the Fragments of *Philolaus* and others in *Stobæus*; but that which is aſſerted in this Piece is, That the World was ſelf-originated, which was contrary to their Doctrine, and of *Ocellus Lucanus* himſelf. There can be no diſpute about the Fragment of the Book of Law, where his opinion is plain and clear, *That* God *is the cauſe of all*, and that *the firſt Cauſe is a wiſe and intelligent Being:* let us now compare this with the Doctrine of this Book, wherein he aſſerts, * *That the World is the cauſe of perfection to other things, and therefore is perfect from it ſelf. Vizzanius* would have it believ'd that this was *the Peripatetic Doctrine:* If he means that *of Ariſtotle* I have already ſhew'd how falſe it is; ſince he ſo plainly derives the being and perfection of the World *from* God, and not *from it ſelf.* But that which will give the greateſt light into this matter is, that *Nogarola*, who publiſh'd *Ocellus* in *Italy* with Notes, obſerves, that *Critolaus*

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 16. p. 32.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 24. p. 44.

Οὕτως ἂν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον γινόμενον τ αὐτο τελειας αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτῦ αὐτοτελές. Ocell. Lucan. c. 1.

the

the *Peripatetick* in *Philo*, us'd the ſame Argument, *That the World muſt be eternal, becauſe it is the cauſe of its own Being, and of other things in it.* Now this *Critolaus* ſucceeded in the *Peripatetick* School at *Athens*, after the Doctrine of it about the beginning of things had been alter'd by *Strato Lampſacenus*, who as *Cicero* tells us, *attributed all to Nature, and nothing to* GOD; *ſuppoſing that Nature had all Cauſes within it ſelf.* And ſo *Plutarch* ſaith, that *Strato* the *Peripatetick ſuppoſed Nature alone to give a Being to all things from it ſelf.* Here we have found the very Principle of this Book, which goes under the name of *Ocellus Lucanus*, which is repugnant to what himſelf had expreſly declar'd; but ſome one of theſe *Atheiſtick Peripateticks* at *Athens* finding that *Ocellus Lucanus* had ſaid ſomething that might be turn'd to their purpoſe, takes what was antient of *Ocellus*, and puts it out of the *Dorick* into the *Attick Dialect*, and makes a ſhort *Syſtem of the Univerſe*, which they thought would better paſs in the World under the name of antient *Pythagorean.* And this ſeems to me the trueſt account of this matter. As for the Arguments themſelves, ſuch as they are, I ſhall conſider them in a more proper place.

Phil. Oper. p. 946.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 38. Cicer. de N. D. l. 1.

Plut. adv. Colot.

Thus I have gone thro' the Opinions of the eldeſt Philoſophers of greateſt eſteem about GOD *and Providence, and the production of the World.* But before I proceed farther, it will be neceſſary to make ſome Reflections on the foregoing Diſcourſe, which may be very ſerviceable to my following Deſigns.

1. That thoſe Philoſophers who aſſerted *the Being of* GOD *and Providence*, were Perſons of the greateſt reputation for Wiſdom and Knowledg, and did not hold theſe things merely from Tradition, but from the ſtrongeſt evidence of Reaſon: which appear'd by this, that after the Atheiſtical Hypotheſes of *Anaximander* and *Democritus* were ſtarted, they were not in the leaſt mov'd by them; but ſaw an abſolute neceſſity in point of Reaſon of holding a Firſt Cauſe, which not only gave a beginning to the World, but continued to govern it. Even *Ariſtotle* owning an Univerſal Providence from ſuch Reaſons as will hold much farther.

2. That theſe Philoſophers who follow'd their Natural Reaſon, were very far from looking on *the Univerſe* as made up *only of Bodies*, or that *an Incorporeal Subſtance imply'd a Contradiction.* Theſe were Perſons who underſtood very well what a *Contradiction* meant; and if there had been any ſuch Repugnancy in the notion of *Mind* or *Spirit* as diſtinct from Body, they would have found it out. But *Anaxagoras* aſſerted a *Superior Mind* antecedent to Matter or Body; ſo did *Socrates* and *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle* too, who expreſly aſſerts GOD to be *an Eſſence without bulk and indiviſible, or without any Parts*; but this can never agree to a Body, altho' never ſo *fine and ſubtle.* And *Cicero* tells us, That *they could have no other notion of* GOD, *but as a free Mind, remote from any compoſition, knowing and perceiving, and moving all things.* Even the *Stoicks*, who blunder'd moſt in this matter, yet yielded GOD to be *Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis*, as *Balbus* in **Tully* calls him; and †*Zeno* in *Laertius* deſcribes GOD *to be an Immortal, Rational and moſt happy Being, uncapable of evil, and taking care of the World.* ‖*Seneca* ſaith, *the World was framed by* GOD, *or by Incorporeal Reaſon.* If at other times they ſeem to contradict this, we are not here concern'd to clear or vindicate them; becauſe my Inquiry is confin'd to thoſe who were elder, and not ſo given to Paradoxes and Innovation in Terms, as the *Stoicks* were.

Metaphyſ. l. 14. c. 7.

Nec verò Deus ipſe qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi poteſt, niſi mens ſoluta quædam & libera, ſegregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia ſentiens & movens, ipſaque prædicta motu ſempiterno. *Tuſc. l. 26.*

* *Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.*

† *Laert. vit. Zenon.*

‖ *Seneca Conſol. ad Hel. c. 8.*

3. That the true and complete Happineſs of Mankind lay in a ſimilitude to GOD. Herein *Socrates* and *Pythagoras*, and their Scholars agreed, as abundantly appears in the *Pythagorean Fragments*; and that the way to be like GOD, is to be *virtuous, and good, and wiſe*; and that all other things, which Mankind are apt to value ſo much, fall infinitely ſhort of this. And I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* himſelf came to this at laſt, for which I have produc'd unqueſtionable Authorities from his Works.

4. That Religion and Piety are very great and commendable Virtues in Mankind. *Plato* ſaid, *the greateſt*. *Pythagoras* gave very good Rules about Divine Worſhip, that it ſhould be perform'd *ſeriouſly and with great attention of Mind*, and not by *the By, and by Chance*. That *our Minds were moſt affected with Religion and Piety in the due Worſhip of* GOD; *that we ſhould undertake nothing without Prayer*; wherein *Socrates* and *Plato* agree with him. And *Ariſtotle* look'd on it as *Madneſs to deſpiſe God and Religion.*

Plut. in Numa. *Cicero de Leg. l. 2.* *Aur. Carm. 49.*

5. That good Men are to bear the troubles of this World as well as they can, and to look for Happineſs in a Future State. This appear'd by the carriage of *Socrates* at his death, and his Diſcourſes then; and the Courage and Conſtancy of *Pythagoras* and his *Diſciples*, when they were ſo miſerably handled by their inveterate Enemies; ſetting fire in the Houſe where they met, baniſhing ſome, and famiſhing others, and diſperſing the reſt.

6. That there was a common conſent of Mankind, as to the Being of GOD, and Immortality of Souls. Which appears not only by expreſs teſtimonies of Philoſophers, but by their appeals to the ſenſe of former Ages and diſtant Nations about them.

7. That, notwithſtanding that Light of Reaſon, which they had, yet they found it ſo defective in many things, that they thought nothing more deſirable than a clear Revelation about ſuch things, which were of great importance to Mankind, but they found to be out of their reach to recover; as appear'd by the Confeſſion of *Socrates*, and the Silence of *Ariſtotle* about a Future State, when his Reaſon could only go to the poſſibility, and not to the undoubted certainty of it. For I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* hath aſſerted ſo much concerning the Nature and Properties of the Soul, or rather the Mind of Man, that it cannot be deſtroy'd by Death; but yet he was ſo far to ſeek concerning a Future State after Death, by reaſon of the Poetical Fictions about it, that he rather choſe to ſay nothing, than what might be thought fabulous or uncertain.

And now, I hope, I have ſufficiently clear'd the firſt thing which I undertook, which was to ſhew, That it was a moſt unreaſonable prejudice againſt Religion, *that it was only a contrivance of Prieſts and Politicians for their own ends.*

II. I come now to conſider in the next place, what account is given by ſuch Men of that impreſſion of Religion, which hath been upon the Minds of Men in all Ages. And the Cauſe muſt be as general as the Effect: Since then we find this Effect of Religion in all kinds of Men, ſome univerſal and common Reaſon muſt be aſſign'd for it: which is the thing I am now to conſider. And ſince no Perſon hath undertaken this Matter in ſuch a manner, as Mr. *Hobbes* hath done, I ſhall particularly examin what he hath ſaid concerning it. *Seeing there are no ſigns, nor fruit of Religion but in Man only, there is no cauſe to doubt, but that the Seed of Religion is alſo only in Man, and conſiſteth in ſome peculiar Quality, or at leaſt in ſome eminent degree thereof not to be found in other living Creatures.*

Leviathan, ch. 12.

But what is this *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* For therein the difficulty lies. How come Men of all ſorts to be poſſeſs'd with it? Not merely the unthinking Multitude, but Men of the deepeſt Senſe and greateſt Capacity, and who have taken the moſt pains to inquire into theſe matters.

And firſt, ſaith he, *It is peculiar to the Nature of Man to be inquiſitive into Cauſes of the Events they ſee, ſome more ſome leſs; but all Men ſo much as to be curious in the ſearch of the Cauſes of their own good and evil Fortune. To be inquiſitive into the Cauſes of Events* is very proper for Rational Beings; but we do not mean ſuch as relate merely *to their own good or evil Fortune*, which is no commendable curioſity; but into the nature and reaſon of things, which they ſee in the World; and this we ſay leads Men to a firſt Cauſe, which is GOD. This he mentions in the next words.

Secondly, Upon the ſight of any thing that hath a beginning to think alſo it had a Cauſe, to determin the ſame to begin when it did, rather than ſooner or later.

And was not this a very reaſonable thought? For *what hath a Beginning* muſt certainly *have a Cauſe* which produced it, which determined its Being at that time. And if this be ſuch a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*, then there is ſomething in Reaſon which carries them to the owning a GOD, which gave a Being to the World, and to the things in it.

Thirdly, Man obſerveth how one Event hath been produced by another, and remembreth in them Antecedence and Conſequence; and if he cannot find out the true Cauſes of things, he ſuppoſes Cauſes of them rather from his own fancy, or Authority of others whom he eſteems.

But how come Mankind not *to find out the true Cauſes of things?* For this is here very ſlily ſuppos'd, without giving the leaſt reaſon for it; and withal the things that Men ſearch for *the Cauſes* of, are ſuppos'd to be *only* ſuch as relate *to their good and evil Fortune* (which are ſaid to be *for the moſt part inviſible*;) but is it not poſſible for Men to inquire into the Cauſes of other things, which we plainly ſee? Do we not ſee our own Bodies, and thoſe of other Animals, as well as the Heavens and Earth? and is it not as proper and reaſonable for Mankind to inquire into the Cauſes of theſe, as well as into their *good and evil Fortune?* What ſtrange ſtuff is this to ſuppoſe all Mankind only to run after *Fortune-tellers*, and never to concern themſelves about the Cauſes of the viſible World? Could any one that in the leaſt pretended to *Philoſophy*, ever think ſo meanly of the reſt of Mankind? But theſe are *the Cauſes* which we ſearch for, and we hope Natural Reaſon will conduct Men in this inquiry to their ſatisfaction; ſo that they need not to have recourſe to *Fancy* or *Authority*.

But he goes on: *The two firſt make Anxiety*, i. e. a Man's *Inquiſitiveneſs into Cauſes* in general, and *thinking that what had a Beginning muſt have a Cauſe.* For *being aſſur'd that there be Cauſes of all things, this fills him with ſolicitude for the time to come; and ſo his Heart is gnaw'd on perpetually by fear of Death, Poverty, or other Calamity; and hath no repoſe or pauſe of his Anxiety but in Sleep.* What? Do Men think of nothing but what Calamities may befal them? And muſt they needs perpetually perplex themſelves with the fear of future Evils? Thoſe who were called *Philoſophers* in former times, thought it poſſible for ſuch who believed GOD and Providence, not to live under ſuch *perpetual anxiety.* But what follows? *This perpetual Fear always accompanying Man-*

kind in the ignorance of Causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something; and therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good or evil Fortune, but some Power or Agent invisible. Thence the Poets said, that the Gods were first created by human Fear; which being spoken of the many Gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But how come we from the *Qualities* of Human Nature to fall upon *the Gods of the Gentiles?* The Question was, What it is in Mankind which inclines them to believe a God? The Answer is, *That Fear made the Gods of the Gentiles.* What is that to *all Mankind?* Suppose there had been no such Saying among the *Poets*, nor such *Gods among the Gentiles*, the Question still remains, whence comes Mankind to apprehend a *Deity?* Doth it all come from a vain superstitious Fear, such as Men have in the dark of they know not what; and because they see nothing, they imagin some *Invisible Power?* Is this the true ground of the Seed of Religion in Mens Minds? If so, then there is no ground in Reason to believe a God, but only an ignorant superstitious Fear.

Not so, saith Mr. *Hobbes. But the acknowledgment of One God, Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire Men have to know the Causes of Natural Bodies, and their several Virtues and Operations, than from the fear of what was to befal them in time to come.* What is the meaning of this? *The acknowledgment of One God may be more easily derived,* &c. If he had meant sincerely, he would not have said, *That it may be more easily derived*, but that no tolerable account can be given of those things any other way. But we are to observe, That he makes *Ignorance* and *Fear* to be *the general Seeds of Religion in Mankind:* so that this *Acknowledgment of One* God doth not come from *the Seed of Religion*, but only from Mens being puzzled about a series of Causes. *For*, as he goes on, *he that from any Effect he sees come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate Cause thereof, and from thence to the Cause of that Cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of Causes, shall at last come to this (even as the Heathen Philosophers confess'd) one first Mover; that is, a First and an Eternal Cause of all things, which is that which Men mean by the name of* God. This seems a plain confession that *Reason* must carry Men to the owning *a First and an Eternal Cause of all things.* And is not Reason a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* How then comes *the Seeds of Religion* not to be plac'd therein, but *in Ignorance and Fear?* And he after saith, *That the Natural Seed of Religion lies in these four things; Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second Causes, Devotion towards what Men fear, and taking things casual for Prognosticks.* How comes the *Natural Reason* of Mankind to be left out? If by that Men may be convinc'd of a *First and Eternal Cause of things*, doth not that dispose Men to a fear and reverence towards a Divine Majesty? And is not that *Religion?* Then the best and truest Seed of Religion lies in that which most disposeth the Mind to fear God. What is the meaning then, that *the Seed of Religion* is plac'd by him in things without Reason? If Men by Reason are brought to own or *acknowledg One* God *Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent*; doth not the same Reason oblige them to pay him that Reverence, and Fear, and Duty, which is owing to him? Therefore by this *Seed of Religion*, he really can mean nothing but an inclination to *Superstition:* And to this purpose he speaks in the conclusion of the foregoing Chapter. *And this Fear of things invisible, is the Natural Seed of that which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that fear or worship that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.*

Here

Here is a notable distinction found out between *Religion* and *Superstition*; the former is the good word a Man gives to himself, the other the Nick-name he bestows on those who differ from him. But in general, *Religion* and *Superstition* are the same thing to him; unless a difference be found out from the *allowance* of one, and not of the other. So he saith in another place: *Fear of Power invisible feign'd by the Mind, or imagin'd from tales publickly allow'd, is Religion; not allow'd, Superstition.* So that what is feign'd and allow'd is *Religion*, and what is not allow'd is *Superstition.* So that the Worship of the Heathen Gods, being from *Tales publickly allow'd*, was *Religion*, and not *Superstition:* and the *Christian Worship* under the Persecution, was *Superstition* and not *Religion.* No, saith Mr. *Hobbes: When the Power imagin'd is such as we imagin, that is true Religion.* How can it be *true Religion*, if Religion be *a fear of a power imagined by the Mind, or from Tales publickly allow'd?* For if this be Religion in general, *true Religion* must be a *true Fiction*, a real *Chimæra*, an allow'd piece of Nonsense. *But when the Power is such as we imagin it, then*, saith he, *it is true Religion.* But if it were *a Power imagined to be such as the Law makes it*, is not that *true Religion?* And if it contradicts what is so established, can this be according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s *true Religion?* Then it follows, that the distinction doth not arise from the *Publick Allowance* or *Disallowance.* For if it be possible for the Civil Power to *disallow* the Worship of the true GOD, (as we know it hath too frequently happen'd) is such Worship being disallow'd *true Religion?* If it be, then it is impossible the other should be true, that *Religion* is taken from the *Publick Allowance*, and *Superstition* from the *Disallowance.* But they who put in some Expressions only for a disguise and concealment, know well enough that they contradict themselves; and they know their Friends will allow them in it, as long as the true meaning may be understood by them: and the safest way of instilling Atheism is by writing Contradictions, *i. e.* by seeming at some times to own a GOD, but by the whole series of the Discourse to overthrow his Being, as a mere fancy of an invisible Power rais'd by a predominant Fear. But hereby we see that *Fear* prevails so much on such Men, that they dare not speak consistently; which is very unbecoming *Philosophers.* As the gross *Hypocrisy* of *Vaninus* before his discovery, and the most servile *Flatteries* and *Importunities* of *Theophile* in *France*, did shew how much the power of Fear may sway in those who have no Religion, (which may be allow'd in them.) But how comes Fear to be made out to be *the seed of Religion in Mankind?* This a true Disciple to the *Leviathan*, in the Preface to his Book, hath undertaken to make out more fully than Mr. *Hobbes* had done; and therefore ought to be consider'd in this place. *When Men*, saith he, *are under any great distress, and see not the way out of it, their Anxiety and Fear makes them act like Men distracted, and ask any one's help, which at another time they would despise: so we find it as to Religion; when they are in great trouble, they run to their Prayers, and when they are over, their Devotion is soon cool'd, as he instances in* Alexander, *and might have done in many others.* But what is all this to the proof of the main Point? That Men are too prone to *Superstition*, especially under Calamities, there is no question. But it is a most unreasonable supposition, that all *Religion* is nothing else but *Superstition*, which Men take up only when they are at their wits end. But if there be a GOD and Providence, as we find both the best *Philosophers* asserted, and the strongest

Leviathan, ch. 6. p. 26.

Lescaloper. in Cicer. de N. D. I. p. 127.

Tract. Theolog. Polit.

ſtrongeſt Reaſons prove it; then whatever Mens condition be as to this World, there is the ſame ground in Reaſon for a due Reverence and Worſhip to be paid to him. But it is a very bad way of arguing againſt all Religion, becauſe of ſome Mens extravagant Superſtition. *Some Men have run mad with Superſtition.* What follows? Therefore all *Religion* is *Madneſs.* Where lies any colour in the Argument? Some have been mad through an exceſs of Love; therefore all Love is Madneſs. No; but we muſt enquire into the proper objects and degrees of Love, whereof ſome are allowable, and ſome not. So here in the Paſſion of Fear, there is a violent, fooliſh, ungovernable Fear; but may there not be a prudent, wiſe and reaſonable Fear? It is madneſs and folly in great diſtreſſes to run to what cannot help us; but is it ſo to make our addreſſes to a Being infinitely wiſe and powerful, who alone can do it? Here lies the fundamental miſtake of theſe Men, they would have it taken for granted, that there is no God nor Providence, and then they cry out upon the fooliſh Fear and Superſtition of Mankind: but they cannot deny that if our foundations be true, Religion is a wiſe and reaſonable thing in Mankind; as it is an owning our Creator by a ſolemn ſubmiſſion to him, and invocation of his help, and dependence upon his Providence. Let any Man in his wits (let his condition as to this World be what it will) deny that it is reaſonable for him to be govern'd by one infinitely wiſer and better than himſelf. If his condition be proſperous, he hath more reaſon to be thankful; if it be troubleſome, he hath more reaſon to be patient, becauſe God knows beſt both how to ſupport him under it, and to deliver him out of it. But if there be no God nor Providence, he hath nothing but the miſerable comfort of neceſſity. *But, did not the multitude of Gods in the Gentile World come from their ignorant and ſuperſtitious Fear, as Mr.* Hobbes *hath at large ſhew'd?* Truly he needed not to have taken ſo much pains to prove a thing which no body denies. But what then? The Gentiles feign'd a great many Gods from their ſuperſtitious Fear; therefore there is no God but what is the effect of Fear. Is this good arguing? *But they fancied Powers inviſible, which were only in their own Imaginations.* Therefore there is *no Inviſible Power* but what depends upon Imagination. Can ſuch Men pretend to Reaſon, who talk at this rate? *But thoſe inviſible Powers they took to be Spirits, and that they were incorporeal, or immaterial, which are words of a contradictory ſignification.* This is news, and ought to have been prov'd in ſome meaſure, ſince the beſt Philoſophers who underſtood contradictions never thought ſo, as I have ſhew'd already. *But thoſe who by their meditation arrive to the acknowledgment of One Infinite, Omnipotent, Eternal* God, *choſe rather to confeſs he is incomprehenſible and above their Underſtanding, than to define his Nature by Spirit incorporeal, and then confeſs their definition to be unintelligible.* Do any that believe God to be *an Immaterial Subſtance*, confeſs this to be *unintelligible?* I rather believe that they think a *Material God* to be *unintelligible*, as being inconſiſtent with the Divine Perfections. And altho' they acknowledg that what is *Infinite*, is ſo far incomprehenſible; yet they may have clear and diſtinct conceptions of *a Firſt and Eternal Cauſe*, which is endued with Infinite Perfections. And this is not only attributed to him *as a Title of Honor with a pious intention*; but from the true ſenſe of their Minds, as to ſuch Attributes which are proper to God.

When

When Mr. *Hobbes* was charg'd with introducing *Atheiſm by denying Immaterial or Incorporeal Subſtances*, he undertook to defend himſelf; not only becauſe we ſay GOD *is incomprehenſible, but becauſe the notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance came from* Plato *and* Ariſtotle, *who miſtook thoſe thin Inhabitants of the Brain they ſee in ſleep for ſo many incorporeal Men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things Corporeal.* Before he ſeem'd only to ſay, That the ignorant ſuperſtitious People entertain'd this notion of *Spirits or inviſible powers being only Creatures of the Brain like the images in ſleep:* but now it ſeems *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* were no wiſer, and that we receive it from them. But I have made it appear that the difference of Mind and Matter was before them; and that not by mere fancy, but by invincible Reaſon: becauſe otherwiſe there could be no ſuch thing as the Motion and Diſpoſition of Matter in ſuch a manner, as we ſee it in the World. And this was the ground which thoſe Philoſophers went upon; who were as little given to be impos'd upon by their dreams, as any before or ſince their time. And it is a ſtrange confidence in any Man to think to bear down the general ſenſe of the moſt Philoſophical part of Mankind, with bare ſaying, that an Immaterial Subſtance implies a contradiction. But he offers to prove it, after an extraordinary manner; *For*, ſaith he, *it is in* Engliſh, *ſomething that without a Body ſtands under — Stands under what? Will you ſay, under Accidents?* Ridiculous! did *Plato* or *Ariſtotle* uſe the word Subſtance? And when it came to be us'd, the word ſignify'd the ſame with *Being*; and ſo the jeſt is quite loſt. Such pitiful things as theſe muſt paſs for Wit and Philoſophy with ſome Men.

Mr. Hobbes *conſider'd, &c. p.* 30.

p. 32.

p. 33.

But to proceed with Mr. *Hobbes*; After he hath reckon'd up the many follies which the Gentiles fell into by their ſuperſtitious Fear, he concludes in this manner. *So eaſy are Men to be drawn to believe any thing from ſuch as have got credit with them, and can with gentleneſs and dexterity take hold of their Ignorance and Fear.* Still we meet with nothing but the reſult of *Ignorance* and *Fear* in the *Gentile World.* We do not deny that Religion was exceedingly corrupted among them; but we affirm, that the true foundations of Religion were kept up among Men of Underſtanding; as fully appears by the Diſcourſes of *Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Ariſtotle, Cicero,* &c. Why are their Reaſons never ſo much as mention'd, and nothing thought worth inſiſting upon, but only the groſs ſuperſtitions and follies of the People? This doth not look like fair dealing with Mankind; to repreſent only the meaneſt and moſt deform'd parts, and to conceal what any ways tended to the honor of them, and of Religion. *Cicero* dealt with Mankind in this matter in a much more ingenuous and candid manner. He doth not conceal the follies either of the *People* or of the *Philoſophers* about their Gods; but then he ſets down all the Arguments for GOD and Providence, and urges them with all his force. And in other places he owns the *general conſent of Mankind*, as to the eſteem and worſhip of a Divine Nature: which he is far from imputing to *Mens Ignorance and Fear*; but he ſaith, *it is the voice of Nature it ſelf.* Nay he goes ſo far as to ſay, * *that there is nothing more evident to any one that looks up to the Heavens, than that there is a moſt excellent Mind, by which theſe things are govern'd,* † *And he queſtions,*

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Cic. de Leg. I. 8. *Tuſc. I.* 13. 15.

* Quid enim poteſt eſſe tam apertum, tamq; perſpicuum, cum cœlum ſuſpeximus, cœleſtiaque contemplati ſumus, quam eſſe aliquod Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis quo hæc regantur. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

† Quod qui dubitet, haud ſane intelligo, cur non idem Sol ſit an nullus ſit dubitare poſſit. Quid enim eſt hoc illo evidentius? *Ibid.*

ſtions, *whether it be more evident that the Sun ſhines.* At what another rate doth that excellent Orator ſpeak of *Human Nature*, with reſpect to Religion, than our modern pretenders to Philoſophy? Nay || *Sextus Empiricus* himſelf ſets down the Arguments fairly which prove the Being of GOD: *viz. The Conſent of Mankind; the Order of the World; the abſurdities of Atheiſm, and the weakneſs of the Arguments for it.* Which he doth largely inſiſt upon; and diſtinguiſhes between the *common errors of the people*, and the *Natural Arguments of Mankind*, with the conſent of the wiſeſt and ſharpeſt Men among them; as *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, the *Ionic Philoſophers* (from *Anaxagoras*) *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoics*. And, ſaith he, *if we enquired after an object of ſight, we would rely moſt on thoſe who ſaw beſt; or after a ſound, on thoſe of the quickeſt hearing: ſo in matters of ſpeculation, the opinion of Philoſophers ought moſt to be regarded.* Which he never anſwers when he ſets down the Arguments on the other ſide; which are chiefly thoſe of *Carneades* againſt the *Stoics*, who laid themſelves open by ſome *Hypotheſes* of their own.

|| *Sextus Empir. ad Mathem. p.* 139.

But Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, *That the firſt Founders and Legiſlators of Common-wealths among the Gentiles took great care to keep the People in obedience and peace; and to that end pretended to Revelation for their Laws: and preſcrib'd Ceremonies, and Supplications, and Sacrifices, &c. by which they were to believe the anger of the Gods might be appeas'd. And thus the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.* Who goes about to deny this? or to juſtify the vain pretences to Revelation among ſome of the ancient Legiſlators, beſides *Numa Pompilius*, whom *Diodorus Siculus* takes care to preſerve the memory of; as of *Mnenis*, as he calls him, the firſt Legiſlator in *Egypt*; who pretended to have his Laws from the God *Hermes:* but this ſeems to have been a miſtake for *Menes*, whoſe Counſellor *Hermes* was: his others are, *Minos* of *Creet*, *Lycurgus* at *Sparta*, *Zathamuſtes* (as he calls him) among the *Arimaſpi*, *Zamolxis* among the *Getæ*; and among the reſt he reckons *Moſes*, who had his Laws from the God *Iäo*. No queſtion *Diodorus Siculus* believ'd all alike; but I hope to ſhew the mighty difference between *Moſes* and the reſt in the following Diſcourſes. But here I am only to conſider the force of the Argument. *Theſe Gentile Legiſlators did pretend Revelation when they had it not, only with a deſign to deceive the People.* Doth it hence follow, that there is no ſuch thing as *Religion*; but that it is only a Trick made uſe of by cunning Legiſlators to draw the People the better to Obedience? Now I think the Argument holds the other way. For, if the People were not before well perſuaded of the truth of *Religion* in general, this Argument would have no force at all upon them. For, let us ſuppoſe a People altogether unacquainted with Religion, or uncertain of the truth of it, to be dealt with, by ſome cunning Legiſlator; and he comes and tells them, he had brought them an excellent Body of Laws, which he had by Revelation from GOD; what would this ſignify to a People that were poſſeſs'd with Mr. *Hobbe*'s Notion of *Inviſible Powers* that were only *Fancies, ſuch as appear in a Dream or a Glaſs*; would they be at all perſuaded by ſuch an Argument to obedience? No; but they would rather look on him as an Impoſtor, that went about to deceive them in the groſſeſt manner; which would raiſe an invincible prejudice againſt them. But, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *they had the Original ſeeds of Religion*, viz. *Ignorance and Fear, and upon theſe ſuch Legiſlators did work.* But he can never make it out, that ever there was a People

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 59.

poſſeſs'd with ſuch *Ignorance and Fear*, but they had a notion of a Deity among them before ſuch Legiſlators appearing; and all the advantage they had, was from ſuch an antecedent Belief of a God; then indeed it was no hard matter for ſuch Legiſlators to impoſe upon them; but without it, the ſuppoſition is unreaſonable. But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, *that Men in the dark are afraid of Inviſible Powers.* As tho' there were no more to be ſaid for the Being of God and Providence, than for ſtories of *Hobgoblings*, and this lies at the bottom of all his Diſcourſe. Wherein he contradicts the common Senſe and Reaſon of Mankind, who have agreed in the Notion and Belief of a Deity, and that as I have ſhew'd from *Socrates* and *Xenophon*, as well as others in *the eldeſt and beſt Ages*, even of the *Gentile World.* But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, where he ſpeaks his Mind more freely, *that there is no Argument from Natural Reaſon doth prove that the World had its beginning from* God; and yet he ſaith, *there is no Argument to prove a Deity but from the Creation.* So that all proof of a God in point of Reaſon, muſt be deſtroy'd by him. This he knew was objected againſt him; and the Anſwer he gives is, *That there are no Arguments from Natural Reaſon, except the Creation, that have not made it more doubtful to many than it was before:* and therefore his opinion is, *that this matter is to be left to the Law to determin.* A very philoſophical Anſwer! But why doth not the Argument from the Creation hold, when himſelf had ſaid, *that from the ſeries of Cauſes there muſt be one firſt Mover*, i. e. *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things?* But that came in by the by, to avoid *odium* in a Book for all Perſons reading; but in his *Philoſophical Diſcourſes*, he doth not allow this Argument to hold. For what reaſon? *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *it only proves, that a Man's Mind cannot go on* in infinitum, *but he muſt ſtop ſomewhere; and at laſt he grows weary, and knows not whether he ſhould go on farther or not.* And is this all the force of the Argument from the Creation? What becomes now of the Argument from the *Mechanical Contrivance of the Human Body, which*, he ſaid, *was ſo clear a proof of a wiſe Maker, that he muſt be ſaid to be without a Mind, that did not aſſert that it was made by one?* And this is in one of his *Philoſophical Treatiſes*, publiſhed after the other; but in his Vindication of himſelf, he juſtifies the former paſſage; only he ſaith, *except the Creation.* So that he knew not well what to ſay in this matter, but only to keep himſelf out of danger, he was reſolv'd to ſubmit to the Law. But that is not our Point: and why did he not go about to take off the Argument from *the wiſe Contrivance of things*, which ought to go along with the other? But he knew it was far eaſier to darken an Argument, wherein *Eternity* and *Infinity* is concern'd; and ſo from thence would infer that in the ſeries of Cauſes Men's-Mind are only puzzled and not convinced. But why, I pray, muſt a Man's Mind *give over in the ſearch of Cauſes, as not knowing whether he may go on or not?* Can any thing be plainer in common reaſon, than that in the order of Cauſes a Man muſt go on till he arrive at a firſt Cauſe? What ſhould make a Man to ſtop here; for he ſees he muſt go on till he comes at a firſt? No; ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *A firſt Cauſe is infinite, and whatever is infinite is above our conception, and ſo we are loſt.* But that is running from the order of Cauſes to the nature of the object, which is a thing of another conſideration.

Phyſ. c. 26. n. 1.

Mr. Hobbes conſider'd, p. 34.

But he ſaith yet farther, *That the Argument from motion doth only prove an eternity of motion, and not an eternal firſt Mover*; becauſe as nothing can be mov'd from it ſelf, ſo whatſoever gives motion muſt be firſt mov'd. But all this depends upon the ſuppoſition that there is

nothing in the Univerſe but Body; and if that be granted, his Argument holds: but if there be Mind diſtinct from Body, and can give motion to it, there is not ſo much as the color of reaſon in this Argument. And ſo much in anſwer to the Second Atheiſtical Pretence.

The Third *Atheiſtical Pretence* to be conſider'd, is, *That there is no ſuch common conſent of Mankind, as to God and Providence, as was aſſerted by the Ancients, and is ſtill by the defenders of Religion; for upon the late Diſcoveries whole Nations have been found without any ſenſe of* God *or Religion.* This is a thing very fit to be inquir'd into, with more care than hath been yet us'd about it: for, altho' we do not ground the truth of Religion merely upon ſuch a general conſent; but upon thoſe Arguments which the wiſer part of Mankind hath inſiſted upon; of which I have given ſome account in the foregoing Diſcourſe: yet ſuch an univerſal conſent doth manifeſtly ſhew that there is nothing repugnant to the common ſenſe of Mankind in it; nothing that looks like a Trick or Impoſture, which could never ſo univerſally prevail as this hath done; eſpecially among the more ſenſible and civiliz'd part of Mankind.

But for our better underſtanding this Matter, it will be neceſſary to lay down ſome general Obſervations.

That we have reaſon to diſtinguiſh the more *Bruti ſh* and *Savage* People, from the more *Tractable* and *Reaſonable*; becauſe it is poſſible for Mankind by an affected and univerſal neglect of all kind of Inſtruction, to degenerate almoſt to the nature of Brutes. But ſurely ſuch are not fit to be brought in for the inſtances of what naturally belongs to Mankind: which we ought to judge of by a due meaſure, *i. e.* by ſuch as neither want natural capacity, nor are profeſs'd Savages, nor have the improvements of the moſt civilized People. There are two ſorts of bruti ſh People in the World, whoſe ſenſe in theſe matters is not much to be regarded. (1.) Such as have very little of common Humanity left among them; ſuch as *Acoſta* deſcribes the *Uros*, who were ſuch *dull and bruti ſh People that they did not think themſelves Men*; and ſuch are the *Caffres* or *Hottentots*, at the *Cape of Good-hope*, who by the laſt Account we have of them remain as *Beſtial* and *Sordid* as ever; inſomuch that the Author who was among them, ſaith, *That if there be any medium between Men and Beaſts, they lay in the faireſt claim to that ſpecies.* And ſuch are the *Caiguæ* of *Paraguaria* (of whom afterwards.) (2.) Such as expreſs open contempt and defiance of *Laws* as well as *Religion*, as the *Chichimecæ* in the Northern part of *America*, who are ſaid *to have lived without any Government as well as Religion*; *(unleſs that they offer the firſt wild Beaſt they catch to the Sun)* and ſo *Acoſta* deſcribes ſome other *Savages* among them; viz. *without King, Law,* God, *or Reaſon:* Thoſe of *Braſil* are ſaid to be *without Faith, without Law, without a King*; and the Savages of *Canada* are deſcrib'd after the ſame manner. So that if any Argument can be drawn from ſuch againſt Religion, it will as well hold againſt *Law* and *Civil Government.*

Acoſta *of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 6.

Voyage to Surat, *An.* 1689. *p.* 489.

De Laet *Deſcript. Ind. Occid. l.* 5. *c.* 25.

De Orig. Gent. Am. p. 27.

Acoſta *of the Weſt-Indies, l.* 7. *ch.* 3.

Du Val *Obſervations ſur le Voyage de* Pirard, *p.* 132.

De Laet *Ind. Occid. l.* 2. *c.* 12.

2. We muſt not judg by light informations of mere Strangers, and Perſons look'd on as Enemies; which is the caſe of the Inhabitants of the *Southern Iſlands*, which we have only from *Seamen* who landed upon them, and were ſuppos'd to come with an ill deſign; whoſe Accounts muſt be very imperfect and partial. But in *Le Mair*'s Account we only read, *that they could obſerve no Offices of Religion among them:* And *Scouten* to the ſame purpoſe of the Inhabitants of *Horn Iſland* (as they call it)

Deſcript. Navig. Jac. Le Mair, 31. *Mzii. Diarium* Schouten. *p.* 47.

not far from *New Guinea*; *but they ſeem'd*, he ſaith, *to live like the Birds of the Air, without any care, upon the fruits of the Earth.* But no certainty can be grounded upon ſuch Obſervations. Nor can we build any thing upon the *Want of Religion* in places not yet fully diſcover'd; as what is ſaid by ſome of the People of *Tedſo* or *Jeſſo:* For the firſt Account given of it was from the Jeſuit *Fronius*, who liv'd long in *Japan*; and he deſcribes it as a Country of Savages; and he ſaith, *that they have no other Religion but the worſhip of the Heavens.* And ſo *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *the ſight of the Heavens was that which brought Men firſt to Divine Worſhip*; and he doth not attribute it to *Ignorance and Fear*, but *to Admiration*; and therefore fix'd *on the Sun and Moon as their chief Gods*; which was the the moſt prevailing Idolatry in the World. But from hence we are not to infer that they believ'd no GOD above them; but they thought he that was above them was above their ſervice: but their viſible Worſhip they thought ought to be paid to theſe viſible Gods, as hath been already obſerv'd of the old *Greeks*; and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith the ſame of the *Egyptians.* But as to theſe People of *Tedſo* we find the firſt Account of them was, that they were a very *Savage People*, but had ſuch kind of Religion as moſt antient Idolaters had: Since that time there hath been no exact Account given of them; the beſt we have is from the *Dutch.* *Caron*, who was Reſident in *Japan*, ſaith only, *that this People are brutiſh*; *and that the* Japoneſe *could never make a full diſcovery of the Country, which is parted from* Japan *by an Arm of the Sea, where it bounds on vaſt Mountains and Deſerts, ſo that the common Paſſage is by ferrying over.* If this be true, there is a Paſſage by Land beyond that Arm of the Sea, and ſo *Japan* is one *Continent* with it, which extends in probability to the Northern parts of *America:* For in the Account of the *Dutch Embaſſy* to *Japan*, *A. D.* 1641. we are told, That in the Treaty between the *Japoneſe* Agent *Syvoan* and the *Dutch*, he produc'd a *Map* of thoſe Parts agreeable to what *Caron* had ſaid; and they obſerve *that* Jeſſo *was in it of a vaſt extent, and reach'd to* North America, *without any Streight of* Anian. *Martinius* makes no doubt, that Japan *was inhabited from* Eaſt Tartary, *as well as by a Colony from* China; which he proves from their *Cuſtoms* and *Language*; but he thinks *they came over the Water, or at leaſt over the Ice*; *for he ſaith, there are ſevere Winters there.* But he ſaith withal, *that the* Chineſe *do make* Jeſſo *a part of* Tartary, *and that it is join'd with the Province of* Niuthan *and* Yupi. *F. Couplet* agrees with *Martinius*, that *Japan* was peopled from *Tartary*; and he ſaith, they have a Chronology of their Kings for 660 Years before *Chriſt*, and long before that the Northern *Tartars* took poſſeſſion of *Japan.* So that the People of *Teſſo* and *Japan* are of the ſame Original. In the *Dutch* Account of *Tedſo* printed by *Thevenot*, in the ſecond Part of his Collections (which was taken from a Ship which went upon the Coaſts of that Country and People) we have a more favourable Deſcription both of the *Country* and *People*; only it is ſaid, *that they do not love to take pains, have little Government or Religion*; but they obſerv'd ſome *Superſtitious Practices* among them. And what exact Account could be expected from ſuch, who went not thither to acquaint themſelves either with the Country or their Religion, but to find a paſſage farther that way?

Maff. Epiſt. l. 4. Apr. 28. 1565.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 7.

Ambaſſade Memorable, &c. p. 27.

Martin. *Atlas Extrem. Aſiæ, p. 170.*

Martin. *Atlas, p. 21.*

Couplet *Diſſert. Proœm. ad* Confuc. *Oper. p. 81.*

3. That it is no certain rule that the People have no Religion, becauſe Strangers cannot find any ſet Times and Places of Worſhip among them. For this was a Principle among many Nations, that the *Supreme* GOD was

to be worship'd only by acts of the Mind; and that external Worship was only for lesser Deities. And *Trigautius* (or rather *Riccius*, who lived a long time in *China*) gives this account of the Religion of that antient and famous Kingdom, *That at first they own'd the Supreme* God, *Lord of Heaven; but afterwards they came to worship inferior Deities; and this*, he saith, *he took out of their most antient Annals and Books of Wisdom, which*, he saith, *did not, in respect to Religion and Morality, come short of the best Philosophers of* Greece. He affirms, *that the Sect of the Learned*, as he calls them, *did still worship one* God, *because all inferior things are preserved and governed by him; but that they gave an inferior Worship to Spirits under him. They are silent about the Beginning of things, as out of their knowledg; but there are some of no such reputation, that talk their own vain Dreams, to which little regard is given.* But *Martinius* hath given some account of these Notions among them; *some would have all by chance, others held the eternity of the World.* He saith, *that their antient Books speak of the supreme Governor of Heaven and Earth*; and altho' they have not *a proper name for* God, yet he confesses *they have such as express his Authority and Government of the World.* *Bartoli* saith, they are extremely mistaken who charge this Learned Sect with *Atheism, because they have no Temples, nor publick Ceremonies of Worship for him; because they apprehend that the supreme* God *is to be solemnly worship'd only by him that is supreme among them.* And *Magaillans*, who was well acquainted with the Court of *China*, and died there about 20 years since, gives this account of Divine Worship, *that at* Pekim *there is a Temple, called the Temple of Heaven, wherein there is a very large Cupolo supported by* 82 *Pillars, wherein the Emperor himself offers Sacrifice on the day of the Winter Solstice, with great solemnity and humility; and another wherein he doth the same at the Summer Solstice: Before which*, he saith, *they observe a strict Fast for three days. He enquired of one of their learned Men, what they meant by this solemn Worship of Heaven; whether it was directed to the material Heaven? He answer'd that they took Heaven not only for the visible Heaven, but for the Creator and Governor of all things; and that at the four Seasons of the Year their Emperor did offer sacrifice in Temples on purpose, not to the Creatures, but to the spiritual Heaven.* *F. Couplet* saith, *That by the antient Custom of* China, *the Emperor only sacrificed to the King of Heaven, as often as there was great occasion for it. And that if he were in a progress, he did it upon the Hills and Mountains.* And by the last account we have from *China*, we find *the same Custom is kept up at* Pekim *by the present Emperors, since the Conquest of* China. Now it were very unreasonable to infer, that there is no Religion or Worship of the Supreme Being in *China*, because it is not commonly practis'd; since according to their Notion of Ceremonies, wherein they are the nicest People in the World, they think none ought to perform Worship to the Supreme in Heaven, but he who is their Supreme upon Earth.

Trigaut. *de Christian. Exped. ap. Sinas, c.* 10.

Martin. *Hist. Sinic. init.*

Bartoli *Hist. Asiat. part.* 3. *l.* 1. *p.* 73.

Magaillans *Novel. Rel. de la China, ch.* 21.

Couplet *Decl. Procem ad Confuc. p.* 83.

Le Compte *part.* 2. *Lett.* 2.

4. Another thing we are to observe in passing our judgment, whether Nations have any Religion among them, is to have a care of trusting too much to the Sayings of known and profess'd Enemies; but as much as may be we ought to take the Opinion of the most free and disinteress'd Persons, who have convers'd among them on the account of Religion. This I intend chiefly with respect to the *Spaniards* accounts of the *West-Indies*, when their design was to enslave the poor *Indians*; for then they made it their business to blacken them as much as possible, by representing

ſenting them as a People without any *ſenſe of* God *or Religion, or any Virtues belonging to Human Nature.* But the contrary appears from the firſt, the moſt impartial and the lateſt Accounts we have of them, from ſuch as have been converſant among them, upon the account of Religion.

In the firſt Account we have of the Diſcoveries of the *Weſt-Indies*, we find that when *Columbus* came to the Iſlands of *Hiſpaniola* and *Cuba*, he ſoon found *that they worſhip'd the Sun and Moon, and the Heavens, but could not then diſcover what other Deities they worſhip'd:* which *Peter Martyr Anglerius* underſtands both of *the Natives* and of the *Caribbians*, who were *Savages*, and very troubleſom to them. And he tells a remarkable Story of one of the Natives coming to *Columbus* at *Cuba*, being a Man of 80 years of age, and deſir'd to diſcourſe with him by an Interpreter. The ſubſtance of it was, That he underſtood *that he with his Ship had given a great diſturbance to the Natives, and bad him to conſider, that after death there were two Paſſages for Souls; the one dark and dreadful for thoſe who were troubleſom to Mankind, the other pleaſant and delightful for thoſe who promote the peace and welfare of People; and if he conſider'd that every Man was to receive according to his Actions after death, he would give over being ſo uneaſy to them.* *Columbus* took the Advice very well, and pretended that they only came to aſſiſt them againſt the *Savages* and *Cannibals, and would hurt none of them*; which the old Man was ſo pleas'd with, that as old as he was, he ſaid he was ready to go with him in ſo good a deſign. Was there any thing that ſavor'd of *Barbariſm* or *Irreligion* in this Diſcourſe, or what would not become a good *Chriſtian* to ſay? Beſides, the ſame Author commends their way of living far beyond what the *Spaniards* brought among them (as appear'd by *Columbus* his own ſuffering for checking their Enormities.) *They enjoy'd the Profits of the Earth in common, without any diviſion or property, having enough for every Family; and none ſuffer'd but ſuch as injur'd others; and without Laws and Judges they did what was right.* This was a great Character from one who was particularly intruſted in the Affairs and Council of the *Indies*, and had all the Accounts ſent to him, out of which he fram'd his *Decades*. *They thought*, as he ſaith, *that Contentment lay in a little compaſs; and they had more than they knew what to do with.* To the ſame purpoſe *Lerius* gives an account of a Conference he had with a *Braſilian* old Man about Trade. *I pray*, ſaid he, *why do your Countrymen take ſo much pains to come hither for our Wood? Have they not enough for Fuel? Yes*, ſaid *Lerius, but your* Braſil-*wood is of great advantage to them in Trade, by which they grow very rich. Very well*, ſaith he, *and when they are ſo rich, do they not die as other Men do? And whither then go all theſe Riches? To their Children or Relations.* Then ſaid the poor *Braſilian, Your Countrymen are a company of great Fools* (inſigniter Fatui.) *For why ſhould they undergo ſo much toil and danger by Sea and Land, to get that which they muſt part with when they die; and for the ſake of thoſe Children, who might live as contentedly without thoſe Riches? Do not you think that we love our Children as well as you? But we are contented that the ſame Earth which nouriſh'd us, will do as much for them? Theſe barbarous* Braſilians, ſaith *Lerius, will riſe up in judgment againſt too many Chriſtians.* To the ſame purpoſe, he ſaith, one of the Natives of *Peru* diſcours'd the *Spaniards*, who took ſo much pains to get their Gold; and ſaid, *they were the Froth of the Sea, reſtleſs and uneaſy, who might with far leſs trouble get a ſubſiſtence at home.* Theſe things I mention to ſhew, that theſe People were far enough from wanting Senſe and Capacity when

Columbi Navigat. c. 5.

Pet. Mart. Dec. I. c. 1.

Ler. Hiſt. Navig. in Braſil. c. 53.

the

the *Spaniards* came among them; and ſeem'd to have a much truer notion of the Happineſs of Human Life than they had.

But to ſhew how far they were from being *without Religion* at that time, we have an Account by *Benzo* (who liv'd a great while in the *Weſt-Indies*, upon their firſt Diſcovery) of an *Oracle* among them, which foretold the *Spaniards* a conſiderable time before. For the *Cachiqui* and *Bohitii*, (*i. e.* their *Great Men and Prieſts*) told *Columbus*, *That in the time of the Father of their preſent King, he and another King had a great mind to underſtand what would happen after their time, and to that end reſolv'd to apply themſelves to their Zemes* (the Gods they worſhip'd) *in an extraordinary manner, by faſting five days together in a moſt ſad and mournful condition.* And then they receiv'd that *Oracle*, upon which they made a *moſt doleful Song*, which they repeated at certain times; but now they found things happen'd to them juſt as they were foretold. The ſame *Benzo* informs us, that after *Columbus* diſcover'd the Continent, the Iſlands were ſoon left by the *Spaniards* in hopes of greater gains; and finding they could not manage the Nations as they deſired, they ſent Perſons on purpoſe to make the worſt repreſentation poſſible of them, that they might have *an Edict* to condemn them to *perpetual Slavery*: And therein they charge them with all manner of vices; but as to Religion, they only accuſe them of *Idolatry*. But, if they had found any ſuch thing as *Atheiſm* and *Irreligion* among them, they would have been ſure not to have conceal'd that.

Benzo *Hiſt. Novi Orbis l.* 1. *c.* 8.

Cap. 17.

Joh. de Laet, in his Deſcription of the Iſle of *Cuba*, ſaith, *That the Inhabitants there had no Temple, no Sacrifices, no Religion.* Which I could not but wonder at, the account being ſo different from that of the firſt Diſcoverers, who muſt certainly know beſt what Religion they had among them: but in probability he followed the later *Spaniards*, who give the worſt accounts of them, to juſtify the moſt inhuman Cruelties which were us'd againſt them. For *Benzo* ſaith, *That of two millions of Natives in* Hiſpaniola, *there were left not above* 150 *in his time*; and the like Deſolation was made in *Cuba*, *Jamaica*, *Port-Rico*, and other places; and *de Laet* confeſſes *that they were all long ſince deſtroy'd.* But if we take the Account given of theſe People upon the firſt Diſcovery, we ſhall find it was very different. For *Peter Martyr*, who was imployed by the King of *Spain*, as himſelf tells us, to take the beſt intelligence he could meet with from the *Indies*, ſaith, *That at firſt they could find no other Worſhip among them but that of the Sun, and Moon, and the Heavens; but upon further acquaintance with them, they found out a great deal more, which related to their Religion*; which he ſaid, *he receiv'd from one who was imploy'd by* Columbus *himſelf in inſtructing them. They had little Images, which they call'd* Zemes, which they ſuppos'd to be inhabited by Spirits, which gave Anſwers to them; but which is conſiderable, he ſaith, *That they look'd on them only as a kind of Meſſengers between them and the Only, Eternal, Omnipotent, Inviſible* God. This was extant long before *De Laet* wrote his pompous Deſcription of the *Weſt-Indies*: Was *Peter Martyr* unknown to him? So far from it, that he mentions and commends him for his diligence: How then comes he to differ ſo much from him in his Account of their Religion? And he there mentions the ſame *Oracle* which *Benzo* had done, and adds, *That the Natives underſtood it at firſt of the* Caribbians *or* Cannibals; *but at laſt found it too true of the* Spaniards. In another place he gives an account of *Hiſpaniola* from *Andreas Morales* his own Mouth, who was imploy'd by the Go-

Deſcript. Ind. Occid. *l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Benzo *l.* 1. *c.* 25.

Pet. Mart. *Dec.* 1. *c.* 9.

Dec. 1. *c.* 3. *c.* 9.

vernor to ſearch out what he could find concerning the Iſland and the Natives. *And he found that they came from another Iſland, and built a Houſe at the place of their landing, which they after conſecrated and enriched, and reverenced to the time of the* Spaniards *coming: and he makes it to have been in as much eſteem among them, as* Jeruſalem *to the* Chriſtians, Mecca *to the* Mahumetans, *and* Tyrena *in the Grand* Canaries; which he ſaith, *was in ſuch eſteem among the Natives, that Perſons would with ſinging leap off from that Holy Rock, in hopes their Souls ſhould be made happy by it.* But altho' this were a great Argument of *ſuperſtitious Folly* in them, yet it ſhews the falſeneſs of that Saying in the firſt Relation of *Columbus* his Voyage, *That there was no ſuch thing as Religion in the* Canaries: but thoſe who pretend to give a more exact Account, ſay, *That the Natives did believe one* GOD, *who puniſhed the Evil, and rewarded the Good.* Columbi *Navigat.* c. 2. *Conqueſt de Canaries, par. II.* p. 208.

The next we are to conſider, are the *Savages* which diſturbed the Natives, before the *Spaniards*; who were called the *Caribbians*, or the Inhabitants of the *Caribbe Iſlands*. Theſe were a wild ſort of People, and a great terror to their Neighbours, whom they were wont to eat in triumph, after they had taken them; which was not the general practice of the *Indians*, but only of the moſt *Brutiſh* and *Savage* People among them, as the *Caribbians* and thoſe of *Braſil*; but the other Natives both of the Iſlands and Continent abhorr'd it, as is found by the lateſt Diſcoveries. This appears by *Chriſt. de Acunna*, who was imploy'd *A. D.* 1659. to diſcover the People about the River of *Amazons*; and there he found a conſiderable People call'd *Aguæ* (the *Spaniards* call them *Omaguæ*) and they were repreſented to be *Eaters of the fleſh of their Enemies*; but he ſaith it was very falſe, and only a malicious calumny of the *Portugueſe*; and there he ſaith, *It was a particular Cuſtom of the* Caribbes, *and not us'd by other* Indians. And *Dampier* ſaith, *That in all his Adventures among the* Indians, *both Eaſt and Weſt, he never met with any ſuch People as eat Man's Fleſh, and that he knew ſome of the Cannibal ſtories to be falſe.* But on the other ſide, it cannot be deny'd that there had been ſuch a barbarous Practice, not only among the *Caribbians*, but the Savages of *Braſil* and elſewhere; as appears by the particular Accounts of ſuch as liv'd among them, and ſaw their manner of doing it; as in *Joh. Lerius*, *Pet. Carder*, *Ant. Knivet*; but eſpecially in *Claud. d'Abbeville* his Relation of *Maragnan*, who is moſt particular in it; and he ſaith, that it aroſe from the Hatred and Revenge they expreſs thereby to their greateſt Enemies; and he adds, that their Stomachs cannot bear or digeſt it; but notwithſtanding it had been continu'd among them, becauſe their Enemies did ſo by them; but they confeſs'd it to be cruel and barbarous, but having been long us'd, they could not lay it aſide, without a general conſent. Some ſay, that the *Tapuiæ* eat the Bodies of their Friends; but thoſe who have liv'd among them, ſay nothing about it: which they would not have omitted; and they are moſt to be rely'd upon. The *Caribbe Iſlands* were diſcover'd by *Columbus* in his ſecond Voyage: but the *Caribbians* would have no communication with them, *flying into their Woods.* *De Laet* ſaith only, *that they are a very brutiſh ſort of People, of no ſhame or fidelity.* Not a word of their *Religion*; and it was not to be expected among them, who had very little regard to any thing but the ſatisfying their brutiſh Paſſions of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*, which are the only things they were then remarkable for. Since that time, they have liv'd more quietly, being ſo much over-power'd by the Plantations upon the

Relation de la Riviere des Amazons, c. 52.

Dampier's *Voyage*, p. 485.

Ler. *Hiſt. Navig. in* Braſil, c. 15. Pilgrims, *part.* 4. p. 1188. 1217. *Hiſt. de la Miſſion en l'Iſle de* Maragnan, ch. 49. Barlæ. *Hiſt.* Braſil. Piſo *Hiſt.* Braſil.

L. 1. c. 17.

Caribbe

Caribbe Iſlands; by which means they have been brought to ſome kind of Humanity and Converſation. And there have been two underſtanding Perſons converſant among them, who have given the beſt Account we have of them; and thoſe are *Monſ. Rochefort* and *F. Du Tertre*; who both agree, that they have ſome knowledge of One Supreme GOD in Heaven, who is of infinite Goodneſs, and hurts no body; but as *Du Tertre*, who liv'd longer among them, ſaith, they account the ſervice of him a needleſs thing, being ſo far above them; but they are mightily afraid of the *Mabogas* or evil Spirits, which they think deſign to do them miſchief: and to appeaſe them they have their *Boyez*, who are a kind of Sorcerers among them. They both agree, that they believe the immortality of the Soul; and that the principal Soul, which is that in the Heart, goes to Heaven. And *Rochefort* from hence concludes the truth of *Cicero*'s ſaying, *That the knowledge of Divinity is planted in the Hearts of Men.*

Rochefort *Hiſtoire de* Caribb. *l.* 4. *c.* 13.

Du Tertre *Hiſt. Nat. de* Antilles *par.* 7. §. 3.

But *De Laet* repreſents the Northern *Indians* to have been as much without Religion, as the Natives of *Cuba* and *Hiſpaniola*; and from no good grounds, altho' herein he did not rely upon the *Spaniſh* Reports. So he ſaith of the Natives of *New-found Land*, of *New-France*, of the *Souriquoſii*, and other People of *Canada*, and the parts thereabouts, and of *Virginia*, &c. But I ſhall make it appear, that he took up with very ſlight Informations in this matter; which are contradicted by thoſe who liv'd longer among them, and underſtood their Senſe and Language better. 'Tis true, which I ſuppoſe gave occaſion to the miſtake, that the Savages had no ſet and conſtant ways of Devotion; but at certain Seaſons of the year, or in time of War and Calamities they had; or however, to Perſons that diſcourſed with them, they did by no means deny a GOD, but thought it was no great matter whether they ſerv'd him or not in ſuch a manner; ſo that their chief fault lay in a groſs neglect of Religion, and not in any ſetled Principles of Irreligion. So the *Sieur de Champlain* ſaith, He diſcours'd with the Savages of *Canada*, and found they wanted no Capacity; and he aſked one of them, why they did not pray to GOD; he anſwer'd, that every one was left to pray as he thought fit in his own Mind. So, ſaith he, for want of a Law for Divine Worſhip, they liv'd like Brutes: and he imputes a great deal to their Savage way of living upon Hunting; whereas if the Land were cultivated, it might be much eaſier to reduce them to Civility and Religion. Mr. *Winſlow* one of the firſt Planters in *New-England*, had ſome diſcourſe with the *Indian Savages* about Religion, and GOD's being the Author of all our Bleſſings, which they agreed to, and ſaid, *That they own'd* GOD, *and call'd him* Kirtitan: upon which I obſerve, that he ingenuouſly retracts the Accounts he had given before of the Natives; *viz. That they had no Religion or Knowledge of* GOD; for, ſaith he, *we find that they do own one ſupreme Being, who was creator of Heaven and Earth; but they likewiſe own'd many Divine Powers under him.* Therefore *Acoſta*, ſpeaking of the *Indian Savages*, ſaith, *It is no hard matter to perſuade them of a ſupreme* GOD, *be they never ſo barbarous and brutiſh.*

L. 3. *c.* 18.

Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain, *l.* 3. *ch.* 5.

Purchas *To.* 4. *l.* 10. *ch.* 5.

Acoſta *Hiſt. of the* Indies, *l.* 5. *c.* 2.

But I muſt do that right to *Joh. de Laet*, as to ſhew that after he had receiv'd better Information, he did ſpeak more favourably of the *Religion* of the *Indians:* For in his Book againſt *Grotius*, ten years after the other, he hath an *Obſervation* on purpoſe to clear this matter. Father *Sagard* had publiſh'd an Account of his Voyage to the *Hurons*, a People of *New-France*, or *Canada*, near the Lake call'd *Mare dulce*, where he

Jo. de Laet *de Origin. Gent. American. p.* 187.

Le Grand *Voyage du Pays de* Hurons, *c.* 18.

learnt their Language, and so was better able to judg of their Opinions; and he saith, Their general Sense was, that there was one Creator, who made the World; and that in their Language he was call'd *Ataouacan.* Which is since confirm'd by the Account of the *French Missions* into those parts; especially of *Paulus Juvenæus*, who spent a Winter among them, to converse with them in their own Language. And when he preach'd to them about God, they all asked him, what he meant by it; he told them he meant such a Being who had infinite Power, and made Heaven and Earth: upon which they looked upon one another, and cried out *Ataouacan. Sagard* saith, *They believe the Immortality of the Soul*; and the latter Accounts say, *That he was told that the* Souriquosii *did truly believe one* God *that created all things.* Which is very different from *de Laet*'s former Account of them. But *de Laet* goes on, that he understood by *Davis* and *Baffin*, that *the Natives of those parts where they had been, i. e.* (about *Fretum Davis* and *Groen-land*) were *Idolaters, and worship'd the Sun. Davis* in the Account of his Voyage saith, *That they were a very tractable People, void of craft or double dealings, and easy to be brought to any Civility or good Order; but they judg'd them to be Idolaters and to worship the Sun.* This is quite another thing from being mere *Savages, and having no Religion among them.* Farther he owns *Hariot*'s Account of the People of *Virginia, that they believ'd many Gods of different degrees, but one supreme* God *who was from eternity.* But he had publish'd to the World in his *Description, that their only Religion was to worship every thing they were afraid of, as Fire, Water, Thunder, Guns, Horses,* &c. *and the Devil, whom they called* Okie. *Hariot*, who conversed among them, saith no such thing; but he saith expressly, *That they own'd that* God *made the World, and that Souls are immortal; and that they shall receive in another World according to their actions in this.* What a different Account is this concerning the same People? And if *Lederer* may be believ'd, who went among the *Indian Natives*, not far from *Virginia*, he saith, Okæe *was the name of the Creatour of all things among them; to him the high Priest alone offers sacrifice; but their ordinary Devotion is perform'd to lesser Deities, to whom they suppose sublunary affairs are committed. Denton*, who liv'd among the *Indian Savages* about *New-York*, saith, *That their solemn worship was not above once or twice a year; unless upon extraordinary occasions, as making War,* &c.

Hist. Canada, *l.* 1. *p.* 78.

P. 87.

Hackluit. *To.* 3. *p.* 100.

Hariot *of* Virginia, 25, 26.

Lederer's *Discovery, p.* 4.

Denton *of* New York *p.* 8.

I shall not need to pursue this matter any farther; since he owns the Religion that was practis'd not only in *Peru* and *Mexico*, but in other parts of the *West-Indies.* Only as to *Chili* he saith, *that we have no certainty, but only that they have solemn Oaths by one they call* Enonamon. But *Marcgravius* in the account he gives of *Chili*, saith at first, *That they know not* God, *nor his worship,* &c. but this must be understood of a clear and distinct knowledge of him; for he saith afterwards, *That they have some knowledge of a supreme Being, by whom all earthly things and human affairs are governed; whom they call* Pillan.

G. Marcgravius *de Regione* Chili. *c.* 3.

The only difficulty then remaining as to the *West-Indies*, is as to the People of *Paraquaria* and *Brasil.* For it is affirm'd, *That there are whole Nations there who know nothing of* God, *or Religion.* Which must be more strictly inquir'd into.

As to *Paraquaria*, it is said, that *Nicholas del Techo in his Letters from thence, saith that the Caiguæ*, (a People of that Country) *had no name for* God, *or the Soul of Man; and no publick worship, nor Idols.* But

Hiſt. Prov. Paraquar. *Auth.* Nicolao del Techo, *Leodii* 1673. the ſame *Nicholas del Techo* hath publiſh'd a full Relation of all the Proceedings in *Paraquaria* and thereabouts, on the account of Religion, and therein he hath acquainted the World with the ſeveral Nations that inhabit thoſe parts between *Braſil* and *Peru*, &c. which were ſcarce heard of before. The *Diaigritæ*, (who rather belong to *Tucumania*, between *Paraquaria* and *Chili*) he ſaith, *were worſhipers of the Sun, after a particular manner; and they believ'd the immortality of Souls, and that the Souls of their great Men went into the greater Stars, and of ordinary People into the leſſer.* The *Guaicuræi worſhipped the Moon and* Bootes. The *Guarani* were *a very ſuperſtitious People, but they could not tell what* God *they worſhiped; but they were mightily addicted to Sorcery.* The *Calchaquini worſhiped the Sun, and Thunder, and Lightning.* In the Plains between *Rio del Plata* and *Tucumania*, he ſaith, *are a very large People, who have little regard to Religion; but they believe that after death, their Souls return to their Creator.* In *Chili*, he ſaith, *when one* God *the Creator was preach'd to them, one of their* Caſiques *(or great Men) ſtood up and ſaid, that they would not bear that the power of creating ſhould belong to any but their God* Pillan; *and that he plac'd the Souls of their great Men after death about the Sun.* After all theſe he mentions the *Caaiguæ, as the ſmalleſt and moſt inconſiderable and brutiſh People among them:* They were a moſt ſavage ſort of Creatures, that could hardly ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood; he ſaith, *They were much more like to Apes than Men, and liv'd upon Mice, and Ants, and Vipers*, &c. *utrique ſexui*, ſaith he, *tenuiſſimus rationis uſus eſt:* they are harder to be tamed than wild Beaſts; and if they are put in chains, they ſtarve themſelves. And this is all the account he there gives of them, and ſaith not a word of their Religion; and it were very unreaſonable to expect any from them. It is not improbable that others could not find a word for God or the Soul among them; for they were not able to ſpeak ſenſe, at leaſt ſo as to be underſtood by Strangers.

L. 2. *c.* 18. *L.* 4. *c.* 16. *L.* 5. *c.* 7. *Chap.* 23. *L.* 3. *c.* 12. *L.* 2. *c.* 26. *L.* 9. *c.* 24.

Come we now to the People of *Braſil, who are ſaid to be without any notion of* God. But thoſe who have been beſt acquainted among them aſſure us, that they believe the immortality of Souls, and rewards and puniſhments after death. And from hence *Lerius* himſelf argues againſt the Atheiſtical Perſons of his time; and that altho' they will not in words own God, yet he ſaith, they ſhew the inward conviction they have of him; eſpecially when it thunders; which *de Laet* confeſſes they call *Tupâ cunanga*, a noiſe made by the Supreme Excellence: for *Tupâ* he ſaith ſignifies ſo much in their Language. And he adds, *That they are very apprehenſive of evil Spirits; that they do own a God of the Mountains, and of the Highways; and altho' they differ in their idolatry and ſuperſtition, yet* he confeſſes *it generally prevails among them, and the other innumerable People who live on both ſides the vaſt River* de la Plata. *Marcgravius*, a Learned Man, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and underſtood their Language ſo far as to write a Grammar of it, ſaith expreſly, *That they call* God *Tupa* and *Tupana*; and in the ſhort Dictionary of *Emmanuel Moraes*, *Tupana* is rendred *Deus*. But the great Argument to *Lerius* was, *that they had no public exerciſe of Religion*; which was the common caſe of the *Savages* in all parts, who liv'd under no Laws; not that they believ'd no God, but they would not be at the trouble to ſerve him. *Ludolphus* ſaith of the *Gallani*, a ſavage People who had almoſt overrun *Abyſſinia*, that they had no publick worſhip, but if any aſked them about a Supreme God, they would anſwer, *Heaven.* So *Dellon* ſaith of

Hiſt. Navi. in Braſil, *c.* 16. *p.* 223, 224.

Laet. *de Orig. Gen.* Americ. *p.* 193.

Marcgrav. *de* Braſil. *Reg. c.* 9.

Ludolph. *Hiſt. Æthiopiæ, l.* 1.

the Inhabitants of *Madagascar*, *that they did not question a Supreme Being that governs all*; *but with a strange obstinacy denied that there was any necessity of praying to him.* *Francis Cauche*, who sojourned a long time among them, saith, *he could observe no publick exercise of Religion among them*; *but they did not deny a* GOD *to be the Creator of all, and asserted the Immortality of the Soul*; *but Good and Bad went to Heaven.* *Flacurt* liv'd five Years among them, and he agrees in the same, as to *no publick exercise of Religion*; but he saith, *They believe One* GOD, *of whom they speak with honor and respect.* *P. Gillet* in the Account of his Voyage to *Goyane* 1674, saith, That the *Nouragues*, and *Acoquas*, and *Galibis*, *all agree in owning One* GOD *in Heaven, but they give no Worship to him.*

Dellon *Relation d'un Voyage*, *To.* 1. *c.* 8.

Relation du Voyage de F. Cauche, *p.* 119.

Histoire de l'Isle de Madagascar, *ch.* 17.

Journal du Voyage dans la Goyane, *p.* 81.

Joh. dos Santos saith of some of the *Caffres* (with whom he convers'd) *That they are the most brutish and barbarous People in the World*; *but they hold the Immortality of the Soul, and have a confus'd knowledg that there is a Great* GOD *from a Natural Instinct*; *but they pray not to him.* But for those *Caffres* at the *Cape of good Hope*, they may vye with any for *Brutishness*; but by the last Accounts given of them, by those who liv'd among them, and publish'd by *F. Tachard*, we find *that they do worship one* GOD, *altho' they have a confus'd knowledg of him*; *but they seem to have little regard to another Life, but sacrifice for Rain and good Seasons.* By which it appears that the Account given of them in *Thevenot*'s Collections is not true, viz. *That they have no knowledg of* GOD, altho' it were not much to be wonder'd at, since the same Author saith, *they are the most barbarous People in the World.* But that was a hasty Observation by Strangers, who could not understand one word they spake: For Sir *James Lancaster* said, *That in seven weeks time, the sharpest Wit among them could not learn one word of their Language*; *their Speech being uttered only in the Throat*, like the *Caaiguæ* in *Paraquaria.*

Hist. de l'Ethiopie Orientale, *ch.* 7.

Purchas *To.* II. *p.* 1639.

Voyage de Siam, *l.* 2. *p.* 84.

Thevenot, *Roé*, *p.* 2.

Purchas, *To.* I. *l.* 3. *ch.* 3. §. 1.

And so **Pliny* mentions a People of *Africa*, who *made a noise without any articulate Pronunciation*; who were surely the Ancestors of those *Hotentots*, concerning whom it is hard to affirm any thing, unless they have learnt lately to express themselves better: As it seems they have done by Monsr. *de la Loubere*'s Account of them; for he saith, *That they have some kind of Worship at new and full Moons*; *and he thinks they own a good* GOD, *to whom they need not to pray*; *but that there is a bad one, to whom they pray not to hurt them.* And in the Journal of Monsr. *de Chaumont*, we read, *That they have no great regard to Religion*; *but when they want Rain, they pray to a certain Being whom they know not, but that lives above*; *and offer Milk, the best thing they have*; *and that the* Dutch *Secretary had seen them at this Sacrifice with Eyes lifted up to Heaven, and in a profound silence.*

* Stridorque non vox; adeo sermonis commercio carent. *Plin. N. H. l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Du Royaume de Siam, *To.* 2. *p.* 112.

Journal du Voyage de Siam, *p.* 78.

Thus I have gone thro' all the Nations I have met with, who have been said to be *without any Notion of* GOD *or Religion*; there remains only one Objection to be taken off, which relates to a Sect in the *East-Indies*, which is said to be *Atheistical* in their *Principles*, having an *External Doctrine* for the People, and an *Internal*, which they keep from them.

To give the best Account I can of this matter; all the late Writers of *China* do agree, that besides the original Doctrine of the Country, there was brought in long since, (they generally say 65 *Years after* Christ) a new *Sect* from *Indosthan*, which they call *Xekiao*. The Author is supposed to be one *Xekia*, or *Xaca* (as the *Japonese* call him) who liv'd long before. *Matt. Riccius*, (or *Trigautius*) saith, *This Sect was at first receiv'd with great applause, because it set forth the Immortality of the*

Trigaut. *l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life; but not eternal, becauſe it introduc'd the Doctrine of *Tranſmigration of Souls*. In order to the Happineſs after Death, it requir'd *Particular Devotions to Idols*, which by that means ſpread over all *China* and *Japan*, as well as other parts of the *Indies*, and *Abſtinence from Fleſh*, as well as *from Murder, Stealing*, &c. and Auſterities, Celibate, Retirement from the World, and great Liberalities to the *Tapoins* and *Bonzes*. Wherein *Bertoli, Marini*, and the reſt agree. But there was a Secret under all this, viz. *That this was but an external Doctrine for the People, but the internal Doctrine was another thing, that the ſupreme Felicity lay in Eternal Nothing*; or as they rather called it, *an Eternal Quiet, and that Souls are to paſs from Body to Body*, ſaith *Martinius*, *till they are fit for it*. *F. Couplet*, who hath given the fulleſt Account of this matter, ſaith, *That when* Xaca *came to die, he ſent for ſome of his choiceſt Diſciples, and told them, that the Doctrine he had hitherto declared to them was only a ſhew, and not the truth; and that all things came out of nothing, and would end in nothing*, as the late Author *Le Compte* expreſſes it; *and that is the Abyſs where all our hopes muſt end*. But *Couplet* ſaith, *That his Diſciples take great care, that this come not among the People; and only thoſe*, he ſaith, *even among the* Bonzes *and others are admitted to it, who are thought capable of ſuch a Secret. The Eternal Doctrine they look on*, as he ſaith, *as the wooden Account which is raiſed to ſupport the other; but they are by all means for keeping that up among the People*. But it is not clear what they underſtand by *Returning to Nothing*; for Monſ. *De la Loubere* ſaith, *They do not underſtand proper Annihilation by it, but in a myſtical ſenſe*; and two things are imply'd by it, 1. *That ſuch Souls as arrive to it, are paſt all Fears of returning to the Body*. 2. *That they live in perfect eaſe and quiet, without any kind of action*. And ſo *Couplet* explains it, *by Acting, Underſtanding, and deſiring nothing*; ſo that this is the higheſt degree of *Quietiſm*: And ſo Monſ. *Gervaiſe*, who was among thoſe of *Siam*, and endeavour'd to underſtand their Doctrine, ſaith, *That Annihilation is to be myſtically underſtood, and not in a phyſical ſenſe*. As appears by what *Couplet* ſaith, *That one of* Xaca's *poſterity ſpent nine years with his Face to the Wall, thinking of nothing, and ſo became perfect*. But from hence he ſadly laments the ſpreading of *Atheiſm* among the *Chineſe*, who were willing to underſtand it in the groſſeſt ſenſe.

Martin. *Atlas*, p. 7.

Couplet. *Proœm. Declar. ad* Confuc. *paragr.* 4.

Le Compte *Memoires Part. II. Let.* 2.

Loubere *du Royaume de* Siam, *To. I. c.* 22.

Hiſt. Nat. & Polit. du Siam, *Part.* 3. *c. p.* 162.

And ſuppoſe it be ſo taken, what imaginable ground can it be for Men of ſenſe, (as the *Chineſe* would be thought above others) to take this for granted, becauſe ſuch an Impoſtor ſaid it; concerning whom ſo many incredible things are ſaid by them, that ſome have queſtion'd whether there ever was ſuch a Perſon or not: and *Loubere* ſeems to think this Story *a Fiction of the* Chineſe; for he can find nothing of him among the *Talapoins* of *Siam*, with whoſe Traditions he was very converſant. But what reaſon or demonſtration did he offer? What ground could they have to believe one who had been an Impoſtor all his days ſhould ſpeak truth at laſt?

But all this ſignifies nothing to the conſent of Mankind: *For this was to be kept up as a Secret*, and only to be communicated to ſuch as were thought capable of it. If they thought this to be the truth, why was it not to be diſcover'd? Was it becauſe the People were ſtill to be kept up in the common perſuaſion about Religion? And was this for the ſake of the *Bonzes*, of whom the wiſe People of *China* had a very mean opinion, as they all agree? Therefore it could not be for their

ſakes. *But the People might grow more unruly, if this were known.* If the *Bonzes* were ſo bad as they make them, they might rather think the People would be better without them; and the beſt ſervice they could do, was to lay open the fraud and impoſture of theſe Men, as thoſe who preach'd *Chriſtianity* in *China* and *Japan* after they underſtood their Languages, did very freely. And yet they did aſſert GOD *and Providence*, and the *Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life*, againſt all the Doctrines of *Xaca*, both as to the *External* and *Internal part*. *Matth. Riccius* having attain'd to good ſkill in the Language of *China*, publiſh'd an account of the *Chriſtian Doctrine* at *Pekim*, *A.D.* 1603. wherein he aſſerted the Being of GOD, not only from Natural Reaſon, but from their own *moſt antient Books*, of which *Couplet* gives a large account, and how the Interpreters of latter times had perverted the Senſe of them. We have in *Kircher* a *Summary of the* Chriſtian *Faith*, as it was publiſh'd in *China*; and therein we find on what grounds they aſſerted the Being of GOD, againſt the *Atheiſtical ſenſe* of *Xaca*'s Doctrine, *That all things came out of nothing*: For, *if nothing were firſt, how came things into Being? therefore to bring them into Being, there muſt be a Creator before them; and this Creator is he whom we call* GOD. This was plain and true Reaſoning, and impoſſible to be anſwer'd by the ſubtileſt of thoſe *Atheiſtical* Wits of *China*. For nothing can produce *Nothing*. So that if *Xaca*'s interior Doctrine were true, *That all things came out of Nothing*, it muſt neceſſary follow, that there muſt be *Nothing* before *any thing*; and what poſſible imagination can any Man of ſenſe have, how any thing ſhould by it ſelf come out of Nothing? There is no repugnancy at all in conceiving that an Infinite Power ſhould give a Being to that which had it not before; for altho' the difference between *not being and being* be ſo great, yet where we ſuppoſe a Power Infinite in the Cauſe, that may command the terms of that diſtance, by giving a Being to that which had it not before. To ſay that *Nothing can be produced out of nothing*, implies that nothing can of it ſelf reſult out of nothing, where there is no ſuperior Cauſe; but to ſay that by no Cauſe whatſoever any thing can be put into Being which had it not before, is to take away all poſſibility of an Infinite Power, without any reaſon, when the very Being of things is an impregnable reaſon for it. For ſince we are certain things are, we muſt be certain that they came into Being; and that muſt be either out of nothing by themſelves, which is impoſſible; or it muſt be from ſuch a Power which can give Being where it was not, which muſt be infinite.

Couplet. *Declar. Procem.* Kircher. China *illuſtrata*, *Par.* 2. c. 10.

Thus far I have conſidered the General Prejudices againſt Religion, and the *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age, and have ſhew'd how very little they ſignify to any Perſons that will take the pains to examin them.

Discourse II.

The Modern Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *examin'd, and the Unreaſonableneſs of them ſhew'd.*

I Now come to conſider the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* of this Age, which I ſhall rank under theſe two Heads:

1. Such as have a *Tendency* towards *Atheiſm.*
2. Such as are *plainly Atheiſtical.*

As to the former, I ſhall inſiſt upon theſe two:

(1.) Such as weaken the known and generally receiv'd Proofs of God and Providence.

(2.) Such as attribute too much to the *Mechanical Powers* of *Matter* and *Motion.*

I begin with thoſe who have gone about to weaken the known and generally received Arguments for God and Providence; which I have at large ſhew'd, were thoſe taken from the manifeſt effects of Wiſdom and Deſign in the parts of Animals, and in the frame of the World. I am far from intending to lay the *charge* of *Atheiſm* on any who have weakned ſome Arguments to prove a God, when they have induſtriouſly ſet themſelves to do it from any other, altho' not ſo firm, nor ſo generally receiv'd. For I conſider the fondneſs Men have for their own Inventions, and how apt therefore they are to ſlight other Arguments in compariſon with them. And this I take to have been the caſe of a Modern Philoſopher of great and deſerved Reputation: For he deſigning to do ſomething beyond other Men, thought he did nothing unleſs he produced Arguments which he thought had not been purſued by others. To this end he ſet aſide the Argument from *Final Cauſes*, for two Reaſons. 1. *Becauſe in Phyſical Inquiries we ought to make uſe of none but the ſtrongeſt Reaſons.* 2. *Becauſe all* God's *ends are unſearchable by us, being kept cloſe in the Abyſs of his infinite Wiſdom.* But when he was ſmartly urged by his learned Adverſary, That altho' upon another occaſion he might ſet aſide Final Cauſes, yet he ought not when the Honor of God, as the Maker of the Soul, is concerned; for by theſe means the Argument from the light of Nature, as to the Wiſdom, Providence, Power, and Exiſtence of God would be caſt off; which he looks on as the chief Argument (which is taken from the parts of the viſible World, the Heavens, Earth, Plants, Animals, and eſpecially Mankind;) He had no other anſwer to make, but *that what was brought for a Final Cauſe, ought to be referred to the Efficient*; i. e. *that from thoſe things we ought to know and honor* God, *as the Maker, but not to gueſs for what end he made them.* Which is a ſtrange anſwer to be made by one of ſo much ſagacity. For, as *Gaſſendus* well urges, how can we honor God for the excellent uſe of theſe things, and not know for what end they were made? Wherein lies the difference between *the Uſe* and *the End* in this caſe? For he that adores God for the Uſe, muſt do it for the End he deſigned thoſe things for.

Des Cartes *Medit.* 4. *Princip. Phil. Part.* 1. *p.* 22.

Reſp. ad 5. *Object.*

But, ſaith *Des Cartes*, *In Moral Conſiderations, wherein it is a pious thing to make uſe of Conjectures, we may conſider* GOD's *End; but not in Phyſical Speculations, wherein we muſt only make uſe of the ſtrongeſt Reaſons.*

To which *Gaſſendus* very well anſwers, That if he takes away the Final Cauſe, he weakens the Argument for the Efficient: for that leads us to him. And it is not the bare ſight of the viſible World which makes us own GOD to be the Maker of it; becauſe it is poſſible for Men to think that theſe things were ſo from Eternity, or came by Chance: but when we obſerve the Wiſdom of GOD in the deſign and contrivance, then we come upon good grounds to own the Efficient Cauſe, and to adore him for the Workmanſhip of his hands. As, ſaith he, if a Man ſees a Paſſage for Water, between Stones on each ſide with an Arch over, that doth not preſently convince him that it is a *Bridge*; becauſe pieces of Rocks might happen ſo, as to afford ſuch a Paſſage: but when he comes to conſider the Order in which they are framed and hold together, and the conveniency of Mankind for paſſing over, he cannot then but acknowledg there was a ſkilful Artificer who managed it, and that it could not be done by Chance.

To the other Argument, *That* GOD's *ends are unſearchable*, he anſwers, That it is not to be denied that GOD may have ends above our reach; but on the other ſide, there are ends which lie open to our view; as ſaith he, particularly in the Body of Man, as the frame of the Mouth for reſpiration and nouriſhment, and all other Paſſages ſo exactly fitted for thoſe ends; and ſo the Bones, Muſcles, Nerves, and other parts of the Body: but there are three eſpecially which ſtrike him with admiration. 1. The Umbilical Veſſels, the fitneſs of them for diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the *Embryo*, and the alteration after the Child is born. 2. The Valves of the Heart, and the ſeveral Veſſels for receiving and diſtributing the Blood. 3. The Perforation of the Tendons which ſerve to draw the Fingers into the Hollow of the Hand. Theſe were cloſe and preſſing Inſtances, of which *Gaſſendus* profeſſeth, *that neither himſelf nor any of his acquaintance, who had made it their buſineſs to ſearch into the Cauſes of things, were able to give any other Account of them, but from the Wiſdom and Power of* GOD. And he challenges *Des Cartes* to ſhew him, *what Mechanical Cauſe could produce ſuch Valves about the Heart; out of what matter, and in what manner they were made; how they came to have ſuch a Temper, Conſiſtence, Flexibility, Bigneſs, Figure, Situation*, &c. But I do not find that he ever undertook to give any anſwer to it; but by a Letter to *Merſennus*, it ſeems he was of opinion, *that he could give an account of the formation of the ſeveral parts of Animals in a Mechanical way, ſuppoſing* GOD *to have eſtabliſhed thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm, which he ſuppoſes in the ſame manner as he had explained the grains of Salt, and figures of Snow in his Meteors.* But however he might pleaſe himſelf in his Opinion, he hath given the World no manner of ſatisfaction about it; inſomuch that his poſthumous piece to that purpoſe is charged with great and fundamental Miſtakes. However his Diſciples run on upon the ſame ground, that *Final Cauſes are to be conſidered only in Morals*; and they muſt overthrow the Argument to prove a Deity, from the Wiſdom and Contrivance in the works of Creation, which, according to them are only occaſion of our Meditation and Praiſe. But how can Men of ſenſe ſatisfy themſelves with this Anſwer? For can we give thanks to GOD for the uſe of our Senſes, without knowing that GOD gave

Epiſt. Part. 2. ep. 98.

Regis Metaphyſ. l. 2. Part. 1. Nittich. in Meditat. Metaph. 4. p. 97.

gave us Eyes to ſee with, with ſuch admirable contrivance for that purpoſe? and ſo for all the variety of Organs for our Hearing, unleſs we are ſatisfied that GOD did really give them for thoſe ends? Otherwiſe all that we have to do, is to thank GOD for putting Matter into Motion, and for eſtabliſhing thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm from whence theſe Organs reſulted. With what Devotion can we praiſe GOD for the Benefits we have from the Influences of Heaven and the Fruits of the Earth, if theſe things were not intended for our good; but it fell out by the Laws of Mechaniſm, that we have theſe advantages by them? So that all Natural Religion, according to this *Hypotheſis*, comes to no more than an acknowledgment of GOD to be the Efficient Cauſe of the World, altho' we have no reaſon from his Works to conclude him to be ſo. *Yes*, ſay they, *from them as the effects of a Firſt Cauſe, which put Matter into motion, we may; but not from the ends which* GOD *intended by them, which are above our capacity.* But this falls ſhort of *Ariſtotle*'s *Divinity*; for he aſſerted, that not only the firſt Motion was from GOD, but the Order of the Univerſe; and that GOD did deſign the mutual Benefits which one part of it hath from others: but according to theſe Laws of Mechaniſm, GOD only put the Matter into motion with ſuch Laws, and then every thing came into the order it is in, without any deſign of Providence. Which takes away all *Life* and *Spirit and Religion*, which depends upon GOD's managing the affairs of the World; and without that Men may own a *Firſt Mover*, and yet live as *without God in the World.* What reaſon can we imagin, why we ought to give GOD thanks for *fruitful Seaſons*, or to pray to him in time of Drought and Scarcity, if he hath left all theſe things to the natural courſe, which he hath eſtabliſhed in the World? But it is not denied by *Des Cartes*, *That* GOD *may reveal to us his own Ends, and then we are to believe them, and to ſerve him accordingly; but that without ſuch Revelation, we cannot find them out.* Now this I ſay is contrary to the general ſenſe of Mankind, where there hath been the moſt confuſed Notion of a GOD. For I have already obſerved, that even the *Caffres* of *Soldania* (or at the *Cape of Good Hope*) do pray ſolemnly to GOD in their diſtreſſes for want of Rain; and the *Savages* of the Northern parts of *America* do the ſame at ſome Seaſons of the Year above others; ſo that if the conſent of Mankind ſignify any thing as to the Being of GOD, it will do as much as to his Providential care of the World. And if ſuch a confuſed Idea did carry along with it the Notion of his Providence, much more the clear and diſtinct *Idea* of him. For *Des Cartes* proves the Being of GOD from the *Idea* of him in our Minds. Now what is there in that *Idea*, which doth not equally imply *Providence*, as well as his *Exiſtence?* For, why ſhould not a *Being abſolutely perfect* as well regard the *Well-being* as the *Being* of his Creatures? *By the name of* GOD in this *Idea*, he ſaith he underſtands *a certain Subſtance, infinite, independent, moſt intelligent and moſt powerful; by which himſelf and all other things were created.* But this is not all; for he acknowledges ſoon after, and in other places, *that becauſe there is no neceſſary connexion between the ſeveral moments of Exiſtence in a contingent Being, we moſt evidently know our dependence on this ſuperior Being for our conſervation*; which he therefore owns to be *a continued Creation.* From hence I infer, that *Des Cartes* his own Idea of GOD doth imply a particular Providence. For, if we depend upon him for every moment of our Subſiſtence, and Conſervation differ only by an act of our Mind from Creation, as he affirms; then there is as immediate

Medit. 3.

Princip. P. I. n. 21.

an act of Providence in our daily Subsistence, as in our first Being. But how is this consistent with leaving all to the Mechanical Laws of Motion? If it be said, *That this is only a general act of Providence in preserving things in that state he hath put them into*; I demand farther, Whether those very Laws of Motion be not the Effect of a wise Providence? And whether we cannot from them infer, that these Laws were directed for very good ends? I do not think this can be denied. And if it cannot, then I am sure it certainly follows, that we may know some ends which GOD hath; whereas *Des Cartes* said, *That all* GOD's *ends are unknown to us, being kept secret in the Abyss of his infinite Wisdom.* But the ends of appointing the Laws of Motion may be known; and if these, why not as well the particular ends of those works of his which we find so useful to Mankind? Especially when his Providence is imply'd in that very Idea from whence he infers his Existence.

I can by no means suspect that *Des Cartes* designed to take away the force of other Arguments for a Deity, that he might secretly undermine the belief of a GOD, by introducing his Argument from the Idea, which he knew would not hold; (as some have suggested) for I am satisfy'd, that he thought this Argument beyond any other: For, in a Letter to a Friend, he saith, *He had found out such an Argument as gave him full satisfaction; and by which he more certainly knew that there was a* GOD, *than the truth of any Geometrical Proposition; but he doubted, whether he could make others understand it so well as he himself did.* To the same purpose he speaks in a Letter to *Mersennus*. And in another Letter to *Mersennus*, he saith, *That he thought himself bound in conscience to publish his Arguments to prove the Existence of* GOD. Which being written to his intimate Friends, shew sufficiently his own apprehension of the strength of them. But what opinion soever he had of it himself, they have not met with such a reception among thinking Men, as a Geometrical Demonstration would have done; altho' he hath endeavor'd to put them into that form. For, after all, they cannot conceive how an objective reality of an Idea in the Mind, can prove the real existence of that object out of the Mind. He grants, That it doth not hold in other Ideas; but that there is some thing so peculiar to this Idea that the Mind could not frame it, if it had not a real Existence: now here lies the main difficulty, what that is in this Idea, distinct from all others, which so exceeds the capacity of human Understanding, that we could not have such an Idea, unless the object were in being.

Ren. Des Cartes, *Ep. Part.* 2. *Ep.* 103.

Ep. 104. *Epist. P. II. Ep.* 37.

Post Resp. ad duas Object. p. 85.

The force of his Argument, as himself hath put it in the Mathematical way, Prop. 2. lies here.

The objective reality in our Ideas must have some Cause in which it is either formally, or eminently: but we have such an Idea within us, which is not within us either of those ways; and therefore there must be some other Cause of it, which can be none but GOD; *and therefore he is.* Now here the difficulty returns, *viz.* to shew what necessary Connexion there is between the *Objective Reality* in the *Idea*, and the real Existence of the thing out of the *Idea*. For that he saith, by *Axiom* 5. *That this is the true Principle of Knowledg; for*, saith he, *we do not know that there is such a thing as the visible Heaven, barely because we see it; for that goes no farther than our sense: but our knowledge is an act of the Mind from the Idea, which arises from hence that the Objective Reality of the Idea in our Minds doth come from the thing it self as the true Cause; and the more of Objective Reality there is, by* Axiom 6. *in Substance than Accident, and*

in an Infinite Subſtance than a Finite, ſo much more doth it prove the Exiſtence of the thing repreſented by the Idea.

But the caſe ſtill ſeems different between an Idea raiſed in our Minds from an object of Senſe; and that which the Mind raiſes within it ſelf about an infinite Subſtance. For, altho' it be impoſſible for the Mind to make an Objective Reality, which is infinite, by its own power; yet it doth not appear, but that it may frame an Idea within it ſelf to which it ſets no bounds, and ſo is infinite to it. And here lies the main ground of the Miſtake: If our Idea were infinitely perfect as GOD himſelf is, no doubt it were wholly out of our power to make it; but then it would follow, that Idea with its Objective Reality muſt be GOD: if it be not GOD, it muſt be finite; and if it be finite, it is within the power of our Minds to frame it. For, altho' our conceptions of GOD be not *merely Negative*, yet whatſoever conceptions we have, they are not adequate; and if not, they are imperfect; and ſo come within the reach of our capacities.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 4. §. 3. When the Learned Monſ. *Huet* urged this Argument againſt *Des Cartes*, *That the Idea in us muſt be finite, becauſe it wants ſomething to make it perfect, being not adequate:* Monſ. *Regis*, who undertook to defend *Des Cartes*, anſwers, *That if the Idea be taken formally as it is in us, ſo it is finite; but if we take it with its objective Reality, ſo it is infinite, and above our power: And as to its not being adequate, he ſaith, it doth not follow that it is finite objectively, but only formally*; becauſe *it repreſents an infinite object, and it is ſufficient to make it infinite becauſe it repreſents as much as we can apprehend.* I grant, that if it reaches as far as our capacity will go, it may be ſaid to be infinite in regard of its object, altho' it be finite as to our manner of apprehending it; but ſtill the main difficulty returns, *viz.* how a finite Idea in us can prove the Exiſtence of an infinite Object. For the Queſtion is not barely about our manner of conception of an infinite Being, which muſt be according to our capacities; but whether ſuch a finite Idea, as we are capable of, can prove an infinite Being: for our Idea can repreſent to us an object to which we can ſet no bounds; but how doth it hence appear that it muſt be an infinite object really exiſting, and that ſuch an Idea muſt proceed from an infinite Cauſe? Altho' theſe things be not ſo clear as were to be wiſh'd, yet we muſt not diſſemble the force of this Argument ſo far as it goes, *viz.* That we cannot form an Idea of Nothing; and that we have no Ideas in our Minds, but what have a proper Cauſe for them; either from without us by *Senſe*, or from within by the acts of our own Minds. As if a Man hath an *Idea* of a rare piece of workmanſhip, either he hath ſeen it, or elſe hath been told it, or was able to invent it. But here can be no evidence from Senſe, and no Man can find within himſelf a power to frame ſuch an object as GOD; therefore either he muſt have it from others, or elſe GOD himſelf hath imprinted it in our Minds. Now if the *Idea* of GOD had been alike in all, *viz.* of a Being infinitely wiſe, powerful and good, there might have been great reaſon to have believ'd it to have been planted in our Minds; but the general Idea of GOD among Mankind was too dark and confus'd to form any Argument from it; and it related chiefly to his power, and ſome kind of goodneſs; but not ſo as to exclude any other Beings from being honored as Gods. So that the force of it cannot be taken from the conſent of Mankind in this Idea; but if it be only ſaid, *That this is a true and juſt Idea of him*; and that there are other Arguments to prove it from his Works; ſo far

Réponſe à la Cenſure de Monſ. Huet, p. 192.

P. 198.

it

it may and ought to be allow'd. But the *Metaphyſical Subtilty* of this Argument, as it was managed by *Des Cartes*, was ſo great, that not merely Perſons of common Capacities could not comprehend it; but he complains himſelf, *That the Mathematicians would not be convinced of the demonſtrative force of it.* Upon which he makes a ſharp Reflection, *That the Mathematicks did rather hinder than farther Men in Metaphyſical Speculations.* Des Cartes *Epiſt. To.* 2. *Ep.* 33.

But my buſineſs is not to lay open the weakneſs of theſe Arguments, but only to ſhew, that there is no cauſe to lay aſide thoſe which have been always uſed, and approved by the moſt ſincere and intelligent Perſons in all Ages. And this I ſhall make appear from his ſecond Argument in his *Meditations*, but the firſt in his *Principles*, where he briefly lays it down after this manner. That among the ſeveral Ideas of our Minds, we find one of a Being infinitely perfect in Wiſdom and Power, which hath not a contingent, but a neceſſary exiſtence; which being contained in the Idea, it follows that ſuch a Being actually exiſts. *Des Cartes* in his 5th Meditation confeſſes, That at firſt appearance this looks like a piece of *Sophiſtry*; but he ſaith, that upon conſideration, neceſſary Exiſtence doth as much belong to an infinite perfect Being, as three Angles do to a Triangle. But he objects againſt his own Argument, that our thoughts put no neceſſity upon things; as if I conceive a Mountain, I muſt likewiſe conceive a Valley, but it doth not follow that there is a Mountain exiſting: But, ſaith he, the difference is, that in this caſe there is no neceſſity of a Mountain's exiſting, but only that a Mountain and Valley cannot be ſeparated; but in the other, it is not our Thought makes neceſſary exiſtence to belong to GOD, but the nature of the thing makes that Thought neceſſary. For, ſaith he, I can frame no other Idea that hath neceſſary exiſtence beſides, nor can I make more than one GOD who hath it; which ſhews that it is no arbitrary or fictitious Idea. But *Gaſſendus* and others ſay, That all this *is a Paralogiſm*; becauſe it ſuppoſes that which it ſhould prove, *viz.* that GOD exiſts, which was the thing in queſtion; and withal they ſay, It is a piece of *Sophiſtry* to argue from the Idea in the Mind to the exiſtence of the thing out of the Mind. And this is the main thing which Monſ. *Huet* inſiſts upon; for he ſaith, *This Argument proves no more, than that a moſt perfect Being muſt neceſſarily exiſt in that way in which it doth exiſt; if it relates to the Idea, then it neceſſarily exiſts only in the Mind; if it relates to the thing, then it really exiſts out of the Mind; but the Argument doth not hold from one to the other.* To this Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, That thoſe things which are ſaid only to exiſt in the Mind, have their foundation out of the Mind; as a Syren, from the Ideas of a Fiſh and a Woman joyn'd together: and ſo other *Chimeras* are form'd from joyning things in the Mind, which nature hath not joyn'd; for a Man cannot have an Idea of nothing. But in the Idea of a perfect Being he cannot diſtinguiſh that which is in the Mind, and that which is out of the Mind. And that here is no taking that for granted which ought to be proved; but it is only arguing from the nature of the thing; and not firſt ſuppoſing it to be, and thence proving that it is. For it is as much of the nature of a perfect Being to have neceſſary exiſtence, as of the nature of a Triangle to have three Angles.

Princip. Part. I. n. 14.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 4. *n.* 8.

Réponſe à la Cenſ. ch. 4. *p.* 233, &c.

And thus the matter ſtands as to this Argument, ſo that whatſoever force there is in it, we plainly ſee that Perſons of great Sagacity and Judgment, ſuſpect that there is ſomething in it of the nature of a *Paralogiſm.*

logiſm. And therefore there can be no reaſon why we ſhould quit the former Arguments, which were plain and obvious to all capacities, for ſuch a *Metaphiſical Demonſtration*, which thoſe who are moſt verſed in *Demonſtrations* will not allow. Let the followers of *Des Cartes* magnify and defend this Argument as well as they can; but let them not deſpiſe and reject all others, which have had the approbation of all Ages, and the wiſeſt Perſons in them; and that upon ſuch frivolous pretences, *that we cannot comprehend all the ends of Divine Wiſdom.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 36.

But *Des Cartes* in an Epiſtle mentioned by Mr. *Boyle*, ſaith, *That it is a childiſh and abſurd thing to affirm in* Metaphyſicks, *that* God *like a proud Man, had no other end in building the World but to be praiſed by Men; or in making the Sun, which is ſo much bigger than the Earth, but only to give light to Mankind, who take up ſo ſmall a part of it.* Which is an Expreſſion not at all becoming the reverence due to the great Creator of the World, from any one that doth acknowledg him truly to be ſo. For the objection, if it be any, lies againſt his making the World at all: ſince it may as well be ſaid, to be *like a proud Prince, only to ſhew the greatneſs of his Power and Wiſdom.* But what is it which ſuch Men would have? Can they imagin the World ſhould be made without *any ends* at all? Is that becoming the wiſdom of the Maker? Or would they not have theſe ends to be known? To what purpoſe are great and noble ends deſign'd, if they are not to be underſtood? And by whom can they be underſtood, but by rational and intelligent Beings? It is a great preſumption in Mankind to pretend to know all the ends which the wiſe Creator had in the vaſt Fabric of the Univerſe; for ſome of the great parts of it are almoſt wholly unknown to us; I mean as to the fix'd Stars, every one of which of the firſt magnitude, is ſaid to be above a hundred times in bigneſs beyond the Globe of the Earth; and yet how ſmall do they appear to us? And in thoſe other Celeſtial Bodies, which we can hardly diſcern without the help of Glaſſes of a late invention: and we are told by ſkilful *Aſtronomers*, that there are many Stars not viſible, even with the help of Teleſcopes; and that they rather leſſen than add to the greatneſs of the fix'd Stars. But if they had given us a fuller view of them, we cannot imagin, that God's great ends could depend upon ſuch way of diſcovery: If all his deſign had been to be admir'd by Mankind for the greatneſs of his work, it would have been plac'd more within our reach; and the Earth we live upon would have born ſome bigger proportion to the Celeſtial Bodies, which is concluded to be but a Point in compariſon of the Starry Heaven; and the very Orb of the Sun is thought to be no more in reſpect of the whole Firmament. So that the main parts of the Univerſe cannot be ſaid to be made for our view. We grant therefore that the infinitely wiſe and powerful Creator hath great and glorious ends, which are above our reach; but how doth it follow from hence, that he hath no ends which we can judg of? For even in thoſe things which we diſcern at ſo great a diſtance, we ſee enough to admire the infinite Majeſty of him that made them; and conſequently to adore, and fear him: And whatever other ends he may have which we cannot ſee into; yet this is the beſt and moſt proper end for us with reſpect to him. Other ends might ſatisfy our curioſity more, but this tends moſt to promote our true happineſs. As I have ſhew'd in the precedent Diſcourſe that the wiſeſt Philoſophers, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Pythagoreans* all agreed upon Principles of Natural Reaſon, that the true happineſs of Mankind

lay in being made like to God, not in an affectation of greatneſs and power, but in goodneſs and true wiſdom; which lay in the knowledg of God, and a temper of Mind ſutable to our appprehenſions of him. Now if thoſe ends be attainable by ſuch Diſcoveries, which God hath made of himſelf in the works of Creation, it is to little purpoſe for any to pretend that we cannot know the particular ends which he had in making ſuch a number of vaſt Bodies of Light in the Heavens, nor why they are placed in ſuch a manner, and at ſo great a diſtance from us; nor whether the ſpace between be wholly void, or filled up with an Ethereal Matter, nor of what uſe thoſe ſeveral Bodies of the Stars are with reſpect to themſelves, or the reſt of the Univerſe. Suppoſing that we are to ſeek as to theſe, and many other things relating to the viſible Frame of the World, muſt we therefore ceaſe to admire and praiſe the great God, the Maker of all, leaſt we ſhould ſeem to flatter him for his Greatneſs and Power? There is doubtleſs a juſt veneration due to an infinite Majeſty, in what way ſoever he ſhews himſelf; but it is too mean a thing to imagin that theſe things were done by him only to be admir'd and prais'd by his own Creatures: But if ſuch an Admiration tends to beget in them a greater and deeper ſence of his Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs; and that be the beſt and moſt effectual means to bring Mankind to a conſtant fear and love of him, and thereby to fit them for a future happineſs; can any Man of ſenſe think this to be an end unbecoming the Creator of the World?

But theſe are ſaid *to be good Moral ends, but not proper for Phyſical Speculations.* I anſwer, That thoſe are truly the moſt *Philoſophical Contemplations*, which lead us to the beſt and moſt noble ends of our Beings; for this was of old look'd on as the trueſt end of *Philoſophy*, and the firſt occaſion of it. For, it is agreed on all hands, that it had its name from *Pythagoras:* And it is very well obſerv'd by S. *Auguſtin, that the Doctrine of the Soul's immortality gave the firſt occaſion to the Greeks to apply themſelves to Philoſophy; and from hence* Pythagoras *began it:* Who was inſtructed therein by his Maſters *Thales* and *Pherecydes*; and after long Travels into ſeveral Countries for his own ſatisfaction, he at laſt fix'd at *Crotone* in *Italy*, and there took upon him to inſtruct others in the way to *Immortality:* but finding great reaſon to miſtruſt many who came to be his Scholars, he ſet up a very ſevere Diſcipline in his School (which prov'd his ruin at laſt) and would admit none but ſuch as he had ſufficiently tried. But when he was aſk'd by one of the Great Men of thoſe parts, *What it was he profeſs'd*, he ſaid nothing but *Philoſophy*, or a *Love of Wiſdom*; which he made to conſiſt in two things, *A ſearch after Truth, and a purſuit of Virtue.* But by *Truth* he did not underſtand the *Phyſical Cauſes* of things, but *Abſtracted and Metaphyſical Speculations*; for his Notion was, that there was no certainty to be had from mere ſenſible things, which rather perplexed and confounded Mens Minds, which were apt to judg by the impreſſions of Senſe; (and his opinion was that the Senſe only tranſmitted the Objects, but *it was the Mind which ſaw and heard*, &c.) therefore to prevent falſe judgments, he thought it neceſſary to draw off their Minds from ſenſible Objects; to this end he bethought himſelf of the way of reaſoning by *Figures* and *Numbers* as is before obſerv'd, which were ſo ſoon and ſo groſly miſunderſtood. *He had learnt*, ſaith *Porphyry, from the Eaſtern Magi, that* God *was Light and Truth*; and therefore he look'd on a ſearch after Truth as one way of aſſimilation to God. But the main thing was in

Aug. *ad* Voluſ. *Ep.* 3.

in the practice of Virtue; of which there is a short Abstract in the *Golden Verses*, and *Hierocles* declares in the beginning, *The design of them all was to bring Mankind to a likeness to the Divine Nature.* And in this, saith *Eudorus* in *Stobæus*, *Socrates* and *Plato agreed with Pythagoras, That this was the chief end of Philosophy*; but *Plato* added Καθὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, *as far as Mankind could attain to it.* And so *Alcinous* expresses the sense of *Plato:* but he tells us, *That* Plato *sometimes set it forth by being Wise, and Just, and Holy; sometimes by following* God; *because according to the ancient Saying* God *is the beginning and end of all things. This,* saith *Hierocles, is the end of the Pythagorean Philosophy, to give wings to our Souls, that when death comes, we may leave a mortal Body behind us, and fly to the immortal Mansions above, and partake of a Divine Nature, as far as we are capable of it.* And *Simplicius* in the beginning of his Commentaries on *Aristotle* saith, *The end of Philosophy is to attain to our most perfect Happiness; and if a Man arriv'd to the top of Philosophy, he might be a God, and not a Man.* These things I mention to shew, that *Philosophy* as it was understood by the Ancients was far from excluding *Final Causes*, or *Moral Considerations* of things; since its great end was to bring Men to a likeness to God.

Stob. Eclog. c. 3. *Alcin. c. 27.* *Simplic. in Categor.*

This being then the true original end of *Philosophy*, to improve Mens Minds in order to their Happiness, how came the consideration of the great ends of God in the World, to be thought unbecoming Philosophical Speculations? The reason was, that the immortality of the Soul hath been excluded too. For, altho' according to the Doctrin of *Des Cartes* its distinction from the Body be asserted and proved, yet its immortality is pass'd over; under this pretence, *that* God *may fix its duration by his Will*; and therefore unless we know the Will of God in it, we can determin nothing in *Philosophy* about it. But the Ancient *Philosophers* made the immortality of the Soul the foundation of all their Inquiries, and therefore took in all such considerations as tended to improve, and refine, and purify the Minds of Men. For which end *Moral Considerations* are most proper. And therefore it cannot but seem strange to any thinking Man, to observe these to be so industriously set aside, on pretence *that we cannot find out the ends that* God *had in framing the World, and the several parts of it:* and yet at the same time they pretend to have found all the Mechanical Powers of Matter, which is much more difficult to comprehend. But of that afterwards: we now consider Final Causes. And have we not reason to conclude from the present Frame of the World with respect to mankind, that the Maker of it intended to dispose things for their advantage? Let Men consider the Faculties of their Minds together with the Materials about them, and the Organs God hath given them to make use of them; and can they think otherwise, but that God hath abundantly made up to them, what other Creatures seem to exceed them in? Their Understanding, and Contrivance, and artificial Inventions go far beyond the natural strength and sagacity of Brutes, as to the comfortable way of subsistence. They can make the Brutes to be very serviceable to them, as to Diet, Clothing, Journeying, Habitations, *&c.* They can find out ways to communicate their Thoughts to each other at a great distance, and entertain commerce in the remotest parts, by the help of their own Inventions as to Navigation. So that if one Country be not sufficiently furnished, they can bring home the products of others. And so, all the benefit of Trading (which in these later Ages is grown to so mighty

a reputation above what it had in elder Ages) is owing to the happy Invention of the uſe of the *Magnet*. But ſet aſide theſe modern Improvements, and conſider Mankind as mere Natives of their ſeveral Countries, take all together, and the Inhabitants of the Earth have no cauſe to complain of Providence; which makes up what is wanting in one thing by ſuch advantages another way, that moſt Nations are fond of their own Countries, and would not change them. The ancient Geographers indeed mention People *who curſed the riſing and ſetting Sun, becauſe his heat was intolerable to them*; and the *Philoſophers* thought they had great reaſon to conclude the *Torrid Zone* uninhabitable. But the experience of theſe latter times have found it quite otherwiſe, and that the places there were fully peopled, and their condition tolerable enough, and in ſome reſpects pleaſant to them: as to the fruitfulneſs of Land, and numbers of Rivers and plenty of commodities. And as to Heat, that is very much qualify'd, by the conſtant breezes in the Day-time, and coolneſs of the Nights; and the particular ſituation of ſome places, at a very little diſtance have Winter and Summer; which ſhews that the Seaſons do not merely depend upon the Sun, but upon the motion of the Air; for where that is ſtopt by the height of Mountains, there is Winter on one ſide, and Summer on the other; as *Iſ. Voſſius* obſerves on the coaſt of *Malabar*; and about the *Mountains* of *Arabia*, *Congo* and *Bengala*, and other places: And *Ludolphus* confirms it concerning the Mountains of *Malabar*; inſomuch, that he ſaith, *the King there may keep a perpetual Summer, only by croſſing the Mountains*. Others have given a more particular account of it, and tell us, That the *Cherſoneſe* between the Rivers of *Indus* and *Ganges*, is divided in the middle by a ridge of *High Hills*, which they call the *Gate*; on the one ſide is *Malabar*, and on the other *Coromandel*: and that it is Winter on one ſide from *April* to *September*, and Summer on the other; and that not above 20 Leagues diſtance in croſſing the Mountains. And the ſame is ſaid to be at Cape *Razalgate* in *Arabia*, and in *Jamaica*; which is imputed to the Mountains ſtopping the current of Vapours wherein the particles of them are driven together, and fall down into drops of Rain; and ſo the Seaſons depend upon the *Monſons* or fix'd Winds in thoſe parts; the North-eaſt blowing on one ſide from *November* to *April*, and the Southerly on the other from *April* to *November*. Sir *H. Middleton* ſpeaks of *ſo great cold on the Mountains of* Arabia, *that he could not have believ'd it, unleſs he had felt it himſelf*; for he deſpis'd their information at *Mecca*, who knew the Country far better. But he thought he went according to *Reaſon*, as the Ancients did; but *Experience* hath plainly diſcover'd their miſtakes. For Heat and Cold are found not to depend merely upon the nearneſs or diſtance of the Sun; for other things we find may not only qualify that heat, but produce cold where it was leaſt expected. *Acoſta* tells us that the old Philoſophers went upon Principles of Common Reaſon, when they ſuppoſed *the Torrid Zone was uninhabitable*, but notwithſtanding he found it ſo far from being ſo, that *he thought it pleaſant and agreeable, and ſaw it full of People:* and he ſaith, *that the Air is cleareſt when the Sun is fartheſt off, and fulleſt of Clouds and Rain when the Sun is neareſt*. As he ſhews at large from the experience himſelf had in thoſe parts. Some places of the *Torrid Zone* he obſerves to be *Temperate*, as in *Quitto*, and *the Plains of Peru*; ſome very cold, as at *Potoſi*; ſome very hot, as in ſome parts of *Æthiopia*, *Braſil* and the *Moluccas*. The temperateneſs of it he imputes to the Rains,

Herod. l. 1. Mela l. 1. c. 8. Plin. l. 5. c. 8.

Iſ. Voſſ. de Nilo, c. 12. Ludolph. Comment. ad Hiſt. Æthiop. p. 101. Philoſoph. Tranſactions, n. 175.

Purchas Pil. To. I. p. 255.

Acoſta of the Indies, l. 2. c. 23.

c. 9.

c. 10.

Rains, to the ſhortneſs of the Days, the nearneſs to the Ocean, the height of Lands and Mountains, but eſpecially to the Winds. For he
C. 13. ſaith, *The Providence of* GOD *hath ſo order'd it, that the freſh and cool Winds do qualify the exceſſive heat of the Sun.* But he obſerves, *that be-*
L. 3. c. 8. *ſides the Breezes from the Sea by day, there are Land-winds by night, which ſerve very much to temper the heat of the Air.*

It look'd like an Objection againſt Providence, when Men concluded that by the nearneſs of the Sun within the Tropics, ſo great a part of the Earth as the *Torrid Zone* ſhould be ſcorch'd by the Sun, as not to be capable of habitation by Mankind: but when the contrary is now found moſt certainly true, and ſuch reaſons are given for it, which Mankind could not have thought of, have we not ground to infer that Providence had certainly ſuch an end as the good of Mankind, to order things ſo, as by ſeveral means to make thoſe habitations not only tolerable, but in many places delightful? By this we ſee how vain thoſe old Arguments againſt Providence were, which were grounded on this ſuppoſition, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind by the intolerable heat of the Sun. Yet how confidently doth *Lucretius* argue upon this ſuppoſition, as tho' he could demonſtrate againſt Providence from Heaven and Earth?

Hoc tamen ex ipſis cœli rationibus auſim
Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus eſſe paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta ſtat prædita culpa.
Principio quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, ſylvæque ferarum
Poſſedere, tenent rupes, vaſtæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum diſtinet oras.
Inde duas porro prope parteis fervidus ardor,
Aſſiduuſque geli caſus mortalibus aufert. Lucret. l. 5.

So much room taken up by the Heavens, ſo much by Mountains, Woods, Rocks, Marſhes and Seas; and two parts of the Earth uſeleſs for Mankind by intolerable Heat and Cold; that he could never imagin this Earth was fram'd with deſign for the good of Mankind. And yet at the ſame time there were *Philoſophers*, who thought the conveniencies for Mankind were ſo great in this World, that from thence they infer'd that there was a Providence, which had a particular regard to the advantages which they enjoy; and this without any Revelation from GOD of thoſe ends which he deſign'd. The *Stoics* knew, as well as *Epicurus*, the compaſs of the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Mountains, Woods, Rocks and Seas; and they believ'd as much that ſome parts of the Earth were not to be inhabited; and yet they concluded, that there was a deſign of Providence in all with reſpect to Mankind. For they took notice, not merely of the ſpace which the Heavens took up, but of the great Beauty, and order, and uſefulneſs of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; and particularly the convenient diſtance of the Sun to make the Earth fruitful and pleaſant; and to diſtinguiſh Days and Nights for Works and Reſt; and that the Mountains were large ſtore-houſes for Metals and Rivers, which could not otherwiſe be ſupply'd; and that the Seas afforded plenty of Fiſh, and large conveniencies for Commerce; and the Woods were furniſh'd with Timber to make Veſſels out of, to paſs over thoſe Seas, and ſo

preſerve a correſpondence among Mankind at the greateſt diſtance for their mutual advantage; and if there were uncultivated parts of the Earth, that only ſhew'd that God did not give theſe things to make Mankind lazy and idle, but to exerciſe thoſe abilities both of Body and Mind, which he had given them.

But as to the two parts of the Earth being wholly unſerviceable to Mankind, by reaſon of exceſſive Heat or Cold, that is found by experience of later Ages to have been a great miſtake. But *Ariſtotle* is poſitive in it, *That the places near the Sun have no Waters nor Paſtures; and that the remote Northern parts are not to be inhabited for the Cold.* But both theſe Aſſertions are found to be falſe; however his Authority was follow'd. Inſomuch, that *Pliny* ſaith, *Of five Zones two are uſeleſs by extremity of Cold; and that there is nothing but a perpetual Miſt, and a ſhining Froſt; and that within the Tropicks all is burnt up by the heat of the Sun, which is ſo intenſe, that,* he ſaith, *there is no paſſage from one Temperate Zone to the other.* This is a ſtrange Account to us now, and given by a Man who had read all Authors then extant about theſe matters; and it is the ſtranger, becauſe in the Chapter before he ſaith, *That* Hanno *paſſed from* Cadiz *to the end of* Arabia, (which is much doubted) *and that* Eudoxus *came to* Cadiz *from the* Arabian *Gulph; and that another went from* Spain *to* Æthiopia *on the account of Trade; and that ſome* Indians *trading abroad were caſt by ſtorms on the Northern Coaſts, who were preſented to the Proconſul of* Gaul. How could theſe things be, and yet they ſuch ſtrangers to the *Torrid Zone*, thro' which they muſt paſs? But he ſeem'd to take it for granted, *That thoſe Regions were unpaſſable, and uninhabitable*, altho' himſelf mentions ſeveral Nations which liv'd within *the Torrid Zone*; as the *Negroes* on both ſides the River *Niger*, the *Garamantes*, *Troglodytæ* (whom *Ludolphus* makes to be ſame with the *Hotentots*) and ſeveral others. Now if all theſe Countries were burnt up, how come ſo many People to be then known to live here; and ſo they were from the time of *Herodotus*, who mentions them? But how different are the beſt Accounts we now have of theſe Places from what the Antients imagin'd? The Country of the *Negroes*, thro' which the *Niger* runs (which is ſuppos'd to be of the ſame *Nature* (if not *Original*) with the *Nile*, and overflows the Country of the *Negroes*, in the ſame manner and at the ſame time that the *Nile* doth *Egypt*) is, according to a late Author, *a populous and fertile Country*, who ſaith, *that the Natives endure the Heat with eaſe, and are healthful and vigorous.* Another, who ſpent ſome time in that Country, ſaith, *That the Heat is more ſupportable by the cool Wind which blows; and that for 6 Months it is as pleaſant as* France. *Andrew Battel*, who liv'd about 18 Years in *Angola* and thereabouts, ſpeaks enough of the *Populouſneſs* of thoſe parts; and *Lopez* who was at *Congo*, commends the *Temperature of the Air* there. *Ludolphus*, in his Account of *Ethiopia*, which he had chiefly from a Native, ſaith, *that it is as temperate as* Portugal. The ſame we have already produc'd from *Acoſta* of *Peru*. Many more ſuch Inſtances might be produc'd, but theſe are ſufficient to ſhew what a wonderful Miſtake the Antients were under as to the *Torrid Zone*, and how very weak *Lucretius* his Argument againſt Providence from thence is. But the Argument for it is much ſtronger from theſe Diſcoveries, becauſe, according to the ordinary effects of the Heat of the Sun, they reaſon'd truly; but there is a concurrence of ſeveral other things which temper the Air, which they could not underſtand. It is true, there are ſome things that abate the

Ariſt. *Meteor. l. 2. c. 5.*

Plin. *l. 2. c. 68.*

L. 5. c. 8.

Herodot. l. 4. c. 183. Plin. l. 5. c. 8. Solin. c. 43.

Voyage to Surat, *p. 61. p. 71. Relation de la* Nigritie, *1689. p. 85.* Purchas *II. l. 7. c. 3. Id. c. 4. Ludolph. Comment. l. 1. c. 5. n. 36.*

Heat which ariſes from the Sun's nearneſs; as the equality of Nights to Days, and the abundance of Rains which fall at that time, of which the moſt probable account is, that altho' in our parts the diſtance of the Sun cauſes Cold and Rain, and the nearneſs Heat and Drought; yet it is quite otherwiſe there, for the Sun raiſes up the Vapors more there by rarifying the Air, and that to a great height; which joining together, and falling down with greater force, doth thereby produce a Wind as well as Water, both which cool and refreſh the Air; and where the Vapors do not produce Rain, yet they make a Dew, as in ſome parts of *Peru*, which falling on the ground makes it fruitful. But theſe things are not ſufficient; for were all the Country in the *Torrid Zone* a flat, with thoſe advantages, it would not be habitable; and therefore the height of the Mountains was neceſſary for this purpoſe. Which ſhews, that theſe are ſo far from being *Botches* or *Ruins*, that they are great inſtances of Divine Providence, if they can be made out to be ſerviceable to this purpoſe. *Scaliger* ſaith, that thoſe do *piè delirare, who impute the Mountains to the fractures made in the Earth by the Flood; and that it is impoſſible that the Earth which fell in, ſhould ever make a ſurface equal with the height of the Mountains:* but he aſſerts them to be a work of Providence in the original frame of the World, and chiefly intended to be a receptacle for Water: and he obſerves that the higheſt Mountains are under the Torrid Zone, where they ſerve likewiſe for tempering the Air. For, *Acoſta* gives that reaſon of the temper of the Air in the *Weſt Indies*, that *it is a high Country, having many Mountains, which afford a great refreſhment to the neighbour Countries:* and he obſerves, *that the Sea-coaſt in* Peru *and* New Spain *is very hot, being low and flat; but it is otherwiſe in the higher parts. Piſo*, a learned Phyſician, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and hath given a *Natural Hiſtory* of that Country, imputes the *Healthfulneſs* of the *Maritime Coaſts* there, which he thinks compares with *Europe*, to two things: 1. *The conſtant breeze from the Sea lying on the Eaſt of it, which* he ſaith, *very much defends them from the exceſſive Heat of the Sun.* 2. *A Ridg of Mountains between that and* Peru, *which keep off the noiſom Vapors of the Mooriſh Grounds on the other ſide of them. In the Night*, he ſaith, *the Cold is ſo great* (even in the *Torrid Zone*) *that they are forc'd to keep Fires to prevent the ill effects of it. Nichol. de Techo*, who was in *Tucumania*, ſaith, *That the part of it which is within the Torrid Zone is very cold, by reaſon of the Mountains there; which*, he ſaith, *evidently confutes the Antients opinion concerning it. Andrew Battel* mentions *the high Mountains* about *Angola, over which he march'd, and found the Air very cold. Ludolphus* ſaith, *The Providence of* God *is much to be admir'd in the Mountains of* Ethiopia; *for the height of their Mountains makes that Country habitable, and their Air more temperate, and affords them Rivers, which the flat in the Torrid Zone do want,* unleſs they be ſuch as come out of the mountainous part. And, which ſeems very ſtrange, he affirms from *Tellez, That the Heats in ſome parts of* Ethiopia *are more tolerable than in* Portugal, *which lies ſo many degrees more to the North.*

Scaliger. Exerc. 43.

Exerc. 42.

Acoſta *Hiſt. of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 12.

Piſon. Hiſt. Nat. & Medic. Braſiliæ, l. 1. *c.* 1.

Hiſt. Paraquar. l. 1. *c.* 19.

Purchas *To.* II. *l.* 7. *c.* 3. §. 3.

Ludolph. Hiſt. Æthiop. l. 1. *c.* 6.

C. 5.

The force of what I have ſaid comes to this. It was ſuppos'd to be an Argument againſt Providence, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind: Which is ſo far from being true, that undoubted Experience hath convinc'd the World, that they have been fully inhabited; and that to the comfortable ſubſiſtence of Mankind, there hath been concurrence of ſeveral things, which could not be the reſult of

Chance, or of the Mechanical Laws of the motion of Matter: and therefore we ought to conclude theſe things to be ordered by Divine Providence, for the uſe and benefit of Mankind.

There is yet one thing to be obſerv'd before I end this part of my Diſcourſe, which is to ſhew the pernicious uſe that hath been made of *Des Cartes* his laying aſide the conſideration of *Final Cauſes.* For there was lately a Perſon too well known in the World, (and whom I intend to conſider at large afterwards) who at firſt profeſs'd himſelf a ſtrict Follower of *Des Cartes* his *Notions* in his *Metaphyſical Meditations.* But he made uſe of the Argument from the *Idea* to prove *the World to be* GOD: And *Des Cartes* cannot be excus'd from giving too great advantage to *Spinoza*, by ſuppoſing *the Idea of extended Matter to be infinite and neceſſary*; which overthrows the force of his own Argument from the *Idea*, for if it agrees to Matter, it cannot prove the Being of a Subſtance diſtinct from Matter, and gave occaſion to the other to think, that nothing but *Infinite Matter* was imply'd in this *Idea:* and to carry on his deſign the better, he kept cloſe to *Des Cartes* in excluding the *conſideration of Final Cauſes.* For in his *Mathematical Ethicks* (as he calls them) he hath an *Appendix* to his firſt Part, where he doth purpoſely ſet himſelf to overthrow all *Final Cauſes, as meer Fictions of Mens Brains.* But the comfort is, that they are no late *Fictions*, but the wiſeſt Men in all Ages, as I have already ſhew'd, did aſſert them: And it is not a mere *Mathematical Appearance* will fright Men now out of the Principles of Reaſon. But let us examin what the grounds are on which *Final Cauſes* are thus peremptorily condemned. He ſaith, *That they ariſe from the common prejudice of Mankind, who have ſo much fondneſs for themſelves as to think that all things are done for their ſakes: that* GOD *made all things for Man, and Mankind to ſerve him.* But this is not a juſt and fair repreſentation of the matter. We do not ſay, that GOD had no other end in the frame of the Univerſe, but merely for the ſake of the Inhabitants of the Earth; for we do not pretend to give an account of the great ends which the Almighty had in thoſe vaſt and numerous Bodies of the fix'd Stars, which are ſo very remote from us; but that which we ſay, is, that GOD hath plac'd Mankind in ſuch a ſtation here upon Earth, that they cannot but look about them; and when they do ſo, they cannot but admire to find ſo great and ſo wiſe a Being order all things ſo, as to ſee not only the Wiſdom but the Goodneſs of their Maker. And how doth this appear to be *a mere Fiction of Mens Brains?* Are there not ſuch juſt cauſes for our admiration? Are there not ſuch conveniences for human Life? Do not all Men ſee the wonderful contrivance and uſefulneſs of the parts of their Bodies? And are there not great diſcoveries of the like Wiſdom in Plants and Animals, and the Earth and Sea? Are all theſe mere Phantaſms and Fictions of Mens Brains? Why are not the miſtakes about theſe things diſcover'd in a Mathematical manner? This might have ſignify'd ſomething: But to go about to confute Mankind by telling them, *That Final Cauſes are mere Fictions of their Brains,* is far from being a Geometrical way of Demonſtration. Let us examin, however, the method he takes to make it out. (1.) In the firſt place, he undertakes to ſhew how Mankind came to think ſo much of *Final Cauſes*; and then, (2.) How repugnant they are to the nature of things: (3.) How Men came to take up the Notions of Good and Evil, and of Rewards and Puniſhments, from this Opinion about *Final Cauſes.* All which I ſhall briefly conſider. As to the firſt, he ſuppoſes *that all Men are born igno-*

Des Cartes Prin. Part. II. n. 21.

B. D. Spinoſ. Opera Poſth. p. 36.

rant of Cauſes, and look after their own advantage, which they are conſcious to themſelves of. And what follows? *Firſt, that they ſuppoſe themſelves free, becauſe they know their own Deſires.* And why ſhould they not, as well as know that they think? For they have the like inward Perception as to both. *But they are ignorant of the Cauſes which determine their Deſires.* How doth it appear, that there are ſuch *Cauſes*, which they are thus ignorant of? If any Man undertakes to aſſign Cauſes which Mankind are not at all ſenſible of, he ought not to take it for granted, that there are ſuch Cauſes, but to prove it in ſuch a manner, as to overballance the evidence of their inward Perceptions. For Mankind are conſcious to themſelves of no ſuch Cauſes; if therefore any one will prove, that however they are not free, certainly that Evidence ought to be clearer than the Argument from our own Perception to the contrary. I think I move my Eye freely to this or that Object, and am fully ſatisfy'd from that inward Perception I have of the voluntary motion of the Muſcles belonging to the Eye. Now if any one goes about to tell me that I am deceiv'd herein, and that there were other Cauſes, which determin'd the motion of my Eye; is it not reaſon I ſhould have Evidence greater than what I have from my own Senſation? But here we have no Cauſes at all aſſign'd; therefore we muſt go on. *Secondly*, ſaith he, *Mankind do all things for ſome End*, viz. *for their own Profit; and therefore deſire only to know Final Cauſes, and if they find theſe they are ſatisfy'd.* Is not this well ſaid by a Man that pretends to *Demonſtration*, and that in a *Geometrical manner?* Could no other *Ends* be thought of but *Profit?* I begin to be of *Des Cartes* his mind, *That Geometry ſpoils Mens Reaſonings in other matters.* For, how was it poſſible for a Man of common ſenſe to argue in ſuch a manner; *Men aim at their own Profit, therefore they deſire only to know Final Cauſes?* What *Profit* was it which this Author aim'd at in making this Work of his. He had without doubt ſome end in it; for I hardly think he could take ſo much pains for no end at all. Was it a *Good* or a *Bad end?* (For Mankind are ſtill apt to be inquiſitive into *Final Cauſes.*) *A Good End*, no doubt his Friends will ſay. What was this *Good End?* was it *mere Profit?* No certainly, they will ſay, his Mind was above it; *for he devoted himſelf wholly* (as they tell us in the Preface to his Works) *to Philoſophy*; and *retired on purpoſe for the proſecution of his Studies.* It is then more than poſſible for a Man to aim at ſome other end, than mere *Profit.* And what was the End he propos'd in Philoſophy? Still we enquire after *the End*, altho' *Profit* be ſet aſide; and we cannot have a better account of it than from himſelf.

De Intell. Emend. p. 357. He tells us, *His Mind was ſet upon finding out the true Good of Mankind.* This was a noble End indeed, and fit for a Perſon that deſign'd to improve his Underſtanding. But was this *true Good* nothing but *Profit?* So far from it, that he ſaith, *He was ſoon ſatisfy'd, that what things Mankind generally purſued, were a hindrance to the End he aim'd at: and therefore he ſaw it neceſſary to give over the purſuit of Riches, Honors and ſenſual Pleaſures; and to fix upon an eternal and infinite Good, which alone can give ſatisfaction to the Mind, and therefore ought to be purſued with all our might.* This, one would think, were ſpoken like a true Chriſtian Philoſopher; but his way is, to uſe our Expreſſions, and to couch his own meaning under very plauſible Terms: but he ſpeaks his Mind more afterwards, when he ſaith, *This chief Good of Man is to underſtand the union between the Mind and Nature.* What that is, will appear more afterwards; but here he ſaith, *That this is the End to which*

P. 361.

our Studies and Endeavors are to be directed. Which is ſufficient to my preſent purpoſe. For here it is confeſs'd, that they are only vulgar Minds that aim at *mere Profit* as their End; but that there is a higher, and more certain, and agreeable End for the Minds of Men to ſearch after; and that their Happineſs lies in the attaining of that End. Which being allow'd, if we ſuppoſe a wiſe and intelligent Being to have created Mankind, there is no incongruity at all in Man's making that infinite and eternal Good to be his chief End, nor in purſuing after it with all his Endeavors; nor can there be any in ſuppoſing that this GOD ſhould order things in this World with that deſign, that they ſhould be ſerviceable to him here as to his preſent ſubſiſtence, in order to his main End. For he allows his *Philoſopher* to do many things with that deſign to ſerve his End, viz. *To ſpeak as other Men do, whatever he thinks: To uſe ſenſual Pleaſures, as they ſerve for Health: To get as much Wealth as will make his Condition eaſy.* Thus far then we find that Mankind may propoſe Ends to themſelves; and that there are things which have a tendency to them; and that it is very becoming to them to uſe thoſe Means in order to their Ends. Why then may not the wiſe Creator of the World appoint proper Ends and Means to Mankind, as to their conveniencies and future Happineſs? What repugnancy is there in this, more than in the former caſe? All that he can ſay is, *That Mankind finding ſomething very uſeful to them, as Eyes for ſeeing, Teeth for eating, Herbs and Animals for nouriſhment, the Sun to give Light, the Sea to breed Fiſh,* &c. *and becauſe they are ſo uſeful to them, conclude that there was a Being above them, which prepar'd all theſe things for them.* And what abſurdity is there in ſo doing? What *Geometrical Demonſtration* is there, that theſe things all came together ſo of themſelves without any intelligent Agent? All that he ſaith is, *That they conſidering them as Means, could not believe that they made themſelves; but becauſe they were wont to provide things for their own uſe, they ſuppoſed or believed ſome free Agent which ordered all theſe things for them. And from hence they judging all by themſelves, concluded that* GOD *ordered all theſe things for their uſe; to oblige Mankind to him, that they might honor and ſerve him; and ſo under a pretence of doing honor to* GOD, *they fell into Superſtition, and were ſo bent upon Final Cauſes, till at laſt they made* GOD *no wiſer than themſelves.* Is not all this *Demonſtration?* They muſt think very meanly indeed of the Underſtandings of Men, that can think they will be ſatisfy'd with ſuch Accounts as theſe. We find he grants *Eyes fitted for Sight, Teeth for Eating,* &c. And why, I pray, may we not in reaſon conclude, that they were deſign'd for that uſe? He finds ſome things to cavil at, about *Unſeaſonable Weather, Earthquakes, Diſeaſes,* &c. (which are conſiſtent with the general Ends of Providence) but he hath nothing to ſay as to his former Inſtances, why we ſhould not believe *we had Eyes to ſee with, or Ears to hear with, or Teeth to eat with:* But if theſe things were given for thoſe uſes and no other, doth not this prove particular Ends of Providence with reſpect to Mankind? What, *if Men do provide Means for their Ends?* Is it an Argument of *Folly*, or *Wiſdom* ſo to do? If it be *Wiſdom* to act for an End, and *Folly* to act for none, why may we not ſuppoſe an infinitely wiſe Being to act for Ends agreeable to himſelf? Not for mean, fooliſh, ſordid Ends, but ſuch as become the great Creator and wiſe Governor, and bountiful Benefactor to Mankind. And what is there unbecoming our *Idea* of GOD in theſe relations? Is it then unfit for a wiſe Creator, and Governor, and Benefactor, to beſtow on Man-

Ethic. P. I. p. 34.

kind

kind ſuch things as tend to the uſe and good of his Creatures, or to take care of their welfare, ſo as to furniſh us with ſuch Organs of our Senſes, ſuch Faculties of our Minds, as may make uſe of the many conveniences which we have about us for our comfortable ſubſiſtence, and our cheerful ſervice of ſo Great, and ſo Good, and ſo Liberal a Benefactor? Can this be call'd *Superſtition*, to ſerve and adore him? Is this *making* God *like to our ſelves*, when we acknowledg the infinite diſtance between him and us, and ſerve him with devout Reverence and godly Fear? Far be it from us to think ſo meanly of him, as to attribute the leaſt degree of our Paſſions and Weakneſſes to him. We know he could not be God, if he were not infinitely above our Thoughts as well as our Services: but if he pleaſe to be ſo kind to us, to give us ſo many reaſons to love and ſerve him, is it fit for his Creatures to deſpiſe his Service, on pretence that he is above it? *Superſtition* is a fooliſh thing, becauſe it comes from mean apprehenſions of God; but *true Religion* is a wiſe and agreeable thing, becauſe it flows from a due ſenſe of a Divine Majeſty, and a tender regard to his Honor. And whatever Men pretend as to *Philoſophy* and *Demonſtration*, there are none that really want Senſe and Underſtanding ſo much, as thoſe who deſpiſe *Religion*, under the name of *Superſtition*. We cannot deny that there is too much of it in the World: but as God remains the ſame notwithſtanding the Follies of Mankind, ſo *Religion* is as juſt and reaſonable a thing as ever, altho' *Superſtition* hath brought ſo much diſhonor upon it.

The next thing is to ſhew, *That Final Cauſes are repugnant to the Nature of things*. This is to the purpoſe indeed, if he can make it out. As to his Argument *from the neceſſity of all things*, that muſt be referr'd to its due time; becauſe it is not prov'd but ſuppos'd: But here we are to conſider how *Final Cauſes* do ſo lamentably pervert the Order of Nature. *They make*, ſaith he, *the Cauſe to be the Effect, and the Effect to be the Cauſe; and that which was firſt in Nature to be the laſt; and make the moſt perfect Being to be the moſt imperfect.* Theſe are ſad Conſequences, if they hold: The two former he paſſes over, as he had reaſon, and fixes on the laſt, *That they overthrow the Divine Perfection*; and he needs no more, if he can make this out. But how? *If* God *works for an End, then he muſt want that which he works for.* Is this the *Demonſtrating Ethicks in a Geometrical way?* A Father out of kindneſs to his Son deſigns to advance him in the World, and furniſhes him with all neceſſary means to that end: Doth this argue weakneſs and indigency, or only kindneſs and good-will to his Son? If there may be a deſign of doing good to others, with regard to their welfare, and many means us'd to that end, what want doth this argue? But rather it flows from *abundant Goodneſs*; and the more perfect any Being is, the greater is the beneficence and readineſs to do good to others: and one would think Men did not want Geometry to know this. *But*, ſaith he, God *did not do this for their ſakes, but his own; his own Glory is the end of all.* But if the *Glory of* God be moſt advanced by the good of his Creatures, how can theſe two be ſeparated from each other? Men may make a diſtinction by Metaphyſical Speculation: but if his Glory be advanced by their good, there can be no real diſtinction between them; for both are carried on by the ſame thing.

After theſe faint Attempts, our *Geometrician* falls to *Ignorance of Cauſes*, (of which I have ſaid ſo much already) and from thence, he ſaith *comes Mens admiration of the Fabrick of Man's Body, becauſe they know not*

the Cauſes of it. And did our Philoſopher know the *Mechanical Cauſes* of all the parts of it? What pity it is we had not ſeen them, inſtead of theſe looſe and idle Diſcourſes; for I can call them no other, when there is ſo much bluſtering talk about *Geometry*, and ſo very little appearance of true Reaſon. But, ſaith he very ſenſibly, *The World looks upon a Man as a very dangerous Heretick, and impious Perſon, if he gives an account of Natural Cauſes, and takes away their ignorance.* I ſee no ſuch great danger from his *Knowledg*, whatever there be from his *Impiety*; for he hath ſhew'd much more cauſe for us to wonder at one, than at the other. But the *Impiety* of his *Syſtem* muſt be conſider'd in its proper place.

The laſt thing he ſaith, as to Cauſes, is, *That Mankind being perſuaded that all things were made for them, they ſet an eſteem upon ſuch things as they found moſt uſeful, and meaſur'd the value of things by their agreeableneſs to themſelves. From hence came the difference of Good and Evil, Orderly and Confus'd, Hot and Cold, Beautiful and Deform'd; and becauſe they imagin'd themſelves free, thence came Praiſe and Diſhonor, Fault and Merit. And what tended to Health or the Worſhip of* GOD, *they called Good, and the contrary Evil; what ſuted to their Imagination, they called Order, what did not, Confuſion. What was agreeable to their Senſes they called Beautiful, Sweet, Pleaſant, and the contrary to what was not, and attributed their Modes of Senſation to the things themſelves: and Men judg of things by their different Imaginations; and from thence come ſuch great differences among Mankind about Good and Evil, Order and Confuſion; all which come from Mens following Imagination, and not Reaſon.* This is the ſubſtance of what he ſaith; which in ſhort takes away all the real difference between Good and Evil, and makes *Good* to be a mere effect of Mens Imaginations, from reſpect to their own Conveniency, or what they call *the Honour of God*; and *Evil* what is repugnant to them. But how comes this to follow from *Final Cauſes?* Yes, ſaith he, *ſince all things are made for them, therefore Good and Evil are to be taken with reſpect to them.* This is a very weak foundation to build this Doctrin upon. For things are not therefore ſaid to be *Morally Good*, becauſe they are uſeful to Mankind; but that implies only a *Natural Fitneſs* for ſuch purpoſes, which is quite another thing from Moral Goodneſs; and it is ſtrange our Philoſophers ſhould not diſcern the difference. For, is there no meaſure of Good and Evil among Mankind with reſpect to one another? If the Good and Evil of things did depend upon Final Cauſes, with reſpect to Mankind in general, then there could be no ſuch thing in regard to each other; for theſe Final Cauſes do not reach to one individual more than another, for they reſpect the whole kind. But we ſay upon good grounds, that there are things which are good and evil between Man and Man. *Yes*, it may be ſaid, *with reſpect to Society, and the common good of the whole.* If it be ſo, then it follows that it doth not depend upon mere Imagination, but that there is a true and juſt meaſure in things; for if Human Society cannot be preſerv'd without Juſtice, and keeping Faith and Obedience to Government, Conjugal Fidelity, *&c.* then there is a real tendency in theſe things to that end, and a repugnancy in the contrary; and if ſo, then their being good or evil doth not depend upon Mens Fancies or Humors, any more than the taking away Fuel doth for leſſening a Fire, or the adding it doth to the increaſe of it. For Mens indulging their own Paſſions againſt Reaſon and a common Intereſt, doth as much tend to a Civil Combuſtion, as the other

ther to a Natural; and Mens due government of themſelves and actions doth as naturally tend to Peace and Tranquillity, as withdrawing Fuel or caſting Water doth to quench the violence of Fire. From whence it appears, that there are real ends as to Mankind, which are the meaſures of Good and Evil, with reſpect to Society. But beſides this, Mankind cannot be ſuppos'd to ſubſiſt without the Relations of Parents and Children: and can any Man in his right Senſes imagin that the Duties of theſe to each other depend only upon Fancy? Is there no natural regard due from Children to Parents, no natural affection and tenderneſs in Parents to Children? Is all this only the product of Imagination? So as to the difference of Sexes; Chaſtity, Modeſty, and a decent regard to each other are things founded in Nature, and do not ariſe from Cuſtom or Fancy. But in all theſe things, altho' there be a juſt regulation of them by Laws, yet the foundation of them is laid in the nature and reſpects of things to one another. As to our own Bodies, Health is not the only meaſure of Good and Evil; for it is ſo uncertain, that thoſe Exceſſes do little prejudice to ſome, which are miſchievous to others: but there is a juſt proportion of things to be obſerv'd with reſpect to their uſe; and ſo *Intemperance* may be conſiſtent with a healthful Body. As to the condition of others, who by reaſon of Poverty or Sickneſs ſtand in need of our help, it is a thing in it ſelf good to afford them our aſſiſtance; and ſo Liberality, Charity, and doing good, are ſo far from being good only from Imagination, that no Man can imagin them to be otherwiſe than good. But beſides all theſe, there are Duties which are owing to that infinite Being, from whom we derive all that we enjoy or hope for; and can it be any other than good for us to fear, and ſerve, and love, and honor him? He confeſſes Mankind allow *that to be good which reſpects the honor of* GOD; but he means *that it is becauſe we ſuppoſe that he made all things for Men.* But altho' his Goodneſs and Providence be very great reaſons for our ſerving him; yet if he had been leſs bountiful to Mankind, they had been bound to ſerve him as their Creator. And it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that he ſhould diſcharge his Creatures from ſo neceſſary a duty, and to make the contrary not to be a Fault. For, it would imply ingratitude and contempt of the beſt Being in the World not to be evil; and that he who is infinitely good, ſhould require what is in it ſelf evil. From all which it appears, that the nature of Good and Evil doth not depend upon the arbitrary Fancies and Opinions of Men; but upon the Nature of things, the Reaſon of Mankind, and the Reſpects they ſtand in to one another.

And it is a great confirmation of this, that our Philoſopher himſelf makes it the ſame caſe as *to Good and Evil*, as it is with reſpect to *Order* and *Confuſion*, and *Beauty* and *Deformity*, and *Harmony* and *Diſcord*. For altho' there may be a *Variety* of *Fancies*, as to ſome *Degrees* of theſe things, and that may pleaſe ſome which doth not others; yet in the main they all agree in a real difference between them: and none can have ſo little judgment, as to think that there is nothing but Fancy which puts a difference between a well digeſted Diſcourſe, and a confus'd heap of Thoughts; or between an exact Beauty, and the Picture of Deformity; or the moſt raviſhing Muſick, and the noiſe of a pair of Tongs. So that the Extremes muſt be allow'd to be really different from one another, what difference ſoever there be in Perſons Fancies, as to what lies between; and yet as to them, when the Idea of the thing it ſelf is agreed upon, then the nearer any approach to it, the more it hath of the reality,

and the farther off, it doth ſo much more depend upon Fancy.

But, ſaith he, *in our Objects of Senſe we imagin the Qualities to be real things without us, whereas they are only the different impreſſions made upon our Senſes, and ſo convey'd to our Imaginations.* And is this an Argument that there is no real difference between *Bitter and Sweet, Savory and Unſavory*, or *that all Sounds are alike?* Or that becauſe ſome have fancied the Muſick of the Spheres, therefore there is no ſuch thing as Harmony? But ſuch kind of arguing deſerves no farther conſideration.

I now come to the ſecond *Hypotheſis*, which tends towards *Atheiſm*, and that is of thoſe who *attribute too much to the Mechanical Powers of matter and motion.* It cannot be denied by any ingenuous Man, that in our Age a great improvement hath been made in *Natural* and *Experimental Philoſophy*. But there is a great difference to be made between thoſe who have proceeded in the way of *Experiments*, which do great ſervice as they go, and ſuch as have form'd *Mechanical Theories* of the Syſtem of the Univerſe; and have undertaken to give an Account how the World was fram'd, and what the immediate Cauſes are of thoſe things which appear in the World. I do not go about to diſpute, whether many things are not better reſolv'd by the *New* than by the *Old Philoſophy*; I am not concern'd in the Doctrines of *Antiperiſtaſis*, *Fuga vacui*, *Occult Qualities*, *Intentional Species*, and ſuch like: And I confeſs, that the *Particular Hiſtories* and *Experiments* relating to things of Nature, as to the *Bodies* of *Animals*, the *Vegetation* of *Plants*, and *Particular Qualities*, tend much more to the true knowledg of Nature, than the mere nice and dry general Speculations about *Forms* and *Qualities*: which have been handled in ſuch a manner, that they have been like ſome of *Ariſtotle's Books, ſet forth, but not to be underſtood.* If therefore ſeveral *Qualities* of Bodies be explain'd *mechanically*, *i. e.* by virtue of the known Affections of Matter, *viz. Size*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. and that new ones can be produc'd by changing the *Texture* or *Motion*, or ſome other *Mechanical Affection* of Matter; it is far from my deſign to oppoſe them, or any ſuch Diſcourſes, which tend only to give us more light into the *Occult Nature* (tho' not *Qualities*) *of things.* For to ſay, that Things proceed from *Occult Qualities*, is in other words to ſay, that they come from we know not what; and none can take that for a good Anſwer from one that pretends to give the reaſon of a thing.

But to proceed more diſtinctly, I make no difficulty of allowing theſe following Principles, as to the *Nature* and *Qualities* of Natural Bodies; which are moſt inſiſted upon by a late Excellent Philoſopher, and a truly *Chriſtian Virtuoſo* among us. (1.) That there is One Univerſal Matter of Bodies, that is, a Subſtance extended, diviſible, and impenetrable. (2.) That there is a diverſity of Motion in ſeveral parts of Matter; ſo it be not ſaid to be in Matter from it ſelf as eſſential to it; for then it muſt always move, and there could be no Reſt, and ſo no Compoſition. (3.) That by virtue of this Motion, Matter is divided into greater and leſſer parts, which have their Determination, Size and Figure. (4.) That beſides theſe, their Situation is to be conſider'd; that is, their Poſture and order, with reſpect to one another: and when the ſeveral parts join together to make up one Body, that is called the *Texture* of them. (5.) That there is a different *Texture* both in our *Organs* of Senſe, and in the *Objects* which make impreſſions upon them, with a different Mo-

Mr. Boyle of the Origin of Forms and Qualities.

tion, Figure and Size; from whence ariſe our different Senſations, and our Apprehenſions of different ſenſible Qualities in things. (6.) That by a Coalition of the ſmaller Particles of Matter into one Body, there are different Subſtances in the World of diſtinct Denominations; but by a change of Texture or Motion, or other Properties of Matter, that compound Body may be put into a different ſtate, which may be called its Alteration or Corruption; and if the change be ſo made as to offend our Senſes, it is then called *Putrefaction.* (7.) That there may be an incomprehenſible variety in the Coalition and Texture of the minute Particles of Matter, which may be ſo different from each other, as to be thought to be endued with diſtinct Qualities. As the 24 Letters make up an inconceivable number of words by the different placing of them.

But when I have allow'd theſe, I can by no means agree, 1. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but what relate to our Senſes. It's true we could not be ſenſible of Heat and Cold, but from the impreſſions made on our Senſes: but ſuppoſing we were not ſenſible of the different agitation of Particles without us; it doth not at all follow, that there is not a real Alteration in the objects themſelves, as that the Fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that diſpoſition in Matter, which is apt to produce ſuch a ſenſe in us, may not be called an inherent Quality, is not ſo eaſy to apprehend. But if there be ſuch a real difference in Bodies, as that one will make ſuch an impreſſion on our Senſes, and another will not, we cannot in reaſon ſay that there is no Quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our Apprehenſion. It is granted, *That Snow hath a greater diſpoſition to reflect light outwards, than a Coal or Soot, when the Sun ſhines upon all three.* Now why this diſpoſition ſhould be called a diſtinct Quality from what is in the other two, ſeems to me a Diſpute of no conſequence. So, if an Eccho be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is diſpos'd to reflect the ſound back to the place from whence it came, altho' it muſt not be called the Quality of the place which makes the Eccho; yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar Figure and Diſpoſition of the parts which make it. So that, if Men will allow ſuch inherent Diſpoſitions in things to produce what we call *Qualities* in us, the difference will not be found worth the diſputing. And I have wonder'd Perſons of Judgment and ſkill in theſe matters lay ſo much weight upon it, as tho' the Quality muſt be ſaid to be only in us, when it is confeſs'd to ariſe from a different Diſpoſition in the parts without us.

2. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but ſuch as an account may be given of by the foregoing Principles: For I do not find it poſſible for any Perſon by virtue of theſe Principles to give an account either of the make or compoſition of the Bodies of Animals, or of the diſpoſition and relation of the inward Parts, or of the inſtruments of Nature for preſervation of the Individual or Species; or of the Diſeaſes they are ſubject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any Perſon ſearches into all the Mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unſatisfy'd he will find himſelf about them; and will ſee reaſon to conclude, as a Learned Phyſician hath done, *That we may know enough for our general direction what to do, but that the ſecret Cauſes are ſo hidden from us, as we have reaſon to admire the Supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.*

Sydenham *de Hydrope* p. 160.

Theſe things being premis'd, I come to the main point, which is, Whether Matter being put into motion, can in a Mechanical manner produce that frame of the Univerſe which we ſee, and the ſeveral things which are in the Heavens, and in this Globe of Earth and Sea.

To make this Matter as clear as we can, we muſt firſt conſider the *General Principles*; and then proceed to the Account given of the ſeveral *Phænomena*, as they are commonly called.

I begin with the *General Principles*, which are theſe;

That the Matter of the Univerſe is one and the ſame extended Subſtance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is diviſible and capable of motion in its parts. I. *Princip. l.* II. *n.* 23.

That this matter is without bounds, and that the Idea of Extenſion is the ſame with that of Corporeal Subſtance. II. *N.* 21.

That it is capable of diviſion into ſo many parts, as we cannot comprehend the utmoſt bounds of its diviſibility. III. *N.* 34.

That GOD alone is the firſt and univerſal Cauſe of the motion of matter, which continues the ſame in the whole, altho' it vary in the ſeveral parts. IV. *N.* 36.

That there are certain Laws of motion, whereof theſe are the chief: V.

1. That every part continues in the ſtate it was in, unleſs mov'd by an External Cauſe. *N.* 37.

2. That all motion of it ſelf is in a right Line, but by other Bodies it becomes oblique, and all matter being in motion it becomes circular. *N.* 39.

3. That when two Bodies meet, the weaker loſes not its motion, but changes its tendency, and the ſtronger loſes ſo much as it gives to the weaker. *N.* 40.

That the parts of matter were at firſt divided into many parcels of an equal and indifferent ſize, and had among them all that motion which is now in the World. VI. *Princip. Part.* 3. *n.* 46.

That theſe Particles of matter could not at firſt be ſpherical, becauſe then there muſt be a void ſpace between them, but by force of motion and natural attrition they became ſo. VII. *N.* 48.

That thoſe leſſer Particles which came off from the Angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty ſpaces between them, and have a quicker motion. VIII. *N.* 49, &c.

That beſides theſe, there are ſome Particles which are large and ſlower than the reſt, being full of Angles, and ſo more apt to ſtick to one another, which by reaſon of their paſſage thro' the triangular ſpaces between the globular Particles become wreathed. IX. *N.* 88.

And theſe are the three Elements out of which he ſuppoſes all Bodies to be made; and accordingly the Ingenious Author hath framed *a Syſtem of the Univerſe* with great Art and appearance of Reaſon; but at ſometimes he is content to let it paſs as a bare *Hypotheſis, agreeing with the Phænomena of the World*; but withal he ſaith, *That he makes uſe of no Principles but ſuch as are moſt evident, and deduces nothing from them but by Mathematical Conſequences.* And in an *Epiſtle* to *Merſennus*, to whom he opened his Mind more freely, he ſaith, *That he ſhould think he knew nothing in Phyſicks, if he could only tell how things might be, if he could not demonſtrate that they could be no otherwiſe.* But to another Perſon he calls it his *Romance of the World*; *which* he confeſſes *he was very well pleas'd with.* *Part. III. n.* 44. *N.* 43, 44. *Ep. To. II. Ep.* 37. *Ep.* 103.

But ſo have not others been, who have taken great pains both in *Philoſophy* and *Mathematicks*; and altho' they cannot deny this *Hypotheſis* to be very conſiſtent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and ſatisfactory account of the *Nature* and *Formation* of the World. But it is not my buſineſs to lay together the Objections of others againſt the *Carteſian Hypotheſis*, but to ſhew the tendency of it to *Atheiſm* in theſe two Points.

1. In ſetting up a Notion of *Matter*, or *Corporeal Subſtance* independent upon the Power of GOD.

2. In undertaking to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe from the Mechanical Laws of motion without a particular Providence.*

As to the former; His firſt Principle is, *That Matter is one and the ſame thro' the Univerſe; and is every where known by its eſſential property, which is Extenſion:* and therein he places *the Eſſence of a Corporeal Subſtance*; (as will preſently appear.) If then the very Eſſence of Matter be independent upon GOD's Power, ſo that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the Creation of the World according to this *Hypotheſis?*

Princip. Part. 2. n. 23.

Du Hamel *de conſenſu vet. & nov. Philoſoph. l. 1. c. 9. n. 9.* P. Petiti *Diſſert. de Principiis* Cart. *p.* 28. Huet. *Cenſ. Philoſoph.* Carteſ. *c.* 8. *n.* 4.

Some object againſt his *Notion* of *Matter*, and ſay, that he hath confounded *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Bodies* with one another. For, ſay they, the ſtrength of his whole *Hypotheſis* depends upon the ſuppoſition *that Matter is nothing but Extenſion, and therefore there can be no Vacuity, becauſe all Space is extended, and therefore Matter is Infinite*; or as he calls it *Indefinite*; but ſo, as he poſitively ſaith, *that the Idea of Space is the ſame with that of Corporeal Subſtance, and that we can conceive nothing in it but Extenſion.* Which they ſay, is true, if we ſpeak of *Mathematical Quantity*, but not of *Real and Phyſical.* But, ſaith *Des Cartes, Men may pretend to diſtinguiſh Corporeal Subſtance from Quantity; but they utter that in words, which they cannot comprehend in their Minds; for either they mean nothing by Subſtance, or attribute a confus'd notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance to a Corporeal, and leave the true Idea of Corporeal Subſtance to Extenſion.* But this is very far from clearing this matter. For himſelf lays it as a fundamental Principle, *That it is capable of Diviſion into Parts, and was actually divided by* GOD *himſelf.* Now I deſire to know what that was which was ſo divided? It muſt be *Something*; and that not *an Incorporeal, but a Corporeal Subſtance:* not *pure Extenſion*, but *a Body that was extended*; and of which the Subſtantial parts of the Univerſe are compos'd. Nay, his whole *Hypotheſis* depends upon *the actual Diviſion of Matter into Parts that are equal, or very* near it; without which his three Elements could not be made; which ariſe from the Motion and mutual attrition of thoſe Particles; and yet he affirms in the Concluſion of the 2d Part of his Principles, *That he owns no other Corporeal Matter, but ſuch as Geometricians call Quantity, and is the thing which their Demonſtrations are converſant about.* But is there no difference between *Geometrical* and *Phyſical Quantity?* It's true that in Mathematical Quantity there is nothing but Extenſion; but doth it therefore follow, that there is nothing more in a Real and Phyſical Body? How can we imagin that GOD ſhould create mere Extenſion in the World; and that out of that all the Bodies in the Univerſe are fram'd? Nay, upon *Des Cartes* his *Principles* it is impoſſible that Matter ſhould either be *created* or *annihilated.* For according to him, *the Idea of Matter and Extenſion are the ſame*; but he ſaith poſitively, *that the Idea of Extenſion and Space are the ſame*; therefore

Part. II. n. 9.

Part. 3. *n.* 46.

Part. II. n. 64.

if

if *Space* can neither be *created* nor *annihilated*, neither can *Matter*. And it ſeem'd ſtrange to me, that a Perſon ſo ſagacious, ſhould not lay theſe things better together; but his *Mathematical Notions* ran ſo much in his Mind, that his endeavor to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into ſuch inextricable difficulties. It is well obſerv'd by Monſ. *Du Hamel*, that the great miſtakes in *Natural Philoſophy* have riſen from Mens applying their *former Notions to it*; *thus*, ſaith he, *the common Philoſophers confounded Natural things with Metaphyſical ſpeculations: on the other ſide*, Des Cartes *being a great Mathematician, endeavor'd to reduce Nature to Geometry, and ſo conſider'd nothing in Body but Extenſion. Extenſion*, ſaith he, *which conſtitutes Space, is the ſame which conſtitutes Bodies*; *but we conſider it more particularly in Bodies, and more generally in Space, which is not chang'd, as the other is.* But is there then nothing to make a *Body*, but mere *Extenſion?* I mean not *a Mathematical*, but *a real Phyſical Body*. No, ſaith he, *in the Idea of a Body, we may caſt off other Qualities, as Hardneſs, Color, Gravity, Heat and Cold, and yet a Body remains*; *to which then nothing belongs but Extenſion, which is common to Body and Space.* This is not ſo deep reaſoning, as might have been expected from ſo great a Maſter of it. For altho' the particular Qualities may be caſt off, yet the Capacity of them can no more than *Extenſion*; as is plain in *Figure* and *Size*, as well as *Hardneſs*, &c. any one particular *Figure* and *Size* may be abſtracted from Body, but it is impoſſible to conceive a Body, but it muſt be capable of one or other. Beſides, all this proves no more but that *Extenſion* is the *Inſeparable Property of Body*. And what then? Muſt the whole Eſſence of a Body conſiſt in one inſeparable Property? *But this is all the Idea we have of Body.* Then I ſay, our Ideas of things are ſhort and imperfect, and there is no forming Worlds upon ſuch Ideas. And this was the fundamental miſtake of *Des Cartes*. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; *or that we cannot take falſhood for truth, if we only give aſſent to ſuch things as we clearly and diſtinctly perceive.* Then he goes on, *that the things which fall under our perception, are either things and their Properties, or eternal Truths. Of things, the moſt general are Subſtance, Duration, Order, Number and ſuch like, which extend to all kinds of things.* And he ſaith, *they may all be comprehended under thoſe two: Of Intellectual or Thinking Subſtances*; *or of Material, i. e. of Bodily and Extended Subſtances.* Thus far all is clear and diſtinct. Then, as to the Notion of *Subſtance*, he ſaith, *By that we can underſtand nothing but a thing which ſo exiſts, as to need nothing elſe to ſupport it. There is but one Subſtance in the World which needs no ſupport, and that is* GOD. *All created Subſtances needs his ſupport, and the Notion of them is, that they are things which only ſtand in need of* GOD's *concourſe to ſupport them.* Hitherto we find nothing to ſtick at. *But how come we to have an Idea of created Subſtances? Not from the bare Exiſtence, for that doth not affect us: but it muſt be from ſome Properties, Attributes or Qualities*; *becauſe Nothing can be attributed to Nothing. From whence we conclude from any Real Attribute, that there muſt be a thing or Subſtance to which it belongs.* All this appears very well ſtill; only we muſt take notice, that all Properties do aſſure us of a *Real Subſtance* under them: Which is very true, relating to *Phyſical Bodies*. But it is poſſible he may from hence aim at proving, *That there muſt be a Corporeal Subſtance in Imaginary Space, becauſe there is an Extenſion there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing*; *therefore there muſt*

De Conſenſu vet. & nov. Philoſoph. l. I. c. 9. n. 8.

Part. 2. n. 10.

N. 11.

Princip. P. I. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

N. 52.

be a Real Body there. But I think it may be truly anſwer'd, That the Extenſion is no more real than the Space is, and implies no more but a Capacity of having Bodies which it had not; that is, that God might create Bodies beyond this World; and if he did ſo, then there would be a real Extenſion; but as we conceive it, the Imaginary Space is no more but a Poſſibility for Bodies exiſting out of the compaſs of this Univerſe. And therefore I deny this to be any real Extenſion; and that it can be no *Real Subſtance*, becauſe *Des Cartes* himſelf, but juſt before, owned *that a created Subſtance was that which ſtood in need of* God *to ſupport it.* Now is it poſſible to imagin that *Space* needs *a Divine Concourſe?* Therefore he muſt diſtinguiſh it from *Subſtance:* or elſe he muſt affirm it to be an uncreated Subſtance; which overthrows his diſtinction here between *Created and Uncreated Subſtances.* As to his Maxim, that *nothing can have no properties*, it certainly relates to *Subſtance*, and not to a *mere Space*; which by the common ſenſe of Mankind muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from *Bodily Subſtance*; and there can be no greater prejudice to Philoſophy, than to go againſt that. Now let us

N. 53. proceed. *From every Attribute a Subſtance is known; but there is one chief Property which conſtitutes the Eſſence and Nature, to which the reſt are referr'd. So*, ſaith he, *Extenſion makes the Nature of a Corporeal Subſtance, and Cogitation of a Thinking Subſtance. For every thing which we attribute to Body, ſuppoſes Extenſion, which is only the Mode of the thing extended; as all things attributed to our Minds, are different Modes*

N. 54. *of thinking. And thus we come to two clear and diſtinct Notions or Ideas; one of a Thinking Subſtance, and the other of a Corporeal; if we diſtinguiſh between the Attributes of thinking and Extenſion.* After this he

N. 63. ſaith, *That Cogitation and Extenſion may be conſider'd, as conſtituting the Natures of a Thinking and Corporeal Subſtance; and ſo their clear Ideas are, a Subſtance which thinks, and a Subſtance which is extended: but then theſe Properties*, he ſaith, *may be conſider'd likewiſe only as Modes*

N. 64. *belonging to thoſe Subſtances; and ſo they make a diſtinct Idea of themſelves, not without the Subſtances, but as Modes belonging to them.*

Thus I have carefully laid down his own Notions about theſe matters. And now ariſes the main difficulty; *viz.* how upon theſe grounds *the Idea of Space, and of Corporeal Subſtance ſhould be the ſame?* All

Part. 2. *N.* 9. that I can can find is, that Extenſion is really *Corporeal Nature, altho' it be call'd an Accident.* But did not himſelf diſtinguiſh it as *a Mode of Matter*, and as *a Subſtance extended?* And was not this look'd on *as ſuch a Property of Matter, as Thinking is of a Mind?* But can any Man ſay, that *Thinking* by it ſelf is *an Intellectual Subſtance*; how then can *Extenſion* by it ſelf be *a Corporeal Subſtance?* And yet, if it be not, as I can ſee no reaſon from his own grounds why it ſhould be; then his Suppoſition of the *Infiniteneſs of Matter*, of *the Plenarty of the World*, and *the circular motion of his Particles of Matter*, on which his whole *Hypotheſis* depends, comes to nothing. And what a ſtrange foundation is *Des Cartes* his World built upon? I could hardly believe that ſo thinking a Man ſhould not diſcern the Weakneſs of his own Grounds. But inſtead of that, it is plain that he laid great weight upon it: For when a learned Man of our own, and then a great admirer of him, ob-

Epiſt. Des Cartes *To.* I. *Ep.* 87. *Ep.* 88. jected to him, *that he extended the notion of Corporeal matter too far; but he thought it of no great conſequence to the main of his Principles*; *Des Cartes* takes him up ſmartly for it, for he ſaith, *he look'd on it, as one of the chief and moſt certain Principles of his Philoſophy.* And in the

Fragment of his laſt Anſwer, which he liv'd not to finiſh, he perſiſted in his Opinion, *That the empty Space was a real Body, becauſe nothing can have no properties.* But there is a difference between *Real Properties* and *Imaginary*; if there be any Bodies in that Space, there will be *Extenſion, Diſtance*, &c. but it is a very unconceivable thing that one of his judgment ſhould ſo much contend to the laſt, *That there was a difference of parts in ſuch a ſpace, where there was nothing but ſpace. i. e.* That there muſt be ſomething, where there is nothing. And therefore *Bernier* obſerves, *That thoſe who confound Space and Body, run themſelves into ſtrange abſurdities by a Corporeal Subſtance to fill all poſſible ſpace, or rather to be ſpace it ſelf; and that* GOD *cannot annihilate the leaſt part of it.* And he concludes it to be *neither Subſtance nor Accident, but a mere Capacity.* And it was not an improbable Conjecture of that Learned Perſon who wrote to *Des Cartes* upon this Argument, that this Doctrine of his, as he explain'd it, laid the foundation of *Spinoza*'s opinion of the *Infinite extent* and *power of matter*; but I cannot think that *Des Cartes* himſelf intended it ſo, however the other underſtood it. And it is great pity one of ſo clear a Capacity in other things, ſhould ſo ſtifly adhere to ſo unreaſonable an Opinion. And yet we find his Diſciples go on to defend him in this Matter. For when Monſ. *Huet* had objected, *That* Des Cartes *had made Extenſion, which was an Accident, to be a Subſtance*; Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, *That he confounded Extenſion which was of the eſſence of Body, with the Extenſion which belonged to Quantity; whereof the one is conſidered in it ſelf, and the other with reſpect to Magnitude.* But let it be conſider'd how he pleaſes, it is ſtill but a Mode belonging to a Subſtance, and not the Subſtance it ſelf. However, he refers us to his Book of *Phyſics* for the clearing of this Matter. And there we find indeed, that he diſtinguiſhes three ſorts of Bodies, *Phyſical, Mechanical*, and *Mathematical. A Phyſical Body is one compos'd of many inſenſible parts in its due order and figure, from whence reſult the Phyſical properties. A Mechanical Body is one compos'd of groſs and ſenſible parts, which by their figure and ſituation are proper for particular motions. A Mathematical Body is a Body conſider'd with its proper extenſion under a regular figure, as a Cube or a Cylinder.* But this doth not ſhew that *Des Cartes* did not confound a *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Body:* For it is an eaſy thing to find out diſtinctions to avoid a difficulty; but then they ought to be agreeable to the general ſenſe of thoſe Terms. But here a *Mathematical Body* is confin'd to *Regular Figures*; whereas the general notion of it is ſuch a Body as *Des Cartes* himſelf means, when he calls it, *Geometrical Quantity, ſuch as is the object of Mathematical Demonſtrations: i. e.* of any kind of Figures abſtract from Phyſical Bodies; and *this*, he ſaith, *is that matter he treated of.* And to ſuch a *Body* Extenſion alone belongs, and to none elſe, either *Phyſical* or *Mechanical.*

Ep. 93.

Bernier *Abregé de Gaſſend. To. I. p. 25.*

H. Mori *Oper. Phil. To. 2. p. 242.*

Cenſur. Carteſ. l. 5. n. 1. Regis *Réponſe à la Cenſure, ch. V. Art. I. p. 255.*

La Phyſiq. Regis *To. I. p. 273.*

Here then lies the difficulty as to *Des Cartes* his Principles: he conſiders Matter *Geometrically*, i. e. *Abſtractedly*, with reſpect to bare *Extenſion*, and yet ſuppoſes the effects of *Phyſical Bodies*; ſuch as *Diviſion of parts of matter one from another*, and *a motion of thoſe parts* in order to the compoſition of things. But *Mathematical Extenſion* is capable of no Diviſion but in the Mind; for no Man imagins the Earth really divided by the *Parallels* and *Meridians*, &c. and the Diviſion of the parts of an empty ſpace is nothing but a Mathematical Diviſion, which implies

nothing

nothing really in that ſpace, but a mere act of the Mind in conceiving the diſtance between the ſeveral parts of it.

Prin. Part. II. n. 16. But *Des Cartes* proves it impoſſible *there ſhould be a vacuum in Nature, becauſe the extenſion of Space and Body are all one.* But may not GOD *annihilate* that Air which is between the ſides of a Veſſel, and would there not be a *Vacuum* between? No; he ſaith, *It is impoſſible to conceive ſuch a Cavity without Extenſion, or ſuch an Extenſion without Matter; and if the middle ſubſtance were annihilated, the ſides muſt come together, becauſe there would be nothing between.* By which we ſee, that this Notion of the Identity of *Extenſion* and *Corporeal Subſtance* had ſunk ſo deep into his Mind, that he makes *Annihilation* of the Subſtance of Matter impoſſible to Divine Power: for there can be no ſuch Vacuity, but there muſt remain *Extenſion*, and conſequently *a Corporeal Subſtance.* This hath been objected to the followers of *Des Cartes*, and lately by *Du Hamel*, in his Cenſure of *Regis* his *Carteſian Philoſophy*; and it is worth the while to ſee what anſwer he makes to it. He ſaith, *That his objection about the Annihilation of the Air between the Heaven and Earth, can be of no force to prove a Vacuum; becauſe if there be no ſpace, they muſt touch one another; and if they do not, there muſt be ſpace, and conſequently a Corporeal Subſtance.* But ſaith *Du Hamel*, may not GOD by the ſame power by which he preſerves the Bodies between Heaven and Earth, deſtroy them, and then there muſt be a Vacuum? He anſwers plainly, *That an Annihilation of the ſubſtance of matter is impoſſible, even to the power of* GOD; *becauſe his Will is immutable. He grants that* GOD *may deſtroy the Air, and all other Bodies as to their Form, or preſent Modification; but he cannot deſtroy their Matter*, i. e. *their Extenſion, which is a true ſubſtance, and ſubſtances are indefectible.* Where we plainly ſee that the *Carteſians* aſſert the neceſſary Exiſtence of Matter, and that it is not in the power of GOD to deſtroy it; and whatever they may talk of the Will of GOD, they deny any power to exerciſe it with reſpect to Matter.

N. 18.

Réponſe aux Reflex. de M. Du Hamel, Part. 2. ch. 4.

But *Du Hamel* proceeds. How can thoſe Bodies touch one another, when GOD can create another Body between? No, ſaith *Regis*, *That ſtill ſuppoſes a ſpace between; and if there be a ſpace, there muſt be a body, and ſo a vacuum is a repugnancy in it ſelf.* But this Space, ſaith *Du Hamel*, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the Mind, and there is no arguing from thence to the Nature of things. *Regis* replies, *that their Ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the Idea of ſpace or extenſion is one of their primitive Ideas; and that it repreſents ſubſtance, and all ſubſtance is incorruptible.* Still we ſee the neceſſary exiſtence of Matter is look'd on by them as a fundamental Principle, and depending on primitive Ideas.

Abregé To. I. p. 13. Monſ. *Bernier* puts the caſe of Air being annihilated between two walls; and he deſires to know of the *Carteſians*, whether theſe two walls will come together or not? They ſay, *They muſt, if there be nothing between.* True, ſaith he, there is nothing Corporeal, or that touches our Senſes, no Subſtance or Accidents; but there is a true diſtance remaining. Suppoſe a Chamber 20 foot long, 15 foot broad, and 10 foot high; and theſe dimenſions to be meaſured, and one wall 20 foot diſtant from the other: it cannot be ſaid that it is the Air that makes the diſtance between them; how then comes this diſtance to be quite loſt, if the Air be deſtroy'd? They have no anſwer, he ſaith, but to ſay, It

is

is an impoſſible Suppoſition; and they will rather deny God's Omnipotency in annihilating the Air, than let go their Opinion. Monſ. *Regis* in his *Phyſicks* takes notice of *Bernier*'s Doubts, and in anſwer to them he reſolves it at laſt into this, *That it is impoſſible there ſhould be an Annihilation, ſo as to make a Vacuum; becauſe Subſtances cannot ceaſe: not from the Nature of things, but from the immutable Will of* God. And after all poſſible Objections, here they ſtick, and ſeem reſolv'd to maintain, that *Extenſion* and *Matter* are the ſame. Reg. *Phyſ.* *Part.* I. *ch.* 3. *n.* 3.

Even Monſ. *Rohault* himſelf, altho' in ſome things he ſaw it neceſſary to leave *Des Cartes*, yet in this he perſiſts, *That the Eſſence of Matter conſiſts in Extenſion, and that Space and Matter are the ſame; and therefore a Vacuum is impoſſible.* And to the Objection about the Walls of a Chamber ſtanding, when the Air is annihilated, he avoids anſwering *as to God's Omnipotency*; but, he ſaith, *according to our Underſtanding the Walls muſt come together.* And to that about the Wall's diſtance not depending on the Air, he anſwers, *That the Being of the Walls does not depend upon the Air within, but the ſtate or diſpoſition of them doth upon the Extenſion between them.* Which he ſuppoſes impoſſible to be taken away, and that the Subſtance of Matter hath a neceſſary Exiſtence. Rohault, *Tr. Phyſ.* *l.* 1. *c.* 7. *n.* 9. *c.* 8. 1, 2, 3.

The ſubſtance of this Argument comes to this. *Des Cartes* makes *all the matter of the World to be one and the ſame:* but he aſſerts *the Eſſence of Matter to be Extenſion*; and that Extenſion can neither be created nor annihilated: and therefore it is impoſſible upon his Principles, to make out the dependence of Matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be ſaid, that *Des Cartes* expreſly ſaith, *That it ſeemed manifeſt to him that there is no other General Cauſe which created Matter with Motion and Reſt but God*; and that in the *Fragment* of his laſt Anſwer to Dr. *H. M.* he ſaith, *That if Matter were left to it ſelf, it would not move; but that it was firſt moved by* God: I anſwer, That according to his *Principles* the Subſtance of Matter muſt be before, becauſe there muſt be *Space*; and *Space and Matter are the ſame.* And I can ſee no poſſible way of clearing him, but by ſaying, that he held two ſorts of *Matter*; one part is *Phyſical Matter*, which God gave motion to at firſt when he created it, and out of which the World was fram'd; and the other *Mathematical*, which conſiſts in mere *Extenſion:* but how to reconcile theſe two to his aſſerting *One and the ſame matter in the World*, is a thing above my Underſtanding. Prin. *P. II.* *n.* 36. *Epiſt. To. I.* *ep.* 93.

II. The next thing to be conſider'd, is *Des Cartes* his undertaking to give an account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe* from the *Mechanical Laws of Motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by ſome, who have been very converſant with the Atheiſtical Perſons of our Age, That *they deſpiſe the Epicurean Hypotheſis of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think* Moſes *his Account more probable than that*; (which is a great Favor indeed.) So that it is to little purpoſe now to ſpend time in ſhewing how *precarious* and *unſatisfactory* the *Principles* of *Epicurus* were, who ſuppos'd Motion in Matter, without the leaſt ground for it; but *Des Cartes* was a Man of too great ſenſe and judgment to commit ſuch Blunders as *Epicurus* was guilty of (whom one of his ſharpeſt Adverſaries allows to have been *of a great and ſearching Wit, well ſkilled in Geometry, to which he endeavor'd to reduce Natural Philoſophy, (altho' he fail'd in his Attempt;) That he had a faculty of expreſſing his Mind clearly in few words above any* Fr. Cuperi *Arcan. Atheiſm. l.* 2. *c.* 3. Huet. *Cenſ. Phil. Cart.* *c.* 8. *n.* 4.

either antient or modern Writer.) Therefore it will be neceſſary to conſider what *Des Cartes* yields, that we may not miſtake or miſrepreſent his deſign.

1. He grants, that God did at firſt create Matter, which was capable of Reſt or Motion.

2. That Matter left to it ſelf would be without any motion; and therefore the firſt Motion was from God.

3. That God by his ordinary Providence doth preſerve as much Motion in the World, as was given at firſt.

4. That we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe any other alteration in the ordinary courſe of things, according to the Laws of Motion, than what we are certain of by Experience or Revelation.

And now the main point is, Whether Matter being thus put into motion, can produce the *Phænomena* of the World, without any farther interpoſition of Providence, than only to preſerve the motion of matter? For which we muſt conſider, That he doth not give a ſatisfactory account, 1. of the *Nature* and *Laws of Motion*; nor 2. of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe.*

(I.) As to the former, I ſhall inquire into his *Notion* of *Motion*, and then of the *Laws* of it.

Princ. Part. II. n. 25.

(1.) He aſſerts, That Motion, according to his Principles, is barely *Mode of Matter*, without any inward Principle of Motion. For *Motion*, he ſaith, is the change of the ſituation of Bodies, with reſpect to one another, or *a removing a Body from the vicinity of ſome Bodies to the neighbourhood of others*; and he places it in ſuch *a Tranſlation* on purpoſe, that it may be underſtood to be only *a Mode of the Matter moved, as Figure is of a thing figured.* But it is not ſo eaſy to underſtand that *Motion*, which imports an Action, ſhould be only *a Mode of the Matter moved*, as it is that Figure belongs only to the thing figured. For it is not poſſible for the Figure to be any where elſe, but in that Body which hath it; but it is poſſible to apprehend Motion to come either from an external Agent, or an internal Principle; and ſo it is not a mere mode of the thing moved. But when the whole weight is laid upon the Nature of *Motion* in this caſe, ſome greater evidence ought to have been given how Motion being once given to Matter, as a Mode of it, muſt always continue, when the reſiſtence of Bodies doth certainly weaken it ſo as to need a new force to repair it. For either all motion of matter muſt be by a violent impulſe, without regard to the different force or magnitude of things (which is to overthrow the due Laws of Motion;) or elſe there muſt be a proportion in the force of the mover to the reſiſtence of the Body moved: and if there be a regard to that proportion (or elſe the ſmalleſt Body might move the greateſt) then there muſt be a reſiſtence in that Body which is moved: But every reſiſtence gives a check to the motion of that Body which moved it, and every check leſſens the impulſe; and ſo from a gradual reſiſtence there muſt come a gradual decay, till at laſt all motion muſt ceaſe; as it is in all Machines, whoſe motion depends upon external force. *Des Cartes* indeed ſaith, *That whatever Motion is loſt by one Body is communicated to the next, and ſo the firſt motion is ſtill preſerved.* But it is hardly poſſible to make it appear, that Motion is not ſo much weakned by reſiſtence, but that it can preſerve it ſelf in a degree of motion proportionable to that which is not communicated to another. For the frequency of impulſe leſſens the power of reflection; and it appears in Light, and Sounds, and other things, that

what-

whatever is reflected grows weaker. So that reſiſtence muſt gradually weaken motion. And in the *Motion of Projected Bodies*, *Des Cartes* himſelf grants, *That the Motion continues till it be hinder'd by the reſiſtence it meets with*; and he ſaith, *It is manifeſt that the Motion is retarded by the Air, and other ambient Fluids, and ſo it cannot continue long.* But is that an Argument *that Bodies do continue motion till they be hinder'd, and that Motion is only a Mode of the Body mov'd?* Whatever *Mode* it is, it comes from the force of the immediate Agent, and not from the motion at firſt given to Matter; and here we ſee the reſiſtence it meets with, ſoon gives a ſtop to it. Therefore it ſeems unconceivable that all the Motion in the World, conſidering the continual reſiſtence of Bodies, ſhould be the ſame mode of Matter, which was at firſt given to it. And as to his definition of *Motion*, ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate it to be falſe, by ſhewing how one Body may come nearer to another, without changing the ſituation of the parts next adjoining to it; and that there is no ſuch reciprocal motion as he aſſerts, altho' there be a reciprocal change of ſituation, which is unavoiable. But Monſ. *Rohault* ſaith, *That Motion is to be taken with reſpect to the next, and not to any remote Bodies.* However Monſ. *Regis* thought fit to quit that definition of *Des Cartes* for another, which *Du Hamel* ſaith is not at all better; but he thought it neceſſary to take in *the efficient Cauſe of Motion*, which makes it not to be a mere mode of the matter moved. And but for the Authority of *Mathematicians* and *Philoſophers*, it would be thought ridiculous for a thing not to be ſaid *to be moved, becauſe it doth not change the ſituation as to the next Bodies about it*; as that the Kernel of a Nut is not moved, becauſe it is thrown with the Shell upon it; or that the Wine is not moved in a Ship at Sea, becauſe it keeps within the Veſſel. So, if the Earth be carry'd about with the force of the *Vortex* wherein it is, 'tis as certainly moved as a Pendulum is with the motion of the Ship, altho' it hath a proper motion of its own.

Part. II. n. 38.

H. Mori Enchirid. Metaphyſ. Part. I. c. 7.

Rohault. *Tr. Phyſic. c.* 10. *n.* 1.

Regis *Réponſe aux Reflections Critique de M.* Du Hamel, *ch.* 7.

But *Des Cartes* undertakes to give an account of the Proportion of the increaſe and leſſening of motion, upon the meeting of two hard Bodies, and he lays down *ſeven Rules* to determin it; but it falls out very unhappily, that *ſix of them* are deny'd *to be true, and that the firſt doth not anſwer the end it was brought for.* This was a bold charge on ſo great a Mathematician; but all that *Regis* ſaith in anſwer to it is, *That he did not undertake to defend all* Des Cartes *his Rules of motion, becauſe they did not appear to him exact enough.* But if the Particular Rules of motion be no better fix'd nor underſtood, how come they to be ſo certain, that the ſame quantity of motion is ſtill preſerv'd in the World? For that *Des Cartes* hath recourſe *to the immutable Will of* God *which hath determin'd it.* No doubt if God hath determin'd it, ſo it muſt be. But from whence comes *Des Cartes* to know this to be the *immutable Will of* God? What antecedent Reaſon is there to ſatisfy any Man's Mind, that God *by his immutable Will* muſt keep up the ſame proportion of motion in the World? Why may not God alter or ſuſpend the Laws of motion, as to the parts of matter, in what way or manner he thinks good? What repugnancy is there to the *Divine Nature* in ſo doing? So that theſe Arguments *à priori* (as they call them) have no kind of Evidence as to ſuch matters, which may be or not be, as God pleaſes. Beſides, what neceſſity was there that *Motion* muſt be only a *Mode of Matter?* And that Mode to be preſerv'd by ſuch *Laws of Motion*, which are ſo very uncertain? A very Skilful and Ingenious Philoſopher of our own

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n.* 45, &c.

Réponſe, &c. *Part.* 2. *ch.* 12.

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

Mr. Boyle of the high Veneration of Man's Intellect towards God, p. 41, 42.

ſaith, *That this Rule, which he ſaith is the moſt uſeful of all* Des Cartes's, *is very metaphyſical, and not very cogent to him: And he doth not ſee how it can be demonſtrated; and he queſtions whether it be agreeable to Experience.* And he was a Perſon very favorable to *Des Cartes*, as far as he could, as appears on all occaſions in his Writings; but here we ſee he gives up his Fundamental Rule. *Du Hamel* ſaith, *The Argument from* God's *Immutability is no force, becauſe it holds not as to Extrinſecal Actions.* *Regis*, to defend this, runs into that Abſurdity to make God a neceſſary Agent, becauſe God's Will and his Eſſence are the ſame; which overthrows all Religion in the Conſequence of it.

Réponſe aux Reflections, part. 2. c. 13.

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

But *Des Cartes* himſelf excepts *ſuch Mutations as are made in Matter, by evident Experience, or Divine Revelation.* What is the meaning of this? Can that be *an Immutable Will of* God, which is contradicted by *Evident Experience*, and *Divine Revelation?* Or were theſe words only put in to avoid Cenſure? As the World was ſaid to be *Indefinite*, leſt he ſhould be charg'd with making the World *Infinite*; and the Definition of *Motion* was altered, to avoid *Galileo*'s fate: But there is no diſſembling in this matter; if it be contradicted by *Evident Experience*, it can be no fix'd and *Immutable Rule*; if it can be alter'd in caſe of Miracles, the Argument from God's Immutability ſignifies nothing. For if it be no repugnancy to the Divine Nature to alter, or ſuſpend the Laws of Motion, as he ſees cauſe; then we can have no aſſurance as to God's Will any farther than himſelf hath declar'd it; and conſequently they muſt prove that God hath manifeſted this to be his Will. But ſaith *Rohault*, *It is unbecoming Philoſophers on all occaſions to run to Miracles and Divine Power.* Who puts them upon it? We may certainly allow an ordinary courſe of Providence, as to Cauſes and Effects, without aſſerting theſe Notions of *Des Cartes*; but this is a pleaſant way of taking it for granted, that none but his Principles are fit for *Philoſophers*.

Rohault. part. I. c. 10. n. 13.

(II.) Come we now to examin his *Catholick Laws of Motion:* and of all things, thoſe ought to be very clear and certain, becauſe ſo much depends upon them; and yet I am afraid we ſhall hardly find one of them to be ſo.

II. The firſt of them is, *That every thing remains in the ſame ſtate it was in, unleſs it be changed by External Cauſes.* From whence he concludes, *That which is moved always continues to be moved; and that nothing tends to Reſt, which is contrary to the Laws of Nature, becauſe Reſt is contrary to Motion: and nothing tends to its contrary, for that would be to tend to its own deſtruction.* The main thing intended by this, is to aſſert the continuance of Motion in the parts of the Univerſe, upon their being once put into it; ſo that Reſt is a ſtate of violence to a Body once moved, becauſe Reſt and Motion are contrary to each other. But this is a very weak Foundation to build ſo much upon: For, we are not to conſider Reſt and Motion Abſtractly, but Phyſically, together with the Bodies in which they are: And I think it will be very hard to perſuade any Body endued with Senſe and Motion, that after weariſome Motion, he doth aim at his own deſtruction by ſeeking for Reſt. This is a ſort of Reaſoning would not be expected from *Philoſophers*; that becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary Motions, therefore no Body in motion can tend to Reſt. *But every thing continues in the ſtate it was in, till it be put out of it; therefore every thing in motion muſt continue to move.* This is not clearly expreſs'd. For if it be meant, that every thing from it ſelf continues in its original ſtate, then it is not true. For Matter, he confeſſes,

Princip. Part. II. n. 37.

would

would reſt, if God did not give motion to it; and ſo it muſt continue to reſt, and there could be no Motion at all: If it be meant, that every thing continues in the ſtate God put it into, unleſs he appointed ſeveral Cauſes to alter it, then it is true; but it doth not ſerve his purpoſe. For if God hath appointed both Motion and Reſt for ſome Bodies, it can never be ſaid that ſuch tend to their own deſtruction, when they tend to that Reſt which God and Nature appointed for them. If God hath appointed them for continual Motion, as the great Bodies of the Univerſe, then they muſt continue in it, not by virtue of any inherent Law of Motion, but by the immutable Will of God. *Des Cartes* ſaw it neceſſary for God to put Matter into motion, but he would have the framing of the Laws of this motion himſelf; whereas he had acted more reſpectfully towards his Maker, and more like a Philoſopher, *i.e.* more conſonantly to his own Principles to have left God that made the World and gave motion to Matter, to have ſetled thoſe Laws of Motion, which were agreeable to his Infinite Wiſdom. For theſe Notions are unbecoming *Philoſophers*, to make *Motion* a mere *Mode of Matter*; and this *Mode* to be ſupported by *Divine Concourſe*; but ſo, that *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, whatever is in *Motion* muſt continue in it; becauſe *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, nothing can tend to its own deſtruction.

Beſides, I know not how to reconcile this with another Law of Nature, as he calls it, *That all Bodies in a circular motion endeavor what in them lies to recede from the center of their motion.* Is not a Body put into a *Circular Motion* in a ſtate belonging to it? How comes it then not to continue in that ſtate, but to endeavor all it can to get out of it? And yet all the *Phænomena* of *Light* depends upon this Law: *That the round particles of the ſecond Element endeavor to recede from their centers; not from any cogitation,* (no doubt of it) *but becauſe they are ſo plac'd and incited to that Motion.* Is that poſſible, and yet *all Bodies continue in the ſtate they are in,* when they endeavor what they can to get out of it? Are not theſe more contrary than *Motion* and *Reſt?* I do not meddle with *External Hindrances*, but the *Natural Endeavors* of Bodies. But it may be ſaid, *That* Des Cartes *intends his Rule only of Primary and Simple Motions, and not of Circular, which are violent and unnatural.* So indeed his words ſeem to run at firſt, that this Rule relates to *ſimple and undivided Bodies*; but then I ſay, it is of no uſe, as to the preſent *Phænomena*; and he ſpeaks of *the Laws of ſuch Motion as we may obſerve in Bodies:* which words ſignify nothing, unleſs his Law reaches to the Bodies now in being; and I ſee no reaſon for him to ſuppoſe Circular Motion to be any more repugnant to the Nature of Matter, than any other. *Regis* to avoid this, ſaith, *That Circular Motion is not Unnatural, but Accidental; and the ſtate of the Body is to be taken from what it would be, if External Cauſes were removed*; i. e. *in a right Line.* But he doth not attend to the Conſequences of this; for then the Circular Motion of the Heavens muſt be *Accidental*, and not under the care of Providence, or the immutable Will of God. For God's *Will*, he ſaith, is, *that every Body be preſerved in its own ſtate; now*, ſaith he, *the ſtate of a Body in motion is in a right line, and the endeavor of Nature is to keep to that.* Then ſay I, whatever Motion is againſt the ſtate wherein Nature deſigns it, muſt be not only *Accidental* but *Violent*, becauſe it is againſt the courſe of Nature. And if it be violent, it cannot be ſuppos'd to be under God's immutable Will; but if it be not *Violent*, then a Body in circular

Part. 2. *n.* 39. *Part.* 3. *n.* 55.

N. 56.

Réponſe, &c. part. 2. *ch.* 10.

circular motion muſt endeavor to preſerve it ſelf in that ſtate, and not to recede from it, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes.

Monſ. *Du Hamel* objects againſt this Law, that Permanent Beings do indeed endeavor to preſerve themſelves in the ſtate they are in; but it doth not hold in Beings that are ſucceſſive; becauſe the former are in their full ſtate at firſt, but it is otherwiſe in ſucceſſive. But ſaith *Regis*, *This doth not hinder them from not doing any thing to their deſtruction.* So that it is a plain caſe, no Body in *motion* can tend to *Reſt*, *becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary*; and this is a Fundamental Law of Nature for this weighty Reaſon.

Réponſe aux Reflex. part. 2. c. 9.

The ſecond Law is, *That all Motion, according to Nature, is in a right Line, and that oblique and circular Motion ariſes from the motion and interpoſition of other Bodies; and whatever Body is moved circularly, hath a perpetual tendency to recede from the center of the circle it deſcribes.*

Now if this Rule had that evidence which is neceſſary to make it a fundamental Law of Motion, it muſt be proved either from the Nature of Matter and Motion, or from the immutable Will of God: The latter is not pretended to be proved, but only *from the immutability and ſimplicity of the operation whereby* God *doth preſerve Motion in Matter; which only regards that very moment, without regard to what was before.* But how from hence it follows that *Motion*, which extends to more moments, ſhould be determined one way rather than another, I cannot apprehend. For if the Motion be in a right line, it muſt be in more moments than one, as well as in a circle; and if it prove any thing, it is *that* God *preſerves Motion* only in a point: but *Des Cartes* owns *That it cannot be conceived in an inſtant, altho' in a right line.* How then comes *Motion* in a *Right Line* to come from God's *Immutability*, and not *in a Circle? Becauſe it is determined in every inſtant towards a right line.* This ought to have been made more evident, than from the inſtance of the *Sling:* For the falling down of the Stone to the Earth, is certainly from another cauſe, *viz.* from the Principle of *Gravitation*, and not from the Inclination of matter to move in a right line. Neither can it be ſaid to come from the *Nature* of *Matter*, or *Motion:* For a Circular Motion, hath as much the Nature and Definition of *Motion*, according to *Des Cartes*, as the other: and *Matter* is of it ſelf indifferent, which way it moves; and ſome have thought *Circular Motion* more perfect, becauſe they obſerv'd the motion of the Heavens to be ſo. But if it ariſes from the impediments of other Bodies, they muſt ſhew, that Matter was firſt put into motion in a ſtreight line; and if God put all the parts of Matter at firſt into motion in a right line, how came the impediments to make it circular? For God preſerves motion as he gave it; he firſt gave it in *right lines*, and *his Will is immutable*, therefore it muſt always ſo continue; and ſo *Circular Motion* will be impoſſible.

But let us ſuppoſe *Circular Motion*, how comes it to be ſo evident as to be made a Law of Nature, *That a Body in that motion always endeavors to recede from the Center?* How is this conſiſtent with the Principle of *Gravitation and Attraction*, which depends upon Mathematical Demonſtrations? Can it be in the Nature of Bodies to tend to the center, and to recede from it at the ſame time? And it is a very improbable thing, that *Gravity* ſhould be nothing elſe, but ſome Particles being not ſo quick in their motion from the center as others are, theſe being left in the lurch, and preſs'd by the motion of the other, do ſink under them; and

and ſo come nearer to the center, which is all that *Des Cartes* means by *Gravity*. But of this afterwards.

The laſt Fundamental Law of Motion is, *That when a Body meets another, if it hath not a greater power to proceed in a right line than the other hath to hinder it, then it turns aſide, but loſeth not its motion; if it hath a greater force than the other, then it communicates its motion to the other, and loſeth it ſelf as much as it gives.* The reaſon given of this is, *Becauſe it is the immutable Will of* GOD, *that the ſame quantity of motion ſhall be always preſerved:* Of which I have ſpoken already. And as to the whole matter of theſe Laws of Motion, Mr. *Boyle* ſaith, *That they have been received by Learned Men, rather upon the Authority of ſo famous a* Mathematician, *than upon any convictive evidence which accompanies the Rules themſelves.* N. 40. Mr. Boyle of Veneration, &c. p. 41.

The next thing we are to do is, to ſee whether from theſe *Laws of Motion*, he gives a ſatisfactory Account of the making of the Univerſe.

And here we muſt conſider the *Elements* out of which he ſuppoſeth it made, and the account of the things made out of them.

As to the *Elements*, this, in ſhort, is his account of them, *The Particles of matter into which it was firſt divided, could not at firſt be round, becauſe then there muſt be a vacuum between them; but they muſt by ſucceſſion of time become round, becauſe they had various circular motions* (altho' the *Natural Motion* be in *a Right Line*, and *God's immutable Will be that every thing ſhould be preſerved in its Natural ſtate.*) *But that force which put them into theſe Notions, was great enough to wear off their Angles, and ſo they become round. Which being join'd together muſt leave ſome intervals, which were filled up by the filings off from the Angles; which were very ſmall and of a figure fit to fill up all interſtices, and were carried about with a very quick motion. So that here we have two Elements, one of the round Particles, and another of the ſubtile Æthereal matter, which came by the attrition of the firſt Particles. But beſides theſe, there are others more groſs and unapt for motion by their figure; and which make the third Element, and out of theſe, all the Bodies of the viſible World are compos'd; the Sun and fixed Stars out of the firſt; the Heavens out of the ſecond; and the Earth, with Comets and Planets out of the laſt.* Princip. Part. 3. n. 48. N. 49. N. 52.

The main thing which makes this *Hypotheſis* unſatisfactory to me is, that it is as precarious and groundleſs as the *Epicurean*, and they differ only as to the beginning of Motion, which the *Epicureans* ſuppoſe to belong to Matter, and *Des Cartes* ſaith, it comes from an infinite Agent diſtinct from it; becauſe he ſuppoſes that it would not move of it ſelf, unleſs it were put into motion. Which being ſet aſide, there is no more of the Wiſdom or Providence of GOD to be found in His making of the World than the others, nor any more evidence as to the Production of his Elements. For he firſt ſuppoſes, that there can be no *Vacuum* in Nature, which he proves only from his Mathematical Notion of Body conſiſting only in Extenſion; and from hence he undertakes to give an account, not of GOD's creating the matter of the World at once, nor of his Production of things within ſix days; but how in proceſs of time Particles of matter being divided would come to make up his ſeveral Elements. And for this, he makes uſe of ſeveral Suppoſitions without any ground of reaſon why it muſt be ſo and no otherwiſe, which was the thing which he undertook to *Merſennus* to do. For what reaſon doth he give that Matter muſt be divided at firſt, in order to the production of the Elements? When there can be no *Diviſion*, but there muſt be Intervals

tervals between the Parts; and if all Matter be *One and the ſame*, and the Space of the Intervals be neceſſarily fill'd up with *Extended Matter*, what diviſion of Parts could there be? And how can that Extenſion be divided into ſolid Bodies? *Des Cartes* grants, *That by reaſon we cannot find out how big the parts of Matter were at firſt, how quick their motion, nor what kind of Circles they deſcribed.* Then it is impoſſible to find out by Reaſon how the World was made. For, *if God*, as he confeſſes, *might uſe innumerable ways of doing it, and we cannot tell which he pitched upon*; what a vain thing is it in any Man to undertake to give an Account how the World came to be form'd? And therefore *Rohault* with great Judgment, pretends not to give an Account how Matter was form'd by God at the firſt Creation; but only to ſhew a poſſibility how it might be fram'd, ſo as to ſolve the Appearances of the World. But neither he nor *Des Cartes* can reconcile this primitive diviſion of Matter into parts, with their original notion of Matter, which is nothing but *Extenſion*. *But if Matter be ſo divided*, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes, *may we not reaſonably conclude, that there were three ſuch Elements as he ſpeaks of?* The Queſtion is not, Whether there be not a Diſtinction of the Particles of Matter anſwerable to theſe three Elements, *viz.* a more ſubtle and ethereal Subſtance, as in Fire; a leſs ſubtle and globular, as in Air; a groſſer, as in Earth; which are moſt made according to theſe Principles, out of ſuch different Particles: but the point is, Whether theſe Elements can be produc'd in ſuch a manner by the mere Motion of Matter? And *Des Cartes* will by no means allow them to be made round, for fear of his *Vacuum*, which would ſpoil all, but *that by length of time they would become round*; *nay they muſt become round: Eas non potuiſſe ſucceſſu temporis non fieri rotundas*, are his words. Now here lies the difficulty, to ſhew how theſe muſt become round by his own Laws of Motion, *i. e.* by a motion in a right line; for he ſaith, *It is done by various circular motions.* But how comes the Original Matter of it ſelf to deviate from the fundamental Law of Motion? That is, from whence came theſe Circular motions, without which the Elements could not be form'd? And if the firſt Particles were ſo ſolid, as is ſuppos'd, how came the Angles to be worn off? For when two ſolid Bodies meet, according to his own Laws of Motion, the one communicates motion to the other, and loſes of its own, which implies nothing but a mutual contact and rebounding upon the colliſion; but this doth by no means ſhew how theſe Bodies come to wear off each others Angles. And therefore this is only a product of fancy, but very neceſſary to his purpoſe. But let us ſuppoſe that by frequent colliſions ſome alterations would be made in the figure of theſe Bodies; what a long time muſt it be before they become ſpherical? Too long to be conſiſtent with ſuch a thing as *Creation*, which at the ſame time is pretended to be believ'd. But the only agreeable Suppoſition to this is, the exiſtence of matter from eternity, which having we know not how many Ages ſince been put into motion, then by a caſual concourſe (for it was not by the Laws of Motion) theſe Particles juſtling one againſt another, at laſt rubb'd off the uneven Particles, ſo as to make them round. But what quantity was there of ſuch Particles in proportion to what was left? For it may eaſily be too great, and ſo the firſt Element be too powerful for the ſecond, as ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate that it muſt be, upon *Des Cartes* his own grounds. And the Anſwer given is inſufficient; becauſe the Proportion of the firſt Element will ſtill be too great, notwithſtanding all the uſes found out for it;

Part. 3. *n.* 46.

Tract. Phyſic. c. 21. *n.* 6.

N. 48.

Enchirid. Metaphyſ. c. 16. Huet *Cenſ. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c.* 6. Regis *Reponſe ch.* 6. *Art.* 2.

and therefore *Rohault* more wiſely avoided theſe attempts of forming the World out of the firſt *Chaos* of confus'd matter, which he found could give no ſatisfaction.

Let us now in the laſt place come to the Account he gives of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe* according to theſe Principles. And becauſe it would be too large a taſk to run thro' all, I ſhall confine my ſelf to theſe following: (1.) The formation of the Sun and Stars. (2.) The motion of the Air. (3.) The placing of the Earth. (4.) The Mechaniſm of Animals.

As to the formation of the Sun and Stars: which *Des Cartes* ſaith was in this manner; *That the matter of the firſt Element increas'd by the attrition of the particles of the ſecond, and there being greater quantity of it than was neceſſary to fill up the interſtices between the round particles of the ſecond Element, the remainder went to the centers of the ſeveral Vortices.* But here ariſes a difficulty, which takes away any appearance of ſatisfaction in this matter; which is, That *Des Cartes* owns *that in this matter of the firſt Element there are ſome parcels which are leſs divided and ſlower moved, having many Angles, and therefore unfit for motion.* Now why ſhould not theſe take up the *Center* of the *Vortex*, and not thoſe which have a quicker Motion, and endeavor to recede from it? For we muſt obſerve, that *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes *that theſe bigger fragments are mix'd with the leſſer, and that they tranſfer their motion to them: according to the Laws of Nature* (which ſerve his turn as he pleaſes) *greater Bodies do eaſier tranſfer their motion to leſſer, than receive motion from them.* So that here we have theſe bigger fragments of the firſt Element mix'd with the leſſer, and communicating their motion to them. Now, who could expect any other than theſe ſhould have fix'd in the centre of the *Vortex?* But if this be ſuppos'd, his whole *Hypotheſis* is loſt; for then the Sun and Stars muſt be *Opaque*, and not *Luminous Bodies.* But *Des Cartes* hath found out a notable Invention to ſend them far enough from the centre; which is, *That they move in the way between the Poles, towards the middle of the Heaven in a right line, and there are gathered into little maſſes, ſome from the North, and others from the South. But when they are in the Body of the Sun or a Star, then they make thoſe ſpots which hinder their Light, and are thrown off like a thick ſcum from heated Liquors.* But when he aſſigns the reaſon of Gravity, he ſaith, *It comes from hence, that thoſe particles which have a quicker motion preſs down thoſe which are not ſo fit for it, and by that means they get nearer to the centre.* How comes it then to be ſo much otherwiſe in theſe parts of the third Element; how come they not to be preſs'd down in the ſame *Vortex* towards the center? Eſpecially when himſelf there ſaith, *That the particles of the firſt Element have more power to depreſs the earthy particles than of the ſecond, becauſe they have more agitation*; and here he ſpeaks of the motion within the *Vortex:* So that according to his Principles, the matter of the third Element ought to ſubſide and be near the center, being leaſt apt for motion. But this would overthrow his whole Theory about the Sun and Stars; and about Light, and the ſpots of the Sun, and of Magnetic Particles, &c. ſo that theſe Particles of the third Element muſt be diſpos'd of as he thinks fit, leſt they put all out of order. And it is ſtrange he ſhould parallel the Scum made by the fermenting of Liquors, with the natural Motion of the Matter of his Elements. And if this Principle were true, that the Matter of the third Element might get above,

I. *Princip. Part.* 3. *N.* 54. *N.* 88. *N.* 89. *N.* 91. *N.* 94. *Princip. Part.* 4. *N.* 23. *N.* 25.

and leave the thinner and more ſubtle Matter neareſt the center, I do not ſee how the Earth could be habitable; for then we could breath nothing but thin and ethereal Air, which we could not bear. As appears by the famous inſtance of *Acoſta*, who ſpeaks by his own ſad experience, as well as of others, that he was in great danger of his Life, by going over one of the higheſt Mountains of *Peru*. From whence it is obſerv'd, that the moſt ſubtle Air is too thin for Reſpiration. But how comes it to paſs, according to theſe Principles, that the heavier part of the Air is moſt towards the center, and the lighter aſcends higheſt? For Air, according to *Des Cartes*, is *a Congeries of the Particles of the third Element very thin and diſ-joyn'd*; and yet we find this comes nearer the center according to its Gravity; and the lighter Air goes higher, and hath very different effects on Mens Bodies, tho' the motion of it be not ſtrong nor violent. For *Acoſta* ſaith, That Air which is ſo fatal to Paſſengers on thoſe Mountains of *Peru* (which are ſo high, that he ſaith, the *Alps* and *Pyrenees* were but as ordinary Houſes to lofty Towers) is ſo ſtill, that it is but *as a ſmall Breath, neither ſtrong nor violent*; and yet it pierces ſo that it often kills Men without feeling, and makes their Hands and Toes drop off; as he affirms from his own knowledg.

Acoſta *of the Indies, l.* 3. *c.* 9. Boyle's *Experiments of Air, p.* 182.

Princip. Part. 4. *N.* 43.

From whence it appears to be a mere fetch in *Des Cartes* to keep theſe Particles of his third Element from being nearer to the center, altho' they are more weighty and indiſpos'd to motion than others are.

But his whole *Hypotheſis* is overturn'd concerning the Celeſtial Bodies, if there be a Principle of *Gravitation* in *Matter*; which makes a Natural tendency towards the *Center*, according to the *Quantity* and *Diſtance* of it. The opinion of *Des Cartes* his great ſkill in *Geometry*, hath gone much farther towards perſuading the World of the truth of his Theory, than any evidences that appear'd in his Principles themſelves: For Men who are not deeply ſkill'd in thoſe matters, are very apt to be ſawy'd by the Authority of thoſe that are. But as it falls out in this caſe, we have this *Theory* of *Gravitation* fully demonſtrated by a very Learned and Judicious Mathematician of our own, to whom I refer the Reader, who hath given a *Mathematical Account* of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; not only of *the Sun and Stars, but of Comets, and the Moon, from the Principle of Gravitation*; not inherent and eſſential to Matter, but by a force given and directed by Divine Power aud Wiſdom. Which being granted, we have no reaſon to be diſpleas'd with the cleareſt Account can be given, in a Mathematical manner, of the chief *Phænomena* of the Univerſe. And the ſame Perſon ſaith, *He hath many Reaſons to ſuſpect that the reſt may depend upon ſome ſecret Powers, by which the Particles of matter do either cohere or fly from each other; for want of the knowledg whereof, Philoſophers have hitherto blunder'd in Natural Philoſophy.* But we proceed in *Des Cartes* his Account of his *Cœleſtial Vortices*.

Iſ. Newton *Philoſoph. Natural. Principia Mathem.*

Præfat.

MVSEVM BRITAN NICVM

FINIS.

Books *printed for and ſold by* Henry *and* George Mortlock *at the* Phœnix *in S.* Paul's *Church-yard.*

THE Works of the Right Reverend and moſt Learned Prelate, Dr. *Edward Stillingfleet*, late Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*. In Six Volumes in Folio.

The Antiquities of *Nottinghamſhire*, extracted out of Records, Original Evidences, Lieger-Books, and other Manuſcripts, and authentick Authorities; beautified with Maps, Proſpects and Pourtraictures; by *Rob. Thornton* Doctor of Phyſick. *Fol.*

Series Chronologica, Olympiadum, Pythiadum, Iſthmiadum, Nemeadum, quibus veteres Græci Tempora ſua metiebantur, per *Gulielmum Lloyd*, A.M. Epiſcopi *Wigornenſis* filium. *Fol.*

Comber on the Common-Prayer.

Cowley's Works.

Prince *Arthur*, by Sir *Richard Blackmore*.

Dryden's Fables.

———His Works in 2 Vol.

Knowledge and Practice; Or, a plain Diſcourſe of the chief things neceſſary to be known, believed and practiſed, in order to Salvation. With a Supplement, and ſeveral Additions, by *Samuel Cradock*. A Book neceſſary to be read in Families. *Fol.*

The Folly and Unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm, demonſtrated from the Advantage and Pleaſure of a Religious Life: The Faculties of Human Souls: The Structure of Animate Bodies, and the Origin and Frame of the World; in eight Sermons: Preached at the Lecture founded by the Honourable *Robert Boyle* Eſq; in the firſt Year, 1692.

Of Revelation, and the *Meſſias*. A Sermon preached at the Publick Commencement at *Cambridge*, *July* the 5th, 1696. Both by *Richard Bentley*, D.D. Chaplain in Ordinary, Library-Keeper to his Majeſty, and Maſter of *Trinity College* in *Cambridge*.

An Hiſtorical Examination of the Authority of General Councils, ſhewing the Falſe Dealing that hath been uſed in the publiſhing of them; and the Difference of the Papiſts themſelves about their Number. The ſecond Edition corrected, *Quarto*. By *Rob. Jenkins*, late Fellow of St. *John*'s College in *Cambridge*.

The Reſtoring of Fallen Brethren; containing the Subſtance of two Sermons on *Gal.* VI. 1, 2. preached at the Performance of Publick Penance, by certain Criminals, on the Lord's Day, uſually called *Mid-Lent Sunday*, 1696. in the Pariſh-Church of *Old Swinford* in *Worceſterſhire*; by *Simon Ford* D.D. and Rector there: With a Preface, by the Right Reverend Father in God *Edward* Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*.

Some Diſcourſes, Sermons and Remains of the Reverend Mr. *Glanvill*, late Rector of *Bathe*, and Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majeſty; collected into one Volume; and publiſhed by *Anthony Horneck* D.D. Preacher at the *Savoy*; with a Sermon preached at his Funeral, by *Joſeph Pleydel* Archdeacon of *Chicheſter*. *Quarto*.

The Countryman's Recreation; Or, the Art of Planting, Grafting, and Gardening. *Quarto*.

The Unreaſonableneſs of a Separation from the new Biſhops; Or, A Treatiſe about Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, ſhewing that although a Biſhop was unjuſtly deprived, neither he nor the Church ever made a Separation, if the Succeſſor was not an Heretick. *Quarto*.

The Caſe of Sees vacant by an Unjuſt or Uncanonical Deprivation, ſtated; in Reply to a Treatiſe entituled, A Vindication of the Deprived Biſhops, *&c.* together with the ſeveral other Pamphlets lately publiſhed as Anſwers to the *Baroccian* Treatiſes. Both by *Humphry Hody*, D.D. Fellow of *Wadham* College in *Oxford*, and *Greek* Profeſſor.

The Hopes of a Reſurrection aſſerted, and applied, in a Sermon preached *December* 4th, 1700. at the Interment of Mr. *Tho. Wright*; wherein are ſome occaſional Reflections on the Abuſe of Funeral Sermons. By *Philip Stubbs* M.A. late Fellow of *Wadham* College *Oxon*, now Rector of St. *Alphage*, *London*.

A Diſcoure concerning the Nature of Idolatry; in which a late Author's true and only Notion of Idolatry is conſidered and confuted. *Quarto*.

Proteſtant Certainty: Or, A ſhort Treatiſe ſhewing how a Proteſtant may be well aſſured of the Articles of his Faith. *Quarto*.

Veteres Vindicati: In an Expoſtulatory Letter to Mr. *Sclater* of *Putney*, upon his *Conſenſus Veterum*, &c. Wherein the Abſurdity of his Method, and the Weakneſs of his Reaſons are ſhewn; His falſe Aſperſions upon the Church of *England* are wiped off, and her Faith concerning the Euchariſt proved to be that of the Primitive Church: Together with Animadverſions on Dean *Boileau*'s French Tranſlation of, and Remarks upon *Bertram*.

An Anſwer to the Compiler of *Nubes Teſtium*: Wherein is ſhewn, That Antiquity, (in relation to the Points of Controverſy ſet down by him) did not for the firſt five hundred Years believe, teach and practiſe as the Church of *Rome* doth at preſent believe, teach and practiſe; Together with a Vindication of *Veteres Vindicati*, from the late weak and diſingenuous Attempts of the Author of Tranſubſtantiation defended.

A Letter to Father *Lewis Sabran* Jeſuit, in anſwer to his Letter to a Peer of the Church of *England*; wherein the Poſtſcript

to

to the Anſwer to the *Nubes Teſtium* is vindicated, and Father *Sabran*'s Miſtakes farther diſcovered.

A ſecond Letter to Father *Lewis Sabran* Jeſuit, in anſwer to his Reply.

A Vindication of the Principles of the Author of the Anſwer to the Compiler of *Nubes Teſtium*, in anſwer to a late pretended Letter from a Diſſenter to the Divines of the Church of *England*. Theſe five by Dr. *Gee*, Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majeſty.

A Diſſertation upon the Epiſtles of *Phalaris*: with an Anſwer to the Objections of the Honourable *Charles Boyle*, Eſq; by *Richard Bently*, D. D. Maſter of *Trinity* Coll. in *Cambridge*, *Octavo*. To which may be added a Chronological Account of the Life of *Pythagoras* and other famous Men his Contemporaries; with an Epiſtle to the Reverend Dr. *Bently* about *Porphyry*'s and *Jamblichus*'s Lives of *Pythagoras*; by the Right Reverend Father in God *William* L. Biſhop of *Worceſter*.

Ten Sermon preached before her Royal Highneſs the Princeſs *Anne* of *Denmark*, at the Chapel at St. *James*'s; by *Lewis Atterbury*, L. L. D. and one of the Six Preachers to her Royal Highneſs.

The Happy Aſcetick, or the Beſt Exerciſe; together with Prayers ſuitable to each Exerciſe: To which is added a Letter to a Perſon of Quality, concerning the Holy Lives of the Primitive Chriſtians, *Octavo*.

Delight and Judgment repreſented, in a Diſcourſe concerning the great Day of Judgment, and its power to damp and embitter ſenſual Delights, Sports and Recreations, *Twelves*.

The Exerciſe of Prayer; Or, A Help to Devotion: containing Prayer and Devotions for ſeveral Occaſions, *Twelves*.

The Fire of the Altar, or certain Directions, how to raiſe the Soul into holy Flames, before, at, and after the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, with ſuitable Prayers and Devotions; to which is prefixed a Dialogue betwixt a Chriſtian and his own Conſcience, concerning the true Nature of the Chriſtian Religion. The 11th Edition. Theſe four by *Anthony Horneck*, D. D. late Chaplain in ordinary to his Majeſty and Prebendary of *Weſtminſter*.

Several Eſſays in Political Arithmetick, concerning the multiplication of Mankind and the growth of the City of *London*: Obſervations on the *Dublin* Bills, or Accounts of the Houſes, Hearths, Baptiſms and Burials in that City: Concerning the People, Houſing, Hoſpitals, *&c.* of *London* and *Paris*; proving that *London* has as many People as *Paris*, *Rome* and *Rouen* put together; with a Diſcourſe concerning the Extent and Value of Lands, People, Buildings, Husbandry, Manufactures, Commerce, Fiſhery, Artizans, Seamen, Soldiers, Publick Revenues, Intereſt, Taxes, *&c.* as the ſame relates to every Countrey in general, but more particularly to the Territories of his Majeſty of *Great Britain*, *Holland*, *Zealand* and *France*; by Sir *William Petty*, late Fellow of the Royal Society, *Octavo*.

The Clerk's Tutor in Chancery, giving true Directions by authentick Precedents how to draw Affidavits, Interlocutory Orders, Reports before Maſters, Bills, Anſwers, Pleas and Demurrers, with ſuch Proceſs, Proceedings and other Inſtruments relating thereunto, *&c.* To which is prefixed an Introduction with ſome Caſes of Note, *&c.* The Third Edition, with large Additions.

The Practice of his Majeſties Court of Exchequer at *Weſtminſter*, as to the Proceedings in Equity by *Engliſh* Bill, Parallel to the Courſe uſed in the high Court of Chancery; containing Precedents of the moſt exact and authentick Forms of Bills, Anſwers, Pleas and Demurrers, interlocutory Orders, Commiſſions, Injunctions, Affidavits, Interrogatories, and ſuch other Proceſs and Pleadings, as have been drawn, by the moſt Learned, Able, and Experienced Council, Clerks, and Practitioners, and approved of, by the ſaid Court, for more than 35 Years laſt Paſt. The Second Edition.

Remains of Sir *Walter Ralegh*, *viz.* Maxims of State. Advice to his Son. His Son's Advice to his Father, His Sceptick Obſervations concerning the Cauſes of the Magnificency and Opulency of Cities, His Obſervations touching Trade and Commerce, with the Hollander and other Nations, proving that our Sea and Land Commodities enrich and ſtrengthen other Countries againſt our own. His Letters to divers Perſons of Quality. The Prorogative of Parliaments in *England*, Proved in a Dialogue between a Counſellor of State and a Juſtice of Peace, with the Additions of Letters never printed before.

A Choice Manual of Rare and Select Secrets in Phyſick and Chyrurgery, Collected and Practiſed by the Right Honourable the Counteſs of *Kent*, late deceaſed: whereto are added ſeveral Experiments of the Virtues of *Gaſcon Powder* and *Lapis contra Tervam*, by a Profeſſor of Phyſick; as alſo moſt exquiſite ways of Conſerving, Preſerving and Candying, *&c.* The 21ſt Edition, with Additions.

The whole Art of Husbandry, or the way of managing and improving of Land, being a full Collection of what hath been writ, either by Ancient or Modern Authors, with many Additions of new Experiments and Improvements not treated of by any others, as alſo an Account of the particular ſorts of Husbandry uſed in ſeveral Counties, with Propoſals for its farther Improvement. To which is added the Country Man's Kalendar, ſhewing what he is to do every Month in the Year. The Second Edit. Corrected, By *J. Mortimer* Eſq; F. R. S.

The New Years Gift Compleat, in ſix Parts, compos'd of Meditations and Prayers for every Day in the Week, with Devotions for the Sacrament, Lent and other Occaſions.